divine inspiration essay

What Is Divine Inspiration (and Why Does It Matter)?

Inspiration and Its Fruit

A great deal has been written about the inspiration, infallibility, and inerrancy of Holy Scripture, though only the first of these terms is found in the Bible itself. Infallibility and inerrancy are best viewed as logical deductions from the principle of divine inspiration. The former term became current in the nineteenth century, when Protestants applied it to the Bible and Roman Catholics to the papacy, but “inerrancy” is of more recent origin.

The general line of argument is that if the Bible is divinely inspired, it must also be infallible because God would not lead his people astray. To be truly infallible, however, it must not contain any errors, because even the smallest mistake might mislead people and cause them to err or (if they discovered the mistake) to doubt the truth of God’s Word. Arguments of this kind make logical sense, but they come up against the obvious objections that we do not possess the original manuscripts and that all the copies we have contain errors of various kinds. This means that no truly “inerrant” text exists, but that does not necessarily imply that the copies we have are misleading and says nothing at all about whether they are inspired by God.

Modern Controversy

A great deal of controversy surrounds these terms, and it is fair to say that in the modern church, belief in what they represent is the hallmark of conservative, and usually evangelical, believers. But it is also fair to say that traditionally orthodox Christians have always believed that the Bible is divinely inspired, and the unique place occupied by its text in Christian worship bears witness to that fact.

In ancient times it was commonly believed that poets were inspired by a muse or other genius, who gave them the superhuman talent they possessed. Inspiration applied primarily to the people who composed literary works, and not to the works themselves. In the New Testament, we find both—holy men were moved by the Spirit of God, but the texts they produced were also breathed out by him. This quality was the mark of their holiness and the guarantee of their supreme authority in the life of the church.

“Infallibility” emerged as a way of saying that the Scriptures do not teach error, and “inerrancy” makes it more precise by insisting that they do not contain it either. Both terms have suffered from the excessive zeal of some of their proponents, who have made extravagant claims that go beyond what can be proved from the texts themselves. For example, some have said that Job must have been a historical person, since he is described in that way in the book that bears his name, but it is just as likely that he is a fictional character whom the anonymous author created in order to make a series of important theological points. To use “inerrancy” as an excuse for insisting on the historicity of Job is going too far, and the term loses its credibility when such claims are made on the basis of it.

To use “inerrancy” as an excuse for insisting on the historicity of Job is going too far, and the term loses its credibility when such claims are made on the basis of it.

Juridical Terms

The best way to look at these words is to see them as essentially juridical terms. The Bible is the written constitution of the church and must be interpreted as such. Its authority is absolute, and therefore it is both infallible and inerrant as far as the life of the church is concerned. No Christian preacher or teacher has any right to distort or minimize its teaching, and every word in it must be carefully weighed and its meaning considered. We do not have to worry if some parts of it (such as the Old Testament food laws) are no longer immediately applicable today, because that is often true of human laws as well. A state constitution almost certainly contains provisions that are now obsolete, but they retain the authority of the document as a whole, and if the circumstances for which they were designed should recur, they would come back into force.

The Bible is very much like that, except that it also contains a spiritual message that can be applied in spiritual ways long after the material circumstances in which it was originally revealed have disappeared. If we view matters in that way, then the Bible will not lead us astray, nor will it teach us anything that is false to the Spirit who inspired it.

What About Mistakes?

We do not need to worry too much about the mistakes scribes made in copying, since many of these can be corrected and few have any real significance as far as the meaning of the original is concerned. Some areas of doubt remain, but as long as we do not put too much weight on words or passages that are unclear, this should not affect our understanding of the overall message of the text.

More serious are the allegations that the Bible contains errors of fact or of judgment that are not accidental. For example, archaeologists have raised questions about the Israelite invasion of Palestine under Joshua because evidence for the collapse of the walls at Jericho or the destruction of Ai is either missing or does not support the claims made in Scripture. Historians have found no evidence for the existence of Esther or Daniel, and many scholars believe that they were made up in later times for what were essentially political reasons.

