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The Natural Law Tradition in Ethics

‘Natural law theory’ is a label that has been applied to theories of ethics, theories of politics, theories of civil law, and theories of religious morality. We will be concerned only with natural law theories of ethics: while such views arguably have some interesting implications for law, politics, and religious morality, these implications will not be our focus here.

This article has two central objectives. First, it aims to identify the defining features of natural law moral theory. Second, it aims to identify some of the main theoretical options that natural law theorists face in formulating a precise view within the constraints set by these defining features and some of the difficulties for each of these options. It will not, however, attempt to recount the history of the development of natural law thought. (For a very helpful detailed history of natural law thought up to the beginning of the modern period, see Crowe 1977. For a very helpful detailed history of natural law thought in the modern period, see Haakonssen 1996. For an article-length recap of the entire history of natural law thought, see Haakonssen 1992.)

1.1 Natural law and divine providence

1.2 natural law and practical rationality, 1.3 the substance of the natural law view, 1.4 paradigmatic and nonparadigmatic natural law theories, 2.1 natural goodness, 2.2 knowledge of the basic goods, 2.3 the catalog of basic goods, 2.4 from the good to the right, other internet resources, related entries, 1. key features of natural law theories.

Even though we have already confined ‘natural law theory’ to its use as a term that marks off a certain class of ethical theories, we still have a confusing variety of meanings to contend with. Some writers use the term with such a broad meaning that any moral theory that is a version of moral realism — that is, any moral theory that holds that some positive moral claims are literally true (for this conception of moral realism, see Sayre-McCord 1988)— counts as a natural law view. Some use it so narrowly that no moral theory that is not grounded in a very specific form of Aristotelian teleology could count as a natural law view. It might be thought that there is nothing that can be done to begin a discussion of natural law theory in ethics other than to stipulate a meaning for ‘natural law theory’ and to proceed from there. But there is a better way of proceeding, one that takes as its starting point the central role that the moral theorizing of Thomas Aquinas plays in the natural law tradition. If any moral theory is a theory of natural law, it is Aquinas’s. (Every introductory ethics anthology that includes material on natural law theory includes material by or about Aquinas; every encyclopedia article on natural law thought refers to Aquinas.)  It would seem sensible, then, to take Aquinas’s natural law theory as the central case of a natural law position: of theories that exhibit all of the key features of Aquinas’s natural law view we can say that they are clearly natural law theories; of theories that exhibit few of them we can say that they are clearly not natural law theories; and of theories that exhibit many but not all of them we can say that they are in the neighborhood of the natural law view but nonetheless must be viewed as at most deviant cases of that position. There remain, no doubt, questions about how we determine what are to count as the key features of Aquinas’s position. But we may take as the key features those theses about natural law that structure his overall moral view and which provide the basis for other theses about the natural law that he affirms.

For Aquinas, there are two key features of the natural law, features the acknowledgment of which structures his discussion of the natural law at Question 94 of the Prima Secundae of the Summa Theologiae . The first is that, when we focus on God’s role as the giver of the natural law, the natural law is just one aspect of divine providence; and so the theory of natural law is from that perspective just one part among others of the theory of divine providence. The second is that, when we focus on the human’s role as recipient of the natural law, the natural law constitutes the principles of practical rationality, those principles by which human action is to be judged as reasonable or unreasonable; and so the theory of natural law is from that perspective the preeminent part of the theory of practical rationality.

While our main focus will be on the status of the natural law as constituting the principles of practical rationality, we should consider for a moment at least the importance within Aquinas’s view of the claim that the natural law is an aspect of divine providence. The fundamental thesis affirmed here by Aquinas is that the natural law is a participation in the eternal law (ST IaIIae 91, 2). The eternal law, for Aquinas, is that rational plan by which all creation is ordered (ST IaIIae 91, 1); the natural law is the way that the human being “participates” in the eternal law  (ST IaIIae 91, 2). While nonrational beings have a share in the eternal law only by being determined by it — their action nonfreely results from their determinate natures, natures the existence of which results from God’s will in accordance with God’s eternal plan — rational beings like us are able to grasp our share in the eternal law and freely act on it  (ST IaIIae 91, 2). It is this feature of the natural law that justifies, on Aquinas’s view, our calling the natural law ‘law.’  For law, as Aquinas defines it (ST IaIIae 90, 4), is a rule of action put into place by one who has care of the community; and as God has care of the entire universe, God’s choosing to bring into existence beings who can act freely and in accordance with principles of reason is enough to justify our thinking of those principles of reason as law.

When we focus on the recipient of the natural law, that is, us human beings, the thesis of Aquinas’s natural law theory that comes to the fore is that the natural law constitutes the basic principles of practical rationality for human beings, and has this status by nature (ST IaIIae 94, 2). The notion that the natural law  constitutes the basic principles of practical rationality implies, for Aquinas, both that the precepts of the natural law are universally binding by nature (ST IaIIae 94, 4) and that the precepts of the natural law are universally knowable by nature (ST IaIIae 94, 4; 94, 6).

The precepts of the natural law are binding by nature: no beings could share our human nature yet fail to be bound by the precepts of the natural law. This is so because these precepts direct us toward the good as such and various particular goods (ST IaIIae 94, 2). The good and goods provide reasons for us rational beings to act, to pursue the good and these particular goods. As good is what is perfective of us given the natures that we have (ST Ia 5, 1), the good and these various goods have their status as such naturally. It is sufficient for certain things to be good that we have the natures that we have; it is in virtue of our common human nature that the good for us is what it is.

The precepts of the natural law are also knowable by nature.  All human beings possess a basic knowledge of the principles of the natural law (ST IaIIae 94, 4). This knowledge is exhibited in our intrinsic directedness toward the various goods that the natural law enjoins us to pursue, and we can make this implicit awareness explicit and propositional through reflection on practice. Aquinas takes it that there is a core of practical knowledge that all human beings have, even if the implications of that knowledge can be hard to work out or the efficacy of that knowledge can be thwarted by strong emotion or evil dispositions (ST IaIIae 94, 6).

If Aquinas’s view is paradigmatic of the natural law position, and these two theses — that from the God’s-eye point of view, it is law through its place in the scheme of divine providence, and from the human’s-eye point of view, it constitutes a set of naturally binding and knowable precepts of practical reason — are the basic features of the natural law as Aquinas understands it, then it follows that paradigmatic natural law theory is incompatible with several views in metaphysics and moral philosophy. On the side of metaphysics, it is clear that the natural law view is incompatible with atheism: one cannot have a theory of divine providence without a divine being. It is also clear that the paradigmatic natural law view rules out a deism on which there is a divine being but that divine being has no interest in human matters. Nor can one be an agnostic while affirming the paradigmatic natural law view: for agnosticism is the refusal to commit either to God’s existence or nonexistence, whereas the paradigmatic natural law view involves a commitment to God’s existence. On the side of moral philosophy, it is clear that the natural law view is incompatible with a nihilism about value, that is, the rejection of the existence of values. It is also incompatible with relativist and conventionalist views, on which the status of value is entirely relative to one’s community or determined entirely by convention. It is also incompatible with a wholesale skepticism about value, for the natural law view commits one to holding that certain claims about the good are in fact knowable, indeed, knowable by all.

The center of Aquinas’s natural law view as described thus far concerns what we might call the metaphysics of morals: its role in divine providence and the universally authoritative character of its norms. What, though, of the normative content of Aquinas’s natural law position?  Is there anything distinctive about the normative natural law position?  Here it is difficult to say much that is uncontroversial, but we can say a sufficient amount about Aquinas’s natural law theory to make clear that it is an interesting alternative to utilitarian (and more generally consequentialist) ethics, Kantian views, and standard Aristotelian positions. (For a magisterial treatment of Aquinas’s natural law ethic, see Rhonheimer 2000.)

Aquinas says that the fundamental principle of the natural law is that good is to be done and evil avoided (ST IaIIae 94, 2). This is, one might say, a principle of intelligibility of action (cf. Grisez 1965): only action that can be understood as conforming with this principle, as carried out under the idea that good is to be sought and bad avoided, can be understood as an intelligible action. But no one can in acting simply pursue good — one has to pursue some particular good. And Aquinas holds that we know immediately, by inclination, that there are a variety of things that count as good and thus to be pursued — life, procreation, knowledge, society, and reasonable conduct (ST IaIIae 94, 2; 94, 3) are all mentioned by Aquinas (though it is not clear whether the mentioned items are supposed to constitute an exhaustive list).

So on Aquinas’s view it is the good that is fundamental: whether an action, or type of action, is right is logically posterior to whether that action brings about or realizes or is some good . The good is, on Aquinas’s view, prior to the right. But on Aquinas’s view we are, somehow, able to reason from these principles about goods to guidelines about how these goods are to be pursued. Aquinas’s thoughts are along the following lines: first, there are certain ways of acting in response to the basic human goods that are intrinsically flawed; and second, for an act to be right, or reasonable, is for it to be an act that is in no way intrinsically flawed (ST IaIIae 18, 1).

The important task, then, is to identify the ways in which an act can be intrinsically flawed. Aquinas does not obviously identify some master principle that one can use to determine whether an act is intrinsically flawed (though for an attempt to identify such a master principle in Aquinas’s work see Finnis 1998, p. 126), though he does indicate where to look — we are to look at the features that individuate acts, such as their objects (ST IaIIae 18, 2), their ends (ST IaIIae 18, 3), their circumstances (ST IaIIae 18, 4), and so forth. An act might be flawed through a mismatch of object and end — that is, between the immediate aim of the action and its more distant point. If one were, for example, to regulate one’s pursuit of a greater good in light of a lesser good — if, for example, one were to seek friendship with God for the sake of mere bodily survival rather than vice versa — that would count as an unreasonable act. An act might be flawed through the circumstances: while one is bound to profess one’s belief in God, there are certain circumstances in which it is inappropriate to do so (ST IIaIIae 3, 2). An act might be flawed merely through its intention: to direct oneself against a good — as in murder (ST IIaIIae 64, 6), and lying (ST IIaIIae 110, 3), and blasphemy (ST IIaIIae 13, 2) — is always to act in an unfitting way. Aquinas has no illusions that we will be able to state principles of conduct that exhaustively determine right conduct, as if for every situation in which there is a correct choice to be made there will be a rule that covers the situation. He allows for the Aristotelian insight that the particulars of the situation always outstrip one’s rules, so that one will always need the moral and intellectual virtues in order to act well (Commentary on NE, II, 2, 259). But he denies that this means that there are no principles of right conduct that hold everywhere and always, and some even absolutely. On Aquinas’s view, killing of the innocent is always wrong, as is lying, adultery, sodomy, and blasphemy; and that they are always wrong is a matter of natural law. (These are only examples, not an exhaustive list of absolutely forbidden actions.)

Part of the interest of Aquinas’s substantive natural law ethic lies in its not falling into the neat contemporary categories for moral theories. His natural law view understands principles of right to be grounded in principles of good; on this Aquinas sides with utilitarians, and consequentialists generally, against Kantians.  But Aquinas would deny that the principles of the right enjoin us to maximize the good — while he allows that considerations of the greater good have a role in practical reasoning, action can be irremediably flawed merely through (e.g.) badness of intention, flawed such that no good consequences that flow from the action would be sufficient to justify it — and in this Aquinas sides with the Kantians against the utilitarians and consequentialists of other stripes. And while Aquinas is in some ways Aristotelian, and recognizes that virtue will always be required in order to hit the mark in a situation of choice, he rejects the view commonly ascribed to Aristotle (for doubts that it is Aristotle’s view; see Irwin 2000) that there are no universally true general principles of right. The natural law view rejects wholesale particularism.

To summarize: the paradigmatic natural law view holds that (1) the natural law is given by God; (2) it is naturally authoritative over all human beings; and (3) it is naturally knowable by all human beings. Further, it holds that (4) the good is prior to the right, that (5) right action is action that responds nondefectively to the good, that (6) there are a variety of ways in which action can be defective with respect to the good, and that (7) some of these ways can be captured and formulated as general rules.

Aquinas was not the only historically important paradigmatic natural law theorist. Thomas Hobbes, for example, was also a paradigmatic natural law theorist. He held that the laws of nature are divine law ( Leviathan , xv, ¶41), that all humans are bound by them ( Leviathan , xv, ¶¶36), and that it is easy to know at least the basics of the natural law ( Leviathan , xv, ¶35). He held that the fundamental good is self-preservation ( Leviathan , xiii, ¶14), and that the laws of nature direct the way to this good (Leviathan, xiv, ¶3). He offered a catalog of laws of nature that constitute the “true moral philosophy” ( Leviathan , xv, ¶40). There are also a number of contemporary writers that affirm the paradigmatic view. These writers, not surprisingly, trace their views to Aquinas as the major influence, though they do not claim to reproduce his views in detail. (See, for example, Grisez 1983, Finnis 1980,  MacIntyre 1999, and Murphy 2001.)

