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The Bhopal disaster and its aftermath: a review

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On December 3 1984, more than 40 tons of methyl isocyanate gas leaked from a pesticide plant in Bhopal, India, immediately killing at least 3,800 people and causing significant morbidity and premature death for many thousands more. The company involved in what became the worst industrial accident in history immediately tried to dissociate itself from legal responsibility. Eventually it reached a settlement with the Indian Government through mediation of that country's Supreme Court and accepted moral responsibility. It paid $470 million in compensation, a relatively small amount of based on significant underestimations of the long-term health consequences of exposure and the number of people exposed. The disaster indicated a need for enforceable international standards for environmental safety, preventative strategies to avoid similar accidents and industrial disaster preparedness.

Since the disaster, India has experienced rapid industrialization. While some positive changes in government policy and behavior of a few industries have taken place, major threats to the environment from rapid and poorly regulated industrial growth remain. Widespread environmental degradation with significant adverse human health consequences continues to occur throughout India.

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December 2004 marked the twentieth anniversary of the massive toxic gas leak from Union Carbide Corporation's chemical plant in Bhopal in the state of Madhya Pradesh, India that killed more than 3,800 people. This review examines the health effects of exposure to the disaster, the legal response, the lessons learned and whether or not these are put into practice in India in terms of industrial development, environmental management and public health.

In the 1970s, the Indian government initiated policies to encourage foreign companies to invest in local industry. Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) was asked to build a plant for the manufacture of Sevin, a pesticide commonly used throughout Asia. As part of the deal, India's government insisted that a significant percentage of the investment come from local shareholders. The government itself had a 22% stake in the company's subsidiary, Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) [ 1 ]. The company built the plant in Bhopal because of its central location and access to transport infrastructure. The specific site within the city was zoned for light industrial and commercial use, not for hazardous industry. The plant was initially approved only for formulation of pesticides from component chemicals, such as MIC imported from the parent company, in relatively small quantities. However, pressure from competition in the chemical industry led UCIL to implement "backward integration" – the manufacture of raw materials and intermediate products for formulation of the final product within one facility. This was inherently a more sophisticated and hazardous process [ 2 ].

In 1984, the plant was manufacturing Sevin at one quarter of its production capacity due to decreased demand for pesticides. Widespread crop failures and famine on the subcontinent in the 1980s led to increased indebtedness and decreased capital for farmers to invest in pesticides. Local managers were directed to close the plant and prepare it for sale in July 1984 due to decreased profitability [ 3 ]. When no ready buyer was found, UCIL made plans to dismantle key production units of the facility for shipment to another developing country. In the meantime, the facility continued to operate with safety equipment and procedures far below the standards found in its sister plant in Institute, West Virginia. The local government was aware of safety problems but was reticent to place heavy industrial safety and pollution control burdens on the struggling industry because it feared the economic effects of the loss of such a large employer [ 3 ].

At 11.00 PM on December 2 1984, while most of the one million residents of Bhopal slept, an operator at the plant noticed a small leak of methyl isocyanate (MIC) gas and increasing pressure inside a storage tank. The vent-gas scrubber, a safety device designer to neutralize toxic discharge from the MIC system, had been turned off three weeks prior [ 3 ]. Apparently a faulty valve had allowed one ton of water for cleaning internal pipes to mix with forty tons of MIC [ 1 ]. A 30 ton refrigeration unit that normally served as a safety component to cool the MIC storage tank had been drained of its coolant for use in another part of the plant [ 3 ]. Pressure and heat from the vigorous exothermic reaction in the tank continued to build. The gas flare safety system was out of action and had been for three months. At around 1.00 AM, December 3, loud rumbling reverberated around the plant as a safety valve gave way sending a plume of MIC gas into the early morning air [ 4 ]. Within hours, the streets of Bhopal were littered with human corpses and the carcasses of buffaloes, cows, dogs and birds. An estimated 3,800 people died immediately, mostly in the poor slum colony adjacent to the UCC plant [ 1 , 5 ]. Local hospitals were soon overwhelmed with the injured, a crisis further compounded by a lack of knowledge of exactly what gas was involved and what its effects were [ 1 ]. It became one of the worst chemical disasters in history and the name Bhopal became synonymous with industrial catastrophe [ 5 ].

Estimates of the number of people killed in the first few days by the plume from the UCC plant run as high as 10,000, with 15,000 to 20,000 premature deaths reportedly occurring in the subsequent two decades [ 6 ]. The Indian government reported that more than half a million people were exposed to the gas [ 7 ]. Several epidemiological studies conducted soon after the accident showed significant morbidity and increased mortality in the exposed population. Table 1 . summarizes early and late effects on health. These data are likely to under-represent the true extent of adverse health effects because many exposed individuals left Bhopal immediately following the disaster never to return and were therefore lost to follow-up [ 8 ].

Immediately after the disaster, UCC began attempts to dissociate itself from responsibility for the gas leak. Its principal tactic was to shift culpability to UCIL, stating the plant was wholly built and operated by the Indian subsidiary. It also fabricated scenarios involving sabotage by previously unknown Sikh extremist groups and disgruntled employees but this theory was impugned by numerous independent sources [ 1 ].

The toxic plume had barely cleared when, on December 7, the first multi-billion dollar lawsuit was filed by an American attorney in a U.S. court. This was the beginning of years of legal machinations in which the ethical implications of the tragedy and its affect on Bhopal's people were largely ignored. In March 1985, the Indian government enacted the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster Act as a way of ensuring that claims arising from the accident would be dealt with speedily and equitably. The Act made the government the sole representative of the victims in legal proceedings both within and outside India. Eventually all cases were taken out of the U.S. legal system under the ruling of the presiding American judge and placed entirely under Indian jurisdiction much to the detriment of the injured parties.

In a settlement mediated by the Indian Supreme Court, UCC accepted moral responsibility and agreed to pay $470 million to the Indian government to be distributed to claimants as a full and final settlement. The figure was partly based on the disputed claim that only 3000 people died and 102,000 suffered permanent disabilities [ 9 ]. Upon announcing this settlement, shares of UCC rose $2 per share or 7% in value [ 1 ]. Had compensation in Bhopal been paid at the same rate that asbestosis victims where being awarded in US courts by defendant including UCC – which mined asbestos from 1963 to 1985 – the liability would have been greater than the $10 billion the company was worth and insured for in 1984 [ 10 ]. By the end of October 2003, according to the Bhopal Gas Tragedy Relief and Rehabilitation Department, compensation had been awarded to 554,895 people for injuries received and 15,310 survivors of those killed. The average amount to families of the dead was $2,200 [ 9 ].

At every turn, UCC has attempted to manipulate, obfuscate and withhold scientific data to the detriment of victims. Even to this date, the company has not stated exactly what was in the toxic cloud that enveloped the city on that December night [ 8 ]. When MIC is exposed to 200° heat, it forms degraded MIC that contains the more deadly hydrogen cyanide (HCN). There was clear evidence that the storage tank temperature did reach this level in the disaster. The cherry-red color of blood and viscera of some victims were characteristic of acute cyanide poisoning [ 11 ]. Moreover, many responded well to administration of sodium thiosulfate, an effective therapy for cyanide poisoning but not MIC exposure [ 11 ]. UCC initially recommended use of sodium thiosulfate but withdrew the statement later prompting suggestions that it attempted to cover up evidence of HCN in the gas leak. The presence of HCN was vigorously denied by UCC and was a point of conjecture among researchers [ 8 , 11 – 13 ].

As further insult, UCC discontinued operation at its Bhopal plant following the disaster but failed to clean up the industrial site completely. The plant continues to leak several toxic chemicals and heavy metals that have found their way into local aquifers. Dangerously contaminated water has now been added to the legacy left by the company for the people of Bhopal [ 1 , 14 ].

Lessons learned

The events in Bhopal revealed that expanding industrialization in developing countries without concurrent evolution in safety regulations could have catastrophic consequences [ 4 ]. The disaster demonstrated that seemingly local problems of industrial hazards and toxic contamination are often tied to global market dynamics. UCC's Sevin production plant was built in Madhya Pradesh not to avoid environmental regulations in the U.S. but to exploit the large and growing Indian pesticide market. However the manner in which the project was executed suggests the existence of a double standard for multinational corporations operating in developing countries [ 1 ]. Enforceable uniform international operating regulations for hazardous industries would have provided a mechanism for significantly improved in safety in Bhopal. Even without enforcement, international standards could provide norms for measuring performance of individual companies engaged in hazardous activities such as the manufacture of pesticides and other toxic chemicals in India [ 15 ]. National governments and international agencies should focus on widely applicable techniques for corporate responsibility and accident prevention as much in the developing world context as in advanced industrial nations [ 16 ]. Specifically, prevention should include risk reduction in plant location and design and safety legislation [ 17 ].

Local governments clearly cannot allow industrial facilities to be situated within urban areas, regardless of the evolution of land use over time. Industry and government need to bring proper financial support to local communities so they can provide medical and other necessary services to reduce morbidity, mortality and material loss in the case of industrial accidents.

Public health infrastructure was very weak in Bhopal in 1984. Tap water was available for only a few hours a day and was of very poor quality. With no functioning sewage system, untreated human waste was dumped into two nearby lakes, one a source of drinking water. The city had four major hospitals but there was a shortage of physicians and hospital beds. There was also no mass casualty emergency response system in place in the city [ 3 ]. Existing public health infrastructure needs to be taken into account when hazardous industries choose sites for manufacturing plants. Future management of industrial development requires that appropriate resources be devoted to advance planning before any disaster occurs [ 18 ]. Communities that do not possess infrastructure and technical expertise to respond adequately to such industrial accidents should not be chosen as sites for hazardous industry.

Following the events of December 3 1984 environmental awareness and activism in India increased significantly. The Environment Protection Act was passed in 1986, creating the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) and strengthening India's commitment to the environment. Under the new act, the MoEF was given overall responsibility for administering and enforcing environmental laws and policies. It established the importance of integrating environmental strategies into all industrial development plans for the country. However, despite greater government commitment to protect public health, forests, and wildlife, policies geared to developing the country's economy have taken precedence in the last 20 years [ 19 ].

India has undergone tremendous economic growth in the two decades since the Bhopal disaster. Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita has increased from $1,000 in 1984 to $2,900 in 2004 and it continues to grow at a rate of over 8% per year [ 20 ]. Rapid industrial development has contributed greatly to economic growth but there has been significant cost in environmental degradation and increased public health risks. Since abatement efforts consume a large portion of India's GDP, MoEF faces an uphill battle as it tries to fulfill its mandate of reducing industrial pollution [ 19 ]. Heavy reliance on coal-fired power plants and poor enforcement of vehicle emission laws have result from economic concerns taking precedence over environmental protection [ 19 ].

With the industrial growth since 1984, there has been an increase in small scale industries (SSIs) that are clustered about major urban areas in India. There are generally less stringent rules for the treatment of waste produced by SSIs due to less waste generation within each individual industry. This has allowed SSIs to dispose of untreated wastewater into drainage systems that flow directly into rivers. New Delhi's Yamuna River is illustrative. Dangerously high levels of heavy metals such as lead, cobalt, cadmium, chrome, nickel and zinc have been detected in this river which is a major supply of potable water to India's capital thus posing a potential health risk to the people living there and areas downstream [ 21 ].

Land pollution due to uncontrolled disposal of industrial solid and hazardous waste is also a problem throughout India. With rapid industrialization, the generation of industrial solid and hazardous waste has increased appreciably and the environmental impact is significant [ 22 ].

India relaxed its controls on foreign investment in order to accede to WTO rules and thereby attract an increasing flow of capital. In the process, a number of environmental regulations are being rolled back as growing foreign investments continue to roll in. The Indian experience is comparable to that of a number of developing countries that are experiencing the environmental impacts of structural adjustment. Exploitation and export of natural resources has accelerated on the subcontinent. Prohibitions against locating industrial facilities in ecologically sensitive zones have been eliminated while conservation zones are being stripped of their status so that pesticide, cement and bauxite mines can be built [ 23 ]. Heavy reliance on coal-fired power plants and poor enforcement of vehicle emission laws are other consequences of economic concerns taking precedence over environmental protection [ 19 ].

In March 2001, residents of Kodaikanal in southern India caught the Anglo-Dutch company, Unilever, red-handed when they discovered a dumpsite with toxic mercury laced waste from a thermometer factory run by the company's Indian subsidiary, Hindustan Lever. The 7.4 ton stockpile of mercury-laden glass was found in torn stacks spilling onto the ground in a scrap metal yard located near a school. In the fall of 2001, steel from the ruins of the World Trade Center was exported to India apparently without first being tested for contamination from asbestos and heavy metals present in the twin tower debris. Other examples of poor environmental stewardship and economic considerations taking precedence over public health concerns abound [ 24 ].

The Bhopal disaster could have changed the nature of the chemical industry and caused a reexamination of the necessity to produce such potentially harmful products in the first place. However the lessons of acute and chronic effects of exposure to pesticides and their precursors in Bhopal has not changed agricultural practice patterns. An estimated 3 million people per year suffer the consequences of pesticide poisoning with most exposure occurring in the agricultural developing world. It is reported to be the cause of at least 22,000 deaths in India each year. In the state of Kerala, significant mortality and morbidity have been reported following exposure to Endosulfan, a toxic pesticide whose use continued for 15 years after the events of Bhopal [ 25 ].

Aggressive marketing of asbestos continues in developing countries as a result of restrictions being placed on its use in developed nations due to the well-established link between asbestos products and respiratory diseases. India has become a major consumer, using around 100,000 tons of asbestos per year, 80% of which is imported with Canada being the largest overseas supplier. Mining, production and use of asbestos in India is very loosely regulated despite the health hazards. Reports have shown morbidity and mortality from asbestos related disease will continue in India without enforcement of a ban or significantly tighter controls [ 26 , 27 ].

UCC has shrunk to one sixth of its size since the Bhopal disaster in an effort to restructure and divest itself. By doing so, the company avoided a hostile takeover, placed a significant portion of UCC's assets out of legal reach of the victims and gave its shareholder and top executives bountiful profits [ 1 ]. The company still operates under the ownership of Dow Chemicals and still states on its website that the Bhopal disaster was "cause by deliberate sabotage". [ 28 ].

Some positive changes were seen following the Bhopal disaster. The British chemical company, ICI, whose Indian subsidiary manufactured pesticides, increased attention to health, safety and environmental issues following the events of December 1984. The subsidiary now spends 30–40% of their capital expenditures on environmental-related projects. However, they still do not adhere to standards as strict as their parent company in the UK. [ 24 ].