The New Testament is less open to this kind of objection because the time period it covers is much shorter and better known, but there are still many details about the life of Jesus and the career of the apostle Paul which are hard to piece together from the texts. Did Jesus cleanse the temple at the beginning of his ministry or at the end, or did he do it twice, as some scholars have tried to argue? More radical scholars might ask whether the event ever happened at all, and suggest that it was concocted by the disciples to make a theological point.

God Is Love

Gerald bray.

This uniquely accessible volume on systematic theology is written for the average Christian and traces the theme of God’s love through all the major doctrines of the Bible.

These are hard and perhaps impossible questions to answer, partly because the evidence is insufficient for us to decide either way and partly because the intention of the original author(s) is unclear. Scholars do their best to resolve these difficulties, on the reasonable assumption that the problems were not apparent to those who first wrote or read the texts and so there must be some explanation for them. The explanation may not always be what we would expect, and certain questions remain unanswerable in our present state of knowledge, but it would be most unwise to accuse the text of lying or misrepresenting the facts simply because we do not know what they are. The true researcher, like a good detective, will persevere until he has found a solution and refuse to comment on facile theories which discount the witness of the texts. They, after all, are a major part of the evidence we have, and must be treated with due caution and respect.

Inspiration the Key

From the standpoint of the ordinary believer, arguments about the “historicity” of the biblical text are important because our faith is based on truth, but such arguments are not the heart of the matter. The Bible is not the source of our doctrine and spiritual life merely because it contains no errors, since the same might be said of a dictionary or computer manual. Infallibility and inerrancy have their place, but divine inspiration remains the key to interpreting the text because that is what makes it the Word of God. The apostle Paul spoke to us all when he wrote to Timothy,

The sacred writings . . . are able to make you wise for salvation through faith in Christ Jesus. All Scripture is breathed out by God and profitable for teaching, for reproof, for correction, and for training in righteousness, that the man of God may be complete, equipped for every good work. (2 Timothy 3:15-17)

In other words, the Bible is our textbook for learning and growing in our faith, so that we may be able to live as we should and bear witness to the truth of the gospel we have received in Christ Jesus.

Gerald Bray  (DLitt, University of Paris-Sorbonne) is research professor at Beeson Divinity School and director of research for the Latimer Trust. He is a prolific writer and has authored or edited numerous books, including The Doctrine of God ;  Biblical Interpretation ;  God Is Love ;   and God Has Spoken .

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A Rationale for the Trustworthiness of the Bible

By Dr. Andrew Corbett, January 15th 2023

Nearly everything we do is built on trust . When we eat we trust that we will not be poisoned by the cook. When we go for a walk we trust that other walkers will not bump us out of their way. When someone tells us something we trust that they are telling us the truth. In fact, there is hardly anything we do in our everyday lives that does not involve trust . While we generally trust those we have come to know, we readily trust some people whom we do not know if they are people possessing appropriate authority such as a policeman, or a medical doctor or an airline pilot. The right authority invites and engenders trust . Christians trust the Bible because it derives from the highest authority – God . In fact, Christians have good reasons (a rationale) for believing that the Bible is divinely inspired and the only infallible and authoritative written Word of God .

The Bible is not the only ‘book’ that God has given mankind. Christians believe that God has given two ‘ books ’ to mankind – (i) the written, authoritative Word of God, and (ii) the ‘book of nature’ – and that by either, a person may come to know the Creator. But as Article 2 of the Belgic Confession (1559) states, it is only the Bible which is authoritative and reveals the means by which a person can be saved:

We know him by two means: first, by the creation , preservation and government of the universe; which is before our eyes as a most elegant book, wherein all creatures, great and small, are as so many characters leading us to contemplate the invisible things of God, namely, His power and divinity, as the apostle Paul saith, Romans 1:20. All which things are sufficient to convince men, and leave them without excuse. Secondly, He makes Himself more clearly and fully known to us by His holy and divine Word, that is to say, as far as is necessary for us to know in this life, to His glory and our salvation.

