example hypothesis of linguistic relativity

• Bipolar Disorder
• Therapy Center
• When To See a Therapist
• Types of Therapy
• Best Online Therapy
• Best Couples Therapy
• Best Family Therapy
• Managing Stress
• Sleep and Dreaming
• Understanding Emotions
• Self-Improvement
• Healthy Relationships
• Student Resources
• Personality Types
• Guided Meditations
• Verywell Mind Insights
• 2024 Verywell Mind 25
• Mental Health in the Classroom
• Editorial Process
• Meet Our Review Board
• Crisis Support

The Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis: How Language Influences How We Express Ourselves

Rachael is a New York-based writer and freelance writer for Verywell Mind, where she leverages her decades of personal experience with and research on mental illness—particularly ADHD and depression—to help readers better understand how their mind works and how to manage their mental health.

Thomas Barwick / Getty Images

What to Know About the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis

Real-world examples of linguistic relativity, linguistic relativity in psychology.

The Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis, also known as linguistic relativity, refers to the idea that the language a person speaks can influence their worldview, thought, and even how they experience and understand the world.

While more extreme versions of the hypothesis have largely been discredited, a growing body of research has demonstrated that language can meaningfully shape how we understand the world around us and even ourselves.

Keep reading to learn more about linguistic relativity, including some real-world examples of how it shapes thoughts, emotions, and behavior.  

The hypothesis is named after anthropologist and linguist Edward Sapir and his student, Benjamin Lee Whorf. While the hypothesis is named after them both, the two never actually formally co-authored a coherent hypothesis together.

This Hypothesis Aims to Figure Out How Language and Culture Are Connected

Sapir was interested in charting the difference in language and cultural worldviews, including how language and culture influence each other. Whorf took this work on how language and culture shape each other a step further to explore how different languages might shape thought and behavior.

Since then, the concept has evolved into multiple variations, some more credible than others.

Linguistic Determinism Is an Extreme Version of the Hypothesis

Linguistic determinism, for example, is a more extreme version suggesting that a person’s perception and thought are limited to the language they speak. An early example of linguistic determinism comes from Whorf himself who argued that the Hopi people in Arizona don’t conjugate verbs into past, present, and future tenses as English speakers do and that their words for units of time (like “day” or “hour”) were verbs rather than nouns.

From this, he concluded that the Hopi don’t view time as a physical object that can be counted out in minutes and hours the way English speakers do. Instead, Whorf argued, the Hopi view time as a formless process.

This was then taken by others to mean that the Hopi don’t have any concept of time—an extreme view that has since been repeatedly disproven.

There is some evidence for a more nuanced version of linguistic relativity, which suggests that the structure and vocabulary of the language you speak can influence how you understand the world around you. To understand this better, it helps to look at real-world examples of the effects language can have on thought and behavior.

Different Languages Express Colors Differently

Color is one of the most common examples of linguistic relativity. Most known languages have somewhere between two and twelve color terms, and the way colors are categorized varies widely. In English, for example, there are distinct categories for blue and green .

Blue and Green

But in Korean, there is one word that encompasses both. This doesn’t mean Korean speakers can’t see blue, it just means blue is understood as a variant of green rather than a distinct color category all its own.

In Russian, meanwhile, the colors that English speakers would lump under the umbrella term of “blue” are further subdivided into two distinct color categories, “siniy” and “goluboy.” They roughly correspond to light blue and dark blue in English. But to Russian speakers, they are as distinct as orange and brown .

In one study comparing English and Russian speakers, participants were shown a color square and then asked to choose which of the two color squares below it was the closest in shade to the first square.

The test specifically focused on varying shades of blue ranging from “siniy” to “goluboy.” Russian speakers were not only faster at selecting the matching color square but were more accurate in their selections.

The Way Location Is Expressed Varies Across Languages

This same variation occurs in other areas of language. For example, in Guugu Ymithirr, a language spoken by Aboriginal Australians, spatial orientation is always described in absolute terms of cardinal directions. While an English speaker would say the laptop is “in front of” you, a Guugu Ymithirr speaker would say it was north, south, west, or east of you.

As a result, Aboriginal Australians have to be constantly attuned to cardinal directions because their language requires it (just as Russian speakers develop a more instinctive ability to discern between shades of what English speakers call blue because their language requires it).

So when you ask a Guugu Ymithirr speaker to tell you which way south is, they can point in the right direction without a moment’s hesitation. Meanwhile, most English speakers would struggle to accurately identify South without the help of a compass or taking a moment to recall grade school lessons about how to find it.

The concept of these cardinal directions exists in English, but English speakers aren’t required to think about or use them on a daily basis so it’s not as intuitive or ingrained in how they orient themselves in space.

Just as with other aspects of thought and perception, the vocabulary and grammatical structure we have for thinking about or talking about what we feel doesn’t create our feelings, but it does shape how we understand them and, to an extent, how we experience them.

Words Help Us Put a Name to Our Emotions

For example, the ability to detect displeasure from a person’s face is universal. But in a language that has the words “angry” and “sad,” you can further distinguish what kind of displeasure you observe in their facial expression. This doesn’t mean humans never experienced anger or sadness before words for them emerged. But they may have struggled to understand or explain the subtle differences between different dimensions of displeasure.

In one study of English speakers, toddlers were shown a picture of a person with an angry facial expression. Then, they were given a set of pictures of people displaying different expressions including happy, sad, surprised, scared, disgusted, or angry. Researchers asked them to put all the pictures that matched the first angry face picture into a box.

The two-year-olds in the experiment tended to place all faces except happy faces into the box. But four-year-olds were more selective, often leaving out sad or fearful faces as well as happy faces. This suggests that as our vocabulary for talking about emotions expands, so does our ability to understand and distinguish those emotions.

But some research suggests the influence is not limited to just developing a wider vocabulary for categorizing emotions. Language may “also help constitute emotion by cohering sensations into specific perceptions of ‘anger,’ ‘disgust,’ ‘fear,’ etc.,” said Dr. Harold Hong, a board-certified psychiatrist at New Waters Recovery in North Carolina.

As our vocabulary for talking about emotions expands, so does our ability to understand and distinguish those emotions.

Words for emotions, like words for colors, are an attempt to categorize a spectrum of sensations into a handful of distinct categories. And, like color, there’s no objective or hard rule on where the boundaries between emotions should be which can lead to variation across languages in how emotions are categorized.

Emotions Are Categorized Differently in Different Languages

Just as different languages categorize color a little differently, researchers have also found differences in how emotions are categorized. In German, for example, there’s an emotion called “gemütlichkeit.”

While it’s usually translated as “cozy” or “ friendly ” in English, there really isn’t a direct translation. It refers to a particular kind of peace and sense of belonging that a person feels when surrounded by the people they love or feel connected to in a place they feel comfortable and free to be who they are.

Harold Hong, MD, Psychiatrist

The lack of a word for an emotion in a language does not mean that its speakers don't experience that emotion.

You may have felt gemütlichkeit when staying up with your friends to joke and play games at a sleepover. You may feel it when you visit home for the holidays and spend your time eating, laughing, and reminiscing with your family in the house you grew up in.

In Japanese, the word “amae” is just as difficult to translate into English. Usually, it’s translated as "spoiled child" or "presumed indulgence," as in making a request and assuming it will be indulged. But both of those have strong negative connotations in English and amae is a positive emotion .

Instead of being spoiled or coddled, it’s referring to that particular kind of trust and assurance that comes with being nurtured by someone and knowing that you can ask for what you want without worrying whether the other person might feel resentful or burdened by your request.

You might have felt amae when your car broke down and you immediately called your mom to pick you up, without having to worry for even a second whether or not she would drop everything to help you.

Regardless of which languages you speak, though, you’re capable of feeling both of these emotions. “The lack of a word for an emotion in a language does not mean that its speakers don't experience that emotion,” Dr. Hong explained.

What This Means For You

“While having the words to describe emotions can help us better understand and regulate them, it is possible to experience and express those emotions without specific labels for them.” Without the words for these feelings, you can still feel them but you just might not be able to identify them as readily or clearly as someone who does have those words. 

Rhee S. Lexicalization patterns in color naming in Korean . In: Raffaelli I, Katunar D, Kerovec B, eds. Studies in Functional and Structural Linguistics. Vol 78. John Benjamins Publishing Company; 2019:109-128. Doi:10.1075/sfsl.78.06rhe

Winawer J, Witthoft N, Frank MC, Wu L, Wade AR, Boroditsky L. Russian blues reveal effects of language on color discrimination . Proc Natl Acad Sci USA. 2007;104(19):7780-7785.  10.1073/pnas.0701644104

Lindquist KA, MacCormack JK, Shablack H. The role of language in emotion: predictions from psychological constructionism . Front Psychol. 2015;6. Doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00444

By Rachael Green Rachael is a New York-based writer and freelance writer for Verywell Mind, where she leverages her decades of personal experience with and research on mental illness—particularly ADHD and depression—to help readers better understand how their mind works and how to manage their mental health.

Sapir–Whorf hypothesis (Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis)

Mia Belle Frothingham

Author, Researcher, Science Communicator

BA with minors in Psychology and Biology, MRes University of Edinburgh

Mia Belle Frothingham is a Harvard University graduate with a Bachelor of Arts in Sciences with minors in biology and psychology

Learn about our Editorial Process

Saul Mcleod, PhD

Editor-in-Chief for Simply Psychology

BSc (Hons) Psychology, MRes, PhD, University of Manchester

Saul Mcleod, PhD., is a qualified psychology teacher with over 18 years of experience in further and higher education. He has been published in peer-reviewed journals, including the Journal of Clinical Psychology.

Olivia Guy-Evans, MSc

Associate Editor for Simply Psychology

BSc (Hons) Psychology, MSc Psychology of Education

Olivia Guy-Evans is a writer and associate editor for Simply Psychology. She has previously worked in healthcare and educational sectors.

On This Page:

There are about seven thousand languages heard around the world – they all have different sounds, vocabularies, and structures. As you know, language plays a significant role in our lives.

But one intriguing question is – can it actually affect how we think?

It is widely thought that reality and how one perceives the world is expressed in spoken words and are precisely the same as reality.

That is, perception and expression are understood to be synonymous, and it is assumed that speech is based on thoughts. This idea believes that what one says depends on how the world is encoded and decoded in the mind.

However, many believe the opposite.

In that, what one perceives is dependent on the spoken word. Basically, that thought depends on language, not the other way around.

What Is The Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis?

Twentieth-century linguists Edward Sapir and Benjamin Lee Whorf are known for this very principle and its popularization. Their joint theory, known as the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis or, more commonly, the Theory of Linguistic Relativity, holds great significance in all scopes of communication theories.

The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis states that the grammatical and verbal structure of a person’s language influences how they perceive the world. It emphasizes that language either determines or influences one’s thoughts.

The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis states that people experience the world based on the structure of their language, and that linguistic categories shape and limit cognitive processes. It proposes that differences in language affect thought, perception, and behavior, so speakers of different languages think and act differently.

For example, different words mean various things in other languages. Not every word in all languages has an exact one-to-one translation in a foreign language.

Because of these small but crucial differences, using the wrong word within a particular language can have significant consequences.

The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is sometimes called “linguistic relativity” or the “principle of linguistic relativity.” So while they have slightly different names, they refer to the same basic proposal about the relationship between language and thought.

How Language Influences Culture

Culture is defined by the values, norms, and beliefs of a society. Our culture can be considered a lens through which we undergo the world and develop a shared meaning of what occurs around us.

The language that we create and use is in response to the cultural and societal needs that arose. In other words, there is an apparent relationship between how we talk and how we perceive the world.

One crucial question that many intellectuals have asked is how our society’s language influences its culture.

Linguist and anthropologist Edward Sapir and his then-student Benjamin Whorf were interested in answering this question.

Together, they created the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, which states that our thought processes predominantly determine how we look at the world.

Our language restricts our thought processes – our language shapes our reality. Simply, the language that we use shapes the way we think and how we see the world.

Since the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis theorizes that our language use shapes our perspective of the world, people who speak different languages have different views of the world.

In the 1920s, Benjamin Whorf was a Yale University graduate student studying with linguist Edward Sapir, who was considered the father of American linguistic anthropology.

Sapir was responsible for documenting and recording the cultures and languages of many Native American tribes disappearing at an alarming rate. He and his predecessors were well aware of the close relationship between language and culture.

Anthropologists like Sapir need to learn the language of the culture they are studying to understand the worldview of its speakers truly. Whorf believed that the opposite is also true, that language affects culture by influencing how its speakers think.

His hypothesis proposed that the words and structures of a language influence how its speaker behaves and feels about the world and, ultimately, the culture itself.

Simply put, Whorf believed that you see the world differently from another person who speaks another language due to the specific language you speak.

Human beings do not live in the matter-of-fact world alone, nor solitary in the world of social action as traditionally understood, but are very much at the pardon of the certain language which has become the medium of communication and expression for their society.

To a large extent, the real world is unconsciously built on habits in regard to the language of the group. We hear and see and otherwise experience broadly as we do because the language habits of our community predispose choices of interpretation.

Studies & Examples

The lexicon, or vocabulary, is the inventory of the articles a culture speaks about and has classified to understand the world around them and deal with it effectively.

For example, our modern life is dictated for many by the need to travel by some vehicle – cars, buses, trucks, SUVs, trains, etc. We, therefore, have thousands of words to talk about and mention, including types of models, vehicles, parts, or brands.

The most influential aspects of each culture are similarly reflected in the dictionary of its language. Among the societies living on the islands in the Pacific, fish have significant economic and cultural importance.

Therefore, this is reflected in the rich vocabulary that describes all aspects of the fish and the environments that islanders depend on for survival.

For example, there are over 1,000 fish species in Palau, and Palauan fishers knew, even long before biologists existed, details about the anatomy, behavior, growth patterns, and habitat of most of them – far more than modern biologists know today.

Whorf’s studies at Yale involved working with many Native American languages, including Hopi. He discovered that the Hopi language is quite different from English in many ways, especially regarding time.

Western cultures and languages view times as a flowing river that carries us continuously through the present, away from the past, and to the future.

Our grammar and system of verbs reflect this concept with particular tenses for past, present, and future.

We perceive this concept of time as universal in that all humans see it in the same way.

Although a speaker of Hopi has very different ideas, their language’s structure both reflects and shapes the way they think about time. Seemingly, the Hopi language has no present, past, or future tense; instead, they divide the world into manifested and unmanifest domains.

The manifested domain consists of the physical universe, including the present, the immediate past, and the future; the unmanifest domain consists of the remote past and the future and the world of dreams, thoughts, desires, and life forces.

Also, there are no words for minutes, minutes, or days of the week. Native Hopi speakers often had great difficulty adapting to life in the English-speaking world when it came to being on time for their job or other affairs.

It is due to the simple fact that this was not how they had been conditioned to behave concerning time in their Hopi world, which followed the phases of the moon and the movements of the sun.

Today, it is widely believed that some aspects of perception are affected by language.

One big problem with the original Sapir-Whorf hypothesis derives from the idea that if a person’s language has no word for a specific concept, then that person would not understand that concept.

Honestly, the idea that a mother tongue can restrict one’s understanding has been largely unaccepted. For example, in German, there is a term that means to take pleasure in another person’s unhappiness.

While there is no translatable equivalent in English, it just would not be accurate to say that English speakers have never experienced or would not be able to comprehend this emotion.

Just because there is no word for this in the English language does not mean English speakers are less equipped to feel or experience the meaning of the word.

Not to mention a “chicken and egg” problem with the theory.

Of course, languages are human creations, very much tools we invented and honed to suit our needs. Merely showing that speakers of diverse languages think differently does not tell us whether it is the language that shapes belief or the other way around.

Supporting Evidence

On the other hand, there is hard evidence that the language-associated habits we acquire play a role in how we view the world. And indeed, this is especially true for languages that attach genders to inanimate objects.

There was a study done that looked at how German and Spanish speakers view different things based on their given gender association in each respective language.

The results demonstrated that in describing things that are referred to as masculine in Spanish, speakers of the language marked them as having more male characteristics like “strong” and “long.” Similarly, these same items, which use feminine phrasings in German, were noted by German speakers as effeminate, like “beautiful” and “elegant.”

The findings imply that speakers of each language have developed preconceived notions of something being feminine or masculine, not due to the objects” characteristics or appearances but because of how they are categorized in their native language.

It is important to remember that the Theory of Linguistic Relativity (Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis) also successfully achieves openness. The theory is shown as a window where we view the cognitive process, not as an absolute.

It is set forth to look at a phenomenon differently than one usually would. Furthermore, the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis is very simple and logically sound. Understandably, one’s atmosphere and culture will affect decoding.

Likewise, in studies done by the authors of the theory, many Native American tribes do not have a word for particular things because they do not exist in their lives. The logical simplism of this idea of relativism provides parsimony.

Truly, the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis makes sense. It can be utilized in describing great numerous misunderstandings in everyday life. When a Pennsylvanian says “yuns,” it does not make any sense to a Californian, but when examined, it is just another word for “you all.”

The Linguistic Relativity Theory addresses this and suggests that it is all relative. This concept of relativity passes outside dialect boundaries and delves into the world of language – from different countries and, consequently, from mind to mind.

Is language reality honestly because of thought, or is it thought which occurs because of language? The Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis very transparently presents a view of reality being expressed in language and thus forming in thought.

The principles rehashed in it show a reasonable and even simple idea of how one perceives the world, but the question is still arguable: thought then language or language then thought?

Modern Relevance

Regardless of its age, the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, or the Linguistic Relativity Theory, has continued to force itself into linguistic conversations, even including pop culture.

The idea was just recently revisited in the movie “Arrival,” – a science fiction film that engagingly explores the ways in which an alien language can affect and alter human thinking.

And even if some of the most drastic claims of the theory have been debunked or argued against, the idea has continued its relevance, and that does say something about its importance.

Hypotheses, thoughts, and intellectual musings do not need to be totally accurate to remain in the public eye as long as they make us think and question the world – and the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis does precisely that.

The theory does not only make us question linguistic theory and our own language but also our very existence and how our perceptions might shape what exists in this world.

There are generalities that we can expect every person to encounter in their day-to-day life – in relationships, love, work, sadness, and so on. But thinking about the more granular disparities experienced by those in diverse circumstances, linguistic or otherwise, helps us realize that there is more to the story than ours.

And beautifully, at the same time, the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis reiterates the fact that we are more alike than we are different, regardless of the language we speak.

Isn’t it just amazing that linguistic diversity just reveals to us how ingenious and flexible the human mind is – human minds have invented not one cognitive universe but, indeed, seven thousand!

Kay, P., & Kempton, W. (1984). What is the Sapir‐Whorf hypothesis?. American anthropologist, 86(1), 65-79.

Whorf, B. L. (1952). Language, mind, and reality. ETC: A review of general semantics, 167-188.

Whorf, B. L. (1997). The relation of habitual thought and behavior to language. In Sociolinguistics (pp. 443-463). Palgrave, London.

Whorf, B. L. (2012). Language, thought, and reality: Selected writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf. MIT press.

Related Articles

Cognitive Psychology

Automatic Processing in Psychology: Definition & Examples

Controlled Processing in Psychology: Definition & Examples

How Ego Depletion Can Drain Your Willpower

What is the Default Mode Network?

Theories of Selective Attention in Psychology

Availability Heuristic and Decision Making

• Skip to primary navigation
• Skip to main content
• Skip to footer

Science Struck

Understanding Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis with Examples

Linguistic relativity, also known as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, holds that the structure of the language natively spoken by people defines the way they view the world and interact with it. This post helps you understand this concept with the help of examples.

Like it? Share it!

“The diversity of languages is not a diversity of signs and sounds but a diversity of views of the world.” – Wilhelm von Humboldt

The linguistic relativity hypothesis posits that languages mold our cognitive faculties and determine the way we behave and interact in society. This hypothesis is also called the Sapir-Wharf hypothesis, which is actually a misnomer since Edward Sapir and Benjamin Lee Whorf never co-authored the theory. Rather, the theory was derived from the academic writings of Whorf, under the mentorship of Sapir. Hence the hypothesis is referred to as the principle of linguistic relativity. This nomenclature also acknowledges the fact that Sapir and Whorf were not the only ones to describe a link between thought and language, and also implies the existence of other chain of thoughts regarding this concept.

This theory has been widely mentioned in various diverse branches of social and behavioral sciences such as anthropology, linguistics, psychology, etc, but despite this, the validity of the theory is being disputed till date. Some scholars claim it to be trivially true, while others believe it to be refuted. To determine the validity and the logic behind the theory, one must therefore place the hypothesis within its historical context, find supporting empirical research finding, and finally examine the theoretical explanations and examples used to explain the relation between language and thought.

Linguistic Relativity: Hypothesis

The hypothesis presents two versions of the main principle – a strong version and a weak version. These versions arise from the way Sapir and Wharf have phrased and presented their ideas with the use of strong and weak words. The two versions of the hypothesis are as follows.

Strong Version – Language determines thought and controls the cognitive processes (linguistic determinism).

Weak version – Structure and usage of language influences thought and behavior (linguistic relativity).

The strong version of the hypothesis has largely been refuted, but the weaker versions are still being researched and debated as they often tend to produce positive empirical results.

Linguistic Relativity: Historical Context

♦ The possibility of thought being influenced by the language one spoke has sparked many a debates in various classical civilizations. In the Indian linguistic scholars, Bhartrihari (600 A.D.) was a major proponent on the relativistic nature of language. This same theory was also highly debated in ancient Greece between Plato and sophist thinkers such as Gorgias of Leontini. Plato believed that the world consisted of a pre-given set of ideas that were merely translated by language, whereas Gorgias held the belief that ones experience of the physical worlds was a direct function of language usage.

♦ The first clear idea of linguistic relativism was given in the early 19 th century by the German romantic philosopher Wilhelm von Humboldt. He proposed that language was the fabric of thought, and that one’s thoughts were produced as a result of an internal dialog of a person in their native language. He also proposed that Indo-European languages such as German and English, that had the same basic syntax and structure were perfect languages, and that the speakers of such languages had a natural dominance over the speakers of other not-so-perfect languages.

♦ With this ideology in view, the American linguist William Dwight Whitney, in the 20 th century tried to eradicate the Native American languages by claiming that their speakers were savages and would be greatly benefited if they accepted English as the choice of language and chose a civilized way of life.

♦ Franz Boas was the first linguist to challenge this school of thought. He advocated equality between all cultures and languages. He did not believe in some languages being superior than others, but that all languages were equally capable of expressing any content but the way and means of expression differed. His student, Edward Sapir, believed in Humboldt’s idea that languages were the key to identify and understand the different ways in which different people viewed the world, and he improved on the idea and proposed that no two languages were ever similar enough to be perfectly translated, and that speakers of different languages would perceive reality differently. Despite this belief he strongly rejected the idea of linguistic determinism, claiming that it would be naive to believe that his experience of the world is solely dependent on the pattern and type of language he spoke.

♦ His vague notion of linguistic relativity was taken up and studied further by his student, Benjamin Lee Whorf. He studied Native American languages, to prove that differences in grammatical systems of a language and its usage had a major effect on the way the speakers perceived the world. He also explained how scientific accounts of event differed from religious accounts of the same events. He explained his theories in the form of examples rather than in an argumentative form, to showcase the differences observed in behavior on use of different languages. He also claimed that certain exotic words referred to exotic meanings that were rather untranslatable.

♦ Roger Brown and Eric Lenneberg widely criticized Whorf’s ideas and attempted to test them. They formulated his inferences into a testable hypothesis, which they named the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis.

Linguistic Relativity: Empirical Research

Structure-centered Research – It involves the study of structural peculiarities in a language and the possible consequences it has on the thought process and behavior of the speaker. For example, the Hopi language expresses and describes time in a manner different from that of English, and hence the Hopi people perceive time differently than others.

Domain-centered Research – This involves choosing a semantic domain and comparing it across a wide range of different languages, to determine its relation to behavior. A common example of this type is, research on color terminologies or spatial categories in different languages.

Behavior-centered Research – This deals with studying various types of behavior among diverse linguistic groups and attempting to establish a viable cause for the development of that behavior.

Linguistic Relativity: Languages

Some philosophers have hypothesized that if our perceptions are influenced by language, it may be possible to influence thought by conscious manipulation of language. This has eventually led to the development of neurolinguistic programming, which is a therapeutic approach towards the use of language to seek and influence cognitive patterns and processes.

Artificial Languages

The same philosophy has given rise to the possibility of generating a new and better language that could enable newer and better ways of thinking. One such language is Loglan, created by James Cooke Brown in an attempt to test this possibility. The speakers of Loglan claim that the language increases their logical thinking skill.

Another such language was created by Suzette Haden Elgin, and it was called Láadan. It was designed to easily express a feminist world view. The language Ithkuil, designed and created by John Quijada, tries to use multiple cognitive categories at a single time, while simultaneously keeping its speakers aware of this.

Programming Languages

Kenneth E. Iverson, the originator of the APL programming language, proposes that the use of powerful notations in a programming language, enhances one’s ability to think about computer algorithms. Also a blub paradox comes into play in connection with linguistic relativity and use of programming languages. It states that any programmer using a particular programming language will be aware of the languages that are inferior to the one he is using, but will be oblivious of the languages that are superior to the language being used by him. The reasoning behind this paradox is that while a programmer is programming in a language, he starts thinking in that language as well, and is satisfied with it, as the language in turn dictates their opinion of the programs being produced.

Linguistic Relativity: Criticism

♦ Linguistic philosophers like Eric Lenneberg, Noam Chomsky, and Steven Pinker have criticized the Whorfian hypothesis and do not accept most of the inferences about language and behavior put forth by Whorf. They claim that his conclusions are speculative since they are based on anecdotal evidence and not on results of empirical studies.

♦ Another criticism that this hypothesis faces is the problem of translatability. According to his theories, every language is unique in its description of reality. This would make translation of one language into another practically impossible. However, languages are regularly translated into each other every day, and hence challenges Whorf’s inference.

Linguistic Relativity: Examples

♦ Whorf observed two rooms at an gasoline plant. One room contained filled gasoline drums, while the other contained empty gasoline drums. The workers had a more relaxed and casual attitude toward the room housing the empty drums, and were seen to indulge in smoking in that room. The word “empty” may have suggested that the situation poses no harm, when in fact, smoking near the empty drums is also perilous, as they still contain leftover flammable vapors of gasoline.

♦ At a factory, metal containers were coated on the outside with spun limestone. Since the word “stone” was associated, the workers did not keep them away from heat or fire. Since spun limestone is a flammable substance, the workers were taken by surprise when the containers that were lined with “stone” caught fire.

♦ The Hopi language has one word to describe three different things. The same word implies an insect, an aviator, and an airplane. Hence, if a Hopi speaker witnesses an insect flying near an aviator, while looking at an airplane, she would claim to have seen the same thing (word) thrice, whereas an English speaker would describe it as seeing three different things.

With the current trend of people learning and excelling at languages that are not natively spoken by them, the concept of bilinguism has emerged. Since bilinguists can perceive and express experiences in native and foreign languages, the possibility of a unique perspective emerges and is interesting to study from a cognitive point of view.

Get Updates Right to Your Inbox

Privacy overview.

• Subject List
• Take a Tour
• For Authors
• Subscriber Services
• Publications
• African American Studies
• African Studies
• American Literature
• Anthropology
• Architecture Planning and Preservation
• Art History
• Atlantic History
• Biblical Studies
• British and Irish Literature
• Childhood Studies
• Chinese Studies
• Cinema and Media Studies
• Communication
• Criminology
• Environmental Science
• Evolutionary Biology
• International Law
• International Relations
• Islamic Studies
• Jewish Studies
• Latin American Studies
• Latino Studies

Linguistics

• Literary and Critical Theory
• Medieval Studies
• Military History
• Political Science
• Public Health
• Renaissance and Reformation
• Social Work
• Urban Studies
• Victorian Literature
• Browse All Subjects

How to Subscribe

• Free Trials

In This Article Expand or collapse the "in this article" section Linguistic Relativity

Introduction, edited collections.

• Reference Resources
• Foundational Works
• Theoretical Perspectives
• Object-Substance
• Object-Substance and Acquisition
• Kinds and Categories
• Grammatical Number
• Tight-Fit, Loose-Fit
• Path-Manner
• Frames of Reference
• Reorientation
• Theory of Mind
• Grammatical Gender

Related Articles Expand or collapse the "related articles" section about

About related articles close popup.

Lorem Ipsum Sit Dolor Amet

Vestibulum ante ipsum primis in faucibus orci luctus et ultrices posuere cubilia Curae; Aliquam ligula odio, euismod ut aliquam et, vestibulum nec risus. Nulla viverra, arcu et iaculis consequat, justo diam ornare tellus, semper ultrices tellus nunc eu tellus.

• Contrastive Analysis in Linguistics
• Critical Applied Linguistics
• Cross-Cultural Pragmatics
• Educational Linguistics
• Edward Sapir
• Generative Syntax
• Georg von der Gabelentz
• Languages of the World
• Linguistic Complexity
• Positive Discourse Analysis
• Psycholinguistics
• Synesthesia and Language
• Translation

Other Subject Areas

Forthcoming articles expand or collapse the "forthcoming articles" section.

• Sentence Comprehension
• Text Comprehension
• Find more forthcoming articles...
• Export Citations
• Share This Facebook LinkedIn Twitter

Linguistic Relativity by Peggy Li , David Barner LAST REVIEWED: 28 October 2011 LAST MODIFIED: 28 October 2011 DOI: 10.1093/obo/9780199772810-0026

Linguistic relativity, sometimes called the Whorfian hypothesis, posits that properties of language affect the structure and content of thought and thus the way humans perceive reality. A distinction is often made between strong Whorfian views, according to which the categories of thought are determined by language, and weak views, which argue that language influences thought without entirely determining its structure. Each view presupposes that for language to affect thought, the two must in some way be separable. The modern investigation of linguistic relativity began with the contributions of Benjamin Lee Whorf and his mentor, Edward Sapir. Until recently, much experimental work has focused on determining whether any reliable Whorfian effects exist and whether effects truly reflect differences in thought caused by linguistic variation. Many such studies compare speakers of different languages or test subjects at different stages of language acquisition. Other studies explore how language affects cognition by testing prelinguistic infants or nonhuman animals and comparing these groups to children or adults. Significant progress has been made in several domains, including studies of color, number, objects, and space. In many areas, the status of findings is hotly debated.

Often, leading researchers in the field summarize their newest findings and views in edited collections. These volumes are good places to begin research into the topic of linguistic relativity. The listed volumes arose from papers presented at conferences, symposia, and workshops devoted to the topic. Gumperz and Levinson 1996 arose from a symposium that revived interest in the linguistic relativity hypothesis, leading to a wave of new research on the topic. Highlights of this work are reported in Bowerman and Levinson 2001 , Gentner and Goldin-Meadow 2003 , and Malt and Wolff 2010 .

Bowerman, Melissa, and Stephen C. Levinson, eds. 2001. Language acquisition and conceptual development . Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press.

DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511620669

This volume brings together research on language acquisition and conceptual development and asks about the relation between them in early childhood.

Gentner, Dedre, and Susan Goldin-Meadow, eds. 2003. Language in mind: Advances in the study of language and thought . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

The volume starts with a collection of perspective papers and then showcases papers that bring data to bear to test claims of linguistic relativity. The papers are delineated on the basis of the types of language effects on thought: language as a tool kit, language as a lens, and language as a category maker.

Gumperz, John J., and Stephen C. Levinson, eds. 1996. Rethinking linguistic relativity . Papers presented at the Werner-Gren Symposium 112, held in Ocho Rios, Jamaica, in May 1991. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press.

A collection of papers arising from the “Rethinking Linguistic Relativity” Wenner-Gren Symposium in 1991 that brought about renewed interest in the topic.

Malt, Barbara C., and Phillip M. Wolff. 2010. Words and the mind: How words capture human experience . Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.

Researchers across disciplines (linguists, psychologists, and anthropologists) contributed to this collection of papers documenting new advances in language-thought research in various domains (space, emotions, body parts, causation, etc.).

back to top

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content on this page. Please subscribe or login .

Oxford Bibliographies Online is available by subscription and perpetual access to institutions. For more information or to contact an Oxford Sales Representative click here .

• About Linguistics »
• Meet the Editorial Board »
• Acceptability Judgments
• Accessibility Theory in Linguistics
• Acquisition, Second Language, and Bilingualism, Psycholin...
• Adpositions
• African Linguistics
• Afroasiatic Languages
• Algonquian Linguistics
• Altaic Languages
• Ambiguity, Lexical
• Analogy in Language and Linguistics
• Animal Communication
• Applicatives
• Applied Linguistics, Critical
• Arawak Languages
• Argument Structure
• Artificial Languages
• Australian Languages
• Austronesian Linguistics
• Auxiliaries
• Balkans, The Languages of the
• Baudouin de Courtenay, Jan
• Berber Languages and Linguistics
• Bilingualism and Multilingualism
• Biology of Language
• Borrowing, Structural
• Caddoan Languages
• Caucasian Languages
• Celtic Languages
• Celtic Mutations
• Chomsky, Noam
• Chumashan Languages
• Classifiers
• Clauses, Relative
• Clinical Linguistics
• Cognitive Linguistics
• Colonial Place Names
• Comparative Reconstruction in Linguistics
• Comparative-Historical Linguistics
• Complementation
• Complexity, Linguistic
• Compositionality
• Compounding
• Computational Linguistics
• Conditionals
• Conjunctions
• Connectionism
• Consonant Epenthesis
• Constructions, Verb-Particle
• Conversation Analysis
• Conversation, Maxims of
• Conversational Implicature
• Cooperative Principle
• Coordination
• Creoles, Grammatical Categories in
• Critical Periods
• Cross-Language Speech Perception and Production
• Cyberpragmatics
• Default Semantics
• Definiteness
• Dementia and Language
• Dene (Athabaskan) Languages
• Dené-Yeniseian Hypothesis, The
• Dependencies
• Dependencies, Long Distance
• Derivational Morphology
• Determiners
• Dialectology
• Distinctive Features
• Dravidian Languages
• Endangered Languages
• English as a Lingua Franca
• English, Early Modern
• English, Old
• Eskimo-Aleut
• Euphemisms and Dysphemisms
• Evidentials
• Exemplar-Based Models in Linguistics
• Existential
• Existential Wh-Constructions
• Experimental Linguistics
• Fieldwork, Sociolinguistic
• Finite State Languages
• First Language Attrition
• Formulaic Language
• Francoprovençal
• French Grammars
• Gabelentz, Georg von der
• Genealogical Classification
• Genetics and Language
• Grammar, Categorial
• Grammar, Cognitive
• Grammar, Construction
• Grammar, Descriptive
• Grammar, Functional Discourse
• Grammars, Phrase Structure
• Grammaticalization
• Harris, Zellig
• Heritage Languages
• History of Linguistics
• History of the English Language
• Hmong-Mien Languages
• Hokan Languages
• Humor in Language
• Hungarian Vowel Harmony
• Idiom and Phraseology
• Imperatives
• Indefiniteness
• Indo-European Etymology
• Inflected Infinitives
• Information Structure
• Interface Between Phonology and Phonetics
• Interjections
• Iroquoian Languages
• Isolates, Language
• Jakobson, Roman
• Japanese Word Accent
• Jones, Daniel
• Juncture and Boundary
• Khoisan Languages
• Kiowa-Tanoan Languages
• Kra-Dai Languages
• Labov, William
• Language Acquisition
• Language and Law
• Language Contact
• Language Documentation
• Language, Embodiment and
• Language for Specific Purposes/Specialized Communication
• Language, Gender, and Sexuality
• Language Geography
• Language Ideologies and Language Attitudes
• Language in Autism Spectrum Disorders
• Language Nests
• Language Revitalization
• Language Shift
• Language Standardization
• Language, Synesthesia and
• Languages of Africa
• Languages of the Americas, Indigenous
• Learnability
• Lexical Access, Cognitive Mechanisms for
• Lexical Semantics
• Lexical-Functional Grammar
• Lexicography
• Lexicography, Bilingual
• Linguistic Accommodation
• Linguistic Anthropology
• Linguistic Areas
• Linguistic Landscapes
• Linguistic Prescriptivism
• Linguistic Profiling and Language-Based Discrimination
• Linguistic Relativity
• Linguistics, Educational
• Listening, Second Language
• Literature and Linguistics
• Machine Translation
• Maintenance, Language
• Mande Languages
• Mass-Count Distinction
• Mathematical Linguistics
• Mayan Languages
• Mental Health Disorders, Language in
• Mental Lexicon, The
• Mesoamerican Languages
• Minority Languages
• Mixed Languages
• Mixe-Zoquean Languages
• Modification
• Mon-Khmer Languages
• Morphological Change
• Morphology, Blending in
• Morphology, Subtractive
• Munda Languages
• Muskogean Languages
• Nasals and Nasalization
• Niger-Congo Languages
• Non-Pama-Nyungan Languages
• Northeast Caucasian Languages
• Oceanic Languages
• Papuan Languages
• Penutian Languages
• Philosophy of Language
• Phonetics, Acoustic
• Phonetics, Articulatory
• Phonological Research, Psycholinguistic Methodology in
• Phonology, Computational
• Phonology, Early Child
• Policy and Planning, Language
• Politeness in Language
• Possessives, Acquisition of
• Pragmatics, Acquisition of
• Pragmatics, Cognitive
• Pragmatics, Computational
• Pragmatics, Cross-Cultural
• Pragmatics, Developmental
• Pragmatics, Experimental
• Pragmatics, Game Theory in
• Pragmatics, Historical
• Pragmatics, Institutional
• Pragmatics, Second Language
• Pragmatics, Teaching
• Prague Linguistic Circle, The
• Presupposition
• Quechuan and Aymaran Languages
• Reading, Second-Language
• Reciprocals
• Reduplication
• Reflexives and Reflexivity
• Register and Register Variation
• Relevance Theory
• Representation and Processing of Multi-Word Expressions in...
• Salish Languages
• Sapir, Edward
• Saussure, Ferdinand de
• Second Language Acquisition, Anaphora Resolution in
• Semantic Maps
• Semantic Roles
• Semantic-Pragmatic Change
• Semantics, Cognitive
• Sentence Processing in Monolingual and Bilingual Speakers
• Sign Language Linguistics
• Sociolinguistics
• Sociolinguistics, Variationist
• Sociopragmatics
• Sound Change
• South American Indian Languages
• Specific Language Impairment
• Speech, Deceptive
• Speech Perception
• Speech Production
• Speech Synthesis
• Switch-Reference
• Syntactic Change
• Syntactic Knowledge, Children’s Acquisition of
• Tense, Aspect, and Mood
• Text Mining
• Tone Sandhi
• Transcription
• Transitivity and Voice
• Translanguaging
• Trubetzkoy, Nikolai
• Tucanoan Languages
• Tupian Languages
• Usage-Based Linguistics
• Uto-Aztecan Languages
• Valency Theory
• Verbs, Serial
• Vocabulary, Second Language
• Voice and Voice Quality
• Vowel Harmony
• Whitney, William Dwight
• Word Classes
• Word Formation in Japanese
• Word Recognition, Spoken
• Word Recognition, Visual
• Word Stress
• Writing, Second Language
• Writing Systems
• Zapotecan Languages
• Privacy Policy
• Cookie Policy
• Legal Notice
• Accessibility