The US chemical giant DuPont learned its lesson of Bhopal in a different way. The company attempted for a decade to export a nylon plant from Richmond, VA to Goa, India. In its early negotiations with the Indian government, DuPont had sought and won a remarkable clause in its investment agreement that absolved it from all liabilities in case of an accident. But the people of Goa were not willing to acquiesce while an important ecological site was cleared for a heavy polluting industry. After nearly a decade of protesting by Goa's residents, DuPont was forced to scuttle plans there. Chennai was the next proposed site for the plastics plant. The state government there made significantly greater demand on DuPont for concessions on public health and environmental protection. Eventually, these plans were also aborted due to what the company called "financial concerns". [ 29 ].

The tragedy of Bhopal continues to be a warning sign at once ignored and heeded. Bhopal and its aftermath were a warning that the path to industrialization, for developing countries in general and India in particular, is fraught with human, environmental and economic perils. Some moves by the Indian government, including the formation of the MoEF, have served to offer some protection of the public's health from the harmful practices of local and multinational heavy industry and grassroots organizations that have also played a part in opposing rampant development. The Indian economy is growing at a tremendous rate but at significant cost in environmental health and public safety as large and small companies throughout the subcontinent continue to pollute. Far more remains to be done for public health in the context of industrialization to show that the lessons of the countless thousands dead in Bhopal have truly been heeded.

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J. Barab, B. Castleman, R Dhara and U Misra reviewed the manuscript and provided useful suggestions.

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a case study on bhopal gas tragedy

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How the 1984 Bhopal gas tragedy in India has hurt multiple generations

Rhitu Chatterjee

Nearly 39 years after a gas from a pesticide factory poisoned tens of thousands of people in Bhopal, India, a new study finds that it also had health and economic impacts on men born a year later.

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Bhopal Gas Tragedy : Causes, effects and aftermath

The Bhopal gas tragedy occurred at midnight of December 2nd- 3rd December 1984 at the Union Carbide India Ltd (UCIL) pesticide facility in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh. This catastrophe affected around 500,000 people along with many animals. People who were exposed are still suffering as a result of the gas leak’s long-term health impacts. Chronic eye difficulties and respiratory problems were some issues due to it. Children who have been exposed have stunted growth and cognitive impairments. 

Table of Content

Bhopal Gas Tragedy

Bhopal gas tragedy case study, causes of bhopal gas tragedy, effects of bhopal gas tragedy, aftermath of bhopal gas tragedy.

Bhopal Gas Tragedy

Union Carbide was an American company that produced pesticides. MIC – methyl isocyanide, a dangerous poisonous gas began to leak at midnight on 2nd December 1984 from the Union Carbide factory. This MIC caused the Bhopal gas tragedy. The Bhopal gas tragedy was a fatal accident. It was one of the world’s worst industrial accidents. 

UCIL was a pesticide manufacturing plant that produced the insecticide carbaryl. Carbaryl was discovered by the American company Union Carbide Corporation, which owned a significant share in UCIL. As an intermediary, UCIL produced carbaryl using methyl isocyanate (MIC). Other techniques for producing the ultimate product are available, but they are more expensive. The very toxic chemical MIC is extremely dangerous to human health. Residents of Bhopal in the area of the pesticide plant began to feel irritated by the MIC and began fleeing the city.

Bhopal UCIL constructed three underground MIC storage tanks which were named E610, E611, and E619. On October 1984, E610 was not able to maintain its nitrogen gas pressure and so the liquid which is present inside the tank would not pump out, because of which 42 tons of MIC in E610 was wasted. The chemical in E610 was left unpumped as they were not able to re-establish its pressure, which later became responsible for Bhopal Gas Tragedy.

The main causes of Bhopal Gas Tragedy are as follows:

  • During the buildup to the spill, the plant’s safety mechanisms for the highly toxic MIC were not working. The alarm off tanks of the plant had not worked properly.
  • Many valves and lines were in disrepair, and many vent gas scrubbers were not working, as was the steam boiler that was supposed to clean the pipes.
  • The MIC was stored in three tanks, with tank E610 being the source of the leak. This tank should have held no more than 30 tonnes of MIC, according to safety regulations.
  • Water is believed to have entered the tank through a side pipe as technicians were attempting to clear it late that fatal night.
  • This resulted in an exothermic reaction in the tank, progressively raising the pressure until the gas was ejected through the atmosphere.

The main effects of the Bhopal Gas Tragedy are as follows:

  • Thousands had died as a result of choking, pulmonary edema, and reflexogenic circulatory collapse.
  • Neonatal death rates increased by 200 percent.
  • A huge number of animal carcasses have been discovered in the area, indicating the impact on flora and animals. The trees died after a few days. Food supplies have grown scarce due to the fear of contamination. 
  • Fishing was also prohibited.
  • In March 1985, the Indian government established the Bhopal Gas Leak Accident Act, giving it legal authority to represent all victims of the accident, whether they were in India or abroad.
  • At least 200,000 youngsters were exposed to the gas.
  • Hospitals were overcrowded, and there was no sufficient training for medical workers to deal with MIC exposure.

In the United States, UCC was sued in federal court. In one action, the court recommended that UCC pay between $5 million and $10 million to assist the victims. UCC agreed to pay a $5 million settlement. The Indian government, however, rejected this offer and claimed $3.3 billion. In 1989, UCC agreed to pay $470 million in damages and paid the cash immediately in an out-of-court settlement.

Warren Anderson, the CEO and Chairman of UCC was charged with manslaughter by Bhopal authorities in 1991. He refused to appear in court and the Bhopal court declared him a fugitive from justice in February 1992. Despite the central government’s efforts in the United States to extradite Anderson, nothing happened. Anderson died in 2014 without ever appearing in a court of law.

Bhopal Gas Tragedy continues to be an important warning sign for industrialization, for developing countries and in particular India, with human, environmental, and economic pitfalls. The economy of India is growing at a fast rate but at the cost of environmental health as well as public safety.

Frequently Asked Questions

What were the reasons behind bhopal gas tragedy.

The reasons behind Bhopal gas tragedy was a large volume of water had been introduced into the MIC tank and has caused a chemical reaction which did force the pressure release valve, which allowed the gas to leak.

What is the name of Bhopal gas case law?

The name is Union Carbide Corporation v.

Which gas was leaked in the Bhopal Gas Tragedy?

The gas which was leaked in the Bhopal Gas Tragedy is methyl isocyanate.

Was Bhopal gas tragedy an accident or experiment?

Bhopal gas tragedy was the world’s most worst industrial accident.

How many people died in the Bhopal Gas?

A total of 3,787 deaths were registered related to the gas release in case of Bhopal Gas Tragedy.

What were the four main demands of the Bhopal Gas victims?

The 4 demands of Bhopal Gas victims include: Proper medical treatment. Adequate compensation. Fixation of criminal responsibility Steps for prevention of such disasters in future.

How was Bhopal Gas Tragedy fixed?

Bhopal Gas Tragedy was fixed with construction of a secure landfill for holding the wastes from the two on-site solar evaporation ponds.

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The Bhopal disaster and its aftermath: a review

Edward broughton.

1 Columbia University, Mailman School of Public Health, 600 W 168th St. New York, NY 10032 USA

This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0 ), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

On December 3 1984, more than 40 tons of methyl isocyanate gas leaked from a pesticide plant in Bhopal, India, immediately killing at least 3,800 people and causing significant morbidity and premature death for many thousands more. The company involved in what became the worst industrial accident in history immediately tried to dissociate itself from legal responsibility. Eventually it reached a settlement with the Indian Government through mediation of that country's Supreme Court and accepted moral responsibility. It paid $470 million in compensation, a relatively small amount of based on significant underestimations of the long-term health consequences of exposure and the number of people exposed. The disaster indicated a need for enforceable international standards for environmental safety, preventative strategies to avoid similar accidents and industrial disaster preparedness.

Since the disaster, India has experienced rapid industrialization. While some positive changes in government policy and behavior of a few industries have taken place, major threats to the environment from rapid and poorly regulated industrial growth remain. Widespread environmental degradation with significant adverse human health consequences continues to occur throughout India.

December 2004 marked the twentieth anniversary of the massive toxic gas leak from Union Carbide Corporation's chemical plant in Bhopal in the state of Madhya Pradesh, India that killed more than 3,800 people. This review examines the health effects of exposure to the disaster, the legal response, the lessons learned and whether or not these are put into practice in India in terms of industrial development, environmental management and public health.

In the 1970s, the Indian government initiated policies to encourage foreign companies to invest in local industry. Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) was asked to build a plant for the manufacture of Sevin, a pesticide commonly used throughout Asia. As part of the deal, India's government insisted that a significant percentage of the investment come from local shareholders. The government itself had a 22% stake in the company's subsidiary, Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) [ 1 ]. The company built the plant in Bhopal because of its central location and access to transport infrastructure. The specific site within the city was zoned for light industrial and commercial use, not for hazardous industry. The plant was initially approved only for formulation of pesticides from component chemicals, such as MIC imported from the parent company, in relatively small quantities. However, pressure from competition in the chemical industry led UCIL to implement "backward integration" – the manufacture of raw materials and intermediate products for formulation of the final product within one facility. This was inherently a more sophisticated and hazardous process [ 2 ].

In 1984, the plant was manufacturing Sevin at one quarter of its production capacity due to decreased demand for pesticides. Widespread crop failures and famine on the subcontinent in the 1980s led to increased indebtedness and decreased capital for farmers to invest in pesticides. Local managers were directed to close the plant and prepare it for sale in July 1984 due to decreased profitability [ 3 ]. When no ready buyer was found, UCIL made plans to dismantle key production units of the facility for shipment to another developing country. In the meantime, the facility continued to operate with safety equipment and procedures far below the standards found in its sister plant in Institute, West Virginia. The local government was aware of safety problems but was reticent to place heavy industrial safety and pollution control burdens on the struggling industry because it feared the economic effects of the loss of such a large employer [ 3 ].

At 11.00 PM on December 2 1984, while most of the one million residents of Bhopal slept, an operator at the plant noticed a small leak of methyl isocyanate (MIC) gas and increasing pressure inside a storage tank. The vent-gas scrubber, a safety device designer to neutralize toxic discharge from the MIC system, had been turned off three weeks prior [ 3 ]. Apparently a faulty valve had allowed one ton of water for cleaning internal pipes to mix with forty tons of MIC [ 1 ]. A 30 ton refrigeration unit that normally served as a safety component to cool the MIC storage tank had been drained of its coolant for use in another part of the plant [ 3 ]. Pressure and heat from the vigorous exothermic reaction in the tank continued to build. The gas flare safety system was out of action and had been for three months. At around 1.00 AM, December 3, loud rumbling reverberated around the plant as a safety valve gave way sending a plume of MIC gas into the early morning air [ 4 ]. Within hours, the streets of Bhopal were littered with human corpses and the carcasses of buffaloes, cows, dogs and birds. An estimated 3,800 people died immediately, mostly in the poor slum colony adjacent to the UCC plant [ 1 , 5 ]. Local hospitals were soon overwhelmed with the injured, a crisis further compounded by a lack of knowledge of exactly what gas was involved and what its effects were [ 1 ]. It became one of the worst chemical disasters in history and the name Bhopal became synonymous with industrial catastrophe [ 5 ].

Estimates of the number of people killed in the first few days by the plume from the UCC plant run as high as 10,000, with 15,000 to 20,000 premature deaths reportedly occurring in the subsequent two decades [ 6 ]. The Indian government reported that more than half a million people were exposed to the gas [ 7 ]. Several epidemiological studies conducted soon after the accident showed significant morbidity and increased mortality in the exposed population. Table ​ Table1. 1 . summarizes early and late effects on health. These data are likely to under-represent the true extent of adverse health effects because many exposed individuals left Bhopal immediately following the disaster never to return and were therefore lost to follow-up [ 8 ].

Health effects of the Bhopal methyl isocyanate gas leak exposure [8, 30-32].

Immediately after the disaster, UCC began attempts to dissociate itself from responsibility for the gas leak. Its principal tactic was to shift culpability to UCIL, stating the plant was wholly built and operated by the Indian subsidiary. It also fabricated scenarios involving sabotage by previously unknown Sikh extremist groups and disgruntled employees but this theory was impugned by numerous independent sources [ 1 ].

The toxic plume had barely cleared when, on December 7, the first multi-billion dollar lawsuit was filed by an American attorney in a U.S. court. This was the beginning of years of legal machinations in which the ethical implications of the tragedy and its affect on Bhopal's people were largely ignored. In March 1985, the Indian government enacted the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster Act as a way of ensuring that claims arising from the accident would be dealt with speedily and equitably. The Act made the government the sole representative of the victims in legal proceedings both within and outside India. Eventually all cases were taken out of the U.S. legal system under the ruling of the presiding American judge and placed entirely under Indian jurisdiction much to the detriment of the injured parties.

In a settlement mediated by the Indian Supreme Court, UCC accepted moral responsibility and agreed to pay $470 million to the Indian government to be distributed to claimants as a full and final settlement. The figure was partly based on the disputed claim that only 3000 people died and 102,000 suffered permanent disabilities [ 9 ]. Upon announcing this settlement, shares of UCC rose $2 per share or 7% in value [ 1 ]. Had compensation in Bhopal been paid at the same rate that asbestosis victims where being awarded in US courts by defendant including UCC – which mined asbestos from 1963 to 1985 – the liability would have been greater than the $10 billion the company was worth and insured for in 1984 [ 10 ]. By the end of October 2003, according to the Bhopal Gas Tragedy Relief and Rehabilitation Department, compensation had been awarded to 554,895 people for injuries received and 15,310 survivors of those killed. The average amount to families of the dead was $2,200 [ 9 ].

At every turn, UCC has attempted to manipulate, obfuscate and withhold scientific data to the detriment of victims. Even to this date, the company has not stated exactly what was in the toxic cloud that enveloped the city on that December night [ 8 ]. When MIC is exposed to 200° heat, it forms degraded MIC that contains the more deadly hydrogen cyanide (HCN). There was clear evidence that the storage tank temperature did reach this level in the disaster. The cherry-red color of blood and viscera of some victims were characteristic of acute cyanide poisoning [ 11 ]. Moreover, many responded well to administration of sodium thiosulfate, an effective therapy for cyanide poisoning but not MIC exposure [ 11 ]. UCC initially recommended use of sodium thiosulfate but withdrew the statement later prompting suggestions that it attempted to cover up evidence of HCN in the gas leak. The presence of HCN was vigorously denied by UCC and was a point of conjecture among researchers [ 8 , 11 - 13 ].

As further insult, UCC discontinued operation at its Bhopal plant following the disaster but failed to clean up the industrial site completely. The plant continues to leak several toxic chemicals and heavy metals that have found their way into local aquifers. Dangerously contaminated water has now been added to the legacy left by the company for the people of Bhopal [ 1 , 14 ].