The Bible’s Composition

Christians believe that the Bible was composed as a result of God superintending certain people, whom He at times:

• commanded to write His words (Exod. 17:14); or,
• directed them to record certain historic accounts from their perspective (Num. 33:2); or,
• guided them to record their prayers and devotional reflections (such as Ps. 55); or,
• had them document their verbalised worship of God which could be sung by others (such as Ps. 9:2); or,
• write letters to address errors and wrong practices among certain believers (such as Paul’s epistles to churches); or,
• write down certain visions they may have received from the Lord (such as Daniel 10:8ff; Rev. 1:11ff); or,
• used editors and compilers to produce and preserve parts of His Word (such as First and Second Kings). The Bible itself reveals that king Hezekiah’s scribes had access to some of king Solomon’s proverbs which they much later compiled together: “These also are proverbs of Solomon which the men of Hezekiah king of Judah copied” (Prov. 25:1). It also believed that the five books comprising the Psalms , which was compiled as a single volume only after the Jews return from their Babylonian captivity, was superintended by Ezra – who probably contributed two “editor’s psalms” as part of its one hundred fifty psalms (Psalm 1 and 119).

The Bible’s Divine Inspiration

“Holy Scripture, being God’s own Word, written by men prepared and superintended by His Spirit, is of infallible divine authority in all matters upon which it touches: it is to be believed, as God’s instruction, in all that it affirms, obeyed, as God’s command, in all that it requires; embraced, as God’s pledge, in all that it promises” (The Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy, Shorter Statement article 2).

The Bible was composed by God’s superintending its composition. Thiessen (1983) describes this divine inspiration of the Scriptures as, “The Holy Spirit so guided and superintended the writers of the sacred text, making use of their own unique personalities, that they wrote all that he wanted them to write without excess or error”, but Thiessen goes on to state, “Inspiration is inexplicable…we do not know exactly how the power of the Spirit operate[d]” (65).

Having noted that the Spirit’s inspiration of Scripture included God directly revealing His revelation to some whom He then commanded to write it down (stated in Rev. 1:11; 14:13; 19:9), we have also noted that God directed, led, guided, and moved (2 Pet. 1:21) certain others to write their part of His Word to mankind. This was done by His Holy Spirit “breathing” upon these writers. “All Scripture is breathed out by God and profitable for teaching, for reproof, for correction, and for training in righteousness, that the man of God may be complete, equipped for every good work” (2 Tim. 3:16-17). It therefore appears that some of those used by God to write His Word were aware that this would be result. “The vision of the evenings and the mornings that has been told is true, but seal up the vision, for it refers to many days from now…But you, Daniel, shut up the words and seal the book, until the time of the end. Many shall run to and fro, and knowledge shall increase” (Dan. 8:26; 12:4). While others may not have been aware of this. “To the rest I say (I, not the Lord) that if any brother has a wife who is an unbeliever, and she consents to live with him, he should not divorce her” (1 Cor. 7:12).

The mystery of how God inspired His Word extends to biblical writers even sharing their lack of knowledge of certain events and the Holy Spirit ensuring that this inability to recall was recorded accurately and honestly. For example, when the Apostle states,“I did baptize also the household of Stephanas. Beyond that, I do not know whether I baptized anyone else” (1 Cor. 1:16).

At other times, it is even the same author who was not aware that he was writing what the Spirit was inspiring, yet what he wrote came from the omniscient mind of God! “Now the Spirit expressly says that in later times some will depart from the faith by devoting themselves to deceitful spirits and teachings of demons, through the insincerity of liars whose consciences are seared, who forbid marriage and require abstinence from foods that God created to be received with thanksgiving by those who believe and know the truth” (1 Tim. 4:1-3).

The Bible’s Infallibility

Christians do not consider that the Bible was divinely mechanically dictated to its writers (unlike Muslims who claim this about their Qur’an). Rather, the Bible’s propositions and intended meaning was divinely inspired and infallible (incapable of being wrong or making an error) in a way that it is not entirely dependent upon a precise series of words. “The Bible is divine in its ultimate origin and theological content but human in its mode of expression or literary form” (Bloesch 1994, 38). This feature of the Bible’s divine inspiration enables it to be translated into any language from its original source languages (Hebrew, Aramaic, and Koine Greek) and still be infallible.