Powered by:

• [66.249.64.20|185.80.151.9]
• 185.80.151.9

• Search Menu
• Sign in through your institution
• Browse content in Arts and Humanities
• Browse content in Archaeology
• Anglo-Saxon and Medieval Archaeology
• Archaeological Methodology and Techniques
• Archaeology by Region
• Archaeology of Religion
• Archaeology of Trade and Exchange
• Biblical Archaeology
• Contemporary and Public Archaeology
• Environmental Archaeology
• Historical Archaeology
• History and Theory of Archaeology
• Industrial Archaeology
• Landscape Archaeology
• Mortuary Archaeology
• Prehistoric Archaeology
• Underwater Archaeology
• Urban Archaeology
• Zooarchaeology
• Browse content in Architecture
• Architectural Structure and Design
• History of Architecture
• Residential and Domestic Buildings
• Theory of Architecture
• Browse content in Art
• Art Subjects and Themes
• History of Art
• Industrial and Commercial Art
• Theory of Art
• Biographical Studies
• Byzantine Studies
• Browse content in Classical Studies
• Classical History
• Classical Philosophy
• Classical Mythology
• Classical Literature
• Classical Reception
• Classical Art and Architecture
• Classical Oratory and Rhetoric
• Greek and Roman Epigraphy
• Greek and Roman Law
• Greek and Roman Papyrology
• Greek and Roman Archaeology
• Late Antiquity
• Religion in the Ancient World
• Digital Humanities
• Browse content in History
• Colonialism and Imperialism
• Diplomatic History
• Environmental History
• Genealogy, Heraldry, Names, and Honours
• Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing
• Historical Geography
• History by Period
• History of Emotions
• History of Agriculture
• History of Education
• History of Gender and Sexuality
• Industrial History
• Intellectual History
• International History
• Labour History
• Legal and Constitutional History
• Local and Family History
• Maritime History
• Military History
• National Liberation and Post-Colonialism
• Oral History
• Political History
• Public History
• Regional and National History
• Revolutions and Rebellions
• Slavery and Abolition of Slavery
• Social and Cultural History
• Theory, Methods, and Historiography
• Urban History
• World History
• Browse content in Language Teaching and Learning
• Language Learning (Specific Skills)
• Language Teaching Theory and Methods
• Browse content in Linguistics
• Applied Linguistics
• Cognitive Linguistics
• Computational Linguistics
• Forensic Linguistics
• Grammar, Syntax and Morphology
• Historical and Diachronic Linguistics
• History of English
• Language Acquisition
• Language Evolution
• Language Reference
• Language Variation
• Language Families
• Lexicography
• Linguistic Anthropology
• Linguistic Theories
• Linguistic Typology
• Phonetics and Phonology
• Psycholinguistics
• Sociolinguistics
• Translation and Interpretation
• Writing Systems
• Browse content in Literature
• Bibliography
• Children's Literature Studies
• Literary Studies (Asian)
• Literary Studies (European)
• Literary Studies (Eco-criticism)
• Literary Studies (Romanticism)
• Literary Studies (American)
• Literary Studies (Modernism)
• Literary Studies - World
• Literary Studies (1500 to 1800)
• Literary Studies (19th Century)
• Literary Studies (20th Century onwards)
• Literary Studies (African American Literature)
• Literary Studies (British and Irish)
• Literary Studies (Early and Medieval)
• Literary Studies (Fiction, Novelists, and Prose Writers)
• Literary Studies (Gender Studies)
• Literary Studies (Graphic Novels)
• Literary Studies (History of the Book)
• Literary Studies (Plays and Playwrights)
• Literary Studies (Poetry and Poets)
• Literary Studies (Postcolonial Literature)
• Literary Studies (Queer Studies)
• Literary Studies (Science Fiction)
• Literary Studies (Travel Literature)
• Literary Studies (War Literature)
• Literary Studies (Women's Writing)
• Literary Theory and Cultural Studies
• Mythology and Folklore
• Shakespeare Studies and Criticism
• Browse content in Media Studies
• Browse content in Music
• Applied Music
• Dance and Music
• Ethics in Music
• Ethnomusicology
• Gender and Sexuality in Music
• Medicine and Music
• Music Cultures
• Music and Religion
• Music and Media
• Music and Culture
• Music Education and Pedagogy
• Music Theory and Analysis
• Musical Scores, Lyrics, and Libretti
• Musical Structures, Styles, and Techniques
• Musicology and Music History
• Performance Practice and Studies
• Race and Ethnicity in Music
• Sound Studies
• Browse content in Performing Arts
• Browse content in Philosophy
• Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art
• Epistemology
• Feminist Philosophy
• History of Western Philosophy
• Metaphysics
• Moral Philosophy
• Non-Western Philosophy
• Philosophy of Science
• Philosophy of Language
• Philosophy of Mind
• Philosophy of Perception
• Philosophy of Action
• Philosophy of Law
• Philosophy of Religion
• Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic
• Practical Ethics
• Social and Political Philosophy
• Browse content in Religion
• Biblical Studies
• Christianity
• East Asian Religions
• History of Religion
• Judaism and Jewish Studies
• Qumran Studies
• Religion and Education
• Religion and Health
• Religion and Politics
• Religion and Science
• Religion and Law
• Religion and Art, Literature, and Music
• Religious Studies
• Browse content in Society and Culture
• Cookery, Food, and Drink
• Cultural Studies
• Customs and Traditions
• Ethical Issues and Debates
• Hobbies, Games, Arts and Crafts
• Natural world, Country Life, and Pets
• Popular Beliefs and Controversial Knowledge
• Sports and Outdoor Recreation
• Technology and Society
• Travel and Holiday
• Visual Culture
• Browse content in Law
• Arbitration
• Browse content in Company and Commercial Law
• Commercial Law
• Company Law
• Browse content in Comparative Law
• Systems of Law
• Competition Law
• Browse content in Constitutional and Administrative Law
• Government Powers
• Judicial Review
• Local Government Law
• Military and Defence Law
• Parliamentary and Legislative Practice
• Construction Law
• Contract Law
• Browse content in Criminal Law
• Criminal Procedure
• Criminal Evidence Law
• Sentencing and Punishment
• Employment and Labour Law
• Environment and Energy Law
• Browse content in Financial Law
• Banking Law
• Insolvency Law
• History of Law
• Human Rights and Immigration
• Intellectual Property Law
• Browse content in International Law
• Private International Law and Conflict of Laws
• Public International Law
• IT and Communications Law
• Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law
• Law and Politics
• Law and Society
• Browse content in Legal System and Practice
• Courts and Procedure
• Legal Skills and Practice
• Primary Sources of Law
• Regulation of Legal Profession
• Medical and Healthcare Law
• Browse content in Policing
• Criminal Investigation and Detection
• Police and Security Services
• Police Procedure and Law
• Police Regional Planning
• Browse content in Property Law
• Personal Property Law
• Study and Revision
• Terrorism and National Security Law
• Browse content in Trusts Law
• Wills and Probate or Succession
• Browse content in Medicine and Health
• Browse content in Allied Health Professions
• Arts Therapies
• Clinical Science
• Dietetics and Nutrition
• Occupational Therapy
• Operating Department Practice
• Physiotherapy
• Radiography
• Speech and Language Therapy
• Browse content in Anaesthetics
• General Anaesthesia
• Neuroanaesthesia
• Browse content in Clinical Medicine
• Acute Medicine
• Cardiovascular Medicine
• Clinical Genetics
• Clinical Pharmacology and Therapeutics
• Dermatology
• Endocrinology and Diabetes
• Gastroenterology
• Genito-urinary Medicine
• Geriatric Medicine
• Infectious Diseases
• Medical Toxicology
• Medical Oncology
• Pain Medicine
• Palliative Medicine
• Rehabilitation Medicine
• Respiratory Medicine and Pulmonology
• Rheumatology
• Sleep Medicine
• Sports and Exercise Medicine
• Clinical Neuroscience
• Community Medical Services
• Critical Care
• Emergency Medicine
• Forensic Medicine
• Haematology
• History of Medicine
• Browse content in Medical Dentistry
• Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery
• Paediatric Dentistry
• Restorative Dentistry and Orthodontics
• Surgical Dentistry
• Browse content in Medical Skills
• Clinical Skills
• Communication Skills
• Nursing Skills
• Surgical Skills
• Medical Ethics
• Medical Statistics and Methodology
• Browse content in Neurology
• Clinical Neurophysiology
• Neuropathology
• Nursing Studies
• Browse content in Obstetrics and Gynaecology
• Gynaecology
• Occupational Medicine
• Ophthalmology
• Otolaryngology (ENT)
• Browse content in Paediatrics
• Neonatology
• Browse content in Pathology
• Chemical Pathology
• Clinical Cytogenetics and Molecular Genetics
• Histopathology
• Medical Microbiology and Virology
• Patient Education and Information
• Browse content in Pharmacology
• Psychopharmacology
• Browse content in Popular Health
• Caring for Others
• Complementary and Alternative Medicine
• Self-help and Personal Development
• Browse content in Preclinical Medicine
• Cell Biology
• Molecular Biology and Genetics
• Reproduction, Growth and Development
• Primary Care
• Professional Development in Medicine
• Browse content in Psychiatry
• Addiction Medicine
• Child and Adolescent Psychiatry
• Forensic Psychiatry
• Learning Disabilities
• Old Age Psychiatry
• Psychotherapy
• Browse content in Public Health and Epidemiology
• Epidemiology
• Public Health
• Browse content in Radiology
• Clinical Radiology
• Interventional Radiology
• Nuclear Medicine
• Radiation Oncology
• Reproductive Medicine
• Browse content in Surgery
• Cardiothoracic Surgery
• Gastro-intestinal and Colorectal Surgery
• General Surgery
• Neurosurgery
• Paediatric Surgery
• Peri-operative Care
• Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery
• Surgical Oncology
• Transplant Surgery
• Trauma and Orthopaedic Surgery
• Vascular Surgery
• Browse content in Science and Mathematics
• Browse content in Biological Sciences
• Aquatic Biology
• Biochemistry
• Bioinformatics and Computational Biology
• Developmental Biology
• Ecology and Conservation
• Evolutionary Biology
• Genetics and Genomics
• Microbiology
• Molecular and Cell Biology
• Natural History
• Plant Sciences and Forestry
• Research Methods in Life Sciences
• Structural Biology
• Systems Biology
• Zoology and Animal Sciences
• Browse content in Chemistry
• Analytical Chemistry
• Computational Chemistry
• Crystallography
• Environmental Chemistry
• Industrial Chemistry
• Inorganic Chemistry
• Materials Chemistry
• Medicinal Chemistry
• Mineralogy and Gems
• Organic Chemistry
• Physical Chemistry
• Polymer Chemistry
• Study and Communication Skills in Chemistry
• Theoretical Chemistry
• Browse content in Computer Science
• Artificial Intelligence
• Computer Architecture and Logic Design
• Game Studies
• Human-Computer Interaction
• Mathematical Theory of Computation
• Programming Languages
• Software Engineering
• Systems Analysis and Design
• Virtual Reality
• Browse content in Computing
• Business Applications
• Computer Security
• Computer Games
• Computer Networking and Communications
• Digital Lifestyle
• Graphical and Digital Media Applications
• Operating Systems
• Browse content in Earth Sciences and Geography
• Atmospheric Sciences
• Environmental Geography
• Geology and the Lithosphere
• Maps and Map-making
• Meteorology and Climatology
• Oceanography and Hydrology
• Palaeontology
• Physical Geography and Topography
• Regional Geography
• Soil Science
• Urban Geography
• Browse content in Engineering and Technology
• Agriculture and Farming
• Biological Engineering
• Civil Engineering, Surveying, and Building
• Electronics and Communications Engineering
• Energy Technology
• Engineering (General)
• Environmental Science, Engineering, and Technology
• History of Engineering and Technology
• Mechanical Engineering and Materials
• Technology of Industrial Chemistry
• Transport Technology and Trades
• Browse content in Environmental Science
• Applied Ecology (Environmental Science)
• Conservation of the Environment (Environmental Science)
• Environmental Sustainability
• Environmentalist Thought and Ideology (Environmental Science)
• Management of Land and Natural Resources (Environmental Science)
• Natural Disasters (Environmental Science)
• Nuclear Issues (Environmental Science)
• Pollution and Threats to the Environment (Environmental Science)
• Social Impact of Environmental Issues (Environmental Science)
• History of Science and Technology
• Browse content in Materials Science
• Ceramics and Glasses
• Composite Materials
• Metals, Alloying, and Corrosion
• Nanotechnology
• Browse content in Mathematics
• Applied Mathematics
• Biomathematics and Statistics
• History of Mathematics
• Mathematical Education
• Mathematical Finance
• Mathematical Analysis
• Numerical and Computational Mathematics
• Probability and Statistics
• Pure Mathematics
• Browse content in Neuroscience
• Cognition and Behavioural Neuroscience
• Development of the Nervous System
• Disorders of the Nervous System
• History of Neuroscience
• Invertebrate Neurobiology
• Molecular and Cellular Systems
• Neuroendocrinology and Autonomic Nervous System
• Neuroscientific Techniques
• Sensory and Motor Systems
• Browse content in Physics
• Astronomy and Astrophysics
• Atomic, Molecular, and Optical Physics
• Biological and Medical Physics
• Classical Mechanics
• Computational Physics
• Condensed Matter Physics
• Electromagnetism, Optics, and Acoustics
• History of Physics
• Mathematical and Statistical Physics
• Measurement Science
• Nuclear Physics
• Particles and Fields
• Plasma Physics
• Quantum Physics
• Relativity and Gravitation
• Semiconductor and Mesoscopic Physics
• Browse content in Psychology
• Affective Sciences
• Clinical Psychology
• Cognitive Psychology
• Cognitive Neuroscience
• Criminal and Forensic Psychology
• Developmental Psychology
• Educational Psychology
• Evolutionary Psychology
• Health Psychology
• History and Systems in Psychology
• Music Psychology
• Neuropsychology
• Organizational Psychology
• Psychological Assessment and Testing
• Psychology of Human-Technology Interaction
• Psychology Professional Development and Training
• Research Methods in Psychology
• Social Psychology
• Browse content in Social Sciences
• Browse content in Anthropology
• Anthropology of Religion
• Human Evolution
• Medical Anthropology
• Physical Anthropology
• Regional Anthropology
• Social and Cultural Anthropology
• Theory and Practice of Anthropology
• Browse content in Business and Management
• Business Strategy
• Business Ethics
• Business History
• Business and Government
• Business and Technology
• Business and the Environment
• Comparative Management
• Corporate Governance
• Corporate Social Responsibility
• Entrepreneurship
• Health Management
• Human Resource Management
• Industrial and Employment Relations
• Industry Studies
• Information and Communication Technologies
• International Business
• Knowledge Management
• Management and Management Techniques
• Operations Management
• Organizational Theory and Behaviour
• Pensions and Pension Management
• Public and Nonprofit Management
• Strategic Management
• Supply Chain Management
• Browse content in Criminology and Criminal Justice
• Criminal Justice
• Criminology
• Forms of Crime
• International and Comparative Criminology
• Youth Violence and Juvenile Justice
• Development Studies
• Browse content in Economics
• Agricultural, Environmental, and Natural Resource Economics
• Asian Economics
• Behavioural Finance
• Behavioural Economics and Neuroeconomics
• Econometrics and Mathematical Economics
• Economic Systems
• Economic History
• Economic Methodology
• Economic Development and Growth
• Financial Markets
• Financial Institutions and Services
• General Economics and Teaching
• Health, Education, and Welfare
• History of Economic Thought
• International Economics
• Labour and Demographic Economics
• Law and Economics
• Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics
• Microeconomics
• Public Economics
• Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics
• Welfare Economics
• Browse content in Education
• Adult Education and Continuous Learning
• Care and Counselling of Students
• Early Childhood and Elementary Education
• Educational Equipment and Technology
• Educational Strategies and Policy
• Higher and Further Education
• Organization and Management of Education
• Philosophy and Theory of Education
• Schools Studies
• Secondary Education
• Teaching of a Specific Subject
• Teaching of Specific Groups and Special Educational Needs
• Teaching Skills and Techniques
• Browse content in Environment
• Applied Ecology (Social Science)
• Climate Change
• Conservation of the Environment (Social Science)
• Environmentalist Thought and Ideology (Social Science)
• Natural Disasters (Environment)
• Social Impact of Environmental Issues (Social Science)
• Browse content in Human Geography
• Cultural Geography
• Economic Geography
• Political Geography
• Browse content in Interdisciplinary Studies
• Communication Studies
• Museums, Libraries, and Information Sciences
• Browse content in Politics
• African Politics
• Asian Politics
• Chinese Politics
• Comparative Politics
• Conflict Politics
• Elections and Electoral Studies
• Environmental Politics
• European Union
• Foreign Policy
• Gender and Politics
• Human Rights and Politics
• Indian Politics
• International Relations
• International Organization (Politics)
• International Political Economy
• Irish Politics
• Latin American Politics
• Middle Eastern Politics
• Political Methodology
• Political Communication
• Political Philosophy
• Political Sociology
• Political Behaviour
• Political Economy
• Political Institutions
• Political Theory
• Politics and Law
• Politics of Development
• Public Administration
• Public Policy
• Quantitative Political Methodology
• Regional Political Studies
• Russian Politics
• Security Studies
• State and Local Government
• UK Politics
• US Politics
• Browse content in Regional and Area Studies
• African Studies
• Asian Studies
• East Asian Studies
• Japanese Studies
• Latin American Studies
• Middle Eastern Studies
• Native American Studies
• Scottish Studies
• Browse content in Research and Information
• Research Methods
• Browse content in Social Work
• Addictions and Substance Misuse
• Adoption and Fostering
• Care of the Elderly
• Child and Adolescent Social Work
• Couple and Family Social Work
• Direct Practice and Clinical Social Work
• Emergency Services
• Human Behaviour and the Social Environment
• International and Global Issues in Social Work
• Mental and Behavioural Health
• Social Justice and Human Rights
• Social Policy and Advocacy
• Social Work and Crime and Justice
• Social Work Macro Practice
• Social Work Practice Settings
• Social Work Research and Evidence-based Practice
• Welfare and Benefit Systems
• Browse content in Sociology
• Childhood Studies
• Community Development
• Comparative and Historical Sociology
• Economic Sociology
• Gender and Sexuality
• Gerontology and Ageing
• Health, Illness, and Medicine
• Marriage and the Family
• Migration Studies
• Occupations, Professions, and Work
• Organizations
• Population and Demography
• Race and Ethnicity
• Social Theory
• Social Movements and Social Change
• Social Research and Statistics
• Social Stratification, Inequality, and Mobility
• Sociology of Religion
• Sociology of Education
• Sport and Leisure
• Urban and Rural Studies
• Browse content in Warfare and Defence
• Defence Strategy, Planning, and Research
• Land Forces and Warfare
• Military Administration
• Military Life and Institutions
• Naval Forces and Warfare
• Other Warfare and Defence Issues
• Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution
• Weapons and Equipment

• < Previous chapter
• Next chapter >

38 Cognitive Linguistics and Linguistic Relativity

Eric Pederson (PhD 1991) is associate professor of Linguistics at the University of Oregon. The overarching theme of his research is the relationship between language and conceptual processes. He was a student at the University of California, Berkeley, working within Cognitive Linguistics with George Lakoff, Dan Slobin, Eve Sweetser, and Leonard Talmy since 1980. He joined the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics in 1991 until 1997, where he began working on issues more specific to linguistic relativity. Relevant publications include “Geographic and Manipulable Space in Two Tamil Linguistic Systems” (1993); “Language as Context, Language as Means: Spatial Cognition and Habitual Language use” (1995); “Semantic Typology and Spatial Conceptualization” (with Eve Danziger, Stephen Levinson, Sotaro Kita, Gunter Senft, and David Wilkins, 1998); “Through the Looking Glass: Literacy, Writing Systems and Mirror Image Discrimination” (with Eve Danziger, 1998); and “Mirror-Image Discrimination among Nonliterate, Monoliterate, and Biliterate Tamil Speakers” (2003). In addition to linguistic relativity, his general interests include semantic typology, field/descriptive linguistics (South India), and the representation of events. Eric Pederson can be reached at [email protected].

• Published: 18 September 2012
• Cite Icon Cite
• Permissions Icon Permissions

Linguistic relativity (also known as the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis) is a general cover term for the conjunction of two basic notions. The first notion is that languages are relative, that is, that they vary in their expression of concepts in noteworthy ways. The second notion is that the linguistic expression of concepts has some degree of influence over conceptualization in cognitive domains, which need not necessarily be linguistically mediated. This article explores the treatment of linguistic relativity within works generally representative of cognitive linguistics and presents a survey of classic and more modern (pre- and post-1980s) research within linguistics, anthropology, and psychology. First, it provides a brief overview of the history of linguistic relativity theorizing from Wilhelm von Humboldt through to Benjamin Whorf. It then discusses the role of literacy to cognitive and cultural development, folk classification, and formulations of linguistic relativity.

1. Introduction

Linguistic relativity (also known as the Sapir - Whorf Hypothesis ) is a general cover term for the conjunction of two basic notions. The first notion is that languages are relative , that is, that they vary in their expression of concepts in noteworthy ways. What constitutes “noteworthy” is, of course, a matter of some interpretation. Cognitive scientists interested in human universals will often describe some particular linguistic variation as essentially minor, while others, for example, some anthropological linguists, may describe the same variation as significant.

The second component notion to linguistic relativity is that the linguistic expression of concepts has some degree of influence over conceptualization in cognitive domains, which need not necessarily be linguistically mediated. In textbooks, this notion of language affecting conceptualization is typically divided into “strong” and “weak” hypotheses. The “strong” hypothesis (also known as linguistic determinism ) is that the variable categories of language essentially control the available categories of general cognition. As thus stated, this “strong” hypothesis is typically dismissed as untenable. The “weak” hypothesis states that the linguistic categories may influence the categories of thought but are not fundamentally restrictive. As thus stated, this “weak” hypothesis is typically considered trivially true.

Arguably, this simplification of the broad issue of the relationship between linguistic and cognitive categorization into two simple (“strong” vs. “weak”) statements has impeded development of genuinely testable hypotheses and has helped lead studies of linguistic relativity into academic ill-repute. Modern research into the general question of linguistic relativity has focused on more narrowly stated hypotheses for testing, that is, investigating the specific relationships between particular linguistic categories (e.g., the categories of number, color, or spatial direction) and more exactly specified cognitive operations (e.g., encoding into long-term memory or deductive reasoning).

This chapter is organized as (i) a brief history of the research question (section 2 ); (ii) a discussion of the challenges in designing research into linguistic relativity (section 3 ); (iii) the treatment of linguistic relativity within works generally representative of Cognitive Linguistics (section 4 ); and (iv) a survey of classic and more modern (pre- and post-1980s) research within linguistics, anthropology, and psychology (section 5 ).

In addition to this chapter, several other surveys of linguistic relativity may be consulted. Lucy ( 1997a ) gives a broad overview of different approaches which have investigated linguistic relativity, while Lucy ( 1992b ) elaborates on a particular empirical approach and provides detailed critiques of previous empirical work. Lee ( 1996 ) provides historical documentation to the often poorly understood work of Benjamin Lee Whorf (see also Lee 2000 ). Hill and Mannheim ( 1992 ) trace the history of the notion of world view with respect to language through twentieth-century anthropology, from Boas through Cognitive Linguistics of the 1980s to the work of John Lucy. Hill and Mannheim also provides a useful overview of the anthropological cum semiotic approach to culturally embedded language use—see especially Hanks ( 1990 ) and Silverstein ( 1985 , 1987 ).

Smith ( 1996 ) also discusses the writings of Sapir and Whorf to clarify that most popular accounts of the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis are not directly derivative of their work. She is also concerned that the relatively large-scale dismissal of the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis in academic culture has been at the expense of serious research into the relationships between language and thought. Similar discussion of the “demise” of the “Whorf Hypothesis” and the misconstrual of Whorf's actual writings can be found in Alford ( 1978 ). 1

Koerner ( 2000 ) also provides a survey of the “pedigree” of linguistic relativity “from Locke to Lucy,” that is, from the seventeenth through the twentieth century. chapters 10–12 of Foley ( 1997 ) as well provide historical coverage of the notion, with summaries of fairly recent work with spatial language and classifiers. Duranti ( 1997 ) similarly provides historical coverage with particular emphasis on the American anthropology traditions.

Hunt and Agnoli ( 1991 ) revisit linguistic relativity from the perspective of cognitive psychology, which had largely rejected the notion as either false or uninteresting during the 1970s. Within canonical Cognitive Linguistics, Lakoff ( 1987 ) dedicates chapter 18 of Women , Fire , and Dangerous Things to discussions of evidence for and types of linguistic relativity. Many of the principles from that chapter have informed the remainder of his work.

2. Historical Speculation and Modern Formulations

Given the wealth of historical surveys of linguistic relativity, this chapter will focus more on modern work and methodological issues. However, a brief overview of the history of linguistic relativity theorizing will help to situate the modern research questions.

2.1. From Humboldt through Whorf

The most widely cited intellectual antecedent for linguistic relativity is the work of Humboldt. Later, the work of Boas is widely seen as the inheritor of the Humboldtian notions and through him, the concern with linguistic relativity was taken up in the writings of Sapir, who developed the vital notion of the “patterns” or structural systematicity of language as being particularly relevant to the relationship between language, mind, and culture.

Humboldt's principal work addressing linguistic relativity is Über die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues und ihren Einfluss auf die geistige Entwicklung des Menschengeschlecht [On the diversity of human language construction and its influence on the mental development of the human species]. There are many editions and translations of this work; for a recent edition of Peter Heath's English translation, see Losonsky ( 1999 ). The philosophical precursors to Humboldt, as well as linguistic relativity in general, is discussed in Manchester ( 1985 ), and an overview of Humboldt's notion of language and Weltansicht (‘world view’) is provided in Brown ( 1967 ).

The writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf are best known through Carroll's edited collection Whorf ( 1956 ). This collection helped to popularize the notion that the categories of language may influence the categories of thought. However, Lee ( 1996 ) argues—especially in light of the previously unpublished “Yale report” (see Whorf and Trager [ 1938 ] 1996 )—that Whorf was concerned with the interpenetration of language and thought; that is, the two words language and thought refer to aspects of a single system, and it is a misapprehension to ask in what way one affects the other. This is quite distinct from the more modular view of language processing dominant in current psychology and linguistics.

2.2. Literacy

While modern linguistics places considerable emphasis on spoken language—which means that this chapter will focus on the potential cognitive impact of the categories found in spoken or signed languages—the role of literacy to cognitive and cultural development has long been a subject of debate.

Early twentieth-century experiments on the relationship between literacy and cognitive development were conducted by Aleksandr Luria and colleagues (for an overview in English, see Luria 1976 ). This classic work investigated the effects of previously established, Soviet-era adult literacy programs on the development of various cognitive skills. There were a number of methodological problems with that work—perhaps the most significant one being the confounding of formal schooling with the acquisition of literacy (or conversely, the lack of formal schooling with nonliterate populations). The largest single effort to overcome this common confound is reported by Scribner and Cole ( 1981 ), who investigated effects of literacy acquisition in the absence of formal schooling. The designs and subject pools were still not completely free of confounding factors and the results, while fascinating, give a largely mixed picture of the effects of literacy as an independent factor on cognition.

“The literacy hypothesis,” namely that various cultural features can be traced to the development of literacy in the history of a given culture, has been subject to considerable debate. Goody and Watt ( 1962 ), one of the better known works, extolled the effects of specifically alphabetic literacy as critical in the development of early Greek and later European culture. This view came under considerable criticism, and Goody himself later backed away from the specific claims about alphabetic literacy. 2 However, on a more general level, the claim that literacy engenders certain cognitive changes—especially enhanced metalinguistic awareness—continues to be argued. Readers interested in the effects of literacy on cognition could also consult Scinto ( 1986 ), Graff ( 1987 ), Olson ( 1991 , 2002 ), Ong ( 1992 ), and references therein.

Rather than studying the general effects of reading and writing on cognition, one line of research has been concerned with the effects of learning particular writing systems. Morais et al. ( 1979 ) investigate the effects of child-acquired literacy on phonemic awareness, and Read et al. ( 1986 ) present evidence arguing that alphabetic literacy, but not logographic and syllabic literacy, leads to phonemic awareness. In Danziger and Pederson ( 1998 ) and Pederson ( 2003 ), I argue that familiarity with specific graphemic qualities can lead to differences in visual categorization in nonwriting/nonreading tasks.

2.3. Folk Classification

Anthropologists have long been concerned with folk classification , that is, the culturally specific ways in which linguistic and other categories are organized into coherent systems. Perhaps the richest body of work is in the area of taxonomies of natural kinds (plants, animals, etc.). This research is conveniently served by having a scientific standard for comparison. While there is abundant anecdotal evidence that people interact with natural kinds according to their taxonomical relations to other natural kinds (e.g., X is a pet, so treat it like other pets), there has not been much in the way of psychological-style testing of specific linguistic relativity hypotheses in this domain. For an introduction to folk classification, see Hunn ( 1977 , 1982 ), Berlin, Breedlove, and Raven ( 1973 ), Berlin ( 1978 ), and Blount ( 1993 ).

2.4. Formulations of Linguistic Relativity

There are many semantic domains one could search for linguistic relativity effects—that is, domains in which one might find linguistic categories conditioning nonlinguistic categorization. For example, cultures and languages are notorious for having varying kinship terms, which group into major types with various subtypes. Importantly, the categories of allowable behaviors with kin tend to correspond to the grouping by kinship terminology. For example, South Indian (Dravidian) languages systematically distinguish between cross-cousins and parallel cousins, with marriage allowed between cross-cousins and incest taboo applying to parallel cousins. In contrast, North Indian languages typically classify all cousins with siblings and incest taboo applies to all (see Carter 1973 ).

However important sexual reproduction may be to our species, the standards of marriage are clearly the result of cultural convention overlaid on biological predispositions. Accordingly, finding linguistic variation corresponding to categories of human behavior in such a domain is not generally taken as a particularly revealing demonstration of linguistic relativity. Likewise, elaborated vocabulary sets in expert domains and impoverished sets where there is little experience, however interesting, are also not taken as particularly revealing. While a tropical language speaker may lack the broad vocabulary of English for discussing frozen precipitation, that same speaker may be quite particular in distinguishing what English speakers lump together as ‘cousins’.

In other words, cases of categorization which are dependent on environmentally or culturally variable experience are generally considered uninteresting domains for the study of linguistic relativity. This corresponds to the late twentieth-century bias toward universalism in the cognitive sciences; namely, for variation to be noteworthy, it should be in a domain where variation was not previously thought to be possible. That is to say, for linguistic relativity to be broadly interesting, it must apply within cognitive domains which operate on “basic” and universal human experience.

3. Challenges in Researching Linguistic Relativity

3.1. intralinguistic variation.

Speakers may use language differently across different contexts, and this difference may be indicative of shifting conceptual representations. One of the few studies within Cognitive Linguistics to empirically address intralinguistic variation is Geeraerts, Grondelaers, and Bakema ( 1994 , especially chapter 4 : “Onomasiological Variation”), which explores alternative expressions as the representation of different construals and perspectivization.

Of course, some of these alternative expressions may be confined to some subcommunities and dialects. While linguistic relativity is typically discussed as the difference across speakers of distinct languages, there is every reason to wonder about parallels with differences in conceptualization that may exist within a single language community. Speakers of different dialects may have different linguistic patterns which might be hypothesized to correspond to different habitual conceptualizations. In Pederson ( 1993 , 1995 ), I investigate communities of Tamil speakers who systematically vary in their preference for terms of spatial reference, but who otherwise speak essentially the same dialect.

The work of Loftus ( 1975 ) has demonstrated that the choice of particular linguistic expressions at the time of encoding or recall may well influence nonlinguistic representation of events. Extrapolating from Loftus's work, we might wonder to what extent language generally can prime specific nonlinguistic representations—I call this the language as prime model. The fact that social humans are surrounded by linguistic input suggests that there might be a cumulative effect of this language priming. Indeed, if a particular linguistic encoding presented before a certain perception influences the nonlinguistic encoding or recall of that perception, what then might be the cumulative effect of one type of linguistic encoding rather than another being used throughout a speaker's personal history? If, for example, the classifiers of a speaker's habitual language force categorization of certain objects as ‘long and thin’, it seems reasonable that such objects may be remembered as potentially longer or thinner than they actually were.

Of course, if there were no consistent pattern to the linguistic priming, then we would not expect any single representation to become dominant. Indeed, Kay ( 1996 ) has argued that there is considerable flexibility within any language for alternative representations, and speakers may well alternate from one representation to another. This suggests that rather than a single and simple “world-view” necessary for a cleanly testable hypothesis, speakers may draw on complex “repertoires” of representations. While this does not preclude the possibility of systematic differences across languages having different repertoires, it certainly argues that the differences are far less obvious.

Given flexibility within a single language, a linguistic relativity hypothesis to be tested may need to compare patterns which are pervasive in one language and underexpressed in another language. This can be difficult to compensate for in an experimental design. A balanced design might seek opposing, but functionally equivalent systems, which are dominant in each language community. Each community may have both systems in common, but not to the same level of default familiarity. Of course, the experimental measure needs to be sufficiently non-priming itself so as to allow each subject population to rely on their default mode of representation.

3.2. Selecting a Domain

Universals in categorization may be of more than one type. Most relevantly, some categories may be essentially innate, that is, an internal predisposition of the organism. Other universal categories maybe the result of commonalities of all human environments in conjunction with our innately driven mechanisms. Even assuming that we can reliably presume that certain categories are universal, determining which are purely innate and which derive from interaction with universal properties of the environment is not a trivial task.

Variation in innate properties is impossible—except inasmuch as the variation is within innately proscribed limits—so we cannot look for linguistic relativity effects in these domains. For linguistic relativity effects to be both interesting to cognitive scientists and robust in their operations, they must apply in a domain which is generally presumed universal by virtue of the common environment, but which can be hypothesized to be nonuniversal. As discussed above, demonstrating effects from language type in cognitive domains with wide variation is unexciting. It follows that the researcher interested in testing linguistic relativity best seeks a domain which is hypothesized to be fairly basic to cognition, but just shy of exhibiting a universal pattern.

This motivates modern linguistic relativity studies to examine categorization in domains presumed to derive somewhat immediately from basic perceptual stimuli or fundamental mechanisms of reasoning. The majority of such empirical studies concern categorization of visual or spatial properties of objects or the environment. A few studies have examined purported differences in reasoning, but these are inherently more difficult to pursue. Object properties and the environment can be experimentally controlled, but processes of reasoning—especially in cross-cultural work—are notoriously difficult to measure while maintaining adequate control of subject variables.

3.3. Independent Evidence for Language and Cognition

Linguists—especially cognitive linguists—frequently claim that a particular linguistic form represents a particular underlying conceptualization. Obviously, however, any substantial claim of a relationship between language and cognition needs independent assessment of each and a correlation established between the two.

Perhaps surprisingly, most work on linguistic relativity spends remarkably little effort demonstrating the linguistic facts prior to seeking the hypothesized cognitive variable. Some of the most severe criticisms of linguistic relativity studies have worried about this insufficient linguistic description. Lucy ( 1992b ) is especially clear in his call for more careful linguistic analysis preparatory to linguistic relativity experimentation.

Given the relative accessibility of the linguistic facts compared with the difficulty inferring cognitive behavior from behavioral measures, one could argue that the often minimal characterization of language is of unacceptable sloppiness. More charitably, linguistic facts are typically quite complex, and in an effort to seek a testable hypothesis, a certain amount of simplification becomes inevitable. Unfortunately, there is no standard to use in evaluating the adequacy of a linguistic description for linguistic relativity work other than using the general standards of descriptive linguistics. Descriptive linguistics tends to be as exhaustive as is practically possible and does not necessarily foster the creation of simple hypotheses about linguistic and conceptual categorization. On the other hand, it is difficult to argue that studies in linguistic relativity should hold their linguistic descriptions to a lower standard.

A related problem is the variability of language. Since many different varieties of language exist depending on communicative and descriptive context, it can be quite misleading to speak of Hopi or English as having a specific characteristic, unless one can argue that this characteristic is true and uniquely true (e.g., there are no competitive constructions) in all contexts. This is, needless to say, a difficult endeavor, but failing to argue the general applicability of the pattern invites the next linguist with expertise in the language to pull forth numerous counterexamples. Studies most closely following the approaches advocated by Whorf have tended to focus on basic grammatical features of the language which are presumed to be fairly context independent. However, this may overlook other linguistic features which may well be relevant to a particular hypothesis of linguistic and conceptual categorization.

One way to partially circumvent this problem was followed in Pederson et al. ( 1998 ), which seeks to describe language characteristics typically used for, in this case, table-top spatial reference. There is no attempt to include or exclude information on the basis of whether or not the relevant language elements were grammaticized or lexicalized. Rather, if the information was present in the language used for a particular context, these linguistic categories are presumed to be available conceptual categories within same or similar contexts. This approach leaves unanswered the question of how broadly the linguistic description (or for that matter the cognitive description as well) applies to the subject population in a variety of other contexts, but it does help ensure that the linguistic description is the most exact match for the cognitive enquiry.

3.4. Subvocalization or What Is Nonlinguistic?

If independent measures are to be taken of both language use and cognitive processes, then great care is necessary to ensure that the behavioral measure for the nonlinguistic cognitive process is not covertly measuring linguistically mediated behavior.