It is also easy to identify a number of writers, both historical and contemporary, whose views are easily called natural law views, through sharing all but one or two of the features of Aquinas’s paradigmatic position. Recently there have been nontheistic writers in the natural law tradition, who deny (1): see, for example, the work of Michael Moore (1982, 1996) and Philippa Foot (2001). There were a number of post-Thomistic writers in the medieval and modern periods who in some way denied (2), the natural authority of the natural law, holding that while the content of the natural law is fixed either wholly or in part by human nature, its preceptive power could only come from an additional divine command: the views of John Duns Scotus, Francisco Suarez, and John Locke fit this mold.    Arguably the Stoics were natural law thinkers, but they seem to deny (4), holding the right to be prior to the good (see Striker 1986). Some contemporary theological ethicists called ‘proportionalists’ (e.g. Hallett 1995) have taken up the natural law view with a consequentialist twist, denying (6). (For a discussion of the relationship between proportionalism and natural law theory see Kaczor 2002.) And while some see Aristotle as being the source of the natural law tradition, some have argued that his central appeal to the insight of the person of practical wisdom as setting the final standard for right action precludes the possibility of the sort of general rules that would (at least in a theistic context) make Aristotle’s ethics a natural law position. There is of course no clear answer to the question of when a view ceases to be a natural law theory, though a nonparadigmatic one, and becomes no natural law theory at all.

2. Theoretical Options for Natural Law Theorists

Even within the constraints set by the theses that constitute the paradigmatic natural law position, there are a number of variations possible in the view. Here we will consider several issues that must be addressed by every particular natural law view, and some difficulties that arise for possible responses to these issues.

It is essential to the natural law position that there be some things that are universally and naturally good. But how is universal, natural goodness possible?  Given the variability of human tastes and desires, how could there be such universal goods?

Natural law theorists have at least three answers available to them. The first answer is Hobbesian, and proceeds on the basis of a subjectivist theory of the good. On subjectivist theories of the good, what makes it true that something is good is that it is desired, or liked, or in some way is the object of one’s pro-attitudes, or would be the object of one’s pro-attitudes in some suitable conditions. One might think that to affirm a subjectivist theory of the good is to reject natural law theory, given the immense variation in human desire. But this is not so. For one might hold that human beings’ common nature, their similarity in physiological constitution, makes them such as to have some desires in common, and these desires may be so central to human aims and purposes that we can build important and correct precepts of rationality around them. This is in fact what Hobbes claims. For while on the Hobbesian view what is good is what is desired, Hobbes thinks that humans are similarly constructed so that for each human (when he or she is properly biologically functioning) his or her central aim is the avoidance of violent death. Thus Hobbes is able to build his entire natural law theory around a single good, the good of self-preservation, which is so important to human life that exceptionlessly binding precepts can be formulated with reference to its achievement.

The second answer is Aristotelian. The idea here is to reject a subjectivism about the good, holding that what makes it true that something is good is not that it stands in some relation to desire but rather that it is somehow perfective or completing of a being, where what is perfective or completing of a being depends on that being’s nature. So what is good for an oak is what is completing or perfective of the oak, and this depends on the kind of thing that an oak is by nature; and what is good for a dog is what is completing or perfective of the dog, and this depends on the kind of thing that a dog is by nature; and what is good for a human depends on what is completing or perfective of a human, and this depends on the kind of thing a human is by nature. So the fact of variability of desire is not on its own enough to cast doubt on the natural law universal goods thesis: as the good is not defined fundamentally by reference to desire, the fact of variation in desire is not enough to raise questions about universal goods. This is the view affirmed by Aquinas, and the majority of adherents to the natural law tradition.

The third answer is Platonic. Like the Aristotelian view, it rejects a subjectivism about the good. But it does not hold that the good is to be understood in terms of human nature. The role of human nature is not to define or set the good, but merely to define what the possibilities of human achievement are. So one might think that some things — knowledge, beauty, etc. — are just good in themselves, apart from any reference to human desire or perfection, but hold that the pursuit of these are only part of the natural law insofar as they fall within the ambit of human practical possibility. This view of the good is not much defended — in part because of the scathing criticism offered of Plato’s view by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics (NE I, 6) — but it was affirmed by Iris Murdoch (1970), and forms part of the natural law view defended by Michael Moore (1982).

None of these answers is without difficulties. While there are contemporary defenders of Hobbesian moral theories (see Gauthier 1986), there is no one who is on record defending Hobbes’s interesting combination of a thoroughgoing subjectivism about the good along with an account of a dominant substantive good around which the moral rules are formulated. The basic reason for this just seems to be that Hobbes’s arguments that the human desire for self-preservation is such an entirely dominant desire are implausible, and there do not seem to be any better arguments available. The Platonic version of the view has struck many as both too metaphysically ornate to be defensible, on one hand, and as not fitting very well with a conception of ethics grounded in nature, on the other. While the Aristotelian version of the view has also been charged with some of the metaphysical excesses that the Platonist view allegedly countenances, most contemporary natural law theory is Aristotelian in its orientation, holding that there is still good reason to hold to an understanding of flourishing in nature and that none of the advances of modern science has called this part of the Aristotelian view into question. (For defenses of such Aristotelian accounts of the good, see Foot 2001, Thompson 1995, and Thompson 2004.)

Another central question that the natural law tradition has wrestled with concerns our knowledge of the basic goods. How can we come to know these fundamental goods?

Return to Aquinas’s paradigmatic natural law position. His account of our knowledge of the fundamental goods has been understood in different ways (Murphy 2001, ch. 1). Some have understood Aquinas as affirming a theory of our knowledge of the fundamental precepts of the natural law that we can label ‘derivationism.’  The idea here is that we can derive from a metaphysical study of human nature and its potentialities and actualizations the conclusion that certain things are good for human beings, and thus that the primary precepts of the natural law bid us to pursue these things (cf. Lisska 1996). One can imagine a Hobbesian version of this view as well. One might say that by a careful study of the human being’s desire-forming mechanisms, one can see that there are certain things that would be necessarily desired by biologically sound human beings, and thus that the human good includes these items. (Hobbes in fact produces such arguments at [EL], I, 7.)  While a natural law theorist might downplay the importance of derivationist knowledge of the natural law, it is hard to see how a consistent natural law theorist could entirely reject the possibility of such knowledge, given the view that we can provide a substantial account of how the human good is grounded in nature: for to show that the human good is grounded in nature is to show that human nature explains why certain things are goods, and it is hard to see how one could affirm that claim while entirely rejecting the possibility of derivationist knowledge of the human good (see Murphy 2001, pp. 16–17). Some have thought, echoing criticisms of natural law theory by those entirely hostile to it, that derivationist theories of practical knowledge fall prey to ‘Hume’s Law,’ that it is impossible to derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is,’ that is, any normative truth from any set of nonnormative truths. The most that this can show, though, is that the natural law theorist needs an account of those bridge truths that enable us to move between claims about human nature and claims about human goods.

It must be conceded, however, that a consistent natural law theorist could hardly hold that derivationist knowledge of the human good is the only such knowledge possible. For it is part of the paradigm natural law view that the basic principles of the natural law are known by all, and the sort of arguments that would need to be made in order to produce derivationist knowledge of the human good are certainly not had (or even have-able) by all. (Recently Jensen (2015) has offered a thorough defense of a derivationist account that aims to take such worries into account.) Another way that Aquinas’s account of knowledge of the fundamental goods has been understood — and it is an understanding better able to come to grips with the widespread knowledge of fundamental goods — can be labeled ‘inclinationism.’  On this view, one’s explicit grasp of the fundamental goods follows upon but is not derived from one’s persistent directedness toward the pursuit of certain ends, which directedness involves an implicit grasp of these items as good. So human beings exhibit a tendency to pursue life, and knowledge, and friendship, and so forth; and reflection on this tendency occasions an immediate grasp of the truth that life, and knowledge, and friendship, and so forth are goods. The affirmation of the claims ‘life is good,’ ‘knowledge is good,’ ‘friendship is good,’ etc. makes intelligible the persistent pursuit of these ends by rational beings like us.

While inclinationism and derivationism are distinct methods, they are by no means exclusive: one can hold that knowledge of fundamental goods is possible in both ways. Indeed, it may well be that one way of knowing can supplement and correct the other. There may be some goods that are easier to recognize when taking the speculative point of view, the point of view of the observer of human nature and its potentialities, and some that are easier to recognize when taking the practical point of view, the point of view of the actively engaged in human life. Indeed, by connecting nature and the human good so tightly, the natural law view requires that an account of the good reconcile these points of view.

There are, of course, reasons to be worried about both of these ways of knowing basic goods — worries that go beyond general skeptical doubts about how we could know any normative truths at all.  Derivationists have to explain how we come to know what counts as an actualization of a human potency, and have to explain how we connect these via bridge principles with human goods. Inclinationists have their own troubles. In particular, they need to deal with the fact that, even if they are not in the business of deriving goods from inclinations or identifying the goods precisely with what we tend to pursue, they take as their starting point human directedness.   And it has been rightly noted that human directedness is not always a lovely thing. Power and prestige seem to be a matter of human directedness — at least as much so as, say,  aesthetic enjoyment and speculative knowledge — but they do not make it to the natural law theorist’s catalog of goods (though they do appear to be part of the good in Aristotle’s picture; cf. the discussion in Hare 2001, p. 14). While these difficulties persist for inclinationist and derivationist accounts of knowledge of the basic goods, they may well be eased if one affirms both accounts: one might be able to use inclinationist knowledge to provide some basis for bridge principles between knowledge of human nature and knowledge of human goods, and one might be able to use derivationist knowledge to modify, in a non-ad-hoc way, the objectionable elements of the account that one might be bound to give if proceeding on an inclinationist basis alone. (Reconciling the inclinationist and derivationist approaches is a theme in Murphy 2001 and Wall 2010.)

The dialectic between inclinationist and derivationist accounts of knowledge of the first principles of the natural law is central to natural law epistemology, but there are other accounts of knowledge of the natural law that focus on its social dimension. Alasdair MacIntyre has argued, for example, that the first precepts of the natural law are to be understood as those that make possible communal inquiry into the nature of the good: both the positive and the negative precepts are enabling rules, norms that enable humans to engage in common pursuit of knowledge of what is valuable. The norms of the natural law preclude our acting toward other potential partners in inquiry in way that would undermine the possibility of common pursuit of the good (MacIntyre 1994, 183–184). To come to know the primary precepts of the natural law, then, is a matter of coming to know what sorts of social relationships make possible common pursuit of common goods.

A distinct sort of social emphasis on knowledge of the natural law asks why we should think of knowledge of the natural law as arising exclusively or even predominantly either from one’s own immediate rational insight into what is implicit grasped or from some sort of derivation from the fact that one’s own inclinations of the will have certain determinate objects. One might hold that we have excellent reason to believe that knowledge of the natural law unfolds historically. Jean Porter, for example, argues that by close attention to the various sorts of social structure exhibited cross-culturally, we can extract the necessary “starting points” (Porter 2005, p. 132) to begin assessing various proposed norms of action. And Jonathan Crowe emphasizes knowledge of the natural law as the outcome of the attempt to interpret human practices, and will be an historically-extended process that will be necessarily an unfinished task (Crowe 2019, pp. 6-7; there is also discussion of interpretation of social practices as a means to knowing the natural law in Murphy 2007).

A developed natural law theory includes within it a catalog of the fundamental goods, the basic values upon which the principles of right are founded. Suppose that we follow at least the inclinationist line, taking it to be faithful to the natural law idea that knowledge of the basic goods is widely distributed. Our task then is to provide an explicit account of those goods implicit knowledge of which is manifested in human inclination toward certain ends. What are the goods affirmation of which makes intelligible these inclinations?

It is clear from this way of putting the question that even if natural law theorists are right that this implicit knowledge is widely distributed, it would be easy for natural law theorists to disagree in their catalogs of basic goods. For the task here is that of formulating propositionally, and in as illuminating a way as possible, what items need be affirmed as intrinsically good in order to make sense out of our inclinations. And there are, unsurprisingly, disagreements in catalogs of basic goods. The goods that Aquinas mentions in his account include life, procreation, social life, knowledge, and rational conduct. Grisez 1983 includes self-integration, practical reasonableness, authenticity, justice and friendship, religion, life and health, knowledge of truth, appreciation of beauty, and playful activities (pp. 121–122). Finnis 1980 includes life, knowledge, aesthetic appreciation, play, friendship, practical reasonableness, and religion (pp. 86–90). Chappell 1995 includes friendship, aesthetic value, pleasure and the avoidance of pain, physical and mental health and harmony, reason, rationality, and reasonableness, truth and the knowledge of it, the natural world, people, fairness, and achievements (p. 43). Finnis 1996 affirms a list much like Grisez 1983, but includes in it “the marital good” (p. 5). Murphy 2001 includes life, knowledge, aesthetic experience, excellence in work and play, excellence in agency, inner peace, friendship and community, religion, and happiness (p. 96). Gomez-Lobo 2002 includes life, the family, friendship, work and play, experience of beauty, theoretical knowledge, and integrity (pp. 10–23). Crowe (2019) includes life, health, pleasure, friendship, play, appreciation, understanding, meaning, and reasonableness (p. 35).

