essay on role of army in nation building

Military Conscription and Its Role in Shaping a Nation

The military was created long before the formation of the current modern state. Established for the purpose of obtaining and protecting territory and resources, the military has played and continued to play a significant role in state formation and building. Consequently, the state and the army’s intricately intertwined relationship has attracted a significant amount of scholarly attention. However, the military is an institution that has expanded beyond its initial goals of offense and defense. Such an expansion has come as a defiance to the general and technical perception of what the military represents. It is a tool for state formation and building but it has also become a means from which nation-building and cohesion could be promoted.  While there is a sufficient amount of research on the military relative to state building, existing literature only goes so far in explaining the effective role of the military vis-à-vis nation-building.  Thus, this study will be focused on the latter; it will specifically evaluate one of the military’s policies, conscription, with respect to the activation of national sentiment.  By assessing the degree to which military conscription can break down existing ethnic barriers and unite citizens with a common national cause and identity, we can positively reframe the controversial perception of conscription. On a broader scale, it will also refine our current understanding of the military not just as a coercive institution but also as a social one with short-term and long-term influences on social attitude, behavior and consequently, nation-building.

Research Questions

In order to understand the potential conscription has in building a nation, it is necessary to evaluate the scope of its influence, with respect to its surrounding environment. Such an objective can be split into two inquiring parts: to what degree does military conscription have a uniting impact on society? And in what context is such an impact nurtured/hindered? The former can be studied by taking into consideration each case study’s social structure and the dynamic relation and interaction between their different social/ethnic groups. This brings us to the sub-questions: what impact does conscription have on inter and intra-ethnic interactions? And can it strengthen sub-groups’ loyalty towards the national community that they are a part of?

The latter can be studied by comparing both case studies to identify common background variables that have ensured the successful establishment and continuation of their conscription programs. This also brings us to further sub-questions: what would explain the successful application of conscription as a nation-building strategy? And, how could it be used to explain the success of some countries, and the failure of others, to maintain conscription as a nation-building process? 

Methodology

The main method employed in this study is an in-depth comparative analysis of two very different case studies: Switzerland and Singapore. While such a selection might seem random, it is, in fact, driven by the cause to highlight and emphasize a specific characteristic of interest to our study. Both case studies have successfully implemented mandatory military service that has, in turn, contributed to their country’s nation-building. Using secondary sources ranging from books to academic articles, this study will be comparing these case studies in order to find common background factors that have led to the successful use of conscription as a nation-building tool.

However, the findings of this research have to be understood in consideration with some of its limitations. Taking a comparative method does relatively restrict the context in which the data will be collected and analyzed. This is especially the case for this research since I have refrained from choosing a case study that has implemented conscription but failed to incite a national identity.  However, it is important to note that Switzerland and Singapore are case studies that are very different in terms of history, culture and structure, with very different processes of state formation. Yet, they still share the same dependent variable — the successful application of conscription as a nation-building strategy. By looking at these two highly different cases, I can extract the potential independent variables and conditions that could further help this process. Since these variables should be found in both cases, it is thus improbable that any factor different across the cases would be the independent variable. In other words, a constant cause is needed for a constant outcome. Consequently, the factors that vary in between these countries will be dropped making it easier to identify and extract the background factors constant/common for both cases — the independent variables. 

The paper is divided into 5 sections. The next section provides an overview of the existing literature and debates on the topic. The third and fourth sections respectively focus on the case studies of Switzerland and Singapore. Both sections focus on potential factors, with respect to each country, that have contributed to the success of conscription as a nation-building tool. Finally, the last section spells out the comparative lessons of the case studies and their theoretical implications. 

Literature Review

When it comes to the military’s role with respect to nation-building, the literature is divided into two main perspectives. One perspective argues that it has a positive role with an organizational and stabilizing impact on the nation and state (Coleman & Brice, 1962; Pye, 1962), and/or the potential of acting as a unifying institution. The other perspective claims the opposite (Dietz, Elkin and Roumani, 1991). Krebs (2004), for example, argues that nations are collective and cannot be built on individuals’ decision to affiliate, while Luckham claims that the military institution is a budgetary burden and consequently restricts investment in human capital (1974). 

However, Lamb and Pisani subscribe to neither perspective. They argue that the military’s role regarding nation-building has been impactful in both a positive and negative manner (2018). According to their historical study of the armed forces in Europe and Africa, the impact of the military and the extent to which it was constructive or destructive is based on how and in what context the state was created and developed. 

 Frederick et. al (2017) attribute the effectiveness of the military, not on state-formation as Lamb & Pisani argue, but rather on its degree of cohesion and consequently the usage of national identity and ideology vis-à-vis the military. They support this argument by taking a wide-range of case studies such as Iraq, South Korea, South Vietnam and several African states to study how the presence/absence of a nation-building project highly impacted the survival of the state. In fact, this argument can be further supported by a study done on the IDF, Israeli Defense Forces, which also finds a positive relationship between the army’s integrative/socializing mechanisms, the force’s effectiveness and the nation’s survival. (Henderson, 1985). Not only does the army seem to be fairly reliant on national identity for cohesion and efficiency, it has also come to symbolize a different form of identification, one that supersedes society’s divisions and conflicts (Lomsky-Feder & Ben-Ari, 2015). Evidently, with the reduction of international conflict and the increase in international interdependence, the military and its focus on nation-building has increasingly expanded and proved to be influential.

Zooming in on the literature concerning conscription will show how the military has incorporated elements of nation-building. While many countries no longer implement conscription and have converted to all-volunteer forces (AVF), there are still many states that have maintained their conscription programs and have thus maintained its significance. To abandon or retain such a program continues to be controversial, especially considering arguments that it is a financial burden, a major restriction of freedom, and a site of exposure to trauma. Yet, Switzerland, one of the happiest countries in the world, has successfully normalized mandatory military service as a practice in society. 

In fact, there have been a wide-range of studies on the impact of conscription in many areas such as crime (Hjalmarsson & Lindquist, 2016; Lyk-Jensen 2018), labor market (Hjalmarsson & Lindquist, 2016; Bauer et. Al, 2012), mental health (Lazar, 2014; Morley et. Al, 2020) and personality traits like that of discipline, belligerence, agreeableness etc. (Navajas et. Al, 2019; Schult, 2015). However, not enough research has studied whether or if partaking in military service may develop a sense of national identity. According to the Goh, former PM of Singapore, “nothing creates loyalty and national consciousness more thoroughly than participation in its defense.” This is exemplified in the case of Singapore; its conscription program has been maintained for decades and yet its abolition has never been an election issue (Kwok, 2014). In fact, in 2014 the UAE implemented a conscription program  after taking inspiration from several states, including Singapore, considered to have some of the most effective conscription practices. The UAE did not do so purely for military reasons; once again, conscription is used as a political and symbolic tool to assert a ‘a more homogenous Emirati identity that supersedes local, tribal, religious, or ideological affiliations’ (Alterman & Balboni, 2017). Thus, as Cohen precisely words it, conscription establishes the military as a representative of a highly diverse and heterogeneous population (1985). 

However, can this be applied to any diverse and heterogeneous population? Can it occur in extremely fragmented societies? According to Allport (1954), public policies, including that of conscription, can reduce the distinction of ethnic identities under the right conditions. Rivkin (1969) also argues that nation-building can be successful if applied under conditions “that are conductive to political stability, economic growth and peaceful change.” However, both writers fail to mention what these conditions are. While scholars have highlighted the ability of conscription to successfully overcome ethnic barriers and enable nation-building in certain states, the conditions necessary for such a strategy are vague. For that reason, this study will be comparing Singapore and Switzerland — two cases that have demonstrated the potential of conscription to ameliorate ethnic divisions. According to Kai Ostwald’s survey experiments, his empirical tests strongly demonstrate that Singapore’s service program has been both durable and successful in changing conscripts’ attitudes and behaviors with respect to ethnic interactions (Ostwald, n.d). Not only has it been maintained for decades in Singapore but it has also been accepted and embraced — despite being obligatory — with its abolition never being an election issue (Kwok, 2014). Switzerland is a similar case. It has a high percentage of Swiss citizens in support of maintaining conscription. This can be further supported by a recent Swiss referendum that disclosed an immensely popular level of support for mandatory military service (Ostwald, n.d; Kwok, 2014).

Singapore and Switzerland are very diverse countries. Yet, they have succeeded in normalizing the practice of conscription, among a heterogenous population, for the sake of national defense. In other words, the policy of conscription, in these cases, encourages an outward-looking perspective rather than an inward one that focuses on groups’ allegiance towards their own group interests and needs.  Thus, using these case studies to identify the necessary conditions for the successful use of conscription could provide other countries, especially ones wreaked with division, with comparative lessons from which to learn from and use.

The Historical Shaping of the Swiss Nation

Switzerland is a confederation made up of twenty-six independent cantons that are unevenly divided according to four different language-speaking groups: German, French, Romansh and Italian. This multilingual entity is considered to be a successful example of the political integration of different ethnic affiliations. However, as a country with rich history, this is largely the result of the certain circumstances from which Switzerland arose and developed. 

Geographic Vulnerability 

The particular languages found in Switzerland not only represent the aftermath of historical territorial dominions but also the exchange of Switzerland’s geographical and cultural borders with that of its neighboring countries. Switzerland is a small state that is landlocked by several countries; Germany to the North, Austria and the Liechtenstein principality to the East, Italy to the South, and France to the West. This brings us to the first factor as to why conscription has come to be a successful nation-building strategy in Switzerland: geographic vulnerability. 

Initially, Switzerland was a small territory with a small population and greater, more powerful and populated neighboring countries. This left Switzerland vulnerable and open to the repercussions of any major conflict in Europe. The threat of a common external enemy and the potential end to political sovereignty and freedom obliged this league of small states to come together in agreement. While most modern states were shaped by contesting the particularism of their different segments, Switzerland deviated from such a pattern. In contrast, Switzerland arose by the preservation and development of the autonomy and character of each of its constituents. Since the cantons were no longer under a feudal structure and the power of protection it is obliged to provide, the cantons were required to depend on themselves to settle any conflicting interests and disputes among themselves. While external aggression and collective security was definitely an incentive for cooperation, the establishment of their alliance was further reinforced by the defense of a common set of principles such as self-governance, liberty, autonomy and democracy; the same set of principles that the current Swiss nation is founded on. Thus, with the need to preserve these principles, Switzerland collectively rose unified and resistant against external control. 

Their practice of collective security overshadowed existing differences and directed the focus on common political values between the different linguistic groups. Thus, it is their resistance against foreign powers that led to the focus on common nationalistic goals rather than the prevalence of trans-ethnic features (Wilner, 2009). Consequently, an environment conducive to conscription was established. Their reliance on conscription was needed to accumulate a dependable fighting-force that would deter threats and defend their independence. The establishment of a citizen’s militia made it every Swiss citizen’s responsibility to defend the state regardless of group identification. Thus, Switzerland’s geostrategic vulnerability and the potential threat of invasion established a defensive military-style culture with an all-encompassing social duty to defend the nation (Wilner, 2009). This created a national identity separate from sub-group identification that emphasized and relied on the common values of self-governance and political liberty. In light of the historical competition between foreign powers and the security problem it poses, the cooperation of the Swiss cantons, for the sake of political (rather than ethnic) values, eventually grew into a federal union. Despite the region’s current stability and scarce number of aggressors, conscription is still a policy that is culturally and politically needed to preserve Switzerland’s democratic values and its traditional security-strategy of deterrence (Stringer, 2017).

Geo-strategic vulnerability is one of the conditions for the successful implementation of conscription as a nation-building strategy. However, it can be easily met in a world characterized by anarchic global relations. For that reason, it is important to note how the condition was utilized in a way that would, or would not, provide an environment stable for nation-building. This can be seen in the fact that most countries wreaked by divisions — such as Lebanon, Iraq, Syria — were and remain to be geo-strategically vulnerable to invasion and interference and yet a national identity outside of their group’s interests is yet to be properly formed. This could be largely attributed to a lack of political consensus (Salamey, 2019) on the general goals of society which is, in contrast, evidently present in the case of Switzerland. For the sake of collective security, the compromise and social bargaining of the different polities in Switzerland resulted in their socio-political cooperation. For that reason, they were (and continue to be) aligned with a broader political community that has eventually manifested itself into a politically tolerant culture and identity. Such a community would not have come to place without the integratory push of external pressures and threats. This push acted as a consolidating force and was actualized through the cooperation of conscripts of different linguistic and ethnic backgrounds, united by the collective need to protect their independence.  

Neutral Foreign Policy 

Another factor that has paved the way for conscription as a successful nation-building tool is related to Switzerland’s foreign policy. Switzerland’s renowned principle of armed neutrality has led to a foreign policy that has resulted in an exceptional lack of conflict from the late 1700s onwards (Kwok, 2014). This neutrality goes all the way back to the Peace of Westphalia when it was officially recognized in 1648 (McComas, 2016). However, Switzerland was still sought after for its great geo-strategic territory especially with respect to the Alpine region which consisted of several European transit routes. For that reason, such recognition was not essentially actualized as demonstrated by the French occupation of Switzerland in 1798 and its transformation into a battle-zone between the European powers in 1799. It was the Napoleonic wars that provided a glimpse of the threatening impact a non-neutral Switzerland would have. Consequently, neither of the neighboring states would tolerate an opposing power dominating Switzerland. Thus, after Napoleon’s defeat, recognition of Switzerland’s neutrality was renewed at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 (McComas, 2016). 

Switzerland’s position of permanent neutrality towards other powers meant that they are not allowed to engage in warfare nor may their territories be — to any extent — the stage for warfare. This neutrality served both external and internal functions. Switzerland’s ‘designation’ as a buffer zone protected its independence and freedom from that of external affairs. It also stabilized Europe’s fragile balance-of-power as outlined in the Treaty of Paris, 1815; the neutrality and independence of Switzerland would “enter into the truest interests of the policy of the whole of Europe” (Schindler, 1998). While neutrality was initially a condition — imposed by European powers — for Switzerland’s independence, it eventually became a moral virtue from which Swiss national identity was built on. This brings us to the internal function of neutrality that has provided the means to promote internal integration. Due to the lack of homogeneity with respect to religion, linguistics and culture, neutrality provided a common and non-instigating identity to associate with. A policy that proved to be both important and sturdy in contrast to the power of ethno-nationalization that was prevailing in Europe (Schoch, 2000). Being free and separate from external pressure not only strengthened internal integration but also preserved Swiss unity throughout several major events. Swiss neutrality managed to prevail throughout the Reformation and the following decades of religious conflict that crippled the rest of Europe. It also persisted throughout two highly destructive World Wars. 

While Switzerland did uphold its state of armed neutrality in WW1, it proved to be difficult as its neighbors were a mix of Central Powers (Germany and Austria-Hungary) and Entente Powers (France and Italy). This stirred up conflicting sympathies as German-speakers felt emotionally attached to the German empire and the French-Italian speakers to that of France and the Entente. This was the first time in Switzerland’s history that alliances were made according to the aspect of language (Wilner, 2009). While this did cause some internal conflict, Switzerland still managed not to take sides or partake in the war. By WW2, Switzerland was more prepared. Although the military threat was essentially larger, the internal language-based divisions were not as important. As the Axis powers gradually began to represent anti-democratic forces that opposed Swiss traditions and values, there occurred a decrease in Swiss-German loyalty (Kerr, 1974). This demonstrates the positive aftereffect of establishing political values that align with a broader community. 