Ideally, the entire cognitive task would be nonlinguistic, but as a practical minimum, the instructions and training for the task must be couched in language which is neutral with respect to the current hypothesis. This is particularly difficult to manage when a language has grammatically obligatory encoding. How do we interpret an effect which may be due to obligatory encoding in the instructions? Is this just an effect of the instructions, or can we interpret this as a general language effect because the instructions only exemplify the continual linguistic context the subjects live within?

There is a general presumption that instructions to the subjects should be in the subjects' native language. One might be tempted to use a shared second language as a type of neutral metalanguage for task instructions, but this introduces unexplored variables. If there is the possibility of a cognitive effect from the regular use of one's native language, then there is also the possibility of an effect from the immediate use of the language of instruction. Additionally, it is more difficult to be certain that all subjects understand the second-language instructions in exactly the same way as the experimenter. Finally, it is unclear how one would guarantee that the language of instruction is neutral with respect to anticipated behavioral outcomes. The very fact that it may mark different categories from the native language may influence the outcome in unpredictable ways.

It is safest therefore to minimize any language-based instruction. General instructions (e.g., “Sit here”) cannot be excluded, but critical information is best presented through neutral examples with minimal accompanying language. Since a dearth of talking makes it more difficult to monitor subject comprehension, it is imperative that the experimental design include a built-in check (e.g., control trials ) to ensure that each subject understands the task in the same way—except, of course, for the variation for which the task was designed to test. An account of the effects of subtle changes in instruction with children in explorations with base ten number systems can be found in Saxton and Towse ( 1998 ).

Another concern is that subjects involved in an ostensibly nonlanguage measure actually choose to use language as part of the means of determining their behavior. For example, the subjects may subvocalize their reasoning in a complex problem and then any patterning of behavior along the lines of the linguistic categories is scarcely surprising. In Pederson ( 1995 ), I address this concern by arguing that if subjects have distinct levels of linguistic and conceptual representations, they should only choose to approach a nonlinguistic task using linguistic means if there were a sufficiently close match between these two levels with respect to the experiment. In effect, a subject's unforced decision to rely on linguistic categories can be understood as validation of at least one sort of linguistic relativity hypothesis.

3.5. Finding Behavioral Consequences of Linguistically Determined Cognitive Variation

Variation in categorization of spatial or perceptual features can be of relatively minor consequence. Whether one thinks of pencils more fundamentally as tools or as long skinny objects has probably little effect on their employment.

The most basic features of humans and their environment are stable across linguistic communities. Gravity pulls in a constant direction, visual perception is roughly comparable, and so forth. If there are cognitive differences across communities with respect to universal features, then these different cognitive patterns must have functional equivalence ; that is, different ways of thinking about the same thing must largely allow the same behavioral responses. For example, whether a line of objects is understood as proceeding from left to right or from north to south makes little difference under most circumstances. If the objects are removed and the subject must rebuild them, either understanding of the array will give the same rebuilt line with no effect on accuracy. Accordingly, any experimental task must select an uncommon condition where the principle of functional equivalence fails to hold (see especially Levinson 1996 ). To continue this example, if the subject is rotated by 90 or 180 degrees before being asked to rebuild an array, the underlying representation (left-right or north-south) should result in a different direction for the rebuilding.

Without a context which effectively disambiguates the possible underlying representations from behavioral responses, a researcher must demonstrate that one subject population has a deficient or improved performance on a task and that this differential performance corresponds to a difference in (default) linguistic encoding. There is a long and sordid history of attributing deficiencies to populations that the investigator does not belong to. Accordingly, it is entirely appropriate that the burden of proof fall particularly hard on the researcher claiming that a studied population is somehow impaired on a given task as a result of their pattern of linguistic encoding. Even if the population is claimed to have an ability which is augmented by linguistic encoding, it is difficult to demonstrate that any difference in ability derives specifically from linguistic differences and not from any of a myriad of environmental (perhaps even nutritional) conditions.

Related to this is the concern for the ecological validity of the experimental task. A task may fail to measure subject ability or preferences owing to unfamiliarity of the materials, instructions, or testing context. Further, it is difficult to decide on the basis of just a few experiments which effects can be generalized to hold for nonexperimental contexts—to wit, the complexity of daily life. This is not, however, an argument against experimentation as the inherently interpretive nature of simple observational data ultimately requires experimentally controlled measures.

3.6. Types of Experimental Design

Various types of experimental tasks have been used for investigating the cognitive side of linguistic relativity. Whatever research methods are used, reliability of the results is far more likely if there is triangulation from a number of observational and experimental methods.

Sorting and Triads Tasks

Perhaps the most common design used in linguistic relativity studies is a sorting task. Quite simply, the subject is presented with a number of stimuli and is asked to group them into categories. These categories may be ad hoc (subject determined) or preselected (researcher determined). Multiple strategies may be used for the sorting task, giving different sorting results. The most common variant of the sorting task is the triads task which presents a single stimulus to the subjects and asks them to group it with either of two other stimuli or stimuli sets; that is, does stimulus X group better with A or with B? (hence, the term AXB test in some research paradigms). For an archetypal example of a triads task, see Davies et al. ( 1998 ).

This task is easy to administer as long as the stimuli are reasonably tangible, interpretable, and able to be considered in a nearly simultaneous manner. One consideration of sorting designs is that subjects often report awareness of multiple strategies which might be employed. Of course, the researcher cannot indicate which is a preferred strategy and can only instruct the subject to sort according to “first impression,” “whatever seems most natural,” or other such instructions. The interpretation of these instructions may add an uncontrolled variable. Further, sorting tasks inherently invite the subjects to respond according to their beliefs about the researcher's expectations, which may not in fact be what would be the normal sorting decision outside of this task.

Discrimination Tasks

Other tasks seek to find different discriminations across populations. As a practical consequence, differences usually boil down to one population making finer or more distinctions than another population; see, for example, much of the work on color discrimination and linguistic labeling discussed in the debates in Hardin and Maffi ( 1997 ). However, it is at least theoretically possible that one population might be more sensitive to certain features at the expense of other features and that a contrasting population would show the reverse pattern.

A limitation of discrimination tasks is that for them to be interpretable, one must be able to assume that beyond the independent variable of different linguistic systems, all subjects brought the same degree of attention, general task satisfying abilities, and so on to the experimental task. Should, for example, one population be less likely to be attentionally engaged, then this reduces the possibility of isolating a linguistic effect on cognition.

Problem Solving Tasks

Problem solving tasks are readily used in many types of research. In linguistic relativity studies, they are typically of two design types: difficult solution or alternative solution.

The first type involves a task which provides some difficulty in finding the solution. Some subjects are anticipated to be better or worse than others at solving the task. As with reduced discrimination just discussed, it is extremely difficult to argue that it is specifically the categories of language which lead to differential performance. The counterfactual reasoning task employed by Bloom ( 1981 ) was such a task, and the difficulty in interpreting its results was part of much of the controversy surrounding that work.

The second type of problem solving tasks allow for alternative solutions each of which should be indicative of a different underlying representation. As such, these are similar to triads tasks in that they allow each subject to find the most “natural” solution for them (at least within the given experimental context). For example, in Pederson ( 1995 ) I describe a transitivity task in which subjects know how each of two objects are spatially related to a third object. They must then decide which side of the second object the first/test object must be placed. Depending on how these relationships are encoded, the test object will be placed on a different side of the second object. Like triads tasks, there is the potential problem that the subjects may be aware of the possibility of multiple solutions, prompting responses derived from any number of uncontrolled factors.

Embedded Tasks

Within psychological research, there is a common solution to the problem of subject awareness of multiple possible responses. Namely, the actual measure of the task is embedded within another task for which the subject is more consciously aware. For example, subjects may be asked to respond as to whether a figure is masculine or feminine, but the researcher is really measuring the distribution of attention to the figures. While the embedded task may still be influenced by subject expectations, it is an indirect and presumably nonreflected influence. As such, one can argue that the responses measured by the embedded task are more likely to correspond to default behaviors used outside of this exact experimental context. The “Animals in a Row” task discussed in Pederson et al. ( 1998 ) was one such task, where subjects understood the task as one to recreate a sequence of toy animals, but the critical dependent measure was the direction the animals were facing when subjects placed them on the table-top before them.

Variable Responses

The researcher must also be careful in coding fixed response types from the subjects. It may be that subject preference is for a response type not allowed by the forced choice, and when pigeonholed into a different response type, subjects may not be responding in a manner reflecting their typical underlying representations. Also, certain patterns (or lack of patterns) of responses may actually indicate a preference for a response type not anticipated by the experimental design. For example, in the “Animals in a Row” task just discussed, some populations—and not others—appear on the scoring sheets as preserving the orientation of the original stimuli roughly half the time. On closer inspection, many of these subjects were actually entirely consistent in giving the animals the same orientation (e.g., always facing left) regardless of the original orientation of the stimuli. Since the task appeared to be about the order and not the orientation of the animals, this is a perfectly reasonable response. Unfortunately, there was no hypothesis anticipating this response, and no claims could be made as to why some subjects and not others gave this response pattern.

3.7. Controlling Extraneous Variables

Work such as Kay and Kempton ( 1984 ) demonstrates that the effects of native language on nonlinguistic categorization tasks can vary with even slightly varied task demands. This is commonly interpreted as an indication that “relativity effects” are “weak.” A more conservative interpretation is that there are many factors (of undetermined “strength”) which can effect results and that language may be only one of many possible factors. The exact total effect of language will depend on what other nonlinguistic factors are in effect. This requires that an experimental design for linguistic relativity effects carefully control all foreseeable linguistic and nonlinguistic variables.

Linguistic Variables

Since they are most directly related to the tested hypothesis, language variables are perhaps the most critical to control in one's design.

Of fundamental importance is that one must be certain that the base language of the subjects is consistent with respect to whatever features have led to the specific hypothesis. This may seem trivial, but dialectal (and even idiolectal) variation may well have the effect that some speakers do not share certain critical linguistic features even though they ostensibly speak the same language.

Perhaps even more problematic is the issue of bilingualism. Unless all subjects are totally monolingual, this is a potential problem for the design. Generally, linguistic relativity tests presume that one's “native” language capacity is the most relevant, but this cannot preclude effects from other known languages. Age of acquisition of second languages may also vary widely; there is certainly no established model of the effects of age of acquisition on nonlinguistic category formation.

If nonnative categories have been learned, how can we assume that they are not also brought to bear on the experimental task—clouding the results in unpredictable ways? This is perhaps most insidious when the language of instruction differs from the native language. Suitably, then, serious work in linguistic relativity needs to use the native language for instruction, but even this is not necessarily a straightforward task. For example, how does one ensure that instructions to multiple populations are both exactly and suitably translated?

How to Control for Exact Translations in a Comparative Work?

Work in linguistic relativity has had an impact in translation theory. Indeed, belief in a sufficiently strong model of insurmountable language differences would suggest that complete translations would be difficult to attain. House ( 2000 ) presents an overview of the challenges of translation and suggests a solution to the problem of linguistic relativity and translation. Chafe ( 2000 ) also discusses translation issues with respect to linguistic relativity, and Slobin ( 1991 , 1996 ) uses translations in his discussions of how languages most suitably express motion events (see the section on space, below). The work of Bloom and his critics (see the discussion below) is particularly relevant for this issue because the ability to translate the experimental task from English to Chinese was central to his research question of counterfactual reasoning. Indeed, one might be skeptical of any attempt to investigate linguistic relativity in which the nonlinguistic experimental design is essentially a language-based task.

Of immediate practical concern is the translation of instructions for any research instrument itself. It is difficult enough to be confident that two subjects speaking the same language have the same understanding of a task's instructions. How, then, can the researcher be confident that translations of instructions are understood identically by speakers of different languages especially in the context of an experiment which seeks to confirm that speakers of these different languages in fact do understand the world in different ways?

The most obvious solution is to avoid linguistic instruction entirely. This does not remove the possibility that subjects understand the task differently, but it does ensure that any different understanding is not the direct result of immediate linguistic context. However, there are severe restrictions on what can be reliably and efficiently instructed without language. Understandably, then, most research relies on language-based instruction. In such cases, one must seek to phrase instructions in such a way that one sample is not more influenced by the particular choice of phrasing than the other sample.

To invent an example, imagine we are interested in the effect of evidential marking (linguistic markings which indicate how information is known to the speaker) on the salience of sources of even nonlinguistic information to speakers of a language which obligatorily marks evidentiality. This population would contrast with speakers of a language which essentially lacks routine marking. How, then, might we word our instructions? Do we use expressions typical for each language such that one set of instructions contains evidential marking and the other not? Alternatively, do we provide evidential information for both languages? In the case of the language which does not typically mark evidentials, providing this information would obviously be more “marked” in usage than for the other language. This greater markedness of the information might make the evidential information more salient for those subjects who normally do not concern themselves with any language expression of evidentiality, which in turn could make issues of evidentiality more salient than they would be under average conditions—countering the entire design of the experiment!

Recent Language Use

Another potential language factor affecting results might be preexperimental, but recent, language use. If the language of instruction can influence results, could not language use immediately prior to instruction also influence the results? Indeed, if we assume that linguistic categories prime access to parallel nonlinguistic categories, then how do we control for language use outside of the experimental setting? On the one hand, one could argue that language use outside of the experiment is exactly the independent variable under consideration, and this is controlled simply through subject selection. On the other hand, if a language has multiple ways of representing categories, what is the potential effect if a subject has most recently been using one of the less typical linguistic categories for his or her language? Once again, the cleanest solution to this risk is to test categories for which there is minimal linguistic variation within each of the examined languages. 3

Conversation during Task

The last of the language variables to consider is language use during the experiment itself. Lucy and Shwedder ( 1988 ) found that forbidding subjects to have conversations between exposure and recall in a memory task allowed a greater recall of focal color terms than of nonfocal color terms (see the subsection on color below). Subjects who had (unrelated) conversations remembered focal and nonfocal colors about equally well. While Lucy and Shwedder do not provide a model for why this might be the case, it clearly suggests that even incidental language use during and perhaps around a task can have significant influences on performance. Other work (see Gennari et al. 2002 ) has suggested that even in cases where there might normally be no particular relation between habitual language use and performance on a nonlinguistic task, language used during exposure or memorization to stimuli can lead to nonlinguistic responses in alignment with language use.

Nonlinguistic Subject Variables

Even more heterogonous to a subject sample than the linguistic variables are the cultural, educational, and other experiential variables. Subject questionnaires are the usual ways to try to control these variables in post hoc analysis, but this control is limited by the foresight to collect adequate information.

One of the more obvious variables to control or record is the amount of schooling and literacy. Unfortunately, while schooling is easily represented on an ordinal scale (first to postsecondary grades), there is little guarantee that this represents the same education especially across, but even within, two population samples. For example, literacy is also not as simple a variable as it might appear. Subjects may be literate in different languages (and scripts) and may have very different literacy practices. Coding subjects who only read the Bible in their nonnative language and other subjects who read a variety of materials in their native language as both simply “literate” clearly glosses over potentially significant differences in experience.

Expertise may also vary considerably across samples. One of the most thorny obstacles in cross-cultural psychology is comparing testing results across two populations, one of which habitually engages with experiment-like settings and the other of which does not. This may have effects beyond simple difficulty in performance, but may affect the way in which subjects understand instructions, second-guess the intentions of the experimenter, and so on. 4

Sex or gender, age, and the more physiologically based experiences are also difficult to compare. Being a woman in different societies means very different daily experiences beyond the variables of amount of schooling and the like. To what extent are subjects in their thirties the same across two populations. In one society but not another, a 35-year-old might typically be a grandparent in declining health with uncorrected vision or hearing loss.

Testing Environment

Lastly, variation in the testing environment is often difficult to control. The more broadly cross-cultural the samplings, the greater the dependence on local conditions. One might think of the ideal as an identical laboratory setup for each population sampled. However, since different subjects might react differently within such an environment, this is not necessarily a panacea (in addition to the obvious practical difficulty in implementation).

The best approach is to carefully examine the environmental features needed for the task at hand. If an experiment is about color categorization, lighting obviously needs to be controlled; if an experiment is about spatial arrays, adjacent landmarks and handedness need to be controlled; and so on. For example, in the basic experiment reported in Pederson et al. ( 1998 ), the use of table tops was not considered essential for tasks testing “table-top space,” but the use of two delimited testing surfaces and the geometrical relationship and distances between these surfaces was critical to the design. This allowed the individual experimenters to set up tables or mats on the ground/floor as was more appropriate for the broader material culture. 5

3.8. Establishing Causal Directionality

Once a correlation between a language pattern and a behavioral response has been experimentally established, the problem of establishing causal directionality remains. While this is a problem for any correlational design, it is particularly vexing for studies of linguistic relativity. Quite simply, it is difficult to rule out the possibility that subjects habitually speak the way they do as a consequence of their culture (and environment) as opposed to the possibility that the culture thinks the way it does because of their language. For discussions of the role of culture vis-à-vis language in linguistic relativity studies, see Bickel ( 2000 ), Enfield ( 2000 ), and the fairly standard reference of Hanks ( 1990 ).

In specific response to work on spatial cognition, Li and Gleitman ( 2002 ) argue that behavioral response patterns are not causally attributable to community language preferences, but rather that language use reflects cultural practice and concerns, for example, the many words for snow used by skiers—however, see also Levinson et al. ( 2002 ) for an extensive response. To the extent that the language features under investigation are roughly as changeable as the culture, this is certainly a likely possibility. On the other hand, when the language features are essentially fossilized in the grammatical system, they cannot be understood as the consequences of current cultural conditions. If anything, the pattern of grammaticized distinctions reflects the fossilized conceptualizations of one's ancestors.

4. Work within Cognitive Linguistics

Some of the earliest cognitive linguistic work (1970s) explicitly tying grammatical structure to cognition is found in studies by Talmy (see especially Talmy 1977 , 1978 ). This work largely focuses on the universal (or at least broadly found) patterns of language and has been revised and expanded in Talmy ( 2000a , 2000b ). Talmy treats language as one of many “cognitive systems” which has the “set of grammatically specified notions [constitute] the fundamental conceptual structuring system of language.… Thus, grammar broadly conceived, is the determinant of conceptual structure within one cognitive system, language” (2000a: 21–22). However, the relationship between this cognitive system (language) and others (i.e., nonlinguistic cognition) is relatively unspecified in his work. Structural commonalities between the various cognitive systems are suggested—most specifically between visual perception and language—but, importantly, Talmy avoids claims that there is any causal effect from linguistic categories to nonlinguistic categories. 6

Langacker is bolder in the relationship between grammar and cognition: in Cognitive Grammar's “view of linguistic semantics. Meaning is equated with conceptualization (in the broadest sense)” (Langacker 1987 : 55). Langacker ( 1991 ) further argues that the cognitive models underlying clause structure have prototypes which are rooted in (variable) cultural understanding. To the extent that we find interesting cross-linguistic variation, we can see the work of Talmy and Langacker as sources for linguistic relativity hypotheses to test—as, for example, Slobin ( 1996 , 2000 ) has begun with the motion event typology of Talmy ( 1985 ).

As mentioned above, Lakoff ( 1987 : chapter 18 ) directly addresses linguistic relativity. Within this chapter on linguistic relativity, there is a discussion of different ways in which two cross-linguistic systems might be “commensurate.” They might be translatable , understandable (though this is vaguely defined), commensurate in usage, share the same framing , and/or use the same organization of the various underlying concepts. In addition to a summary of the now classic Kay and Kempton ( 1984 ), there is an elaborate extension to linguistic relativity of semantics work in Mixtec and English by Brugman ( 1981 ) and Brugman and Macaulay ( 1986 ).

Metaphor is an obvious area of interest to many cognitive linguists (see Grady, this volume, chapter 8 , and references therein). The nature of metaphor is to consider conceptualizations in terms of other linguistically expressed domains. To the extent that source domains can vary cross-linguistically or cross-culturally (or different features of these source domains are mapped), this is an area ripe for linguistic relativity studies. To date, however, linguistic relativity studies—that is to say, work with behavioral data—have largely limited themselves to the study of elemental and literal language. One exception to this is linguistic relativity research on time, which almost necessarily is metaphorically expressed (see section 5.6 below).

5. Research by Topic Area

This section gives a brief overview of modern linguistic relativity work organized by topic area. While some comments are given, it is impossible in this space to summarize the findings of the entire body of work. Further, the empirical details of each study are essential to critical evaluation of the findings, so the original sources must be consulted.

Perhaps the greatest debate in linguistic relativity has been in the domain of color. Historically, linguists and anthropologists had been struck by the seemingly boundless diversity in color nomenclature. Given the obvious biological underpinnings of color perception, this made “color” a domain of choice to seek language-specific effects overriding biological prerequisites.

Lenneberg and Roberts ( 1956 ) is one of the earliest attempts to empirically test linguistic relativity, and as such this study spends considerable space defining the intellectual concerns before it reports on a relatively small study involving Zuni versus English color categorization. Brown and Lenneberg ( 1958 ) report on various work and develop the notion of codability : that is, the use of language as a way to more efficient coding of categories for the purposes not only of communication, but also of augmenting personal memory.

Berlin and Kay ( 1969 ) and the updated methodology in Kay and McDaniel ( 1978 ) have laid the groundwork of considerable research in color terminology. Central to the method is the use of Munsell color chips as a reference standard which can be carried to various field sites. Universal patterns were found to establish a typology of different color systems which appeared to be built out of a small set of universal principles. Research continues to be robust in this area and the interested reader may wish to consult the conference proceedings published as Hardin and Maffi ( 1997 ) for more current perspectives.

Eleanor Rosch (under her previous name: Heider 1971 , 1972 ) found that focal colors (or Hering primaries from Hering's theory of light and color, see Hering 1964 ) were better remembered even by young children and were also more perceptually salient for them. Further, Heider and Olivier ( 1972 ) and Rosch ( 1973 ) found that, even for members of a community (the Dani of Papua New Guinea) who had little color terminology at all, certain color examples were better remembered. She argues that these “natural” categories are generally favored in human learning and cognition. This work is often taken as support for universals of color perception, though since the Dani had no linguistic categories to sway them away from biologically primary colors, this cannot be taken as evidence against a potential linguistic influence on color perception.

The effects of language on color categorization could be seen in Kay and Kempton ( 1984 ), but any effects of language-specific color terms only surfaced under specific conditions, and the effects were not as robust as earlier researchers had hoped. Various proposals have been made to revise the Berlin and Kay approach in ways which accommodate linguistic relativity effects within a basically universally constrained system. Most notable of these is Vantage Theory, which seeks to explain multiple points of view—even within the putative universals of color perception—and how points of view may be linguistically mediated; see especially MacLaury ( 1991 , 1995 , 2000 ).

Work by Davies and colleagues has also expanded upon the work of Kay and Kempton ( 1984 ) by examining a variety of linguistic systems for denoting colors. They then test participants from these speech communities using various categorization tasks. For Turkish, see Oezgen and Davies ( 1998 ); for Setswana, English, and Russian, see Davies ( 1998 ), Davies and Corbett ( 1997 ), and Davies et al. ( 1998 ); see also Corbett and Davies ( 1997 ) for a discussion of method in language sampling for color terminology.

Especially within anthropology, there has been concern about the fundamental adequacy of the empirical method followed by Berlin and Kay (and later modifications). Jameson and DʼAndrade ( 1997 ) address the adequacy of the theory of color perception inherent in the use of the Munsell color system. Lucy ( 1997b ) criticizes most work on color terminology as insufficiently descriptive of the actual linguistic properties of the color terms themselves: without an adequate investigation into these properties, it is unclear what the effects may be of forcing reference with these terms into the Munsell system. The worry is that the Munsell system will not only standardize the coding of the responses, but actually create standardized and unnatural responses rather than allowing the terms to refer to their actual reference.

For a survey of recent work exploring color naming and its relationship to nonlinguistic cognition, see Kay and Regier ( 2006 ).

5.2. Shape Classification

In determining whether or not the Navajo shape classification system influenced sorting behavior, Carroll and Casagrande ( 1958 ) attempted to balance cultural factors across samples by using English-speaking and Navajo-speaking ethnic Navajo children. As a control group, English-speaking, middle-class American children were used. The results from triad classification (by either shape/function or color) were largely consistent with the Navajo verb classification, in that the Navajo-speaking Navajo children demonstrated a greater preference for shape sorting than English-speaking Navajo children. Note, however, that English-speaking middle-class children also patterned like Navajo-speaking children, suggesting to Carroll and Casagrande that cultural factors beyond language play an important role in such classification.

Lucy and Gaskins ( 2001 ) also use triad-type methods to compare Yucatecan children and adults with English-speaking Americans. Again, a broad consistency with each language's classification system is found, but interestingly, this only becomes prominent after age nine (see section 5.6 )

5.3. Conditional Reasoning

With basic reasoning processes, variation is more likely to be viewed as directly advantageous or disadvantageous, that is, essentially correct or incorrect. Whether the hypothesized cause is linguistic or otherwise, in modern academia, the burden of proof appropriately falls most heavily on the researcher hoping to demonstrate any potential absence (or “deficiency”) within a particular community.

The work of Alfred Bloom and his many detractors falls fully into this predicament. Bloom ( 1981 ) proposed that Chinese (unlike English) lacks a specific counterfactual construction and that this has led to reduced ability to engage in counterfactual reasoning. The debate was carried across several volumes of Cognition : Au ( 1983 , 1984 ), Bloom ( 1984 ), Liu ( 1985 ), Takano ( 1989 ); making use of different samples, these studies did not generally replicate Bloom's findings. 7 Unfortunately, there has been a tendency to interpret the various results (or lack thereof) as disconfirming linguistic relativity more generally rather than demonstrating a failure of a particular experimental design. Takano used Japanese speakers, who like Chinese speakers, lack a dedicated counterfactual construction, but found that their reasoning patterned like English speakers. More recently, Lardiere ( 1992 ) investigated Arabic speakers. Arabic patterns like English in that there is an explicit counterfactual construction, yet the Arabic participants performed like Bloom's original Chinese subjects on counterfactual reasoning. From these studies, both Takano and Lardiere conclude that the principal effect on counterfactual reasoning is traceable not to linguistic habit, but to cultural practices of reasoning, testing conventions, and the like.

Another conclusion one might draw from these studies is that we cannot automatically assume that either linguistic or nonlinguistic habit will be discern-able from the presence or absence of specialized linguistic constructions. Obviously, those Chinese and Japanese speakers trained in formal counterfactual reasoning must have found some means of expression. Conversely, the Arabic speakers need not have used their counterfactual construction in ways analogous to the ways of formally educated English speakers.

5.4. Number

Cardinal numbers.

One clear way in which languages vary is in their cardinal number systems. In addition to the obvious lack of larger numbers in many languages (at least as native vocabulary), languages also vary in their organization of these numbers. Various languages partially use a base twenty counting system and other languages appear to have relics of base five systems. But even within primarily base ten systems, there is variation of consistency and expression.

Miura ( 1987 ) argues that the generally superior mathematical abilities of school children in or from some cultures (especially East Asian) result at least in part from the transparency and exception-free nature of the base ten numerals used for counting, which children generally control prior to beginning formal education—see also the follow-up cross-linguistic studies: Miura and Okamoto ( 1989 ), Miura et al. ( 1988 ), Miura et al. ( 1993 ), Miura et al. ( 1994 ), Miura et al. ( 1999 ).

Saxton and Towse ( 1998 ) provide a more cautious conclusion, suggesting that the influence of native language on the task of learning place values is less than argued for by Miura and colleagues. Many other differences in performance were found across groups which were better accounted for as resulting from general cultural attitudes toward education and so on, than as the result of the linguistic number system.

Grammatical Number

On a grammatical level, languages vary in terms of their grammatical encoding of the number of entities in an event or scene. While this topic has not been widely taken up, the work of Lucy ( 1992a ) is noteworthy for its extensive consideration of attention to number in Mayan and English speakers. An extensive typological discussion of grammatical number, though without focus on issues of linguistic relativity, is provided by Corbett ( 2000 ). Lastly, Hill and Hill ( 1998 ) discuss the effects of culture on language (rather than linguistic relativity) for number marking (plurals), and in particular the “anti-Whorfian effect” they find in Uto-Aztecan.

Reference Frames

Currently, the primary area of linguistic relativity research in spatial domains is with reference frames (however, there is also the important developmental work on topological relations by Choi and Bowerman 1991 , see below).

Reference frames are the psychological or linguistic representation of relationships between entities in space. They require fixed points of reference, such as the speaker, a landmark, or an established direction. Within linguistics, the typology of reference frames is complicated, but most accounts include something like an intrinsic reference frame (whereby an object is located only with respect to an immediate point, e.g., The ball is next to the chair ) and various flavors of reference frames which make use of additional orientation (e.g., The ball is to my right of the chair or The ball is to the north of the chair ). Languages vary in terms of their habitually selected reference frames, and following the linguistic relativity hypothesis, speakers should also vary in their encoding spatial memories, making locational calculations, and so forth. For extensive work measuring event-related potential data (recordings at the scalp of electrical charges from brain activity during specific tasks), see the work of Taylor and colleagues: Taylor et al. ( 1999 ) and Taylor et al. ( 2001 ). These works compare the viewer/speaker-relative (or egocentric ) reference frame with the intrinsic.

Of note for being broadly comparative across diverse linguistic and cultural communities is the work reported in Pederson et al. ( 1998 ), which found correlations between habitual linguistic selection of reference frames and cognitive performance on spatial memory (and other) tasks. There were many studies within this same general project. Perhaps the most important to consult for the theoretical underpinnings for the project are Brown and Levinson ( 1993 ) and Levinson ( 1996 ). As pointed out by Li and Gleitman ( 2002 ), the populations reported as using an absolute/geo-cardinal ( north of …) reference frame were largely rural populations, and the populations using a speaker-relative/egocentric reference frame are largely urban, so there is a potential confound in the population samples between language and culture/environment. For a rebuttal to these concerns and Li and Gleitman's similar experiments, see Levinson et al. ( 2002 ); see also Pederson ( 1998 ) for a discussion of this urban/rural cultural split.

Motion Events

Talmy ( 1985 , 2000b ) identifies a typological contrast in the ways that languages encode basic motion events. To simplify, some languages such as the Romance languages commonly encode the fact of motion and the basic path with the main verb (e.g., to enter , to ascend , etc.). In contrast, Germanic and many other languages most commonly encode the fact of motion along with the manner of motion in the verb (e.g., to wiggle ), and the path is expressed elsewhere.

Slobin ( 1991 , 1996 ) considers the cognitive consequences of these linguistic patterns for English and Spanish speakers. Slobin ( 2000 ) extends this approach to French, Hebrew, Russian, and Turkish. Gennari et al. ( 2002 ) and Malt, Sloman, and Gennari ( 2003 ) examine these contrasts experimentally and argue for some effects of one's native language pattern on certain nonlinguistic tasks.

While spatial relationships have been extensively studied for linguistic relativity effects, the effects of different temporal encoding have received much less attention. In part, this may be attributed to the relative difficulty of developing research instruments. An obvious difference cross-linguistically is whether or not a language grammatically encodes tense. Bohnemeyer ( 1998 ) discusses the lack of tense-denoting constructions in Yucatec Mayan and contrasts this with German speakers observing the same video stimuli; nonetheless, both samples appeared to have encoded similar event orderings in memory. Languages also have some variation in preferred metaphors for talking about time. Boroditsky ( 2000 , 2001 ) argues that Mandarin Chinese speakers have a different metaphor for time (vertical) and this appears to influence their nonlinguistic encoding as well.

5.7. Developmental Studies

Ultimately, any linguistic relativity effects must be explained in terms of the acquisition of linguistic categories and the effects on cognitive development.

Choi and Bowerman ( 1991 ) and Bowerman and Choi ( 2001 ) contrast early lexical acquisition of Korean and English spatial terms, principally those expressing contact, closure, and similar concepts. Korean-speaking adults use spatial terms to categorize subtypes of these different relationships in very different ways from English-speaking adults. Perhaps surprisingly, Choi and Bowerman report that Korean-speaking children as young as two demonstrate linguistic patterning more like the Korean-speaking adults than like the English-speaking children (and vice versa). This suggests that even in fairly early lexical acquisition, children show remarkable sensitivity to the specific language input rather than relying on purportedly universal cognitive categorizations and fitting the language categories onto these.

Lowenstein and Gentner ( 1998 ), Gentner and Loewenstein ( 2002 ), and Gentner and Boroditsky ( 2001 ) argue that metaphor and analogical reasoning are key parts of concept development and early word meaning. To the extent that these are cross-linguistically variable, it can be argued that linguistic relativity effects may be present especially for abstract reasoning which most depends on relational terminology and analogy.

As mentioned in the section on shape classification, Lucy and Gaskins ( 2001 ) look at the age of development of language-particular patterns in shape versus material sorting tasks. Assuming one can extrapolate from their data, the critical age at which language helps to direct nonlinguistic behavior (for these sorts of tasks) is around ages 7–9. This suggests that the acquisition of language categories need not immediately manifest cognitive effects in nonlinguistic domains, but rather that there maybe a period in which the linguistic categories are initially more solely linguistic and then eventually the analogy from language to other types of categorization is drawn. It may also reflect a greater dependence on linguistically mediated internal thought, à la Vygotsky.

Susan Goldin-Meadow and colleagues have examined the interplay of gesture, home sign, and conventional language use and their relationships to underlying (and developing) cognitive representations. A good recent summary may be found in Goldin-Meadow ( 2002 ) and the references within. Zheng and Goldin-Meadow ( 2002 ) examine the similarities across cultures in home sign despite notable differences in the adult spoken languages. These commonalities suggest what the underlying conceptual categories may be in children prior to acquiring the “filter” provided by the model of a specific language.

Working with English-speaking children and language acquisition delayed deaf children, de Villiers and de Villiers ( 2000 ) argue that language has a vital role in the development of understandings of false beliefs—at least insofar as demonstrated in unseen displacement. (For example, the puppet doesn't see that I replaced the crayons in the crayon box with a key; what does the puppet think is in the crayon box?) Language is eminently suited for the representation of counterfactual and alternative beliefs, so it is unclear whether it is the specifics of language acquisition or just general exposure to alternatives that happen to come through the medium of language which might be driving this development. For a summary of the work by Gopnik and colleagues on the potential interactions of language and cognitive development, especially around ages 1–2, see Gopnik ( 2001 ).

5.8. Sign Language versus Spoken Language

Lastly, what of the medium of the language itself? Might the mechanical constraints of spoken language versus sign language have their own influences? Working with native ASL signers and English speakers on mental rotation tasks, Emmorey, Klima, and Hickok ( 1998 ) show evidence that the vast experience of signers in understanding their interlocutors' spatial perspective during signing has given them some advantage in nonlinguistic rotation tasks compared with nonsigners.

6. Future Directions

As can be seen from the above discussion, the issue of linguistic relativity is as open a question as it is broad. However, as empirically driven models of human cognition become increasingly detailed, work within linguistic relativity (and Cognitive Linguistics generally) becomes increasingly specific in its description of cognitive mechanisms.

The question “Does language influence thought?” is being replaced by a battery of questions about whether a given feature of a specific language influences particular cognitive operations, what the exact cognitive mechanisms are which give rise to this influence, and how we can most precisely characterize the nature of this influence? Rather than this being a step away from the “big picture” of human cognition, this general trend toward increasingly precise definitions and, ideally, more falsifiable hypotheses leads us to a simply more reliable understanding of cognition and the role of language within it.

As we discover more of the specific interactions between language and the rest of the cognitive systems, there is a need to understand the time course of this development. Except for Lucy and Gaskins ( 2001 ) and some of the home sign studies, there has been virtually no attempt to determine the time course of any linguistic relativity effects. If language influences a particular cognitive operation or conceptualization, does it do so upon acquisition of the language model, shortly subsequent to this acquisition, or is there a gradual “internalization” (in Vygotskian terms) of the linguistic structure as something more than a learned code?

One must also wonder whether certain linguistic construals more readily have influences beyond language than others. For example, is spatial categorization more likely to be influenced by language than color categorization is, or vice versa? If some domains are more linguistically sensitive, what do these domains have in common?

These are all broad questions and are unlikely to be resolved in the immediate future. However, as research in linguistic relativity becomes increasingly mainstream within psychology and linguistics, it seems certain that we will understand ever more of the complexities between language and thought.

Many more recent writings by Alford on Whorf, linguistic relativity, and related topics can be found on Alford's Web site: http://www.enformy.com/alford.htm.

This idea was apparently insufficiently discredited as it has more recently resurfaced in the popular press with Shlain ( 1998 )—where it is now associated with the demise of polytheism and the claimed consequent surge of misogyny in European history.

Anecdotally, I can report that subjects in spatial reference frame experiments would use their linguistically dominant frame of reference in nonlinguistic tasks but would switch when they heard an alternate frame of reference used immediately before the task. (Specifically, when an assistant erroneously used nonneutral language in an example.) In subsequent tasks, with no reference frame language repeated, the subjects could switch over to what might well have been a more default reference frame for such tasks. Of course, these subject results are not coded with other subjects, and this dictated extreme care in controlling the immediately preceding linguistic environment during experimental sessions.

College students (especially those participating for credit in an introductory psychology class!) are infamous for trying to second guess the “hidden” purpose of an experiment. Surely, such subjects are less directly comparable with the perhaps experimentally less savvy subjects drawn from other populations.

Li and Gleitman ( 2002 ) changed “small procedural details” (see their footnote 5) in this experiment—notably they eliminated the distance between the tables—and report different results. Although they do not attribute the different results to these changes, but rather to other uncontrolled variables in the original study, the control of the experimental setup clearly can be critical for evaluating the results.

The linguistic parallels with basic operations in visual perception imply a bias favoring the building of linguistic categories from more fundamental cognitive categories rather than any particular influence from language to cognition.

Cara and Politzer ( 1993 ) also found no correspondence of language to reasoning with Chinese and English speakers on counterfactual reasoning tasks, though the design seems uninfluenced by the debate in Cognition .

Alford, Dan K. H. 1978 . The demise of the Whorf hypothesis.   Berkeley Linguistics Society 14: 485–99.

Au, Terry Kit-Fong. 1983 . Chinese and English counterfactuals: The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis revisited.   Cognition 15: 155–87.

Au, Terry Kit-Fong. 1984 . Counterfactuals: In reply to Alfred Bloom.   Cognition 17: 289–302.

Berlin, Brent. 1978 . Ethnobiological classification. In Eleanor Rosch and Barbara B. Lloyd, eds., Cognition and categorization 9–26. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Google Scholar

Google Preview

Berlin, Brent, Dennis E. Breedlove, and Peter H. Raven. 1973 . General principles of classification and nomenclature in folk biology.   American Anthropologist 75: 214–42.