Lessons learned

The events in Bhopal revealed that expanding industrialization in developing countries without concurrent evolution in safety regulations could have catastrophic consequences [ 4 ]. The disaster demonstrated that seemingly local problems of industrial hazards and toxic contamination are often tied to global market dynamics. UCC's Sevin production plant was built in Madhya Pradesh not to avoid environmental regulations in the U.S. but to exploit the large and growing Indian pesticide market. However the manner in which the project was executed suggests the existence of a double standard for multinational corporations operating in developing countries [ 1 ]. Enforceable uniform international operating regulations for hazardous industries would have provided a mechanism for significantly improved in safety in Bhopal. Even without enforcement, international standards could provide norms for measuring performance of individual companies engaged in hazardous activities such as the manufacture of pesticides and other toxic chemicals in India [ 15 ]. National governments and international agencies should focus on widely applicable techniques for corporate responsibility and accident prevention as much in the developing world context as in advanced industrial nations [ 16 ]. Specifically, prevention should include risk reduction in plant location and design and safety legislation [ 17 ].

Local governments clearly cannot allow industrial facilities to be situated within urban areas, regardless of the evolution of land use over time. Industry and government need to bring proper financial support to local communities so they can provide medical and other necessary services to reduce morbidity, mortality and material loss in the case of industrial accidents.

Public health infrastructure was very weak in Bhopal in 1984. Tap water was available for only a few hours a day and was of very poor quality. With no functioning sewage system, untreated human waste was dumped into two nearby lakes, one a source of drinking water. The city had four major hospitals but there was a shortage of physicians and hospital beds. There was also no mass casualty emergency response system in place in the city [ 3 ]. Existing public health infrastructure needs to be taken into account when hazardous industries choose sites for manufacturing plants. Future management of industrial development requires that appropriate resources be devoted to advance planning before any disaster occurs [ 18 ]. Communities that do not possess infrastructure and technical expertise to respond adequately to such industrial accidents should not be chosen as sites for hazardous industry.

Following the events of December 3 1984 environmental awareness and activism in India increased significantly. The Environment Protection Act was passed in 1986, creating the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) and strengthening India's commitment to the environment. Under the new act, the MoEF was given overall responsibility for administering and enforcing environmental laws and policies. It established the importance of integrating environmental strategies into all industrial development plans for the country. However, despite greater government commitment to protect public health, forests, and wildlife, policies geared to developing the country's economy have taken precedence in the last 20 years [ 19 ].

India has undergone tremendous economic growth in the two decades since the Bhopal disaster. Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita has increased from $1,000 in 1984 to $2,900 in 2004 and it continues to grow at a rate of over 8% per year [ 20 ]. Rapid industrial development has contributed greatly to economic growth but there has been significant cost in environmental degradation and increased public health risks. Since abatement efforts consume a large portion of India's GDP, MoEF faces an uphill battle as it tries to fulfill its mandate of reducing industrial pollution [ 19 ]. Heavy reliance on coal-fired power plants and poor enforcement of vehicle emission laws have result from economic concerns taking precedence over environmental protection [ 19 ].

With the industrial growth since 1984, there has been an increase in small scale industries (SSIs) that are clustered about major urban areas in India. There are generally less stringent rules for the treatment of waste produced by SSIs due to less waste generation within each individual industry. This has allowed SSIs to dispose of untreated wastewater into drainage systems that flow directly into rivers. New Delhi's Yamuna River is illustrative. Dangerously high levels of heavy metals such as lead, cobalt, cadmium, chrome, nickel and zinc have been detected in this river which is a major supply of potable water to India's capital thus posing a potential health risk to the people living there and areas downstream [ 21 ].

Land pollution due to uncontrolled disposal of industrial solid and hazardous waste is also a problem throughout India. With rapid industrialization, the generation of industrial solid and hazardous waste has increased appreciably and the environmental impact is significant [ 22 ].

India relaxed its controls on foreign investment in order to accede to WTO rules and thereby attract an increasing flow of capital. In the process, a number of environmental regulations are being rolled back as growing foreign investments continue to roll in. The Indian experience is comparable to that of a number of developing countries that are experiencing the environmental impacts of structural adjustment. Exploitation and export of natural resources has accelerated on the subcontinent. Prohibitions against locating industrial facilities in ecologically sensitive zones have been eliminated while conservation zones are being stripped of their status so that pesticide, cement and bauxite mines can be built [ 23 ]. Heavy reliance on coal-fired power plants and poor enforcement of vehicle emission laws are other consequences of economic concerns taking precedence over environmental protection [ 19 ].

In March 2001, residents of Kodaikanal in southern India caught the Anglo-Dutch company, Unilever, red-handed when they discovered a dumpsite with toxic mercury laced waste from a thermometer factory run by the company's Indian subsidiary, Hindustan Lever. The 7.4 ton stockpile of mercury-laden glass was found in torn stacks spilling onto the ground in a scrap metal yard located near a school. In the fall of 2001, steel from the ruins of the World Trade Center was exported to India apparently without first being tested for contamination from asbestos and heavy metals present in the twin tower debris. Other examples of poor environmental stewardship and economic considerations taking precedence over public health concerns abound [ 24 ].

The Bhopal disaster could have changed the nature of the chemical industry and caused a reexamination of the necessity to produce such potentially harmful products in the first place. However the lessons of acute and chronic effects of exposure to pesticides and their precursors in Bhopal has not changed agricultural practice patterns. An estimated 3 million people per year suffer the consequences of pesticide poisoning with most exposure occurring in the agricultural developing world. It is reported to be the cause of at least 22,000 deaths in India each year. In the state of Kerala, significant mortality and morbidity have been reported following exposure to Endosulfan, a toxic pesticide whose use continued for 15 years after the events of Bhopal [ 25 ].

Aggressive marketing of asbestos continues in developing countries as a result of restrictions being placed on its use in developed nations due to the well-established link between asbestos products and respiratory diseases. India has become a major consumer, using around 100,000 tons of asbestos per year, 80% of which is imported with Canada being the largest overseas supplier. Mining, production and use of asbestos in India is very loosely regulated despite the health hazards. Reports have shown morbidity and mortality from asbestos related disease will continue in India without enforcement of a ban or significantly tighter controls [ 26 , 27 ].

UCC has shrunk to one sixth of its size since the Bhopal disaster in an effort to restructure and divest itself. By doing so, the company avoided a hostile takeover, placed a significant portion of UCC's assets out of legal reach of the victims and gave its shareholder and top executives bountiful profits [ 1 ]. The company still operates under the ownership of Dow Chemicals and still states on its website that the Bhopal disaster was "cause by deliberate sabotage". [ 28 ].

Some positive changes were seen following the Bhopal disaster. The British chemical company, ICI, whose Indian subsidiary manufactured pesticides, increased attention to health, safety and environmental issues following the events of December 1984. The subsidiary now spends 30–40% of their capital expenditures on environmental-related projects. However, they still do not adhere to standards as strict as their parent company in the UK. [ 24 ].

The US chemical giant DuPont learned its lesson of Bhopal in a different way. The company attempted for a decade to export a nylon plant from Richmond, VA to Goa, India. In its early negotiations with the Indian government, DuPont had sought and won a remarkable clause in its investment agreement that absolved it from all liabilities in case of an accident. But the people of Goa were not willing to acquiesce while an important ecological site was cleared for a heavy polluting industry. After nearly a decade of protesting by Goa's residents, DuPont was forced to scuttle plans there. Chennai was the next proposed site for the plastics plant. The state government there made significantly greater demand on DuPont for concessions on public health and environmental protection. Eventually, these plans were also aborted due to what the company called "financial concerns". [ 29 ].

The tragedy of Bhopal continues to be a warning sign at once ignored and heeded. Bhopal and its aftermath were a warning that the path to industrialization, for developing countries in general and India in particular, is fraught with human, environmental and economic perils. Some moves by the Indian government, including the formation of the MoEF, have served to offer some protection of the public's health from the harmful practices of local and multinational heavy industry and grassroots organizations that have also played a part in opposing rampant development. The Indian economy is growing at a tremendous rate but at significant cost in environmental health and public safety as large and small companies throughout the subcontinent continue to pollute. Far more remains to be done for public health in the context of industrialization to show that the lessons of the countless thousands dead in Bhopal have truly been heeded.

Competing interests

The author(s) declare that they have no competing interests.

Acknowledgements

J. Barab, B. Castleman, R Dhara and U Misra reviewed the manuscript and provided useful suggestions.

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Bhopal Gas Tragedy – Case Study And Legal Consequences

Introduction:.

The industrial manufacturing sector is pivotal for the buoyancy of the Indian economy. Since this production sector extended its hands to facilitate economic sustainability, it has branched with diversified industries indulged and engaged in manufacturing automobiles, pieces of machinery, equipment, mental and electric appliance, mineral-extractions, so on. To utilize our demographic dividend, Indian is supposed to alleviate unemployment. The attainment of such an object necessitates the growth of the industrial sector, which is capable to create large-scale employment opportunities for youths. Consequently, millions of families will move out of poverty and fulfill their economic needs.

On the other hand, every single thing has its highlights and challenges. With having an eye on accomplishing economic and technological culmination, the human community is resting in a vain attempt to bring back or keep up the ecological footprint. The status quo industrial societies are pervaded with noxious or hazardous substances; indeed without the same nothing could be processed and produced. Negligence in treatment, usage, or disposal of such kinds of stuff has its ramifications in all walks of human life; even history tells us the same. India has witnessed countless industrial accidents; one of the notable incidents which have still deeply-rooted in the minds of Indians is the Bhopal gas leak tragedy.

Brief About the Incident:

To produce the pesticide named  Sevin  comprises the reagents, Methyl Isocyanate and Alpha Naphthol;   the American enterprises entitled the Union Cambridge Corporation has established its subsidiary in Bhopal as qua the central place with excellent transport links. Later, the established Indian subsidiary was named The Union Cambridge India Limited (UCIL) since the Indian public had owned the ownership, nearly 40.1% share in the corporation.

The incident happened on the night of December 2 to 3, 1984, when the forty tons of Methyl Isocyanate (MIC) was massively escaped from the Tank E106 at the UCC’s Indian subsidiary laid on at Bhopal. Since the plant has established in a crowded and inhabited area, within less than an hour, a great number of people and animals were befallen as victims and consequently died due to the toxicity of the leaked MIC. The estimated number of immediate death was 3500+, and the critical injury was 6+ lakh. Approximately, over the past decades since the incident, the death count has reached 20000. As per the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) estimation, 62.58% of the Bhopal population had suffered from inhalational toxicity, withal having survivors might have experienced and developed bodily morbidities.

Concerning the treatment and Medicare, due to lack of information about the gas ebullition, the doctors did not play an efficient role. One of the causes for such a ramification is that the UCC’s refusal to disclose the precise proportion of the escaped gas by relying on the trade secrecy as a reasonable exemption.

Following the mishap, the victims have gone on an endless travel quest for justice, who have either lost their lives or sustained permanent disability. The two-fold question presented before the law for consideration is that, on what basis, the parameters for quantifying the liabilities of the corporation engaged in processing such a dangerous substance with nullified safety standards will be fixed? And the further aspect was how the government is going to tackle and prevent future damages by the installation of necessary safety protocols.

Legal Consequences of Bhopal Gas Tragedy:

The Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act, 1985:

Soon after the man-disaster, noticing the multitude of the suits arising out of the incident, the Indian parliament has passed the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act on 29th March 1985. This Act confers the government to file suit for damages in place as a representative of the victims (either survived or deceased). For the purpose of effective enforcement of the Act, Section 9 authorizes the central government to frame a scheme; amounts to the introduction of the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Registration and Processing of Claims) Scheme in 1985. The aforementioned government’s power to represent the affected party, both within and outside of India [1] , was predicated by the doctrine of  parens patriae.  However, the government has heavily criticized as, by enacting the Bhopal Act, it is attempting to smother the claimant from taking actions against the UCIL, since the government qua stakeholder at UCIL, is eligible to hold partially liable. Per contra, the government has managed to substantiate such enactment as, its  quo animo  is to secure the claims arising out of, or connected with, the Bhopal gas leak disaster, are dealt with speedily, effectively, equitably, and to the best advantage of the claimants and for matters incidental thereto . [2]

Does the Bhopal Act ultra vires the constitution:

Indeed, few allegations were brought before the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of the Bhopal Act in relation to Article 14 , 19 and 21. It was confronted that Sections 3, 4 and 11 of the Bhopal Act violated the right of Indian citizens under the Constitution of India to choose their own counsel, and alleging a conflict of interest by the Indian government, for it could not represent the victims because of its shared responsibility for the disaster by failing to enforce safety regulations. [3]  However, the Apex court rejected the appeal and upheld its constitutionality [4] .

Initial litigation:

Following the Act’s promulgation, in April 1985, the Indian government filed a suit against the UCC (the parent company of UCIL) in the Federal District Court of the southern district of New York, claiming 3.3 billion US dollars i.e. Rs. 3900 Crores. The skepticisms are that, why the Indian government does propose the American judiciary on behalf of the claimants, despite preferring the Indian judiciary system? Whether India has mistrusted its own judicature, or perhaps, it is strategically a ligation, which desires a significant sum of damages that the American judiciary could award? Nevertheless, the UCC fruitfully availed of the aforementioned issues under discussion and requested for the case dismissal on the grounds of  forum non-conveniens. Withal, they pleaded that, since the accident was taken place in India (Bhopal), it might be more convenient to be tried in India. 

Thus the litigation seeking both damages and punitive damages, invoking UCC’s liabilities such as absolute liability, strict liability, multinational enterprises liability theories, misrepresentation, negligence, and breach of warranty, was dismissed by the federal District Court after accepting the plea of UCC on May 12, 1986.

Rejection of settlement offers:

Since the parent company is responsible for the tortuous acts of the subsidiary company abroad, several efforts were taken by the UCC for outside court settlement but it went vain attempt after rejection by the Indian government. The negotiated settlement initiated by Union Carbide stood ready to provide 350 million dollars, which was accepted by the private lawyers representing the injured (both victims and the deceased) but dismissed by the Indian government.

Justice combats in Indian courts:

After getting rejected by the American Court, the suit pursued battle in India. In 1986 the Indian union brought this issue before the Bhopal District Court to recover 3.5 billion rupees damages. Subsequently, the same was reduced by 30% to 2.5 billion rupees by the high court of Madhya Pradesh. Later on, the Indian government appealed against the reduced interim award, rendered by the Madhya Pradesh high court before the apex court.

The five-judge bench heard the case, concerning the condition and status of victims, who were filled with hopelessness and experiencing the agony of despair. After four years of the chronicle’s worst industrial catastrophe, to end the wild goose chase and provide the immediate remedy, the Apex court rendered its judgment on 14th February 1989.