Aside from the inevitable differences in lists of goods produced by natural law theorists, there are also more focused debates about the inclusion of particular alleged goods within the natural law theorists’ lists. Note, for example, that of the lists above, only Chappell’s includes pleasure and the absence of pain. Whatever else we say here, it seems that common sense is initially on Chappell’s side: what seems more obvious than that pleasure and the avoidance of pain are basic reasons for action?  The reasons for rejecting pleasure and the absence of pain from the list of goods are various: some writers argue, following Aristotle, that pleasure is not a good in abstraction from the activity in which pleasure is taken; some that the absence of pain is not a completion or a fulfillment of human nature, and thus cannot be among the basic goods; some that the avoidance of pain is simply an instance of some other basic good, such as inner peace. What this debate illustrates is the extent to which the formulation of a catalog of goods is not a straightforward matter. Everyone agrees that one who avoids touching a hot stove in part to avoid the awful pain has some reason to avoid touching the stove. The difficulty is to bring together our various sources of knowledge about the good to formulate an account that explains well precisely why it is that such an act is reasonable. These sorts of debates reappear with respect to goods like life (is life intrinsically or instrumentally good?  is merely being alive intrinsically good, or is life only intrinsically good when one is enjoying a certain level of vitality?), religion (is harmony with God really a human good?  is it merely a kind of friendship?  does its status as a good depend on whether there is a being such as God?), and what Finnis and Grisez now call the ‘marital good’ (is the good of marriage simply an amalgam of various other goods, as friendship, procreation, rational agency, or is it really a distinct, analytically separable value?). Thus Echeñique denies that life can be a basic good in the way that natural law theorists typically take it to be (Echeñique 2016); Cuneo has rejected religion as a basic good (Cuneo 2005, pp. 116–118); and Macedo has argued against the marital good (Macedo 1995).

Suppose that we were to have in hand satisfactory accounts of natural goodness and our knowledge of it, along with a rationally defensible account of the basic goods that are the fundamental reasons for action. All that we would have so far is the natural law theorist’s account of what we might call minimally rational action — action that seeks to realize some good. What we would not have yet is a full account of right action. For we are frequently in situations in which there are various different courses of action that we might pursue, each of which promises to realize some good; are there no guidelines to which we might appeal in order to show some of these choices superior to others?  After all, some of even the most obviously morally wrong actions can be seen to promise some good — a robber might kill in order to get the money he needs to pursue genuine goods — and the natural law theorist wants to be able to say why these obviously morally wrong actions are morally wrong. As we have seen, the paradigmatic natural law view holds that there are some general rules of right that govern our pursuit of the various goods, and that these rules of right exclude those actions that are in some way defective responses to the various basic goods. How, though, are we to determine what counts as a defective response to the goods?

There are at least three possibilities. One might appeal to a master rule of right that can be used to generate further rules; call this the master rule approach. One might appeal to a methodological principle by which particular rules can be generated; call this the method approach. Or one might appeal to some standard for distinguishing correct and incorrect moral rules that is not understandable as a method; call this (for reasons we shall see shortly) the virtue approach.

On the master rule approach, the task of the natural law theorist is to identify some master rule which bears on the basic goods and, perhaps in conjunction with further factual premises, is able to produce a stock of general rules about what sorts of responses to the basic goods are or are not reasonable. While it is far from clear whether there was a single way that Aquinas proceeded in establishing moral norms from the primary precepts of the natural law in the Summa Theologiae , John Finnis has argued (Finnis 1998, p. 126) that Aquinas employed this master rule approach: on his view, Aquinas held that this master rule is the rule of universal love, that one should love one’s neighbor as oneself. This rule bids us to respond to the good lovingly wherever it can be realized, and from it we can see that certain ways of responding to the good are ruled out as essentially unloving. Grisez clearly employs this approach: he writes that the first principle of morality is that “In voluntarily acting for human goods and avoiding what is opposed to them, one ought to choose and otherwise will those and only those possibilities whose willing is compatible with a will toward integral human fulfillment” (Grisez 1983, p. 184). This first principle, Grisez says, contains implicitly within it various “modes of responsibility” from which particular moral rules can be derived.

The central difficulty with this employment of the master rule approach is that of explaining how we are to grasp this first principle of morality as correct. What is the relationship between our knowledge of the basic goods and our knowledge of the master rule?  When Grisez defends his master rule, he writes that its status is due to a certain function that a first principle of morality must perform:  “It must provide the basis for guiding choices toward overall human fulfillment. As a single principle, it will give unity and direction to a morally good life. At the same time, it must not exclude ways of living which might contribute to a complete human community” (Grisez 1983, p. 184). But this presupposes an awful lot: why should we assume in advance that a proper response to the basic goods must be one that is oriented toward a “complete human community”?

On the method approach, by contrast, there is no need for a master principle that will serve as the basis for deriving some particular moral rules. The idea here is the natural law theorist needs not a master rule but a test for distinguishing correct moral rules from incorrect ones. We know from our earlier consideration of the paradigmatic natural law view that the test for distinguishing correct moral rules from incorrect ones must be something like the following: if a moral rule rules out certain choices as defective that are in fact defective, and rules out no choices as defective that are not in fact defective, then it is a correct moral rule. What would distinguish different employments of the method approach is their accounts of what features of a choice we appeal to in order to determine whether it is defective. The knowledge that we have to go on here is our knowledge of the basic goods. If a certain choice presupposes something false about the basic goods, then it responds defectively to them. So a moral rule can be justified by showing that it rules out only choices that presuppose something false about the basic goods.

This is very abstract. Here is an example of an employment of this approach. While Finnis now affirms Grisez’s master rule approach, in his 1980 work he defends various principles of practical reasonableness without adverting to a master rule. He argues, for example, that it is always wrong to intend the destruction of an instance of a basic good (Finnis 1980, pp. 118–123). (So, no lying, for lying is an intentional attack on knowledge; no murder, for murder is an intentional attack on life, and so forth.)  Why is it always wrong to do so?  It would be unreasonable simply to try to destroy an instance of a basic good, for no further purpose: for that would treat an instance of a basic good as something that it is not — that is, as valueless. And it would be wrong to destroy an instance of a basic good for the sake of bringing about some other instance of a basic good: for that would make sense only if the good brought about were more valuable than the good destroyed, but on Finnis’s view all distinct instances of basic goods are incommensurable — none is of more, less, or equal value with any other. So the rule forbidding intentional destruction of an instance of a basic good is justified because it rules out only choices that presuppose something false about the nature of the basic goods. (For a working out of the method approach, see Murphy 2001, ch. 5.)

The method approach presupposes less of substance about morality than the master rule approach presupposes. But it requires us to draw upon an interesting and rich knowledge of the features of the basic goods. Whether this information is available is a matter for debate. But the method approach has the advantage of firmly rooting natural law arguments for moral principles in the goods the pursuit of which those moral principles are supposed to regulate.

Neither the master rule nor the method approach implies that the natural law theorist must hold that all right action can be captured in general rules. The natural law view is only that there are some such rules. It is consistent with the natural law position that there are a number of choice situations in which there is a right answer, yet in which that right answer is not dictated by any natural law rule or set of rules, but rather is grasped only by a virtuous, practically wise person. It is, however, open to the natural law theorist to use this appeal to the judgment of the practically wise person more widely, holding that the general rules concerning the appropriate response to the goods cannot be properly determined by any master rule or philosophical method, but can be determined only by appeal to the insight of the person of practical wisdom. If it really is wrong in all cases to tell lies, as Aquinas and Grisez and Finnis have argued, our grasp of this moral truth is dependent on our possessing, or our being able to recognize the possessor of, practical wisdom. If such a person never tells lies, because she or he just sees that to tell lies would be to respond defectively to the good, then that lying is always wrong is a rule of the natural law.

It may be true that by the virtue approach we can learn of some general rules of the natural law. What is more interesting is whether a defender of the virtue approach would be right to dismiss the claims of the master rule or method approaches. (For, after all, one might be able to learn that lying is wrong either through moral argument or through the perceptive insight of practical wisdom.)  And it does not seem that the defender of the master rule or method approach should be particularly concerned to discredit the virtue approach. For if defenders of the master rule or method approach recognize the existence of a capacity of judgment like practical wisdom, then it would be strange to allow that it can be correctly exercised on a number of particular occasions while denying that we might learn of general rules from observing patterns of its exercise on various occasions.

One challenge to these various natural law attempts to explain the right in terms of the good denies that the natural law theorist can provide adequate explanations of the range of norms of right conduct for which moral theories ought to be able to provide explanations. That is, one might allow for the sake of argument the natural law theorist’s identification of some range of human goods, while denying that he or she can identify, and justify in natural law terms, adequately concrete modes of appropriate response to those goods. This challenge cannot be profitably addressed here; what would be required would be a close examination of the merits of particular natural law explanations of particular moral norms (a task taken up in, for example, Grisez 1993). One might also look to recent attempts to apply the natural law view to pressing contemporary moral problems — those of research ethics (Tollefsen 2008), economic justice (Chartier 2009), environmental ethics (Davison 2009), business ethics (Gonzalez 2015), the ethics of suicide and euthanasia (Paterson 2015), and population ethics (Delaney 2016), for example — as tests of the fruitfulness of that position.

A more radical critique of the paradigmatic natural law account of the connection between the good and the right calls into question the very idea that one can get principles of moral rightness merely from what constitutes a defective response to the good. According to this critique, while it is true that one might be able to come up with some notion of unreasonableness by appeal to the notion of what is defective response to the human goods, the notion of moral rightness belongs to a family of concepts distinct from that to which the notion of reasonableness belongs. On this view, moral rightness belongs to the obligation family, and the concept of obligation is irreducibly social : one is under an obligation only if one is subject to some sort of demand in the context of a social relationship (see, for an example of this view from a theological voluntarist perspective, Adams 1999, pp. 238–241; see, for an example of this view with a Kantian twist, Darwall 2006). It is part of the logic of obligation that when one is under an obligation, that condition has resulted from a demand imposed on him or her by some other party. So, according to this line of criticism, the paradigmatic natural law view is unable to show that the natural law is intrinsically morally authoritative: the precepts of the natural law can be rules that all of us human beings are obligated to obey, that it would be wrong for us to disobey, and that we would be guilty for flouting only if these precepts are imposed upon us by an authoritative being — perhaps a being like God.

The intrinsic moral authority of the natural law has been a matter of debate since Aquinas: it was a central issue dividing Aquinas’s view from those of Scotus, Ockham, and Suarez. It continues to be an issue between natural law theorists like Grisez (1983) and Finnis (1980) on one hand and theological voluntarists like Adams (1999) and Hare (2001) on the other. Natural law theorists have several options: they can argue against any meaningful distinction between morality and the reasonable more generally (Foot 2000, pp. 66–80); or they can embrace the distinction, but hold that on the clearest conception of the moral that we possess, the natural law account of reasonableness in action adequately satisfies that conception (Murphy 2001, pp. 222–227); or they can hold that the notion of ‘morally right’ is so muddled that it should be jettisoned, leaving in its stead the notion of the reasonable (cf. Anscombe 1958). It is at present far from clear which of these avenues of response the natural law theorist has most reason to embrace.

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What is Natural Moral Law? What are the strengths and weaknesses of NML?

Uzma Tariq 13-06                R.S Essay

Natural Moral Law

What is Natural Moral Law?

Natural law or the law of nature has been described as a law whose content is set by nature and that therefore is universal. As classically used, natural law refers to the use of reason to analyze human nature and deduce binding rules of moral behaviour. Philosopher, Aristotle stated that everything has a purpose. If we are to find something new of which we had no prior knowledge of we can always ask four vital questions. 1) What is it? 2) What is it made of? 3) How did it come to exist? 4) What is it used for? These questions enable us to prove that everything in the universe has purpose.  He also discusses the hierarchy of purpose: Humans, Animals, Plants, Rain - everything in this hierarchy has a proper place and purpose. Philosopher Cicero famously said: ‘The law will not lay down one rule in Rome and another in Athens...There is one law eternal and unchangeable, binding at all times on all people.’ This quote shows Cicero’s beliefs that there is one universal law which applies to everyone. The stoics taught that the world was ordered according to this law. Cicero believed that Humans have reason and therefore can understand nature. He also believed that the greatest evil is emotion. Emotion goes against Natural law; such example would be the love between one man and one woman (natural). However, if one of either party was to have an affair, they will be acting on their emotions to go against nature. Overall, the stoics believed that we should fit in the world or fight against it in some futile way. Philosopher John Locke saw the importance of living in an orderly way. He believed that there are natural rights to life and liberty, which can be explained as ‘survival of the fittest.’ Locke focused on individual rights. He believed that we should all look after ourselves and thus our duty to one another is not of importance. He also disagreed with the notion of paying taxes – he believed in justice, where our role is to survive – not to make sure our neighbour survives. Thomas Aquinas developed his views on Natural law. He stated that everything in the universe had ‘efficient cause’ and a ‘final cause.’ This belief combined with Christian concepts begins to mean that God bought everything into existence for a reason. He then goes on to say that something is only ‘good’ if it does its job properly. For example, a good knife cuts. In the context of the world and God Aquinas states that – for something to be good, it has to do what God had intended at the creation of the world.  For example, at creation God intended for humans to procreate, thus contraception is bad as it intervenes with God’s intentions. So from this we can conclude that a ‘good’ person is one which has lots of offspring and a ‘bad’ person doesn’t. Aquinas also states that all things have potentiality and actuality. Potentiality refers to the things something can change into for example, a tadpole can potentially turn into a frog and an accord can potentially turn into an oak tree. Actuality is the way something is – the more potentials that are realised, the better it is. For example, a developed oak tree is better than a stunted one. We can then go on to apply this theory to humans. A healthy educated person, who has developed their conscience, is better than a sick, ignorant or vicious one. Fulfilling purpose, or as Aquinas would say - turning potential into actual is the essence of goodness. However the problem lies at how humans are supposed to no their purposes. Aquinas stated that we needed to be ‘good’ humans, but what is the definition of ‘good.’ He was an ethical naturalist and thus believed that it was possible to look at the things around us to see what we ought to do (Naturalistic Fallacy - drawing ethical conclusions from empirical observation). Aquinas tells us we should obey natural law. A seed planted in fertile ground that receives daylight and water will grow, therefore obeying natural law. However, humans are different from other things as we have free will. We should try and reach our potential by deciding what we think is right.