Berlin, Brent, and Paul Kay. 1969 . Basic color terms: Their universality and evolution . Berkeley: University of California Press.

Bickel, Balthasar. 2000 . Grammar and social practice: On the role of ‘culture’ in linguistic relativity. In Susanne Niemeier and René Dirven, eds., Evidence for linguistic relativity 161–91. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Bloom, Alfred H. 1981 . The linguistic shaping of thought: A study in the impact of language on thinking in China and the West . Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Bloom, Alfred H. 1984 . Caution—the words you use may affect what you say: A response to Au.   Cognition 17: 275–87.

Blount, Ben G. 1993 . Cultural bases of folk classification systems. In Jeanette Altarriba, ed., Cognition and culture: A cross-cultural approach to psychology 3–22. Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Bohnemeyer, Jürgen. 1998. Time relations in discourse: Evidence from a comparative approach to Yukatek Maya. PhD dissertation, Katholieke Universiteit Brabant, Netherlands.

Boroditsky, Lera. 2000 . Metaphoric structuring: Understanding time through spatial metaphors.   Cognition 75: 1–28.

Boroditsky, Lera. 2001 . Does language shape thought? Mandarin and English speakers' conceptions of time.   Cognitive Psychology 43: 1–22.

Bowerman, Melissa , and Soonja Choi. 2001 . Shaping meanings for language: Universal and language-specific in the acquisition of spatial semantic categories. In Melissa Bowerman and Stephen C. Levinson, eds., Language acquisition and conceptual development 475–511. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brown, Penelope, and Stephen C. Levinson. 1993 . “Uphill” and “downhill” in Tzeltal.   Journal of Linguistic Anthropology 3: 46–74.

Brown, Roger Langham. 1967 . Wilhelm von Humboldt's conception of linguistic relativity: Janua linguarum . The Hague: Mouton.

Brown, Roger W., and Eric. H. Lenneberg. 1958 . Studies in linguistic relativity. In Eleanor E. Maccoby, Theodore M. Newcomb, and Eugene L. Hartley, eds., Readings in social psychology 9–18. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Brugman, Claudia, and Monica Macaulay. 1986 . Interacting semantic systems: Mixtec expressions of location.   Berkeley Linguistics Society 12: 315–27.

Cara, Francesco, and Guy Politzer. 1993 . A comparison of conditional reasoning in English and Chinese. In Jeanette Altarriba, ed., Cognition and culture: A cross-cultural approach to psychology 283–97. Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Carroll, John B., and Joseph B. Casagrande. 1958 . The function of language classifications in behavior. In Eleanor. E. Maccoby, Theodore M. Newcomb, and Eugene L. Hartley, eds., Readings in social psychology 18–31. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Carter, Anthony T. 1973 . A comparative analysis of systems of kinship and marriage in South Asia.   Proceedings of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland : 29–54.

Chafe, Wallace. 2000 . Loci of diversity and convergence in thought and language. In Martin Pütz and Marjolijn Verspoor, eds., Explorations in linguistic relativity 101–23. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Choi, Soonja, and Melissa Bowerman. 1991 . Learning to express motion events in English and Korean: The influence of language-specific lexicalization patterns.   Cognition 41: 83–121.

Corbett, Greville G. 2000 . Number . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Corbett, Greville G., and Ian R. L. Davies. 1997 . Establishing basic color terms: Measures and techniques. In C. L. Hardin and Luisa Maffi, eds., Color categories in thought and language 197–223. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Danziger, Eve, and Eric Pederson. 1998 . Through the looking glass: Literacy, writing systems and mirror image discrimination.   Written Language and Literacy 1: 153–64.

Davies, Ian R. L. 1998 . A study of colour grouping in three languages: A test of the linguistic relativity hypothesis.   British Journal of Psychology 89: 433–52.

Davies, Ian R. L., and Greville G. Corbett. 1997 . A cross-cultural study of colour grouping: Evidence for weak linguistic relativity.   British Journal of Psychology 88: 493–517.

Davies, Ian R. L., Paul T. Sowden, David T. Jerrett, Tiny Jerrett, and Greville G. Corbett. 1998 . A cross-cultural study of English and Setswana speakers on a colour triads task: A test of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis.   British Journal of Psychology 89: 1–15.

de Villiers, Jill G., and Peter A. de Villiers. 2000 . Linguistic determinism and the understanding of false beliefs. In Peter Mitchell and Kevin John Riggs, eds., Children's reasoning and the mind 191–228. East Sussex: Psychology Press.

Duranti, Alessandro. 1997 . Linguistic anthropology . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Emmorey, Karen, Edward Klima, and Gregory Hickok. 1998 . Mental rotation within linguistic and non-linguistic domains in users of American sign language.   Cognition 68: 221–46.

Enfield, Nick J. 2000 . On linguocentrism. In Martin Pütz and Marjolijn Verspoor, eds., Explorations in linguistic relativity 125–57. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Foley, William A. 1997 . Anthropological linguistics: An introduction . Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Geeraerts, Dirk, Stefan Grondelaers, and Peter Bakema. 1994 . The structure of lexical variation: Meaning, naming, and context . Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

Gennari, Silvia P., Steven A. Sloman, Barbara C. Malt, and W. Tecumseh Fitch. 2002 . Motion events in language and cognition.   Cognition 83: 49–79.

Gentner, Dedre, and Lera Boroditsky. 2001 . Individuation, relativity, and early word learning. In Melissa Bowerman and Stephen C. Levinson, eds., Language acquisition and conceptual development 215–56. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gentner, Dedre, and Jeffrey Loewenstein. 2002 . Relational language and relational thought: Language, literacy, and cognitive development. In Eric Amsel and James P. Byrnes, eds., The development and consequences of symbolic communication 87–120. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Goldin-Meadow, Susan. 2002 . From thought to hand: Structured and unstructured communication outside of conventional language. In Eric Amsel and James P. Byrnes, eds., Language, literacy, and cognitive development: The development and consequences of symbolic communication 121–50. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Goody, Jack, and Ian Watt. 1962 . The consequences of literacy.   Comparative Studies in Sociology and History 5: 304–45.

Gopnik, Alison. 2001 . Theories, language and culture: Whorf without wincing. In Melissa Bowerman and Stephen C. Levinson, eds., Language acquisition and conceptual development 45–69. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Graff, Harvey J. 1987 . The legacies of literacy . Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Hanks, William F. 1990 . Referential practice: Language and lived space among the Maya . Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Hardin, C. L., and Luisa Maffi. 1997 . Color categories in thought and language . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Heider, Eleanor R. 1971 . “Focal” color areas and the development of color names.   Developmental Psychology 4: 447–55.

Heider, Eleanor R. 1972 . Universals in color naming and memory.   Journal of Experimental Psychology 93: 10–20.

Heider, Eleanor R., and Donald C. Olivier. 1972 . The structure of the color space in naming and memory in two languages.   Cognitive Psychology 3: 337–54.

Hering, Ewald. 1964 . Outlines of a theory of the light sense . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Hill, Jane H., and Kenneth C. Hill. 1998 . Culture influencing language: Plurals of Hopi kin terms in comparative Uto-Aztecan perspective.   Journal of Linguistic Anthropology 7: 166–80.

Hill, Jane H., and Bruce Mannheim. 1992 . Language and world view.   Annual Review of Anthropology 21: 381–406.

House, Juliane. 2000 . Linguistic relativity and translation. In Martin Pütz and Marjolijn Verspoor, eds., Explorations in linguistic relativity 69–88. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Hunn, Eugene S. 1977 . Tzeltal folk zoology: The classification of discontinuities in nature . New York: Academic Press.

Hunn, Eugene S. 1982 . The utilitarian factor in folk biological classification.   American Anthropologist 84: 830–47.

Hunt, Earl, and Franca Agnoli. 1991 . The Whorfian hypothesis: A cognitive psychology perspective.   Psychological Review 98: 377–89.

Jameson, Kimberly, and Roy G. DʼAndrade. 1997 . It's not really red, green, yellow, blue: An inquiry into perceptual color space. In C. L. Hardin and Luisa Maffi, eds., Color categories in thought and language 295–319. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kay, Paul. 1996 . Intra-speaker relativity. In John J. Gumperz and Stephen C. Levinson, eds., Rethinking linguistic relativity 97–114. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kay, Paul, and Willett Kempton. 1984 . What is the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis?   American Anthropologist 86: 65–79.

Kay, Paul, and Chad K. McDaniel. 1978 . The linguistic significance of the meanings of basic color terms.   Language 54: 610–46.

Kay, Paul, and Terry Regier. 2006 . Language, thought and color: Recent developments.   Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10: 51–54.

Koerner, Konrad E. F. 2000 . Towards a ‘full pedigree’ of the ‘Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis’: From Locke to Lucy. In Martin Pütz and Marjolijn Verspoor, eds., Explorations in linguistic relativity 1–23. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Lakoff, George. 1987 . Women, fire, and dangerous things: What categories reveal about the mind . Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Langacker, Ronald W. 1987 . Nouns and verbs.   Language 63: 53–94.

Langacker, Ronald W. 1991 . Foundations of cognitive grammar . Vol. 2, Descriptive application . Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Lardiere, Donna. 1992 . On the linguistic shaping of thought: Another response to Alfred Bloom.   Language in Society 21: 231–51.

Lee, Penny. 1996 . The Whorf theory complex: A critical reconstruction . Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Lee, Penny. 2000 . When is ‘linguistic relativity’ Whorf's linguistic relativity? In Martin Pütz and Marjolijn Verspoor, eds., Explorations in linguistic relativity 45–68. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Lenneberg, Eric H., and John M. Roberts. 1956 . The language of experience: A study in methodology . International Journal of American Linguistics Memoir, no. 13. Baltimore, MD: Waverly Press.

Levinson, Stephen C. 1996 . Frames of references and Molyneux's question: Crosslinguistic evidence. In Paul Bloom, Mary A. Peterson, Lynn Nadel, and Merrill Garrett, eds., Language and space 109–69. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Levinson, Stephen C., Sotaro Kita, Daniel B. M. Hauna, and Björn H. Rasch. 2002 . Returning the tables: Language affects spatial reasoning.   Cognition 84: 155–88.

Li, Peggy, and Lila Gleitman. 2002 . Turning the tables: Language and spatial reasoning.   Cognition 83: 265–94.

Liu, Lisa Gabern. 1985 . Reasoning counterfactually in Chinese: Are there any obstacles?   Cognition 21: 239–70.

Loftus, Elizabeth F. 1975 . Leading questions and the eyewitness report.   Cognitive Psychology 7: 560–72.

Losonsky, Michael, ed. 1999 . Wilhelm von Humboldt: On language: On the diversity of human language construction and its influence on the mental development of the human species . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lowenstein, Jeffrey, and Dedre Gentner. 1998 . Relational language facilitates analogy in children. Proceedings of the Twentieth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society 615–20. Mahwah, NJ.: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Lucy, John A. 1992 a. Grammatical categories and cognition: A case study of the linguistic relativity hypothesis . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lucy, John A. 1992 b. Language diversity and thought: A reformulation of the linguistic relativity hypothesis . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lucy, John A. 1997 a. Linguistic relativity.   Annual Review of Anthropology 26: 291–312.

Lucy, John A. 1997 b. The linguistics of “color.” In C. L. Hardin and Luisa Maffi, eds., Color categories in thought and language 320–46. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lucy, John A., and Suzanne Gaskins. 2001 . Grammatical categories and the development of classification preferences: A comparative approach. In Melissa Bowerman and Stephen C. Levinson, eds., Language acquisition and conceptual development 257–83. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lucy, John A., and Richard A. Shwedder. 1988 . The effect of incidental conversation on memory for focal colors.   American Anthropologist 90: 923–31.

Luria, Aleksandr Romanovich. 1976 . Cognitive development, its cultural and social foundations . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

MacLaury, Robert E. 1991 . Exotic color categories: Linguistic relativity to what extent?   Journal of Linguistic Anthropology 1: 26–51.

MacLaury, Robert E. 1995 . Vantage theory. In John R. Taylor and Robert E. MacLaury, eds., Language and the cognitive construal of the world 231–76. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

MacLaury, Robert E. 2000 . Linguistic relativity and the plasticity of categorization: Universalism in a new key. In Martin Pütz and Marjolijn H. Verspoor, eds., Explorations in linguistic relativity 251–93. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Malt, Barbara C., Steven A. Sloman, and Silvia P. Gennari. 2003 . Speaking versus thinking about objects and actions. In Dedre Gentner and Susan Goldin-Meadow, eds., Language in mind: Advances in the study of language and thought 81–111. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Manchester, Martin L. 1985 . The philosophical foundations of Humboldt's linguistic doctrines . Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Miura, Irene T. 1987 . Mathematics achievement as a function of language.   Journal of Educational Psychology 79: 79–82.

Miura, Irene T., Chungsoon C. Kim, Chih-mei Chang, and Yukari Okamoto. 1988 . Effects of language characteristics on children's cognitive representation of number: Cross-national comparisons.   Child Development 59: 1445–50.

Miura, Irene T., and Yukari Okamoto. 1989 . Comparisons of U.S. and Japanese first graders' cognitive representation of number and understanding of place value.   Journal of Educational Psychology 81: 109–14.

Miura, Irene T., Yukari Okamoto, Chungsoon C. Kim, Chih-Mei Chang, Marcia Steere, and Michel Fayol. 1994 . Comparisons of children's cognitive representation of number: China, France, Japan, Korea, Sweden, and the United States.   International Journal of Behavioral Development 17: 401–11.

Miura, Irene T., Yukari Okamoto, Chungsoon C. Kim, Marcia Steere, and Michel Fayol. 1993 . First graders' cognitive representation of number and understanding of place value: Cross-national comparisons: France, Japan, Korea, Sweden, and the United States.   Journal of Educational Psychology 85: 24–30.

Miura, Irene T., Yukari Okamoto, Vesna Vlahovic-Stetic, Chungsoon C. Kim, and Jong Hye Han. 1999 . Language supports for children's understanding of numerical fractions: Cross-national comparisons.   Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 74: 356–65.

Morais, José, Luz Cary, Jésus Alegria, and Paul Bertelson. 1979 . Does awareness of speech as a sequence of phones arise spontaneously?   Cognition 7: 323–31.

Oezgen, Emre, and Ian R. L. Davies. 1998 . Turkish color terms: Tests of Berlin and Kay's theory of color universals and linguistic relativity.   Linguistics 36: 919–56.

Olson, David R. 1991 . Literacy as metalinguistic activity. In David R. Olson and Nancy Torrance, eds., Literacy and orality 251–70. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Olson, David R. 2002 . What writing does to the mind. In Eric Amsel and James P. Byrnes, eds., Language, literacy, and cognitive development: The development and consequences of symbolic communication 153–65. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Ong, Walter J. 1992 . Writing is a technology that restructures thought. In Pam Downing, Susan D. Lima, and Michael Noonan, eds., The linguistics of literacy 293–319. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Pederson, Eric. 1993 . Geographic and manipulable space in two Tamil linguistic systems. In Andrew U. Frank and Irene Campari, eds., Spatial information theory 294–311. Berlin: Springer Verlag.

Pederson, Eric. 1995 . Language as context, language as means: Spatial cognition and habitual language use.   Cognitive Linguistics 6: 33–62.

Pederson, Eric. 1998 . Spatial language, reasoning, and variation across Tamil communities. In Petr Zima and Vladimír Tax, eds., Language and location in space and time 111–19. Munich: Lincom Europa.

Pederson, Eric. 2003 . Mirror-image discrimination among nonliterate, monoliterate, and biliterate Tamil speakers.   Written Language and Literacy 6: 71–91.

Pederson, Eric, Eve Danziger, David Wilkins, Stephen Levinson, Sotaro Kita, and Gunter Senft. 1998 . Semantic typology and spatial conceptualization.   Language 74: 557–89.

Read, Charles, Yun-Fei Zhang, Hong-Yin Nie, and Bao-Qing Ding. 1986 . The ability to manipulate speech sounds depends on knowing alphabetic writing.   Cognition 24: 31–44.

Rosch, Eleanor. 1973 . Natural categories.   Cognitive Psychology 4: 328–50.

Saxton, Matthew, and John N. Towse. 1998 . Linguistic relativity: The case of place value in multi-digit numbers.   Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 69: 66–79.

Scinto, Leonard F. M. 1986 . Written language and psychological development . New York: Academic Press.

Scribner, Sylvia, and Michael Cole. 1981 . The psychology of literacy . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Shlain, Leonard. 1998 . The alphabet versus the goddess: The conflict between word and image . New York: Viking.

Silverstein, Michael. 1985 . Language and the culture of gender: At the intersection of structure, usage, and ideology. In Elizabeth Mertz and Richard J. Parmentier, eds., Semiotic mediation: Sociocultural and psychological perspectives 219–59. Orlando, FL: Academic Press.

Silverstein, Michael. 1987 . Cognitive implications of a referential hierarchy. In Maya Hickmann, ed., Social and functional approaches to language 125–64. Orlando, FL: Academic Press.

Slobin, Dan I. 1991 . Learning to think for speaking: Native language, cognition, and rhetorical style.   Pragmatics 1: 7–25.

Slobin, Dan I. 1996 . Two ways to travel: Verbs of motion in English and Spanish. In Masayoshi Shibatani and Sandra A. Thompson, eds., Grammatical constructions: Their form and meaning 195–219. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Slobin, Dan I. 2000 . Verbalized events: A dynamic approach to linguistic relativity and determinism. In Susanne Niemeier and René Dirven, eds., Evidence for linguistic relativity 107–38. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Smith, Marion V. 1996 . Linguistic relativity: On hypotheses and confusions.   Communication & Cognition 29: 65–90.

Takano, Yohtaro. 1989 . Methodological problems in cross-cultural studies of linguistic relativity.   Cognition 31: 141–62.

Talmy, Leonard. 1977 . Rubber-sheet cognition in language.   Chicago Linguistic Society 13: 612–28.

Talmy, Leonard. 1978 . The relation of grammar to cognition—a synopsis. In David Waltz ed., Proceedings of TINLAP -2 14–24. New York: Association for Computing Machinery.

Talmy, Leonard. 1985 . Lexicalization patterns: Semantic structure in lexical form. In Timothy Shopen, ed., Language typology and syntactic description , vol. 3, Grammatical categories and the lexicon 57–149. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Talmy, Leonard. 2000 a. Toward a cognitive semantics . Vol. 1, Concept structuring systems . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Talmy, Leonard. 2000 b. Toward a cognitive semantics . Vol. 2, Typology and process in concept structuring . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Taylor, Holly A., Robert R. Faust, Tatiana Sitnikova, Susan J. Naylor, and Phillip J. Hol-comb. 2001 . Is the donut in front of the car? An electrophysiological study examining spatial reference frame processing.   Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology 55: 175–84.

Taylor, Holly A., Susan J. Naylor, Robert R. Faust, and Phillip J. Holcomb. 1999 . “Could you hand me those keys on the right?” Disentangling spatial reference frames using different methodologies.   Spatial Cognition and Computation 1: 381–97.

Whorf, Benjamin L. 1956 . Language, thought, and reality: Selected writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Whorf, Benjamin L., and George L. Trager. [1938] 1996 . Report on linguistic research in the department of Anthropology of Yale University for the term Sept. 1937–June 1938. In Penny Lee, The Whorf theory complex: A critical reconstruction 251–80. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Zheng, Mingyu, and Susan Goldin-Meadow. 2002 . Thought before language: How deaf and hearing children express motion events across cultures.   Cognition 85: 145–74.

• About Oxford Academic
• Publish journals with us
• University press partners
• What we publish
• New features  
• Open access
• Institutional account management
• Rights and permissions
• Get help with access
• Accessibility
• Advertising
• Media enquiries
• Oxford University Press
• Oxford Languages
• University of Oxford

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide

• Copyright © 2024 Oxford University Press
• Cookie settings
• Cookie policy
• Privacy policy
• Legal notice

This Feature Is Available To Subscribers Only

Sign In or Create an Account

This PDF is available to Subscribers Only

For full access to this pdf, sign in to an existing account, or purchase an annual subscription.

Linguistic Relativity: 10 Examples and Definition

Linguistic relativity, often referred to as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis , is a linguistics theory that language can shape our perceptions of reality and control our thoughts. 

As a result, people who speak different languages may have fundamentally different lenses through which they see reality.

According to the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, language’s structure and content have the power to direct one’s thoughts by controlling how we comprehend reality. 

This idea implies that language usage patterns can determine the approach toward different situations. 

For instance, the people who speak Inuit have numerous phrases to describe snow, reflecting that they rely heavily on elements like snow. 

Therefore, an individual speaking this dialect may view ice sheets differently than someone using English with meager terminology regarding frozen water bodies’ diverse aspects. 

So, linguistic relativity means that people who speak different languages may have distinct ways of looking at their surroundings due to the variations in terms used by each language. 

Definition of Linguistic Relativity

Linguistic relativity, also known as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, suggests that language shapes our thoughts and perceptions – even impacting how we conceptualize the world around us (Lucy, 1997).

It means that different people can perceive even the same words in a bit or completely different manner across various languages.

According to Lucy (1997),

“…the linguistic relativity hypothesis, the proposal that the particular language we speak influences the way we think about reality, form one part of the broader question of how language influences thought” (p. 291).

A classic example of this is color perception. Certain languages have distinct words for shades English speakers might consider one hue. 

It makes it easier to distinguish between such nuances when compared to their counterparts who only use a single term for both. 

While research on its validity remains ongoing, many scholars believe other factors like culture or environment may contribute toward cognition just as much (if not more) than speech itself (Busser, 2015).

As Marina (2008) states,

“…linguistic relativity is a complicated, multilevel and multidimensional phenomenon referring to the relations between language, thought, experience (reality) and culture” (p. 59).

To put it simply, this hypothesis suggests that people who speak different languages perceive the world differently due to variations in terms used by each language.

A Note from Chris: Linguistic relativity comes in two forms: strong and weak linguistic relativity, with the former implying language, dictates thought processes while the latter holds its influences but does not determine them entirely (Marina, 2008). 

10 Examples of Linguistic Relativity

• Color : The way different languages classify and refer to colors varies. For instance, certain languages have distinct phrases for light blue and dark blue, which may allow those speakers to more quickly recognize the differences between these shades compared to people who speak other dialects.
• Time perception : Our linguistic expression of time can have a powerful impact on our understanding and experience of it. Take the Hopi language, for instance. By not utilizing tenses to differentiate between past or future events, its speakers may interpret time in quite a distinct way compared with those conversants in languages that employ such devices.
• Spatial orientation : Different languages approach the concept of spatial orientation in distinct ways. For instance, some rely on absolute references such as north, south, east, and west to describe objects’ locations. In contrast, others employ relative orientations based on nearby landmarks or other points of reference. This contrast can substantially influence how speakers perceive and move through space.
• Numbers : Numbers are more than just figures; they can be powerful symbols with the potential to affect how we perceive them profoundly. Our language, and our use of it when expressing numbers, plays a critical role in this process. Take, for instance, the Pirahã dialect – it only has terms to describe ‘one,’ ‘two,’ and ‘many’; this could potentially restrict their capacity to carry out certain numerical operations.
• Gender : How gender is expressed through language can significantly shape our understanding of it. As an example, certain languages assign a gender to all nouns. This could lead speakers of such tongues to link particular traits with entities sharing the same gender designation (see also: how gender is socially constructed ).
• Metaphors : The use of metaphors in language can significantly influence how we perceive intangible concepts. For example, when expressing love in English, the tendency is to compare it with heat (“he’s burning with passion”). In contrast, other languages might instead employ sensory analogies such as sight or sound. Such an approach offers us different perspectives and further enriches our understanding of this abstract concept .
• Directional language : Native speakers of Kuuk Thaayorre have an edge, thanks to their directional language. Constantly considering where they are in space requires them to use terms like “north,” “south,” and so on when talking about people or objects – leading some experts to believe that this dialect’s users might possess a heightened sense of spatial awareness compared with others.
• Causation : The way we word our cause-and-effect statements can have a huge impact on how they are perceived. For instance, English speakers often phrase them in the form of ‘if-then’ sentences (“If it rains, the ground will become wet”), whereas other languages may take another approach to convey causation. This kind of distinction could significantly shape an individual’s understanding of causality.
• Social relationships : How is employed to express social dynamics can deeply impact how we perceive our standing in the power structure. As an example, certain languages may feature distinct levels of politeness depending upon who you are talking to and their position of influence or stature.
• Perception of taste : The power of language to shape our perception is clearly illustrated when considering taste. For example, take the Indonesian word “enak,” which conveys a blend of sweet and salty flavors – something that English doesn’t have an equivalent term for. Consequently, this may lead Indonesians to savor such tastes differently than those who don’t speak their language – ultimately highlighting how one’s mother tongue can influence experience!

Origins of Linguistic Relativity

The concept of linguistic relativity, or the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis as it’s often known, originated with two early 20th-century linguists, Edward Sapir and Benjamin Lee Whorf (Hahner, 2017).

The former, Edward Sapir, was a renowned anthropologist who believed that language played an essential role in human cognition and culture formation. 

He proposed different languages possess varying ways of expressing concepts which could lead to diverse thought processes among speakers (Hahner, 2017).

His student, Benjamin Lee Whorf, took his ideas one step further by suggesting that language influenced thought and determined it. 

He claimed grammar structures within certain tongues create unique worldviews for its users distinct from those using other languages (Hahner, 2017).

In this way, these two pioneers established the basis for linguistic relativity.

Although met with criticism throughout time due to debate surrounding the topic, today, their work is highly regarded across fields like psychology, anthropology, and cognitive science alike!

Strong and Weak Forms of the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis

The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, or linguistic relativity, can be divided into two forms – strong and weak (McIntyre et al., 2021).

Strong form (or linguistic determinism ) argues that one’s language determines their worldview, while weak (linguistic relativity) claims it merely shapes them without constraining thoughts. 

For example, English speakers often describe time using spatial metaphors like ‘looking forward’ to the future or ‘looking back’ on past events. Yet this doesn’t limit an individual from thinking about time in non-spatial ways as well. 

In contrast, however, is North America’s Hopi tribe who lack a linear concept of time entirely due to their agricultural lifestyle being expressed through cycles and seasons instead.

Therefore, proponents of strong linguistic relativism argue for more than just influence when considering cognitive abilities between cultures speaking diverse languages (McIntyre et al., 2021).

But, those backing up weaker theories suggest there is still room left open for personal interpretation despite any existing frameworks they provide us with based on language alone.

Criticism of Linguistic Relativity 

Linguistic relativity has been influential in linguistics and other fields. Still, there is scant empirical evidence to back up its strongest form. 

Studies attempting to prove linguistic relativity have been faulted for their methodological flaws, such as tiny sample sizes or biased participant selection (Everett, 2013). 

Critics also suggest that the hypothesis oversimplifies the complex connection between language and thought. While it may influence our thinking somewhat, many factors shape cognition and perception apart from language alone (Everett, 2013). 

Furthermore, this theory fails to explain universal concepts present across all languages – time being one example expressed differently yet universally understood among cultures around the world (Lucy, 1997).

Additionally, linguistic relativity tends to focus on something other than similarities existing within various languages, like similar grammatical structures expressing analogous ideas (Everett, 2013). 

Thereby, it is limiting a more comprehensive understanding of different tongues’ capabilities.

Finally, some observers assert that this belief can encourage cultural biases by implying people speaking diverse dialects think fundamentally divergent ways about life matters or understand reality in distinct manners (Lucy, 1997).

The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis or language relativity has become a cornerstone of linguistics, anthropology, and psychology. This theory suggests that language can have an impact on how we think – to what degree depends on the context. 

For example, English speakers often use spatial metaphors when talking about time, while North America’s Hopi tribe views it as recurring cycles or seasons. 

Some studies have criticized linguistic relativity for having methodological issues and an oversimplification of the relationship between language and thought while disregarding similarities among various languages.

Despite the varying opinions, experts in psychology, anthropology, and cognitive science still hold their work with high regard and continue to devote time to its research.

Busser, R. D. (2015). Chapter 1. The influence of social, cultural, and natural factors on language structure.  John Benjamins Publishing Company EBooks , 1–28. https://doi.org/10.1075/clscc.6.01bus

Everett, C. (2013).  Linguistic relativity: Evidence across languages and cognitive domains (applications of cognitive linguistics) . New York: De Gruyter Mouton.

Hahner, L. (2017).  Testing linguistic relativity. The rediscovery of a controversial theory . London: Grin Publishing.

Lucy, J. (1997). Linguistic relativity.  Annu. Rev. Anthropol ,  26 , 291312. https://cslc.nd.edu/assets/142525/lucy_linguistic_relativity.pdf

Marina, V. (2008). Linguistic relativity and its theoretical and practical value at the time of globalization.  Santalka ,  16 (2), 57–66. https://doi.org/10.3846/1822-430x.2008.16.2.57-66 McIntyre, D., Jeffries, L., Evans, M., & Gold, E. (2021).  The babel lexicon of language . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Viktoriya Sus (MA)

Viktoriya Sus is an academic writer specializing mainly in economics and business from Ukraine. She holds a Master’s degree in International Business from Lviv National University and has more than 6 years of experience writing for different clients. Viktoriya is passionate about researching the latest trends in economics and business. However, she also loves to explore different topics such as psychology, philosophy, and more.

• Viktoriya Sus (MA) #molongui-disabled-link 15 Free Enterprise Examples
• Viktoriya Sus (MA) #molongui-disabled-link 21 Sunk Costs Examples (The Fallacy Explained)
• Viktoriya Sus (MA) #molongui-disabled-link Price Floor: 15 Examples & Definition
• Viktoriya Sus (MA) #molongui-disabled-link Protection Motivation Theory: Definition and Examples

Chris Drew (PhD)

This article was peer-reviewed and edited by Chris Drew (PhD). The review process on Helpful Professor involves having a PhD level expert fact check, edit, and contribute to articles. Reviewers ensure all content reflects expert academic consensus and is backed up with reference to academic studies. Dr. Drew has published over 20 academic articles in scholarly journals. He is the former editor of the Journal of Learning Development in Higher Education and holds a PhD in Education from ACU.

• Chris Drew (PhD) #molongui-disabled-link 25 Positive Punishment Examples
• Chris Drew (PhD) #molongui-disabled-link 25 Dissociation Examples (Psychology)
• Chris Drew (PhD) #molongui-disabled-link 15 Zone of Proximal Development Examples
• Chris Drew (PhD) #molongui-disabled-link Perception Checking: 15 Examples and Definition

Leave a Comment Cancel Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

• Table of Contents
• Random Entry
• Chronological
• Editorial Information
• About the SEP
• Editorial Board
• How to Cite the SEP
• Special Characters
• Advanced Tools
• Support the SEP
• PDFs for SEP Friends
• Make a Donation
• SEPIA for Libraries
• Back to Entry
• Entry Contents
• Entry Bibliography
• Academic Tools
• Friends PDF Preview
• Author and Citation Info
• Back to Top

Supplement to Philosophy of Linguistics

Whorfianism.

Emergentists tend to follow Edward Sapir in taking an interest in interlinguistic and intralinguistic variation. Linguistic anthropologists have explicitly taken up the task of defending a famous claim associated with Sapir that connects linguistic variation to differences in thinking and cognition more generally. The claim is very often referred to as the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis (though this is a largely infelicitous label, as we shall see).

This topic is closely related to various forms of relativism—epistemological, ontological, conceptual, and moral—and its general outlines are discussed elsewhere in this encyclopedia; see the section on language in the Summer 2015 archived version of the entry on relativism (§3.1). Cultural versions of moral relativism suggest that, given how much cultures differ, what is moral for you might depend on the culture you were brought up in. A somewhat analogous view would suggest that, given how much language structures differ, what is thinkable for you might depend on the language you use. (This is actually a kind of conceptual relativism, but it is generally called linguistic relativism, and we will continue that practice.)

Even a brief skim of the vast literature on the topic is not remotely plausible in this article; and the primary literature is in any case more often polemical than enlightening. It certainly holds no general answer to what science has discovered about the influences of language on thought. Here we offer just a limited discussion of the alleged hypothesis and the rhetoric used in discussing it, the vapid and not so vapid forms it takes, and the prospects for actually devising testable scientific hypotheses about the influence of language on thought.

Whorf himself did not offer a hypothesis. He presented his “new principle of linguistic relativity” (Whorf 1956: 214) as a fact discovered by linguistic analysis:

When linguists became able to examine critically and scientifically a large number of languages of widely different patterns, their base of reference was expanded; they experienced an interruption of phenomena hitherto held universal, and a whole new order of significances came into their ken. It was found that the background linguistic system (in other words, the grammar) of each language is not merely a reproducing instrument for voicing ideas but rather is itself the shaper of ideas, the program and guide for the individual’s mental activity, for his analysis of impressions, for his synthesis of his mental stock in trade. Formulation of ideas is not an independent process, strictly rational in the old sense, but is part of a particular grammar, and differs, from slightly to greatly, between different grammars. We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages. The categories and types that we isolate from the world of phenomena we do not find there because they stare every observer in the face; on the contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds—and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds. We cut nature up, organize it into concepts, and ascribe significances as we do, largely because we are parties to an agreement to organize it in this way—an agreement that holds throughout our speech community and is codified in the patterns of our language. The agreement is, of course, an implicit and unstated one, but its terms are absolutely obligatory ; we cannot talk at all except by subscribing to the organization and classification of data which the agreement decrees. (Whorf 1956: 212–214; emphasis in original)

Later, Whorf’s speculations about the “sensuously and operationally different” character of different snow types for “an Eskimo” (Whorf 1956: 216) developed into a familiar journalistic meme about the Inuit having dozens or scores or hundreds of words for snow; but few who repeat that urban legend recall Whorf’s emphasis on its being grammar, rather than lexicon, that cuts up and organizes nature for us.

In an article written in 1937, posthumously published in an academic journal (Whorf 1956: 87–101), Whorf clarifies what is most important about the effects of language on thought and world-view. He distinguishes ‘phenotypes’, which are overt grammatical categories typically indicated by morphemic markers, from what he called ‘cryptotypes’, which are covert grammatical categories, marked only implicitly by distributional patterns in a language that are not immediately apparent. In English, the past tense would be an example of a phenotype (it is marked by the - ed suffix in all regular verbs). Gender in personal names and common nouns would be an example of a cryptotype, not systematically marked by anything. In a cryptotype, “class membership of the word is not apparent until there is a question of using it or referring to it in one of these special types of sentence, and then we find that this word belongs to a class requiring some sort of distinctive treatment, which may even be the negative treatment of excluding that type of sentence” (p. 89).

Whorf’s point is the familiar one that linguistic structure is comprised, in part, of distributional patterns in language use that are not explicitly marked. What follows from this, according to Whorf, is not that the existing lexemes in a language (like its words for snow) comprise covert linguistic structure, but that patterns shared by word classes constitute linguistic structure. In ‘Language, mind, and reality’ (1942; published posthumously in Theosophist , a magazine published in India for the followers of the 19th-century spiritualist Helena Blavatsky) he wrote:

Because of the systematic, configurative nature of higher mind, the “patternment” aspect of language always overrides and controls the “lexation”…or name-giving aspect. Hence the meanings of specific words are less important than we fondly fancy. Sentences, not words, are the essence of speech, just as equations and functions, and not bare numbers, are the real meat of mathematics. We are all mistaken in our common belief that any word has an “exact meaning.” We have seen that the higher mind deals in symbols that have no fixed reference to anything, but are like blank checks, to be filled in as required, that stand for “any value” of a given variable, like …the x , y , z of algebra. (Whorf 1942: 258)

Whorf apparently thought that only personal and proper names have an exact meaning or reference (Whorf 1956: 259).

For Whorf, it was an unquestionable fact that language influences thought to some degree:

Actually, thinking is most mysterious, and by far the greatest light upon it that we have is thrown by the study of language. This study shows that the forms of a person’s thoughts are controlled by inexorable laws of pattern of which he is unconscious. These patterns are the unperceived intricate systematizations of his own language—shown readily enough by a candid comparison and contrast with other languages, especially those of a different linguistic family. His thinking itself is in a language—in English, in Sanskrit, in Chinese. [footnote omitted] And every language is a vast pattern-system, different from others, in which are culturally ordained the forms and categories by which the personality not only communicates, but analyzes nature, notices or neglects types of relationship and phenomena, channels his reasoning, and builds the house of his consciousness. (Whorf 1956: 252)

He seems to regard it as necessarily true that language affects thought, given

• the fact that language must be used in order to think, and
• the facts about language structure that linguistic analysis discovers.

He also seems to presume that the only structure and logic that thought has is grammatical structure. These views are not the ones that after Whorf’s death came to be known as ‘the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis’ (a sobriquet due to Hoijer 1954). Nor are they what was called the ‘Whorf thesis’ by Brown and Lenneberg (1954) which was concerned with the relation of obligatory lexical distinctions and thought. Brown and Lenneberg (1954) investigated this question by looking at the relation of color terminology in a language and the classificatory abilities of the speakers of that language. The issue of the relation between obligatory lexical distinctions and thought is at the heart of what is now called ‘the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis’ or ‘the Whorf Hypothesis’ or ‘Whorfianism’.

1. Banal Whorfianism

No one is going to be impressed with a claim that some aspect of your language may affect how you think in some way or other; that is neither a philosophical thesis nor a psychological hypothesis. So it is appropriate to set aside entirely the kind of so-called hypotheses that Steven Pinker presents in The Stuff of Thought (2007: 126–128) as “five banal versions of the Whorfian hypothesis”:

• “Language affects thought because we get much of our knowledge through reading and conversation.”
• “A sentence can frame an event, affecting the way people construe it.”
• “The stock of words in a language reflects the kinds of things its speakers deal with in their lives and hence think about.”
• “[I]f one uses the word language in a loose way to refer to meanings,… then language is thought.”
• “When people think about an entity, among the many attributes they can think about is its name.”

These are just truisms, unrelated to any serious issue about linguistic relativism.

We should also set aside some methodological versions of linguistic relativism discussed in anthropology. It may be excellent advice to a budding anthropologist to be aware of linguistic diversity, and to be on the lookout for ways in which your language may affect your judgment of other cultures; but such advice does not constitute a hypothesis.

2. The so-called Sapir-Whorf hypothesis

The term “Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis” was coined by Harry Hoijer in his contribution (Hoijer 1954) to a conference on the work of Benjamin Lee Whorf in 1953. But anyone looking in Hoijer’s paper for a clear statement of the hypothesis will look in vain. Curiously, despite his stated intent “to review and clarify the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis” (1954: 93), Hoijer did not even attempt to state it. The closest he came was this:

The central idea of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is that language functions, not simply as a device for reporting experience, but also, and more significantly, as a way of defining experience for its speakers.