The matter of fact is that the people have lacked credibility since their collective thought was that the wrongdoer might get them self out of liabilities by invoking the exceptions of the doctrine of strict liability. Per contra, relying on the absolute liability Doctrine, the Apex Court [5]  upheld the liabilities of UCC and ordered them to pay the sum of 470 million USD (approximately Rs. 700 crores) as compensation.

Although the Indian government has brought the golden justice by fixing the liability of the company to pay $470 million, it is deemed to be a bad move qua the fixed damages is hardly 15% of the original claim for $3.3 million. Lucidly, it is not a sufficient sum to compensate for all the damage caused in relation to the tragedy.

Concerning the distribution of the awarded compensation, Rs. 1 lakh was provided to the deceased person’s family, Rs. 50000 for persons suffering lasting damage and Rs. 25,000 for the temporarily injured.

Criticisms on the settlement:

As mentioned, firstly, it was assailed for the total sum of the compensation amount, as being the full and final settlement of all claims, rights, and liabilities arising out of that disaster, [6] the fixed amount leads to inadequacy of sum to compensate. Secondly, in terms of the final payment, vide its judgment ‘ this settlement shall finally dispose of all past, present and future claims, causes of action and civil and criminal proceedings (of any nature whatsoever wherever pending) by all Indian citizens’. Comprehensibly, it quashed the criminal proceedings and concluded all the civil proceedings, further limited the liabilities for the claims which were filed later.

Considering the aforesaid criticisms,  in 1989, the Apex Court clubbed several petitions and revived the criminal proceedings, and held that if there is any shortage in the amount of compensation the state is bound to bridge the gap [7] .

In 1990, the Indian government sanctioned Rs. 258 crores funds to aid the victims for economic, social, environmental, and medical rehabilitation. Later in 2010, former UCIL chairman and other 6 Ex-employees were convicted for the term of 2 years with a 2000 USD fine for the offense of causing death by negligence.

Employed principle:

Absolute liability:.

The trite English principle of strict liability was laid by the case of Ryland v. Fletcher [8]  in 1868. The said principle states that the person will be held responsible for the leakage of any hazardous substance from his premises. Withal, it is noteworthy that, even though there is no negligence on his part, he will be held accountable for the act of keeping the dangerous things in his premises.  Vide  this case’s judgment; it elucidates the ingredients that are essential to invoke strict liability viz. there should be the possession of dangerous substances, it must be escaped from defendant’s premises, and it has been kept for non-natural use of the land. In addition, there are certain exceptions to this rule, which are as follows,

  • The fault of the plaintiff
  • Act of the third party
  • Consent of the party

Till the date of the  MC Mehta v Union of India case, [9] the rule of strict liability has governed the Indian judicature in relation to the matter of fact in issue. But then, the rule of absolute liability was introduced in the said oleum gas leak case, wherein the oleum gas was escaped from the fertilizer plant of Shriram foods and fertilizers enterprises. Since the enterprises had engaged in an ultra-hazardous activity, it is their absolute and non-delegable duty to safeguard others from getting injured out of their industrial process. In the case of any failure in discharging the obliged duties, the enterprises will be held liable to pay damages under tort law regardless of the cited strict liability exceptions. Indeed, the same was held in this oleum gas leak gas. Thus, in simple words, the concept of absolute liability is the strict liability without any exceptions, which means under no grounds a person could escape the liabilities.

Conclusion and Analysis:

After analyzing the given circumstance, it is pretty evident that the legislative lacunae lasted at the time of tragedy. Though the factories Act, 1948 was propounded even before the Bhopal catastrophe, it prioritizes the welfare of the workers employed in industries and factories and there is no first place law to deal with the concerned situation. This incident led to breakthroughs in the Indian legislature, the catena of legislations related to the environmental safeguard and determination of penalties were enacted. The status quo is that any similar incident that occurs now will be tried before the National Green tribunal and fall under the ambit of the Environmental protection Act, 1986. Even though, under the provisions of the Public liability Act, 1991, the injured could claim damages for the caused injury because of the leaked hazardous chemicals. In addition, the said Act of 1991 out on the basis of the concept of ‘no-fault liability.

Concerning the disposal of hazardous wastes from industry, we have Hazardous Wastes (Management, Handling, and Transboundary Movement) Rules, 2008, to govern the storage and disposal of such toxic substances with the aid of the pollution control board. Further, In the case of Foundation for Science, Technology and Natural Resource policy v. Union of India, [10] the Apex court upholds the constitutionality of the Hazardous wastes (Management & Handling) Rules, 1989, and the applicability of directions provided in the BASEL Convention. Prior to this, Chemical Accidents (Emergency Planning, Preparedness, and Response) Rules, 1996 was legislated to address gas leaks and to monitor the industries handling those deadly chemicals .

Thus, the aftermath of the Bhopal gas leak tragedy has substantially informed us about the importance of environmental protection and the concept of sustainable development . The wider array of Article 21 of the Indian constitution in relation to the r ight to a clean and healthy environment [11] has also been obtained only after the catena of judicial decisions interpreted the same. Besides, the Indian constitution prescribes the state as well as citizens to protect the environment under its Article, 39(b), 47, 48, 49, 48 A, and 51 A (g).

Even we have sufficient legislations to address the gas leaks issue; it is an absolute challenge to measure the injuries sustained by a person. However, the injured will receive damages in the light of law (Ubi jus ibi remidium). But then, how far it recompenses their loss? What about the people who lost their lives or happened to suffer the morbidities. Their psychological and physiological distresses are immeasurable. Hence, prevention is always better than cure by the mean, the government, industries, and citizens are obliged to take reasonable care because, ultimately, this is our environment.

References:

  • https://blog.ipleaders.in/bhopal-gas-tragedy-case-study/#_ednref28
  • https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/tag/bhopal-gas-tragedy/
  • https://indianjudiciarynotes.com/case-study/case-study-mc-mehta-vs-union-of-india/
  • https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1464&context=ncilj

[1] Section 3(1) of the Bhopal Act, 1985.

[2] THE BHOPAL GAS LEAK DISASTER (PROCESSING OF CLAIMS) ACT, 1985, https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/1855/1/A1985-21.pdf.

[3] Lewin,  Carbide Is Sued in U.S. by India in Gas Disaster,  N.Y. Times, April 9, 1985, at D2, col.4

[4] State of Madras v. V. G. Row,   AIR 1952 SC 607.

[5] Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India, 1990 AIR 273.

[6] Supra note 5.

[7] Zia Modi, 10 Judgments that changed India, 44, {2013}

[8] Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330

[9] 1987 AIR 1086.

[10] AIR 2012 SC 2627.

[11] Subhash Kumar v. the State of Bihar, 1991 AIR 420, 1991 SCR (1) 5.

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a case study on bhopal gas tragedy

Snegapriya V S

A third-year student of law at Vellore Institute of Technology (VIT School of Law), budding first-generation lawyer cum legal researcher with multiple publications in various web journals and portals on different subject matters of law in issue. Being a zealous-natured person with thoughts enrooted in epistemophilia has boosted my passion for research writings by interpreting diversified legal facets. As a perceptive observer and reader, I pay greater attention to the overlooked legal fields where divergent challenges might arise, that include cyber law, environmental law, consumer law, and several constitutional provisions. Besides, I prioritize construing legal problems with social psychology. My dream and vision are to catch myself as a skilled legal adroit.

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Lesson from bhopal gas tragedy (1983-84).

Dr. Rhyddhi Chakraborty Programme Leader (Health and Social Care), London Churchill College, UK Email: [email protected]

Introduction and Background

Bhopal, the capital city of the Indian state of Madhya Pradesh, is the administrative headquarter of Bhopal district and Bhopal division. Around 500m above sea level, geographically Bhopal lies at the centre of India and is surrounded by hills, forests, and fields. The Bhopal Municipality covers about 285 sq km with two large dams formed in the structure of the lakes. In 1984, in the north of the dams housed the Old Town mainly with poor people and, on the South, was the villa quarters and modern building complexes. In 1970, in the North adjacent to the slums and railway station, a pesticide plant has been set up by the Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL). From late 1977, the plant started manufacturing Sevin (Carbaryl) by importing primary raw materials, viz. alpha-naphtol and methyl isocyanate (MIC) in stainless steel drums from the Union Carbide's MIC plant in USA. However, from early 1980, the Bhopal plant itself started manufacturing MIC using the know-how and basic designs supplied by Union Carbide Corporation, USA (UCC). The plant at Bhopal also produced carbon monoxide (CO) and phosgene (COCI2) as intermediate required for the production of MIC.The manufacturing process for Sevin involves the reaction of a slight excess of alpha-naphtol with MIC in the presence of a catalyst in carbon tetrachloride solvent. The chemical process employed in the Bhopal plant had methylamine reacting with phosgene to form MIC, which was then reacted with 1-naphthol to form the final product, carbaryl. The Bhopal UCIL facility housed three underground 68,000 litres liquid MIC storage tanks: E610, E611, and E619 and was claimed to ensure all the safety from leakage.

Occupational Hazards of UCIL

Soon after the plant was set up, the plant has been in news. 1976: Local trade unions complained of pollution within the plant. 1980: A worker was reported to have accidentally splashed with phosgene while carrying out a regular maintenance job of the plant's pipes. 1982 (January): A phosgene leak exposed 24 workers, all of whom were admitted to a hospital. Investigation revealed that none of the workers had been ordered to wear protective masks. 1982 (February): An MIC leak affected 18 workers. 1982 (August): A chemical engineer came into contact with liquid MIC, resulting in burns over 30 percent of his body. 1982 (October): In attempting to stop the leak, the MIC supervisor suffered severe chemical burns and two other workers were severely exposed to the gases. 1983-1984: There were leaks of MIC, chlorine, monomethylamine, phosgene, and carbon tetrachloride, sometimes in combination.

Oversighted Causes

In early December 1984, most of the Bhopal plant's MIC related safety systems were not functioning and many valves and lines were in poor condition. In addition, several vent gas scrubbers had been out of service as well as the steam boiler, intended to clean the pipes. For the major maintenance work, the MIC production and Sevin were stalled in Bhopal plant since Oct. 22,1984 and the major regular maintenance was ordered to be done during the weekdays’ day shifts. The Sevin plant, after having been shut down for some time, had been started up again during November but was still running at far below normal capacity. To make the pesticide, carbon tetrachloride is mixed with methyl isocyanate and alpha-naphthol, a coffee-coloured powder that smells like mothballs. The methyl isocyanate, or MIC, was stored in the three partly buried tanks, each with a 15,000-gallon capacity.

During the late evening hours of 2 December 1984, whilst trying to unclog, water was believed to have entered a side pipe and into Tank E610 containing 42 tons of MIC that had been there since late October. Introduction of water into the tank began a runaway exothermic reaction, which was accelerated by contaminants, high ambient temperatures and other factors, such as the presence of iron from corroding non-stainless steel pipelines.

The Fateful December Night, 1984

December 2, 2:45 pm: It was a typical Sunday afternoon and the open-air market in the city was bustling with vendors, sellers. Across the street from the factory, children were playing outside their slum huts. In the factory, about 100 workers reported for duty on the eight-hour shift. The workers expected the day to be slow to go. The problem arose when the workers had not been able to use the methyl isocyanate in the tank, No. 610, to make the pesticide, for, more than a week they could not get the chemical out of the tank. Every time they tried to push it out and into the Sevin plant by pumping in nitrogen, the nitrogen leaked out somewhere, the location which was untraced of. The workers informed the supervisor who started his duty in the second shift.

December 2, 9:15 pm: The supervisor telephoned one of the MIC operators, asked him to come to the MIC area of the plant and clean a pipe. The pipe, about 25 feet long and 8 feet off the ground, led from a device that filtered crude methyl isocyanate before it went into the storage tanks. Inside the pipe there was a valve claimed to have been closed.

December 2, 9:30 pm: The MIC operator noticed that the closed valve had not been sealed with a slip blind, a metal disc that is inserted into pipes to make sure that water does not leak through the valve. The MIC operator and the supervisor left the area, while the pipe was being cleaned. Unattended, water flowed into the pipe, out pipe drains and onto the floor, where it entered a floor drain. The water continued to flow for about three hours. According to the MIC operator, it was the only pipe in the MIC unit being washed during the second shift of the day.

December 2, 10:30 pm: The workers on duty prepared for the change in shifts in about 15 minutes. Before leaving, they logged the pressure indicated on the gauge in the control room for MIC tank No. 610 which was normal at the time. Operators, however, did not record the temperature of the tank, for, there was no column to record it in the log books.

December 2,11 pm: Two staff noticed that the pressure gauge for Tank 610 read 10 pounds per square inch - five times what it had been half an hour earlier. However, considering one of the readings as faulty, they undermined any probability of the accident in the plant.

December 2,11:30 pm: Workers in the MIC area realized that there was a MIC leak somewhere as their eyes began to tear. The workers began to look for the source of the leak. One of the workers spotted a small but a continuous drip of liquid about 50 feet off the ground and observed some yellowish-white gas accompanying the drip. He went by himself to inform the MIC operator, while the other workers kept looking at it.

December 2, 11:45 pm: MIC operator, on being informed, affirmed that he would deal with the leak after the next tea break, scheduled at 12:15 am. and the workers continued to inspect the area.

December 3, 12:15 am: All the workers had tea together in the control room about 100 feet away from the storage tanks. The workers kept on discussing about the leak, among other things, over tea.

December 3, 12:40 am: A worker, while investigating the leak, stood on a concrete slab above three large, partly buried storage tanks holding the chemical MIC. The slab suddenly began to vibrate beneath him and he witnessed at least 6 inches thick crack on the slab and heard a loud hissing sound. As he prepared to escape from the leaking gas, he saw gas shoot out of a tall stack connected to the tank, forming a white cloud that drifted over the plant and toward nearby neighbourhoods where thousands of residents were sleeping. In short span of time, the leak went out of control.

December 3, 12:45 am: The workers were aware of the enormity of the accident. They began to panic both because of the choking fumes, they said, and because of their realization that things were out of control; the concrete over the tanks crack as MIC turned from liquid to gas and shot out the stack, forming a white cloud. Part of it hung over the factory, the rest began to drift toward the sleeping neighbourhoods nearby.

The supervisor ordered all water sources in the area to be shut off and ordered water sprayed on the leak to break down the MIC. The effect of the MIC became more pronounced by the minute - workers eyes began to hurt and tear more excessively; some began to cough, they said. Someone sounded an alarm by breaking its glass. The operator made an announcement on the factory loudspeaker that there was a large MIC leak and that people should leave. Workers ran around in panic, shouting ''massive MIC leak. Within a minute or so, the fire brigade arrived on trucks and turned on several hydrants to put a water curtain around the escaping gas but the curtain reached only about 100 feet high while the gas was escaping from the top of a stack 120 feet high and was shooting another 10 feet into the air.