Translators work with original language manuscripts (MSS) produced by textual critics who have compared the known ancient manuscripts (often consisting of MSS fragments) to ascertain where copyists may have made errors (often consisting of scribal spelling mistakes or inclusions of a margin note into the text). Textual critics also incorporate new discoveries of even more reliable ancient MSS into their ‘reconstructed’ MSS (which usually includes their ‘apparatus’ which provides their sources and reasoning for selecting certain renderings). Because textual critics assemble their most reliable original language MSS from diverse sources (through a process of accepting and/or rejecting certain ancient variants), some question whether the claim to biblical infallibility is sustainable. This is one of the reasons why Bloesch (1994) feels that infallibility needs to understood as the truthfulness of the Bible’s propositions not necessarily its words : “We must not read into the biblical testimony a conception of truth that is tied to the epistemology of a naive realism in which words directly present what they signify” (34). When the The International Council on Biblical Inerrancy (ICBI) met in 1978 to affirm the Bible’s infallibility, they also avoided any reference to the need for correspondence to the precise wording of the original autographs:

Being wholly and verbally God-given, Scripture is without error or fault in all its teaching, no less in what it states about God’s acts in creation, about the events of world history, and about its own literary origins under God, than in its witness to God’s saving grace in individual lives. (The Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy, Shorter Statement, Article 4)

The three hundred signatories to the Statement affirmed the distinguishing definitions of the terms infallible and inerrant as:

Holy Scripture, as the inspired Word of God witnessing authoritatively to Jesus Christ, may properly be called infallible and inerrant . These negative terms have a special value, for they explicitly safeguard crucial positive truths. Infallible signifies the quality of neither misleading nor being misled and so safeguards in categorical terms the truth that Holy Scripture is a sure, safe, and reliable rule and guide in all matters. Similarly, inerrant signifies the quality of being free from all falsehood or mistake and so safeguards the truth that Holy Scripture is entirely true and trustworthy in all its assertions. (The Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy, Exposition.)

As our scientific knowledge of the natural world increases, and confirmation of historic events described in the Bible based on archaeological discoveries including discoveries of Ancient Near East (ANE) writings (sometimes recorded on earthenware pottery and tablets) have silenced the criticisms of the Bible’s reliability from yesteryear (Metaxas 2021). For example, the Bible’s scientific claims – such as the creation of the world out of nothing, now referred to scientifically as the Big Bang , (Ross 2018, 25) was once mocked by critics such as Sir Fred Hoyle (professor of astronomy, Cambridge University) prior to the mid-twentieth century before Edwin Hubble’s discovery of “red shift” was confirmed that the universe must have indeed had a beginning (Graetzer 2020, 26).

The Bible’s infallibility is also frequently challenged by those responding to faulty interpretations of the Scriptures, rather than what the Bible actually teaches. For example, as science professor, Daniel Graetzer points out, there are things assumed by some Christians which are not stated in the Bible – such as the age of the universe, or the age of our planet, or the date of when homo sapiens appeared on earth (Graetzer 2020, 34). This is why it is important to understand the principles of hermeneutics – the art and science of interpreting literature – which accommodates how we understand poetry, metaphors, similes, and hyperboles. For example, no one believes that Jesus was claiming He had door-frame hinges just because He said He was a “door”! “So Jesus again said to them, “Truly, truly, I say to you, I am the door of the sheep” (John 10:7).

The Bible is Authoritative

Bruce (1988) notes that the New Testament Gospels and Epistles were recognised very early (second century) as authoritative “because they contained the apostolic tradition which came from the Saviour Jesus” and, together with the Mosaic law, were recognised as Scripture for Christians (149). The earliest complete list of the twenty-seven books of the New Testament was noted by Athanasius, bishop of Alexandria, in AD 367, “who listed exactly the twenty-seven books which traditionally make up the New Testament in catholic and orthodox Christianity, without making any distinction of status among them” (208-209).

The Bible is authoritative because it claims to be the Word of God. “This God—His way is perfect; the word of the LORD proves true; He is a shield for all those who take refuge in Him” (Ps. 18:30). The prophets whom God used to write His Word specifically describe these moments of divine inspiration with the expression, “Then the word of the Lord came to me” (refer to: Jer. 42:7; 43:8; Ezek. 1:3; 3:16; 6:1; 7:1; 11:14; 12:1;13:1; 14:2). Jesus described the record of these divinely inspired messages as “the word of God” (Matt. 15:6) and referred to it as “Scripture” (‘the writings’) and declared that “Scripture cannot be broken” (John 10:35). Jesus also stated that the “Scripture must be fulfilled” in Him (Luke 22:37; John 13:18; Acts 1:16).