The non-alignment policy also played an important role in Switzerland’s defense strategy. Given that neutral countries are not allowed to favor or assist any other countries, the opposite also applies. Thus, conscription and the security/deterrence it provides becomes a necessary strategy for the lack of protection under neutrality. In fact, an empirical study was conducted on the determinants of conscription’s decline between the timeframe of 1970-2010 (Hall & Tarabar, 2016). Membership in military alliances was found to be related. As countries increasingly partake in strategic and protective alliances, they feel less threatened and consequently reduce their military force. Considering Switzerland does not have such privileges, it had and still has to be as self-sufficient as possible with respect to its defensive capabilities. 

Despite the region’s current stability and scarce number of aggressors, Swiss conscription is still a relevant policy that remains necessary in a neutral country that has no military alliances. While the original reason behind conscription was largely militarily, history shows that it is a representation of collective security that has been anchored, alongside the principle of neutrality, in the political identity and practice of the Swiss state. In other words, the purpose of conscription has changed and become essentially more political. This would explain why a recent Swiss referendum on the abolition of conscription reflected an immensely popular level of support for conscription, despite the lack of external motive (Reuters Staff, 2013).

Direct and Consociational Democracy

The successful maintenance of conscription does not only have to do with the particular conditions from which Switzerland developed, but also with the complex institutional-structure of the current federal state. Referendums are part of an important institutional feature that impacts Switzerland and its wide-range of decisions, including that of conscription and consequently nation-building. This feature is known as direct democracy. The Swiss model has granted a high level of participation and self-determination to its citizens allowing them to be more involved in the formation or alteration of Swiss law. In fact, at least one-third of all the referendums held at the national-level worldwide have occurred in Switzerland (Kaufmann, 2019). Thus, the extent to which Switzerland has provided its citizens with a direct voice in their own affairs is beyond compare to any other country. Indeed, like any other average representative system, most of the political decisions are made by the legislative and executive branches. However, with respect to the most important of issues, especially related to the constitution, the people have the final say by means of referendum. Thus, direct democracy controls and regulates the power of the political elites while also giving these important political decisions high rates of approval and legitimacy. Despite criticism of maintaining conscription in a stable region, in 2013, Switzerland rejected a referendum on the suspension of conscription – for the third time in 25 years. 73% of voters from all across the twenty-six cantons rejected the abolition while only 27% were in favor (Reuters Staff, 2013). Evidently, Switzerland’s semi-direct democracy has over and over again provided conscription a legitimate foundation for its application in a world where all-volunteer forces (AVF) are the trend. 

Yet, it is not the only institutional feature that impacts conscription; Switzerland’s mixture of both direct democracy and power-sharing is what makes its system so distinct. Within this government type, rather than the application of majority decisions and a ‘winner takes it all’ structure, each group gets something. As aforementioned, Switzerland did not replicate its neighbors’ inclination towards unification and homogenization. It did not encourage the identity of one specific group at the expense of the other. Instead, it formed a state that preserved the cantonal autonomy of the different group identities. Rather than focus on the establishment of cultural, linguistic, and religious homogeneity, Switzerland accepted its pre-existing diversity and built its institutions on it. This can be seen in the consociational structure of the government and its emphasis on shared decision-making and group inclusion. However, it is important to note that Swiss institutions, as seen through a glimpse of its history, were already accepted and functioning at all levels (Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 2008). This explains why a broad political identity — preaching common political values — was able to simultaneously emerge. This would also explain why, in contrast, countries with weak and politically contested institutions are unable to incite a sense of identity. Even if only one group were to challenge the state’s institutions and its credibility, such institutions will not be able to serve as the basis of an overarching and shared political identity. Yet, in the case of Switzerland, political institutions and values have proven to be able to establish a communal sense of belonging, distinct from that of individual ethnic and cultural bonds. 

It also must be pointed out that Switzerland is not a country that has experienced prolonged internal conflict as popularly seen in ethnically-diverse countries (mainly due to its neutrality). While it did experience civil war in 1847, it was short only causing a small number of casualties. In other words, it did not trigger a great level of suffering. For that reason, Switzerland does not have an ‘emotionalized’ population nor are they represented by ‘emotionalized’ elites (Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 2008). The inter-ethnic interactions between the different ethnic groups are not as delicate as popularly seen in ethnically-diverse countries. Thus, not only is there a certain level of trust and tolerance among different groups but there is also a concentrated effort by these elites to establish and support a shared national identity. This is supported by Wilner who claims that in 1917, the elites from different ethno-linguistic groups “very quickly moved to an appeasement policy in attempt to realign political sentiments along the nationalist axis that they had designed in previous decades” (Wilner, 2009; Wimmer, 2011). Another example is the creation of the term “Geistige Landesverteidigung” in 1938 by elites in the Federal Council.  Equivalent to “spiritual national defense”, this term promoted Swiss political/cultural ideas and values in order to diminish rising ethnic pressure and counter the propaganda of surrounding countries (Wilner, 2009; Ormes, 2011). Evidently, the continuing trust between both groups and elites have created an environment conducive to the institutional accommodation of different cultural groups. Switzerland’s situation is exceedingly unlike countries that implement power-sharing as a temporary means to avoid ethno-political conflict. 

The combination of direct citizen participation, the institutionalization of common political values, inclusive decision-making, and the lack of emotionalization at all levels has paved the way for an institutional structure that is trusted by the people. Evidently, such a strong and complex institutional structure has created an atmosphere which is not only conducive to conscription but to the military as a whole. The Swiss military has been and continues to be, in essence, a cultural institution. Not only does it represent Swiss culture and history but it also embodies an overarching political identity in which promotes trust, tolerance and diversity. For that reason, the citizens’ perception of the military and other institutions is a positive one that continues to encourage the establishment of a national identity. This positive perception towards state institutions, especially the military apparatus, is not commonly seen in countries divided by ethnic divisions.

The Artificial Shaping of the Singaporean Nation 

Singapore is a small city-state made up of one main island and more than 60 small islets. It has 4 major ethnic groups according to the CMIO model of ethnic classification; the Chinese, the Malays, the Indians and the others which include nationalities mostly from Central Asia and Europe.  However, the sizes of these different groups, with respect to each other, are in no way proportional. The Chinese in Singapore form the ethnic majority as they make up 75% of the population while the Malays, the constitutionally-recognized indigenous people of Singapore, amount to around 13.7%. The Indian ethnic group is at 8.7% leaving a remaining 2.6% for other nationalities (Ortmann, 2009). Evidently, Singapore’s diverse ethnic composition makes it difficult to establish a common feeling of identity. However, the success and development of Singapore as a city-state shows that peaceful coexistence and effective governance was able to be attained and differences surpassed. 

In 1965, Singapore was removed from Malaysia and was forced to become an independent and sovereign state. An independent and sovereign state with a Chinese majority squished between the larger and more populated Malaysia and Indonesia; neighbors that are predominantly Muslim. The establishment of its fragile independence within a potentially threatening territory had consequently established national survival as the main goal of Singapore. This was clearly stated and recognized by Singaporean Prime Minister Lee in 1965:

“We want peace simply because we have not the capacity to make war on anybody. We are surrounded by bigger and more powerful neighbors with whom we cannot afford to settle disputes by force of arms. My country is well aware that it is situated in a region of the world which has traditionally been the battleground of big power conflict. Singapore itself, by virtue of its location, has attracted the attention of nations who wish to dominate Southeast Asia” Moore, 2017

Not only did its geographic location pose a threat to this newly created state but also the structure of its society. Its society is fragmented by its increasingly different ethnic composition as each group identifies with a different language, religion and culture.  Differences that were clearly seen and manipulated in the communal tensions that led to the separation of Singapore from Malaysia. Thus, the amount of investment in the state’s relations with any one of the groups is highly sensitive and restricted by its relations with the others. Evidently, after independence, Singapore was faced with both internal and external conditions of vulnerability impacting every level of society. Thus, in order to lessen such vulnerabilities, Singapore moved towards the method of securitization (Chang, 2019). This led to the prioritization of policies focused on countering and securing their vulnerabilities. This was actualized be a range of security measures taken. For instance, in 1965, Singapore passed a security proposal that would establish the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) responsible for the protection of national defense. In 1967, it introduced the National Service policy as an ‘exceptional’ security practice for securing their vulnerability.  Its implementation played and continues to play a dual role of military defense and nation-building respectively targeting both external/geographic and internal/social vulnerabilities. This was followed up by another security policy, in 1984, known as the Total Defense Doctrine. Implemented to “unite all sectors of society in the defense of Singapore”, the Total Defense Doctrine tackles military defense, economic defense, civil defense, social defense, digital defense etc.  These different areas of defense are conveyed to be, individually and collectively, dependent on the effort of all of society in deterring potential aggressors. Additionally, in 1970, the Ministry of Defense was divided into two ministries, the Ministry of Defense (MINDEF) and the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA). Each ministry became responsible for external and internal security respectively (Chong, 2020).

The continuous state of anxiety about the state’s survival has created an insecure environment that has reoriented the people to accept such securitization policies, especially that of conscription. The implanting of Singapore’s vulnerability as a prevalent discourse — reinforced by the implementation of security policies — has created a positive and exceptional attitude towards conscription. In fact, in Lee’s memoirs, he highlights the need to tailor people in a way that they would accept how essential it is to have “a people’s army” (Yew, 2000, p. 33). Thus, by the constant appeal to the people’s fear, vulnerability has been deeply-rooted in people’s perception consequently leading to a defensive and militarized mentality — a mentality that reflects the fusion of civil-military relations. As Brown claimed, Singapore legitimized its rule through “an “ideology of survivalism” (2000) which has been continuously used to compensate for the lack of national identity. The discourse of national survival became the means from which to mobilize the population and incite national consciousness. It has been further actualized and reinforced through conscription for the greater purpose of national integration —  a purpose that remains to be an issue for an import-dependent country within a region made up of its very close, larger and more populated neighbors.

Meritocracy and Elite Governance

The obstacles facing this young nation provided great incentive for an ideology of survivalism, however, it could not be exclusively depended on as a long-term resource. Although Singapore’s independence and expulsion from Malaysia left it scarce of both human and natural resources, it was capable of achieving significant growth as GNI/capita measured an increase from $34,576 in 1990 to $83,793 in 2018 (a 142.3% increase) (UN, 2018). Singapore’s remarkable economic and social advancement, in a relatively short period, hindered the credibility of the survival discourse making it no longer compelling enough for the mobilization of its people. As a young state made up of immigrants coming from different ‘native lands’, such as China, India and Malay states, it is consequently lacking in shared historical and cultural roots. Due to this weak foundation from which to construct a national identity, the government turned to different alternatives. One of which was elitism. With the rise of democracy and the idea of political legitimacy, elitism was left behind in the 20 th century. However, Singapore remainsan exception (Skrbis & Barr, 2008).

Considering the dynamics of Singapore’s composition, establishing a sense of national identity required an active, adaptable and leading government. For that reason, from the time of its independence, the issue of national identity was largely a governmental project. This goes to show that nation-building was not a naturally occurring process but rather ‘artificially’ developed through the policies implemented by a selected elite administration. An administration that has directly tied the survival of the state to its own existence. This is mainly reinforced by the government’s support for meritocracy, which is largely an elite-building process. Established as a foundation of Singapore’s national identity, the meritocratic approach promoted a system grounded on the tendency of achievement rather than that of ascription. From a highly competitive educational system, top performers are selected and trained into a ruling elite that would pragmatically guide and reform society from above. For that reason, the country’s investment in nation-building is largely intertwined with the investment going into elite formation. While this top-down approach certainly has an alienating effect, this elitist approach to politics — founded on that of meritocracy — has become crucial to Singapore’s national identity. This is largely due to the influential role of elites’ in shaping national and political discourse according to their principles. In other words, Singapore’s national identity is the product of the elites’ direct and active role they play, from above, in actualizing and institutionalizing pragmatic ideas and practices that would ensure coexistence. 

This is exemplified by the establishment of the Ministry of Culture, in 1959, to drive cultural programs that would foster a sense of pride, loyalty and national identity across a population that initially had no roots in Singapore. It launched the first national symbols — its new red and white flag, the state crest and state anthem. It created events and activities that explicitly promote nation-building and improve “inter-cultural awareness, racial understanding and bonding among the four main races” (Ministry of Communications and Information, 2018). It also established Singapore’s National Day Parade (NDP) which maintains, to this day, a military theme. The parade is continuously presented as a symbol of Singapore’s capabilities with respect to the country’s citizen army. In fact, quite recently in 2018, the Minister for Defense, Dr. Ng Eng Hen, reminded citizens of the significance of participating and sponsoring in the NDP:

“Because we can forget what it is about, we can think it is just a parade show. But as a relatively young and independent country, each NDP that we hold every year is about a nation still establishing itself, and not least through a common identity” …. “the NDP reminded us of the struggles in our past and that we can be stronger helping one another as a community” Min Zhang, 2018

This highlights their continuous manipulation of anxiety with respect to the country’s uncertain future. This consequently reinforces the relevance of conscription and the need for a citizen-army. In fact, a study was done on the previous PM, Mr. Lee Kuan Yews and the speeches he gave at 26 different National Day Rallies between the timeframe of 1959-1990. The identification and expression of threats in the environment turned out to be a very common theme found throughout most of the speeches (Tan & Wee, 2002). Evidently, elites play a significant role in their indirect integration of ideas into national and political discourse —  discourse that is consistent in reflecting a certain and consistent perspective of the nation. This is exemplified in the constant promotion of ‘national’ principles: economic growth, multiracialism, equal opportunity and upward socio-economic mobility for all citizens regardless of their ethnicity in Singapore’s constructed nation-building myth.

This has been established as a necessary tactic to develop a shared identity that can cut across ethnic and cultural lines. A tactic that has succeeded in reshaping the people’s sense of identity with a nation not defined by race but rather by political factors. Not only does this demonstrate that national identity is actually a social construction but it also highlights the important role of the elites in establishing and reinforcing it. Despite some claims of meritocracy being the means and justification for the ruling party’s continuous hegemony, Singapore has one of the most trusted governments. Not only did it rank 6 th among 180 countries in Transparency International’s 2017 Corruption Perceptions Index but it was also one of a few countries classified by Edelman’s Trust Barometer as enjoying high levels of public trust (Li Sa et. Al, 2018). This is most likely due to the effectiveness of the government in its commitment to the creation and application of ‘pragmatic’, rather than ideological, policies. This is more than supported by Singapore’s consistently high ranking on the Worldwide Governance Indicators (Governance in Singapore, n.d). The results of these different indices can be seen in the fact that decades have passed and the current meritocratic leadership continues to be re-elected. This has occurred in parallel to the practice of conscription which has also been maintained for decades with its abolition never being an election issue. Evidently, as long as the current system of governance is effective, it will continue to be upheld. Thus, the principles it reinforces, including the citizen-army mentality, will be preserved and consequently conscription will continue to be embraced. In other words, the maintenance of conscription is largely intertwined with the existence of the elites and their principles that have largely shaped national and political discourse.