The claim that “language functions…as a way of defining experience” appears to be offered as a kind of vague metaphysical insight rather than either a statement of linguistic relativism or a testable hypothesis.

And if Hoijer seriously meant that what qualitative experiences a speaker can have are constituted by that speaker’s language, then surely the claim is false. There is no reason to doubt that non-linguistic sentient creatures like cats can experience (for example) pain or heat or hunger, so having a language is not a necessary condition for having experiences. And it is surely not sufficient either: a robot with a sophisticated natural language processing capacity could be designed without the capacity for conscious experience.

In short, it is a mystery what Hoijer meant by his “central idea”.

Vague remarks of the same loosely metaphysical sort have continued to be a feature of the literature down to the present. The statements made in some recent papers, even in respected refereed journals, contain non-sequiturs echoing some of the remarks of Sapir, Whorf, and Hoijer. And they come from both sides of the debate.

3. Anti-Whorfian rhetoric

Lila Gleitman is an Essentialist on the other side of the contemporary debate: she is against linguistic relativism, and against the broadly Whorfian work of Stephen Levinson’s group at the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics. In the context of criticizing a particular research design, Li and Gleitman (2002) quote Whorf’s claim that “language is the factor that limits free plasticity and rigidifies channels of development”. But in the claim cited, Whorf seems to be talking about the psychological topic that holds universally of human conceptual development, not claiming that linguistic relativism is true.

Li and Gleitman then claim (p. 266) that such (Whorfian) views “have diminished considerably in academic favor” in part because of “the universalist position of Chomskian linguistics, with its potential for explaining the striking similarity of language learning in children all over the world.” But there is no clear conflict or even a conceptual connection between Whorf’s views about language placing limits on developmental plasticity, and Chomsky’s thesis of an innate universal architecture for syntax. In short, there is no reason why Chomsky’s I-languages could not be innately constrained, but (once acquired) cognitively and developmentally constraining.

For example, the supposedly deep linguistic universal of ‘recursion’ (Hauser et al. 2002) is surely quite independent of whether the inventory of colour-name lexemes in your language influences the speed with which you can discriminate between color chips. And conversely, universal tendencies in color naming across languages (Kay and Regier 2006) do not show that color-naming differences among languages are without effect on categorical perception (Thierry et al. 2009).

4. Strong and weak Whorfianism

One of the first linguists to defend a general form of universalism against linguistic relativism, thus presupposing that they conflict, was Julia Penn (1972). She was also an early popularizer of the distinction between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ formulations of the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis (and an opponent of the ‘strong’ version).

‘Weak’ versions of Whorfianism state that language influences or defeasibly shapes thought. ‘Strong’ versions state that language determines thought, or fixes it in some way. The weak versions are commonly dismissed as banal (because of course there must be some influence), and the stronger versions as implausible.

The weak versions are considered banal because they are not adequately formulated as testable hypotheses that could conflict with relevant evidence about language and thought.

Why would the strong versions be thought implausible? For a language to make us think in a particular way, it might seem that it must at least temporarily prevent us from thinking in other ways, and thus make some thoughts not only inexpressible but unthinkable. If this were true, then strong Whorfianism would conflict with the Katzian effability claim. There would be thoughts that a person couldn’t think because of the language(s) they speak.

Some are fascinated by the idea that there are inaccessible thoughts; and the notion that learning a new language gives access to entirely new thoughts and concepts seems to be a staple of popular writing about the virtues of learning languages. But many scientists and philosophers intuitively rebel against violations of effability: thinking about concepts that no one has yet named is part of their job description.

The resolution lies in seeing that the language could affect certain aspects of our cognitive functioning without making certain thoughts unthinkable for us .

For example, Greek has separate terms for what we call light blue and dark blue, and no word meaning what ‘blue’ means in English: Greek forces a choice on this distinction. Experiments have shown (Thierry et al. 2009) that native speakers of Greek react faster when categorizing light blue and dark blue color chips—apparently a genuine effect of language on thought. But that does not make English speakers blind to the distinction, or imply that Greek speakers cannot grasp the idea of a hue falling somewhere between green and violet in the spectrum.

There is no general or global ineffability problem. There is, though, a peculiar aspect of strong Whorfian claims, giving them a local analog of ineffability: the content of such a claim cannot be expressed in any language it is true of . This does not make the claims self-undermining (as with the standard objections to relativism); it doesn’t even mean that they are untestable. They are somewhat anomalous, but nothing follows concerning the speakers of the language in question (except that they cannot state the hypothesis using the basic vocabulary and grammar that they ordinarily use).

If there were a true hypothesis about the limits that basic English vocabulary and constructions puts on what English speakers can think, the hypothesis would turn out to be inexpressible in English, using basic vocabulary and the usual repertoire of constructions. That might mean it would be hard for us to discuss it in an article in English unless we used terminological innovations or syntactic workarounds. But that doesn’t imply anything about English speakers’ ability to grasp concepts, or to develop new ways of expressing them by coining new words or elaborated syntax.

5. Constructing and evaluating Whorfian hypotheses

A number of considerations are relevant to formulating, testing, and evaluating Whorfian hypotheses.

Genuine hypotheses about the effects of language on thought will always have a duality: there will be a linguistic part and a non-linguistic one. The linguistic part will involve a claim that some feature is present in one language but absent in another.

Whorf himself saw that it was only obligatory features of languages that established “mental patterns” or “habitual thought” (Whorf 1956: 139), since if it were optional then the speaker could optionally do it one way or do it the other way. And so this would not be a case of “constraining the conceptual structure”. So we will likewise restrict our attention to obligatory features here.

Examples of relevant obligatory features would include lexical distinctions like the light vs. dark blue forced choice in Greek, or the forced choice between “in (fitting tightly)” vs. “in (fitting loosely)” in Korean. They also include grammatical distinctions like the forced choice in Spanish 2nd-person pronouns between informal/intimate and formal/distant (informal tú vs. formal usted in the singular; informal vosotros vs. formal ustedes in the plural), or the forced choice in Tamil 1st-person plural pronouns between inclusive (“we = me and you and perhaps others”) and exclusive (“we = me and others not including you”).

The non-linguistic part of a Whorfian hypothesis will contrast the psychological effects that habitually using the two languages has on their speakers. For example, one might conjecture that the habitual use of Spanish induces its speakers to be sensitive to the formal and informal character of the speaker’s relationship with their interlocutor while habitually using English does not.

So testing Whorfian hypotheses requires testing two independent hypotheses with the appropriate kinds of data. In consequence, evaluating them requires the expertise of both linguistics and psychology, and is a multidisciplinary enterprise. Clearly, the linguistic hypothesis may hold up where the psychological hypothesis does not, or conversely.

In addition, if linguists discovered that some linguistic feature was optional in two different languages, then even if psychological experiments showed differences between the two populations of speakers, this would not show linguistic determination or influence. The cognitive differences might depend on (say) cultural differences.

A further important consideration concerns the strength of the inducement relationship that a Whorfian hypothesis posits between a speaker’s language and their non-linguistic capacities. The claim that your language shapes or influences your cognition is quite different from the claim that your language makes certain kinds of cognition impossible (or obligatory) for you. The strength of any Whorfian hypothesis will vary depending on the kind of relationship being claimed, and the ease of revisability of that relation.

A testable Whorfian hypothesis will have a schematic form something like this:

• Linguistic part : Feature F is obligatory in L 1 but optional in L 2 .
• Psychological part : Speaking a language with obligatory feature F bears relation R to the cognitive effect C .

The relation R might in principle be causation or determination, but it is important to see that it might merely be correlation, or slight favoring; and the non-linguistic cognitive effect C might be readily suppressible or revisable.

Dan Slobin (1996) presents a view that competes with Whorfian hypotheses as standardly understood. He hypothesizes that when the speakers are using their cognitive abilities in the service of a linguistic ability (speaking, writing, translating, etc.), the language they are planning to use to express their thought will have a temporary online effect on how they express their thought. The claim is that as long as language users are thinking in order to frame their speech or writing or translation in some language, the mandatory features of that language will influence the way they think.

On Slobin’s view, these effects quickly attenuate as soon as the activity of thinking for speaking ends. For example, if a speaker is thinking for writing in Spanish, then Slobin’s hypothesis would predict that given the obligatory formal/informal 2nd-person pronoun distinction they would pay greater attention to the formal/informal character of their social relationships with their audience than if they were writing in English. But this effect is not permanent. As soon as they stop thinking for speaking, the effect of Spanish on their thought ends.

Slobin’s non-Whorfian linguistic relativist hypothesis raises the importance of psychological research on bilinguals or people who currently use two or more languages with a native or near-native facility. This is because one clear way to test Slobin-like hypotheses relative to Whorfian hypotheses would be to find out whether language correlated non-linguistic cognitive differences between speakers hold for bilinguals only when are thinking for speaking in one language, but not when they are thinking for speaking in some other language. If the relevant cognitive differences appeared and disappeared depending on which language speakers were planning to express themselves in, it would go some way to vindicate Slobin-like hypotheses over more traditional Whorfian Hypotheses. Of course, one could alternately accept a broadening of Whorfian hypotheses to include Slobin-like evanescent effects. Either way, attention must be paid to the persistence and revisability of the linguistic effects.

Kousta et al. (2008) shows that “for bilinguals there is intraspeaker relativity in semantic representations and, therefore, [grammatical] gender does not have a conceptual, non-linguistic effect” (843). Grammatical gender is obligatory in the languages in which it occurs and has been claimed by Whorfians to have persistent and enduring non-linguistic effects on representations of objects (Boroditsky et al. 2003). However, Kousta et al. supports the claim that bilinguals’ semantic representations vary depending on which language they are using, and thus have transient effects. This suggests that although some semantic representations of objects may vary from language to language, their non-linguistic cognitive effects are transitory.

Some advocates of Whorfianism have held that if Whorfian hypotheses were true, then meaning would be globally and radically indeterminate. Thus, the truth of Whorfian hypotheses is equated with global linguistic relativism—a well known self-undermining form of relativism. But as we have seen, not all Whorfian hypotheses are global hypotheses: they are about what is induced by particular linguistic features. And the associated non-linguistic perceptual and cognitive differences can be quite small, perhaps insignificant. For example, Thierry et al. (2009) provides evidence that an obligatory lexical distinction between light and dark blue affects Greek speakers’ color perception in the left hemisphere only. And the question of the degree to which this affects sensuous experience is not addressed.

The fact that Whorfian hypotheses need not be global linguistic relativist hypotheses means that they do not conflict with the claim that there are language universals. Structuralists of the first half of the 20th century tended to disfavor the idea of universals: Martin Joos’s characterization of structuralist linguistics as claiming that “languages can differ without limit as to either extent or direction” (Joos 1966, 228) has been much quoted in this connection. If the claim that languages can vary without limit were conjoined with the claim that languages have significant and permanent effects on the concepts and worldview of their speakers, a truly profound global linguistic relativism would result. But neither conjunct should be accepted. Joos’s remark is regarded by nearly all linguists today as overstated (and merely a caricature of the structuralists), and Whorfian hypotheses do not have to take a global or deterministic form.

John Lucy, a conscientious and conservative researcher of Whorfian hypotheses, has remarked:

We still know little about the connections between particular language patterns and mental life—let alone how they operate or how significant they are…a mere handful of empirical studies address the linguistic relativity proposal directly and nearly all are conceptually flawed. (Lucy 1996, 37)

Although further empirical studies on Whorfian hypotheses have been completed since Lucy published his 1996 review article, it is hard to find any that have satisfied the criteria of:

• adequately utilizing both the relevant linguistic and psychological research,
• focusing on obligatory rather than optional linguistic features,
• stating hypotheses in a clear testable way, and
• ruling out relevant competing Slobin-like hypotheses.

There is much important work yet to be done on testing the range of Whorfian hypotheses and other forms of linguistic conceptual relativism, and on understanding the significance of any Whorfian hypotheses that turn out to be well supported.

Copyright © 2024 by Barbara C. Scholz Francis Jeffry Pelletier < francisp @ ualberta . ca > Geoffrey K. Pullum < pullum @ gmail . com > Ryan Nefdt < ryan . nefdt @ uct . ac . za >

• Accessibility

Support SEP

Mirror sites.

View this site from another server:

• Info about mirror sites

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is copyright © 2024 by The Metaphysics Research Lab , Department of Philosophy, Stanford University

Library of Congress Catalog Data: ISSN 1095-5054

The Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis Linguistic Theory

DrAfter123/Getty Images

• An Introduction to Punctuation
• Ph.D., Rhetoric and English, University of Georgia
• M.A., Modern English and American Literature, University of Leicester
• B.A., English, State University of New York

The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is the  linguistic theory that the semantic structure of a language shapes or limits the ways in which a speaker forms conceptions of the world. It came about in 1929. The theory is named after the American anthropological linguist Edward Sapir (1884–1939) and his student Benjamin Whorf (1897–1941). It is also known as the   theory of linguistic relativity, linguistic relativism, linguistic determinism, Whorfian hypothesis , and Whorfianism .

History of the Theory

The idea that a person's native language determines how he or she thinks was popular among behaviorists of the 1930s and on until cognitive psychology theories came about, beginning in the 1950s and increasing in influence in the 1960s. (Behaviorism taught that behavior is a result of external conditioning and doesn't take feelings, emotions, and thoughts into account as affecting behavior. Cognitive psychology studies mental processes such as creative thinking, problem-solving, and attention.)

Author Lera Boroditsky gave some background on ideas about the connections between languages and thought:

"The question of whether languages shape the way we think goes back centuries; Charlemagne proclaimed that 'to have a second language is to have a second soul.' But the idea went out of favor with scientists when  Noam Chomsky 's theories of language gained popularity in the 1960s and '70s. Dr. Chomsky proposed that there is a  universal grammar  for all human languages—essentially, that languages don't really differ from one another in significant ways...." ("Lost in Translation." "The Wall Street Journal," July 30, 2010)

The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis was taught in courses through the early 1970s and had become widely accepted as truth, but then it fell out of favor. By the 1990s, the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis was left for dead, author Steven Pinker wrote. "The cognitive revolution in psychology, which made the study of pure thought possible, and a number of studies showing meager effects of language on concepts, appeared to kill the concept in the 1990s... But recently it has been resurrected, and 'neo-Whorfianism' is now an active research topic in  psycholinguistics ." ("The Stuff of Thought. "Viking, 2007)

Neo-Whorfianism is essentially a weaker version of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis and says that language  influences  a speaker's view of the world but does not inescapably determine it.

The Theory's Flaws

One big problem with the original Sapir-Whorf hypothesis stems from the idea that if a person's language has no word for a particular concept, then that person would not be able to understand that concept, which is untrue. Language doesn't necessarily control humans' ability to reason or have an emotional response to something or some idea. For example, take the German word  sturmfrei , which essentially is the feeling when you have the whole house to yourself because your parents or roommates are away. Just because English doesn't have a single word for the idea doesn't mean that Americans can't understand the concept.

There's also the "chicken and egg" problem with the theory. "Languages, of course, are human creations, tools we invent and hone to suit our needs," Boroditsky continued. "Simply showing that speakers of different languages think differently doesn't tell us whether it's language that shapes thought or the other way around."

• Definition and Discussion of Chomskyan Linguistics
• Generative Grammar: Definition and Examples
• Cognitive Grammar
• Universal Grammar (UG)
• Linguistic Performance
• What Is a Natural Language?
• Linguistic Competence: Definition and Examples
• Transformational Grammar (TG) Definition and Examples
• What Is Linguistic Functionalism?
• 24 Words Worth Borrowing From Other Languages
• The Theory of Poverty of the Stimulus in Language Development
• Definition and Examples of Case Grammar
• The Definition and Usage of Optimality Theory
• An Introduction to Semantics
• Construction Grammar
• 10 Types of Grammar (and Counting)

Group 6: Potpourri

Linguistic relativity: the whorf hypothesis.

In the 1920s, Benjamin Whorf was a graduate student studying with linguist Edward Sapir at Yale University in New Haven, Connecticut. Sapir, considered the father of American linguistic anthropology, was responsible for documenting and recording the languages and cultures of many Native American tribes, which were disappearing at an alarming rate. This was due primarily to the deliberate efforts of the United States government to force Native Americans to assimilate into the Euro-American culture.

Sapir and his predecessors were well aware of the close relationship between culture and language because each culture is reflected in and influences its language. Anthropologists need to learn the language of the culture they are studying in order to understand the world view of its speakers. Whorf believed that the reverse is also true, that a language affects culture as well, by actually influencing how its speakers think. His hypothesis proposes that the words and the structures of a language influence how its speakers think about the world, how they behave, and ultimately the culture itself. Simply stated, Whorf believed that human beings see the world the way they do because the specific languages they speak influence them to do so. He developed this idea through both his work with Sapir and his work as a chemical engineer for the Hartford Insurance Company investigating the causes of fires.

One of his cases while working for the insurance company was a fire at a business where there were a number of gasoline drums. Those that contained gasoline were surrounded by signs warning employees to be cautious around them and to avoid smoking near them. The workers were always careful around those drums. On the other hand, empty gasoline drums were stored in another area, but employees were more careless there. Someone tossed a cigarette or lighted match into one of the “empty” drums, it went up in flames, and started a fire that burned the business to the ground. Whorf theorized that the meaning of the word  empty  implied to the worker that “nothing” was there to be cautious about so the worker behaved accordingly. Unfortunately, an “empty” gasoline drum may still contain fumes, which are more flammable than the liquid itself.

Whorf’s studies at Yale involved working with Native American languages, including Hopi. The Hopi language is quite different from English, in many ways. For example, let’s look at how the Hopi language deals with time. Western languages (and cultures) view time as a flowing river in which we are being carried continuously away from a past, through the present, and into a future. Our verb systems reflect that concept with specific tenses for past, present, and future. We think of this concept of time as universal, that all humans see it the same way. A Hopi speaker has very different ideas and the structure of their language both reflects and shapes the way they think about time. The Hopi language has no present, past, or future tense. Instead, it divides the world into what Whorf called the manifested and unmanifest domains. The manifested domain deals with the physical universe, including the present, the immediate past and future; the verb system uses the same basic structure for all of them. The unmanifest domain involves the remote past and the future, as well as the world of desires, thought, and life forces. The set of verb forms dealing with this domain are consistent for all of these areas, and are different from the manifested ones. Also, there are no words for hours, minutes, or days of the week.

Native Hopi speakers often had great difficulty adapting to life in the English speaking world when it came to being “on time” for work or other events. It is simply not how they had been conditioned to behave with respect to time in their Hopi world, which followed the phases of the moon and the movements of the sun. In a book about the Abenaki who lived in Vermont in the mid-1800s, Trudy Ann Parker described their concept of time, which very much resembled that of the Hopi and many of the other Native American tribes. “They called one full day a sleep, and a year was called a winter. Each month was referred to as a moon and always began with a new moon. An Indian day wasn’t divided into minutes or hours. It had four time periods—sunrise, noon, sunset, and midnight. Each season was determined by the budding or leafing of plants, the spawning of fish or the rutting time for animals. Most Indians thought the white race had been running around like scared rabbits ever since the invention of the clock.” [1]

The lexicon, or vocabulary, of a language is an inventory of the items a culture talks about and has categorized in order to make sense of the world and deal with it effectively. For example, modern life is dictated for many by the need to travel by some kind of vehicle—cars, trucks, SUVs, trains, buses, etc. We therefore have thousands of words to talk about them, including types of vehicles, models, brands, or parts.

The most important aspects of each culture are similarly reflected in the lexicon of its language. Among the societies living in the islands of Oceania in the Pacific, fish have great economic and cultural importance. This is reflected in the rich vocabulary that describes all aspects of the fish and the environments that islanders depend on for survival. For example, in Palau there are about 1,000 fish species and Palauan fishermen knew, long before biologists existed, details about the anatomy, behavior, growth patterns and habitat of most of them—in many cases far more than modern biologists know even today. Much of fish behavior is related to the tides and the phases of the moon. Throughout Oceania, the names given to certain days of the lunar months reflect the likelihood of successful fishing. For example, in the Caroline Islands, the name for the night before the new moon is  otolol , which means “to swarm.” The name indicates that the best fishing days cluster around the new moon. In Hawai`i and Tahiti two sets of days have names containing the particle  `ole  or  `ore ; one occurs in the first quarter of the moon and the other in the third quarter. The same name is given to the prevailing wind during those phases. The words mean “nothing,” because those days were considered bad for fishing as well as planting.

Parts of Whorf’s hypothesis, known as linguistic relativity were controversial from the beginning, and still are among some linguists. Yet Whorf’s ideas now form the basis for an entire sub-field of cultural anthropology: cognitive or psychological anthropology. A number of studies have been done that support Whorf’s ideas. Linguist George Lakoff’s work looks at the pervasive existence of metaphors in everyday speech that can be said to predispose a speaker’s world view and attitudes on a variety of human experiences. [2] 

A metaphor is an expression in which one kind of thing is understood and experienced in terms of another entirely unrelated thing; the metaphors in a language can reveal aspects of the culture of its speakers. Take, for example, the concept of an argument. In logic and philosophy, an argument is a discussion involving differing points of view, or a debate. But the conceptual metaphor in American culture can be stated as ARGUMENT IS WAR. This metaphor is reflected in many expressions of the everyday language of American speakers: I won the argument. He shot down every point I made. They attacked every argument we made. Your point is right on target. I had a fight with my boyfriend last night. In other words, we use words appropriate for discussing war when we talk about arguments, which are certainly not real war. But we actually think of arguments as a verbal battle that often involve anger, and even violence, which then structures how we argue.

To illustrate that this concept of argument is not universal, Lakoff suggests imagining a culture where an argument is not something to be won or lost, with no strategies for attacking or defending, but rather as a dance where the dancers’ goal is to perform in an artful, pleasing way. No anger or violence would occur or even be relevant to speakers of this language, because the metaphor for that culture would be ARGUMENT IS DANCE.

[1] Trudy Ann Parker, Aunt Sarah,  Woman of the Dawnland  (Lancaster, NH, Dawnland Publications 1994), 56.

[2] George Lakoff and Mark Johnson,  Metaphors We Live By  (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1980), 4-5.

• Linguistic Relativity: The Whorf Hypothesis, in the Language Variation: Sociolinguistics section of Chapter 4, Language. Authored by : Nina Brown, Thomas McIlwraith, Laura Tubelle de Gonzalez. Provided by : The Society for Anthropology in Community Colleges (SACC). Located at : https://perspectives.pressbooks.com/chapter/language/#chapter-66-section-3 . Project : Perspectives: An Open Introduction to Cultural Anthropology, 2nd Edition. License : CC BY-NC: Attribution-NonCommercial
• image of Hopi dwelling. Authored by : Eric Simon. Provided by : Pixabay. Located at : https://pixabay.com/photos/montezuma-castle-national-monument-436735/ . License : CC0: No Rights Reserved
• image of empty barrels. Authored by : Hafis Fox. Provided by : Pixabay. Located at : https://pixabay.com/illustrations/barrel-environment-game-oil-2557164/ . License : CC0: No Rights Reserved
• image of earth, sun, moon, and tree, showing day and night. Authored by : Dirk Rabe. Provided by : Pixabay. Located at : https://pixabay.com/illustrations/day-and-night-little-planet-694840/ . License : CC0: No Rights Reserved
• image of children fishing. Authored by : Sasin Tipchai. Provided by : Pixabay. Located at : https://pixabay.com/photos/children-fishing-teamwork-together-1807511/ . License : CC0: No Rights Reserved
• image of two people facing away from one another/disagreement. Authored by : Fxq19910504. Provided by : Pixabay. Located at : https://pixabay.com/photos/character-back-to-back-male-woman-1797362/ . License : CC0: No Rights Reserved
• image of two people dancing. Authored by : ArtTower. Provided by : Pixabay. Located at : https://pixabay.com/photos/emotional-couple-tango-dance-50309/ . License : CC0: No Rights Reserved

Privacy Policy

From Linguistic Relativity to Script Relativity

• Open Access
• First Online: 15 October 2020

Cite this chapter

You have full access to this open access chapter

• Hye K. Pae 10  

Part of the book series: Literacy Studies ((LITS,volume 21))

7929 Accesses

4 Citations

This chapter reviews the evolution of the linguistic relativity hypothesis and how it was dismissed. The opponents of linguistic relativity misinterpreted the hypothesis itself and research results. With new interpretations and more scientific research findings, the hypothesis has gained rekindled interest in recent years. Empirical evidence for linguistic relativity is reviewed from the perspectives of first language influences on cognition, including color, motion, number, time, objects, and nonlinguistic representations, and from the prism of cross-linguistic influences. The chapter drives the discussion from linguistic relativity to the introduction to script relativity. The chapter ends with the claim that, among other factors that can explain cross-linguistic and cross-scriptal influences, script relativity has the greatest competitive plausibility to explain the consequences of reading.

“The very fact that a significant scientific novelty so often emerges simultaneously from several laboratories is an index both to the strongly traditional nature of normal science and to the completeness with which that traditional pursuit prepares the way for its own change.” - Thomas Kuhn ( 2012 , p. 65)

“… brain imaging demonstrates that the adult brain contains fixed circuitry exquisitely attuned to reading.” - Stanislas Dehaene ( 2009 , p. 4)

You have full access to this open access chapter,  Download chapter PDF

• linguistic relativity
• evidence of L1 influences on cognition
• cross-scrital evidence
• semiotic relativity
• script relativity
• competitive plausibility

Does the language we speak shape the way we think about the world? This question has been debated for more than a half century, and was developed into the tenet of the linguistic relativity hypothesis or the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis Footnote 1 formulated in the 1950s. Ever since it came to prominence in the linguistic field, the linguistic relativity hypothesis has been highly controversial in such disciplines as anthropology, psychology, education, and linguistics. Lucy ( 1997 ) noted that “[f]ew ideas generate as much interest and controversy as the linguistic relativity hypothesis…” (p. 291). Twenty years after Lucy’s ( 1997 ) claim, it remains largely the same. What is different from before, however, is that more rigorous scientific studies with multiple approaches and methods have been conducted to test and elucidate linguistic relativity in recent decades. What has made the hypothesis so controversial and, at the same time, so interesting? The long-standing die-hard interest, despite intense criticisms by a certain school of thought, suggests that the hypothesis has something significant at the core. The premise of the language-thought connection has also led to more sophisticated questions as to whether language functions as a lens or a mirror (or both).

Kuhn’s ( 2012 ) notion of the paradigm shift applies to linguistic relativity as well. As one of the epigraphs above shows, Kuhn ( 2012 ) explains the development of paradigm shifts in science. Kuhn uses the phrase normal science to refer to traditional scientific activities, including answering specific questions, collecting data, and making interpretations based on data collected. According to Kuhn ( 2012 ), in the process of normal science, anomalies emerge, which cannot be explained by an existing paradigm. When anomalies have accumulated against a current paradigm, the scientific discipline calls for extraordinary research , which is exploratory in nature, to address the anomalies accrued. As a result of extraordinary research on the anomalies, a new a paradigm is formed, which refers to a paradigm shift. A paradigm shift encounters resistance. As the new paradigm gradually gets accepted and goes through gestalt-like changes, however, the old paradigm eventually die (Kuhn, 2012 ). In the long run, the new paradigm becomes the dominant one.

The controversy of linguistic relativity has led to a wide range of laboratory studies as a traditional approach (i.e., normal science) and established a foundation for a paradigm shift by extensively exploring linguistic and nonlinguistic domains as extraordinary research in relevance to our thinking. Hacking ( 2012 ) notes that “[w]e have a tendency to see what we expect, even when it is not there. It often takes a long time for an anomaly to be seen for what it is, something contrary to the established order” (Hacking, 2012 , p. xxvi). The opposition to Whorfianism has shown the inability to explain differences shown by different language groups. With the technological advances, brain imaging research has become available. Especially given that adults’ brains are reshaped as a result of literacy (see the second epigraph), the impact of reading on our cognition warrants a new treatment as a paradigm shift.

Since the linguistic relativity hypothesis has gone through an unprecedented cycle of acceptance and dismissal for more than five decades, this chapter first reviews the heated debate over the hypothesis, focusing on the evolution and dismissal of the hypothesis, followed by accounts of why and how it was dismissed. Next, empirical evidence that has been accrued in multiple disciplines in recent decades is reviewed. This chapter ends with an expansion on the linguistic relativity hypothesis to the script relativity hypothesis .

1 The Evolution and Dismissal of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis

The idea of the linguistic relativity hypothesis was incubated in the early 1900s, evolving from an ethnolinguistic inquiry. The idea that language and thought were intertwined was first indirectly expressed by Wilhelm von Humboldt, who saw language as the key to understanding the worldviews of its speakers and who observed relations between language and the mind in his cultural study of kawi , a literary language in Java (Odlin, 2005 ). The proposal was more refined by Franz Boas, Edward Sapir, and Benjamin Lee Whorf in the mid-1900s (Koerner, 1992 ). Among them, Whorf became the primary figure of the linguistic relativity hypothesis with his research into the language of Hopi Indians of Arizona and his comparison of temporal markings between the Hopi and English in the 1930s. Whorf attempted to explain the way in which language and syntactic systems affected human perception and ideas through his study of the Native American language. Whorf ( 1940 ) argued “… the background linguistic system (in other words, the grammar) of each language is not merely a reproducing instrument for voicing ideas but rather is itself a shaper of ideas…” (p. 212; cited in Koerner, 1992 , p. 181). Although Whorf lacked an advanced degree in linguistics and was a fire prevention engineer and inspector for an insurance company with a degree in chemical engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, his insights were considered prudent in providing anecdotal ethnographic evidence and were highly regarded by linguistic authorities, such as Boas, Sapir, Bloomfield, and Lucy. Lucy ( 1997 ) notes that, although Whorf did not have formal training in psychology and linguistics, his work in linguistics is still considered to be of outstanding quality. After Whorf’s premature death in 1941 at age 44, a book entitled Language, Thought and Reality was published posthumously in 1956 compiling unpublished papers that he had left behind. The thesis of Whorfianism was continuously developed by linguists, psychologists, and anthropologists who investigated the effect of habitual use of language on habitual thinking and cognition.

Although Whorf himself did not put forth the strong deterministic effect of language on thinking, the hypothesis was later interpreted in two versions: (1) linguistic determinism as a strong version that posits that language determines thought and cognition and (2) linguistic relativity as a weak version that postulates that linguistic categories and habitual use of language affect our thought patterns (Pinker, 1994 ). The first view was the main source of strong opposition and quickly fell out of favor among scholars. The second view has received both acceptance and extreme dismissal over time. However, it has been repeatedly espoused by many scholars who argue that language indeed influences certain areas of cognition or cognitive processes.

Although many scholars believe that Whorf subscribed to linguistic determinism, another camp of scholars, such as Lee ( 1997 ) and Lucy ( 1992 , 1997 , 2016 ), reinterprets Whorf’s view based on his words, and claims that Whorf did not subscribe to the linguistic deterministic view. Schwanenflugel, Blount, and Lin ( 1991 ) seem to join the camp of Lee ( 1997 ) and Lucy ( 1997 ). They note that “Whorf’s major points appear to be arguments against the simplistic view that languages are directly translatable, category for category and word for word. His linguistic analyses were accordingly designed to highlight differences in grammatical and lexical patterns and to argue that a speaker must adhere to the patterns of his/her specific language in order to be understood” (p. 73).

Two types of examples are dominant in cross-linguistic comparisons under the notion of linguistic relativity: Lexical differentiation and grammatical differentiation. At the lexical level, Whorf argued that the way in which languages differentiate concepts in domains was different according to the culturally significant meaning assignment showing the high concentrations of differentiation in words in some domains and low concentrations in others. A well-known example is the statement that the Eskimo languages, including Yupik and Inuit, have a much larger number of words for “snow” in the lexicon than English. Whorf claimed that “[w]e [English speakers] have the same word for falling snow, snow on the ground, snow hard packed like ice, slushy snow, wind-driven snow--whatever the situation may be. To an Eskimo, this all-inclusive word would be almost unthinkable...” (Carroll, 1956 , p. 216). Another example is that the American Indian language of Hopi uses an umbrella word to refer to everything that flies except birds; that is, the same word is used for insects, airplanes, aviators, etc. (Carroll, 1956 ). Whorf’s lexical examples received criticisms that resulted from a different view on morphological differentiations. Regardless of the focus of the debate, it suggests that each language has its own way of differentiating lexical domains, which is different across languages. The real question is whether or not linguistic variations yield differences in thinking and thought patterns.

At the syntactic level, languages differ in the use of word order or morphology to represent meaning. Whorf claimed that grammatical classifications or distinctions would also impact individuals’ ways of thinking. Relatedly, the syntactic ordering of subject-verb-object (SVO) is the norm in English. In principle, each sentence begins with a noun or pronoun, followed by a verb (and then by another noun or noun phrase or ends with only S+V). This overt rule may reinforce a reliance on the subject and its action or description. Li and Thompson ( 1976 ) dub English a subject-prominent language. In contrast, Japanese and Korean use an SOV order, in which the subject is most of the time omitted in the sentence. Even objects are at times omitted in the sentence, but the speaker and the listener do not have difficulty understanding the meaning of the sentence or message. Japanese and Korean are called topic-prominent languages or context-bound languages in that sentences are structured around a given topic and that contextual cues play a significant role in deciphering the sentence. The SOV word order and null-subject usage in the Japanese and Korean languages may have to do with context-focused problem-solving strategies Japanese and Korean people typically use, as discussed in Chapter 6 .

Whorf’s hypothesis indicating that the habitual use of language affects habitual thinking and behavior has been challenged mostly by nativists or universalists from the 1960s through the 1980s. Opponents, such as Chomsky and Pinker, criticize Whorf’s hypothesis for implausibility or lack of logic in the accounts of how language affects thought and for Whorf’s arguments being in the form of anecdotes and speculations without hard evidence. The nativists argue that all languages share a common underlying structure that is largely innate. They believe that linguistic differences across languages are at the surface and do not make differences in the universal linguistic processes of the brain. Since they believe that all human beings possess the same set of psychological faculties, biological construction, and neural configuration, similar cognitive patterns are expected to show in language use across different language speakers; as a result, cultural variability is of less importance.

As a vehement opponent, Pinker ( 1994 ) criticizes Whorf’s hypothesis, in his book The Language Instinct , to be a “conventional absurdity: a statement that goes against all common sense…” (p. 47). He also mentions “… the more you examine Whorf’s arguments, the less sense they make” (p. 50) and “[a]s a cognitive scientist I can afford to be smug about common sense being true (thought is different from language) and linguistic determinism being a conventional absurdity” (p. 57). He goes on asserting that “[p]eople do not think in English or Chinese or Apache; they think in a language of thought” (p. 72), which is a meta-language mentalese and that “[k]nowing a language… is knowing how to translate mentalese into strings or words and vice versa” (p. 73).

As shown in his words, Pinker equated Whorfianism with the strong version, linguistic determinism , which can be seen as a misinterpretation of Whorf’s claim. Considering that the notion of strong and weak versions of Whorfianism was posthumously invented by other scholars, there is no evidence that Whorf himself claimed the determinism. In his later book, Pinker ( 2007 ) continues to debunk the linguistic relativity hypothesis by again relying on the strong version of linguistic determinism. Ironically, he essentially acknowledges linguistic relativity, as shown in his own words “[l]et me say at the outset that language surely affects thought--at the very least, if one person’s words didn’t affect another person’s thoughts, language as a whole would be useless” (p. 125). However, he still erroneously sticks with the determinism and tries to make Whorfianism “banal” (p. 126).

Malotki ( 1983 ) was an anthropologist who rejected Whorfianism. He argued that the Hopi language contains a series of time-related linguistic features, such as tense, metaphors for time, and time units (e.g., days, weeks, months), as opposed to Whorf’s claim. Lee ( 1991 ,  1997 ) directly refuted Malotki’s ( 1983 ) analysis of adverbial particle “tensors” to be problematic and invalid. Lee also contended that, since his interest was geared toward showing that Hopi was similar to English, Malotki overlooked how Hopi grammar and time concepts were different from English.

There was an additional group of scholars who were opposed to linguistic relativity. Following Lenneberg’s line of inquiry, Berlin and Kay ( 1969 ) continued color research and indicated that the formation of color terminology was universal based on the three core color names (i.e., black, white, and red ) commonly found across cultures. Berlin and Kay endorsed universal typological color principles, which were regarded to be determined by physical-biological universals, not by linguistic factors. However, Lucy ( 1992 ) criticized Berlin and Kay’s interpretation of their findings, arguing that the results of their study actually did not disprove linguistic relativity in color naming mainly because of questionable assumptions and data-related problems that were contained in their study of basic color terms. Due to the controversial accounts of linguistic relativity and conflicting research results, the debate has been continuing.

2 Rekindled Interest in the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis

In the midst of the criticism on the linguistic relativity hypothesis, Fishman ( 1982 ) attempted to expand on Whorfianism as an intrinsic cultural value. He suggested that Whorfianism be the third kind above and beyond the linguistic relativity and linguistic determinism hypotheses. This third kind of hypothesis supports ethnolinguistic diversity as an intrinsic value of societal assets to promote pan-human creativity, problem solving, and mutual cross-cultural acceptance. He viewed this third kind as a “valuable humanizing and sensitizing effect on the language-related disciplines” (p. 1).

This line of refocusing on the linguistic relativity hypothesis continued in the late 1980s and early 1990s when cognitive linguistics solidified its way. Lakoff ( 1987 ) argues in his book Women, Fire and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind that language is used metaphorically and that our knowledge is organized by the mapping of idealized cognitive models which are a by-product of category structures and cultural metaphors. In his elaboration on cultural metaphors, Lakoff ( 1987 ) revisits linguistic relativity focusing on how linguistic categorizations influence mental categories. He asserts that opponents have used different parameters to describe linguistic relativity to the degree that their criticisms are not fully grounded in the tenet of linguistic relativity. He also stresses that misunderstanding and confusion got in the way of opposition by noting “[t]he point is to show that there is not one concept of relativism but literally hundreds and that much of the emotion that has been spent in discussion of the issue has resulted from confusions about what is meant by ‘relativism’” (p. 304). Lakoff ( 1987 ) continues to assert that the dismissal of relativism was a result of “… scholarly irresponsibility, fuzzy thinking, lack of rigor, and even immorality” (p. 304). When it comes to different conceptual systems across languages, the degree, depth, nature, and locus of variations need to be scientifically addressed above and beyond the monolithic system issue.