This is a preview of the whole essay

In conclusion, the natural law is the rule of conduct which is prescribed to us by the  in the constitution of the   with which He has endowed us. What are the strengths and weaknesses of NML? There are many strengths and weaknesses to Natural law. This essay will discuss both and reach an informed conclusion. I will begin with the advantages: The first advantage to Natural law is that it appeals to the intrinsic idea of right and wrong. From a young age we have all remarked the phrase, ‘it’s not fair’ – this is because we know an unjust action has taken place. And thus since an early age we are aware of right and wrong , however life ‘batters’ this out of us as we grow older. Secondly, Natural law combines what is said religiously in the Bible with human morality. These both acknowledge that humans are not perfect and do things which are wrong. Thirdly, Natural law is based purely on deductive, rational reasoning. This makes it an objective theory, it is not open to interpretation – should everyone reason correctly we should all come to the same conclusions about what is right and what is wrong. We can see this in action around the world, with many societies sharing common beliefs about morality – this is a strength of the theory since there is evidence of a common system of morality in place, although that is not to say the universal theory is natural law. Furthermore, Natural law is absolutist. This means that is does not change with opinion. They are laws of nature and they all apply equally to everyone. The strengths to Natural Law are somewhat limited. However, the disadvantages are numerous. Firstly, Aquinas stated that everything lies in actual and potential states, and if you fulfil your potential it is ‘good.’ However, the potential is not always great things. For example the elderly have the potential to live deaf, blind and senile. Secondly, it is fair to say that some natural laws are ridiculous. For example, human teeth are a mixture of canines for flesh and meats as well as incisors for vegetables and plant like foods. According to natural law we should fulfil or potential and use are teeth to eat both meat and vegetables – if you fail to eat meat (e.g. vegetarians) you go against natural law. Thirdly, Natural law states that there is a universal law for everyone, but is there? We are meant to live, grow, reproduce and die. However there are people such as Mother Theresa and St Thomas Aquinas who have both failed to reproduce – does that mean that these  two are wrong bad bad people ?

Furthermore, how do we know what we are really supposed to do? We are told to fulfil our potential – but what is it? Do we have children or not have children? These choices are subjective and are ones individuals choose on their own accord – therefore our potential is chosen by us. Also, it is key to note that as humans reproduction is not our sole purposes. If this was true, we would then be no different to animals. Therefore, we have a variety of purposes, which can be tricky to follow – especially all together, as some may contradict. For example, a woman has the potential to have lots of babies; however, she also has a brain and thus has the potential to have a successful career. But how could you possibly follow both potentials – they contradict. Additionally, Natural law is heavily reliant upon Aquinas’ statement that everybody will always know what’s right and wrong.  However this is incorrect – in Natural Moral Law God has different purposes for different people – so what is natural and what isn’t?  Even if we did know – not everybody would follow it. Some people acknowledge that they are doing wrong but are apathetic. Finally, it is key to note the problem between NML and Darwin’s theory of evolution. Evolution, does not talk about NML – you do not act how you should, there is no sense of right and wrong. You simply act to survive. This follows Darwin’s ‘survival of the fittest’ theory. In conclusion, the weaknesses clearly outweigh the strengths to Natural Moral Law. It is clear to say that the theory has many flaws and little strength. Modern portfolio thinking tends to suggest that we have changing function, so just as laws and society changes, so does our purpose (and thus our morality). In this sense natural law is very inflexible and perhaps even pretentious is suggesting it has a theory which is universally applicable, eternal and accessible to all.

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Natural Law vs: Legal Positivism: Debating the Foundations of Law

Introduction:.

The debate between natural law and legal positivism has been a cornerstone of legal philosophy for centuries. At its core, this debate revolves around the fundamental question of what constitutes the foundation of law. Natural law proponents argue that there exists a universal moral law that supersedes human-made laws, while legal positivists contend that law is solely based on what is enacted and enforced by human authorities. This essay aims to provide a critical analysis of the natural law vs. legal positivism debate by examining their key principles, criticisms, contemporary applications, and implications for the understanding of law and justice.

Key Insights into Natural Law and Legal Positivism:

Natural law asserts the existence of a universal moral law discoverable through reason, while legal positivism posits that the legitimacy of law derives solely from human enactment and enforcement, devoid of moral considerations. It elucidates the importance of this debate by discussing how it influences our understanding of the foundations of law and the role of morality therein.

Key Insights into Natural Law:

• Universal Moral Law : Natural law theory posits the existence of a universal moral law that transcends human-made laws. This law is believed to be discoverable through reason and observation, reflecting inherent principles governing human behavior and interaction.
• Objective Morality : Natural law proponents argue that morality is objective and inherent in nature, independent of cultural, religious, or personal beliefs. This objective morality serves as a foundation for assessing the validity and justness of human laws.
• Basis for Legal Systems : Natural law theory suggests that legal systems should be grounded in these universal moral principles rather than being arbitrary constructs of human authorities. It advocates for aligning human laws with the higher moral law to ensure justice and fairness in society.
• Interpretation of Law : Natural law theorists advocate for interpreting laws based on their moral content, asserting that laws contradicting moral principles should be deemed unjust and subject to challenge or reform.

Key Insights into Legal Positivism:

• Conventional Nature of Law : Legal positivism emphasizes that the legitimacy of law derives from its source, such as legislative enactment or judicial decision, rather than its moral content. It asserts that laws are social constructs created and enforced by human authorities.
• Separation of Law and Morality : Legal positivists argue for a separation between law and morality, contending that the validity of law is independent of its moral content. According to this view, a law is valid simply by virtue of its enactment by a recognized authority.
• Social Order and Stability : Legal positivism prioritizes social order and stability, emphasizing the importance of law in regulating human conduct and resolving disputes. It views law as a tool for maintaining societal cohesion rather than reflecting objective moral principles.
• Role of State Authority : Legal positivism underscores the authority of the state in creating and enforcing laws, with the state’s will serving as the ultimate source of legal validity. It focuses on the formal aspects of law, such as rules and procedures, rather than moral considerations.

These insights provide a foundational understanding of the contrasting principles and perspectives underlying the natural law and legal positivism theories, shaping their respective approaches to the nature, interpretation, and application of law in society.

Criticism of Natural Law Theory:

It highlights concerns regarding its subjectivity, potential for justifying oppression, and its perceived unnecessary reliance on a higher moral authority. Critics argue that natural law’s reliance on moral principles can lead to inconsistencies and justify oppressive practices, thereby undermining its reliability as a foundation for law.

• Subjectivity and Ambiguity :
• One of the primary criticisms leveled against natural law theory is its inherent subjectivity and ambiguity. The notion of a universal moral law that transcends cultural, religious, and personal beliefs is often deemed abstract and elusive.
• Critics argue that the interpretation of natural law principles can vary widely among individuals and societies, leading to conflicting conclusions about what constitutes morally just laws.
• The subjectivity of natural law theory makes it challenging to apply consistently across diverse contexts, undermining its reliability as a basis for legal systems.

2. Difficulty in Determining Universal Principles :

• Critics contend that identifying and agreeing upon universal moral principles, as advocated by natural law theorists, is fraught with challenges. Different cultures, religions, and philosophical traditions espouse divergent views on morality.
• The diversity of moral perspectives complicates the task of discerning universally applicable principles, casting doubt on the feasibility of natural law as a comprehensive moral framework for law.

3. Potential for Justifying Oppression :

• Natural law theory has been criticized for its potential to justify oppressive laws and practices under the guise of moral absolutism.
• Historical examples, such as the use of natural law arguments to justify slavery or discrimination, highlight the susceptibility of natural law principles to manipulation and exploitation by those in power.
• Critics argue that the inherent subjectivity of natural law theory enables interpretations that perpetuate injustice and inequality rather than promoting universal human rights and dignity.

4. Lack of Empirical Basis :

• Natural law theory relies heavily on abstract philosophical reasoning and lacks empirical evidence to substantiate its claims about the existence of a universal moral law.
• Critics argue that the absence of empirical verification undermines the credibility of natural law theory as a scientific or objective basis for law.
• The reliance on intuition and deductive reasoning, rather than empirical observation and experimentation, raises questions about the validity and applicability of natural law principles in practical legal contexts.

5. Challenges of Adjudication and Enforcement :

• Adjudicating legal disputes and enforcing laws based on natural law principles pose significant challenges due to the subjective nature of moral judgments.
• Judges may struggle to reconcile conflicting interpretations of natural law, leading to inconsistencies and unpredictability in legal outcomes.
• The lack of clear criteria for adjudicating moral dilemmas under natural law theory undermines the efficacy and legitimacy of legal systems grounded in such principles.

In summary, while natural law theory offers a compelling framework for understanding the relationship between law and morality, it faces criticism for its subjectivity, ambiguity, and potential for justifying oppression. The difficulty in determining universal principles and the lack of empirical basis further undermine its credibility as a reliable foundation for legal systems. Critics argue that these shortcomings highlight the inherent challenges of applying abstract philosophical concepts to the complexities of law and society.

Criticism of Legal Positivism:

It addresses criticisms related to its inability to provide a moral foundation for law, its neglect of social and historical contexts, and its prioritization of state interests over individual rights. Critics argue that legal positivism’s detachment from morality can lead to unjust outcomes and overlook the broader societal implications of law.

• Moral Vacuousness :
• One of the primary criticisms leveled against legal positivism is its perceived moral vacuousness. Legal positivists argue that the validity of laws is contingent solely upon their source, such as legislative enactment or judicial precedent, without regard to their moral content.
• Critics contend that this approach divorces law from morality, allowing for the existence of unjust or morally repugnant laws that are deemed valid simply because they are enacted by legitimate authorities.
• Legal positivism’s emphasis on the formal criteria of law, such as its origin and enforceability, without considering its ethical implications, is criticized for promoting a morally relativistic view that undermines the pursuit of justice and human rights.

2. Failure to Account for Injustice :

• Legal positivism has been criticized for its failure to adequately address situations where laws conflict with fundamental moral principles or result in unjust outcomes.
• Critics argue that legal positivism’s focus on the authority of the state as the ultimate source of law can lead to the validation of oppressive or discriminatory laws, even when they violate basic human rights.
• The theory’s insistence on the separability of law and morality can perpetuate systemic injustices by legitimizing legal systems that prioritize state sovereignty over individual rights and freedoms.

3. Ignorance of Social and Historical Contexts :

• Another criticism of legal positivism is its tendency to overlook the social, economic, and historical contexts in which laws are created and enforced.
• Legal positivists prioritize formal legal rules and procedures over broader social and moral considerations, thereby neglecting the underlying factors that shape legal systems and influence legal outcomes.
• Critics argue that this narrow focus on the formal aspects of law impedes a nuanced understanding of the complex interactions between law, society, and culture, leading to legal interpretations that are disconnected from the realities of people’s lives.

4. Rigid Formalism :

• Legal positivism’s emphasis on formal legal criteria, such as legislative enactment and judicial precedent, is criticized for promoting a rigid and inflexible approach to law.
• Critics argue that this formalism can lead to legal interpretations that prioritize adherence to legal rules over considerations of fairness, equity, and justice.
• The rigid application of legal positivism may result in legal decisions that fail to adapt to changing social norms, technological advancements, or evolving moral standards, leading to outcomes that are perceived as unjust or outdated.

5. Undermining Moral Responsibility :

• Legal positivism’s insistence on the separability of law and morality has been criticized for undermining individuals’ moral responsibility to challenge unjust laws and advocate for ethical reform.
• By legitimizing laws solely based on their formal legality, legal positivism may discourage dissent and activism aimed at addressing systemic injustices and promoting social change.
• Critics argue that legal positivism’s reluctance to acknowledge the moral dimension of law diminishes the role of individuals and communities in shaping legal norms and holding authorities accountable for their actions.

Legal positivism provides a formal framework for understanding the structure and validity of legal systems, it faces criticism for its moral vacuousness, failure to address injustice, ignorance of social contexts, rigid formalism, and undermining of moral responsibility. Critics argue that these shortcomings highlight the limitations of legal positivism in addressing the complexities of law, morality, and social justice.

Comparative Analysis: Natural Law and Legal Positivism

Natural law and legal positivism are two influential theories in the philosophy of law that offer distinct perspectives on the nature, source, and legitimacy of law. A comparative analysis of these theories reveals both their similarities and differences, highlighting their respective strengths and limitations in addressing fundamental questions about the foundations of law and morality.

• Basis of Law :
• Natural Law : Natural law theorists assert that law is derived from a higher moral order inherent in nature or discernible through human reason. According to this view, laws that conform to objective moral principles are just, while those that violate such principles are unjust and may be disobeyed.
• Legal Positivism : In contrast, legal positivists maintain that the validity of law is determined solely by its source, such as legislative enactment or judicial decision, without reference to its moral content. According to legal positivism, laws are the product of human authority and convention, rather than any inherent moral order.

2. Morality and Law :

• Natural Law : Natural law theorists posit a strong connection between law and morality, arguing that just laws are those that align with objective moral principles. Morality serves as the foundation of law, guiding its creation and interpretation.
• Legal Positivism : Legal positivists, however, reject the inherent connection between law and morality, asserting that the legitimacy of law derives solely from its recognition by authoritative institutions. According to legal positivism, the moral content of laws is irrelevant to their validity.