Comparative Analysis

Both Singapore and Switzerland, among the richest and most politically-stable nations in the world, were built on their highly diverse ethnic composition. A diversity that they both embraced, institutionalized and executed. However, the product of each country’s historical roots and social conditions was an inverted style of governance. In the case of Switzerland, a bottom-up system is applied in which the local/canton level is involved in policy making. This is reflected by the emphasis on a high level of local/canton autonomy that can be traced back all the way to Switzerland’s origin. However, in the case of Singapore, a young state forced into independence with no common cultural and historical roots, a top-down approach was adopted. As a response to the lack of substance for a national identity (and the risk of conflict), the state applied strong political direction and governance in order to make national decisions that would filter down and shape lower levels. Yet, in both case studies, conscription as a tool for nation-building is successfully being applied. Thus, in comparing Switzerland’s consociational and direct democracy with that of the Singapore’s elitist ‘democracy’, the form of government can be dropped as one of the potential causes and conditions for the maintenance of conscription.

Despite the difference in political systems, both countries have strong institutions that are consistently ranked high in their performance and quality. One of which is the military. Both have developed a system institutionally strong enough to manage and prevent the polarization of factions. Their ability to do so has legitimized the authority of state institutions. It is also important to highlight that both states have created a government in which legitimacy is not founded on the sensitive power of ideologies. In the case of Switzerland, the government’s legitimacy is derived from the people and their high level of participation. In the case of Singapore, it is derived from merit. Therefore, their state institutions give legitimacy to the acts of the government as a whole, rather than the choices of a specific leader or party. In other words, their strong state institutions legitimize the authority and structure of the government consequently legitimizing their implementation of policies, including conscription. Accordingly, strong institutions seem to be a necessary precondition, and an essential foundation, for the role of conscription in national integration.

Another factor common to both countries that, in fact, brought about their existence- is their extensive vulnerabilities, both geographic and social. As both are small states surrounded by larger, more powerful and populated neighbors, the need to self-sufficiently secure their independence and survival was of upmost importance. This factor is not only common to Switzerland and Singapore but to most small states as they are the most susceptible to invasion or attack, in an international system perceived to be anarchic. For that reason, it is also important to highlight the response to such vulnerability. With respect to the case studies, both states have successfully adopted a strategy of deterrence, a strategy that has lost its significance and necessity after the Cold war.  However, both Singapore and Switzerland have continuously adjusted their policies to the type and level of threat present. In doing so, they continuously reinforced and actualized the idea of their potential vulnerability. This created an environment that was (and had to be) unifying, rather than divisive, in order to survive. In the case of Switzerland and its historical policies of neutrality and non-alignment, it gradually established a politically tolerant and accommodating culture. In the case of young Singapore and its securitization policies, it established the means from which to mobilize the population and incite national consciousness. Despite applying different tactics, both states have adopted strategies of deterrence and seek to preserve it through conscription, as it mobilizes the forces needed to assert these policies.  

The final common factor that explains the successful application of conscription as a nation-building strategy is the establishment of a common civic identity. Despite the different sequence in establishing a civic identity (whether before or after applying conscription), both states have created a common national identity that simultaneously respects and recognizes poly-ethnicity. They did not embrace ethno-linguistic nationalism, but rather promoted a common civic culture founded on distinct political features; features that were politically (and rhetorically) tied to the survival and independence of the state. In the case of Switzerland and its rich history, the cooperation of the cantons originally began as a way to defend a common set of political principles such as self-governance, liberty and democracy.  This need for civil defense paved the way for the need for conscription. The same set of principles that held the Swiss polity together at the time have come to characterize Swiss culture today. This establishment of a broader community based on civic and political values is also apparent in the case of Singapore. However, Singapore, as a recently-established state, established its civic identity after (and through) applying conscription. In contrast to Switzerland’s natural and historical process, Singapore has artificially planned and developed a civil culture to continuously promote and reinforce. Meritocracy is at the core of this as it has established a system running on hard work, merit, and achievement, rather than that of ascription. Such an approach has been embedded and propagandized in the educational, political and economic structure of the state, alongside the values of multi-racialism and religiosity. Thus, in both case studies, political and civic values have been used as a means to align and encourage an outward-looking perspective that would redirect groups’ allegiance towards the broader community that they are a part of.  A well-established community that conscripts, regardless of their linguistic and ethnic background, would be willing to defend and protect. It is important to note that the building of a common identity was facilitated by the fact that both countries do not have an ‘emotionalized’ population nor are they represented by ‘emotionalized’ elites. This largely refers to the fact that both countries have not experienced any prolonged and major internal conflicts. Therefore, the inter-ethnic interactions between the different ethnic groups are not as delicate or sensitive as popularly seen in ethnically-diverse countries.  

Implications

While the military might have been originally used for the sake of state formation, it is evident that it is no longer limited to such a technical purpose. Offense and defense are still the major functions of the military; however, they are being executed alongside another function, nation-building and cohesion. This is a social function clearly exemplified by countries that still apply conscription in a globalized and interdependent world dominated by all-volunteer forces (AVF).  

The study of Singapore and Switzerland has not only reflected the positive impact of conscription on inter and intra-ethnic interactions, but also its ability to further strengthen sub-groups’ allegiance towards the national community. In both cases, the states were aware that without internal cohesion, they would become more vulnerable and susceptible to invasion. Thus, their ability to form a state that surpassed the continuous threat of their heterogeneity was largely the result of the simultaneous building and reinforcement of the nation. In other words, since the absence of a common identity would hinder the building of a national community that is essential for effective state-formation, nation-building and state-building became a double-task that had to occur at the same time. A double task that conscription was able to tackle. This not only breaks the ‘stereotype’ associated with the idea of forced military service but also reframes our understanding of the military as a social institution. The military has the ability to be a coercive institution and also a social one with evident short-term and long-term influences on social attitude, behavior and consequently, nation-building. Such influences can be seen in both case studies today as their support for the conscription policy — in a stable and interdependent region —continues to be consistent throughout the years. 

Conscription has a potentially unifying impact on society. However, that potential and whether or not it can be actualized is dependent on the context in which it is occurring. By comparing case studies that have successfully implemented mandatory military service as a nation-building tool, I was able to extract 4 common factors needed to create a context in which maximizes the unifying potential of conscription: strong state institutions, geographic and social vulnerability, the adoption of a deterrence approach, and finally, the establishment of a civic identity. These conditions could be used to provide other countries, especially ones wreaked by division, with comparative lessons from which to learn from and use. Such lessons can be especially derived from Singapore, a young state with no common historical/cultural/political roots, that was able to successfully establish both a state and a nation in a short-period of time. Switzerland, on the other hand, is largely the product of its rich history and the certain circumstances from which it arose and developed. This makes Singapore more of a relatable and pragmatic model to follow and learn from than that of Switzerland.  

This research was based on case studies that have implemented conscription and succeeded in inciting a national identity. Thus, further research should be done on the existence/absence of the aforementioned conditions in countries that have implemented conscription but failed to incite a national identity. Also, considering that Singapore and Switzerland are among the most developed countries in the world, it would be more realistic to analyze the satisfaction of these conditions, or lack of, in fragile or deeply-divided countries. For instance, in the case of sectarian Lebanon and its weak state, it does not satisfy most of the conditions. Thus, unlike Switzerland and Singapore, would state-building policies need to be applied prior to the concerns of nation-building policies? Accordingly, is conscription only successful in developed countries that have already established a strong state foundation? In other words, can conscription impact extremely fragmented societies that have undermined the state? Would it not be possible for a strong and legitimate military to have a unifying impact in the presence of a weak state? Considering the implication that conscription cannot flourish in all types of environments, such questions should be pursued in order to provide more insight on when and where to use military conscription as a tool for building a cohesive nation. 

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Further Reading on E-International Relations

• Constructing a Narrative: Ontological Security in the Scottish Nation (State)
• A Spectre of Conflict: Shaping Lebanese Sectarianism and Identity Politics
• (Re)Shaping Territories to Identities: Is the Middle East a Colonial Invention?
• Has the US Learned from Its Experience in the Vietnam War?
• Shaping the Transnational Capitalist Class: TNCs and the Global Economy
• Violence and Political Order: Galtung, Arendt and Anderson on the Nation-State

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Nation building and Pak Army

A nation is a group of people bound together by language, culture, common heritage and usually recognised as a political entity. Nation building means measures taken to streamline a nation institutionally and economically. Since creation, Pakistan Army has fought three wars followed by the Kargil war, war at Siachen and also against terrorism. Over the last 73 years, Pakistan Army has remained the most well managed, disciplined and responsive institution of the country, which besides defence of the country, also carries a rich history of making sacrifices and contribution towards nation building by assisting the government in various fields. Pakistan army has been repeatedly called upon for duties which were well beyond the scope of its role. The strengths of Pakistan Army include a large reservoir of disciplined manpower, organisational ability and strength, technical expertise and skill, accountability, sincerity of purpose, and experience in aid of civil administration. Most of the armies in the world are directly contributing towards nation building like the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China, the United States army, Israeli defence forces, South American armies and the Turkish army. There has been a production corps in the Chinese army since 1954; in agriculture, industry and mines, laying of railway tracks, construction of highways and civic facilities. Pakistan army has made positive contribution and impact in remote areas of the country like Gilgit-Baltistan, erstwhile FATA, Chitral and Balochistan, through the construction of roads, education facilities, water supply schemes, medical facilities through CMHs and medical camps. Frontier Works Organisation, raised in 1966 for the construction of Karakoram Highway, the all-weather road, was completed in 13 years from Havelian to Khunjerab. The organisation has also provided valuable assistance in natural calamities and the construction of roads and bridges. The establishment of communication in Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan was beyond the capability of civil organisation. Without the assistance of the Special Communication Organisation (SCO), all of Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan would have been totally cut off from the rest of the country. The SCO provides telephone, telegraph and satellite communication to Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan. SCO is strategically defence oriented and is also playing a pivotal role in the country’s economy. The National Logistic Cell (NLC) was established in 1978 for the speedy movement of imported wheat from Karachi. NLC was also useful during emergencies and war for transportation of vehicles, machinery and tanks. The bulk of its manpower comes from the Pakistan army and it is under the ministry of planning and development and works under the supervision of the planning commission of Pakistan. The NLC is also playing an important role in the construction of roads, bridges and grain godowns across the country. In the health sector, Pakistan army is also playing a life-saving role in the remote areas of Gilgit-Baltistan, Azad Kashmir and Balochistan through CMHs and establishment of free medical camps. Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF), a large industrial complex of factories, one of the largest manufacturers of engineering tools/weapons/ammunition, is contributing to the national economy as the largest exporter of arms and ammunition in the country. Heavy Industries Taxila (HIT), in collaboration with China, is contributing towards the manufacture of defence-related goods. In HIT, both army and civilians are employed where APCs, Tanks and artillery guns are manufactured. The Pakistan army was employed to revive the WAPDA in 1998 as serving officers inducted to manage the offices of the electricity board and vigilance wings. The basic aim of employment was to help recover the organization from losses as a huge amount was extracted from defaulters. Pakistan army is regularly called in for desilting/cleanliness of barrages, canals and connected arteries of waterways across the country. The Pakistan army, through planned afforestation, brought vast acreage of wasteland in cultivation besides the plantation of saplings. The Army undertook a large-scale afforestation campaign across Pakistan in the past along the border belt and other selected areas. The Pakistan army is also playing an important role in the agriculture and animal husbandry sectors. The army has an animal dairy, and agriculture farms and also breeds good quality milk-producing animals. Pakistan army also plays the leading role in promoting sports. Besides providing sports facilities, sportsmen, army also coaches promising young talent. The Army Welfare Trust generates funds for the welfare and rehabilitation of the orphans and widows of shuhada (martys), disabled, retired persons of the army and also provides employment opportunities. Fauji Foundation is a self-supporting welfare organisation; the beneficiaries are ex-service men, their families and dependents of the shuhada (martyrs). It plays an important role in nation building through its industrial and commercial projects and in generating revenue for the country. In the field of education, various technical institutions run by the army are being utilised for importing education/training to civilians in civil engineering, telecommunication, aeronautical engineering etc to raise the literacy level. The Army also runs public schools and colleges and federal government educational institutions in far-flung areas which has brought about a social revolution. According to Stephen Cohen’s book, there are armies that guard their nation’s borders; and there are those that are occupied with protecting their own position in society and there are those that defend a cause or idea, “the Pakistan army does all three”. The primary role of Pakistan army is to defend the country against all internal and external threats, yet it shares the economic burden of the country by undertaking nation-building projects because of its displayed performance, commitment, loyalty and efficiency. Pakistan is a symbol of national integration, unity and the strongest bastion of defence.

Injured ASI dies in Karachi hospital

Masud Ahmad Khan

The writer is a retired brigadier and freelance columnist. He tweets @MasudAKhan6.

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Why Nation-Building Matters

By Roger B. Myerson PRISM Vol. 10, No. 1

Reviewed by Roger B. Myerson

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Lessons from a long career in expeditionary diplomacy

The recent fall of Kabul is a stark reminder that policymakers need to understand much more about the problems of nation-building. Some may try to swear off any further involvement with nation-building, but these problems cannot be ignored when failures of law and governance in weak states underlie a pressing migrant crisis on America’s own borders. As the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction has noted, America’s refusal to prepare for future stabilization missions after the collapse of South Vietnam did not prevent the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq but instead ensured that they would become quagmires. 1 To begin thinking more carefully about these vital problems, a good place to start is with Keith Mines’s book Why Nation-Building Matters .

Keith Mines has participated in most of America’s foreign nation-building missions since the 1980s. His first service was in the U.S. Army, where he served as a paratrooper in Granada and taught counterinsurgency in Central America. He then joined the U.S. Foreign Service in 1991. In this valuable book, he discusses experiences and lessons from his long career in expeditionary diplomacy, including missions to Colombia, El Salvador, Somalia, Haiti, Darfur, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

Mines has written this book as an experienced practitioner of nation-building, and I have read it as an economic theorist who shares his view that a deeper understanding of nation-building is greatly needed. In the quest for this understanding, I hope that he might agree with me that a combination of our practical and theoretical perspectives could be helpful. In particular, economists study agency theory to learn how the structure of an effective organization can depend on problems of coordinating agents who observe different information, and this theoretical perspective helps me to see broader principles in some of Mines’s key insights. Mines has emphasized that a nation-building mission needs to rely on field officers who can closely observe the political challenges in different communities, and he has recommended that such officers should get more flexibility in spending funds to support local political development. I would argue that these are key points for understanding why a nation-building agency is needed and how it should be structured. But first, I should highlight and summarize some parts of Mines’s book that I found especially insightful, in his chapters on El Salvador, Iraq, and Darfur.

Rediscovering Counterinsurgency in Central America After Vietnam

In 1984, as part of the American response to insurgency in El Salvador, Mines was assigned to help train soldiers for counterinsurgency in Central America. It was a time when memories of Vietnam made U.S. policymakers highly averse to nation-building, but Mines’s assignment put him in the one place where Americans were still focused on the challenges of nation-building. Mines’s chapter on El Salvador contains a magnificent section entitled “Counterinsurgency Rediscovered” which offers a distilled summary of what he learned then from masters of the previous generation, who had experienced counterinsurgency warfare in Vietnam, Cuba, and the Philippines during the 1950s and 1960s. His mentors while working on Central American counterinsurgency (including Lt. Col. Reynaldo Garcia and Col. John Waghelstein) warned against the dangers of relying on large American forces and heavy weapons to solve the political problems of another country. They taught that a nation-building intervention should involve a balanced mix of military and political support for its indigenous hosts, and America’s contribution must be strictly limited so that the hosts should never forget that it is their country to win, and it is their responsibility to offer a better deal for people throughout their country.