December 3, 12:50 am: The public siren briefly sounded and was quickly turned off, as per company procedure meant to avoid alarming the public around the factory over tiny leaks. Workers, meanwhile, evacuated the UCIL plant. The control room operator then turned on the vent gas scrubber, a device designed to neutralize escaping toxic gas. The scrubber had been under maintenance; the flow meter indicated there was no caustic soda flowing into the device. He was not clear to him whether there was actually no caustic soda in the system or whether the meter was broken. Broken gauges were not unusual at the factory. In fact, the gas was not being neutralized but was shooting out the vent scrubber stack and settling over the plant. Inside the factory, the white cloud of methyl isocyanate engulfed the production plant and started wafting toward the control room. Nearly all members of the plant staff began to leave. Those fleeing looked at the wind direction indicator, a large sock on a pole, and ran into the win. Four buses were parked by the road on which workers ran to escape. There was a provision for drivers to man the vehicles and drive them to the nearby neighbourhood, loading some residents aboard and having the rest follow, workers said. But the buses stood idle, for everybody was busy running away.

December 3, 1 am: The supervisor called the assistant factory manager. He said to turn on the flare tower, which is designed to burn off escaping gas. The supervisor gave the instruction to workers and the control room operator reminded the supervisor that turning on the flare with all that gas in the air would cause a huge explosion. The workers considered other alternatives, such as dumping the escaping gas into a spare storage tank. One of the three tanks, No. 619, was supposed to be empty, but it was not; it also contained MIC, as did No. 611. The workers started grabbing their oxygen masks and tanks.

Bhopal's superintendent of police was informed by telephone, by a town inspector, that residents of the neighbourhood of Chola (about 2 km from the plant) were fleeing a gas leak. About 25,000 people were crammed into Hamidia Hospital. The floor was splattered with blood and vomit.

The railway station lay close to the factory and smack in the path of the gas cloud. The deputy chief power controller, risked his life by staying on, while his wife and 14-year-old son died in the neighbouring railway colony. The control room which monitors movements of all trains on this vital trunk route, was, however, in a mess: vomit and human excreta scattered all around, files and registers in disorder, chairs knocked down. After midnight, the 116 Up Gorakhpur-Bombay Express rolled in but its passengers miraculously escaped death, presumably because they kept their windows closed because of the cold night, but also because station superintendent risked his life to wave the train on to safety. The super, who was found dead later, also alerted all the nearby stations to stop trains from coming into Bhopal.

December 3, 1: 15- 1:30 am: At Bhopal’s 1,200-bed Hamidia Hospital, the first patient with eye trouble reported. Within five minutes, there were a thousand patients. Calls to the UCIL plant by police were twice assured that "everything is OK", and on the last attempt made, "we don't know what has happened, sir". In the plant, meanwhile, MIC began to engulf the control room and the adjoining offices.

December 3, 2 am: The pressure and temperature gauges were still off the top of their scales. Public siren was again switched on. Minutes later, after the public siren sounded, a UCIL employee walked to a police control room to both inform them of the leak (their first acknowledgement that one had occurred at all), and that "the leak had been plugged."

December 3, 2:30 am: The gas that had begun shooting out of the stack nearly two hours earlier had stopped coming out. Meanwhile, 4,000 people suffering from not just eye ailments but also from respiratory problems were in the Hamida hospital. The hospital staff’s first response was of shock and bewilderment. Nobody knew what to do and Union Carbide was not volunteering any useful information. Several staff members at Hamidia, about three km from the factory, were soon overwhelmed by the gas themselves. They had to be replaced by a fresh medical team. When journalists visited the hospital, they saw only one doctor, and he had no medicine to treat patients with.

December 3, 2.45 am: The army had sent a fleet of vehicles and started a systematic search of houses for people trapped within. The effort was made for continuous evacuation channel to the Military Hospital as well as the Hamidia Hospital all through the night.

December 3, 3:00 am: The factory manager, arrived at the plant and sent a man to tell the police about the accident because the phones were out of order. The police were not told earlier because the company management had an informal policy of not involving the local authorities in gas leaks. Meanwhile, people were dying by the hundreds outside the factory. Some died in their sleep. Others ran into the cloud, breathing in more and more gas and dropping dead in their tracks.

December 3, 7:30 am: The major station of Bhopal remained to be cut off from the rest of the world. Hundreds of sick and writhing people were found all around, on platforms, on staircases, in the office rooms and even on the railway tracks. On the roads and footpaths around the station were the bodies of poor beggars and urchins. Those who could not flee made their way to the hospitals.

December 3, 9 am: At the Hindu cremation grounds, about 15 pyres were lit at a time. The crematoriums soon ran out of firewood and trucks had to be marshalled to bring in more. To save time, money, energy and manpower, five to ten persons were cremated on each pyre. As per Hindu rites, the children and infants were buried. At the Muslim burial ground, too, there was not enough space to bury the bodies coming in. Rescue workers dug graves each holding 11 bodies. When there was no more space left, old tombs were opened and 100-year old bones displaced to make room. The head priest of the Muslim clergy in Bhopal had to issue a fatwa to allow the digging up of old graves.

Immediate Consequences

• With the lack of timely information exchange between UCIL and Bhopal authorities, the city's Hamidia Hospital was first told that the gas leak was suspected to be ammonia, then phosgene. They were then told that it was "MIC", which hospital staff had never heard of, had no antidote for, and received no immediate information about. Apart from MIC, based on laboratory simulation conditions, the gas cloud most likely also contained chloroform, dichloromethane, hydrogen chloride, methyl amine, dimethylamine, trimethylamine and carbon dioxide, that was either present in the tank or was produced in the storage tank when MIC, chloroform and water reacted. The gas cloud, composed mainly of materials denser than air, stayed close to the ground and spread in the southeasterly direction affecting the nearby communities. The chemical reactions may have produced a liquid or solid aerosol.

• Most city residents who were exposed to the MIC gas were first made aware of the leak by exposure to the gas itself. The initial effects of exposure were coughing, severe eye irritation and a feeling of suffocation, burning in the respiratory tract, blepharospasm, breathlessness, stomach pains and vomiting. People awakened by these symptoms fled away from the plant. Those who ran inhaled more than those who had a vehicle to ride. Owing to their height, children and other people of shorter stature inhaled higher concentrations.

• Thousands of people had died by the following morning. Primary causes of deaths were choking, reflexogenic circulatory collapse and pulmonary oedema. Findings during autopsies revealed changes not only in the lungs but also cerebral oedema, tubular necrosis of the kidneys, fatty degeneration of the liver and necrotising enteritis.

• By the time the sun rose, hundreds, some even say thousands, lay dead, many on the roads and many at home under their tattered quilts: corpses with distended bellies were beginning to rot, attracting vultures and dogs.

• Within a few days, trees in the vicinity became barren and bloated animal carcasses had to be disposed of. 170,000 people were treated at hospitals and temporary dispensaries; 2,000 buffalo, goats, and other animals were collected and buried. Supplies, including food, became scarce owing to suppliers' safety fears. Fishing was prohibited causing further supply shortages.

Subsequent legal action

• Formal statements were issued that air, water, vegetation and foodstuffs were safe, but warned not to consume fish. The number of children exposed to the gases was at least 200,000. Within weeks, the State Government established a number of hospitals, clinics and mobile units in the gas-affected area to treat the victims.

• Legal proceedings involving UCC, the United States and Indian governments, local Bhopal authorities, and the disaster victims started immediately after the catastrophe. The Indian Government passed the Bhopal Gas Leak Act in March 1985, allowing the Government of India to act as the legal representative for victims of the disaster, leading to the beginning of legal proceedings.

• Initial lawsuits were generated in the United States federal court system in April 1985. Eventually, in an out-of-court settlement reached in February 1989, Union Carbide agreed to pay US$470 million for damages caused in the Bhopal disaster. The amount was immediately paid.

• Throughout 1990, the Indian Supreme Court heard appeals against the settlement. In October 1991, the Supreme Court upheld the original $470 million, dismissing any other outstanding petitions that challenged the original decision. The Court ordered the Indian government "to purchase, out of settlement fund, a group medical insurance policy to cover 100,000 persons who may later develop symptoms" and cover any shortfall in the settlement fund. It also requested UCC and its subsidiary UCIL "voluntarily" fund a hospital in Bhopal, at an estimated $17 million, to specifically treat victims of the Bhopal disaster. The company agreed to this.[32]

Post-settlement activity

UCC chairman and CEO Warren Anderson was arrested and released on bail by the Madhya Pradesh Police in Bhopal on 7 December 1984. Anderson was taken to UCC's house after which he was released six hours later on $2,100 bail and flown out on a government plane. Anderson, eight other executives and two company affiliates with homicide charges to appear in Indian court. In response, Union Carbide said the company is not under Indian jurisdiction. In 1991, the local Bhopal authorities charged Anderson, who had retired in 1986, with manslaughter, a crime that carries a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison. He was declared a fugitive from justice by the Chief Judicial Magistrate of Bhopal on 1 February 1992 for failing to appear at the court hearings in a culpable homicide case in which he was named the chief defendant. Orders were passed to the Government of India to press for an extradition from the United States. From 2014, Dow is a named respondent in a number of ongoing cases arising from Union Carbide’s business in Bhopal.

In 2004, the Indian Supreme Court ordered the Indian government to release any remaining settlement funds to victims. And in September 2006, the Welfare Commission for Bhopal Gas Victims announced that all original compensation claims and revised petitions had been "cleared".

In June 2010, seven former employees of UCIL, all Indian nationals and many in their 70s, were convicted of causing death by negligence. They were each sentenced to two years imprisonment and fined Rs.100,000 (US$2,124). All were released on bail shortly after the verdict.

US Federal class action litigation, Sahu v. Union Carbide and Warren Anderson, had been filed in 1999 under the U.S. Alien Torts Claims Act (ATCA), which provides for civil remedies for "crimes against humanity."[34] It sought damages for personal injury, medical monitoring and injunctive relief in the form of clean-up of the drinking water supplies for residential areas near the Bhopal plant. The lawsuit was dismissed in 2012 and subsequent appeal denied.[35] Anderson died in 2014.

Long-term health effects

• A total of 36 wards were marked by the authorities as being "gas affected," affecting a population of 520,000. Of these, 200,000 were below 15 years of age, and 3,000 were pregnant women. The official immediate death toll was 2,259, and in 1991, 3,928 deaths had been officially certified. The government of Madhya Pradesh confirmed a total of 3,787 deaths related to the gas release.

• Later, the affected area was expanded to include 700,000 citizens. A government affidavit in 2006 stated the leak caused 558,125 injuries including 38,478 temporary partial injuries and approximately 3,900 severely and permanently disabling injuries.

Studied and reported long term health effects are:

  • Eyes: Chronic conjunctivitis, scars on cornea, corneal opacities, early cataracts
  • Respiratory tracts: Obstructive and/or restrictive disease, pulmonary fibrosis, aggravation of TB and chronic bronchitis, irritation to the lungs, causing coughing and/or shortness of breathing. Higher exposure caused build up of fluids (pulmonary enema), caused asthma.
  • Neurological system: Impairment of memory, finer motor skills, numbness etc.
  • Psychological problems: Post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)
  • Children’s health: Peri- and neonatal death rates increased. Failure to grow, intellectual impairment, etc.
  • Cancer Hazard: Caused mutation( genetic changes).
  • Milk Contamination: Traces of toxins were found in the breast milk of mothers and were in turn transmitted to the recipient babies.

Affect on Soil and Water: Lead, Nickel, Copper, Chromium, hexachlorocyclophexane and chlorobenzenes were found in soil samples. Mercury was found to be between 20,000 to 6,000,000 times the standard level in soil.

Health care

  • The Government of India had focused primarily on increasing the hospital-based services for gas victims thus hospitals had been built after the disaster.
  • When UCC wanted to sell its shares in UCIL, it was directed by the Supreme Court to finance a 500-bed hospital for the medical care of the survivors. Thus, Bhopal Memorial Hospital and Research Centre (BMHRC) was inaugurated in 1998 and was obliged to give free care for survivors for eight years. BMHRC was a 350-bedded super speciality hospital where heart surgery and hemodialysis were done.
  • Sambhavna Trust is a charitable trust, registered in 1995, that gives modern as well as ayurvedic treatments to gas victims, free of charge.

Environmental rehabilitation

  • In 1982 tubewells in the vicinity of the UCIL factory had to be abandoned and tests in 1989 performed by UCC's laboratory revealed that soil and water samples collected from near the factory and inside the plant were toxic to fish.
  • Several other studies had also shown polluted soil and groundwater in the area. Reported polluting compounds include 1-naphthol, naphthalene, Sevin, tarry residue, mercury, toxic organochlorines, volatile organochlorine compounds, chromium, copper, nickel, lead, hexachloroethane, hexachlorobutadiene, and the pesticide HCH.

Occupational and habitation rehabilitation

  • It was estimated that 50,000 persons need alternative jobs, and that less than 100 gas victims had found regular employment under the government's scheme.
  • The government also planned 2,486 flats in two- and four-story buildings in what is called the "widow's colony" outside Bhopal. The water did not reach the upper floors and it was not possible to keep cattle which were their primary occupation.

Economic rehabilitation

  • Relief measures commenced in 1985 when food was distributed for a short period along with ration cards.
  • By the end of October 2003, according to the Bhopal Gas Tragedy Relief and Rehabilitation Department, compensation had been awarded to 554,895 people for injuries received and 15,310 survivors of those killed. The average amount to families of the dead was $2,200.
  • On 24 June 2010, the Union Cabinet of the Government of India approved a ₹12,650 million (US$190 million) aid package which would be funded by Indian taxpayers through the government.

Other impacts

In 1985, Henry Waxman, a California Democrat, called for a U.S. government inquiry into the Bhopal disaster, which resulted in U.S. legislation regarding the accidental release of toxic chemicals in the United States.

Ethical Negligence

The "corporate negligence" argument:  This point of view argues that management (and to some extent, local government) underinvested in safety, which allowed for a dangerous working environment to develop.

Safety audits:  In September 1984, an internal UCC report on the West Virginia plant in the USA revealed a number of defects and malfunctions. It warned that "a runaway reaction could occur in the MIC unit storage tanks, and that the planned response would not be timely or effective enough to prevent catastrophic failure of the tanks". This report was never forwarded to the Bhopal plant, although the main design was the same.

Causes of the disaster: the "disgruntled employee sabotage" case:  Now owned by Dow Chemical Company, Union Carbide maintains a website dedicated to the tragedy and claims that the incident was the result of sabotage, stating that sufficient safety systems were in place and operative to prevent the intrusion of water.