3. Interpretation of Law :

• Natural Law : Natural law theorists advocate for the interpretation of law in light of moral principles, asserting that laws inconsistent with fundamental moral truths should be subject to criticism and revision.
• Legal Positivism : Legal positivists emphasize a literal or formalistic interpretation of law, focusing on the text and structure of legal rules rather than their moral implications. The intent of lawmakers and the established legal framework guide the interpretation and application of law.

4. Flexibility and Change :

• Natural Law : Natural law theory allows for flexibility and adaptation in response to evolving moral norms and societal values. The discovery of new moral truths may necessitate the revision of existing laws to better reflect justice and human flourishing.
• Legal Positivism : Legal positivism tends to exhibit less flexibility, as it emphasizes adherence to established legal procedures and norms. Changes in law are typically driven by formal legal mechanisms, such as legislative reform or judicial interpretation, rather than moral imperatives.

5. Moral Critique :

• Natural Law : Natural law theory provides a basis for moral critique of legal systems, allowing individuals to challenge unjust laws by appealing to higher moral principles. Critics argue that this approach may lead to subjectivity and inconsistency in legal decision-making.
• Legal Positivism : Legal positivism offers a more objective and predictable framework for evaluating the validity of laws, focusing on their formal characteristics rather than their moral content. Critics contend, however, that legal positivism may sanction morally objectionable laws that lack popular legitimacy or violate fundamental rights.

6. Role of Authority :

• Natural Law : Natural law theory emphasizes the primacy of moral authority in guiding human conduct and shaping legal norms. Ultimate authority derives from transcendent moral principles or divine law, which supersede human legislation.
• Legal Positivism : Legal positivism prioritizes human authority as the source of law, emphasizing the importance of state sovereignty and institutional legitimacy. Laws are valid because they are recognized and enforced by established legal institutions, rather than by reference to external moral standards.

Natural law and legal positivism offer contrasting perspectives on the relationship between law and morality, they both contribute valuable insights to the philosophy of law. Natural law theory highlights the moral dimension of law and provides a basis for challenging unjust laws, while legal positivism emphasizes the importance of formal legal criteria and institutional legitimacy in determining the validity of law. A nuanced understanding of these theories requires recognition of their complementary aspects as well as their divergent implications for legal theory and practice.

Contemporary Applications of Natural Law and Legal Positivism

Natural law and legal positivism, despite their historical and theoretical differences, have relevance and application in contemporary legal systems and debates. Here are some examples of how these theories are applied in modern contexts:

• Human Rights :
• Natural Law : Natural law theory provides a foundation for human rights, asserting that certain rights are inherent to human beings by virtue of their humanity. For example, proponents of natural law argue that principles such as the right to life, liberty, and equality are not contingent on positive law but are universal and timeless.
• Legal Positivism : Legal positivism acknowledges human rights as rights recognized and protected by law. In contemporary legal systems, human rights are often enshrined in constitutions, international treaties, and domestic legislation. Legal positivism provides a framework for interpreting and enforcing these rights within the legal system.

2. Social Justice :

• Natural Law : Natural law theory emphasizes the pursuit of justice as a fundamental moral imperative. In contemporary debates on social justice issues such as poverty, inequality, and discrimination, natural law principles may inform arguments for legal and policy reforms aimed at promoting the common good and human flourishing.
• Legal Positivism : Legal positivism provides mechanisms for addressing social justice concerns through legal institutions and procedures. Courts, legislatures, and administrative bodies play a crucial role in interpreting and applying laws to address societal injustices within the framework of positive law.

3. International Law :

• Natural Law : Natural law theory asserts the existence of universal moral principles that govern the behavior of states and individuals in the international arena. Concepts such as jus cogens norms (peremptory norms of international law) are often invoked as examples of natural law principles that transcend state sovereignty.
• Legal Positivism : Legal positivism recognizes international law as a system of rules and norms created by sovereign states through treaties, customary practices, and international agreements. Legal positivism provides a framework for understanding the sources, interpretation, and enforcement of international legal norms within the context of state consent and international institutions.

4. Ethical Dilemmas in Technology :

• Natural Law : Natural law principles may inform ethical debates surrounding emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, genetic engineering, and biotechnology. For example, concerns about the ethical implications of AI algorithms or genetic manipulation may be evaluated in light of natural law principles regarding human dignity and the sanctity of life.
• Legal Positivism : Legal positivism provides a framework for regulating emerging technologies through legislation, regulations, and judicial decisions. Legal positivist approaches focus on the establishment of legal norms and procedures to address ethical dilemmas and ensure accountability in the development and use of technology.

5. Environmental Law :

• Natural Law : Natural law theory emphasizes humanity’s interconnectedness with nature and the moral responsibility to steward the environment for future generations. Principles of environmental ethics rooted in natural law may inform legal arguments and advocacy for environmental protection and sustainability.
• Legal Positivism : Legal positivism provides the legal framework for environmental regulation through statutes, regulations, and international agreements. Environmental laws are developed and enforced within the framework of positive law, addressing issues such as pollution, conservation, and biodiversity protection.

In contemporary legal practice and policymaking, natural law and legal positivism continue to influence debates on fundamental questions of law, morality, and justice. While natural law provides a moral foundation for legal principles and rights, legal positivism offers practical mechanisms for interpreting, enforcing, and reforming the law within existing legal systems and institutions. These theories, though distinct, contribute to a richer understanding of the complexities of law and its role in society.

Conclusion:

The complexity and significance of the natural law vs. legal positivism debate. It underscores the ongoing nature of this discourse and the profound implications it holds for our understanding of law and justice. By critically analyzing the principles, criticisms, comparative analysis, and contemporary applications of these theories, the essay seeks to foster a deeper appreciation for the nuances inherent in legal philosophy. Ultimately, the essay calls for continued engagement and dialogue to navigate the complexities of this enduring debate and strive towards a more just and equitable legal system.

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Strengths And Weaknesses: Natural Law

November 21, 2009.

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YOU SAY: "Natural Law has been interpreted to ban contraception, because this interferes with the natural primary precept of reproduction. But a. it’s not clear that sex is exclusively for reproduction, in fact, the function of bonding may be primary and b. the consequence of this policy in Africa has had evil effects of the spread of AIDS and the birth of AIDS infected children who often become orphans living on the streets."

REPLY: While sex is oriented toward conception of a child, the pleasure involved draws mankind toward it. However, to frustrate in any way the purpose of the act, which is the conception of a child, is a misuse of the act for it's pleasure! Seeing the problems it creates, you mention AIDS infected children, and the spread of AIDS among the population. However, these problems, and others, can be solved in different ways, where an immoral practice actually ruins people!

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A Level Philosophy & Religious Studies

Sexual Ethics

This page: full notes      a* summary notes       c/b summary notes, introduction.

This topic requires you to be able to evaluate:

• Christian views verses secular views on sexual ethics.
• The debate between private (liberalism) and public (conservative authoritarianism).
• The application of any of the four normative ethical theories to sexual ethics.
• The issues of homosexuality, pre-marital sex and extra-marital sex.

The three main Christian approaches to sexual ethics:

• Conservative Christianity: Biblical teachings & traditional theologians.
• Natural moral law: typically a conservative catholic view.
• Liberal Christianity: the bible is not the literal word of God so we need to update Christian ethics for modern. times. Fletcher’s situation ethics is an example of this.

The two main secular approaches to sexual ethics:

• Conservative secularists: the traditions regarding sexual ethics are useful for our society and so we should maintain them. Kantian ethics can be interpreted as an example of this.
• Liberal secularists: the traditions regarding sexual ethics might have been useful in the past but are increasingly outdated and harmful. Utilitarianism is an example of this.

Christian views on sexual ethics

St augustine on sexual desire and original sin.

Augustine references Genesis, where after disobeying God Adam and Eve became aware of their nakedness and covered up out of shame. Augustine claims it is ‘just’ that we feel shame about our naked bodies, since it is just that we feel shame over having lust because it being beyond our control is the result of our fallen state. Augustine argues this is universal – people of all cultures cover up their genitals, and sex is done in private, which Augustine suggests is due to the shame associated with it. This all shows the connection between sex, sex organs and the shame of original sin which caused Adam and Eve to feel shame and wear clothes. Augustine concludes that humanity is the ‘ massa damnata’ – the mass of the damned.

Biblical teachings on sexual ethics

Traditional conservative approaches to Christian ethics would regard the Bible as the perfect word of God. All sex outside of heterosexual marriage is condemned in the Bible and is therefore wrong on this view.

Homosexuality

In 1 Corinthians and 1 Timothy, St Paul condemns “sodomites” as unrighteous and sinners.

In Romans, Paul is describing godless and wicked people who became idolators when he says this:

“Because of this, God gave them over to shameful lusts. Even their women exchanged natural sexual relations for unnatural ones.   In the same way the men also abandoned natural relations with women and were inflamed with lust for one another. Men committed shameful acts with other men, and received in themselves the due penalty for their error.” Romans 1:26-27.

“If a man lies with a man as he does with a woman, both have committed an abomination. They shall surely be put to death, their blood is upon them”. Leviticus 20:13.

When discussing marriage, Jesus claims it is between a man and a woman. When combined with the claim that sex should be confined to marriage, that suggests homosexual sex is wrong: “Haven’t you read,”  he replied,  “that at the beginning the Creator ‘made them male and female,’   and said, ‘For this reason a man will leave his father and mother and be united to his wife, and the two will become one flesh’? So they are no longer two, but one flesh. Therefore what God has joined together, let no one separate.” Matthew 19:4-6.

Pre/extra-marital sex

The message of the Bible seems to be that humans have temptation to have sex. We are born with original sin and this causes us to desire all sorts of sinful action, including sinful sexual action.

“Each of you must learn to control his own body, as something holy and held in honour, not yielding to the promptings of passion, as the heathen do in their ignorance of God.” 1 Thessalonians 4.

Galatians 5 calls sexual immorality “the works of the flesh”, indicating that it is the sinful state of our human bodily existence that causes our sinful desires.

The Bible is very clear that God has commanded that sex should be confined to within a marriage:

“Thou shalt not commit adultery” (10 commandments) Exodus 20:14.

1 Corinthians 7 claims that because we have a ‘temptation to sexual immorality’ people should pair off into husband and wife and satisfy each other ‘so that Satan may not tempt you because of your lack of self-control’.

In the sermon on the Mount, Jesus goes as far as claiming that even having sexually impure thoughts/desires is wrong:

“everyone who looks at a woman with lustful intent has already committed adultery with her in his heart” – Matthew 5:28

The liberal approach to the Bible. Liberal Christians can reject conservative views of sexual ethics by arguing that the Bible is not the perfect word of God but is instead just a product of the human mind. During the enlightenment period, scientific, historical and literary methods of analysis were greatly improved and applied to the Bible itself. This led to evidence of scientific inaccuracies, historical inaccuracies, and literary evidence such as that the writers of the Bible had different styles which seemed to depend on their nationality, culture and age. They narrated the same events differently, appeared to have made efforts to gather information, and made grammatical mistakes. None of this looks like the words of an omniscient being. It became difficult to ignore the human influence in the scriptures. This suggests that the scriptures were written by witnesses of God’s divine events in history like the incarnation, or times when God communicated or revealed himself. What came to be written down as a result however was merely what those people took away from such events, or from hearing about such events from the testimony of those who witnessed them. The words of the Bible are therefore just human interpretations of what the authors felt and understood of God’s revelation. The Bible thus reflects the cultural and historical context of its human authors and requires continual re-interpretation to ensure its relevance.

Passages which seem to reflect the discriminatory, violent or barbaric culture of the time can therefore be ignored. Liberal Christians tend to be accepting of homosexuality, even gay marriage, and place less emphasis on the need for sex to be confined within marriage.

Liberal inspiration leads to a crisis of authority. The problem with liberal views of inspiration is that it’s difficult to see how it could grant authority to the Bible if it derives from human minds. Furthermore, it opens up the Bible to interpretation and every person will have their own interpretation. This cannot provide the kind of stable consistent theology that a religion needs for it to persist. This is why traditional Christians criticise liberal Christianity for allowing people too much freedom to believe whatever feels right to them and their opinion, which results in the disunified chaos of everyone believing in their own God and the interpretation of the Bible which suits them.

Secular views on sexual ethics

Freud himself was quite conservative regarding sex in many ways, but nonetheless he was very influential on secular liberal views on sex. He thought that traditional Christian attitudes towards sex resulted in a feeling of shame about sexual desire which led to unhealthy repression and mental illness.

The liberal secular attitude towards sex is influenced by Freud. It claims that sex is a natural biological desire which shouldn’t be a source of shame but of well-being. Augustine’s insistence that there is something shameful about lust is absurd and pointless once you understand it is the result of evolution, not original sin. Conservative religious attitudes towards sex are therefore unnecessarily repressive and puritanical. They become an unhealthy and pointless obsession with self-control borne from insecurity over a mythical fall from grace.

Arguably Christianity’s repression of sexual desire made more sense in ancient times when humans were more animalistic, less socialised, less domesticated. Strict laws and harsh penalties might have been needed then, because humans were less self-controlled and thus needed greater external pressures to keep them behaving adequately. However today, arguably humans have developed to the point where they can be trusted with more freedom. This suggests that our nature is not cursed with original sin such that we need draconian sexual norms and legislation. Traditionalists always fought against the sexual liberalisation of society, concerned it would harm social order, and yet society seems fine if not better.