In discussing the missions where he has served, Mines regularly reminds us that the results of any nation-building mission are likely to include a complex mixture of successes and failures. In El Salvador, the notable success in negotiating a political settlement to end the war in 1992 was followed by a profoundly disappointing failure to secure the subsequent peace, allowing criminal violence to grow in a region that has become today the source of a serious refugee crises confronting America. Conversely, although America’s intervention in Somalia in 1994 conspicuously failed to forge a political settlement there, we should recognize that it did succeed in ending a massive famine in that country.

A Key Perspective on the Occupation of Iraq

Among the assignments that Mines has undertaken, one of the most important was his service as governance coordinator for Al Anbar province in 2003 during the occupation of Iraq. There he had primary local responsibility for responding to some of the toughest political challenges of the growing Sunni insurgency. His chapter on Iraq is the longest in the book, and it offers an insightful perspective on this mission.

The book’s subtitle (“political consolidation, building security forces, and economic development”) summarizes the mission’s priorities as Mines assessed them after he arrived in Al Anbar late in the summer of 2003. He saw that job-creating economic development could offer people some hope for a better life, but economic development was impossible without basic security, and security would ultimately depend on political reconciliation of groups that could act as spoilers. So among the challenges of rebuilding Iraq, political consolidation had to come first.

The formation of a broadly representative provincial council was key to any hopes for political reconciliation. During the early months of the occupation, civil affairs officers had done what they could to recruit various local leaders and sheikhs into a provincial council, and Mines later organized a series of local caucuses to elect council members who could be more properly representative of communities throughout the province. The provincial council served as a regular channel for complaints from people in Al Anbar, but its effectiveness was frustrated by its lack of any ability to exercise authority over a budget.

A group of sheikhs proposed to organize a Civil Defense Force to protect roads and power lines in the province, if the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) would provide regular funding and equipment for tribal security forces. They were offering to do essentially what was done through the Anbar Awakening three years later, but Mines was unable to get the funding that was needed to do this in 2003. Instead, the CPA put resources into national programs for recruiting and training security forces. However, in the absence of any national political consensus, such national security forces would be seen in Al Anbar as outsiders with no local accountability, and so it is not surprising that people turned to insurgent resistance.

In the fall of 2003, the CPA head Paul Bremer began a series of monthly one-day meetings with his provincial governance coordinators. Mines describes one such meeting where there was vigorous debate about Bremer’s plans for economic austerity measures, where Mines and other provincial coordinators argued that government-funded jobs programs could play a vital role in winning support for the new regime. I would suggest that, in such debates, we can see the importance of bringing local political perspectives into central policymaking discussions. There has been much ex-post facto criticism of Bremer’s early decisions about de-Baathification and disbanding the Iraqi army in May 2003, but what was needed was a broad debate that included locally informed officials when the decisions were made. Such policies, which would fundamentally affect political realities in every part of the occupied country, should have been formulated in consultation with provincial governance coordinators who were working to earn the trust of local political leaders throughout the country.

From this perspective, it seems severely problematic that Mines and other provincial governance coordinators were not even appointed until after these fundamental postwar policies were formulated. If America had established an effective agency for coordinating stabilization operations, this agency could have ensured that the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan would have, from the start, a team of local stabilization officers ready to monitor local political challenges and provide vital guidance for the strategic direction of these interventions.

Lessons from the Mission to Darfur

The costly frustration of massive American-led interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq has prompted policymakers to seek different models for how a limited American involvement might effectively support an intervention that is led by countries in the region. The most promising model for such nation-building missions may be found in Mines’s chapter on Darfur.

In 2007, Mines was sent to head a field office in Darfur, where he coordinated American support for peace-keeping forces from the African Union. If American policymakers could study just one chapter in this book, this is the one that I would recommend for them to see how a strictly limited American involvement can provide valuable support for peace-keeping missions led by countries in the region. But the chapter deserves careful study, to fully draw out the lessons from Mines’s involvement in Darfur.

With authorization from a United Nations resolution, the African Union sent a peace-keeping force that was spread across Darfur in a series of outposts. Each outpost had a U.S.-contracted military observer to help with operational planning and intelligence, and so Mines was sent to oversee a team of field agents who were well placed to monitor and respond to events on the ground throughout Darfur.

One fundamental point that Mines emphasizes in the Darfur chapter is the vital importance of stationing officers in the field to get local information on the ground where the conflict is. Even before he got to Darfur, Mines was advised that, whatever uncertainties he might have, after ten days in Darfur he would know more about the situation there than the rest of the U.S. Foreign Service, and so he should be prepared to offer decisive leadership there. Mines’s basic observation about the essential value of field presence for building a peaceful national order may be worth quoting here:

Making peace requires hard work that goes beyond a declaration or a conference. It includes the gritty detailed tasks on the ground: reassuring, reporting, and shaping the political environment. It often goes against the interests of numerous stakeholders, and on a higher level includes directed force, sanctions and international pressure, and negotiations. But it starts with people on the ground, and the closer they can get to reality, the more effective and well-calibrated the policies will be. 2

Perhaps a simple peace conference could have been enough if the conflict had been between two highly disciplined organizations with clear, coherent leadership, but such conditions cannot be expected from a conflict in a failed or fragile state.

In fact, among the challenges confronting Mines in Darfur were problems of banditry by former separatist fighters, and the worst offenses were actually committed by troops from the one separatist faction that had signed a peace agreement with the government of Sudan. By agreeing to peace, the leader of this faction had lost the ability to send his fighters on profitable raids against government bases, so he no longer had the resources to pay and control his troops.

Mines observes that, in Darfur, the essential first step toward ending the conflict was inducing rebel groups to form a unified organization that could negotiate with the central government to forge a new political order in Sudan. The billions that America spent to support the Darfur intervention might have been more effective if even a fraction of that amount had been invested in compensation schemes as incentives for local leaders to back a peace deal.

Thus, a second fundamental point that Mines emphasizes in the Darfur chapter is the critical value of flexible finance (or “walking-around money”) for field officers to support positive political development in a distant country. A U.S. officer in the field might readily see how the goals of peace-building could be effectively advanced by allocating money to pay and equip the forces of cooperative local leaders in Al Anbar or Darfur. But in Washington D.C., where these local leaders are unknown, such an expense could seem harder to justify than a much larger allocation for training and arming the forces of recognized national allies, even when those national forces are distrusted by people in the conflict zone.

Mines notes that the U.S. military observers formed the backbone of the peace-building force, and worked in difficult circumstances to stop a genocide, for which they received little public recognition. But there was no regular system for keeping American officers in the field for missions like Darfur, and so as Mines and his colleagues left Darfur, they were not replaced. Thus, the Darfur mission was limited by basic issues of funding and staffing.

Toward a Doctrine for Nation-building

Before discussing the conclusions that Mines summarizes in the book’s Epilogue, let me say something about his basic decision to use the term nation-building instead of the term state-building , which many of us have used almost synonymously. If there is a difference between the two terms, it would be that nation-building should include not only developing the capacity of the government, but also encouraging people to identify with their nation as a whole. I was initially surprised by Mines’s expressed preference for nation-building as the term to describe his work, since he never seemed to get involved in any kind of public relations drive to foster people’s patriotic feelings. However, much of his professional service was devoted to helping to develop a trustworthy working relationship between local leaders and national leaders. I would suggest that perhaps a true basis for people’s patriotic feelings could be found in their confidence that respected leaders of their communities can have a positive role in the greater nation. If so, then popular enthusiasm for national unity would depend on a generally accepted distribution of powers and responsibilities between local leaders and national leaders.

So perhaps Mines is right to prefer the term nation-building , if it can help to remind us of this imperative to develop the essential local foundations for a strong national political system. Then a mission to develop the capabilities of Afghan government ministries and security forces could be properly called state-building , but it should not be called nation-building without some complementary effort to ensure that respected local leaders have a constructive role in the national political system.

Such a reminder is needed. When he attended a conference in Canada shortly after his service in Iraq, it seemed to Mines that the potential importance of federalism in nation-building was getting more discussion in Canada than in the United States. Mines observed that “U.S. thinkers and policymakers, with a thin understanding of the complexities and options in federalism, tended to miss many of the opportunities that might have been available in getting the country to the right political end-state.” 3 This observation seems astonishing when we consider that the United States of America was actually established by a revolution to defend the powers of provincial assemblies, and the need to maintain an appropriately balanced distribution of powers between national and local governments has remained a vital concern in American politics since the U.S. Constitution was written. But somehow, when Americans try to support nation-building abroad, there has been a common tendency to ignore the lessons of America’s own history and assume that foreigners could not have similar concerns about national centralization of power.

In the language of the American Revolution, the people who formed the fundamental basis for the new nation were understood to be the enfranchised inhabitants acting together in their local communities throughout the land. If this understanding had been applied in Afghanistan, the first principle of a nation-building project there should have been respect for the autonomous authority of traditional village institutions; instead, the American intervention focused on building a centralized national government that implicitly threatened them.

So we need a doctrine that lists key points to bear in mind when approaching complex missions like nation-building, and Mines’s book includes a valuable Epilogue in which he summarizes lessons that he would include in a doctrine for nation-building. Mines emphasizes that the first priority for nation-builders must be to support the development of a political compact that can bring people together in the nation. This settlement should address the local concerns of people in all parts of the nation, and economic reforms should not be pushed before the political compact is consolidated.

Mines also lists the development of effective security forces as an essential priority. But I would suggest that perhaps there should be more emphasis on the question of to whom these forces will be accountable. Without clear accountability, even newly trained security forces can be as abusive as in any authoritarian regime, as Mines saw in Haiti. However, accountability for security forces can be defined only in the context of a political settlement. So again we should recognize the priority of the political compact, but with a broader understanding that it should include decisions about the allocation of control over police and military forces. Where local groups do not fully trust the national authorities, some locally accountable police forces might be needed. This point may have sufficiently general applicability to belong also in a basic doctrine for nation-builders.

Finally, Mines discusses the need for an agency to provide standby capability for future nation-building missions, with a cadre of trained and experienced local stabilization officers who would be prepared for the challenges of helping a failed state to consolidate a new political compact and reconstruct effective government. Compared to what America invests in maintaining large, magnificently-equipped military forces which are prepared for conflict anywhere in the world, preparations for the challenges of post-conflict political reconstruction have been negligible.

We should emphasize here that the critical importance of flexible finance for local officers in a nation-building mission has fundamental implications for how a nation-building agency should be structured. To induce positive political change, its field officers must identify key local leaders and offer them appropriate incentives to cooperate in forging a national political compact. For this purpose, the effectiveness of foreign assistance depends on its local political conditionality, so that local leaders should understand that they and their supporters can benefit from foreign assistance only if they cooperate with a wider program of national political reconstruction. In a typical project for international economic development, we might measure results by counting the number of people who have observably benefited from our assistance. But when the goal is political development, it is essential to understand which local groups are benefiting and what they and their leaders have done to support national reconciliation, and such local political conditions are very hard for anyone outside the country to assess.

So there are fundamental reasons why a nation-building agency may need to operate under different kinds of fiscal controls from other agencies of the U.S. Federal Government. A basic principle for structuring operations in most Federal agencies is that American tax-payers’ money should be spent only with regular controls that can assure meaningful accountability to the American people through their elected political representatives. But in foreign nation-building missions, the ultimate goal is to support the development of a government that is accountable to its people, not to America. For American assistance to support this development, the criteria for distributing assistance must depend on conditions that can be understood by the local recipients, even if not necessarily by people in America. Thus, when America’s political leaders have decided that a mission to help rebuild a failed state would be in America’s interest, the budgeted resources for the nation-building mission should be managed by a team of field officers and supervisors who, by their selection and training, can be trusted to spend the money appropriately according to local conditions in remote communities of the failed state, where normal controls of the U.S. Federal Government would be very difficult to apply.

The possibility of future nation-building missions is not just an abstraction. Even today, the United States is challenged by a continuing flood of refugees from Central America who are desperate to escape from crime and oppression in their home countries. The problem of reducing this migration is a first-order political issue for the current U.S. Administration, but the problem is unlikely to abate until these countries develop legal and political institutions that can protect their citizens. Governance reforms have been resisted by small but powerful local groups that have a stake in the oppressive status quo. Increased economic assistance to these countries will not induce the reforms that are needed unless the assistance is supervised by field officers who can direct the aid to benefit key local leaders when they support these reforms. So the migrant crisis today should be seen as a nation-building problem, and this reviewer would be more confident of an effective mission to address it if experts like Keith Mines were directing the mission. PRISM

1 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, What we need to learn: lessons from Afghanistan Reconstruction (August 2021), xii, 96, available at <https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/lessonslearned/SIGAR-21-46-LL.pdf>.

2 Mines, 152.

3 Mines, 282.

Beyond Intractability

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By Carolyn Stephenson

January 2005  

Introduction

Nation-building is a normative concept that means different things to different people. The latest conceptualization is essentially that nation-building programs are those in which dysfunctional or unstable or "failed states" or economies are given assistance in the development of governmental infrastructure, civil society, dispute resolution mechanisms, as well as economic assistance, in order to increase stability. Nation-building generally assumes that someone or something is doing the building intentionally.

But it is important to look at the evolution of theories of nation-building and at the other concepts which it has both supplanted and included. Many people believe that nation-building is evolutionary rather than revolutionary, that is takes a long time and is a social process that cannot be jump-started from outside. The evolution of the Italian city-states into a nation, the German city-states into the Zollverein customs union and later a nation, the multiple languages and cultural groups in France into the nation of France, the development of China from the warring kingdoms, took a very long time, and were the result, not only of political leadership, but of changes in technology and economic processes (the agricultural and then industrial revolutions), as well as communication, culture and civil society, and many other factors.

In what Seymour Martin Lipset has called The First New Nation , the United States, at first 13 colonies with diverse origins, came together to form a new nation and state.[1] That state, like so many in contemporary times, faced the prospect of secession and disintegration in 1865, and it took another 100 years for the integration of black and white, North and South, East and West. This was a new type of nation-state, because its people were not all of the same ethnicity, culture, and language, as had been thought to be the case in the early defining of the concept of nation-state.

But nation-building by one nation may destroy others. In the building of the US nation and others, aboriginal nations were erased or marginalized. The Six-Nations Confederacy of the Iriquois had existed before the US nation (and was thought by some to be a model for it). Today many "First Nations" are in the process of nation re-building, re-building the social, cultural, economic and political foundations for what is left of self-governance. First nations seek to re-build cultural identities as nations in order to challenge their disintegration by others in the creation of their own states.

Association of First Nations National Chief Matthew Coon cited the Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development (released in 2001 by the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard) proposal of a Nation Building Model of Economic Development. The project defined Nation-building as: "Equipping First Nations with the institutional foundation necessary to increase their capacity to effectively assert self-governing powers on behalf of their own economic, social and cultural objectives." [2] The study identified four core elements of a nation building model: 1) genuine self rule (First Nations making decisions about resource allocations, project funding and development strategy), 2) creating effective governing institutions (non-politicized dispute resolution mechanisms and getting rid of corruption), 3) cultural match (giving first nations institutions legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens), and the need for a strategic orientation (long-term planning).

One of the reasons for the difficulties of what many consider "failed states" is that some peoples who had been integrated were taken apart by European colonialism, while others who were separate peoples were integrated together in new states not based in common identities. Particularly in Africa and the Middle East, new political borders paid little attention to national identities in the creation of new states. Thus the notion of nation-state, a nation which developed the governmental apparatus of a state, was often nonsense. While in Europe nation-building historically preceded state-building, in post-colonial states, state-building preceded nation-building. The aftermath of colonialism led to the need for nation-building.