References 1. The Bhopal Disaster. Health, India’s Environment-1984-85; 206-232. Available at https://web.archive.org/web/20160528042900/http://www.cseindia.org/userfiles/THE%20BHOPAL%20DISASTER.pdf (28 May 2018). 2. Diamond, Staurt. 1985. SPECIAL TO THE NEW YORK TIMES THE DISASTER IN BHOPAL: WORKERS RECALL HORROR. Available at https://www.nytimes.com/1985/01/30/world/the-disaster-in-bhopal-workers-recall-horror.html (Accessed on 19 August 2018) 3. Dr. S. Varadarajan et al. 1985. REPORT ON SCIENTIFIC STUDIES ON THE FACTORS RELATED TO BHOPAL TOXIC GAS LEAKAGE Available at https://bhopalgasdisaster.files.wordpress.com/2014/12/csir-report-on-scientific-studies-december-1985.pdf (Accessed 28 May 2018).

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Bhopal Gas Tragedy after 38 years: Why the govt is demanding compensation now

In october, the government told the supreme court that it is “keen to pursue” a petition for additional compensation in the bhopal gas tragedy case, saying it “cannot abandon” the people. what is the case about, and what does the petition demand.

a case study on bhopal gas tragedy

On the night of December 2, 1984, one of the biggest industrial disasters to ever take place began unfolding in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh. Harmful Methyl isocyanate (MIC) gas started leaking from a nearby Union Carbide pesticide plant, eventually resulting in the Bhopal Gas tragedy, where an estimated 3,000 people died within the first few days. Over time, similarly horrifying numbers of those who suffered life-long health issues would become known.

For the first time in India, the case led to a focus on the need for protecting people and the environment from industrial accidents, with new laws introduced by the government afterwards. But those who suffered the effects firsthand have continued insisting that the company at the centre of it all – Union Carbide, now a part of Dow Jones – has not fulfilled its responsibility in terms of providing just compensation.

a case study on bhopal gas tragedy

Around 19 years after compensation was agreed upon, the Indian government filed a curative petition in 2010 to seek additional compensation from Dow, of more than ten times the amount it gave in 1989. Last month, the government told the Supreme Court that it is “keen to pursue” it, saying it “cannot abandon” the people.

How did the industrial disaster occur, and what is the recent demand for compensation? We explain.

The night of December 2, 1984

Union Carbide (India) Ltd. (UCIL) was a subsidiary of the Union Carbide Corporation (UCC), a US corporation. The UCIL pesticide manufacturing factory was located on the outskirts of Bhopal . On December 2, highly toxic MIC gas escaped the plant. People living in nearby areas reported a burning sensation in their eyes and difficulties in breathing, with many also losing consciousness.

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Its effects were such that apart from killing thousands of people in a short span of time, it led to disease and other long-term problems for many who inhaled the gas. The scale of environmental pollution also became clearer only later. For example, the sources of water around the factory were deemed unfit for consumption and many handpumps were sealed. To date, the reproductive health of many of Bhopal’s women has been affected, and children born to those exposed to the gas have faced congenital health problems.

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The aftermath

A 2019 report by the UN’s International Labour Organization (ILO) said at least 30 tonnes of the poisonous gas affected more than 600,000 workers and nearby inhabitants. It added the disaster was among the world’s “major industrial accidents after 1919”.

Multiple analyses have alleged that the leak was a result of general laxity in safety rules, and in the training of the workers, most of whom were unaware of the MIC’s dangers. Dr S Varadarajan, director general of the Government’s Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), said at the time that the MIC gas in its plant was being handled without adequate safety measures or plans for emergencies.

The incident also pointed to the lack of specific laws in India at the time for handling such matters. As a PRS Legislative Research article points out, this changed after Bhopal. Major laws passed since 1984 include the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, which authorised the central government to take relevant measures and regulate industrial activity for environmental and public safety.

The Public Liability Insurance Act of 1991, which provides public liability insurance for providing immediate relief to the persons affected by an accident occurring while handling any hazardous substance, was also passed.

The demand for compensation

After the disaster, the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act was passed in 1985, giving certain powers to the Indian government for settling claims. It said the Central Government would have the “exclusive right” to represent, and act in place of every person connected with the claims.

A case was lodged against Union Carbide. Warren Anderson, the Chairman of UC, was arrested when he visited India but was shortly released on bail, after which he left the country. Other high-level executives were also released on bail.

The case was also in a US court for some time but was later transferred to India. By December 1987, the CBI filed a charge sheet against Anderson. Two years later, a non-bailable warrant of arrest against Warren Anderson was issued, for repeatedly ignoring summons. Anderson never returned to India and died in 2014.

In February 1989, the Indian government and Union Carbide struck an out-of-court deal and compensation of $470 million was given by UC. The Supreme Court also upheld it in a judgement. Over the years, the government gradually released the money, but the delay led to frequent protests by those affected.

Many of those people continued petitioning on the matter. The CBI, in 2010, sought reconsideration of a 1996 Supreme Court judgement, which had whittled down the charge against the company to ‘causing death due to rash and negligent act’.

The new petition

With the billion-dollar corporation Dow Jones taking control of Union Carbide in 1999, it became the focus of proceedings. It has opposed the reopening of compensation claims. “Dow has long maintained that it has no connection to the incident and does not belong in any legal proceeding involving Bhopal,” it said.

It emphasised the SC’s earlier judgements, claiming since the government agreed to the earlier compensation there is no case now. It has said of the 2010 petition, “The Government’s ill-advised action puts at peril the image of India as a nation committed to promoting and adhering to accepted legal principles and the rule of law, with the inevitable result that confidence in investing in India will be undermined.”

Attorney General R Venkataramani told a five-judge bench in October 2022 that he had looked into examples elsewhere and has considerable literature on where the courts have gone beyond the already conducted settlement. But a delay of many years since the judgment was passed has reduced the chances of any change in the status quo. As University of Warwick Law professor Upendra Baxi wrote in The Indian Express , a “heroic effort” would be needed to enforce any ultimate result.

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Bhopal-Gas-tragedy

What is Bhopal Gas Tragedy? (Detailed Case study)

The Bhopal gas tragedy also known as the Bhopal gas disaster, was a gas leak incident on the wintry night of 2 December 1984 at the Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) pesticide plant in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, India. It is considered to be the world’s worst industrial disaster.

bhopal-gas-tragedy

Table of Contents

MIC Chemical Reactions :

Bhopal disaster

Bhopal gas tragedy case study :

On 2nd December night, the night shift staff of the Union Carbide Factory, Bhopal, took around 11 p.m. There were three double-walled, partly buried S.S. tanks (No. 610, 611and 619) each of 60-tonne capacity and all containing the poisonous gas MIC (Methyl isocyanate) to be used to produce a deadly pesticide Carbaryl.

At 11-30, pm. workers in the plant realized that there was a MIC leak somewhere: their eyes began to tear. A few of them went to the MIC structure and noticed a drop of liquid with yellowish-white gas, about 50 feet off the ground. They told the supervisor who, however, decided to deal with the leak after the tea break which ended at 12:40 night. Meanwhile, the events had moved very fast.

The temperature of tank 610 had reached 25°C at the top of its scale and the pressure was increased twenty times rushing towards 40 psi at which the emergency safety valve was to open. Soon the pressure gauge showed 55 psi, the top of the scale, and the safety valve had opened releasing MIC With a loud hissing sound and tremendous heat. A white cloud drifting over the plant was moving towards the sleeping neighborhood.

The workers tried to operate the safety devices, but nothing seemed to work. The water jet failed to reach the top of the 120-foot stack from which MIC was escaping. The vent gas scrubber to neutralize the escaping gas did not work. The scrubber was under maintenance, the flow meter was not indicating the circulation of caustic soda whose concentration was also not known since October.

The flare tower to burn off the gas could not be ‘used because its piping was corroded and not replaced. The refrigeration system, of 30-tonne capacity, to keep the MIC in a liquid state at 0°C was closed down in June 1984 as an economy drive and the gas was at 15°-20°C Which was unsafe. For approximately two hours, the safety valve remained open releasing over 50,000 pounds of MIC (which might also contain Phosgene, Chloroform, Hydrogen cyanide. Carbon dioxide, etc.) out of 90,000 pounds stored in tank No. 610 at the time of the incident. Sometime between 1-30 to 2-30 am. the safety valve was reseated as the tank pressure went below 40 psi.

As per official records, the Bhopal gas leak killed 3,787 people. The figures were updated by the Madhya Pradesh government later as the immediate official estimate had put the death toll due to a gas leak from the Union Carbide factory at 2,259.

However, activists fighting for justice for Bhopal gas tragedy victims put the figures of death between 8,000 and 10,000. In an affidavit, submitted in 2006, the government said that the Bhopal gas leak caused 5,58,125 injuries that included approximately 3,900 severe and permanently disabling injuries.

Bhopal gas tragedy  Causes of the Accident :

(a) unsafe conditions of the bhopal gas tragedy  .

From the published press reports they seem to be:

  • The refrigeration system to keep the gas cool was closed for since long.
  • The vent gas scrubber was under-designed, not repaired, and not connected.
  • The corroded flare tower pipe was not replaced and was not connected.
  • The water curtain jests were under-designed to reach the maximum height.
  • All three tanks were filled in while one ought to have been kept empty to use as an emergency bypass.
  • The computerized pressure/temperature sensing system, a warning device to give the alarm and control the situation at the time of abnormal conditions was not installed.
  • The carbon steel valves were used instead of stainless steel and the valves ‘were notorious for leaking.
  • The instruments to check the valve leakage were not available.
  • The wind direction and velocity indicator were not installed to warn the people about leakage direction and severity.
  • The neighboring community was not told of the significance of the danger alarm and the dangers posed by the materials used in the plant.
  • Control instruments at the plant were faulty.
  • Maintenance and operational practices deteriorated.
  • Chemical reactors, piping, and valves were not purged, washed, and aired before maintenance operations.
  • The blind disc to disallow the water in the tank through the valve was missing.
  • Underqualified workers were running the factory.
  • People with chemical engineering backgrounds were replaced by less skilled operators.
  • The workers’ strength was reduced from 850 to 642 during the preceding two years and the operator’s duty relieving system was suspended.
  • The operating manual was grossly inadequate, not specifying all necessary emergency procedures to control abnormal conditions.
  • At the time of the accident, in the MIC control room, there was only one operator who found it virtually impossible to check the 70-odd panels, indicators, and controllers.
  • A design modification of the jumper line to interconnect the relief valve vent header and the process vent header was defective, as it allowed the water to go into the MIC tank.

(B) Unsafe Actions of Bhopal gas tragedy   :

  • The leak was not attended as soon as it was reported. Initial time passed in the tea break.
  • The first information about the five-fold pressure rise was dismissed in the belief that the pressure gauge could be faulty.
  • A newly recruited supervisor had asked a novice operator to clean a pipe and the blind disc was not inserted while doing so.
  • The public siren was put on around 1 am. nearly an hour after the gas leakage and that too for a few minutes.
  • The correct antidotes and medical treatments were not suggested to surrounding doctors. On the contrary confusion of MIC or Phosgene or Hydrogen cyanide was confounded.

(C) Unsafe Reactions of Bhopal gas tragedy  :

The above unsafe conditions and actions lead to the violent unsafe reaction. Different hypotheses have been expounded by Carbide’s scientists, Indian experts, and Dr. S. Varadrajan, who lead the investigations on behalf of the Government. According to him a small quantity of water reacted with Phosgene in the tank, mixed with MIC as an impurity to make it unstable. The Phosgene water reaction (hydrolysis) produced heat, CO2, and HCI.

The heat and HCI acted as the accelerators of the polymerization, additions, and degradation of MIC leading to a runaway reaction. According to others, the increased temperature of MIC (it vaporizes above 38°C) generated heat, pressure, and side reactions, higher than normal amounts of Chloroform in the stored MIC and an iron catalyst lead to the violent reaction. Because of the colder night of December, the escaped MIC settled down and traveled downward covering the sleeping surroundings with the blanket of death and damages.

What is Methyl isocyanate –

Methyl Isocyanate (MIC) is a chemical that is used in the manufacture of polyurethane foam, pesticides, and plastics. It is handled in liquid form which can be easily burned and explosive. It evaporates quickly in the air and has a strong odor. Its molecular formula is CH3NCO or C2H3NO and its molecular weight is approx. 57.05 g/mol. It is used in the production of pesticides, polyurethane foam, and plastics.

Remedial Measures of the Bhopal Gas Disaster :

All the 25 major causes of this accident stated above in (A) and (B) suggest remedial measures. To avoid repetition, all these contributing causes should be removed first and necessary steps should be taken to run the plant always safe and sound, with all the safety devices properly working. The working conditions must be improved and unsafe actions must be removed by proper policy, training, and education.

The Bhopal incident opened my eyes and gave many lessons to multinationals, developed countries, and developing countries.

Human life must be equally valued everywhere. No double standard for developed and developing countries. ‘Right to Know’ and ‘Obligation to Tell’ concepts are to be covered by the legislation. Training to staff, and workers, emergency procedures, highest standards for plant operation and maintenance and safety equipment, ‘worst case’ study and assessment, etc. were incorporated in 1987.

After the Bhopal gas leak incident :

Bhopal had a population of about 8.5 lakh back in 1984 and more than half of its population was coughing, complaining of itching in the eyes, skin and facing breathing problems. The gas caused internal hemorrhage, pneumonia, and death. The villages and slums in the neighboring areas of the factory were the worst affected.

The alarm system of the Union Carbide did not work for hours. No alarm was raised by the factory managers. Suddenly thousands of people started running to hospitals on the morning of December 3 with their complaints.

Unlike today, Bhopal in 1984 did not have too many hospitals. Two government hospitals could not have accommodated half of the population of the city. People were suffering, finding it difficult to breathe and confused. So were doctors, who did not immediately know the reasons for the sudden illness that afflicted every new rushing patient.

Patients complained of dizziness, breathlessness, skin irritation, and rashes, some others reported sudden blindness. Doctors of Bhopal had never faced a situation like this. They had no experience in dealing with industrial disasters.

Symptoms of methyl isocyanate exposure were not immediately known to them. And, the two hospitals reportedly treated around 50,000 patients in the first two days of the Bhopal gas leak. Officially, the government declared that the gas leakage was contained for eight hours, but the city is still finding it difficult to come out of its grip even 33 years later. So Bhopal incident was the world’s worst  industrial mishap .

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a case study on bhopal gas tragedy

Bhopal Gas Tragedy Case Study

Bhopal Gas Tragedy 1984

  This article is written by Ayushma Sharma of Faculty of Law, Aligarh Muslim University where she has discussed the Bhopal Gas Tragedy Case.