Secular society is oversexualised. Catholics/natural law would argue that God designed human life to be lived a certain way, and if you upset that balance you cause social problems. 21 st century youth culture is sexualised to a degree many Christians find concerning. Hook-up culture influences young people to regard sex as an opportunity for higher social status. Devaluing a personal intimate act into a superficial sign of social status harms people psychologically. Sex is commodified and people feel pressured into it. They obsess unhealthily about their physical appearance. This is harmful, and makes creating meaningful relationships difficult.

Bishop Barron develops this point, arguing that secular culture’s attitude towards sex is that there is an ‘almost complete lack’ of reference to the moral and ethical setting for sex, the purpose and meaning of sex or religious context for sexuality. This encourages a self-interested ego disconnected from external objective good which thereby turns inward and cares only about itself in a self-absorbed and finally destructive way. Barron argues this is the reason for the ‘deep sadness’ that comes out of the hook-up culture.

Stephen Fry , a gay writer and broadcaster, argues that the paedophile priest scandal can be explained by the Church’s repressive attitude towards sex, pointing to “the twisted, neurotic and hysterical way that [the Church] leaders are chosen; the celibacy, the nuns, the monks the priesthood. This is not natural and normal.”

Fry is suggesting that the unhealthy sexual repressiveness of Church teachings causes its priests to become sexually perverted. Fry is applying the theory of Freud and Nietzsche – that repression of desires can be unhealthy as they can erupt out in negative ways.

Fry then responds to the Church’s claim that they are not repressed but that modern secular society is simply oversexualised:

“They will say we with our permissive society and rude jokes are obsessed [with sex]. No, we have a healthy attitude. We like it, it’s fun, it’s jolly. Because it’s a primary impulse it can be dangerous and dark and difficult. It’s a bit like food in that respect only even more exciting. The only people who are obsessed with food are anorexics and the morbidly obese, and that in erotic terms is the catholic Church in a nutshell.”

Fry is claiming that secular attitudes towards sex are not perfect but are still healthier than religious attitudes.

It might be tempting to try and argue that we could have a healthy balance, but where in history has that healthy balance been achieved? Maybe human nature really is black and white like traditional Christians suggest – we either control ourselves or we slip into selfishness with sin. Human nature is sinful and needs restriction and control – and if we lift those controls a little bit we will keep sliding down the slope towards oversexualisataion.

Situation ethics on sexual ethics

Situation ethics holds that an action is good if it leads to the most loving outcome possible. This will depend on the situation. So, if acts involving homosexuality or pre/extra marital sex involve consent and those involved are happy, it seems that the outcome is loving and therefore those acts would be morally good. However, if manipulation was involved in persuading people into such acts, then the outcome would not be loving, and it would be wrong.

Fletcher points to the example of adultery, often thought absolutely wrong. He explains the case of a mother trapped in a prison work camp during a war. The only conditions of release are either disease or pregnancy, so she asked a guard to impregnate her, thus committing adultery. She was released, her family ‘thoroughly approved’ of her action and loved the resulting child as their own. The implication is that wrongness is not absolute, it depends on the situation.

Another of Fletcher’s illustration is from Nash’s play ‘ The Rainmaker’ – the rainmaker has (pre-marital) sex with a spinster (unmarried woman) to save her from becoming spinsterised (a bit of an outdated sexist term!). Her brother is morally outraged and wants to shoot the rainmaker, but her father stops him, saying to his outraged son “you are so full of what’s right that you can’t see what’s good”.

The private/public debate: Situationism & Legalism

Fletcher was critical of legalism – the view that ethics must be based on rules which do not take the situation into account. It is up to the individual person to decide in a moral situation what would have the loving outcome. This suggests that sexual behaviour should not be subject to public norms and legislation – it should only be subject to the principle of Agape.

Love is subjective

Situation ethics claims that love is the basis for ethical judgement. However, it is subjective, meaning a matter of opinion. Someone might find it loving to try and prevent their homosexual child from expressing or acting on their homosexuality, or even to disown them. They might also think it loving to disown their child if they engaged in pre-marital sex. Someone might find it loving to manipulate/pressure someone into or out of pre/extra marital sex.

Defence of Fletcher: love is subjective, but agape is not. Agape is much more specific than love, it means selfless love of your neighbour. Pressuring others into sex or disowning them for sexual behaviour is not selfless love of your neighbour.

Counter defence: However, actually Agape is subjective. The way you love your neighbour when loving them as yourself depends on the way you love yourself, which is subjective. A parent who disowns their child for sexual behaviour might indeed think that if they had behaved similarly as a child then they should have been disowned too.

Situation ethics ignores most of the commands in the Bible

The Bible is clearly against homosexuality and pre/extra-marital sex, so Fletcher’s theory is not being true to Christian ethics.

Defence of Fletcher: Fletcher doesn’t think the Bible is the perfect word of God that we can follow literally. The most we can get from it is general themes and Fletcher thinks that Agape is an important theme in the Bible.

Barclay: situation ethics grants people a dangerous amount of freedom

People are not perfectly loving so if given the power to judge what is good or bad, people will do selfish or even cruel things. People’s loving nature can be corrupted by power.

Defence of Fletcher: Fletcher & Robinson argue that mankind has ‘come of age’, meaning become more civilised and educated.

Natural law on sexual ethics

Natural law theory is based on the idea that God created all things, including us, with the potential to flourish if we live according to the natural law. The telos of human life is achieving ultimate happiness through glorifying God by following the natural moral law. Going against God’s natural law is not just wrong because it is a sin, it is also bad for our own happiness and well-being. This type of argument has led to critiques of sex outside marriage as detrimental to happiness.

Natural law on homosexuality

The focus of Natural law is not merely on following God’s commands in the Bible (the divine law) but also on comprehending and maintaining the purpose (telos) of our natural desires as part of the natural law. Aquinas regarded homosexuality as unnatural because it required a divergence from what he thought was the natural mode of sex. This means the homosexual orientation, though feeling natural to homosexuals, cannot be so. Aquinas thought that not all inclinations were natural in the sense that they were part of God’s natural law.

The catechism of the catholic church claims that homosexuality is against the natural law as it divorces sex from the gift of life and is thus against God’s design.

Pope Benedict XVI (Ratzinger) argued that “Although the particular inclination of the homosexual person is not a sin, it is a more or less strong tendency ordered toward an intrinsic moral evil; and thus the inclination itself must be seen as an objective disorder.

Stephen Fry (secular) responded to Ratzinger that religion is repressive of homosexual feelings: “It’s hard for me to be told that I’m evil, because I think of myself as someone who is filled with love … with 6% of all teenage suicides being gay teenage suicides, we certainly don’t need the stigmatization, the victimization that leads to the playground bullying when people say you’re a disordered morally evil individual.”

Augustine said ‘Love the sinner hate the sin’. Many Christians claim only to be against homosexual acts, since that is all the bible mentions, not the homosexual orientation. So Christians respond that they don’t claim Fry is evil only that his homosexual actions are evil.

Bishop Barron argued that if the first and only message gay people hear is that they are ‘intrinsically disordered’ then the Church has a serious problem. The first message is that gay people are a ‘beloved child of God … invited to a full share in the divine life’

Christopher Hitchens (secular) rejects the kind of arguments Augustine and Barron make as ‘revolting casuistry’ and claimed that this supposed separation of sinner from sin was absurd in the case of homosexuality since their homosexual actions come from their nature. He claimed that homosexuals are not condemned by the Church for what they do but for what they are and that the Church have no moral standing to criticise the sexual behaviour of others because of its complicity in the paedophile priest scandal. Hitchens denounces the homophobia of the Catholic Church:

“ For condemning my friend Stephen Fry, for his nature. For saying you couldn’t be a member of our church, you’re born in sin. There’s a revolting piece of casuistry that’s sometimes offered on this point; we hate the sin only, we love the sinner … He’s not being condemned for what he does he’s being condemned for what he is … This is disgraceful. It’s inhuman. It’s obscene, and it comes from a clutch of hysterical, sinister virgins who’ve already betrayed their charge in the children of their own Church. For Shame!”

Bishop Barron would respond that all humans have desires which God’s law prohibits. Homosexuals are not unusually singled out in that regard for being told to control their desires.

However, when the entire object of someone’s natural sexual orientation is defined as sinful it seems homosexuals are especially condemned.

Natural law on pre/extra-marital sex

The focus of Natural law is not merely on following God’s commands in the Bible (the divine law) but also on comprehending and maintaining the purpose (telos) of our natural desires. Aquinas thinks we have a natural desire to reproduce, educate, protect and preserve human life and live in an orderly society. All of these primary precepts are threatened by sexual immorality. The only way for children to be provided for such that they can receive education is if they are born to married parents. So, Aquinas thinks that to follow the primary precepts requires confining all sexual behaviour to marriage – so pre/extra marital sex is wrong.

The issue that natural law is outdated

Strength: Natural law ethics is available to everyone because all humans are born with the ability to know and apply the primary precepts. It is possible to follow the natural law even if you are not Christian or have no access to the divine law (Bible).

Weakness: Aquinas’ Natural law ethics is increasingly seen as outdated. In ancient and medieval history, society was more chaotic. It made sense to create strict absolutist ethical principles, to prevent society from falling apart. This would explain the primary precepts. They served a useful function in medieval society.

In Aquinas’ time, sex usually led to children which without married parents usually led to being underprovided for and probably death since society was in a more economically deprived state. It was useful to restrict sexual behaviour to marriage, because of how economically fatal single motherhood used to be. It was useful to require having lots of children, because most children died.

The issue clearly is that all of these socio-economic conditions have changed. Today, we have contraception which disconnects sex from pregnancy and our society has more resources for helping single parents. So, the primary precepts are no longer useful. They were designed for a different time and are now increasingly outdated. Society can now afford to gradually relax the inflexibility of its rules and think about how they might be reinterpreted to better fit modern society.

Evaluation: Aquinas could be defended that this doesn’t actually make his theory wrong. The fact that mainstream culture has moved on from natural law ethics doesn’t mean it was right to. If Hitler had won WW2 and enslaved humanity, then democracy might have been viewed as ‘outdated’, but that wouldn’t make it wrong. Calling an ethical theory outdated is not an argument against its actual truth.

Counter-evaluation: A better version of the ‘outdated’ critique is to argue that Aquinas’ theory was actually a reaction to his socio-economic context and since that has changed, Natural law is no longer relevant.

Aquinas thought that he discovered the primary precepts through human reason, as God designed. However, arguably it’s a simpler explanation that Aquinas was simply intuiting what was good for people in his socio-economic condition. The idea that the resulting principles actually came from God was only in his imagination.

The great strength of religion as a form of social organisation is also its greatest weakness. By telling people that its ethical precepts (such as the primary precepts or sanctity of life) come from God it creates a strong motivation to follow them. Yet, because those precepts are imagined to come from an eternal being, they become inflexible and painstakingly difficult to progress. This makes them increasingly outdated.

Fletcher’s critique of Aquinas

Fletcher’s critique that there is no natural law, or our minds are unable to know it, as shown by cross-cultural moral disagreement. There are clear cases of different moral views on sexual ethics between different societies. This suggests it’s not true that we are born with the ability to discover the primary precepts.

However, there are cross-cultural similarities, such as the idea of marriage and the importance of confining sex to marriage.

However, again, those could be explained by the universality of practical requirements for the raising of children, especially since for most of history people have been economically deprived.

Natural “LAW” applied to the private/public debate

Aquinas was clear that human law should be based on the natural and divine law, which include prohibitions on sex outside marriage, and that marriage is between a man and a woman. This is an argument for religious authoritarianism since it involves the claim that what people do in their private lives must conform to the natural and divine law.

Utilitarianism on sexual ethics

Act Utilitarianism would judge an action based on whether it produced the most amount of pleasure compared to other actions. If a sexual act, whether it is homosexual or pre/extra marital sex, maximised pleasure compared to the other option of not doing or allowing them, then it would be good to do/allow them.

           Standard criticisms of Utilitarianism applies, including:

            Issues with calculation and measuring pleasure

            Issues with liberty/rights & justifying bad actions

Utilitarianism on private vs public

J.S. Mill , a secular liberal, argues that trying to make things illegal because they go against religious morality must be rejected because it has been the foundation of all religious persecution. He discusses what for most Christians is considered immoral extra-marital sex – polygamy, which is allowed in the Mormon faith, but his views on it could be applied to all issues in sexual ethics.

Mill argues that even if some genuinely suffer due to their sexual practices, as long as there is consent amongst all those involved, so long as those who suffer due to the practices do not seek aid from other communities and are allowed ‘perfect departure’ from their community, then:

‘I cannot admit that persons entirely unconnected with them ought to step in and require that a condition of things with which all who are directly interested appear to be satisfied should be put an end to because it is a scandal to persons some thousands of miles distant who have no part or concern in it.”

Mill advocates the harm principle: that people should be free to do as they like as long as they do not harm others. This includes consensual sexual behaviours which are private. However people are also free in public to attempt to persuade others of which sexual norms to follow, though that persuasion can only take the form of argument, never force nor legislation. Mill’s conception of society is of individuals each pursuing what seems good to them, their only universal bond being the wrongness or illegality of harming others.

“The only freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily, or mental or spiritual. Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves, than by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest”.