What IS nation-building?

A 2003 study by James Dobbins and others for the RAND Corporation defines nation-building as "the use of armed force in the aftermath of a conflict to underpin an enduring transition to democracy."[3] Comparing seven historical cases: Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, "in which American military power has been used in the aftermath of a conflict to underpin democratization elsewhere around the world since World War II," they review the lessons learned. This definition of nation-building is substantially different than those which see nation-building as the province of people within a nation. The definition centers around the building of democratic processes, but many argue that the use of the military to bring about democracy may be inherently contradictory. Whether nation-building can be imposed from outside is one of the central questions in this field, and whether that can be done by the military is a further part of the question.

What is a nation?

To understand the concept of nation-building, one needs to have some definition of what a nation is. Early conceptions of nation defined it as a group or race of people who shared history, traditions, and culture, sometimes religion, and usually language. Thus the United Kingdom comprises four nations, the English, Irish, Scottish, and Welsh. The people of a nation generally share a common national identity , and part of nation-building is the building of that common identity. Some distinguish between an ethnic nation, based in (the social construction of) race or ethnicity, and a civic nation, based in common identity and loyalty to a set of political ideas and institutions, and the linkage of citizenship to nationality.

Today the word nation is often used synonymously with state, as in the United Nations. But a state is more properly the governmental apparatus by which a nation rules itself. Max Weber provided the classic definition of the state:

Today, however, we have to say that a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. Note that "territory" is one of the characteristics of the state. Specifically, at the present time, the right to use physical force is ascribed to other institutions or to individuals only to the extent to which the state permits it.[4]

In approaching the question of nation-building, and in particular its relationship to state-building, it is important to keep in mind that this definition specifies the legitimate use of force.

The Evolution of Nation-Building Theory

The term nation-building is often used simultaneously with state-building, democratization , modernization, political development, post-conflict reconstruction , and peacebuilding . But each concept is different, though their evolution is intertwined. The concept of nation-building came to be used especially among American political scientists a decade or so after World War II, to describe the greater integration of state and society, as citizenship brought loyalty to the modern nation-state with it. Reinhard Bendix focused on the expansion of citizenship and of rights to political participation. [5] Karl Deutsch focused on the role of social communication and national integration in nation-building in Western societies.[6] Others began to apply it to non-Western societies as well.

Almond and Coleman argued for the functional approach to understand and compare the political systems of developing countries.[7] They argued for the interdependence and multi-functionality of political structures, and argued especially that the input functions of political systems could help to distinguish stages of political development. They defined input functions as: 1) political socialization and recruitment, 2) interest articulation, 3) interest aggregation, and 4) political communication. Output functions were: 5) rule-making, 6) rule application, and 7) rule adjudication. [8] Most nation-building after the end of the Cold War seems to focus more on the output functions.

Lucian Pye linked modernization with Westernization and "the diffusion of a world culture," what we might today call globalization .[9] He identified political development with:

.A world culture based on advanced technology and the spirit of science, on a rational view of life, a secular approach to social relations, a feeling for justice in public affairs, and, above all else, on the acceptance in the political realm that the prime unit of the polity should be the nation-state.[10]

Pye identified multiple meanings of political development, among them:

• as prerequisite to economic development,
• as politics typical of industrial societies,
• as political modernization,
• as administrative and legal development,
• as mass mobilization and participation ,
• as the building of democracy , and
• as stability and orderly change.

He identifies equality as one of the basic themes running through all of these.[11] While nation-building after 9/11 still incorporates many of these meanings of political development, equality does not seem to play a major role in practice.

Dudley Seers, in his presidential address to the Society for International Development in 1969, presaged what has become the concept of human development . He said:

The questions to ask about a country's development are therefore: what has been happening to poverty? What has been happening to unemployment? What has been happening to inequality? If all these have declined from high levels, then beyond doubt this has been a period of development....[12]

In the 1990s the UN Development Program brought out the Human Development Report and the Human Development Index to focus on those aspects of development other than economic, including in the index both health and education. Many UN programs, as well as NGO efforts, focus on these aspects, and the World Bank has begun to focus on poverty, but to date there seems no effort by the US in either Afghanistan or Iraq to include poverty, unemployment, or inequality in nation-building efforts.

Almond and Verba in 1963 introduced the concept of The Civic Culture to the development literature. The civic culture, which combines tradition and modernity, is one of the processes that sustain democracy. Almond and Verba defined as part of this civic culture the obligation to participate and the sense of civic competence and cooperation. They also noted the importance of the role of education in the development of a civic culture.[13] Alexis de Toqueville had noted the importance of associations in sustaining Democracy in America at its earliest stages.[14] Robert Putnam, in exploring the civil traditions in modern Italy that make democracy work, includes in his notion of the civic community: civic engagement, political equality, and solidarity, trust , and tolerance , in addition to associations.[15] He finds the presence of choral societies in Italy, bowling leagues in the US, and other associations, to be important, but in Bowling Alone , finds such associations to be reducing in the US today.

The importance of civil society also became clear as a factor in the movement from authoritarianism toward democracy in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe at the end of the Cold War. The role of civil society received much support in early nation-building/democratization efforts in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, but has drastically declined since then. This notion of the importance of civil society as an underpinning to democratic nation-building seems to be given lip-service in current efforts, but in reality it is not seen as significant by nation-builders if one measures this by any spending measure.

If nation-building in the 20th century is to be successful, it may want to return to look at some of its early theorists. The importance of democratic values, of the civic culture and civil society that develop and sustain them, the importance of increasing social, political, and economic equality, and of human development, rather than just economic development or state-building, are key in any successful strategy for long-term democratic nation-building. Nation-building is more than just state-building. To be a sustainable force for peacebuilding, it must incorporate more than just the Western appendages of democracy. Voting systems and free market development and increasing the GNP per capita are not likely to bring stable peace .

Why does nation-building matter?

Nation-building matters to intractable conflict because of the theory that a strong state is necessary in order to provide security , that the building of an integrated national community is important in the building of a state, and that there may be social and economic prerequisites or co-requisites to the building of an integrated national community.

Further, when nation-building implies democratization, there is the further hypothesis known as the democratic peace hypothesis. Originally explicated by Immanuel Kant in the 17th century, the democratic peace hypothesis says that perpetual peace can be achieved by developing a federation or league of free republican nations. Representative democracies, organized in an international organization, would bring peace. Political scientists who have explored this hypothesis have focused on one of two versions: democracies don't make war against each other, or democracies don't initiate war at all. There is certainly evidence of the former, and some evidence of the latter.

The other side of the coin is that nation-building may sometimes be simply another name for external intervention and the extension of empires. If it can be said that failed states are the cause of national, regional, or world security problems, or that human rights abuses are so extensive that the need to overcome them in turn overcomes the traditional sovereignty rights of states under international law , then intervention in the name of nation-building can be seen to be justified. Sometimes nation-building may simply be used as a justification for the expansion of imperial control. So nation-building matters, but what is meant by nation-building matters even more.

What can be done?

The first major question that needs to be asked is whether nation-building should be done at all. In the context of intractable conflict, is nation-building an appropriate method of providing stable peace and a secure community, which can meet the needs of the people within it? There are mixed conclusions here. The democratic peace hypothesis argues that democratic states do not initiate wars, or alternatively, in its more limited version, do not initiate wars against each other. Immanuel Kant's original statement of the hypothesis in his essay on Perpetual Peace in the 17th century argued both for the necessity of republican (or representative democracy) governments, and for their participation in a league of peace, or federation of free nations.[16] This would mean that the simple creation of democratic nations would not be enough; peace would require also the creation of some sort of international governance and international law.

There is disagreement among current theorists of nation-building as to the relationships between the development of a free market economy and the development of democratic participation, as well as over the necessity of building a civil society as a prerequisite for the development of state institutions for democratic participation. Different theories of nation-building emphasize different parts of the arguments. Different versions of nation-building benefit different groups. Some appear to benefit more the outside countries, and/or the international governmental and nongovernmental organizations which are involved. Some benefit elites in the nation being built or rebuilt. Some spread benefits widely in the society; some do not.

Nation-building that will be likely to contribute to stable international peace will need to emphasize the democratic participation of people within the nation to demand rights . It will need to build the society, economy, and polity which will meet the basic needs of the people, so that they are not driven by poverty, inequality, unemployment, on the one hand, or by a desire to compete for resources and power either internally or in the international system. This does means not only producing the formal institutions of democracy, but the underlying culture which recognizes respect for the identities and needs of others both within and outside. It means development of human rights -- political, civil, economic and social, and the rule of law. But it also means development of sewer systems, and roads, and jobs. Perhaps most important, it means the development of education . Nation-building must allow the participation of civil society , and develop democratic state institutions that promote welfare. Democratic state-building is an important part of that. This is a multi-faceted process that will proceed differently in each local context.

WHO? Military or Civilian?

The second major question in what can be done about nation-building is the question (if it should be done) of who should do it, and who CAN effectively do it. The literature is divided over these issues. Clearly the US leadership of the years 2001-4 believes that nation-building in Iraq is primarily the province of the US military. It has shut out even much of the US State Department in this effort, let alone other countries, let alone Iraqis themselves. But the US military itself remains divided on the issue of whether the military should be involved in peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and nation-building. Some argue that this is not the function of the military; it is to exert force, or as retired Colonel Fred Peck announced in an NPR interview October 22, 2001: "Our job is to kill people and smash things." Some argue that this would weaken the military and make them less capable of doing their primary task of defending US national interests. Some argue that the institution that projects force cannot at the same time build peace or build a nation. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's "Mission Statement and Commander's Intent" says that it develops competent and adaptive leaders ..., imbu[ing] the qualities and skills necessary to dominate across the spectrum of conflict."[17] Is it possible to dominate across the spectrum of conflict at the same time as helping to build a nation?[18]

There are others in and out of the US military who argue for a kinder, gentler military, and argue that military training needs to be changed to reflect these new tasks. In a 2003 article in The Atlantic Monthly , Robert Kaplan [19] laid out 10 rules for "Managing the World." The first rule: "Produce More Joppolos," refers to Major Victor Joppolo, from John Hersey's novel, A Bell for Adano .[20] Kaplan argues that Joppolo, a US civil affairs officer who became the post-WWII military mayor of Adano, and worked to settle internal disputes, return fishermen to the sea, and find a replacement for the bell Mussolini had melted down for arms, can be a model for soldiers in military occupations and peacemaking operations. US Army Lt. Colonel Patrick Donohoe argues that the Army must prepare leaders for nation building, by providing training in "culture; basic law and civics; city planning and public administration; economics; and ethics," as well as language, and "how a free, democratic government is supposed to work."[21] He argues that ethics training must include knowledge of the Geneva Conventions and the Law of Armed Conflict. While all of these may be important, one is still left with the question of whether the military is the best institution for nation-building.

WHO? The US? or the UN?

Another question is whether an outside country can build a nation in another country. Is nation-building more effectively done by a single country, by the UN or UN-related organizations, by regional organizations, or by some combination of these? Michael Ignatieff, in a cogent article critiquing "nation-building lite" in Afghanistan, prior to the start of the second Iraq war, argues for "imperial nation-building," for the importance of sufficient US application of force and sufficient and much larger application of dollars in development aid to make a difference in a critical period. He acknowledges this as imperialism, arguing that "nation-building is the kind of imperialism you get in a human rights era, a time when great powers believe simultaneously in the right of small nations to govern themselves and in their own right to rule the world."[22] He argues that Afghans "understand the difficult truth that their best hope of freedom lies in a temporary experience of imperial rule."

The 2003 RAND study by James Dobbins and others reviews the lessons learned in US nation-building efforts. Comparing seven historical cases: Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, "in which American military power has been used in the aftermath of a conflict to underpin democratization elsewhere around the world since World War II,"[23]

Dobbins and colleagues come to the following conclusions:

Dobbins and colleagues recognize the advantages of a multilateral approach, arguing that while it is more complex and time-consuming, it is less expensive for any one participant and, more important, is better at producing both transformation and regional reconciliation. They also recognize the important role of neighboring countries. They make no mention of the US attempt to win hearts and minds in Vietnam.

The United Nations has participated in nation-building efforts both through the Security Council's authorization of peacekeeping missions involving primarily military, but also civilian and police participants as well. Among these have been Cambodia, Angola, and Bosnia in the early 1990s, and Kosovo and East Timor. Some have been more, some less, successful. It has also participated in development and human rights efforts completely aside from peacekeeping. Efforts range from those of UNICEF in fostering children's rights, to the UN Development Program in providing human development aid , to the Ad Hoc Criminal Tribunals on Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, to the World Food Program, to UNESCO's Education for All program. These are also an important component of nation-building. Economic, social, and political development, and institutions which protect human rights and provide for the rule of law, are important not only to post-conflict peacebuilding , but to nation-building at any stage of development or any stage of conflict . And it may well be that the international legitimacy that can be provided by a global institution may be better for nation-building than efforts by any single country, or a regional organization, or a "coalition of the willing." Accusations of "imperial nation-building" are reduced when there is greater international consensus.

But Donini, Niland and Wermester question whether Western approaches, military and technological, can foster just outcomes, whether through individual countries efforts or through UN agencies. They raise questions of how UN agencies and international NGOs interact with national and local communities in the process of providing aid for political reconstruction and human rights development. Can nation-building really come from outside at all? It may be necessary to go back to the debates over the definition and purposes of nation-building to answer that question.

WHO? IGOs , States or NGOs ?

NGOs and state development agencies have also played important roles in nation-building projects. Mary Anderson has argued that foreign development aid has often fostered the propensity for greater conflict rather than reducing it. She urges that state development agencies first be certain to "do no harm."[24] As states began both to realize the costs of development aid, both financial and otherwise, NGOs became increasingly involved. Supposedly NGOs, with smaller budgets and staffs, could have a greater likelihood of actually reaching the needs of people. But both IGOs and NGOs have now become big business, and many now have the same disadvantages of states.

The issue is not so much which agency, but how the agency functions. Does it simply throw money at the problem? Does it exacerbate tensions by providing money or projects unevenly across ethnic groups or regions in such a way as to generate competition or, worse, security fears? Is its presence so big that it overwhelms the local or national governing structures it is trying to nurture? Is it culturally knowledgeable and sensitive? If one of the components of nation-building is to nurture the further development of civil society, how does an outside organization interact with civil society? This brings us to our final question: can nation-building be done by external actors, or is it only effective when done by those whose nation is being built?

WHO? Indigenous or exogenous actors?

Nation-building is an evolutionary process. It takes a long time. One of the problems with outside actors is that they come and they go. While it may be considered useful for an outside military occupation or peacekeeping force to provide the temporary stability and security necessary in order to allow the process of nation-building to proceed, the question of whether this is the best method remains. If a military stays too short a time, expectations of a dependable peace for the foreseeable future may not develop, and thus people will be unlikely to invest in the future. If, on the other hand, a military stays too long, people will rely on the security provided by outsiders and fail to develop their own institutions for providing it.

The same questions may be asked about outside civilian actors, whether a single state, a regional organization, a global organization, or an NGO. While a significant influx of resources may be necessary, especially in the period immediately following a violent conflict, the right amount, the right methods, and the right length of time are critical. In general, it appears that nation-building is best left in the hands of those whose nation it is or will be, and that outside organizations support, rather than direct, nation-building.