Table of Contents

Introduction 

The night of 2-3 December 1984, was the most unfortunate night for the Bhopal, in fact not only for Bhopal but for the whole world. Thousands of people lost their lives that night and many are suffering the consequences of the tragedy even now. The incident was caused because of the leakage of Methyl Isocyanate (MiC) gas from the Union Carbide India Ltd (UCIL) plant.

Background 

The Union Carbide Corporation, an American enterprise established a pesticide plant in India because of its central location. The plant was supposed to produce Sevin, a pesticide. Union Carbide and the Indian Government had a deal, and under this idea, the Union Carbide had a 50.9% share and the Indian Investors had a 40.1% share. The plant was named as The Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL).

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UCIL started its production of pesticide in 1979. While this pesticide was produced, a toxic liquid was also produced i.e., Methyl Isocyanate (MIC). Since MIC is a very toxic chemical it required great maintenance. 

Around 1:00 a.m on 4th December 1984, when the MIC gas started swallowing up the whole of Bhopal people who were sleeping peacefully started feeling the change in the air. They ran for their lives but couldn’t escape their death. Some who were able to save their lives weren’t able to save themselves from the coming disabilities. All this happened because of leakage of the MIC gas from the tank E106.

Earlier, too, complaints were being made about the maintainability of the plant, of how MIC was leaking in small amounts. The previous incidents of leakage had also caused the death of some people and left others severely injured. But, the authorities paid no attention to it. The machines were worn out but no replacement was there.

 The Gas Disaster 

Around midnight on 3-4 December 1984, the MIC gas got leaked from the plant and got mixed with the fresh air in Bhopal. Suddenly, people started feeling uneasy, started vomiting, were having trouble while breathing, people started dying within a few minutes of inhaling the toxic gas. It was not only the human beings that suffered but animals, too, suffered and lost their lives.

People, in large numbers, were rushed to the hospital but at that time no doctor knew about the actual cause of death. No one knew about the leakage of the MIC. They just had a hunch about some leakage but exactly didn’t know about the leakage of MIC gas. Since doctors couldn’t operate properly without knowing the exact cause of the accident, so many people lost their lives.

It was reported that nearly 3000 people lost their lives and more than 6 lacs were severely injured. The survivors survived with permanent respiratory problems, and other complications. Children who weren’t even born at that time were born with some health issues. 

a case study on bhopal gas tragedy

 The International Medical Commission

After the tragedy took place there was no proper health aid provided to the victims. The company was involved in lawsuits and was on the verge of closing down its business. On the other hand, the Indian Government had to face the wrath of the families of the victims and the other people all over India on a lack of carrying out an investigation and providing medical aid to the sufferers. 

For the medical personnel to provide correct medical treatment to the victims they had to know the exact cause of the tragedy. So that based on the cause they could start their operation. A connection had to be established between the cause of the accident and the health attributes caused by the accident.

In 1992, Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal suggested the formation of an international commission to provide better medical treatment to the victims of the Bhopal tragedy. Later on, in 1993 Bhopal Group for Information and Action laid down a proposal for the same.

Finally, in the year 1993 International Medical Commission on Bhopal (IMCB) was organized to provide medical assistance to the survivors of the Bhopal tragedy of 1984. IMCB was a constitution of 15 professionals from 12 countries having expertise in the field of:

  • Environmental health
  • Respiratory medicine

IMCB had co-chairpersons and they were, Dr. Rosalie Bertell and Gianni Tognoni. The main aim of the International Medical Commission on Bhopal was to provide some relief to the victims and to suggest some ways to prevent such disasters in the future. 

The work was divided into 8 areas, and they are:

a case study on bhopal gas tragedy

  • Family Life
  • Epidemiology
  • Medical care 
  • Drug Therapies 
  • Accident Analysis
  • Review of published literature

A plan was laid out for investigation to know the actual cause of the exposure. This plan has three phases. 

First Phase – In this phase, the symptom report was analyzed and distance was used as a substitute for exposure. It stated that respiratory and neurologic problems were the aftermath health effects of the exposure.

Second Phase – Lung function and respiratory organs were assessed. According to the report, there were excessive respiratory issues and the functioning capability of the lungs was reduced with each passing minute. 

It was noticed that to know the exact level of risk factors involved it was necessary to analyze the exposure accurately. Also, to provide long-term care and medical aid it was mandatory for them to know exactly what they were dealing with.

Third Phase – This was the last phase of the process. In this phase, the victims were assessed individually based on exposure time, location and distance. Finally, the reports were compared to the findings from the distance surrogate to determine whether their association is better than that of distance alone. 

Immediate effects of the Bhopal Gas Tragedy

The leak and its effects.

Methyl Isocyanate (MIC) :

  • The colorless liquid used for the creation of pesticides.
  • Is highly toxic.
  • Since it is extremely reactive to water, it requires good maintenance.
  • A small amount of water is sufficient to increase pressure for converting the liquid into a toxic gas.

The UCIL had to store three tanks of MIC and its temperature was to be maintained below zero degrees celsius. Also, it was to be kept under pressure with the help of inert nitrogen. But, before the few days of the accident the tank, E106, in which the MIC was kept couldn’t hold the pressure any longer resulting in stopping of production for some time. 

The tank even after being worn out couldn’t stop the production for a much longer time. The production process resumed after some time. But, on the night of 2-3 December 1984, because of a lack of maintainability, the water broke out from the connecting pipe and started getting mixed with the MIC liquid. This resulted in a strong heating reaction because of which pressure at a splitting pace was created and the MIC gas got released. 

People who were leaving nearby started getting affected by the harmful gas. They started having a breathing problem, irritation in eyes, chemical burns on the skin, contraction of lungs. They were then taken to the hospital but without the main reason for the accident, the doctors couldn’t operate correctly. 

Cause of Leakage

Though the main reason for the tragedy was the mixing of water with the Methyl Isocyanate because of leaks in the connecting pipes yet it was not the only reason that contributed towards the happening of the tragedy. There are many other reasons which contributed to this unfortunate event. All these small reasons are because of the lack of proper maintenance.

Following are the reasons that, too, have contributed to the Bhopal tragedy:

  • An inspection team came from Danbury, the United States to the Bhopal plant and found 61 safety problems. Out of these 61 problems 31 were major.
  • Main refrigeration and cooling system were closed down before 150 days of the accident
  • To lower the cost number of workers working were reduced.
  • Also, the specialized training was not given to the unskilled workers so that they could at least have an idea about the consequences of their actions.
  • As already mentioned, before this major tragedy there had already been minor leakages which cost the life of one worker and others were injured.
  • No supervisor was there for his night shift.
  • The pressure control valve of the tank E610 had not been working properly for over a month.
  • Negligence on the part of the maintenance authorities.
  • There was no backup plan in case of emergencies.

Another important thing to notice is that if the fire or the rescue squad had an idea of how to prevent the gas from spreading, or if there was any antidote chemical that could have been used to bring down the effects of MIC gas then, maybe some lives could have been saved.

The root cause was the lack of management on the part of the authorities. Also, it’s been said that the company had not informed all the concerned authorities about the emission of MIC gas. Had some authorities known about the gas maybe they could have prepared some backup strategies in case of a crisis. 

Toxicology of MIC

Methyl Isocyanate is highly toxic. The American Conference of Government Industrial Hygienists stated that the level up to which a worker could be exposed to MIC without any harmful effects is 0.02ppm. As soon as the level is 0.4ppm it is toxic by inhalation, or by ingestion. At 5ppm, most people cannot detect it but because of symptoms, they get a warning. 

The symptoms of exposure includes:

  • Irritation in the eyes
  • Breathing problem
  • Irritation in the nose and throat
  • Burning of skin 

When exposure level is above 21ppm it can result in:

  • Bronchial Pneumonia – A condition that causes inflammation of the lungs
  • Lung edema – A condition caused by the accumulation of excessive fluid in the lungs, making it difficult to breathe
  • Emphysema – It means damage to the air sacs in the lungs resulting in shortness of breath

Therefore, storing methyl isocyanate requires proper care and caution, and especially when comes to water extra precautions must be taken. Methyl Isocyanate is very sensitive to water. It can be stored in glass or stainless steel, and temperature should be below 40-degree celsius or 104-degree Fahrenheit. 

Attributed diseases to the gas exposure

The attributed diseases to gas exposure are as follows:

  • Ophthalmic Problems – The MIC gas irritated the eyes of the people. MIC gas caused burning, watering, and photophobia, redness of the eye, swelling of the eyelid.
  • Respiratory and Pulmonary Problems – Inhalation of MIC gas resulted in shortness of breath, suffocation and chest pain. When examined it was found that some victims had suffered necrotizing lesions in their respiratory organs
  • Reproductivity Toxicity – Gas leak resulted in high-risk factors to the fetus and it not only the gas leak that increased risk but the factors like stress and ingestion of drugs by the mothers.
  • Genotoxicity – The MIC gas had affected the genetic information of the victims within their cells which had increased their possibility of having cancer. 
  • Neuromuscular Toxicity – It was found that the survivors of the accident had neuromuscular symptoms like numbness, pain, aches, and sensation of needles
  • The victims suffered many other health problems like carcinogenicity, immunotoxicity, psychological and neurobehavioral toxicity.

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After the accident, many cases were filed on behalf of the victims since there was a problem in claiming compensation, and many people, especially the ones having low financial status, couldn’t afford to fight the case for a long time. These cases were filed against UCC in Bhopal as well as in the USA. An effort was also made to settle the matter outside of the court but it wasn’t successful. 

Then, after some time passed, the Indian Parliament passed The Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act, 1985 . According to Section 3 of the Act, the government of India had the power to file cases on behalf of every citizen who was entitled to claim the compensation. The government by Section 9 of the Act introduced “The Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Registration And Processing of Claims) Scheme, 1985”. 

The Indian Government filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court of NewYork against UCC. But, the UCC pleaded that filing the lawsuit in an American Court was not convenient. They pleaded on the grounds of forum inconvenient (it means that the Court can refuse to take jurisdiction when the parties have more convenient forums to go to). UCC said that since the accident took place in Bhopal and all the evidence was there only so it was more convenient to try in Indian Courts. 

So, Keenon J. accepted the plea of UCC and a new case was filed in the District Court of Bhopal. The District Court ordered UCC to pay a sum of Rs 350 crore to the victims. Next, UCC filed an appeal in the Madhya Pradesh High Court against the judgment of Bhopal District Court. This resulted in a decrease in the “interim compensation” from Rs 350 crore to Rs 250 crore. Simultaneously UCC tried to settle the matter directly with the gas victims outside the court. But, M.W. Deo J. of Bhopal District Court put an interim order on UCC to not to make any settlement with any victim until further orders of the Court. 

Finally, after the propagation of the rule of Absolute liability, the Court held UCC liable for the Bhopal tragedy. Though people had their doubts that the Indian Judiciary won’t be able to handle the situation. They thought that the wrongdoers would escape from their liability under the rule of Strict liability but it didn’t happen. The Indian Judiciary brought fair justice to the victims. 

On 14th and 15th February 1989, the Supreme Court in Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India [1] ordered UCC to pay a sum of $470 million (Rs 750 crores) to the victims. 

Principle of Absolute Liability 

This liability is also known as “No-Fault Liability”.

Absolute liability is a liability where the accused is held liable but without any exception of getting excused from the liability. Normally, a person can be held liable only when he had mens rea (guilty mind) but in the case of absolute liability, a person can be held liable even if he had no intention of committing the offense. 

The principle of absolute liability is similar to strict liability. In the case of strict liability, a person keeps something dangerous with him, and he knows that even the slightest mistake would cause a release of that thing resulting in the death of human beings. So, even if he took proper care and caution but still the thing escaped resulting in the death of a man, he can be held liable under strict liability.

The principle of strict and absolute liability differ only at one point. While on one hand under strict liability, a person is having options to escape the lability so arisen but, on the other hand under absolute liability a person has no such options available. 

  • Rylands v. Fletcher

This doctrine of Strict liability was laid down in Rylands v. Fletche r [2] by Justice Blackburn.

  • The defendant paid the contractor to build a reservoir on his land.
  • The contractors while doing their work discovered old coal shafts in the ground.
  • They decided not to do anything and carried on with their work.
  • The defendant didn’t know anything about this.
  • Later on, when the reservoir was filled with water the shaft broke and the water started bursting out of the reservoir.
  • As a result, the neighbor’s mine was flooded.
  • The respondent (neighbor) then, filed a suit against the defendant and claimed damages.

The House of Lords propounded the Doctrine of Strict Liability in this case stating that even if the accused did not have any intention of causing any harm to others yet he would be held liable for the same. This was so because of his mistake harm was caused. 

Following are the words used by Blackburn J. while propounding the rule: [3]

“We think that the rule of law is, that the person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and if he does not do so, prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape. He can excuse himself by showing that the escape was owing to the plaintiff’s default; or perhaps that the escape was the consequence of vis major, or the act of God: but as nothing of this sort exists here, it is unnecessary to inquire what excuse would be sufficient.” 

Another important feature of Strict liability is that for the applicability of this rule the use of land should be non-natural. 

  • M.C. Mehta v. Union of India

The Doctrine of Absolute Liability was introduced in this case [4]  by P.N. Bhagwati J.

  • The defendant, Shri Ram Food and Fertilizer Industry belonging to Delhi Cloth Mills Ltd. produced dangerous chemicals.
  • M.C. Mehta had already filed cases against this industry demanding closure of units of this industry.
  • On December 4 the oleum gas leaked from one of the units of the industry.
  • Many people lost their lives in this accident including an advocate practicing in the Tis Hazari Court.
  • It is believed that the leakage was caused because of mechanical and human errors.
  • not even two days after the accident there was another minor leakage of oleum gas from the connecting pipes.
  • District Court ordered Shriram industry to stop their production of lethal gases and chemicals.
  • M.C. Mehta filed a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution. 

It was the second case of leakage of toxic gas after the leakage of MIC gas from the Union Carbide plant in Bhopal within one year. The Supreme Court knew that if they applied the Doctrine of Strict liability which was laid down in Rylands v. Fletcher case then the industries involved in hazardous work will escape liability by using an exception to the rule of the strict article. 

Therefore, the Apex Court decided to introduce a new rule which will align the Indian circumstances. It laid down the rule of Absolute liability which did not have exceptions available to a person under strict liability. The court held the defendant was liable under the rule of absolute liability. 

The Court held that the petitioners could claim compensation for the same on behalf of the victims after filing an action in an appropriate court. 

The Court, while justifying the rule gave the following two reasons: 

  • An industry knows all about its operations that are being carried out while producing commodities. It is, therefore, the industry’s responsibility to have resources and safeguards in case of any danger.
  • When an industry is involved in a dangerous or hazardous activity for profit then it owes an obligation towards the public for their safeguard. Therefore, in case of an accident, it has to compensate for the sufferers. 