A stockpile of studies accumulated by Lucy ( 1992 , 1997 ), Lee ( 1991 ), and Levinson and colleagues (Bowerman & Levinson 2001 ; Gumperz & Levinson, 1996 ; Levinson, 2003 ) shows how the linguistic relativity hypothesis was misinterpreted, and also suggests a nuanced approach to study how language is intertwined with speakers’ cognition and mental processes. Levinson ( 2003 ) points out how the view of Simple Nativists was “simply ill informed” (p. 28). He continues indicating that “… Simple Nativism has outlived its utility; it blocks a proper understanding of the biological roots of language, it introduces incoherence into our theory, it blinds us to the reality of linguistic variation and discourages interesting research on the language-cognition interface.” ( 2003 , p. 43).

Hunt and Agnoli ( 1991 ) indicate from a perspective of cognitive psychology that thought is related to variations in the lexicality, syntax, semantics, and pragmatics of language, and that different languages bring up different challenges and support for the cognition of diverse speakers. They also note that “[t]he Whorfian hypothesis is properly regarded as a psychological hypothesis about language performance and not as a linguistic hypothesis about language competence” (p. 387). Rediscovering Whorf’s insights, Lee ( 1997 ) argues that relativism has significant implications for pedagogy and education such that accepting the language-mind-experience relationship would facilitate teaching and thinking.

Another effort to rethink and reformulate linguistic relativity has been made with an anthology entitled Rethinking Linguistic Relativity edited by Gumperz and Levinson ( 1996 ). The compilation of articles focuses on cognitive and social aspects of linguistic relativity ranging from the cognitive processes of spatial semantic categories to the linguistic and cultural relativity of inference, including both pro-Whorfianisn and anti-relativist perspectives. The collection covers language-specific effects on cognition as well as cross-linguistically and cross-culturally specific and universal constructs. In addition, it covers not only language and linguistic structures that are situated within particular cultural contexts, but also the ramifications of linguistic and cultural concepts as well as language use and the variability of language. This line of resurrected interest has been extended to conceptual discussions in cross-language or second language studies (Bylund & Athanasopoulos, 2014 ; Casasanto, 2008 ; Cook & Bassetti, 2011 ).

3 Empirical Evidence for Linguistic Relativity

Lucy ( 1997 ) laments that, although linguistic relativity has drawn a long-standing historical interest from scholars of multi-disciplines, there has been a paucity of empirical studies, compared to other subjects. There are several reasons for the lack of empirical studies. First, as indicated in Chapter 1 , it has to do with the interdisciplinary nature of the hypothesis, which makes the specialization of approach and methodology difficult to reconcile among different disciplines (Lucy, 1997 , 2016 ). Second, it is related to the fact that, as briefly discussed earlier, some scholars equate Whorfianism with determinism, which has led to misinterpretations, unjust treatments of the hypothesis, and prejudices and biases (Lucy, 1997 ). Third, the intricately interwoven nature of language and cognition has also made empirical research challenging. Whorf discussed many linguistic classifications, but they were difficult to disentangle without assessing language independently of cognition. Boroditsky ( 2001 ) also points out a challenge involved in research of linguistic relativity. Although comparison studies have been conducted in different languages, a lack of instruments that are comparable to and reliable in each language imposes huge difficulties in the interpretation of results. The next challenge is related to nonlinguistic tasks used in the research. Although tasks are claimed to be nonlinguistic, it is difficult to ensure that nonlinguistic tasks are not reinforced or affected by the participant’s language due to the nature of interrelatedness between language and cognition and between language and human behavior. Last, Whorf’s views did not fit well with the tradition of behaviorists in psychology that prevailed at the time nor with subsequent nativism that was pioneered by Chomsky in the 1950s.

Lucy ( 1997 ) summarizes empirical research into linguistic relativity in three main approaches, focusing on language , thought , and reality as the central orientations: structure-centered, domain-centered, and behavior-centered approaches. The structure-centered approach focuses on the lexicogrammatical structures of languages and examines structural differences in languages between two languages as well as their possible implications for thought and reality (e.g., number, gender, aspect markings). The three key elements of language, thought, and reality are closely interrelated such that “[l]anguage embodies an interpretation of reality and language can influence thought about that reality” (Lucy, 1997 , p. 294; emphasis in original). Human thought not only is closely linked to perception and attention, but also regulates the personal, sociocultural, and linguistic systems of classification, inference, and memory. The domain-centered approach involves the domains of experienced reality as well as the way in which a language encodes and construes semantic categories (e.g., color, time, space). The last behavior-centered approach concerns practical matters in relation to the behavioral aspects of the linguistic system (e.g., usage-based analysis).

Besides the three main foci on language, thought, and reality , other conceptual and methodological considerations are worth mentioning. First, the parameter of differences in languages needs to be defined. This has been addressed by looking at the presence or absence of a particular linguistic marker in languages under comparison. Another way is to address how the differences, if any, are manifested in languages being compared. Second, if a language shapes or affects the speaker’s cognition or thought patterns, the degree to which the language affects cognition needs to be defined, clarified, and identified. Third, differences in cognition or thought patterns also need to be defined. Since cognition and thought patterns are latent constructs, they are difficult to measure. Therefore, research has taken an indirect route to examine color perception, time perception, number perception, and so on. As indicated in Chapter 1 , the opponents of linguistic relativity claim that evidence should come from nonverbal behavior in order to make linguistic relativity tenable. However, it is difficult to draw a distinct line between language and cognition because these two have an interlocking relationship that has been formed since infancy (Perszyk & Waxman, 2018 ). Although perceptual and conceptual domains, such as color, time, number, and space, can be considered nonverbal, it is still an open question because linguistic representations associated with these concepts are bound to be activated in the performance of tasks that elicits color, time, number, and space concepts.

With these issues related to research in Whorfianism in mind, a review of scientific evidence that supports or refutes linguistic relativity is in order. Research on first language influences on thinking is first reviewed and then studies of cross-language transfer in relation to linguistic relativity are discussed.

3.1 Studies of First Language Influences on Cognition among Various Language Communities

3.1.1 color.

Zipf’s ( 1935 ) law refers to the inverse relationship between the frequency of a word and its rank in the frequency table as well as a negative correlation between the length of a word and its frequency of usage. The higher the frequency of a word, the shorter the word. This notion was used in Brown and Lenneberg’s ( 1954 ) study of color codability based on the relationship between codability and ease of expression. Brown and Lenneberg asked college students to name 24 different colors and examined their reaction time. They found that colors with longer names (meaning less codable or less focal, according to them) took longer time, produced less agreement among the participants, and produced less consistency from one time to another.

Given that Brown and Lenneberg’s ( 1954 ) study used only English, linguistic relativity could not be fully addressed without a comparison between (at least) two language groups. Berlin and Kay ( 1969 ) investigated color terms and codability in 20 different languages. They took the nativist’s position that color recognition and coding were an innate physiological process rather than a form of cultural acquisition that relied on a premise of cross-linguistic regularities and constraints involved in the coding of colors and biological sources of color patterns. They noted universal restrictions on the number of basic color terms across languages. They claimed that all color terms of all languages could be broken down into 11 color terms that were monomorphemic, which appeared in a five-level hierarchy in languages: (1) black and white, (2) red, (3) yellow, green, and blue, (4) brown, and (5) purple, pink, orange, and grey. If one language had just two basic colors, the terms would be black and white (e.g., New Guinean people). If one language has three basic colors, it would be black , white , and red , and so forth, according to the hierarchy. This hierarchy was extended as evidence that human physiology would determine the categorization of color terms and put constraints on linguistic variations on color classification and perception. Berlin and Kay interpreted their findings as anti-Whorfianism.

Early studies of the lexical codability of colors showed that more codable colors (i.e., aforementioned focal colors) were better remembered than less codable colors in nonlinguistic tasks. Agrillo and Roberson ( 2009 ) revisited Brown and Lenneberg’s ( 1954 ) color study by comparing communication accuracy and recognition memory with varying distractor arrays for color items in order to overcome or control for the influence of context and task demands on the results. Unlike the findings of Brown and Lenneberg’s ( 1954 ) study, Agrillo and Roberson found that colors that were easier to name showed no recognition advantage for memory in a randomized array of distractors which was more akin to real life situations outside the laboratory setting. They concluded that the eight basic colors were not inherently more codable and memorable than other colors.

In another study, Kay and Kempton ( 1984 ) compared color categorization between English speakers and speakers of Tarahumara, a Uto-Aztecan language of northern Mexico, who did not have a distinction between green and blue and had instead a collective term siyóname meaning green or blue , in order to examine whether the lexical difference would result in a distinct judgment of the distances between the two colors. In Experiment 1, 56 triads of color chips were presented, in which three chips were shown at a time, and participants were asked which of the three chips was most different from the other two (a.k.a., a “pick an odd one out” method). Two chips were distinct in the colors of green and blue, while the hue of the other item was somewhere in between green or blue. English speakers tended to exaggerate the distinction of colors close to the lexical category boundary of blue and green, whereas Tarahumara did not show the tendency. In other words, English speakers clearly distinguished the green and blue chips based on the lexical category, while Tarahumara speakers did not distinguish the blue-green contrast. Kay and Kempton interpreted this result as a clear Whorfian effect in the direct subjective judgment of colors. When speakers are forced to judge color discrimination, they may use the lexical classification of the judged objects as if discrimination is related to the required dimension of judgment as long as the task does not block this connection. Under this assumption, Experiment 2 eliminated the subject’s use of the color name strategy to examine whether or not participants used a name strategy as a cognitive mechanism when discriminating between blue and green colors according to their lexical categories. The participants made discriminations based on the distance between the two colors but not on the lexical category, which showed no group difference. Results indicated that no sensitivity to lexical category boundaries was found in English speakers and that the Whorfian effect found in experiment 1 disappeared when the use of their color names was removed from the experiment.

Roberson et al. ( 2000 , 2005 ) investigated perceptual judgments and memory in different language groups whose basic color terms were different. They found that differences in color cognition between different language groups yielded significant effects on perception and memory for colors (Roberson, Davies, & Davidoff, 2000 ). In order to overcome limited evidence from a tiny and remote language community, Roberson et al. ( 2005 ) studied a large language community of semi-nomadic tribesmen in Southern Africa and found a different cognitive organization of color was involved in both English and semi-nomadic tribesmen’s language with five color terms (Roberson et al., 2005 ). Roberson et al. ( 2000 , 2005 ) suggested that categorical perceptions were language-dependent given the close interaction found between language and cognition, supporting the cultural relativity hypothesis.

Research has also been conducted to investigate whether having a word for a concept influences visual color perception. Given that English and Russian color terms are different in the color spectrum (while English has a single word for blue , Russians use different color terms for light blue goluboy and dark blue siniy ), Winawer et al. ( 2007 ) examined whether the difference in color terms made differences in color discrimination. They tested native speakers of English and Russian in a speeded color discrimination task using two shades of blue. Russian speakers were faster to discriminate two shades when they fell into different shades used in Russian (one siniy and the other goluboy ) than the same shades (both siniy or both goluboy ). In order to determine whether words were unconsciously activated, they asked Russian participants to perform a verbal task at the same time when making their color discrimination. The reaction time advantage of different shades of goluboy and siniy disappeared. The different results of the verbal dual tasks indicated that the task of discriminating color shades was facilitated by the unconscious activation of verbal categories. English speakers showed no difference in discriminating the two blue shades. Winawer et al. ( 2007 ) concluded that color categories in language influenced color discrimination in simple perceptual color tasks and that the effect of language was disrupted by verbal interference. These findings are a piece of evidence for pro-Whorfianism.

Özgen and Davies ( 2002 ) also examined categorical color perception and claimed that color perception could be learned through repeated practice, such as laboratory training. They interpreted the findings of four experiments as support for the linguistic relativity hypothesis, claiming that “language may shape color perception” (p. 477). Lu, Hodges, Zhang, and Wang’s ( 2012 ) study was also in a similar line. They investigated the effects of Chinese color names on recognition in the left and right hemispheres using color naming and color memory. Results showed that, unlike previously assumed, linguistic effects on color discrimination were not constrained in the left hemisphere. They suggested that the right hemisphere’s relative speciailzation of color discrimination and the left hemisphere’s relative speciailzation of linguistic discrimination might have yielded varing degrees of effects on timing. Gibson and colleagues ( 2017 ) also conducted a large-scale study of 110 languages using the World Color Survey. They found cross-language similarity in color naming efficiency as well as differences in overall usefulness of color across cultures.

Importantly, Kay and Regier ( 2006 ) seem to support this line of reasoning. They acknowledge that there are universal constraints on color categories, but, at the same time, differences in color categorization across languages yield differences in color cognition and perception. This is a significant advancement for linguistic relativity, compared to the claim made in Berlin and Kay ( 1969 ), which was anti-Whorfianism.

Another set of studies in relation to linguistic relativity is an encoding pattern of motion events. Athanasopoulosa and Albright ( 2016 ) adopted a perceptual learning approach to the linguistic relativity hypothesis to examine the way English speakers categorize motion events by training them in an English-like way (aspect language) and in a Swedish-like way (non-aspect language) using the conditions of with and without verbal interference in English. Results showed that verbal interference effects were salient only in the within-language condition (i.e., English speaker’ categorizing events in an English-like way) but not in the between-language condition (i.e., English speakers’ categorizing events in Swedish-like way). This suggests a selective language influence on the classification of motion event cognition among English speakers. Gennari, Sloman, Malt, and Fitch’s ( 2002 ) study also examined lexicalizing patterns of motion events among English and Spanish speakers using two nonlinguistic tasks of recognition memory and similarity judgment. They found a linguistic effect in the similarity task with verbal encoding only, indicating that language-specific encoding patterns were observed in the form of language-dependent regularities involving the lexicalization of motion events.

Choi and Bowerman ( 1991 ) reported that children learning English and Korean showed different patterns of lexicalization of motion as early as 17-20 months. American children tended to quickly generalize spatial words of path particles, such as up , down , and in, to both spontaneous and causal changes of location. In contrast, Korean children were more likely to use different words for spontaneous and cause motion expressions. These findings indicated that children’s language acquisition was influenced by the semantic organization of their native language from the early phase of language acquisition. This suggests that language input and cognition interact with each other from the beginning of learning about motion and space.

3.1.2 Number

An attempt to redefine a Whorfian effect as a processing difference according to the language spoken has been made through research on numbers. Brysbaert, Fias, and Noël ( 1998 ) examined number sense and numerical encoding among French- and Dutch-speaking students. Whorfian effects on numerical cognition was examined using the Dutch number naming system in which the order of tens and units was reversed (e.g., 24 is read ‘four-and-twenty’). In Experiment 1, the researchers used two conditions of mathematical addition problems: (1) different order of the combination of two- and single-digit operands (e.g., 20 + 4 vs. 4 + 20) and (2) different presentation modality (i.e., Arabic numeral vs. oral). A significant difference was found between the two language groups in the presentation modalities. Experiment 2 showed that the difference disappeared when the participants were asked to type in their answers instead of verbal response. This indicated that the difference found in the methods of presentation might be related to input or output processes rather than the mathematical addition operation per se. Although numerical cognition could be independent of the language system, the authors did not completely dismiss the possibility of Whorfian effects on human cognition.

Lucy ( 1992 ) also examined relationships between grammatical number markings and cognition among speakers of American English and Yucatec Maya. English speakers use obligatory plural markings to accord with associated countable nouns, whereas Yucatec speakers optionally indicate plural terms. The two groups of different language speakers performed differently in nonverbal experimental tasks with a preference made based on the lexical structure of their native language. Specifically, English speakers showed a preference for shape-based classifications, while Yucatec speakers demonstrated material-based categorizations. This is an interesting study because not all languages have obligatory plural markings as shown in English. For example, the Japanese and Korean languages do not require number agreement between the subject and the verb as well as between the number marking and related countable nouns in the sentence. Specifically, the Korean language does not require number agreement between the subject and the verb or other grammatical elements within the sentence, but has a specific classifier that collocates with a given noun. For example, the phrases three books and three dogs in English are expressed as book three kwon ( kwon is a designated classifier for books) and dog three mari ( mari is a designated classifier for animals). Although no empirical data are available on this as of today, it is possible that these kinds of linguistic differences yield differences in shape-based, material-based, or animacy-based categorization as well.

Scientific attention has been paid to morphological differences in number coding between East-Asian languages and English as well as its effect on children’s conceptualization on numbers, and, ultimately, their mathematics performance. The number naming system in English is less straightforward than that of the East-Asian languages. In English, for example, the number name for 11 is hardly related to the unit name for 1, although the decade names for 13 through 19 are consistent with the unit names 3 through 9. The three Asian languages have a systematic code of number names from 11 and beyond; that is, the decade name followed by the unit name. For example, 11 and 12 are coded as literally (one) ten one and (one) ten two , respectively, and so forth. Likewise, the names for 21 and 22 are literally two ten one , two ten two , respectively, and so on. The numbers greater than 100 follow the same rule. This consistent way of combination does not require the use of new additional words to refer to numbers, unlike the number names from 13 to 19 in English. Notably, the English number names for 13 through 19 have inconsistent combinations because they consist of the unit name before the decade name, which is different from the other number names (i.e., names for 20 and onward). In short, the three East-Asian languages code the number names by the principle of place-value structure , meaning that the numeric values of multi-digit numbers are represented by the position of constituent digits in the structure of descending power from left to right (e.g., 123 = {1} ×10 2 + {2} ×10 1 + {3} ×10 0 ).

Based on these formal place-value structures of numbers, research has been conducted on the effect of the numeric name system on mathematics performance among students of different language groups. Miura et al. ( 1988 , 1994 ) carried out cross-national comparisons of mathematics performance among American, Chinese, Japanese, and Korean children ( 1988 ) and among Chinese, French, Japanese, Korean, Swedish, and American children ( 1994 ). The results of two studies showed differences in cognitive representations of numbers and their effects on math achievement. Children with the three East-Asian languages consistently outperformed their peers of European and American backgrounds. The researchers attributed the East-Asians’ outperformance to numerical language characteristics. In other words, East-Asian children tended to construct decade blocks and unit blocks in a systematic way to show the place value, showing a better understanding of the place-value structure of the number system. However, children from France, Sweden, and the U.S. showed a preference for a collection of unit blocks to represent numbers as a grouping of counted objects. Furthermore, Asian students showed a greater flexibility in mental number manipulations than their counterparts. Miura et al. ( 1988 , 1994 ) concluded that the systematic numeric characteristics expressed in the three East-Asian languages might facilitate the learning of mathematics, especially arithmetic.

Differences in the naming speed of the numbers have also been found among different language groups. Miller et al. ( 1995 ) found that Chinese children were faster in counting between 11 and 99 than English-speaking children, although there was no difference in the range of numbers between 1 and 10 and beyond 99. This difference may be attributable to the systematic number name structure between 11 and 99, as explained earlier. Additional studies also indicated that Chinese speakers pronounced numbers faster than English speakers. Hoosain and Salili ( 1987 ) noted that working memory capacity did depend on the time-based duration of sounds rather than the item-based number chunks. They reported that Chinese speakers’ pronunciation speed was faster and their sound duration for numbers was shorter than those of English speakers in their three experiments with English- and Chinese-speaking undergraduate students. They also reported Chinese speakers’ greater digit spans than those of English speakers. They suggest that pronunciation speed for numbers in language affects the mental capacity for the speaker’s cognitive manipulation of numbers.

It seems plausible that East-Asian children take advantage of the greater regularity embedded in their languages than English when they acquire number names and number sense. Ng and Rao ( 2010 ) have indicated in a comprehensive review that the Chinese language offers benefits for math learning and that the language is a contributing factor to the early attainment of math skills, although language, culture, cultural beliefs, and educational systems are interrelated. Klein et al. ( 2013 ) also show that a direct comparison of Italian-speaking children to German-speaking children further corroborates the previous findings that language affects cognitive number processing. They conclude that numerical development can be language-universal, but it might be modulated by language.

Another study with an Amazonian tribe provides an interesting piece of evidence that challenges the idea that people have an innate mathematical ability. Frank et al. ( 2008 ) argue that the number is a cognitive technology for creating mental representations for accurate memory. The Pirahã, an Amazonian tribe of hunters-gatherers in remote northwestern Brazil, have no words that express exact quantity (not even one ), although they have words to express the quantities “one,” “two,” and “many” (Everett, 2005 ). These number words do not refer to counting numbers, but are rather signifying relative quantities (e.g., one for any quantity between one and four; two for as many as six). Frank et al. ( 2008 ) carried out two experiments for an investigation of the number language (Experiment 1) and numerical abilities (Experiment 2). They showed that the Pirahã could perform exact matching tasks with the large numbers of objects when the tasks did not involve memory. However, their responses were inaccurate on matching tasks when involved with memory. These results suggest that language for the exact cardinal number is a cultural invention rather than a linguistic universal. They also indicate that number words do not change our underlying number representations, but instead are a cognitive technology for keeping track of the cardinality of large sets across time, space, and modality (Frank et al., 2008 ). Although the results do not support the strong version of Whorfianism, they do suggest that language influences cognition and memory.

The concept of time has also been studied. Universalists view time as a universally abstract concept, while relativists stress that different languages frame and express time differently. Boroditsky ( 2001 ) investigated the concept of time perceived by native speakers of Mandarin and English by looking at whether time is perceived horizontally or vertically because Mandarin and English encode time concepts differently in the languages. She demonstrated different ways of indicating time in English and Chinese, showing that English speakers tended to express time horizontally, while Chinese were likely to express time vertically. Specifically, Mandarin speakers responded faster when March and April were presented in a vertical display. In contrast, English speakers’ judgment was faster when March and April were presented in a horizontal array. She offered support for the weak version of linguistic relativity by concluding that the native language was a tool that shaped habitual thought and cognition of abstract concepts. Although January and Kako ( 2007 ) rebutted Boroditsky’s ( 2001 ) conclusion in a replication study, the inconsistent findings have not prevented from maintaining continued research interest in time perception.

Bylund and Athanasopoulos ( 2017 ) investigated how people construct their mental representations of time passage and estimate time among native speakers of Spanish and Swedish as well as Spanish-Swedish bilinguals. The Swedish language describes time in terms of length (i.e., long or short ), while the Spanish language estimates it in terms of volume (i.e., big or small ). When the participants were asked to measure the time duration (i.e., how much time had passed) while watching on the computer screen either a line gradually growing or a container being filled or both, “Swedish speakers were misled by stimulus length, and Spanish speakers were misled by stimulus size/quantity" (Bylund & Athanasopoulos, 2017 , p. 911). Based on the language-specific interference found in the duration reproduction task, they asserted that language could play a powerful role in transforming our psychophysical experience of time, based on the robust presence of preferred expressions of time duration in magnitude according to the native language; that is, the long - short concept in Swedish and the big - small concept in Spanish. Bylund and Athanasopoulos’ ( 2017 ) bilingual data showed a different interference effect depending on the language used in the context. When the word “duración” ( duration in Spanish) was presented first, bilinguals were likely to rely their time estimate more on how full the container was than how much the line grew. When they were prompted with the word “tid” ( duration in Swedish), they measured the time estimate merely by the distance that the lines that had made by growing. These results were not counterevidence to linguistic relativity. The researchers concluded that humans’ mental representation of time was malleable in the form of a “highly adaptive information processing system” (p. 911). Montemayor ( 2019 ) recently suggests that the mechanism for time perception be examined in a broader context (i.e., early and late time perception) of time cognition and perception to overcome the narrow scope of termporal properties of time. He states that time perception provides researchers with new possibilities to invenstigate linguistic modulation through the interface between semantic categorization and mental representations in different forms.

3.1.4 Object

Conceptual categories pertaining to object names seem to be constructed as early as when children learn their mother tongue, if not before. Gopnik and Choi ( 1990 ) examined an early semantic and cognitive development among Korean-, French-, and English-speaking children by having them perform object-permanence, means-ends problem solving, and categorization tasks. Gopnik and Choi found that Korean children used significantly different forms than English-speaking children in encoding disappearance and success-failure words. English- and French-speaking children developed categorization and naming earlier than did Korean children. A longitudinal study (Gopnik, Choi, & Baumberger, 1996 ) showed that Korean-speaking children used not only more means-ends and success-failure words, but also more verbs than English speakers. These results are consistent with the observation that Korean-speakng mothers used more verbs and fewer nouns than English-speaking mothers (Gopnik, Choi, & Baumberger, 1996 ). In an observational study, they found that Korean mothers tended to emphasize actions, while English-speaking mothers tended to emphasize categorical names. Consistent with the previous study, Korean-speaking children were delayed in categorization but superior in means-ends abilities, compared to English-speaking counterparts. These findings suggest that differences in linguistic input and linguistic usage influence children’s cognitive development through two-way interactions between language and cognition in the early phase of language acquisition.

The specification of object position was also examined. Koster and Cadierno ( 2018 ) examined whether the perception of placement is universal or not using German and Spanish verbs. They examined categorization (Experiment 1), recognition memory (Experiment 2), and object orientation (Experiment 3). Null effects were found in the categorization and mental simulations of object orientation. However, German speakers demonstrated better recognition memory for object position than did Spanish-speaking counterparts. Although it did not show fully involved mental processes in the perception of placement, the study demonstrated robust language-specific effects involved in the specification of object position. More studies in this line are warranted for a better understanding of the interface between language and perception.

3.1.5 Nonlinguistic Representations

Nonlinguistic representations were also examined using musical pitch. Dolscheid, Shayan, Majid, and Casasanto ( 2013 ) used nonlinguistic psychophysical tasks to investigate the mental representation of musical pitch among native speakers of Dutch and Farsi. The two languages encode pitches differently; Dutch describes pitches using adjectives of high or low , while Farsi describes pitches using terms thin or thick . Performance differences were found in two pitch-reproducton tasks between the two groups. The Dutch-speaking group was further trained to describe musical pitches as in Farsi (i.e., thin or thick in description). Training actually made Dutch participants describe pitch in a similar way to that of Farsi speakers, which provided psychophysical evidence for linguistic relativity. The authors concluded “[l]anguage can play a causal role in shaping nonlinguistic representations of musical pitch” (p. 613).

3.1.6 Other Areas

The framework of the linguistic relativity hypothesis has been addressed in diverse areas. Gender issues were examined in a social identity analysis through the prism of the linguistic relativity hypothesis (Khosroshahi, 1989 ). Sign language was also used to examine a Whorfian effect. Xia, Xu, and Mo ( 2019 ) investigated deaf people’s color perception using visual search and oddball tasks. Both behavioral and electrophysiological findings showed that sign language affected the perception of color categories among deaf people and concluded that the nature of language influenced perception and thought. Considering little relevance of these studies to the thesis of this book, albeit important in terms of addressing linguistic relativity, the review of these studies is limited here.

Also examined was how language or grammatical usage could make workers misconstrue dangerous situations in the workplace. Strømnes observed that the linguistic features of Swedish prepositions could represent space in three dimensions, while Finnish cases could represent space in two dimensions coupled with a third dimension of time or duration. In other words, the Swedish language describes movement in detail in three-dimensional spaces, whereas the Finnish language places emphasis on static and holistic relationships between or among people. This could be extended to the linguistic difference between Indo-European languages and Uralic languages. Indo-European languages (e.g., Swedish, Norwegian, English) tend to form coherent temporal entities in a way that actions are explained linearly from the beginning to the end in the setting. In contrast, Uralic languages (Finnish, Hungarian, Estonian) tend to describe static settings with minimal movement of the person in a way that settings are expressed with the global sentiment of people involved within the setting. Due to these linguistic differences in the emphasis placed in the situation, the Finns tend to organize their work environment in a way that individual workers are more focused (i.e., person-centered) than the work process for overall production. This lack of emphasis on the overall temporal organization of production processes is likely to lead to frequent disruptions in production, and ultimately result in higher occurrences of work-related accidents than Swedish-speaking counterparts. (summarized from Lucy, 1997 ; see pp. 303-304).

3.2 Studies of Cross-Language Influences

The debate over the linguistic relativity hypothesis has been mainly involved in the monolingual mind. However, Neo-Whorfianism exemplifies universal constraints and cross-cultural regularities. As such, linguistic relativity has been resurrected as an active research topic in psycholinguistics and studies of a second language (L2) or a third language (L3). Jarvis and Pavlenko ( 2007 ) employed the linguistic relativity hypothesis as a framework of crosslinguistic influences on bilinguals’ and multilinguals’ minds and learning additional languages regardless of the directionality of cross-language influences (i.e., L1 to L2, L2 to L1, or L2 to L3). The new wave of studies of L2 learning in recent decades in a wide range of areas, including phonetics and phonology, speech perception, lexical access, morphology, reading, and pragmatics, has provided a different perspective on the accounts of linguistic relativity as well as a groundwork for continued research on linguistic relativity.

Negating, at times, helps better explain the phenomenon under consideration. If language does not influence our thoughts, why do speakers of different languages display different perceptions, different worldviews, and different behavioral patterns? If language does not affect our cognition, why do we observe cross-language transfer and how should we interpret it? On a flip side, if our cognition affects language, why does language not change as a result of different thoughts? Language does evolve. However, it hardly evolves due to the change of our thinking or cognition. New words are coined in response to necessity, new technology, new discoveries, or social movements.

Empirical evidence of second language studies generally concurs with the paradigm of linguistic relativity. Bylund and Athanasopoulos ( 2014 ) suggest that linguistic relativity be a new approach to L2 research. They underscore neo-Whorfianism in studies of L2 acquisition with refined methodological and theoretical prerequisites for linguistic relativity research, and encourage the use of nonverbal methods to examine the effects of linguistic relativity among L2 speakers to avoid argument circularity (which was one of Pinker’s criticisms about linguistic relativity). In order to demonstrate the extent and the nature of cognitive restructuring in L2 learning as a function of learner variations, Bylund and Athanasopoulos ( 2014 ) also call for an identification and delineation of cognitive mechanisms related to the associative learning involved in L2 acquisition and nonverbal behavior. Factors characterizing individual learner trajectories, such as L2 proficiency, L2 contact and use, learning context, and age, need to be taken into account in recalibrating nonverbal behavior among L2 speakers. Pavlenko ( 1999 ) also offers a new look at the bilingual mind. Pavlenko ( 1999 ) attempted to interpret L1-based description of events among speakers of Russian and English within the framework of the linguistic relativity hypothesis. Although her focus is semantics and concepts in bilingual memory, the results of her study are essentially in support of the relativistic approach.

Recent studies have attempted to tease apart the extent, dimension, and directionality of cross-language transfer. L2 research is especially effective in filling gaps presented in the debate about linguistic relativity. Odlin ( 2005 ) adopts the linguistic relativity hypothesis as a theoretical framework to explain cross-linguistic influences, especially to explain conceptual transfer from L1 to L2 or from L2 to L1. While highlighting the intersection between L2 acquisition and linguistic relativity, Odlin ( 2005 ) uses the concept of “binding power” of language to the mind or cognition. He points out that even highly skillful speakers of L2 “never free themselves entirely of the ‘binding power’ of L1” (p. 3) in L2 comprehension or production because cognitive templets are established in L1. By a similar token, Slobin ( 1996 ) proposes thinking for speaking as a moderate version of linguistic relativity, and notes that an L1-specific worldview affects the subsequent learning of another language.

Pederson et al. ( 1998 ) examined spatial relations using prepositions among 13 typologically and genetically different languages. Their linguistic data revealed that prepositions showed functional similarities, but represented different semantics across languages. Their nonlinguistic data showed a correlation between the cognitive frame of reference and the linguistic frame of reference in the same referential domain of spatial arrays among the languages. For example, Dutch speakers used direct deictic locations and gestures (e.g. this one ; explicit pointing) to recall the location of objects, while speakers of Arandic, a language belonging to the Pama-Nyungan language family spoken in Australian, used their linguistic system of absolute Geo-cardinal-derived (and intrinsic) information (e.g., north, south ) to recall the same objects. Speakers of languages using the absolute frame of reference, such as Tzeltal (Mayan language spoken in Mexico) and Longgu (or Logu; Austronesian language spoken in the Solomon Islands archipelago), tended to show more accurate recall of the location of objects than those who use the relative frame of reference, such as Japanese.

L1 effects on personality perception was also examined (Chen, Benet-Martinez, & Ng, 2014 ). Chinese-English bilinguals showed more dialectical thinking and differences between self-ratings and observer-ratings of personality when they use Chinese rather than English. They indicate that language affects personality perception and that culture-related linguistic cues are perceived differently according to the language used to fulfill a specific demand.

Since studies of Chinese, Japanese, and Korean in relation to English are reviewed more in-depth in Chapters 8 and 9 , I keep this section (of cross-language influences) rather short in this chapter. An expansion on linguistic relativity to script relativity is in order.

4 From Linguistic Relativity to Script Relativity

Lucy ( 1997 ) classified three levels of potential linguistic influences on thought: (1) semiotic level, (2) structural level, and (3) functional level. The semiotic level concerns “whether having a code with a symbolic component (versus one confined to iconic-indexical elements) transforms thinking” (p. 292). This inherently refers to the semiotic relativity of thought. The second level, structural level, involves a question of whether the morphosyntactic configuration of meaning affects thought or not. This is basically what the traditional linguistic relativity posits. The last functional level concerns a question of whether the use of language in a particular way affects thought or not. This largely has to do with the context or setting in which language is used (e.g., casual setting vs. academic setting).

Among these three levels, what is most related to my claim, script relativity , is the first level of Lucy’s ( 1997 ) classification. Semiotic relativity has not been investigated or drawn scientific attention so far in the discussion of relativism. Given that linguistic relativity has been saturated for more than a half century, for better or worse, we can easily identify what is known so far and what is unknown so far. It is time to extend the linguistic relativity hypothesis to a s cript relativity hypothesis . In this regard, my claim is to extend semiotic relativity to script relativity . Semiotics is the study of signs, symbols, or sign processes. Although it includes nonlinguistic sign systems, semiotics primarily refers to the linguistic study of signs or symbols because meaning-making is crucial in semiotics.

Signs are by and large arbitrary. The arbitrariness of signs refers to the absence of natural connections between a sign and its sound or between a sign and its meaning. As most written signs are assigned arbitrarily within the writing system, arbitrariness is one of linguistic characteristics that is common among almost all languages. Although a Chinese logographic character signifies a meaning, the Chinese writing system is not free from arbitrariness. This is heightened in simplified characters. Strictly speaking, Chinese is not purely logographic because some signs refer to the morphemes of the word, while others indicate their pronunciation. In this sense, Chinese is a morphosyllabary, as indicated in Chapter 1 . Since scripts rely on cultural conventions, each script has a unique convention that evolves over time.

Just like linguistic relativity that postulates that habitual language use results in a unique set of habitual thought and thinking patterns, habitual reading of a particular script has the great potential to yield unique thought processes or patterns in the reader’s mind as an embodied experience. As mentioned in Chapter 1 , Logan’s ( 2004 ) book entitled The Alphabet Effect captures this point well with the focus on the alphabetic script (regardless of criticisms that the book has received for Eurocentrism and the inaccurate presentation of Chinese characters). Dehaene ( 2009 ) notes, as one of the epilogues shows, that brain imaging shows that the fixed neural networks and circuitry of skilled adults’ brains delicately adjust to reading. This suggests that prolonged literacy rewires our brain to be conducive to reading. Hence, it is natural to surmise the consequences of literacy, as many scholars (Goody & Watts, 1963 ; Logan, 2004 ; Ong, 1986 ) postulated before brain imaging technology becomes available.

The concept of the paradigm shift is related to linguistic relativity. The existing paradigm of anti-Whorfianism cannot explain why the same phenomenon is viewed and interpreted differently by different linguistic and cultural groups. This inability can be seen as Kuhn’s ( 2012 ) term anomalies that nativists or opponents of linguistic relativity cannot explain. The anomalies have been addressed by extraordinary research of structure-centered and domain-centered subjects as well as L2-related inquiries with advanced research tools, including brain-imaging. Accrued findings have formed a new paradigm, which is neo-Whorfianism. If the paradigm shift from anti-Whorfianism to neo-Whorfianism is tenable, the extension of linguistic relativity, which is script relativity , has a sound ground. Hence, it can be said that script relativity is an offspring of the new paradigm shift.

Since I will gradually develop the thesis, script relativity , throughout this book, I use this section as a signal to a more in-depth discussion of the thesis in the following chapters in Part II, and, therefore, I keep this section rather short. In the meantime, I would like the reader to think about competitive plausibility between the pro-Whorfianism and the anti-Whorfianism. If Whorfianism is more plausible to explain how our perception and thought patterns are molded, I ask the reader again to think about how we are affected by what we read everyday. If you are a bilingual and biliterate individual, I ask you to think about the script-shifting between your most comfortable script in which you read and less comfortable script. If you are like me, you are likely to see differences in reading two scripts. I can sense differences in my eye movement and attention I pay within the passage during reading in Korean and English. I will cover the alphabet and nonalphabetic scripts in the following chapters for a comparison purpose. The Chinese, Japanese, and Korean writing systems are considerably different from the Roman alphabet. Although it is classified as an alphabetic script, the Korean writing system is discussed along with Chinese and Japanese as a batch of the East-Asian scripts due to its unambiguous syllabic configuration. In the following Part II section, discussed are the alphabet, the three East-Asian scripts, the difference between the East-West, and psycholinguistic and neurolinguistic evidence of script relativity .

It is known that the term Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis was first used as a later invention by Harry Hoijer, one of Sapir’s students, although Sapir and Whorf neither formerly advanced the theory together nor co-authored any works. Carnes ( 2014 ) even claims that “… Sapir’s inclusion in the ‘Whorfian’ context is erroneous… Sapir was vigorously speculative but at the same time far more circumspect than Whorf in his estimate of the rule of language in the formation of ideas” (p. 263). In this volume, the terms linguistic relativity and Whorfianism are used interchangeably.

Agrillo, C., & Roberson, D. (2009). Colour language and colour cognition: Brown and Lenneberg revisited. Visual Cognition, 17 (3), 412–430.

Article   Google Scholar  

Athanasopoulosa, P., & Albright, D. (2016). A perceptual learning approach to the Whorfian hypothesis: Supervised classification of motion. Language Learning, 66 (3), 666–689.

Berlin, B., & Kay, P. (1969). Basic color terms; their universality and evolution . Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Google Scholar  

Boroditsky, L. (2001). Does language shape thought? Mandarin and English speakers’ conceptions of time. Cognitive Psychology, 43 (1), 1–22.