In the New Testament epistles we have internal references to the teaching of the apostles recorded in the Bible as Scripture which the writer of Second Peter states, “Our beloved brother Paul also wrote to you according to the wisdom given him, as he does in all his letters when he speaks in them of these matters. There are some things in them that are hard to understand, which the ignorant and unstable twist to their own destruction, as they do the other Scriptures ” (2 Pet. 3:15b-16).

Within the sixty-six books of Scriptures we have a unified and coherent revelation from God about His identity as the Creator, the Law-giver, the Redeemer, the Saviour, and the Final Judge. Its sixty-six books tell one story – God’s plan of redemption and conquest over and ultimate vanquishing of evil. Within the Scripture is the revelation of how to be reconciled to God by having our sins forgiven through Christ. It is the Scriptures which assure us that we have one mediator between us and God the Father – Jesus the Christ (1 Tim. 2:5; Heb. 9:15; 12:24) through whom we can directly appeal. It is within the Scriptures that we find the commands of God for how we are to live, conduct our lives, order our affairs, treat others, and prioritise our worship of God. Thus, we are not permitted to just be “hearers” of God’s Word, we are to accept its authority and be compliant with its commands and imperatives (Rom. 2:13; 1 Tim. 4:16; James 1:22-23) – because it is the Word of God.

Wayne Grudem unambiguously explains the unique authority of Scripture as:

The New Testament writings contain the final, authoritative, and sufficient interpretation of Christ’s work of redemption…Thus, once the writings of the New Testament apostles and their authorized companions are completed, we have in written form the final record of everything that God wants us to know about the life, death, and resurrection of Christ, and its meaning for the lives of believers for all time…The authority of Scripture means that all the words of Scripture are God’s words in such a way that to disbelieve or disobey any word of Scripture is to disbelieve or disobey God. (Grudem 2005, 64, 73)

REFERENCE LIST

Bloesch, Donald G. 1994. Holy Scripture. Revelation, Inspiration, and Interpretation. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press.

Bruce, F. F. 1988. The Canon of Scripture . Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press.

Graetzer, Daniel G. 2020. Studies in Human Biology. Independent-study Textbook . Springfield, MO: Global University.

Grudem, Wayne. 2005 (1994). Systematic Theology. An introduction to Biblical Doctrine . Grand Rapids, MI: Inter-Varsity Press.

Metaxas, Eric. 2021. Is Archaeology Proving the Bible? Newsweek Online. Accessed 4th January 2023. https://www.newsweek.com/archaeology-proving-bible-opinion-1634339

Ross, Hugh N. 2018. The Creator and the Cosmos. How the Latest Scientific Discoveries Reveal God. Covina, CA: Reasons To Believe.

The Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy. 1978. http://www.bible-researcher.com/chicago1.html

Thiessen, Henry Clarence. 1983 (1949). Lectures in Systematic Theology . Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans.

I agree the Bible can be 100% trusted to give us the truth. As for others, these last few years has given me great doubt that anyone can be trusted. The health professionals lied and pushed a vaccine on us that does more harm than good. Our politicians shut us down with mandates that some profesionals (the Barrington Decleration) said will not work. Even my own minister said that anyone talked of an old earth or the big bang were liars. So we have to make up our own minds to what the truth is. John Bontius

John, many of us have been quite jaded by the influence of big Pharma on our politicians and the audacious measures that ensued which often did more harm than good. Comments like the ones you have shared from your minister are disappointing and reflect his own misunderstanding of the relationship between the Bible and verifiable science.

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The Foundation and Roof for the Evangelical Doctrine of Divine Inspiration

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How to tap into divine inspiration to live more creatively, from experts.

Have you ever been struck by an inexplicable creative urge , seemingly out of nowhere? You may have actually been experiencing divine inspiration. This spiritual concept has been around for centuries, so we asked experts what it's all about—plus how to tap into your own creativity every day.

The history of divine inspiration.

Many accounts of divine inspiration throughout history have been linked with religions, including Christianity, Islam, and Hinduism. The Bible, for example, was said to be divinely inspired, with its various authors claiming to have channeled God in their messages.