Arguing for the importance of indigenous nation-building does not mean that outside actors should ignore the process. If an outside military is to be involved, it must be funded and supplied sufficiently so that it can bring order and security following conflict. Or it must stay out. Similarly, if there is to be outside civilian involvement, whether state-based, IGO or NGO, it must also have sufficient funding and technical skills in order to provide what is needed and to stay the course. Arguing for the indignity of the process should not be an excuse for exiting the process where there is need for outside help.

[1] Lipset, Seymour M.(1979). The First New Nation .W.W. Norton & Co. Inc.

[2] Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development. Available online at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/hpaied/res-main.htm . Accessed Feb 9, 2005.

[3] Dobbins, James. (2003). "Nation-Building: the Inescapable Responsibility of the World's Only Superpower." RAND Review, Summer 2003.

[4] Weber, Max. "Politics as a Vocation," in Gerth and Mills. From Max Weber. New York, 1946. 48.

[5] Reinhard Bendix, Nationbuilding and Citizenship (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).

[6] Karl Deutsch, "Nation-Building and National Development: Some Issues for Political Research," in Karl Deutsch and William Foltz, eds., Nationbuilding (New York: Atherton, 1963) 7-8.

[7] Almond, Gabriel A. and James S. Coleman (eds.) The Politics of the Developing Areas. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960.

[8] Ibid, p 17.

[9] Pye, Lucian W. Aspects of Political Development. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966.

[10] Ibid, p. 9

[11] Ibid, pp. 33-45

[12] SeErs, Dudley, "The Meaning of Development," in Uphoff, Norman T. and Warren F. Ilchman (eds.). The Political Economy of Development. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972. p. 124.

[13] Almond, Gabriel A. and Sidney Verba. The Civic Culture. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1963, pp. 315-324.

[14] Tocqueville, Alexis de. Democracy in America . Hardcover ed. New York: Signet Books, 2001.

[15] Putnam, Robert D. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993, pp. 86-91.

[16] Kant, Immanuel. Perpetual Peace, and Other Essays on Politics, History, and Morals. Hacket Publishing Company, 1983.

[17] As cited in Donohoe, "Preparing Leaders for Nationbuilding"Military Review. http://www.Leavenworth.army.mil/milrev/download/English/MayJun04/don.pdf

[18] Army Training and Doctrine Command, "Mission Statement and Commander's Intent," on-line at http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/regs/r870-1.pdf , accessed 16 April 2004.

[19] Robert Kaplan, "Supremacy by Stealth," The Atlantic Monthly (July-August 2003): 65.

[20] John Hersey, A Bell for Adano. New York: A.A. Knopf, 1944.

[21] Donohoe, Patrick. "Preparing Leaders for Nationbuilding"Military Review. http://www.Leavenworth.army.mil/milrev/download/English/MayJun04/don.pdf

[22] Michael Ignatieff. "Nation-Building Lite," New York Times Magazine, 28 July 2002.

[23] Dobbins, James. (2003). "Nation-Building: the Inescapable Responsibility of the World's Only Superpower." RAND Review, Summer 2003.

[24] Anderson, Mary. "Do No Harm." Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999.

Use the following to cite this article: Stephenson, Carolyn . "Nation Building." Beyond Intractability . Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: January 2005 < http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/nation-building >.

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Indian Army in Nation Building

The secure environment provided by the Army, ensuring the path to prosperity and development for the country as a whole, is only a part of the larger and ubiquitous role played by the Indian Army in nation building

The Indian Army is a much respected and loved organisation. War anniversaries bring it into focus for the citizenry and any perfidy by inimical neighbours on the borders suddenly energises a nationwide interest in this very fine organisation. Beyond that, its role and understanding remains hazy or unknown. In fact, there are often critical voices raised about the drain of the defence budget on the national exchequer. There is a definite need for an understanding of the larger and ubiquitous role played by the army in nation building.

Ensuring a Secure Environment

First and foremost, it is the secure environment provided by the army as a guarantor of national and territorial integrity that ensures the path to prosperity and development for the country as a whole. Today the dimensions of conflict are manifold and not restricted to the border areas alone. Once again, it is this organisation which is combating the scourge of violence and terrorism unleashed by secessionist elements, aided and abetted by adversarial powers. As a vital organ of the state it is the army, the ultimate arbiter of national safety and security which ensures a safe environment for internal progress and prosperity. Post COVID-19 pandemic, the Indian economy is set for a northward trajectory and the stress by the government is on inclusive development. All this is not feasible without an adequate assurance of a safe and secure nation and the armed forces represent this insurance policy.

The Army is a great reservoir of trained, skilled and disciplined manpower, readily available. Development of Human Resource has always been a hallmark of the Indian Army.

Humanitarian Assistance

Another area where the army periodically occupies centre stage is humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. The Navy has played a stellar role in providing critical help on foreign shores and also evacuation of Indian citizens in distant lands during times of natural as well as human crisis. The Air Force is vital during such disasters due to its speed and reach with both rotary and fixed wing air efforts. However, it is the army with its pan-India presence, especially in the far-flung areas of our country, which is omnipresent during any disaster relief efforts. Ideally, the various organs of state and central governments should come into play before the resources of the army are tapped for such eventualities. But invariably it ends up being not only the most potent responder but also the first responder due to its ingrained capabilities, equipment and disciplined application. In recent years, the National Disaster Relief Force (NDRF) has been playing a pivotal role during natural calamities but it is still not large enough to cater for the continental dimensions of India. Therefore, behind the bright orange overalls the army camouflage uniforms are clearly visible in large numbers during any relief operations. The army’s network of field hospitals, its transportation assets, engineer plant equipment and reconnaissance and communication resources with its nationwide reach, has saved countless lives and provided succour to the people of India, during any natural calamity. The army and organisations like the NSG which are populated by army personnel on deputation have the core competencies in areas vital for crisis management and resolution. These include aspects such as hostage rescue, bomb disposal, search and rescue missions, heli-borne extraction and even rescue operations from blind wells.

Infrastructure Development

The Indian army is possibly the leading force for inclusive development. The road and track infrastructure in the remotest areas over inhospitable terrain, has ensured outreach and connectivity with Indian citizens who inhabit these far-flung parts of the country. Combined with this the army has always taken the lead in building and running schools, medical facilities and habitat enhancing infrastructure in distant border areas. Interestingly, it has also been playing a key role in ecological sustenance through the various territorial army units.

Boosting Domestic Manufacturing

The flavour of the season and the pointer to future economic prosperity is ‘Make in India’. Once again, it’s the Indian army which is a major stakeholder in the success of the ‘Make in India’ pursuit. Being the largest single service, the matrix of numbers related to its equipment and wherewithal are of a very large dimension. Manufacture of military equipment not only gives a boost to the defence industry, it also builds up a dual use ecosystem of many smaller items and sub-items which in turn encourages entrepreneurship, generates employment and multiple other benefits. Success of ‘Make in India’ for defence equipment will lead to an enhancement of defence exports, accrue forex earnings and contribute significantly to the GDP. It also needs to be emphatically emphasised that rather than being a drain, the defence budget should be seen as an engine for economic growth.

Foreign Missions

In the international arena military diplomacy in its various forms is a key element in engaging with other nations. The army has adequately leveraged its capacity of putting boots on ground by being the largest contributor to worldwide UN missions. It also provides invaluable support in terms of capacity building and capability development to various friendly foreign armies. Its training institutions have a sizeable presence of officers from such nations.

Trained Manpower

Within the country the army has provided key support to the central armed police forces in terms of training, equipment and crossattachment of personnel for absorbing best practices. Outside its own organisation the army has been a great facilitator in human resource development. The training and interaction imparted by its personnel to the youth of India, through the medium of the National Cadet Corps, is a stellar example. In fact, the NCC is widely regarded as an arena of discipline, duty and patriotism and many young spirits vie to don its khaki uniform. The army is also a great reservoir of trained, skilled and disciplined manpower, readily available for lateral absorption in other government organisations as well as the private sector. In that sense development of human resource has always been a hallmark of the Indian army.

Confidence in Uniform

The nation expects the army to perform, whether in war, internal strife, disaster relief or any other contingency beyond other organs of governance and the army can proudly claim that it never ever fails on this count. In fact, it goes far beyond this and will always remain a key element in nation building.

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THE MILITARY AND THE CHALLENGES OF NATION - BUILDING IN NIGERIA

Nigerian independence has spanned through 57 years (from October 1, 1960). Of these 57 years the military have ruled for over 32 years. It was expected that the new state of Nigeria in due course would develop public institutions and out of their multiple ethnic communities and diverse cultural groups would emerge the spirit of the nation. Unfortunately, however, at independence, the British not only handed over leadership to a class of educated elite, but also handed over a regionalized, ethnic based administration. So, the emergence of a 3-region structure for Nigeria at independence had implications for nation building. A conscious policy or plan of making Nigeria a nation definitely includes putting in place a set of cultural values and practices for all those referred to as Nigerians. But the question is, did the military in its lengthy years of rule ever have the ambition or dream of building a nation? This paper contends that the military rule is a dictatorship rule which in itself produced all kind of challenges to nation building. These challenges include; the challenge of power- sharing; the challenge of unequal socio-economic development, intergroup tensions and conflicts among others. The paper concludes that nation building is a task for all and sundry; military as well as civilian administration.

Article visualizations:

Abdulrahman, A. A., 2014. “The Impact of the Military on Nigeria’s Nations building, 1966 – 1979” Historical Research Letter 15: 17 – 22 www.iiste.org. Retrieved 18/5/18.

Achebe, C., cited in Gambari. I. A., 2008. “The Challenges of Nation Building: The Case of Nigeria” Lecture delivered at the First Anniversary of Mustapha Akanbi Foundation, Abuja 7/2/2008. www.mafng.org/anniversary/challenges-nation-building-nigeria.htm retrieved on 17/5/18.

Agbowu, D. A., 2000. Nigeria: The Truth, Censuses, Elections, Revenue Allocations and the Way forward. Greenville, Delaware, Bajot Publishers, 205.

Ake, C., 1981. A Political Economy of Africa: London, Addison-Wesley Longman Ltd.

Aluko, F. S., 2005. “The State, Ethnic Politics and National Political Reforms Conference in Nigeria” in Alli, W. O. (ed) Political Reform Conference; Federalism and the National Question in Nigeria, Nigeria political Association, 34.

Coleman, J. S., 1958. Nigeria; A background to Nationalism. Bekerly, University of California Press, 45 – 46.

David, B. G., 1970 (ed): Webster’s New World Dictionary, Vol II, New York, The World Publishing Company, 946.

Ehimika, I., 2003. “Ethnicity, Differential Citizenship and the problem of Nation building” in Olaniyan, R. A. 2003. (ed): The Amalgamation and its Enemies…. 167 – 182.

Elaigwu, J., 2005. Nigeria: Yesterday and Today for Tomorrow: Essay in Governance and Society. Jos, Alpha Publishing House, 384.

Eminue, O., 2006. Military in Politics, Uyo; Soulmate Press and Publishers.

Eshikena, J., 2012. Nigerian Government and Politics, Lagos: Fortan Press Ltd.

Fawole, W. A., 2003. “The Military Rule and The Unitarianization of Nigeria” in R. A. Olaniyan (ed). The Amalgamation and its Enemies: An Interpretative History of Modern Nigeria, Ile-Ife, Obafemi Awolowo University Press, 145 – 165.

Gambari, I. A., 2008. “The Challenges of Nation Building: Case of Nigeria” Lecture delivered at the First Anniversary of Mustapha Akanbi Foundation, Abuja 7/2/2008. www.mafng.org/anniversary/challenges-nation-building-nigeria.htm retrieved on 17/5/18.

Ibuomo, S. L. and Ekundayo, A., 2017. “The Nigerian State, Deprivation and Demand for Resource Control in Niger Delta Region”. European Journal of Social Sciences studies, 2, Issue 8, 297 – 311.

Ikime, O., 2006. History, The Historian and the Nation; The Voice of a Nigerian Historian, Ibadan, Heinemann, 294.

Joseph, R., 1991. Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria; The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic, Ibadan, Spectrum Books Ltd.

Miners, N. T., 1971. The Nigerian Army, 1956 – 1966, London, Methuen, 2.

Olali, S. T. and Ekundayo, A., 2010. “The Niger Delta Travails and Insecurity: Implications on National Stability” in Ashafa, A. M.: Challenges for Nigeria at 50: Essay in Honour of Professor Abdullahi Mahadi. Kaduna, Kaduna State University Press, 439 – 454.

Oyediran, O., 1996. (ed): Governance and Development in Nigeria; Essay in In Favour of Professor Billy. J. Dudley, Ibadan, Oyediran Consult International.

Pye, L., 1962. Aspects of Political Development, Boston, Little Brown.

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• Sudur Pashchim

Nepali Army in nation building: Quality leadership is the key

Sandeep sen.

The Nepali Army has been a symbol of unity and since its establishment has cultivated the spirit of a united Nepal, like no other organ of the state. The Army has maintained its ethos that has proved to be a solid composition for nation building

States and armies are inextricably linked. In fact, the army is an institution that predates the creation of modern states. Historical account indicates that the army emerged along with the establishment of organised human communities, mainly with two important needs: To acquire territories and resources and to provide protection from hostile communities.

In short, armies were created with the purpose of forming and strengthening communities, and protecting the territorial integrity of a political community.

The army has been an integral part of the formation of modern states, and Nepal is no exception. The unification of Nepal by Prithivi Narayan Shah marked the beginning of the “formation” of modern Nepal, and the army’s role was an integral part of that drive. After the unification of the territories, constructing a national identity under a defined system of governance, which unites all the citizens and ensures political stability and viability, was one of the major challenges.

The Nepali Army (NA) has stood firm in its resolve to maintain stability and relentlessly supported the transformation and development of Nepal from ‘nation formation’ to ‘nation building’. While our country has seen a lot of transformation in our journey from the monarchy to federalism, the Army’s place and role have always remained respectable and stable. In an ever changing course of nation building, the Nepali Army has always stood strong to preserve the core values and vital interests critical to the nation-state from external and internal challenges.

The institutional history of the NA establishes a direct link between modern Nepal and its national territory as invading independent principalities and conquering territories through fortified armed strength was considered a common practice. The “unification” of the Baise Chaubise independent kingdoms and tribal territories that gave birth to the national territory of Nepal during the second half of the 18th century can be considered as the foundation of nation building. The expansion campaign led by King Prithvi Narayan Shah, from his small kingdom of Gorkha in the hills of central Nepal, was not possible without a strong and motivated army. Since the unification itself, the NA has, in the highest spirit of nationalism, stepped forward to face all challenges posed to the nation and has been a pillar of support to the people who look up to it in times of crisis.

The Nepali Army has been a symbol of unity and since its establishment has cultivated the spirit of a united Nepal, like no other organ of the state. The Army, in particular, has maintained its ethos that has proved to be a solid composition for nation building and national integration.

From national security to building roads, schools, public health facilities, vocational facilities, sporting facilities and provisioning essential supplies, the Nepali Army has been at the forefront of nation building.

Amongst some of the most important contributions to the task of nation building has been the untiring efforts of the NA in connecting the far flung areas of the country with the national mainstream.

Some examples are the contribution of the NA in building the 105-km Kanti Rajpath, 20-km Kharipati to Nagarkot road, 105-km Trisuli-Somdang road, 88- km Katari to Okhaldhunga road, 86-km Salyan-Musikot road and the 232-km-long Surkhet-Jumla road. Areas which were considered distant and desolate are very much a part of the network of roads created by the NA.