Bowerman, M., & Levinson, S. C. (2001). Language acquisition and conceptual development . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Book   Google Scholar  

Brown, R. W., & Lenneberg, E. H. (1954). A study in language and cognition. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 49 (3), 454–462.

Brysbaert, M., Fias, W., & Noël, M.-P. (1998). The Whorfian hypothesis and numerical cognition: Is ‘twenty-four’ processed in the same way as ‘four-and-twenty’. Cognition, 66 , 51–77.

Bylund, E., & Athanasopoulos, P. (2014). Linguistic relativity in SLA: Toward a new research program. Language Learning, 64 (4), 952–985.

Bylund, E., & Athanasopoulos, P. (2017). The Whorfian time warp: Representing duration through the language hourglass. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 146 (7), 911–916.

Carnes, R. L. (2014). A perceptual model of the Whorfian thesis: A review of general semantics. et Cetera, 71 (3), 263–271.

Carroll, J. B. (Ed.). (1956). Language, thought, and reality: Selected writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Casasanto, D. (2008). Who’s afraid of the Big Bad Whorf? Crosslinguistic differences in temporal language and thought. Language and Learning, 58 (Suppl.), 63–79.

Chen, S. X., Benet-Martinez, V., & Ng, J. C. K. (2014). Does language affect personality perception? A functional approach to testing the Whorfian hypothesis. Journal of Personality, 82 (2), 130–143.

Choi, S., & Bowerman, M. (1991). Learning to express motion events in English and Korean: the influence of language-specific lexicalization patterns. Cognition, 41 (1–3), 83–121.

Cook, V., & Bassetti, B. (Eds.). (2011). Language and bilingual cognition . New York, NY: Psychology Press.

Dehaene, S. (2009). Reading in the brain: The new science of how we read . New York, NY: Penguin Books.

Dolscheid, S., Shayan, S., Majid, A., & Casasanto, D. (2013). The thickness of musical pitch: psychophysical evidence for linguistic relativity. Psychological Science, 24 (5), 613–621.

Everett, D. L. (2005). Cultural constraints on grammar and cognition in Pirahã. Current Anthropology, 46 (4), 621–646.

Fishman, J. A. (1982). Whorfianism of the third kind: Ethnolinguistic diversity as a worldwide societal asset (The Whorfian Hypothesis: Varieties of validation, confirmation, and disconfirmation II). Language in Society, 11(1) , 1–14.

Frank, M. C., Everett, D. L., Fedorenko, E., & Gibson, E. (2008). Number as a cognitive technology: evidence from Piraha language and cognition. Cognition, 108 (3), 819–824.

Gennari, S. P., Sloman, S. A., Malt, B. C., & Fitch, T. (2002). Motion events in language and cognition. Cognition, 83 , 49–79.

Gibson, E., Futrell, R., Jara-Ettinger, J., Mahowald, K., Bergen, L., Ratnasingam, S., … Conway, B. R. (2017). Color naming across languages reflects color use. PNAS, 114 (40), 10785–10790.

Goody, J., & Watt, I. (1963). The consequences of literacy. Comparative studies in society and history, 5 , 304–345.

Gopnik, A., & Choi, S. (1990). Do linguistic differences lead to cognitive differences? A crosslinguistic study of semantic and cognitive development. First Language, 10 , 199–215.

Gopnik, A., Choi, S., & Baumberger, T. (1996). Cross-linguistic differences in early semantic and cognitive development. Cognitive Development, 11 (2), 197–225.

Gumperz, J. J., & Levinson, S. C. (1996). Rethinking linguistic relativity . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hacking, I. (2012). Introductory essay. T. S. Kuhn, The structure of scientific revolutions (3 rd ed.) (pp. vii – xxxvii). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Hoosain, R., & Salili, F. (1987). Language differences in pronunciation speed for numbers, digit span, and mathematical ability. Psychologia: An International Journal of Psychology in the Orient (Vol. 30).

Hunt, E., & Agnoli, F. (1991). The Whorfian hypothesis: A cognitive psychology perspective. Psychological Review, 98(3) , 377–389.

January, D., & Kako, E. (2007). Re-evaluating evidence for linguistic relativity: reply to Boroditsky (2001). Cognition, 104 (2), 417–426.

Jarvis, S., & Pavlenko, A. (2007). Crosslinguistic influence in language and cognition . New York, NY: Routledge.

Kay, P., & Kempton, W. (1984). What is the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis? American Anthropologist, 86 (1), 65–79.

Kay, P., & Regier, T. (2006). Language, thought and color: recent developments. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10 (2), 51–54.

Khosroshahi, F. (1989). Penguins don’t care, but women do: A social identity analysis of a Whorfian problem. Language in Society, 18 (4), 505–525.

Klein, E., Bahnmueller, J., Mann, A., Pixner, S., Kaufmann, L., Nuerk, H.-C., & Moeller, K. (2013). Language influences on numerical development—Inversion effects on multi-digit number processing. Frontiers in Psychology, 4 , 480.

Koerner, E.F. K. (1992). The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis: A preliminary history and a bibliographical essay. Journal of Linguistic Anthropology, 2(2) , 173–198.

Koster, D., & Cadierno, T. (2018). Is perception of placement universal? A mixed methods perspective on linguistic relativity. Lingua, 207 , 23–37.

Kuhn, T. S. (2012). The structure of scientific revolutions with an introductory essay by Ian Hacking . Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Lakoff, G. (1987). Women, fire, and dangerous things : what categories reveal about the mind . Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Lee, P. (1991). Whorf’s Hopi tensors: Subtle articulators in the language/thought nexus? Cognitive Linguistics, 2 (2), 123–148.

Lee, P. (1997). Language in thinking and learning: Pedagogy and the new Whorfian framework. Harvard Educational Review, 67(3), 430–471.

Levinson, S. C. (2003). Language and mind: Let’s get the issues straight! In D. Gentner & S. Goldin-Meadow (Eds.), Language in mind: Advances in the study of language and thought (pp. 25–46). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Li, C. N., & Thompson, S. A. (1976). Subject and topic: A new typology of language (pp. 457). Cambridge, MA: Academic Press.

Logan, R. K. (2004). The alphabet effect : a media ecology understanding of the making of Western civilization . Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.

Lu, A., Hodges, B. H., Zhang, J., & Wang, X. (2012). A Whorfian speed bump? Effects of Chinese color names on recognition across hemispheres. Language Sciences, 34 (5), 591–603.

Lucy, J. A. (1992). Language diversity and thought . New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Lucy, J. A. (1997). Linguistic relativity. Annual Review of Anthropology, 26(1) , 291–312.

Lucy, J. A. (2016). Recent advances in the study of linguistic relativity in historical context: A critical assessment. Language Learning, 66(3) , 487–515.

Malotki, E. (1983). Hopi time: A linguistic analysis of temporal concepts in the Hopi language . Berlin: Mouton.

Miller, K. F., Smith, C. M., Zhu, J., & Zhang, H. (1995). Preschool origins of cross-national differences in mathematical competence: The role of number-naming systems. Psychological Science, 6 (1), 56–60.

Miura, I. T., Kim, C. C., Chang, C.-M., & Okamoto, Y. (1988). Effects of language characteristics on children’s cognitive representation of number: Cross-national comparisons. Child Development, 59 (6), 1445–1450.

Miura, I. T., Okamoto, Y., Kim, C. C., Chang, C.-M., Steere, M., & Fayol, M. (1994). Comparisons of children’s cognitive representation of number: China, France, Japan, Korea, Sweden, and the United States. International Journal of Behavioral Development, 17 (3), 401–411.

Montemayor, C. (2019). Early and late time perception: On the narrow scope of the Whorfian hypothesis. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 10 , 133–154.

Ng, S. S. N., & Rao, N. (2010). Chinese number words, culture, and mathematics learning. Review of Educational Research, 80 (2), 180–206.

Odlin, T. (2005). Crosslinguistic influence and conceptual transfer: What are the concepts? Annual Review of Applied Linguistics,25, 3–25.

Ong, W. (1986). Writing is a technology that restructures thought. In G. Baumann (Ed.), The written word: Literacy in transition (pp. 23–50). New York, NY: Clarendon Press.

Özgen, E., & Davies, I. R. (2002). Acquisition of categorical color perception: A perceptual learning approach to the linguistic relativity hypothesis. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 131 , 477–493.

Pavlenko, A. (1999). New approaches to concepts in bilingual memory. Bilingualism: Language and Cognition, 2 , 209–230.

Pederson, E., Danziger, E., Wilkins, D., Levinson, S., Kita, S., & Senft, G. (1998). Semantic typology and spatial conceptualization. Language, 74 (3), 557–589.

Perszyk, D. R., & Waxman, S. R. (2018). Linking language and cognition in infancy. Annual Review of Psychology, 69 , 231–250.

Pinker, S. (1994). The language instinct: How the mind creates language . New York, NY: HarperCollins.

Pinker, S. (2007). The stuff of thought: Language as a window into human nature . New York, NY: Penguin.

Roberson, D., Davidoff, J., Davies, I. R., & Shapiro, L. R. (2005). Color categories: evidence for the cultural relativity hypothesis. Cognitive Psychology, 50 (4), 378–411.

Roberson, D., Davies, I., & Davidoff, J. (2000). Color categories are not universal: Replications and new evidence from a stone-age culture. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 129 (3), 369–398.

Schwanenflugel, P. J., Blount, B. G., & Lin, P-J. (1991). Cross-cultural aspects of word meanings. In P.J. Schwanenflugel (Ed.), The psychology of word meanings (pp. 71–90). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Slobin, D.I. (1996). From “thought and language” to “thinking for speaking.” In J. J. Gumperz & S. C. Levinson (Eds.), Rethinking linguistic relativity (pp. 70–96). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Whorf, B. L. (1940). Science and linguistics. Technology Review, 42 (2), 212–231.

Winawer, J., Witthoft, N., Frank, M. C., Wu, L., Wade, A. R., & Boroditsky, L. (2007). Russian blues reveal effects of language on color discrimination. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 104 (19), 7780–7785.

Xia, T., Xu, G., & Mo, L. (2019). Bi-lateralized Whorfian effect in color perception: Evidence from Chinese Sign Language. Journal of Neurolinguistics, 49 , 189–201.

Zipf, G. K. (1935). The psycho-biology of language: An introduction to dynamic philology . Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.

Download references

Author information

Authors and affiliations.

School of Education, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, OH, USA

You can also search for this author in PubMed   Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2020 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Pae, H.K. (2020). From Linguistic Relativity to Script Relativity. In: Script Effects as the Hidden Drive of the Mind, Cognition, and Culture. Literacy Studies, vol 21. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55152-0_3

Download citation

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55152-0_3

Published : 15 October 2020

Publisher Name : Springer, Cham

Print ISBN : 978-3-030-55151-3

Online ISBN : 978-3-030-55152-0

eBook Packages : Education Education (R0)

Share this chapter

Anyone you share the following link with will be able to read this content:

Sorry, a shareable link is not currently available for this article.

Provided by the Springer Nature SharedIt content-sharing initiative

• Publish with us

Policies and ethics

• Find a journal
• Track your research

• school Campus Bookshelves
• menu_book Bookshelves
• perm_media Learning Objects
• login Login
• how_to_reg Request Instructor Account
• hub Instructor Commons

Margin Size

• Download Page (PDF)
• Download Full Book (PDF)
• Periodic Table
• Physics Constants
• Scientific Calculator
• Reference & Cite
• Tools expand_more
• Readability

selected template will load here

This action is not available.

8.5: Linguistic Relativity

• Last updated
• Save as PDF
• Page ID 23788

\( \newcommand{\vecs}[1]{\overset { \scriptstyle \rightharpoonup} {\mathbf{#1}} } \)

\( \newcommand{\vecd}[1]{\overset{-\!-\!\rightharpoonup}{\vphantom{a}\smash {#1}}} \)

\( \newcommand{\id}{\mathrm{id}}\) \( \newcommand{\Span}{\mathrm{span}}\)

( \newcommand{\kernel}{\mathrm{null}\,}\) \( \newcommand{\range}{\mathrm{range}\,}\)

\( \newcommand{\RealPart}{\mathrm{Re}}\) \( \newcommand{\ImaginaryPart}{\mathrm{Im}}\)

\( \newcommand{\Argument}{\mathrm{Arg}}\) \( \newcommand{\norm}[1]{\| #1 \|}\)

\( \newcommand{\inner}[2]{\langle #1, #2 \rangle}\)

\( \newcommand{\Span}{\mathrm{span}}\)

\( \newcommand{\id}{\mathrm{id}}\)

\( \newcommand{\kernel}{\mathrm{null}\,}\)

\( \newcommand{\range}{\mathrm{range}\,}\)

\( \newcommand{\RealPart}{\mathrm{Re}}\)

\( \newcommand{\ImaginaryPart}{\mathrm{Im}}\)

\( \newcommand{\Argument}{\mathrm{Arg}}\)

\( \newcommand{\norm}[1]{\| #1 \|}\)

\( \newcommand{\Span}{\mathrm{span}}\) \( \newcommand{\AA}{\unicode[.8,0]{x212B}}\)

\( \newcommand{\vectorA}[1]{\vec{#1}}      % arrow\)

\( \newcommand{\vectorAt}[1]{\vec{\text{#1}}}      % arrow\)

\( \newcommand{\vectorB}[1]{\overset { \scriptstyle \rightharpoonup} {\mathbf{#1}} } \)

\( \newcommand{\vectorC}[1]{\textbf{#1}} \)

\( \newcommand{\vectorD}[1]{\overrightarrow{#1}} \)

\( \newcommand{\vectorDt}[1]{\overrightarrow{\text{#1}}} \)

\( \newcommand{\vectE}[1]{\overset{-\!-\!\rightharpoonup}{\vphantom{a}\smash{\mathbf {#1}}}} \)

Language and thought tend to influence one another in a dual, cyclical relationship.

Learning Objectives

• Characterize the relationship between language and thought in humans
• The  theory  of linguistic relativity states that the  structure  of a language influences the way its speakers conceptualize the world.
• The Sapir-Whorf  hypothesis  discusses the grammatical structure of a particular language and how it influences its speakers’  perceptions  of the world.
• Cognitive -behavioral theory claims that what people  think  impacts what they say and do.
• According to behavioral economics, people are  more  likely to believe an event is true if it is described vividly.
• semantics : The study of the relationship between words and their meanings.
• cognitive distortion : Exaggerated and irrational thoughts, believed to perpetuate psychological disorders.

Language and thought (or “cognition“) tend to interact in a dual and cyclical relationship, a theory known overall as linguistic relativity. What one thinks becomes what one communicates, and what one communicates can lead to new thoughts. There are several different theories that aim to discuss the relationship between cognition and language, and each will be discussed in this chapter.

The Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis

The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis states that the grammatical structure of a person’s language influences the way he or she perceives the world. The hypothesis has been largely abandoned by linguists as it has found at best very limited experimental support, and it does not hold much merit in psychology. For instance, studies have not shown that speakers of languages lacking a subjunctive mood (such as Chinese) experience difficulty with hypothetical problems. The weaker version of this theory does have some merit, however. For example, different words mean different things in different languages; not every word in every language has a one-to-one exact translation in a different language. Because of these small but important differences, using the wrong word within a particular language (because you believe it to mean something else) can have dire consequences.

The canonical example of studying linguistic relativity is in the area of color naming. Sapir and Whorf, as believers in linguistic relativity, would believe that people whose languages partition the color spectrum along different lines actually perceive colors in a different way. However, recent research has supported the idea that human color perception is governed more by biological and physical rather than linguistic constraints, regardless of how many color words a language has.

Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy

According to the theory that drives cognitive-behavioral therapy, the way a person thinks has a huge impact on what she or he says and does. Founded by Aaron T. Beck, this school of thought discusses the interplay among emotion, behavior, language, and thought. Since internal dialogue is a form of language, the way we speak to ourselves can influence our daily lives. Problems with our internal dialogue, known as cognitive distortions, can lead to negative behaviors or serious emotional problems.

Behavioral Economics

The field of behavioral economics studies the effect of psychological and cognitive factors on individuals’ behavior in an economic context. In this field (and others), researchers have shown that the more vividly an event is described, the more likely people will believe it is true. Thus, people will draw different conclusions and make different choices about a situation based on the language used to describe that situation.

Language and thought

What a person thinks (thought) has a direct impact on what that person says (language), and vice versa.

An official website of the United States government

The .gov means it’s official. Federal government websites often end in .gov or .mil. Before sharing sensitive information, make sure you’re on a federal government site.

The site is secure. The https:// ensures that you are connecting to the official website and that any information you provide is encrypted and transmitted securely.

• Publications
• Account settings

Preview improvements coming to the PMC website in October 2024. Learn More or Try it out now .

• Advanced Search
• Journal List
• Wiley Open Access Collection

Neurolinguistic Relativity: How Language Flexes Human Perception and Cognition

Guillaume thierry.

1 School of Psychology and Centre for Research on Bilingualism, Bangor University

The time has come, perhaps, to go beyond merely acknowledging that language is a core manifestation of the workings of the human mind and that it relates interactively to all aspects of thinking. The issue, thus, is not to decide whether language and human thought may be ineluctably linked (they just are), but rather to determine what the characteristics of this relationship may be and to understand how language influences—and may be influenced by—nonverbal information processing. In an attempt to demystify linguistic relativity, I review neurolinguistic studies from our research group showing a link between linguistic distinctions and perceptual or conceptual processing. On the basis of empirical evidence showing effects of terminology on perception, language‐idiosyncratic relationships in semantic memory, grammatical skewing of event conceptualization, and unconscious modulation of executive functioning by verbal input, I advocate a neurofunctional approach through which we can systematically explore how languages shape human thought.

Introduction

Think of a frog. Even better, perhaps, don't. Here, language—in this case, a noun supported by a verb—will have prompted a thought in your mind. Does language have a strong relationship to thought? The second instruction above (don't think of a frog) is perhaps an even better illustration of the link: Not only does language appear inherently and implacably connected to thought, but the connection seems to escape our control entirely. It is impossible for one not to think of something called up by language. Thus, language triggers thought, and it does so whether we like it or not, provided we are familiar with the code. Language is undoubtedly one of the most exquisitely sophisticated and powerful products of the human mind. Its importance in the development of human civilization, society, and science hardly needs introducing or highlighting. Even though the language‐thought binding contingency appears intuitive to many, some scholars and thinkers have dismissed the premises of linguistic relativity—an equally intuitive correlate of the contingency—as linguistic idealism (see Jackson, 1991 ).

Casasanto ( 2008 ) reminds us that language is naturally not the same as thought, because thought preexists language, both ontologically and phylogenetically. Animals manifest forms of cognitive processing (e.g., perception, attention, memory, problem solving, planning, adaptive execution) that resemble thought processes seen in humans (e.g., Gallistel, 1989 ). Preverbal infants anticipate, direct their attention, draw inferences, and thus manifest thought outside language (Feigenson, Dehaene, & Spelke, 2004 ; Gordon, 2004 ). But after having agreed that we must leave the idea of a language‐thought equivalence behind, we are not yet out of the woods. We can still come across the “big bad Whorf” (Casasanto, 2008 ). One thing is to recognize that thought exists outside language and thus that it likely coexists with language. Another is to wander at the other end of a conceptual continuum and consider that thought might be entirely independent of language. Does Pinker ( 2007 ) use a strawman strategy to counter and ridicule the linguistic relativity hypothesis? If language does not equate thought, must we readily adopt the extreme opposite view and consider language‐thought independence as a de facto alternative? That is wrong, though, all wrong. Thinking that language may be entirely disconnected from thought is an example of what deserves to be called reductio ad absurdum .

People who speak different languages appear to conceive of the world somewhat differently and diversity of thought, perspective, and innovation seem intuitively linked to naturally occurring language diversity. Why is it, then, that many scholars in science, linguistics, and philosophy (perhaps in these fields more than elsewhere) are skeptical, if not overtly critical, of the idea that languages may go hand in hand with different ways of not only conceiving and paying attention to the world, but also literally holding different perceptions? Perhaps the most basic argument against a strong language‐thought binding contingency concerns the commonly advocated existence of universal concepts. If such concepts exist, then thought must be separable from language. But then, reciprocally, if language is narrowly married to thought, and if together they are somewhat idiosyncratic to each and every human mind, how do we know that universal concepts are indeed universal? For instance, Jackson ( 1991 ) asks, “Can the French not tell the difference between sheep and mutton, because they only have one word for them?” (p. 209). Indeed, even though native speakers of French use the label mouton for both the meat derived from the sheep and the animal itself, they can conceptualize this distinction. If the meat–animal distinction is shared by native speakers of both French and English, then language arguably fails to shift the concept. However, because French and English differ in the way they refer to the meat and the animal it derives from, one can reasonably hypothesize that this distinction is, in fact, conceptually different for the speakers of the two languages (e.g., a sheep may be considered more primarily as a source of food by French speakers than English speakers). We thus find ourselves prisoners of a circular reasoning loop: Language and thought seem bound up with one another, but then there appear to be shared concepts that transcend language diversity. We cannot, however, be sure that these concepts are shared if we cannot conceptualize something independently of a particular language or languages, and so on.

Such circular reasoning has profoundly hindered progress in characterizing the nature of the language‐thought binding contingency and partly explains the stark skepticism that has stigmatized linguistic relativity. Breaking out of the loop thus requires a demonstration that language and thought are intertwined even when one ventures into territories of human cognition that are as far from language as we can conceive. One such territory is perception. Indeed, empirical research testing the linguistic relativity hypothesis has progressively drifted toward the testing of nonverbal perception, in the hopes of identifying processing differences that do not trivially derive or relate to (consciously accessible) language distinctions, but that can rationally and indirectly be linked to the same. However, such empirical studies (e.g., Boroditsky, 2000 , 2001 ; Gentner, Imai, & Boroditsky, 2002 ; Lupyan, 2008 ; Lupyan & Spivey, 2010 ; Meteyard, Bahrami, & Vigliocco, 2007 ) have failed to convince the skeptics (e.g., Gleitman & Papafragou, 2005 ; Klemfuss, Prinzmetal, & Ivry, 2012 ; Pinker, 2007 ), perhaps because (a) they hardly ever avoid language reference entirely, (b) they fail to test perception, or (c) because of a combination of (a) and (b).

Studies relying on behavioral measures (such as reaction times and response patterns) are notoriously susceptible to verbal interference and late, postperceptual strategic effects, which may explain why reports of such effects are often followed by publications of counterevidence or null effects studying the same contrasts (e.g., Firestone & Scholl, 2014 ; January & Kako, 2007 ). Humans can (and do) silently verbalize all the time and thus responses from conscious decisions in supposedly nonverbal perceptual tasks can never be deemed free of verbal contamination. Rather than having differently structured minds, then, speakers of different languages may have their behavior nudged by grammar or terminology in ways that reflect properties of their native language (Pinker, 1997 ). This pertinent criticism applies to most empirical studies that attempt to draw conclusions from behavioral measures. How, then, can potential effects of language structure on perception be tested? This requires an investigation method that can tackle stages of mental processing that are sufficiently early, unconscious, and automatic, so as to not be directly affected by online aspects of language processing. There is thus no alternative but to test the hypothesis using physiological correlates of perception that derive from brain activity.

A fully interactive, nonselective account of human brain physiology is largely inconsistent with modular views positing a given faculty (such as language) as encapsulated and relatively independent vis‐à‐vis other specialized brain systems such as perception, object categorization, or motor control (Barsalou, 2008 ). As highlighted by Pulvermüller ( 1999 ) and in line with the theoretical tenets of connectionism and Hebbian theory (Hebb, 1949 ), the human brain is a richly connected network of neurons, in which functional subnetworks recruit distributed cells firing in coincidence (cell assemblies) rather than anatomically and/or functionally distinct modules. If one considers that connectivity within the brain—involving forward connections and feedback loops—spans the entire cortex and internal ganglia, it soon becomes evident that making a distinction between language and the rest of the mind is essentially meaningless. Making such a distinction implies that language and mind are two ensembles that can be delimited, as if one could draw a line between the two, or trace a line around language within the mind. This is misleading both from an anatomical and a neurophysiological viewpoint. First, it is well established that high‐level executive functions such as planning and attention modulate perceptual processing at the most basic levels of processing (McAdams & Reid, 2005 ). Second, to this day, there is little or no evidence for language‐specific regions in the human brain (Démonet, Thierry, & Cardebat, 2005 ; Price, Thierry, & Griffiths, 2005 ). Indeed, areas of the cerebral cortex, inner ganglia, and cerebellum involved in language processing are also activated by various nonverbal auditory and visual stimuli presented in a variety of experimental contexts (e.g., Thierry, Giraud, & Price, 2003 ; Thierry & Price, 2006 ). Even though some recent studies have offered evidence in favor of what may be construed as microselectivity in areas often associated with language processing (Fedorenko, Duncan, & Kanwisher, 2012 ), the spatial and temporal resolution of functional neuroimaging remains largely insufficient to establish any selectivity at the macrostructural level. Third, there is no shortage of empirical evidence showing interaction between language and other perceptual‐cognitive processes, such as emotion (Wu & Thierry, 2012 ), decision making (Costa, Foucart, Arnon, Aparici, & Apesteguia, 2014 ; Gao, Zika, Rogers, & Thierry, 2015 ; Keysar, Hayakawa, & An, 2012 ), or inhibitory control (Wu & Thierry, 2013 ).

In sum, neurophysiology and cognitive neuroscience suggest that language and thought are intrinsically bound together, and thus that language likely influences thought. An example of the mechanism through which this can occur is the label‐feedback hypothesis put forward by Lupyan ( 2012 ). Lupyan proposed that a category name becomes associated with distinctive features of the category it denotes as soon as it is learned. The activation of this name or label then results in the modulation of lower‐level perceptual processes via feedback looping, filtering, and improving the bottom‐up flow of information through the perceptual system. Naming an object would thus lead to more categorical and less idiosyncratic representations and effectively lead to the perceptual grouping of objects denoted by the same category label. This model, however, makes the strong assumption that language representations (and the neural network underpinning them) modulate low‐level perceptual processing in real time rather than by means of more durable structural and functional reorganizations. Furthermore, the label‐feedback hypothesis accounts for lexical effects, but says little or nothing about the impact on perception of other structural properties of language such as grammar and syntax. If the language–thought binding contingency seems obvious and pervasive from a cognitive neuroscience perspective, why spend time demonstrating its existence? I would argue that relativist research has two main objectives: (a) characterizing the nature of the effects and mechanisms through which language influences other aspects of cognition and (b) establishing whether there exist conditions in which thought may actually be independent of language.

As long as the phenomena studied empirically in linguistics, psycholinguistics, neurolinguistics, and cognitive science require, or merely encourage, conscious processing and verbalization, it will be impossible to establish an effect of language on nonverbal thinking. Progress thus requires evidence that minimizes the chances of a contamination by explicit top‐down strategies, which are likely to prompt language processing (overtly or implicitly) during tasks that are supposedly nonverbal. In this sense, most behavioral studies provide insufficient evidence, because the effects reported can always be construed as a mere effect of language on language (Pinker, 2007 ; Slobin, 1996 ). The need for a neurophysiological approach becomes more and more clear: Observing modulations of neural activity relating to perceptual or unconscious evaluation of nonverbal stimuli that can be predicted on the basis of definitional, contrasting properties of languages must be the best evidence that language shapes human thought.

I am hopeful that this outlook challenges the idea that there are instances in which language stands alone, disconnected from perception, attention, memory, executive control, or thought, whatever definition one chooses to lend them. Here, I discuss findings from three domains of research, which I believe strongly undermine the idea that language may stand apart from the rest of our cognitive make‐up: (a) color and object categorization, (b) motion conceptualization, and (c) executive function.

Color and Object Categorization

The firm determination to submit to experiment is not enough; there are still dangerous hypotheses; first, and above all, those which are tacit and unconscious. Since we make them without knowing it, we are powerless to abandon them. (Henri Poincaré, 1913 , p. 134)

Notwithstanding the disputable nature of conclusions from behavioral studies relying solely on overt decision data, a host of recent studies have convincingly demonstrated that lexical and grammatical information affects domain‐general cognitive processes. For example, color terminology has been shown to influence categorical perception of color in monolingual and bilingual speakers (Franklin et al., 2008 ; Gilbert, Regier, Kay, & Ivry, 2006 ). Athanasopoulos and colleagues, in particular, have provided empirical evidence that native speakers of Greek, who in their language have two basic color terms for light and dark blue ( ghalazio and ble ), perceive these two shades of blue as more distinct than do native speakers of English, whose language has only the basic color term blue (Athanasopoulos, 2009 ; Athanasopoulos, Damjanovic, Krajciova, & Sasaki, 2011 ). Such effects have been found both in tasks inviting participants to identify prototypical colors corresponding to a particular term and similarity judgment tasks (Athanasopoulos et al., 2011 ).

To address the core question of possible online access to language representations during overt behavioral tasks requiring conscious evaluation of color features, we chose to record event‐related brain potentials in participants, who were monitoring colored shapes in a very simple shape detection task. Event‐related potentials (ERPs) are derived from electroencephalographic (EEG) activity recorded continuously throughout an experimental session from the surface of the scalp of a participant, who is usually presented with a series of visual or auditory stimuli. Real‐time continuous EEG is essentially impossible to interpret as is, at least when it comes to making inferences about the cognitive processes involved. In order to purify the activity specific to a given stimulus category or cognitive operation, the continuous EEG recording is split into epochs, using stimulus onset time as a temporal reference. By averaging EEG signals collected over several trials (generally at least 30), brain activity that is unrelated to the particular stimulus presented or the particular cognitive operation performed by the participant is blurred and tends to fade into background activity, whereas those variations of electrical potentials that specifically relate to the stimuli presented tend to be repeated from one trial to the next and thus to be revealed through averaging. ERPs offer a unique opportunity to study the average modulation of activity produced by the brain in response to a class of stimuli and/or a particular cognitive task. The temporal resolution of the method is very high (in the order of the millisecond), but it provides little or no information regarding the source of the signal in the brain.

We presented native speakers of Greek and English with streams of simple shapes (mostly circles and, infrequently, squares) filled in light blue, dark blue, light green, or dark green and instructed them to press a designated button when they saw a square. Participants’ attention was thus drawn to shape rather than color. Such an experimental procedure, the so‐called oddball paradigm, has been used extensively both in the auditory and the visual modalities to study an automatic and unconscious response of the brain to stimulus perceptual deviance (a detectable difference between frequent and rare stimuli)—mismatch negativity (Czigler, 2014 ; Näätänen, Kujala, & Winkler, 2011 ). We predicted that the existence of two basic color terms in Greek for light blue and dark blue would result in a visual mismatch negativity (vMMN) of larger magnitude for the blue contrast than the green contrast. The light green/dark green contrast was used as a control condition, because Greek (like English) has only one basic color term for green ( prasino ). Therefore, we expected the contrast between light green and dark green to elicit vMMNs of similar magnitude in the two groups. And, indeed, we found the predicted three‐way interaction between participant group, color hue, and stimulus deviancy (Thierry, Athanasopoulos, Wiggett, Dering, & Kuipers, 2009 ). We concluded that a lexical distinction in a given language leads to greater perceptual discrimination in individuals who possess this distinction, as compared to speakers of a language that lacks the distinction. We argued that this effect is not linked to online activation of verbal representations in the mind of the participant (see below), but rather constitutes evidence for a perceptual distinction established through repeated exposure to color terms that constantly highlight color contrasts.

Some of our reviewers and a number of colleagues raised questions at the time about this finding, most notably: (a) How do we know that the process is unconscious? (b) Why could this not be explained by online lexical access, the result being another example of online effects of language that do not imply the long‐term shaping of nonverbal representations by language? and (c) How do we know that the effects found are not merely due to the different environments in which the individuals of the two compared groups were raised? In other words, how do we know that this is not merely a question of environmental experience rather than a genuine effect of terminology and language use? Here are tentative answers to these questions:

• We debriefed our participants very carefully at the end of each experiment, and we were surprised to discover that most failed to recall that standard stimuli (circles) could have different colors within any given block. Most did recall (correctly) that squares could change color (i.e., be light blue or dark blue within a block), but they failed to remember that the circles, too, could change color within a block, even though this was the perceptual change at the origin of the vMMN. The fact that participants could not recall the critical manipulation at the origin of the vMMN modulation suggests that they were not paying much attention to the critical stimuli and that the processing of color deviancy was mostly automatic.
• Studies of online speech production using ERPs have shown that participants in optimal conditions (after training) show the earliest effects of lexical frequency at around 200 milliseconds after stimulus onset in picture naming (Costa, Strijkers, Martin, & Thierry, 2009 ; Strijkers, Costa, & Thierry, 2010 ). In addition, when participants are not required to name pictures, but rather make semantic decisions about them, lexical frequency effects are observed much later, presumably because lexical properties of picture names are not critical to perform a semantic decision task (Strijkers, Holcomb, & Costa, 2012 ). Taken together, these studies suggest that specific lexical information is only available after 200 milliseconds following the presentation of a picture, even when picture names have been practiced and naming is directly required. The vMMN effect recorded in Thierry et al. ( 2009 ) started before 200 milliseconds and occurred in circumstances when the critical stimuli required no naming, let alone full perceptual evaluation, which suggests that it was not under online influence of language representations. Furthermore, when we investigated the latency and amplitude of the P1 (an early peak of ERPs classically associated with early visual processing), we again found a striking dissociation between groups: British participants showed a close overlap of amplitude and latencies between P1s elicited by stimuli of matched lightness (light blue and green on the one hand, and dark blue and green on the other), but Greek participants showed a marked P1 dissociation between the four stimuli as well as substantially increased variance. These differences are very unlikely to be reducible to online effect of language processing.
• Greek participants were likely to have experienced different shades of blue in their lives compared to locally sourced native speakers of English, given the marked meteorological contrasts between Greece and Wales. However, and even though this is not a definitive argument, the environment in Wales and the United Kingdom generally boasts an extraordinary palette of green shades, whereas the same can hardly be said of blue which is, after all, rather infrequent in the United Kingdom. Therefore, if the larger vMMN contrast found for blue than green in the native Greek participants could be accounted for by the naturally occurring variety of blue shades in the environment in Greece, one could reasonably predict a larger vMMN contrast for green than blue in the British participant group. However, this was not observed in our data.

Shortly after the publication of this first study, we realized that our Greek group of 20 participants could be split into two groups of 10 with markedly different lengths of stay in the United Kingdom. We thus set out to test whether a longer stay in the United Kingdom, naturally correlated with increased proficiency in English, would lead to a reduction in the vMMN effect, because the use of the word blue to refer to both ghalazio and ble might have led to a dimming of the perceptual contrast between the two colors. We compared three groups: 10 native speakers of Greek who had spent an average of 7.2 months (5–12) in the United Kingdom (short stay), 10 native speakers of Greek who had spent an average of 42.6 months (18–60) in the United Kingdom (long stay), and a group of 10 native speakers of English randomly selected from the 20 tested in the 2009 study. Recalculated vMMN results in the new participant groupings revealed that dark and light blues were not only perceived as more similar by long‐stay Greek participants, but the vMMN effect elicited by the blue contrast was also markedly reduced, as compared to that elicited in short‐stay bilinguals (Athanasopoulos, Dering, Wiggett, Kuipers, & Thierry, 2010 ). These results strongly suggest that terminology not only drives categorical distinction at a perceptual level, but also that this process is eminently plastic in nature, modulated by language exposure and usage.

Following these studies in the domain of color perception, we wondered if a similar phenomenon could be observed in the domain of object categorization. In collaboration with Bastien Boutonnet, we designed an experiment similar to the color study contrasting pictures of cups and mugs, one picture being the frequently presented standard and the other being the infrequent deviant (Boutonnet, Dering, Viñas‐Guasch, & Thierry, 2013 ). Infrequent pictures depicting a bowl were the targets, which participants had to detect by pressing a button. We tested 14 native speakers of English, who had no difficulty naming the objects as cup and mug and 13 native speakers of Spanish in Spain, who all called both objects taza . We predicted a two‐way interaction between group and deviancy, such that the vMMN difference between cups and mugs would be greater in the English natives than the Spanish natives. Indeed, we found essentially no vMMN amplitude difference between cups and mugs in the Spanish group and a significant difference in native speakers of English. It must be kept in mind that ERP markers of perceptual differences between objects differentiated the two categories reliably in both groups of participants, that is, the P1 peak of ERPs elicited by cups and mugs, averaged irrespective of frequency status in the oddball experiment, elicited a P1 difference that was very similar in the two groups, showing that the two objects were perceived as different, and to a similar extent by speakers of each language. Indeed, it would be ludicrous to think that because two objects are named using the same word, they could be taken to be visually indistinguishable. However, during early stages of visual categorization, these objects are less distinguishable among individuals who use the same term to designate them than those who usually use distinct terms, and in that sense, it remains fundamentally a question of perception.

Effects such as those reviewed above are eminently predictable for one who is positively predisposed toward the premises of the linguistic relativity hypothesis: A difference in terminology relates to a difference in perceptual processing. A stronger argument in favor of linguistic relativity, then, would be to identify not merely concepts that can be distinguished on the basis of specific lexical contrasts, but rather concepts that are related in a nontrivial fashion, for instance, due to the existence of links that exist at a predominantly linguistic level and have relatively low incidence at a conceptual level. The concepts of horse and sea , for instance, can be considered only mildly related from a conceptual viewpoint and probably not more so than bike and sea . Horse and sea , however, are formally related in English through the existence of the compound word seahorse . In the study by Boutonnet, McClain, and Thierry ( 2014 ), we tested whether such relations between words idiosyncratic to a language would yield predictable links between corresponding nonverbal representations and concepts. We presented participants undergoing ERP recordings with picture pairs that were either related in meaning, unrelated in meaning, or arbitrarily related because of the existence of a compound word comprising the names of the objects depicted by the two pictures. We quantified picture‐to‐picture priming using the N400, a wave of ERP known to be modulated in amplitude by semantic priming (Kutas & Federmeier, 2011 ). As expected, we found that related pictures elicited an N400 of reduced mean amplitude as compared to unrelated pictures. Surprisingly, however, while pictures derived from words forming a compound and presented in the same order (as in sea – horse ) elicited an N400 response similar to unrelated pictures, the N400 was significantly reduced when the pictures were presented in the reverse order (as in horse – sea ). We interpreted this result as evidence that the two concepts (e.g., horse and sea ), presented nonverbally and visually, are abnormally related in semantic memory, because they primed one another to a greater extent than otherwise unrelated concepts (e.g., horse and smoke ), probably due to the existence of a compound word crystallizing a formal link within the lexicon (e.g., seahorse ). It may be surprising that we did not find such priming effect when the pictures were presented in the same order as words within the corresponding compound (e.g., sea – horse ). We interpreted these findings as a clash between conceptual priming and access to the meaning of the actual compound (e.g., seahorse ), which was unrelated and thus conflicted with the concepts activated by the pictures. This study broke new ground in neurolinguistic approaches to linguistic relativity by revealing semantic associations between concepts driven mainly by lexical relations idiosyncratic to a particular language and thus nontrivially reliant on the signifiant – signifié relationship of Saussure (Saussure, Bally, Sechehaye, & Riedlinger, 1916 ).