Devlin: invisible bonds of common thought. Devlin argued that society has the right to protect itself; the purpose of the law is to guard against threats to the existence of the society. A society cannot survive without some moral standards of the sort which are imposed on all. He claims ‘history shows’ that loosening moral bonds is ‘often the first stage of disintegration’. A society is not held together ‘physically; it is held by the invisible bonds of common thought’. Since a society has a right to continue existing it must therefore have a right to impose some moral standards by law. If the feelings of an ordinary average person towards homosexuality are of ‘intolerance, indignation and disgust’ then that is an indication of potential danger to the social fabric should those feelings not be backed by law. Devlin claimed that society has the ‘right to eradicate’ vices so ‘abominable’ that their ‘mere presence is an offense’.

Mill thought his harm principle was required to prevent the dissolution of society, so arguably Mill and Devlin only disagree about which common morality is required for society to exist, not whether one is required.

Mill is not impressed with the appeal to the disgust of the masses. He claims that humans have a tendency to increasingly encroach on the freedom of the individual and will appeal to the disgust of the majority to justify that. Mill points out that such a principle would justify (in his time) forbidding non-Muslims to eat pork in Islamic countries, since it genuinely disgusts the majority of those populations, or the example of the Spanish Catholicism persecuting Protestantism, since Spaniards found the protestant practices in Europe of allowing clergy to marry disgusting. Mill’s point is that the only the harm principle can adequately draw the line between an individual’s private life and public norms/legislation in a way which prevents persecution and enables individual flourishing.

“unless we are willing to adopt the logic of persecutors, and to say that we may persecute others because we are right, and that they must not persecute us because they are wrong, we must beware of admitting a principle of which we should resent as a gross injustice the application to ourselves.”

Lord Devlin: private affects the public. Devlin argues that the private and public spheres influence each other too greatly for Mill’s liberalism to work. A majority has a right to defend it social environment from change it opposes. If homosexuality or pre/extra marital sex were not subject to public norms or legislation, the social environment, especially the nature of the family, would change in ways difficult to foresee. The environment in which people live and raise their children is affected by the behaviours and models of relationships that other people engage with in their private life. The private therefore affects the public, which gives grounds for subjecting private life to public norms or legislation if the private practice sufficiently threatens a public good for which it is worth the cost to human freedom to protect. The implication is that the traditional family may be such a public good.

Homosexuality has not harmed society. Legalising and normatively accepting homosexuality arguably has not caused the damage to the family that secular thinkers like Devlin and some religious leaders like Archbishop J Welby worried that it would. There is no evidence that children raised by homosexual parents are worse off, for example.

Furthermore, communities can change and indeed should progress. Devlin’s argument seems to make that difficult in any area, not only homosexuality. While community is dependent on shared bonds, Mill’s view that they can be freely chosen or not by different individuals is arguably sufficient for cohesion and clearly allows for change.

Mill accepts that a person’s actions in their private life could still harm society. However, Mill claims that this harm is “one which society can afford to bear, for the sake of the greater good of human freedom.” Although the private sphere does affect the public sphere, it is still for the greater good to allow people freedom in their private life so long as they are not harming others. People do have the right to defend their culture from change they oppose, but only through rational argument and persuasion – not the coercion of public morality or law.

Kant on sexual ethics

Homosexuality doesn’t seem universalisible, since if everyone were homosexual then the species could not continue and then no one would exist to follow the duty to be homosexual.

However, if the maxim is simply ‘follow your own orientation’, then that does seem universalisible.

Pre/extra-marital sex seems universalisible because no contradiction arises in the conception of everyone engaging in pre/extra-marital sex.

The second formulation of the categorical imperative is important regarding sex for Kant. He thinks that sex which is not within a marriage for the purpose of procreation pretty much involves each person using the other as a mere means to their own gratification. This is a kind of objectification – treating someone as an object, which involves treating them as a mere means.

However, Kant thinks that marriage is a contractual agreement involving the granting of “lifelong possession of each other’s sexual attributes,”. The idea seems to be that if each person agrees to being used by the other, then both are respecting each other’s end and thus only treating them as a means, not a mere means .

Not treating people as a mere means in sexual ethics is arguably a good principle – but Kant seems wrong to think that it only allows for sex that is within marriage for the purpose of having children. Kant thinks sex outside marriage necessarily always involves objectification and mere using of another person, but that seems a bit cynical and pessimistic. Kant doesn’t seem to appreciate romantic connection. He never married, after all.

Hume’s meta-ethics was greatly disliked by Kant and motivated Kant to create his own ethical theory. Kant thinks ethics can be based on reason and that we can and should remove emotion as a motivation for moral decision making. However, Hume claims that moral judgements being motivating means they must involve desire, which is an emotion or sentiment. It’s not enough merely to reason that we should do something because why would we care that we should do what we should do unless we had a desire to do what we should do? Hume claims that we just are the sort of being which cannot help but require desire in order to be motivated to do actions, which means Kant’s ideal of the good will is an impossible ideal.

P1 – moral judgements are intrinsically motivating. P2 – Reason is not intrinsically motivating. C1 – Therefore, moral judgements cannot be derived from reason alone.

Rational agents can put their emotion aside. The idea that reason and emotion are in conflict goes back to Plato, who saw human reason as aimed higher than the world at intellectual abstract ideas, in conflict with the body which anchored reason in the mere physical world with animalistic feelings. Kant too clearly thinks something like this and suggests that, as rational agents, we can and should try to separate our reason from emotional influence.

However, Hume claimed that “reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions”. There are everyday examples which illustrate this. When someone criticises your deeply held personal belief, your mind instantly starts thinking of defences. If it cannot think of anything, it starts getting angry and projecting negative psychological motivations into the critic. This looks like your mind has pre-conceived feelings and the role of reason and rationality is merely to provide ad hoc rationalisations to serve our prejudices. Our mind is more like a lawyer than a scientist.

It is our culture which determines our emotional feelings. Kant’s views on sexual ethics are an excellent example of how his supposedly reasoned moral views were really just reflections of and rationalisations for his culture’s views:

Homosexuality is an “unmentionable vice” so wrong that “there are no limitations whatsoever that can save [it] from being repudiated completely”.

Kant even suggests children born outside marriage could be killed or left to die:

“A child that comes into the world apart from marriage is born outside the law (for the law is marriage) and therefore outside the protection of the law. It has, as it were, stolen into the commonwealth (like contraband merchandise), so that the commonwealth can ignore its existence (since it rightly should not have come to exist in this way), and can therefore also ignore its annihilation”

Regarding Kant, there is a difference between the logic of his theory which arguably can lead to fairly liberal views, and his own personal views which were rigidly traditional and conservative. Some argue that this actually demonstrates a serious critique of Kant’s ethics. Kant imagined that ethics could be based on reason, yet when it came to the practical implementation of his ethics to sexual issues, he was just as much a product of his culture as the most unthinking and unreasonable person in it. His reason was a slave of his culturally conditioned passions.

Possible exam questions for Sexual ethics

Easy Are secular views on sexual ethics superior to traditional religious views? ‘Secular sexual ethics are an improvement on traditional religious views’ – How far do you agree? Assess religious views on sexual ethics How useful is natural law in dealing with issues in sexual ethics? How useful is situation ethics in dealing with issues in sexual ethics? How useful is Kantian ethics in dealing with issues in sexual ethics? How useful is utilitarianism in dealing with issues in sexual ethics?

Medium Do religious views on sexual ethics have a continuing role today? Are normative theories useful for issues within sexual ethics? Should sexual behaviour be entirely private or a matter of public norms and legislation? Assess Aquinas’ on sexual ethics Should sexual ethics be judged based on the loving thing to do in each situation? How successful is the categorical imperative applied to sexual ethics? ‘Issues in sexual ethics should be judged based on the principle of utility’ – Discuss. Can premarital sex ever be ethical? Can extramarital sex ever be ethical? Can homosexuality ever be ethical?

Hard To what extent are traditional religious views on sexual ethics relevant today? ‘Developments in religious views on sexual ethics have had a significant impact’ – Discuss. Have religious view on sexual ethics changed for the better?

Quick links

Year 12 ethics topics: Natural Law. Situation ethics. Kantian ethics. Utilitarianism. Euthanasia. Business ethics. 

Year 13 ethics topics: Meta-ethics. Conscience. Sexual ethics. 

OCR Philosophy OCR Christianity OCR essay structure OCR list of possible exam questions

Ethics Finnis Natural Law AO2

Additional information.

This activity uses material from Theme 2D: The effectiveness of Finnis’ Natural Law in dealing with ethical issues. It focuses on the skill of evaluation. The tasks illustrate the different levels of evaluation from good to weak examples.

The beauty of John Finnis’ system is that it is grounded in morality and yet established through the law. Since there are moral issues that are dealt with by the law, for example stealing and murder, and also those that are not, for example, issues surrounding sexuality, one could put forward the argument that it is the ideal ethical theory because it addresses the full range of moral issues. Ethical issues that are located within the parameters of law are dealt with by the law; the ethical issues that do not, are debated, resolved and decided upon by individual citizens in a more private realm and without the need for common public approval. Therefore, it would appear that on the surface of things, Finnis’ Natural Law is effective in dealing with ethical issues.

In order to evaluate a little more effectively, we need to delve a bit deeper than just a general overview and so we will consider some ethical issues and how Finnis has used his version of Natural Law.

In regard to the issue of homosexuality, Finnis has been quite clear. In an article from the Guardian newspaper 3rd February 2017, it points out that in 1994 Finnis had written that ‘a life involving homosexual conduct is bad even for anyone unfortunate enough to have innate or quasi innate homosexual inclinations’. In the same paper he described ‘the evil of homosexual conduct'.

It is, therefore, quite clear that in applying his basic goods, homosexuality does not fall within the remit of life or friendship (society). However, homosexuality is not against the law. Homosexuality has quite recently been afforded the similar rights as heterosexuality. Indeed, for many people today homosexuality is not an issue and where there is a moral issue it is with how homosexual individuals have, both today and in the past, been discriminated against and not whether or not homosexuality is ‘moral’ or ‘immoral’. Finnis’ Natural law then appears to be outdated when dealing with this ethical issue.

With regard to immigration, the official Roman Catholic teaching is one of warm welcome. However, for Finnis, his view of immigration over the past 50 years has meant ‘a trajectory of demographic and cultural decay… pervasive untruthfulness about equality and diversity; population transfer and replacement by a kind of reverse colonisation’. In other words he sees the overall idea of immigration as destroying a country’s identity and a threat to a ‘community’s medium term-survival’ due to their ‘replacement, as a people by other peoples, more or less regardless of the incomers’ compatibility of psychology, culture, religion or political ideas and ambitions, or the worth or viciousness of those ideas and ambitions’. Once again, his application of the basic goods appears to be skewed towards an ancient Greek model of patriotism and a nationalism that is not in line with the Pope’s declarations that ‘There is no Christian joy when doors are closed; there is no Christian joy when others are made to feel unwanted, when there is no room for them in our midst’.

In terms of capital punishment, Finnis’ appears more compassionate. Finnis says that the law of ‘talion’ (latin for ‘retaliation’) misses the point because it focuses on the criminal acts rather than on the criminal and that this is preferring self-interest to common good. If we are really going to address the wrong, we need to help people turn from selfishness. For Finnis, capital punishment directly attacks the basic good of life. It is not acceptable and he argues that the law should ‘work to restore reasonable personality in offenders, reforming them for the sake not only of others but of themselves’.

In conclusion, we can see that Finnis’ Natural Law clearly works when applied to moral issues. However, effectiveness does not really mean it is simply applied but more that it is applied well. My own view that it is not always applied well, as clear instances of ethical views that are contrary to human rights are in danger of emerging. However, this does not mean it cannot be effective. I am sure that there are other ways of applying Finnis’ Natural Law and reaching a different conclusion.

This is a wide-ranging discussion that is well structured and evaluative. In terms of critical analysis it may be a little one-sided in its selection of how Finnis applies the theory without consideration of different ways; however, this is recognised and addressed in a balanced and mature conclusion. Good use of evidence and examples throughout.

John Finnis makes a modern statement for Natural Law in his famous book entitled ‘Natural law and Natural Rights’ published in 1980. In this book, Finnis develops the idea of primary precepts of Aquinas and gives them a more modern feel. Once again, coming back to the idea of a natural good, first identified by Aristotle vaguely in his concept of ‘eudaimonia’ (happiness) and then developed by Aquinas into natural good, Finnis uses the term ‘well-being’ to establish what the telos, end or purpose for humanity ideally is.

Like Aquinas and others, Finnis stresses the importance of reasoning: ‘From one’s capacity to grasp intelligently the basic forms of good as ‘to-be-pursued’, one gets one’s ability... to sympathetically (though not uncritically) see the point of actions, life-styles, characters and cultures that one would not choose for oneself.’

In using reason human beings can identify what Finnis calls basic values or “basic forms of good”. He identifies seven of these:

• Sociability (friendship)
• Aesthetic experience
• Practical reasonableness

Such goods are identifiable psychologically through ‘corresponding inclinations and urges of one’s nature’.

In order to apply them to society, Finnis develops aspects of what he calls ‘practical reasonableness’ which assist an individual in life with the aim of fulfilling the ‘basic forms of good”’. The nine principles are:

• Having a rational and coherent life plan
• Not arbitrarily prioritising one basic good over another
• Treating everyone as equal
• Remaining objective by not letting detachment lead to indifference
• Maintaining commitment to the ideals of the basic goods
• Limiting the relevance of consequences
• Respect for every basic value in every act
• The requirements of the common good
• Following one’s conscience

As can be seen from above Finnis’ work is very well set out for ethical issues and being effective in solving them because there are clear guidelines.