The Army has also taken responsibility to construct the 81.8-km Nijgadh to Kathmandu fast track. The fast tract project and other ongoing projects like the 107-km Chhinchu to Jajarkot road, 112-km Jajarkot to Dolpa road, 31-km Devsthal to Chourjahari road, 145-km Musikot to Burtibang road, and the 91-km Nagma to Gamgadhi road require a great deal of focus, resources and disciplined human resource to execute.

Domestic contribution aside, the Nepali Army has proudly represented Nepal in the UN-led International Peace Keeping Missions around the globe since 1958 and remains the 5th largest contributor of human resource globally.

Its devotion to duty and excellence in executing its responsibility have been widely acclaimed. This has contributed in maintaining a stable and resolute image of Nepal in the international arena.

Contribution of the Nepali military to the nation building process is dependent on its quality of leadership. Therefore, a conscious push is needed to attract the right kind of talent and human resource to the armed forces. The military by itself is also in a process of transformation and development along with the rest of the nation.

The relationship between officers and other ranks should adjust to change in the socio-economic scenario of the country. The growing levels of education and increasing awareness call for dynamic qualities of leadership and overall management. Only a motivated visionary leadership will be able to help the NA achieve its mission in every role.

The NA must emerge as a national symbol that represents the nation’s unique characteristic, which is “unity in diversity” in order to successfully achieve its goals and mission. The military virtues of sacrifice, loyalty and discipline have always remained and must serve as objects of admiration for the rest of the nation.

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The Indian Army’s stellar role in nation building

Loved and respected by his countrymen, the Indian soldier is a role model for the people of India. The Indian soldier's role in nation building has been truly outstanding.

A Tribute to the Indian Soldier

GUARANTOR OF THE IDEA OF INDIA: The Indian soldier is the epitome of courage and unflinching devotion to duty. He is scrupulously honest, truly secular and completely apolitical. With an ethos of hard work, simple needs and frugal habits, more than any other group or community in the country, the soldier embodies and represents the idea of India. Loved and respected by his countrymen, the Indian soldier is a role model for the people of India.

In hail, sleet and snow, in icy blizzards and pouring rain, he stands sentinel over the nation’s borders in the high Himalayas. He maintains a silent and lonely vigil along the Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir J&K). He has held the Saltoro Ridgeline west of the Siachen Glacier, the highest battlefield in the world, with unflinching determination for over 30 years and denied the adversary the opportunity to alter the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL). He has repeatedly shown his mettle while meeting the Chinese challenge along the Line of Actual Control! (LAC) with Tibet.

From the snow-clad and wind-swept mountains of the Himalayas in the north, to the steaming hot and humid jungles of the seven sisters in the north-east and the shimmering sands of the burning Thar Desert in the west, he never lowers his guard. Along the LoC, he braves daily spells of intermittent small arms and mortar fire from a wily enemy. Sometimes he lives through many days of heavy artillery shelling when the very earth around him shakes ominously. Despite the omnipresent danger, hardships and privations of life on the nation’s troubled frontiers, he stands tall and firm. Stoic and resolute in the face of adversity, his courage never wavers, his spirit never flags.

Guardian of the frontiers

The Indian soldier stopped the rape of Baramulla by Pakistani Razakars in 1947 and saved Srinagar from a similar Tate. He took tanks to the 12,000 feet high Zoji La pass in 1948 to push back Pakistani invaders. He fought off the Chinese despite being ill-clad for a winter in the high Himalayas and despite being armed with World War II vintage .303 rifles. In a battle that has gone down in military history as the ultimate example of courage under fire, he fought to the last man and last round at Rezang La, near Chushul in Ladakh, in 1962. Though he was heavily outnumbered and surrounded, he stood last against the Chinese at Walong.

He smashed Pakistan’s Patton tanks at Asal Uttar in 1965 with obsolete recoilless rifles. He stormed the invincible citadel at Haji Pir pass on the Pir Panjal range. At Nathu La in 1967 and at Wangdung in 1986, the glint of his bayonet made the Chinese blink. In 1971, he raced across the Sunderbans to berate Bangladesh and gave back to the oppressed Bengali people their freedom and their dreams. Standing shoulder-to-shoulder with him, his naval mates sank the Ghazi and left Karachi burning. His air force brothers flew rings around Pakistan’s Sabres and Starfighters (gifted by America) with their tiny Gnats.

In 1999, his indomitable courage in the face Of daunting odds and steadfast devotion to duty triumphed over Pakistan’s regular soldiers entrenched on the mountain tops on the Indian side of the LoC in Kargil district of J&K. As the world watched in awe, he manned his guns unflinchingly under the very nose of the enemy and, Tiring in the pistol-gun direct fire role, he blew every bunker on Tiger Hill and half a dozen other mountain tops to smithereens. He took back every mountain inches unparalleled valour in the face of withering Tire inflicted another crushing defeat on the perfidious enemy.

Execptional role in nation building

The Indian soldier’s role in nation building has been truly outstanding. He spearheaded the effort to integrate Junagadh (1947), Hyderabad (Operation Polo, 1948), Goa (Operation Vijay, 1961) and Sikkim (1975) with the Indian Union. He participated in the military interventions in the Maldives and Sri Lanka at the behest of the governments of these countries and was ready to do so in Mauritius. He helped to evacuate beleaguered Indian citizens from the war Zones in Iraq (2003), Lebanon (2006), Egypt, Libya and Yemen (2011), Ukraine and Syria – Iraq (2014) and Yemen (2015).

For many decades in the northeast and since 1989-90 in J&K, he has fought insurgents and mercenary terrorists unleashed by the country’s enemies to destabilise India. He has been ambushed, fired upon with machine guns, made the target of land-mines and IEDs and has been tortured and killed in cold blood by ruthless Islamist fundamentalists sent to wage a war through terror on India, but has never wilted. He has quelled communal and political riots and police revolts. In all the internal security challenges confronting India, he has never struck back in anger even in the face of the gravest provocations. In fact, while fighting with one hand tied behind his back, he has given a new meaning to the term ‘use of minimum force’.

He is called out regularly for flood relief all over the country. He has removed bodies buried under the rubble of earthquakes at Latur and Dharchula and landslides at Kedar Nath and other places in the Kumaon Hills. He coped with determination in the aftermath of the South East Asian Tsunami In December 2004. He has risked his life in cyclonic storms in Orissa and Andhra Pradesh to bring succour to his suffering countrymen. He has often provided essential services during strikes. He has taken medical aid to remote corners of the country. He has braved epidemics and plagues. He has quelled communal disturbances and riots. He has participated in peace-keeping operations and earned the gratitude of beleaguered people from Korea to the Congo, from Kampuchea to Bosnia-Herzegovina across four continents — Africa, Asia, Europe and South America. He has brought laurels to the country in the field of sport and often won most of India’s medals in the Olympic and the Commonwealth Games.

Flag bearer

Belonging to Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, Christian and many other faiths, he prays, eats, lives, plays and fights for India together with his brothers in uniform. He is secular In a positive manner. He not only tolerates other religions but also participates in their rituals and observes their customs and gets immense joy from celebrating their festivals. He has evolved the concept of a dharmasthal where the idols of Hindu Gods and Goddesses are installed side by side with the Guru Granth Sahib and a statue of Lord Jesus Christ and soldiers of all religions pray together. On Dussehra, all soldiers participate with folded hands and bowed heads in Shastra Pooja regardless of their religion.

In many remote corners of the country, he Is the flag bearer. He represents the government of India. Whenever he goes on leave to his village and when he finally retires, he carries the message of nationhood and a disciplined way of life to all corners of the country. He has probably done more to knit India together than all the pompous politicians with their pseudo national integration programmes.

Often reviled, mostly ignored, sometimes venerated by the government of the day, he has taken it all in his stride. He has never complained. He has stood by the nation through thick and thin. He has held the nation together for seven turbulent decades. In the cesspool of filth, squalor and corruption in public life, he alone stands apart like a shining lotus. His life is one of honour, glory and sacrifice — of life and limb. His blood has hallowed the nation’s battlefields.

For our tomorrow, he willingly, selflessly, unpretentiously, gives his today, but asks Tor nothing in return. Apolitical by nature, he knows he will get nothing from uncaring politicians and scheming civil servants. If he frets about anything at all, it is about the national leadership’s callousness in falling to erect a befitting war memorial to commemorate the supreme sacrifice made by his fallen comrades. He is troubled that his brothers-in-arms lay down their lives “unwept, unhonoured and unsung”. But, even here he draws comfort from the knowledge: “On tame’s eternal camping ground, their silent tents are spread; and, glory guards with solemn round, the bivouac of the dead.

He has truly lived up to Lord Krishna’s exhortation: “Reward is not thy concern”. For him, duty is the most supreme religion — the only one he professes (Seva Parmo Dharma).

The Indian soldier gives so much, gets so little in return, and yet serves with a smile. He Is the quintessential Indian who has knit India together. if there is some truth in the phrase “kuchh baat nai jo hasti mit-ti nahin hamari” (there is something about us that we cannot be destroyed), It is because of his indomitable courage and his immeasurable Sacrifices.

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Essay on The role of the Indian Army in nation building

Essay – the role of the indian army in nation building.

The role of the Indian Army in nation building Essay: The Indian National Army is the fourth-largest armed force in the world and the second-largest voluntary military force with over one and a half million active personnel. The fundamental duty of the armed forces is to assure national security and national unity, to overthrow external aggression and internal aggression, and look after peace and security within the sovereign borders of the nation. While providing defence and security remain the major functions of the Indian Armed forces, executing rescue missions and providing assistance during natural and man-made crises are amongst prime contributions towards nation-building.

The Indian Armed Forces play a crucial role in contributing to building a strong and secure nation. As such, it has more than one task besides military activities. The armed forces of India have carried out military operations since the crisis caused by an Islamic militia in Kargil in the 1950s and 1980s respectively and the apprehensions of Chinese invasions in the North Eastern States of Assam and Arunachal Pradesh. The Central Reserve Police Force and the Assam rifles executed the multifaceted role of neutralizing the threats. Apart from carrying out military activities successfully, the Indian Armed forces have also fulfilled its significant role in maintaining national integrity during times of crisis. One such instance can be found in the Military’s functions of urging and evoking a sense of patriotism and nationalism amongst the youth generation of the Northeastern Region of India. The militant insurgency in Northeastern states of India involved numerous local youth of Assam and the adjoining states. A majority of the militia in the Northeast went on to become an integral part of the Indian National Army contributing to the defence force of the nation. The Arunachal Dragon Force (ADF) is an example of an erstwhile militia force that later became a part of the Indian National army.

In addition, the Indian Armed Forces have also adhered to its motto “Service before Self” as it has assisted in the rescue and rehabilitation of common civilians during natural calamities in the country. The army employed seventeen rescue troops in the states of West Bengal and Odisha to manage human and material loss during the Yash Cyclone that hit the states in 2021. It evacuated approximately 2500 people from the seaside region of ‘Digha’. Besides executing relief missions, the Army established the National Cadet Corps in 1948 for the holistic development of youth and ensuring education to individuals hailing from less developed regions of the nation.

In conclusion, it can be said that the Indian Armed Forces play multi-faceted roles to serve the nation. While the primary role of the Armed Forces is to carry out military functions in safeguarding Indian borders and ensuring internal peace and security for efficient governance, it has in the past catered to national integration of the nation. The armed forces have carried out rescue missions during natural calamities and also aided in education for the youth. Thus the Indian armed Forces are a dynamic and versatile institution.

Q1. What is the nature of the Indian Armed Forces?

Ans: The Indian National Army is the fourth-largest armed force in the world and the second-largest voluntary military force with over one and a half million active personnel.

Q2. How have the Armed forces contributed to civilian duties?

Ans:  In addition, the Indian Armed Forces have also adhered to its motto “Service before Self” as it has assisted in the rescue and rehabilitation of common civilians during natural calamities in the country.

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IT GENERAL PRADEEP BALI (RETD)

T HE INDIAN ARMY IS a much respected and loved organisation. War anniversaries bring it into focus for the citizenry and any perfidy by inimical neighbours on the borders suddenly energises a nationwide interest in this very fine organisation. Beyond that, its role and understanding remain hazy or unknown. In fact, there are often critical voices raised about the drain of the defence budget on the national exchequer. There is a definite need for an understanding of the larger and ubiquitous role played by the army in nation-building.

Ensuring a Secure Environment

First and foremost, it is the secure environment provided by the army as a guarantor of national and territorial integrity that ensures the path to prosperity and development for the country as a whole. Today the dimensions of conflict are manifold and not restricted to the border areas alone. Once again, it is this organisation which is combating the scourge of violence and terrorism unleashed by secessionist elements, aided and abetted by adversarial powers. As a vital organ of the state, it is the army, the ultimate arbiter of national safety and security which ensures a safe environment for internal progress and prosperity. Post COVID-19 pandemic, the Indian economy is set for a northward trajectory and the stress by the government is on inclusive development. All this is not feasible without adequate assurance of a safe and secure nation and the armed forces represent this insurance policy.

Humanitarian Assistance

This story is from the December 2020 - January 2021 edition of SP's Land Forces.

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The Army’s Innovation Dilemma

Abdul Subhani | 03.11.24

When Clayton Christensen first published The Innovator’s Dilemma in 1997, he almost perfectly forecast today’s dynamic across the United States Department of Defense. His central warning—that private incumbents who fail to embrace disruption will seriously risk their positions of market leadership—now rings especially true for our most trusted national institutions. For example, the United States Army employs 1.2 million people and executes a budget that reached $178 billion in fiscal year 2023. It operates at a depth and breadth of verticals that no Fortune 500 could imagine—and its idiosyncratic culture predates the birth of our nation. And as we now face a new round of transformation, it wanders directly into the path of Christensen’s warning.

So what is the urgency for an Army that has talked about reorganizing and modernizing since the end of the Cold War brought the peace dividend? Simple—it is the uniqueness of today’s moment in time. Never before have we endured such unpredictable budgets and funding due to abysmally partisan politics at an unprecedented strategic crossroads while technology changes faster than our systems and processes can accommodate. Make no mistake—the situation is dire and each day we are charged with global leadership in an unforeseen crisis. The need to innovate and maximize the responsiveness of our Army is now. We can’t control the external dynamics but we can begin to identify the behavioral and structural challenges preventing us from innovating from within.

At the heart of Christensen’s findings was an observation that good companies unsuspectingly err by continuing to refine their businesses around customer needs while failing to recognize larger market disruptions until losing market share and confronting obsolescence. Obviously, the Army doesn’t have customers, per se. Much has been written about the effect of a lack of market forces in the public sector. However, it’s worthwhile to map the customer-like effect of certain Army-specific stakeholders. As an incredibly hierarchical and byzantine organization, those with the power to mandate change do not necessarily have the power to execute it. Consequently, even the esteemed leadership team of Secretary Christine Wormuth and General Randy George must still rely on those around them to articulate their guidance and monitor the necessary steps to evolution. Unfortunately, those who spend the most time with Army leaders are largely some of the least well-situated to recognize disruptive opportunities or soldier needs. Our leaders are left with “customer” insights from either a misaligned military industrial complex or aloof bureaucrats who are far removed from both ground truth and advances in technology. This is why the Army finds itself in such a dire place today—struggling to balance generational recruiting issues with an inability to modernize at a pace that keeps up with the modern economy. The institution has embraced a system that has effectively insulated its leaders from ground truth and, moreover from the ability to drive enterprise change—even when it’s sorely needed.