Motion Conceptualization

Users of markedly different grammars […] are not equivalent as observers but must arrive at somewhat different views of the world. (Benjamin Lee Whorf, 1956 , p. 221)

One essential question, much closer to Whorf's original speculations, is whether effects of language on perception through a mind‐shaping effect of grammar could be more entrenched than those originating in terminology. Beyond linguistic observations suggesting that grammatical number and grammatical gender may alter object categorization in observers of different languages (Athanasopoulos & Kasai, 2008 ; Boutonnet, Athanasopoulos, & Thierry, 2012 ; Cubelli, Paolieri, Lotto, & Job, 2011 ; Saalbach, Imai, & Schalk, 2012 ), a paradigm that has attracted a lot of attention is that of motion perception, because of the rich diversity of the way in which different languages deal with, for example, path, goal, direction, and manner of motion.

Some languages (e.g., English) tend to encode manner of motion within the verb (compare to walk and to stroll , or to run and to sprint ) whereas others (e.g., French; Talmy, 1985 ) will more often optionally encode manner through the addition of adverbs (compare marcher and marcher lentement , or courrir and courrir très vite , which are tentative French translations of the previously exemplified English verbs). Apart from the fact that individuals who speak a manner‐oriented language will (rather expectedly) be more inclined to linguistically encode manner when describing motion events (Papafragou, Hulbert, & Trueswell, 2008 ), the features of the language have been suggested to mildly influence behavior in eye‐tracking experiments (Flecken, Carroll, Weimar, & von Stutterheim, 2015 ; Papafragou et al., 2008 ) and in a variety of categorization, matching, and recognition tasks (Gennari, Sloman, Malt, & Fitch, 2002 ; Kersten et al., 2010 ; Papafragou, Massey, & Gleitman, 2002 ).

Another key example of the way in which grammatical idiosyncrasies of different languages affect linguistic encoding strategies and, correlatively, conceptualization of motion events, pertains to the domain of grammatical aspect. Studies by von Stutterheim and Nüse (2013), von Stutterheim, Andermann, Carroll, Flecken, and Schmiedtova ( 2012 ), and Flecken, von Stutterheim, and Carroll ( 2014 ), for instance, have shown a relationship between grammatical aspect and attention to endpoints when individuals observe motion. Indeed, languages can be distinguished on the basis of their systematic or optional encoding of aspect within verbs (Slobin, 2006 ). When asked to describe an incomplete motion event (e.g., a video clip showing a woman walking on a road toward a car but not reaching the vehicle), speakers of nonaspect languages (e.g., German or Swedish) tend to specify the action's goal, or the endpoint, as compared to speakers of aspect languages (e.g., English or French), who tend to keep to the description of the motion itself and are thus less likely to mention the endpoint (Bylund & Athanasopoulos, 2014 ; Bylund, Athanasopoulos, & Oostendorp, 2013 ).

Perhaps the most radical demonstration of the impact of language aspect on conceptualization is that recently offered by Athanasopoulos et al. ( 2015 ) who showed how fluent German‐English bilinguals can switch back and forth between the goal‐orientation preference of native speakers of either of their two languages, depending on language context. Strikingly, when bilingual German‐English participants are asked to perform a verbal interference task (counting backwards) in either English or German while categorizing video clips depicting motion events, they display the goal‐orientation preference of the language not in use, as if that language was available to shape selection behavior!

While substantial behavioral evidence is now available to show that motion event conceptualization depends on the properties of the native language and the immediate language context, it remains the case that observing motion events depicted by video clips or monitoring of eye movements using eye‐tracking during stimulus observation cannot exclude covert verbalization, and thus the possibility of online influences of language, which again raises the spectre of the effect of language on language criticism. Here, too, more compelling evidence in support of the strong relativist viewpoint (Gentner & Goldin‐Meadow, 2003 ; Gumperz & Levinson, 1996 ; Lucy, 1997 ) must come from cognitive neurolinguistics, using experimental procedures that are less susceptible to covert language involvement and that rely on direct neurophysiological measures of cognitive processing more readily linked to conceptualization.

In a recent study by Flecken, Athanasopoulos, Kuipers, and Thierry ( 2015 ), this was precisely what we aimed to do. We presented two groups of native speakers of German or English with video animations of a black dot travelling along a trajectory (straight or curved) toward a shape (square or hexagon). Given that speakers of English, an aspect‐language, are drawn to pay attention equally to trajectory and endpoint, whereas speakers of German, a nonaspect language, tend to pay more attention to endpoints, we expected the perceptual saliency of the endpoint to be greater in native speakers of German than native speakers of English. We engaged our participants in a motion event‐picture matching task in which animations were used as primes and were followed by picture targets symbolizing the motion events. In 75% of trials, the animation prime (e.g., dot moving along a straight line toward a square) was followed by a target picture featuring both a mismatched trajectory (e.g., a curve) and a mismatched endpoint shape (e.g., a hexagon; mismatch condition); in 10% of trials, the trajectory depicted in the picture target matched that of the dot in the animation prime (trajectory match); in 10% of trials, the shape in the picture target matched the endpoint shape of the animation prime (endpoint shape match); and in only 5% of trials, both the trajectory and the endpoint shape matched that of the animation prime (full match). Participants were instructed to press a button only in the full match condition. This design conformed to that of an oddball paradigm geared toward probing conceptualization and conscious monitoring because the relevant animation characteristics (trajectory and endpoint) were directly relevant for task completion. We thus expected to see a P3b wave of event‐related brain potentials in the full‐match condition, because this wave is well known to index conscious detection of infrequent target stimuli among frequent stimuli. Critically, the amplitude of the P3 elicited in partial match conditions served as an index of the perceived importance of trajectory and endpoint information, respectively. Endpoint‐match stimuli elicited greater P3 amplitude than trajectory‐match stimuli in native speakers of German tested in Germany, but no differences between the P3s elicited by endpoint‐match and trajectory‐match stimuli were found in native speakers of English tested in the United Kingdom. Furthermore, a behavioral testing procedure conducted in similar language groups failed to show any performance difference between groups. This study is probably the first to show that grammatical properties of the native language affect motion event conceptualization in a systematic fashion, even when language involvement is unlikely, given the nature of the stimuli and task, and when categorization behavior is not overtly biased by the instructions.

Executive Function

But if thought corrupts language, language can also corrupt thought. (George Orwell, 1946 , p. 167)

Beyond effects of language on perception and categorization, a critical question is whether language can influence or even constrain aspects of executive function and action selection. Language experience is known to affect cognitive abilities. For example, bilinguals have been shown to outperform monolinguals in a number of nonlinguistic tasks (e.g., the Simon task and the Attention Network Test) that measure various aspects of executive function (Bialystok, Craik, Klein, & Viswanathan, 2004 ; Costa, Hernández, & Sebastián‐Gallés, 2008 ). One explanation for this apparent advantage is that managing two languages requires constant selection of words in the intended language and inhibition of words from the unintended language, processes that are thought to engender a highly efficient control mechanism (Bialystok & Feng, 2009 ; Green & Abutalebi, 2013 ). However, groups of bilinguals and monolinguals differ not only in language ability but also in other respects, such as socioeconomic status or ethnic origin and, indeed, these factors have been suggested to account for the bilingual advantage (Costa, Hernández, Costa‐Faidella, & Sebastián‐Gallés, 2009 ; Morton & Harper, 2007 ; Sabbagh, Xu, Carlson, Moses, & Lee, 2006 ). Unlike monolinguals, bilinguals can either use only a single language (monolingual context) or both their languages (bilingual context) in any given interaction. If bilingualism bestows a generic and sustained executive control advantage to bilinguals, enhanced cognitive control should be observed independently of language context. If, on the contrary, the advantage is context dependent, enhancement should be greater in a bilingual than in a monolingual context.

Wu and Thierry ( 2013 ) tested whether language context modulates executive functioning in Welsh‐English bilinguals by measuring interference in an adapted version of the flanker task (Fan, McCandliss, Sommer, Raz, & Posner, 2002 ). Participants were instructed to report the direction of a central arrow (i.e., the target) surrounded by congruent or incongruent flanker arrows. Occasionally, instead of arrows, participants were presented with a word, which they were instructed to ignore. The experiment contained three blocks in which the contextual words to be ignored were in Welsh, in English, or in either of the two languages. Whereas the cognitive interference caused by incongruent trials was of similar magnitude when intervening words were all in one language or the other within a block, the amount of interference decreased (and thus participants were better able to manage incongruent trials) when contextual words were randomly presented in English and Welsh. This study was the first to demonstrate a direct influence of language context on executive function within the same bilingual individuals, which means that inhibitory control can be modulated by simply presenting participants with a mix of words from their two languages, even when word stimuli are irrelevant and participants are instructed to ignore them.

In the domain of decision making, language has been found to influence cognitive and emotional processes that mediate departures from normatively rational choice (Keysar et al., 2012 ). This is due in part to the fact that language can modify one's emotional state, which in turn can affect various aspects of decision making (Damasio, 1996 ; De Martino, Kumaran, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006 ). Damasio ( 1996 ) provided compelling clinical evidence that emotion is an integral component of decision making that can lead to suboptimal decisions or even indecision. On the other hand, mental representations are known to be sensitive to established language‐emotion interactions. Wu and Thierry ( 2012 ), for instance, reported inhibition of access to native lexical representations by emotionally negative words presented in the second language of Chinese‐English bilinguals: When presented with pairs of English words that concealed a Chinese character repetition in their Chinese translation, a well‐established effect of unconscious access to native translation equivalent representation (Thierry & Wu, 2007 ; Wu & Thierry, 2010 ) was not found if the prime word had a negative affective valence, but the anticipated priming was found when primes were affectively positive or neutral. This suggests that emotional aspects of people's decision making, sometimes associated with suboptimal choices, may be susceptible to the language context in which they operate.

Keysar and colleagues ( 2012 ), who investigated language‐cognition interactions in decision making under risk, showed how using a foreign language modulates framing and loss aversion when participants choose between risky and safe prospects. In their native language, participants displayed standard risk aversion for dilemmas emphasizing gains, on the one hand, and risk‐seeking behavior for dilemmas emphasizing losses, on the other, but they did not do so in their second language. This and other findings (e.g., Costa et al., 2014 ) show that making decisions in a second language moderates peoples’ risk‐attitudes by underweighting larger gains and losses, which is consistent with the framing effect (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981 ), and equalizes the impact of good and bad choice outcomes, thus modulating loss aversion (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992 ). Note that, in real settings, decisions are often sequenced together such that good or bad outcomes of given trials influence subsequent choices (Osborn & Jackson, 1988 ; Thaler & Johnson, 1990 ) and this can happen even when decision outcome is unpredictable or random as, for example, in the case of the Hot Hand Fallacy, in which random events with a positive outcome are wrongly interpreted as reflecting a winning streak (Ayton & Fischer, 2004 ).

Gao et al. ( 2015 ) tested whether risk taking would be modulated by language‐based feedback when participants repeatedly chose between playing and leaving (not playing) 50/50 gambles to win small monetary rewards. The choices were presented in numeric form, but the outcome was presented using adjectives with positive and negative valence in the participants’ first language (Chinese) or second language (English). We modeled the effects of presenting feedback, indicating good and bad outcome in either Chinese or English, upon participants’ subsequent decisions to play. In addition, we used ERPs to investigate a possible link between the neural correlates of language processing and the processing of decision outcomes themselves based on modulation of the feedback‐related negativity (FRN). The FRN is a frontally distributed negative deflection of ERPs, which typically peaks between 250 and 300 milliseconds after the onset of feedback stimulus and is sensitive to feedback valence, that is, how good or bad outcomes turn out to be (Gehring & Willoughby, 2002 ; Holroyd & Coles, 2002 ; Miltner, Braun, & Coles, 1997 ). Because emotional sensitivity has been shown to differ in the first and second language of bilinguals (Harris, Aycicegi, & Gleason, 2003 ), we hypothesized that feedback words in English would elicit an FRN smaller in amplitude than their Chinese equivalents, in turn affecting risk‐taking behavior. While positive feedback incited participants to play more on the next trial than negative feedback, we found a striking dissociation between languages, such that positive feedback in the native language (Chinese) incited participants to take 10% more gambles (i.e., more risk) on the next trial, as compared to all other conditions. This striking effect of language context was further supported by correlations between differences in FRN amplitude between language of feedback and differences in probabilities of playing. In other words, expressions that appear to convey the same message appear to have a profoundly different effect on decision making, depending on whether they are presented in the native or the second language of bilinguals, showing that interactions between language and decision making should not be taken lightly.

There is now substantial neurophysiological evidence validating psycholinguistic data and theoretical linguistic accounts of linguistic relativity: Language(s), human perception, and aspects of cognition that may be construed as nonverbal interact in a rich and complex fashion. At the forefront of the current inquiry in this field is the question of the causal role of language and the depth of its pervasive influence on thinking. The studies reviewed above show that lexical and grammatical distinctions between languages affect elementary aspects of color and object perception, or motion conceptualization, and support the positive interpretation of results from behavioral experiments that have tested premises of the linguistic relativity hypothesis. Notwithstanding the debate among linguists regarding the existence of language universals (Evans & Levinson, 2009 ; von Fintel & Matthewson, 2008 ), a neurolinguistic approach can offer answers without requiring systematic comparison of all the many languages of the world. In addition to providing insights from within a particular language, the neurolinguistic approach allows us to characterize the nature of the relationship between formal aspects of language, perception, and concepts on the basis of unbiased physiological measurements rather than human performance in behavioral tasks prone to inciting metacognitive evaluation and thus susceptible to interpretative muddling.

Many questions remain unanswered. In fact, accepting the linguistic relativity hypothesis raises many new and fascinating questions: Is language and its particular forms not only sufficient, but also essential to the existence of certain perceptual distinctions? How reliable are such distinctions without language encoding? Are different types of learning—implicit or explicit—differently affected by language? How does language interact with other extralinguistic variables in shaping human cognition? How are the effects of differing linguistic codes reconciled in the multilingual mind? Does language proficiency directly or indirectly impact conceptual organization? How do languages and sociocultural conceptions interact in shaping human civilization? One can only hope that future research will progressively unveil such mechanisms and establish how strategic language use can better assist human learning, cognitive development, and decision making.

The copyright line for this article was changed on 19 August 2016 after original online publication

I wish to thank Marilyn Vihman, Panos Athanasopoulos, and Manne Bylund, as well as two anonymous reviewers for their attentive reading of this manuscript and for their highly constructive comments that have led to considerable improvements. A number of the empirical studies reviewed here were made possible by funding received from the UK Economic and Social Research Council (Centre for Research on Bilingualism in Theory and Practice, ES/E024556/1), the European Research Council (Starting Investigator Grant, ERC‐SG‐209704), and the British Academy (Mid‐Career Fellowship award, BA‐MD120036).

• Athanasopoulos, P. (2009). Cognitive representation of colour in bilinguals: The case of Greek blues . Bilingualism: Language and Cognition , 12 , 83–95. doi: 10.1017/S136672890800388X [ Google Scholar ]
• Athanasopoulos, P. , Bylund, E. , Montero‐Melis, G. , Damjanovic, L. , Schartner, A. , Kibbe, A. , et al. (2015). Two languages, two minds: Flexible cognitive processing driven by language of operation . Psychological Science , 26 , 518–526. doi: 10.1177/0956797614567509 [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Athanasopoulos, P. , Damjanovic, L. , Krajciova, A. , & Sasaki, M. (2011). Representation of colour concepts in bilingual cognition: The case of Japanese blues . Bilingualism: Language and Cognition , 14 , 9–17. doi: 10.1017/S1366728909990046 [ Google Scholar ]
• Athanasopoulos, P. , Dering, B. , Wiggett, A. , Kuipers, J. R. , & Thierry, G. (2010). Perceptual shift in bilingualism: Brain potentials reveal plasticity in pre‐attentive colour perception . Cognition , 116 , 437–443. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2010.05.016 [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Athanasopoulos, P. , & Kasai, C. (2008). Language and thought in bilinguals: The case of grammatical number and nonverbal classification preferences . Applied Psycholinguistics , 29 , 105–123. doi: 10.1017/S0142716408080053 [ Google Scholar ]
• Ayton, P. , & Fischer, I. (2004). The hot hand fallacy and the gambler's fallacy: Two faces of subjective randomness? Memory & Cognition , 32 , 1369–1378. doi: 10.3758/bf03206327 [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Barsalou, L. (2008). Grounded cognition . Annual Review of Psychology , 59 , 617–645. doi: 10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093639 [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Bialystok, E. , Craik, F. I. , Klein, R. , & Viswanathan, M. (2004). Bilingualism, aging, and cognitive control: Evidence from the Simon task . Psychology and Aging , 19 , 290–303. doi: 10.1037/0882-7974.19.2.290 [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Bialystok, E. , & Feng, X. (2009). Language proficiency and executive control in proactive interference: Evidence from monolingual and bilingual children and adults . Brain and Language , 109 , 93–100. doi: 10.1016/j.bandl.2008.09.001 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Boroditsky, L. (2000). Metaphoric structuring: Understanding time through spatial metaphors . Cognition , 75 , 1–18. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Boroditsky, L. (2001). Does language shape thought? Mandarin and English speakers’ conceptions of time . Cognitive Psychology , 43 , 1–22. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Boutonnet, B. , Athanasopoulos, P. , & Thierry, G. (2012). Unconscious effects of grammatical gender during object categorisation . Brain Research , 1479 , 72–79. doi: 10.1016/j.brainres.2012.08.044 [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Boutonnet, B. , Dering, B. , Viñas‐Guasch, N. , & Thierry, G. (2013). Seeing objects through the language glass . Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience , 25 , 1702–1710. doi: 10.1162/jocn_a_00415 [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Boutonnet, B. , McClain, R. , & Thierry, G. (2014). Compound words prompt arbitrary semantic associations in conceptual memory . Frontiers in Psychology , 5 , 222. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00222 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Bylund, E. , & Athanasopoulos, P . (2014). Language and thought in a multilingual context: The case of isiXhosa . Bilingualism: Language and Cognition , 17 , 431–441. doi: 10.1017/s1366728913000503 [ Google Scholar ]
• Bylund, E. , Athanasopoulos, P. , & Oostendorp, M. (2013). Motion event cognition and grammatical aspect: Evidence from Afrikaans . Linguistics , 51 , 929–955. doi: 10.1515/ling-2013-0033 [ Google Scholar ]
• Casasanto, D. (2008). Who's afraid of the big bad Whorf ? Crosslinguistic differences in temporal language and thought . Language Learning , 58 , 63–79. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9922.2008.00462.x [ Google Scholar ]
• Costa, A. , Foucart, A. , Arnon, I. , Aparici, M. , & Apesteguia, J. (2014). “ Piensa” twice: On the foreign language effect in decision making . Cognition , 130 , 236–254. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2013.11.010 [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Costa, A. , Hernández, M. , Costa‐Faidella, J. , & Sebastián‐Gallés, N. (2009). On the bilingual advantage in conflict processing: Now you see it, now you don't . Cognition , 113 , 135–149. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2009.08.001 [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Costa, A. , Hernández, M. , & Sebastián‐Gallés, N. (2008). Bilingualism aids conflict resolution: Evidence from the ANT task . Cognition , 106 , 59–86. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2006.12.013 [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Costa, A. , Strijkers, K. , Martin, C. , & Thierry, G. (2009). The time course of word retrieval revealed by event‐related brain potentials during overt speech . Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America , 106 , 21442–21446. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0908921106 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Cubelli, R. , Paolieri, D. , Lotto, L. , & Job, R. (2011). The effect of grammatical gender on object categorization . Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition , 37 , 449–460. doi: 10.1037/a0021965 [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Czigler, I. (2014). Visual mismatch negativity and categorization . Brain Topography , 27 , 590–598. doi: 10.1007/s10548-013-0316-8 [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Damasio, A. R. (1996). Descartes’ error: Emotion, reason and the human brain . London: Papermac. [ Google Scholar ]
• De Martino, B. , Kumaran, D. , Seymour, B. , & Dolan, R. J. (2006). Frames, biases, and rational decision‐making in the human brain . Science , 313 , 684–687. doi: 10.1126/science.1128356 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Démonet, J. F. , Thierry, G. , & Cardebat, D. (2005). Renewal of the neurophysiology of language: Functional neuroimaging . Physiological Reviews , 85 , 49–95. doi: 10.1152/physrev.00049.2003 [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Evans, N. , & Levinson, S. (2009). The myth of language universals: Language diversity and its importance for cognitive science . Behavioral and Brain Sciences , 32 , 429–448. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X0999094X [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Fan, J. , McCandliss, B. D. , Sommer, T. , Raz, A. , & Posner, M. I. (2002). Testing the efficiency and independence of attentional networks . Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience , 14 , 340–347. doi: 10.1162/089892902317361886 [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Fedorenko, E. , Duncan, J. , & Kanwisher, N. (2012). Language‐selective and domain‐general regions lie side by side within Broca's area . Current Biology , 22 , 2059–2062. doi: 10.1016/j.cub.2012.09.011 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Feigenson, L. , Dehaene, S. , & Spelke, E. (2004). Core systems of number . Trends in Cognitive Sciences , 8 , 307–314. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2004.05.002 [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Firestone, C. , & Scholl, B. J. (2014). “ Top‐down” effects where none should be found: The El Greco fallacy in perception research . Psychological Science , 25 , 38–46. doi: 10.1177/0956797613485092 [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Flecken, M. , von Stutterheim, C. , & Carroll, M. (2014). Grammatical aspect influences motion event perception: Findings from a cross‐linguistic non‐verbal recognition task . Language and Cognition , 1–34. doi: 10.1017/langcog.2013.2 [ Google Scholar ]
• Flecken, M. , Athanasopoulos, P. , Kuipers, J. R. , & Thierry, G. (2015). On the road to somewhere: Brain potentials reflect language effects on motion event perception . Cognition , 141 , 41–51. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2015.04.006 [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Flecken, M. , Carroll, M. , Weimar, K. , & von Stutterheim, C. (2015). Driving along the road or heading for the village? Conceptual differences underlying motion event encoding in French, German, and French‐German L2 users . The Modern Language Journal , 99 , 100–122. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-4781.2015.12181.x [ Google Scholar ]
• Franklin, A. , Drivonikou, G. V. , Bevis, L. , Davies, I. R. , Kay, P. , & Regier, T. (2008). Categorical perception of color is lateralized to the right hemisphere in infants, but to the left hemisphere in adults . Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America , 105 , 3221–3225. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0712286105 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Gallistel, C. R. (1989). Animal cognition: The representation of space, time and number . Annual Review of Psychology , 40 , 155–189. doi: 10.1146/annurev.ps.40.020189.001103 [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Gao, S. , Zika, O. , Rogers, R. D. , & Thierry, G. (2015). Second language feedback abolishes the "hot hand" effect during even‐probability gambling . Journal of Neuroscience , 35 , 5983–5989. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.3622-14.2015 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Gehring, W. J. , & Willoughby, A. R. (2002). The medial frontal cortex and the rapid processing of monetary gains and losses . Science , 295 , 2279–2282. doi: 10.1126/science.1066893 [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Gennari, S. P. , Sloman, S. A. , Malt, B. C. , & Fitch, W. T. (2002). Motion events in language and cognition . Cognition , 83 , 49–79. doi: 10.1016/s0010-0277(01)00166-4 [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Gentner, D. , & Goldin‐Meadow, S. (2003). Language in mind: Advances in the study of language and thought . London: MIT Press. [ Google Scholar ]
• Gentner, D. , Imai, M. , & Boroditsky, L. (2002). As time goes by: Evidence for two systems in processing space time metaphors . Language and Cognitive Processes , 17 , 537–565. [ Google Scholar ]
• Gilbert, A. L. , Regier, T. , Kay, P. , & Ivry, R. B. (2006). Whorf hypothesis is supported in the right visual field but not the left . Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America , 103 , 489–494. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0509868103 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Gleitman, L , & Papafragou, A . (2005). Language and thought . In Holyoak K. J. & Morrison B. (Eds.), Cambridge handbook of thinking and reasoning (pp. 633–661). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. [ Google Scholar ]
• Gordon, P. (2004). Numerical cognition without words: Evidence from Amazonia . Science , 306 , 496–499. doi: 10.1126/science.1094492 [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Green, D. W. , & Abutalebi, J. (2013). Language control in bilinguals: The adaptive control hypothesis . Journal of Cognitive Psychology , 25 , 515–530. doi: 10.1080/20445911.2013.796377 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Gumperz, J. J. , & Levinson, S. C. (1996). Rethinking linguistic relativity . Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. [ Google Scholar ]
• Harris, C. L. , Aycicegi, A. , & Gleason, J. B. (2003). Taboo words and reprimands elicit greater autonomic reactivity in a first language than in a second language . Applied Psycholinguistics , 24 , 561–579. doi: 10.1017/s0142716403000286 [ Google Scholar ]
• Hebb, D. O. (1949). The organization of behavior: A neuropsychological theory . New York: Wiley. [ Google Scholar ]
• Holroyd, C. B. , & Coles, M. G. H. (2002). The neural basis of human error processing: Reinforcement learning, dopamine, and the error‐related negativity . Psychological Review , 109 , 679–709. doi: 10.1037//0033-295x.109.4.679 [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Jackson, L. (1991). The poverty of structuralism: Literature and structuralist theory . New York: Longman. [ Google Scholar ]
• January, D. , & Kako, E. (2007). Re‐evaluating evidence for linguistic relativity: Reply to Boroditsky . Cognition , 104 , 417–426. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2006.07.008 [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Kersten, A. W. , Meissner, C. A. , Lechuga, J. , Schwartz, B. L. , Albrechtsen, J. S. , & Iglesias, A. (2010). English speakers attend more strongly than Spanish speakers to manner of motion when classifying novel objects and events . Journal of Experimental Psychology: General , 139 , 638–653. doi: 10.1037/a0020507 [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Keysar, B. , Hayakawa, S. L. , & An, S. G. (2012). The foreign‐language effect: Thinking in a foreign tongue reduces decision biases . Psychological Science , 23 , 661–668. doi: 10.1177/0956797611432178 [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Klemfuss, N. , Prinzmetal, W. , & Ivry, R. B. (2012). How does language change perception: A cautionary note . Frontiers in Psychology , 3 . doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00078 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Kutas, M. , & Federmeier, K. D. (2011). Thirty years and counting: Finding meaning in the N400 component of the event‐related brain potential (ERP) . Annual Review of Psychology , 62 , 621–647. doi: 10.1146/annurev.psych.093008.131123 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Lucy, J. A. (1997). Linguistic relativity . Annual Review of Anthropology , 26 , 291–312. doi: 10.1146/annurev.anthro.26.1.291 [ Google Scholar ]
• Lupyan, G. (2008). The conceptual grouping effect: Categories matter (and named categories matter more) . Cognition , 108 , 566–577. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2008.03.009 [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Lupyan, G. (2012). Linguistically modulated perception and cognition: The label‐feedback hypothesis . Frontiers in Psychology , 3 , 54. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00054 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Lupyan, G. , & Spivey, M. J. (2010). Redundant spoken labels facilitate perception of multiple items . Attention Perception and Psychophysics , 72 , 2236–2253. doi: 10.3758/BF03196698 [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• McAdams, C. J. , & Reid, R. C. (2005). Attention modulates the responses of simple cells in monkey primary visual cortex . The Journal of Neuroscience , 25 , 11023–11033. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.2904-05.2005 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Meteyard, L. , Bahrami, B. , & Vigliocco, G. (2007). Motion detection and motion verbs: Language affects low‐level visual perception . Psychological Science , 18 , 1007–1013. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.02016.x [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Miltner, W. H. R. , Braun, C. H. , & Coles, M. G. H. (1997). Event‐related brain potentials following incorrect feedback in a time‐estimation task: Evidence for a “generic” neural system for error detection . Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience , 9 , 788–798. doi: 10.1162/jocn.1997.9.6.788 [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Morton, J. B. , & Harper, S. N. (2007). What did Simon say? Revisiting the bilingual advantage . Developmental Science , 10 , 719–726. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-7687.2007.00623.x [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Näätänen, R. , Kujala, T. , & Winkler, I. (2011). Auditory processing that leads to conscious perception: A unique window to central auditory processing opened by the mismatch negativity and related responses . Psychophysiology , 48 , 4–22. doi: 10.1111/j.1469-8986.2010.01114.x [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Orwell, G. (1946). Politics and the English language . London: Horizon. [ Google Scholar ]
• Osborn, R. N. , & Jackson, D. H. (1988). Leaders, riverboat gamblers, or purposeful unintended consequences in the management of complex, dangerous technologies . Academy of Management Journal , 31 , 924–947. doi: 10.2307/256345 [ Google Scholar ]
• Papafragou, A. , Hulbert, J. , & Trueswell, J. (2008). Does language guide event perception? Evidence from eye movements . Cognition , 108 , 155–184. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2008.02.007 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Papafragou, A. , Massey, C. , & Gleitman, L. (2002). Shake, rattle, 'n’ roll: The representation of motion in language and cognition . Cognition , 84 , 189–219. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Pinker, S. (1997). How the mind works . New York: W.W. Norton. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Pinker, S. (2007). The language instinct: How the mind creates language . New York: Harper. [ Google Scholar ]
• Poincaré, Henri. (1913). The Foundations of Science . Science and Hypothesis, Part IV. The Science Press; New York, USA: p.134 [ Google Scholar ]
• Price, C. , Thierry, G. , & Griffiths, T. (2005). Speech‐specific auditory processing: Where is it? Trends in Cognitive Sciences , 9 , 271–276. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2005.03.009 [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Pulvermuller, F. (1999). Words in the brain's language . Behavioral and Brain Sciences , 22 , 253–279. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X9900182X [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Saalbach, H. , Imai, M. , & Schalk, L. (2012). Grammatical gender and inferences about biological properties in German‐speaking children . Cognitive Science , 36 , 1251–1267. doi: 10.1111/j.1551-6709.2012.01251.x [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Sabbagh, M. A. , Xu, F. , Carlson, S. M. , Moses, L. J. , & Lee, K. (2006). The development of executive functioning and theory of mind: A comparison of Chinese and U.S. preschoolers . Psychological Science , 17 , 74–81. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2005.01667.x [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Saussure, F. d. , Bally, C. , Sechehaye, A. , & Riedlinger, A. (1916). Cours de linguistique générale . Paris: Payot. [ Google Scholar ]
• Slobin, D. (1996). From thought and language to thinking for speaking In Gumperz J. J. & Levinson S. C. (Eds.), Rethinking linguistic relativity (pp. 70–96). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. [ Google Scholar ]
• Slobin, D. (2006). What makes manner of motion salient? Explorations in linguistic typology, discourse, and cognition In Hickmann M. & Robert S. (Eds.), Space in languages: Linguistic systems and cognitive categories (pp. 59–81). Amsterdam: John Benjamins. [ Google Scholar ]
• Strijkers, K. , Costa, A. , & Thierry, G. (2010). Tracking lexical access in speech production: Electrophysiological correlates of word frequency and cognate effects . Cerebral Cortex , 20 , 912–928. doi: 10.1093/cercor/bhp153 [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Strijkers, K. , Holcomb, P. J. , & Costa, A. (2012). Conscious intention to speak proactively facilitates lexical access during overt object naming . Journal of Memory and Language , 65 , 345–362. doi: 10.1016/j.jml.2011.06.002 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Talmy, L. (1985). Lexicalization patterns: Semantic structure in lexical forms In Shopen T. (Ed.), Language typology and syntactic description. Grammatical categories and the lexicon (pp. 57–149). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. [ Google Scholar ]
• Thaler, R. , & Johnson, E. (1990). Gambling with the house money and trying to break even: The effects of prior outcomes on risky choice . Management Science , 36 , 643–660. doi: 10.1287/mnsc.36.6.643 [ Google Scholar ]
• Thierry, G. , Athanasopoulos, P. , Wiggett, A. , Dering, B. , & Kuipers, J. (2009). Unconscious effects of language‐specific terminology on preattentive color perception . Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences , 106 , 4567–4570. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0811155106 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Thierry, G. , Giraud, A. , & Price, C. (2003). Hemispheric dissociation in access to the human semantic system . Neuron , 38 , 499–506. doi: 10.1016/S0896-6273(3)00199-5 [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Thierry, G. , & Price, C. (2006). Dissociating verbal and nonverbal conceptual processing in the human brain . Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience , 18 , 1018–1028. doi: 10.1162/jocn.2006.18.6.1018 [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Thierry, G. , & Wu, Y. J. (2007). Brain potentials reveal unconscious translation during foreign language comprehension . Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences , 104 , 12530–12535. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0609927104 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Tversky, A. , & Kahneman, D. (1981). The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice . Science , 211 , 453–458. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Tversky, A. , & Kahneman, D. (1992). Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty . Journal of Risk and Uncertainty , 5 , 297–323. [ Google Scholar ]
• von Fintel, K. , & Matthewson, L. (2008). Universals in semantics . Linguistic Review , 25 , 139–201. doi: 10.1515/TLIR.2008.004 | 10.1515/TLR.2008.004 [ Google Scholar ]
• von Stutterheim, C. , Andermann, M. , Carroll, M. , Flecken, M. , & Schmiedtova, B. (2012). How grammaticized concepts shape event conceptualization in language production: Insights from linguistic analysis, eye tracking data, and memory performance . Linguistics , 50 , 833–867. doi: 10.1515/ling-2012-0026 [ Google Scholar ]
• von Stutterheim, C. , & Nüse, R. (2003). Processes of conceptualization in language production: Language‐specific perspectives and event construal . Linguistics , 41 , 831–881. [ Google Scholar ]
• Whorf, B. L. (1956). Language, thought, and reality . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. [ Google Scholar ]
• Wu, Y. J. , & Thierry, G. (2010). Chinese‐English bilinguals reading English hear Chinese . Journal of Neuroscience , 30 , 7646–7651. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1602-10.2010 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Wu, Y. J. , & Thierry, G. (2012). How reading in a second language protects your heart . Journal of Neuroscience , 32 , 6485–6489. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.6119-11.2012 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Wu, Y. J. , & Thierry, G. (2013). Fast modulation of executive function by language context in bilinguals . Journal of Neuroscience , 33 , 13533–13537. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.4760-12.2013 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]

November 30, 2018

Does Your Language Influence How You Think?

Would it be harder for people who speak a highly gendered language to create a more gender-neutral society?

By Grammar Girl Mignon Fogarty & Neal Whitman

Getty Images

Last November, I ran an episode on  the myth that the Inuit language has a surprisingly large number of words for “snow.”  I talked about how this myth is one example of a widely debunked idea called the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, named after the linguists Edward Sapir and Benjamin Whorf. This hypothesis claims that the language you speak determines the way you think, or at least influences it. This hypothesis is also sometimes called linguistic relativity. Here’s one of  the arguments against the idea of linguistic relativity  that I summarized in that episode.

[M]ultiple languages have just one word that covers both the color blue and the color green. Researchers sometimes call these “grue” languages, “grue” being a  portmanteau  of “green” and “blue,” but people who speak these grue languages can still distinguish between blue and green. They recognize that they’re different colors even though they are covered by one word, in the same way that we recognize that light blue and dark blue are different colors even though we’d sometimes call them both just “blue.” There are some subtle differences—people who speak languages that distinguish between green and blue find it easier to accurately pick a bluish-green color they’ve seen earlier out of a group of swatches because it’s easier to remember something you have a distinct name for—but it’s not that they are better at recognizing or conceiving the difference between blue and green (1).

However, I recently read  an article in “Smithsonian” magazine that seemed to challenge this view . It was about a court ruling in Germany saying it is unconstitutional for government institutions to assume that every person is either male or female. Any government form that people fill out now must have either a third gender to allow for people who identify as neither male nor female, or no gender question at all. The author of the article, Madhvi Ramani, argued that this ruling would be particularly troublesome for Germans, because German is a strongly gendered language (2). For example, you don’t just say you are a teacher. You are either a male teacher (der Lehrer) or a female teacher (die Lehrerin), and the author argued that this leads the German people to be especially partial to the idea of gender as a binary construct.

On supporting science journalism

If you're enjoying this article, consider supporting our award-winning journalism by subscribing . By purchasing a subscription you are helping to ensure the future of impactful stories about the discoveries and ideas shaping our world today.

So which is it? Can the language you speak influence your thoughts, or can’t it? The short answer is: Yes it can, but it’s not the kind of mind-blowing influence that people usually have in mind. 

What kind of mind-blowing influence are we talking about that isn’t actually real? For my money, the best example is the science fiction movie “Arrival” from 2016 .  I won’t spoil it for those who haven’t seen it, but I can say this much: The protagonist, a linguist named Louise Banks, learns the language of some alien visitors to Earth, and doing so changes the way her mind works so much...that it’s a major plot point. In fact, it’s the basis of the big reveal near the end of the movie. 

Linguistic Relativity and Color Names

Now, on to some aspects of language where people have done research to test the idea of linguistic relativity. Most of these examples come from “Language Files , ”a textbook published by the Ohio State University Department of Linguistics, and  a great TED talk by Lera Boroditsky  (3), a linguist at UC San Diego who is the leading expert on linguistic relativism.

First, let’s talk about color names a little more. A famous study in 1969 by Brent Berlin and Paul Kay did  not  find evidence for linguistic relativity when it came to color names. Instead, they found that languages tended to follow similar patterns in what colors they had names for, and  in the order in which they gained new color terms  (4). 

On the other hand, in favor of linguistic relativity are the facts about color terms that I mentioned earlier: People who speak languages that distinguish between green and blue find it easier than people who don’t to sort green and blue swatches into piles. There are similar results from the language Zuñi, which uses the same word for both yellow and orange (5).

»Continue reading “Does Your Language Influence How You Think?” on QuickAndDirtyTips.com