This is a weak attempt at evaluation. This is more of an AO1 skill answer than an AO2. It consists of reciting some application of Finnis but not weighing the relative strengths and weaknesses of these applications. It may be that the person has panicked and just written down anything on Finnis. This answer clearly demonstrates the reminder to make sure AO1 and AO2 answers are clearly different.

Finnis says that the goal of the law is a quality of communal life ‘in which the demands of the common good indeed are… also recognised as including the good of individual autonomy…’ So, the law has to serve both the community as well as individuals.

Natural Law is based on what it means to be human and this means acting in line with your true nature and follow our natural inclinations. When the theory is applied, it assumes the special status of human beings. It is a universal law, and not relative to culture or a religion and it appeals to common sense. Therefore, in theory it is effective in dealing with moral issues.

Finnis Natural Law is good because it is based in the Law and morality. Its guidelines are clear and can be easily applied to moral issues. So therefore, in theory it can be seen to be effective. But what about in practice?

Take capital punishment. It is easy to see how capital punishment might serve the community – removal of threat, no ongoing cost to the community for services to the prisoner, a sense of justice and closure for the victim’s family. However, it contravenes the basic good of life. Finnis says that the law of ‘talion’ (latin for ‘retaliation’) misses the point because it focuses on the material consequences of criminal acts rather than on their formal wrongness. This means that it is preferring self-interest to common good. If we are really going to address the wrong, we need to help people turn from selfishness. This demonstrates the ambiguity of Natural Law. Finnis argues against it as going against a basic good; Aquinas argues that sometimes it is necessary to defend society. Therefore, it is not totally effective.

One could also question the idea of a constant unchanging human nature and a natural law that stems from it. For example, why is it, that so many through the centuries have got human nature so wrong (e.g. slavery and apartheid considered natural)? Human nature seems to change. For instance the debate about homosexuality has raised questions about what is natural.

Therefore, as in theory it seems ok, when it comes to applying it to specific moral issues it is not that effective.

This is a fair attempt at an evaluation. It mainly deals with some strengths and weaknesses that are generic to the theory, but it does at least attempt to evaluate the success of Finnis’ Natural Law in terms of capital punishment. This aspect saves the answer from ruin and keeps it focused. In the generic parts of the answer it could have done with more discussion and evaluation of the other ethical issues mentioned. The conclusion does follow from the argument and makes sense.

Read the following and identify whether the example illustrates a good or weak evaluation. Put them in rank order. Examine how you might improve the answer by identifying any weaknesses it may illustrate. Then click on the text to see if you agree with the comments.

'Finnis’ Natural Law is effective in dealing with ethical issues.' Evaluate this view.

Question 1 ‘Finnis’ Natural Law is a weak theory.’ Evaluate this view.

In order to answer this question, we need to look at both the strengths and the weaknesses of Finnis’ Natural Law theory in order to reach a reasoned conclusion.

A strength of Finnis’ Natural Law is that it does not rely on the existence of God for its authority, e.g. the basic goods cannot be derived from God. Finnis’ Natural Law could appeal to non-believers because it is reliant on human (and not divine) deductive reasoning. White argues, ‘Finnis attempts to formulate a rational basis for moral action.’

However, Finnis accepts that one of the seven basic goods is religion, still providing a basis for believers to accept his theory. Greenawalt states, ‘natural law theorists have consistently asserted that individuals can discover the natural law, independent of their particular religious beliefs.’ Therefore, Finnis’ ethic can be seen to be open to all. It potentially provides a universally acceptable idea on what is ‘good’ rather than just a religious one.

In Finnis’ Natural Law, ‘basic goods’ and ‘principles of practical reason’ are adapted to contemporary society i.e. this version of Natural Law is more in line with the beliefs of a secular society. In addition, Finnis states that ‘Each is fundamental. None is more fundamental than any of the others.’ They are definitive and cover a wide range from play to religion.

Another strength of Finnis’ Natural Law is that it focuses on community morality rather than just individual morality. This can be seen in Finnis’ ‘First Moral Principle’ - the idea that we act for the good of the community as a whole not just as an individual. However, he also extends this with the idea of the ‘common good’ and argues, that ‘authority be exercised… for the purpose of promoting a common good in which such respect for rights is a component.’

However, Finnis’ Natural Law can be seen as a weak ethic. The seven basic goods are based on fallible human reason and therefore they have no divine justification. Many religious believers would, as a result of this, not consider following Finnis' Natural Law. Its status as a moral ethic is flawed because it is not associated with the command of God.

Alternatively, as Stephen Buckle has pointed out, his basic goods and the principal of practical reasonableness actually hide an underlying agenda of meeting the criteria of Roman Catholic theology.

A further weakness of Finnis’ Natural Law is that it is not a clear ethic. Aquinas’ Natural Law, for example, gives a clear set of ethical rules, whereas Finnis’ Natural Law can be seen as something to aspire to rather than a set of moral commands.

Finnis claims that the seven basic goods are independent of human thought. They are universal and do not change in the same way that Aquinas claimed his precepts were universal and unchanging. This claim will not appeal to moral agents brought up in a post-modern society, where morality is seen as fluid and unique to each moral agent and or situation.

In conclusion it could be argued that whilst it is not by any means a weak theory as some of the strengths above have demonstrated, this does not mean that it is perfect or that it works well. That is a different matter.

• Finnis is an Australian philosopher.
• Finnis also works at Oxford University as a scholar.
• His theory is a modern day version of Aquinas and his theory gives clear rules.
• The ‘goods’ he selects are up to date from Aquinas. But the goods are not precepts.
• However, Finnis’ Natural Law is weak because it is not clear.
• But it is strong because it is based in reason. People today like reason.
• It is also very much like common sense. People today like common sense arguments and not complicated ones.
• It also is contemporary because it does not accept God and this is a strong thing for society. Most people today are atheists.
• It is a strong theory because it helps makes laws but is weak because it has no morals.
• Practical reasonableness makes it strong because it means that it is a practical theory and it is reasonable.
• In conclusion, there are two sides to the argument and both are valid so it just depends really on your whole point of view.

A strength of Finnis’ Natural Law is that it does not rely on the existence of God for its authority, e.g. the basic goods cannot be derived from God. In this way it could be argued that Finnis’ Natural Law could appeal to non-believers because it is reliant on human (and not divine) reasoning. This also makes it a firm basis for Law in society. However, he accepts that one of the seven basic goods is religion, still providing a basis for believers to accept his theory.

Therefore, Finnis’ ethic can be seen to be open to all. It potentially provides a universally acceptable idea on what is ‘good’ rather than just a religious one. Therefore, both religious believers and atheists will find it very useful.

Another strength of Finnis’ Natural Law is that it focuses on community morality rather than just individual morality. This can be seen in Finnis’ ‘First Moral Principle’ - the idea that we act for the good of the community as a whole not just as an individual. This is very important because the whole aim of Finnis’ work is to give something that is practical and works in society. Finnis is big on laws as a barrister himself and so this is crucial for society.

Therefore, all in all, after weighing up both sides of the argument I would tend to say that it has more strengths than weaknesses. I particularly like the idea of it being secular and think that it works well.

Question 2 An evaluation of Finnis’ Natural Law is a useful guide for contemporary society.

This question asks me to look at John Finnis’ Natural Law theory and decide whether or not it works in contemporary society. I will answer this by looking at who John Finnis is and what his argument entails.

John Finnis was Professor of Law and Legal Philosophy at Oxford University from 1989 to 2010. Finnis first made a modern statement for Natural Law in his famous book entitled Natural Law and Natural Rights published in 1980. This received critical acclaim but also created controversy amongst some scholars, for example, Stephen Buckle, who saw it as an attempt to justify Roman Catholic morality through a legal framework.

Finnis’ attempts to set out a framework for society that is grounded in a legal framework. The way to do this is not by establishing moral laws primarily, as for Finnis these are already made known to us, but by creating a legal system within which the moral principles can operate. There is no doubt that Finnis is religious, and as a Roman Catholic himself, his moral grounding is revealed when he himself applies Natural Law to moral issues.

Finnis’ identification of seven basic goods is his appeal to philosophical wisdom. Finnis sees the identification of those goods as ‘basic’ in that they should be the common denominators of pro-eudaimonic truth.

Finnis lists his seven basic goods as: (1) Life (2) Knowledge (3) Friendship (4) Play (5) Aesthetic experience (6) Practical reasonableness and (7) Religion. The pursuit of the basic goods is not teleological either; they do not set out a specific goal or a set of rules. Rather, according to Finnis, it is seen as a ‘participation’ in that particular basic good by way of the commitments, projects and actions undertaken in life.

Therefore John Finnis’ Natural law theory is very modern and works well.

John Finnis’ revamp of the Natural Law system gives it a much more contemporary ‘feel’. It is based in ‘goods’ and it is not linked to God in any way. This means it can apply for all, religious and non-religious. To make specific decisions in life, you think reasonably, in accordance with the nine requirements, and then decide how you will pursue the basic goods. The focus on reason makes it applicable to contemporary society.

Against this, Finnis argues that contemporary motivations for action, such as the pursuit of pleasure or material gain, are misguided. However, it could be argued that Finnis is misjudging human nature. Maybe pleasure and greed are the contemporary dominant human emotions. His list of seven basic goods is not meant to be arbitrary but the focus on life for instance, rules out some important aspects such as ‘death’ and accompanying ‘rights’. Thus, when applied to euthanasia it appears to uphold a ‘traditional view’ that it is not acceptable.

Again, it is not always a useful guide as the ‘goods’ are vague. There are no specific rules and there is no clear way to apply them. It may be suggested that two people could draw two very different conclusions.

But what is good and contemporary about Finnis’ Natural Law is the above scope for discretion. As the seven basic goods do not exist in a hierarchy it appears flexible. This could appeal to post-modernists who see a new type of Natural Law that can be adapted to modern society. That is, Finnis’ Natural Law would potentially work better in a Post-Modern Society because it rejects the traditional monist deontological fixed rules of Aquinas’ Natural Law.

Overall, I think that it is a brave attempt to update Aquinas and that Finnis has done a reasonable job in making it appeal to the contemporary reader.

Finnis’ work is recognised as ‘the leading proponent of natural law theory within the Anglo-American legal academy’ according to Greenawalt. Indeed, the close relationship between morality and legal jurisdiction makes Finnis’ theory applicable to all aspects of life that befall a citizen. Finnis’ system allows for a safe and secure community based on clear principles that can be used to carefully formulate laws. It also protects society morally since, like all Natural Law theories, it establishes clearly which acts are always bad.

One major strength is the encouragement for individuals to engage with society by embracing the common goods which are not presented as a list of ‘don’ts’. Instead they encourage purpose in life, which is to be full of activity and enjoyed. The rules (where there are rules) seem to appeal to common sense and the law is positive in defending human rights. This all makes for an attractive, thriving modern society. His emphasis on aesthetics, play and sociability makes a vital contribution towards the 21st-century discussions about shared values, citizenship and tolerance.

However, although this may be presented as an argument that this gives us clear guidance and values, some have rejected this. For instance, Finnis is known widely to be very ‘right wing’ in terms of politics and his conservative principles in applying Natural Law have been criticised. For example, he has made controversial observations about immigration, equating it with ‘reversed colonisation’ and causing ‘a trajectory of demographic and cultural decay’. He has also been criticised for his views on homosexuality, even arguing that the law has the function and duty to condemn homosexuality in various ways, although he does not state how.

Another of the main attractions for Finnis’ Natural Law is that it does not need consideration of a God. Whilst it does not deny the importance of ‘religion’ as a basic good, unlike Aquinas, there is no need to ground his theory in divinity. In this way it appeals to both religious and non-religious people as a common social foundation. As Einwechter writes, ‘Since natural law is part of the nature of things the knowledge of it is accessible to all men through reason apart from any supernatural revelation.’

However, it is also possible to deny that Finnis’ model of Natural Law is relevant to all in society. For instance, we could reject the assumption that humans share a common human nature and also suggest that the basic goods are incomplete. In fact why are there seven? Why not more or less? Are the goods fully representative and meaningful? Brigita White suggests, ‘A self-evident principle is only self-evident to the subject, in this case Finnis, and then only to the extent that it has become self-evident and not challenged by that subject's experience. It is quite conceivable that different people would come up with entirely different formulations of goods to be attained.’

The good of life ignores any consideration of death and the right to die and so immediately evades difficult debate about suicide and euthanasia. Indeed, Brigita White comments, ‘Although, Finnis indeed posits a place for morality in the law, the type of morality Finnis has in mind is questionable.’

That there are other, more relevant and flexible systems of ethical theory that may be better for contemporary society. These include both religious and non-religious. Indeed, our society is built upon democracy and the law and our political system has had much utilitarian influence. People may prefer this because it is more flexible and applicable in a variety of ways and see Finnis’ Natural Laws as simply inflexible.

There are clearly ways in which Finnis’ Natural Law is acceptable in society but this does not mean that it will always work, that there are no problems, or indeed, that another alternative ethical theory may be better in serving contemporary society.

Now rank each of the two sets of three answers that follow, as to their quality of evaluation. Make your own comments on the answers provided and how the evaluation aspect could be improved. Compare rankings and comments that others in the class have made and assess if there are any significant differences between you.

‘Finnis’ Natural Law is a weak theory.’ Evaluate this view.

An evaluation of Finnis’ Natural Law is a useful guide for contemporary society. Evaluate this view.