Those who rarely deal with the Army might be reading this and wondering, how could the Army face such criticism after sharpening its sword for the last twenty years of war? There is some validity to the premise here. Yes, the Army just put an entire generation through two wars. But the Army also received priority attention and funding for whatever it needed during that time. As geopolitics shift, it now plays a secondary role (at best) to the Air Force and Navy as the United States reevaluates its technological dominance, its supply chains, and its ability to project power. And therefore, the Army finds itself attempting to prioritize modernization with practices and personnel accustomed to being first to the trough for the past twenty years. It will take time to build an institution resilient enough to pounce on emerging opportunities given this new reality.

Leadership also plays a role in facilitating—or hindering—innovation, and the Army’s leadership lays at a crossroads. For years, the Army promoted its leaders based upon who demonstrated the very best combat effectiveness in war. Leaders who were the most battle-tested were prioritized above all else (and for good reason). However, as the landscape shifted faster than the institution could realize, it’s fair to question institutional shortcomings in the promotion systems and talent management of the Army’s leaders. Today’s general officers were largely promoted because of their tactical prowess, not because they were experts in emerging technologies, contracting, recruiting, or marketing. And although there are obviously exceptional leaders who can thrive in any vertical, many cannot, or at least should not, be our only choice for leadership in today’s Army. This talent and experience mismatch among the Army’s general officer corps has an outsized effect on its ability to recognize disruptive opportunities because they simply do not have the appropriate context to do so.

Risk aversion is yet another obstacle to innovation. You may also think that any organization built to win wars could not possibly be too risk averse. You would be wrong. The Army’s culture does not promote risk-taking. There are many reasons for this and most of them apply to almost any other public sector organization. But the Army’s risk tolerance is particularly unsettling because of such widespread recognition for the need to innovate. Invariably, innovation means messiness. Yet enterprise leaders cannot effectively underwrite the career risk for the rare leaders who do show entrepreneurial skills and take risk to meet emerging opportunities. Too often, leaders kowtow to planned innovation in which certain units or commanders are authorized the wherewithal to operate differently. To truly embrace innovation, we must make leaders more comfortable with disruption within the institution itself—not just in a combat setting.

The characteristics of the modern information environment also play a role. The Army’s centralized decision-making apparatus lacks true operating context or ground truth. There are several reasons for this. First, the flow of information today is overwhelming. At the Army’s scale, it’s impossible to effectively manage. Leaders are forced to constantly switch context or adjust to the tyranny of the day. Operating a “ 7,000-mile screwdriver ”—senior leaders engaging with details at the tactical edge—has never proven optimal and today’s modern information environment makes such an approach entirely untenable. Second, Pentagon topic briefs and attention spans are short for the things that are different. It should be the other way around but this is due to the aforementioned cultural issues. Disruptive ideas rarely get senior leader follow-through during execution phases but that’s when it’s needed the most. This inverted pyramid effect perversely reinforces the inclination for conformity and risk aversion as senior leaders are simply not given the time to focus on the fledgling, different ideas that badly need their personal touches. Third, the chain of middle management is well-versed in these challenges and has professionalized an autoimmune response to change—something Bob Gates described very well in his book Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War . This layer is the source of continuity across administrations and it understands that there is a low probability that a senior leader will find the time to return to an issue (and even if he or she does return to it, that momentum can be reversed after time lapses). More institutionalized middle management will prey on the decision-makers’ good-natured expectations that follow-through was appropriately executed to presumably protect exciting new initiatives.

Finally, it is important to consider the impacts of turnover. The Army’s ideal leader is a generalist. It has institutionalized a massive enterprise education system to create and curate leaders who are exposed to a little of everything. Consequently, it moves its personnel around the world every 18–36 months. If a strategic goal is to better recognize and seize disruptive opportunities, this is problematic. First, the process and associated practices are prioritized well ahead of the influence any one individual can exert. This both solidifies the undercurrent of risk aversion and suppresses any sense of personal initiative. Second, the frequent moves make it difficult for one to recognize necessary and responsible change—especially when the role is outside of one’s core competency. Third, whether a vestige of the past or not, these frequent moves are at odds with the modern workforce’s expectations of predictability and inadvertently pushes away our most entrepreneurial and capable soldiers.

Looking ahead, the Army must confront these institutional and cultural barriers to innovation and disruption. To do so, we must encourage our leaders and our legislators to push for foundational change in our most trusted institutions. Today’s operational environment and the pace of change demand it. Key to national defense will be a versatile Army that can flexibly respond to any contingency and mix the full capacity of our military with modern problem-solving. Anything less risks our precious resources, the quality of our Army, and our national security.

Abdul Subhani is a career technologist and entrepreneur. He balances his role as the president and CEO of a tech company with several service‐oriented roles, such as the civilian aide to the secretary of the Army for the Texas capitol region and the distinguished innovation chair at the United States Military Academy at West Point. He also serves on the board of advisors for the Center for a New American Security as well as in several advisory roles across the country.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Spc. Nolan Brewer, US Army

The articles and other content which appear on the Modern War Institute website are unofficial expressions of opinion. The views expressed are those of the authors, and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

The Modern War Institute does not screen articles to fit a particular editorial agenda, nor endorse or advocate material that is published. Rather, the Modern War Institute provides a forum for professionals to share opinions and cultivate ideas. Comments will be moderated before posting to ensure logical, professional, and courteous application to article content.

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The Army’s Role in the Indo–Pacific

Key Takeaways

Of the U.S. Armed Forces, the Navy and the Air Force have the largest roles to play in the Indo–Pacific, but there is also a critical role for the Army.

Smart investment and strategy can allow the Army to punch above its weight in theater and deny air and sea littorals to China using asymmetric tactics.

The Army’s newest long-range-fire capabilities are critical to deterring China in the Indo–Pacific and should be prioritized.

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The Indo–Pacific is primarily a maritime theater. Strategically important countries in the region are separated by hundreds or even thousands of miles of open ocean. The United States is a treaty ally of Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, two of which are island nations that are primarily threatened by the naval, air, and missile forces of China. As a result, in a conflict with China, the U.S. Navy and Air Force would play the leading roles. The Army, though, has a critical role to play in the region, both with its existing assets and with new capabilities currently under development.

The Army’s two main roles in an Indo–Pacific conflict would be to provide logistics and air defense for forward airfields (a familiar role) and to provide shore-based anti-access capabilities—a relatively new role for which the Army began readying itself only recently. The Army can draw lessons in denying access to air and sea littorals with limited and mobile land-based assets from two examples: the Ukrainians and the Houthis.

The Navy and Air Force will play the leading roles in a conflict in the Indo-Pacific, and therefore draw the bulk of new funding for the near future. Given the difficulties in expanding the defense budget in a meaningful way, the Army may even need to downsize to further fund the acquisition of the ships, planes, and munitions that will be most critically needed if the U.S. were ever again engaged in a war in the Indo–Pacific. Given these difficulties, the Army may need to narrow its ambitions and commitments around the world to focus on its role in the Indo–Pacific.

The Marine Corps has already done something similar in a plan called Force Design 2030, divesting itself of equipment and cancelling planned purchases that would be irrelevant to a conflict in the Indo–Pacific and reshaping the service away from how it was structured for counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan and toward near-peer adversary conflict in the Pacific. REF Although it would not be a perfect fit for the Army (which does need to maintain assets such as armor), Force Design 2030 does have some useful lessons for how the Army can retool itself to be relevant in the coming decades as the U.S. and China compete for influence and position in the Indo–Pacific (hoping and assuming that the United States does not repeat its mistake of engaging in any more nation-building occupations in the near future).

The Army’s Role in a Conflict

Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth has identified five core tasks for the Army in the Indo–Pacific if war were to break out: REF

• Serve as the “linchpin” service by establishing and protecting staging areas and joint operating bases for air and naval forces, including providing air and missile defense.
• Provide logistics for the joint force, especially in terms of secure communications.
• Provide command-and-control capacity.
• Use ground-based, long-range fires to interdict enemy missiles, suppress enemy air defense, and provide counter fires against mobile enemy targets.
• Provide counterattack capability with ground combat forces.

In the Indo–Pacific, the U.S. Army must operate in a primarily naval theater of operations against an adversary that has the home field advantage. China is hundreds of miles or less away from the potential conflict zones—as opposed to the United States’ main Pacific nodes of San Diego and Hawaii, which are thousands of miles away from the potential conflict zones—with protected interior supply lines and numerical superiority in terms of equipment and munitions in theater.

The Army can draw lessons from the outsized success of both the Ukrainians and the Houthis in land-based targeting of ships in recent years. The Ukrainians, with no navy to speak of and only short-range and intermediate-range missiles, have sunk Russian ships, targeted Russian port infrastructure, and largely denied the Russians the use of the Ukrainian littoral for offensive operations against Ukraine. The Russians have withdrawn most warships from Crimea and now keep them safely out of range—but also out of the fight. Likewise, the Houthis are threatening international commerce and targeting Western warships with nothing more than cheap drones and land-to-sea missiles.

Until 2019, the United States had been unable to construct ground-based missiles with a range between 300 miles and 3,400 miles due to the restrictions of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which restricted both the United States and the Soviet Union (later Russia). The Chinese were never a party to this agreement and have been engaged in a substantial buildup of missile capabilities over the past several decades. China’s most recent national security white paper states that it is “strengthening its intermediate and long-range precision strike forces … so as to build a strong and modernized rocket force.” REF The Chinese now have missiles capable of reaching targets as far away as Guam and a variety of missiles with different capabilities for both conventional and nuclear missions. REF

Since the end of the INF Treaty in 2019, the U.S. Army has been free to develop and field ground-based intermediate-range missiles. These missiles, coupled with air defense systems, such as the Patriot missile battery, could make it exceedingly difficult for the Chinese to operate in certain contested straits—including the waters between the northernmost tip of the Philippines and Taiwan. China has designed its existing anti-access/area denial capabilities to counter American warships and aircraft and may have a more challenging time targeting and destroying mobile land-based assets. In the event of a conflict in the region, land-based air defense and anti-ship missiles distributed throughout the region would give the Chinese a complex problem to solve and add another layer of deterrence.

New Weapons in the Army’s Arsenal

In 2021, the Army committed to fast-tracking and delivering multiple new fires systems by 2023. The Army has done a respectable job of meeting this target, surprising many doubters who were familiar with the Army’s failed modernization programs in the early 2000s. REF Most of these new weapons and systems have been tested successfully, and U.S. Army Pacific Commander General Charles Flynn has stated that the Army plans to deploy some of them to the Indo–Pacific in 2024. The Army is further developing these new weapons and systems to improve its capability to deliver long-range precision fires that would be especially relevant to a conflict in the region. REF The new weapons and systems are:

• The Precision Strike Missile (PrSM). The PrSM is the next-generation surface-to-surface missile being developed by the Army to replace the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS). REF Lockheed Martin, the missile’s developer, says the missiles have a range of up to 310 miles. REF Like the ATACMS missile, the PrSM will be launched from the mobile HIMARS launch system, although the launcher will now be capable of carrying two PrSM missiles, whereas previously it could carry only one ATACMS missile. REF
• The  Strategic Mid-Range Fires System. Also called the “Typhon” missile system, it has been developed to fire anti-ship missiles, air defense missiles, and land-to-land mid-range missiles. The system is mobile and therefore difficult for enemy forces to target, and its range varies by missile type. REF
• The  Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW). The LRHW is set to be the U.S. military’s first long-range hypersonic missile, with a range of at least 1,700 miles (but possibly more). REF The Chinese have already deployed a significant number of hypersonic missiles and are significantly ahead of the United States in this regard. REF Hypersonic missiles, traveling at least five times the speed of sound, are a huge challenge for traditional air defense measures that the United States has yet to adequately address. If the Army successfully fields an LHRW battery in the near future, it would go a long way toward addressing this capability gap.
• The Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF). The Army has introduced a new type of unit to accommodate these and other precision fires systems, called the MDTF. The Army describes the MDTF as “theater-level maneuver elements designed to synchronize precision effects and precision fires in all domains against adversary anti-access/ area denial (A2/AD) networks in all domains, enabling joint forces to execute their operational plan (OPLAN)-directed roles.” REF The 1st MDTF was established in 2017 at Joint Base Lewis–McChord in Washington State, with the 2nd MDTF following in 2021 in Germany and the 3rd MDTF in 2022 in Hawaii.

The Army’s Role in Peacetime

To shape the region and build an enduring advantage, the Army is deeply engaged in building allied and partner capabilities, especially through joint exercises and training. The U.S. military’s strategy in the Indo–Pacific necessitates building up capable partners and allies in the region to deter the Chinese from launching a war of aggression. The stronger that Japan, South Korea, Australia, Taiwan, the Philippines, and India are (and to a lesser extent, Vietnam and Indonesia), the more constrained China is in its ability to solve political questions in the region by force. The Army’s campaigning strategy in the Pacific demonstrates to Beijing the ability of the United States and its partners and allies to operate jointly technically, procedurally, and at the human level. REF

To further complicate matters for Chinese military planners, the Army should consider expanding joint training exercises to newer partners, such as Vietnam and India, which both share American security concerns about China. In both Vietnam and India, there is a rationale for the U.S. Army to train with local forces in traditional ground combat operations. If such joint training exercises are sustained and effective, the Chinese would not be able to plan for a war over Taiwan that involves solely the United States. Instead, the Chinese will have to consider whether taking Taiwan is possible in the face of opposition by both the United States and U.S. partners and allies, working in tandem and having planned and practiced a joint response for years. The ultimate effect is to deter the Chinese from either an invasion of Taiwan or using military force in one of its many territorial disputes.

The Army recently opened its first regional training complex in 50 years—the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center (JPMRC)—with the goal of training both U.S. and allied forces in a Pacific environment. REF This center maintains two permanent campuses (one in Hawaii and one in Alaska) and one mobile campus that cycles between allied countries for joint training purposes. Over the past several years, the JPMRC has operated from Indonesia and Australia, and this year it will be moving to the Philippines. REF The United States has long maintained bases in Europe where joint training exercises can take place, and this new center has filled a critical gap in allied readiness in the Pacific. REF

The Army conducts exercises, such as Operation Pathways, to practice establishing supply lines and command-and-control networks in the Western Pacific in the event of a conflict. Army units, such as the Fifth Security Force Assistance Brigade, deploy in support of joint exercises in the Pacific, acting as integrators between American and allied troops. REF These sorts of exercises are exactly what the Army should be doing at this point. The primary issue is that the U.S. commitment of troops and resources in the Pacific does not match the Indo–Pacific’s status as the primary region of concern in the National Defense Strategy. The Army continues to devote as much or more troops and resources to other theaters, especially to the U.S. European Command and U.S. Central Command, and is struggling with fully manning its units as a result of the recruiting crisis. If the Army wants to be decisive in the joint effort to deter China in the Indo–Pacific, it will need to shift personnel and resources away from other theaters and to the Indo–Pacific.

The Army deserves praise for moving quickly on these new systems, for being proactive in its engagements with partner and allied nations in the Pacific, and for being responsive to policymakers pushing it to reorient its procurement and force structure around the Indo–Pacific. If the Army is able to build and deploy significant numbers of these new systems to the Indo–Pacific, it will deter China from launching an attack on either American forces or its partners and allies.

Wilson Beaver is Senior Policy Analyst for Defense Budgeting in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for National Security at The Heritage Foundation.

Senior Policy Analyst, Allison Center for National Security

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