Bhagwati C.J. while laying down the new principal gave the following statement: [5]

“We are of the view that an enterprise which is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous industry which poses a potential threat to the health and safety of the persons working in the factory and residing in the surrounding areas owes an absolute and non-delegable duty to the community to ensure that no harm results to anyone on account of hazardous or inherently dangerous activity which it has undertaken. The enterprise must be held to be under an obligation to provide that the hazardous or inherently dangerous activity in which it is engaged must be conducted with the highest standards of safety and if any harm results on account of such activity, the enterprise must be absolutely liable to compensate for such harm and it should be no answer to the enterprise to say that it had taken all reasonable care and that the harm occurred without any negligence on its part.”  

The Court gave the following statement as well: [6]

“Where an enterprise is engaged in hazardous or inherently dangerous activity and harm results to anyone on account of an accident in the operation of such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity resulting, for example, in the escape of toxic gas, the enterprise is strictly and absolutely liable to compensate all those who are affected by the accident and such liability is not subject to any of the exceptions which operate vis-a-vis the tortious principle of strict liability under the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher.”

Enactment of Acts 

Even after so many years of the accident people living in Bhopal, especially in the places near the plant, are still being affected till date. They haven’t escaped from the consequences of the accident yet. Even now, children who are being born have some kind of problem which is about the accident.

The Government to prevent future environmental hazards caused because of the actions of human beings has decided to implement laws that would protect the environment. Laws that would ensure that in case of disputes some authority is there for a speedy trial.

The Environment Protection Act, 1986

The Environment Protection Act was enacted in the year 1986 after 2 years of the Bhopal tragedy. The main purpose of the Act is to safeguard the environment and prevent future hazards. It is said to be implemented based on the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm in June 1972.

The Act contains five chapters and twenty-six sections. This Act is concerned with the protection of the environment, human beings, plants and animals, and prevention of any kind of future hazard like Bhopal tragedy. 

This Act is also known as an Umbrella Act because it makes the Union and the State work in coordination for the various other laws like the Water Act and the Air Act.

The National Green Tribunal Act, 2010

This Act provides speedy trial to the cases related to matters concerned with environmental protection. In case of any violation of environmental law, or case human beings require protection against the use of hazardous chemicals this Act is applicable. The main purpose of The National Green Tribunal Act is to provide speedy disposal of cases.

This Act has five chapters and thirty-eight sections. This owns its established to Article 21 of the Indian Constitution which provides for “Right to a healthy environment”.

The Factories Act

The Factories Act, 1948 was enacted before the Bhopal accident. But, the provisions of this Act are in favor of the workers involved in factories, industries, and mines. The main purpose of this Act is to ensure the welfare of the workers, to improve the working conditions for the workers and also, it provides special provisions for women and children involved in the factories.

The Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991

According to the Public Liability Insurance Act,1991 , a person can claim relief in case of an accident caused because of keeping any hazardous chemicals. The Act provides public liability insurance. This Act is based on “No-Fault Liability”. This means that it is the responsibility of the person to compensate for another irrespective of the fact that he was careful enough to avoid any kind of accident.

Widened scope of Article 21 of the Constitution of India 

Article 21 of the Indian Constitution states that every person has a right to life and personal liberty. Unless a court order, a person cannot be deprived of this right. This Article is considered as the “mini-constitution”. It includes many other rights within itself like, Right to Privacy, Right to Shelter, Right to Information. The Apex Court of India has widened the scope of Article 21 from time to time and by making ‘Right to a clean and healthy environment’ a fundamental right it added more to its dimensions. 

The Supreme Court in Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar [7] held that the citizens of India have a fundamental right of living in a free pollution environment for their full enjoyment of life. This even compelled the local authorities to take measures to decrease the rate of pollution in their areas.

In Rural Litigation and Environment Kendra, Dehradun v. State of Uttar Pradesh [8] the Supreme Court admitted a Public Interest Litigation under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution and ordered some limestone quarries to close down their quarries. It was held that only those quarries which were fit for operating their business and caused less adverse effect could carry out their work. The fitness of a quarry was decided after an inspection. 

Initially, there was no provision regarding the protection of the environment but with time, the Supreme Court realized its importance and incorporated it as a fundamental right. There are other provisions, too, in the Indian Constitution that direct the State and the citizens to protect the environment. These provisions include Article 39(b) , 47 , 48 , 49 , 48 A and 51 A (g) . 

Amendment in Penalty 

According to Section 15(1) of the Environment Protection Act, 1986 if a person violates any provision of the Environment Protection Act then he shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 5 years, or with fine which may extend to one lakh rupees, or with both. And, in case the offender continues to violate the Act then he has to pay an additional fine of Rs 5000 every day from the date of conviction till he stops violating it.

Section 15(2) states that in case the violation continues beyond a period of one year then he can be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 7 years.

Introducing New Legislative Rules 

Hazardous rules, 2008.

The Hazardous Wastes (Management & Handling) Rules, 1989 was enacted under the Environment Protection Act, 1986 . Later on, it was amended in 2000 and then in 2003. 

In 2008, the Hazardous Wastes (Management, Handling & Transboundary Movement) Rules, 2008 superseded the Hazardous Wastes, 1989 and its amendments.

The Hazardous Wastes (Management, Handling & Transboundary Movement) Rules, 2008 is concerned with the proper management in handling storing, collecting, and disposing of the ‘hazardous wastes’. The Schedule 1, 2 and 3 of the Rule divides hazardous wastes into different categories. The definition of ‘hazardous wastes’ under this Rule does not include exhaust gases, biomedical wastes, wastewater, etc.

Chemical Accident Rules 1996

The production process of different commodities involves dealing with many dangerous chemicals. The use of these chemicals, if proper care and caution is not taken, involves a high-level risk in case of any mishap. Therefore, the government of India introduced Chemical Accidents (Emergency Planning, Preparedness, and Response) Rules, 1996 , so that in case of any emergency people would know exactly what to do.

Under these rules a Central Crisis Group, State Crisis Group and a District Crisis Group were to be formed, and these groups would deal with chemical mishaps and provide guidance in dealing with the issue. A list of hazardous chemicals has also been mentioned in the Chemical Accident Rules, 1996 .

Conclusion 

No matter how many years have passed, the aftermath of the Bhopal tragedy can still be seen today. Even after holding UCC liable the loss of those people who lost their lives and the ones who are still suffering cannot be measured. Though it is important for the government to promote globalization it should ensure that there are no risks involved. Also, it is the need of the hour that the laws made are implemented in the best way possible because nothing is more important than the lives of the people.

References 

  • A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 273 .
  • (1868) LR 3 HL 330 .
  • A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 1086 .
  • (1991) 1 SCC 598 .
  • 1985 A.I.R. 652, 1985 SCR (3) 169 .

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  1. (PDF) Case study for Bhopal Gas Tragedy

    Page 1 of 5. Case study for Bhopal Gas Tragedy. Amina Sharif. 19SCO3PH015. 1.0 Introduction: Bhopal disaster, chemical leak in 1984 in the city of Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh state, India. At the time ...

  2. Bhopal disaster

    Bhopal disaster, chemical leak in 1984 in the city of Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh state, India.At the time, it was called the worst industrial accident in history.. On December 3, 1984, about 45 tons of the dangerous gas methyl isocyanate escaped from an insecticide plant that was owned by the Indian subsidiary of the American firm Union Carbide Corporation. ...

  3. Case Study: Bhopal Gas Tragedy (1983-84)

    In fact, the gas was not being neutralized but was shooting out the vent scrubber stack and settling over the plant. December 3, 1984 1: 15- 1:30 am: At Bhopal's 1,200-bed Hamidia Hospital, the first patient with eye trouble reported. Within five minutes, there were a thousand patients.

  4. Bhopal disaster

    The Bhopal disaster or Bhopal gas tragedy was a chemical accident on the night of 2-3 December 1984 at the Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) pesticide plant in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, India.In what is considered the world's worst industrial disaster, over 500,000 people in the small towns around the plant were exposed to the highly toxic gas methyl isocyanate (MIC).

  5. The Bhopal disaster and its aftermath: a review

    By the end of October 2003, according to the Bhopal Gas Tragedy Relief and Rehabilitation Department, compensation had been awarded to 554,895 people for injuries received and 15,310 survivors of those killed. ... Castleman B PP: Appendix: the Bhopal disaster as a case study in double standards. The export of hazards: trans-national ...

  6. PDF Bhopal gas Tragedy: A safety case study

    1. Introduction. On December 3 1984, in the city of Bhopal, a highly toxic cloud of methyl isocyanate(MIC) vapor burst from the Union Carbide pesticide plant. Of the 800,000 people living in Bhopal at the time, 2,000 died immediately, and as many as 300,000 were injured1.

  7. PDF Bhopal gas Tragedy: A safety case study

    The Bhopal gas Tragedy: A safety case study Omar Basha Jawaher Alajmy Tahira Newaz. Outline •Introduction •Background •The leak •Bhopal: Investigations and Lessons •Observations from Bhopal •Conclusion •References. The Tragedy • On December 3 1984, Bhopal: MIC, a major component for the production of the pesticide Sevin escaped ...

  8. How the 1984 Bhopal gas tragedy in India has hurt multiple ...

    Nearly 39 years after a gas from a pesticide factory poisoned tens of thousands of people in Bhopal, India, a new study finds that it also had health and economic impacts on men born a year later.

  9. Case Study: Bhopal Plant Disaster

    Bhopal Plant Disaster - Situation Summary. M.J. Peterson Revised March 20, 2009. During the night of 2-3 December 1984, a leak of some 40 tons of methyl isocyanate (MIC) gas mixed with unknown other gasses from a chemical plant owned and operated by Union Carbide (India) Limited, a partly-owned subsidiary of the US-based Union Carbide ...

  10. PDF Case Study of the Bhopal Incident

    JAPI 36, 1285-1296. Union Carbide Corporation (1985) Bhopal methyl isocyanate incident investigation team report. Union Carbide, Danbury, Connecticut. Vijayan VK, Pandey VP, Sankaran K, Mehrotra Y, Darbari BS, and Misra NP (1989) Bronchoalveolar lavage study in victims of toxic gas leak at Bhopal.

  11. What Caused the Bhopal Gas Tragedy? The Philosophical Importance of

    The Bhopal case study confirms the adverse epistemic consequence of disregarding pragmatic details in favor of generality. The case also shows potentially pernicious social consequences of ignoring Mill's warnings. ... The Bhopal Gas Tragedy raises a real question of whether the best intervention to prevent horrific disasters is to eliminate ...

  12. Bhopal Gas Tragedy : Causes, effects and aftermath

    Bhopal Gas Tragedy Case Study. Bhopal UCIL constructed three underground MIC storage tanks which were named E610, E611, and E619. On October 1984, E610 was not able to maintain its nitrogen gas pressure and so the liquid which is present inside the tank would not pump out, because of which 42 tons of MIC in E610 was wasted. ...

  13. Bhopal gas Tragedy: A safety case study

    Bhopal gas Tragedy: A safety case study. This report provides an overview of the Bhopal Gas disaster which occurred at the Union Carbide pesticide production plant in India in 1984. A large amount of Methyl Isocyanate (MIC) was released from tank 610 within the facility, a failure of safety and alarm systems allowed the gas cloud spread and ...

  14. PDF Case Study

    human tragedy and suffering, media attention, and a general aura of suspicion and hostility towards ... Bhopal as a Case Study - Union Carbide Corp. Page 3 of 16 *The author of this paper and the organization he represents were a part of this investigation team. Thus, if the team was unaware that a particular document existed, the document ...

  15. The Bhopal disaster and its aftermath: a review

    By the end of October 2003, according to the Bhopal Gas Tragedy Relief and Rehabilitation Department, compensation had been awarded to 554,895 people for injuries received and 15,310 survivors of those killed. ... Castleman B PP. Appendix: the Bhopal disaster as a case study in double standards. In: Ives J, editor. The export of hazards: trans ...

  16. The Psychosocial Consequences of an Environmental Disaster ...

    Environmental Disaster: Selected Case Studies of the Bhopal Gas Tragedy Renu Kapoor Deemed University ABSTRACT: The present study deals with the psychosocial problems which the Bhopal gas ... Bhopal gas tragedy. In the early hours of 3rd December, 1984, an accident occurred at the pesticide plant of Union Carbide in Bhopal, the capital city of ...

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    Legal Consequences of Bhopal Gas Tragedy: The Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act, 1985: Soon after the man-disaster, noticing the multitude of the suits arising out of the incident, the Indian parliament has passed the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act on 29th March 1985. This Act confers the government to ...

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    Case Studies; Featured Articles; Featured Articles. All Articles Lesson from Bhopal Gas Tragedy (1983-84) Posted by WMM1942 on September 4, 2018 at 5:21pm ... By the end of October 2003, according to the Bhopal Gas Tragedy Relief and Rehabilitation Department, compensation had been awarded to 554,895 people for injuries received and 15,310 ...

  19. What was the 1984 Bhopal Gas tragedy?

    On the night of December 2, 1984, one of the biggest industrial disasters to ever take place began unfolding in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh. Harmful Methyl isocyanate (MIC) gas started leaking from a nearby Union Carbide pesticide plant, eventually resulting in the Bhopal Gas tragedy, where an estimated 3,000 people died within the first few days.

  20. What is Bhopal Gas Tragedy? (Detailed Case study)

    Bhopal gas tragedy case study: On 2nd December night, the night shift staff of the Union Carbide Factory, Bhopal, took around 11 p.m. There were three double-walled, partly buried S.S. tanks (No. 610, 611and 619) each of 60-tonne capacity and all containing the poisonous gas MIC (Methyl isocyanate) to be used to produce a deadly pesticide ...

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    The night of 2-3 December 1984, was the most unfortunate night for the Bhopal, in fact not only for Bhopal but for the whole world. Thousands of people lost their lives that night and many are suffering the consequences of the tragedy even now. The incident was caused because of the leakage of Methyl Isocyanate (MiC) gas from the Union Carbide ...

  22. The Railway Men

    The Railway Men: The Untold Story of Bhopal 1984 is a 2023 Indian Hindi-language historical drama television miniseries about railway workers who saved many lives during the 1984 toxic gas leak at the chemical company Union Carbide India Limited's plant in Bhopal.It is produced by YRF Entertainment (the streaming division of Yash Raj Films) and stars R. Madhavan, Kay Kay Menon, Divyenndu and ...

  23. Bhopal gas Tragedy: A safety case study

    Metadata. This report provides an overview of the Bhopal Gas disaster which occurred at the Union Carbide pesticide production plant in India in 1984. A large amount of Methyl Isocyanate (MIC) was released from tank 610 within the facility, a failure of safety and alarm systems allowed the gas cloud spread and kill thousands of people resulting ...