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And from Brahms to Beethoven, many famous composers considered their music an act of God, insisting it came from a higher power. "It was commonly believed that poets, artists, and writers were inspired by a muse or other genius, who gave them the talent they possessed," spiritual author  Shannon Kaiser tells mbg.

In short, the idea of divine inspiration stems from the sheer inexplicability of creativity. Great creatives through time have felt they couldn't have come up with their work on their own, so it must have been divinely inspired.

What it means to feel divinely inspired today.

Nowadays, the idea of divine inspiration is still around, though it can be less secular, depending on who you ask. As Kaiser explains, divine inspiration is the concept that a supernatural force, beyond the human self, causes an influx of creative ideas and/or desires.

"Depending on what you believe, this could be inspiration from God, universal source energy, ascended masters, archangels, spirit guides , ancestors, or even your higher self ," she notes, adding, "I like to say that divine inspiration is the support of love energy guiding you."

According to professional intuitive and the author of  Angel Intuition   Tanya Carroll Richardson , another definition of divine inspiration is "something you feel your soul wants you to do, or as I call it, feeling like you are on a soul mission."

Divine inspiration can happen to anyone at any time, Kaiser says, but it can certainly correlate with spiritual awakenings —whether a spiritual awakening elicits divine inspiration or vice versa.

"Often being divinely inspired involves seeing how you can be of service to, or help benefit, a greater humanity or world," Richardson adds. "Divine inspirations involve something larger than yourself, and a big part of spiritual awakenings is realizing and even feeling that everyone and everything is connected."

How to feel more inspired in day-to-day life.

While divine inspiration can't really be forced, there are things you can do in your day-to-day life to be more open and receptive to inspiration.

According to Richardson, it's important to stay in touch with and understand your intuition . In addition to that, "create open space and time in your schedule," she says. "This gives you a chance to check in with yourself and your soul and also gives you time to daydream," which can transform into real-life manifestations .

Kaiser recommends simply doing more of what you love and honoring your natural-born gifts, which she says will help you tap into an elevated state of awareness and connect to your highest self. "Ask yourself what you loved to do as a child, and when you were your best self. These are insights into your true nature," she adds.

You can even watch or read about people and events you find inspiring, Richardson says. "Whether it's watching an athlete or musician perform at their best or hearing about someone giving back in a way that benefits many, piggyback on some of that inspirational energy and feel it in your own system."

Practices to get in touch with your creativity:

Set the scene..

According to Richardson, no matter what creativity looks like for you, you'll want to make space for it to come through. "I love creating a physical space that encourages my creativity ," she explains, adding that her home office is decorated with objects and colors that spark creativity. "Creative spaces should make you feel calm, energized, curious, and inspired," she adds.

Tap into your intuition.

Kaiser and Richardson both agree it's important to tap into your intuition in order to allow divine inspiration to flow. Again, Richardson says one of the best ways to do this is to allow time within your schedule, without distractions, so the inspiration can come.

Kaiser also thinks practices like journaling, spending time in nature, or work with divination tools like oracle cards can be great for this.

Do whatever it is you love.

And lastly, the goal is to give yourself the gift of doing what you love, whatever that may be. As Kaiser explains, "When we're tapped into our innate gifts and honor our joy, we expand time, increase our joy, and attract abundance. Seeking joy daily and aligning with your core values and passion will help you live creatively."

Whether it's painting, gardening, or anything else that lights you up, make time to do it—and have fun with it.

The bottom line.

Divine inspiration will come and go without warning, blessing us with instantaneous moments of creative insight and energy. And while we can't always will the inspiration to come, we can take measures to remain open so when the inspiration arrives , we can harness it for good.

As Kaiser says, "We are all here to support one another and the flow of life; divine inspiration is a force to guide us all into ultimate alignment and inner peace."

"I woke up this morning and I feel much better."

Bobbi Brown, founder Bobbi Brown Cosmetics

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Divine inspiration: rescuing run-down churches – a photo essay

Sixty-odd years ago a Welsh MP along with TS Eliot and John Betjeman formed a group to save ‘ancient and beautiful’ churches from dereliction and demolition. Today, the Friends of Friendless churches keep the doors open to more than 50 of these treasures

T he Friends of Friendless Churches (FoFC) is a small charity that works to save places of worship across England and Wales, many of which face abandonment and ruin as a result of shrinking populations in rural areas.

Founded in 1957 by Welsh journalist and former MP Ivor Bulmer-Thomas – a leading layman in the Church of England – the charity aims to preserve beautiful churches as public monuments that should be rightly recognised as “dispersed world heritage sites” and important components of our cultural legacy. The founding members included politician Roy Jenkins , artist John Piper, poet TS Eliot , and poet and conservation campaigner John Betjeman .

According to Friends director Rachel Morley, through his vociferous campaigning Bulmer-Thomas “almost singlehandedly changed the fate of parish churches”. Having witnessed the demolition of St Peter the Less Church in Chichester in 1960 , he vowed to prevent similar acts of cultural vandalism from occurring again. Bulmer-Thomas believed that “an ancient and beautiful church fulfils its primary function merely by existing. It is, in itself, and irrespective of the members using it, an act of worship. Their message is delivered – not for half hours on Sundays, but every hour of every day of every year, and not merely to those who enter, but to all who pass by.”

Though Bulmer-Thomas was himself a devoted churchgoer, the mission of the Friends is not a religious one. Morley says that “we are an architectural conservation organisation”, and the aim of the Friends is to preserve beautiful places of worship as public monuments. The churches are, according to Morley, our “greatest architectural and cultural legacy … equivalent to the great cultural treasures of places such as Tuscany, Istanbul and Andalucía.”

St Mary of the Angels, Gloucestershire, was bought from the diocese by local villagers in 2011 and will host a pop-up Christmas bar on 20 December

The 56 churches that the Friends look after range from tiny 13th-century stone cells to cavernous modern masterpieces, with a number being added to their portfolio every year. All of the buildings cared for by the Friends are in isolated countryside. “The biggest population around one of our churches is 200 people max,” says Morley. This is in part because it is easier for the Friends to keep an eye on churches away from large urban centres, but also because rural churches are the most at risk. According to a study by the Historic Religious Buildings Alliance, 9% of the 16,000 parish churches in the UK are located where just 0.33% of the population live. As rural populations age, decline and in some cases become more secular, this lack of congregation places a huge number of church buildings in jeopardy.

Nestled in woods at the corner of a farmer’s fields, St Peter’s, Llancillo, Herefordshire, boasts an 11th-century chancel and 13th-century bell

The Venerable Ambrose Mason, Archdeacon of Monmouth, says: “It is the local congregation that has the responsibility for looking after the buildings, their repair and maintenance, and if something really serious crops up – a congregation of perhaps elderly people say ‘we just can’t raise a quarter of a million pounds to repair the roof’,” so, in many cases, the decision has to be made to “walk away from the building”.

This often results in churches being labelled as “unviable”, after which alternative uses for them are sought by church authorities. Morley says: “In the 1950s, many were demolished, whereas now there are better systems in place within the church commissioners and the diocese for finding an outcome.” However, this often means the buildings slip out of the “shared national heritage” into private ownership – converted into private dwellings or offices with little to no public access. Archdeacon Mason says the Friends “provide a vital role in helping to preserve the more significant local churches where the congregations have dropped to a point where they are not viable”.

Morley says “These buildings are beautiful and important in and of themselves. We do not need to justify their continued existence by turning them into cafes or social security offices. The parish churches of England and Wales contain the most important art and architecture and they are vulnerable.” Many churches that are sold often appear cheap at point of purchase but due to the expense of conversion – few have electricity or water – fall into disrepair and are left locked and abandoned.

Just feet from the Great Western Canal in mid-Devon is the former private chapel of the Ayshford family, a Grade I-listed, 15th-century building with diagonal buttresses. Volunteer Julia Pound, who lives next door, describes herself as an “accidental church warden”

The Friends has a membership of 2,000 and relies on a network of 200 volunteers around the country to keep their eyes on the buildings. Julia Pound happily describes herself as an “accidental church warden” after moving in to the property next door to Ayshford Chapel, which is cared for by the Friends. She describes her role as “sweeping it out once a week and making sure it looks loved”.

In the case of St Mary the Virgin in Llanfair Kilgeddin, in Monmouthshire, the church has been cared for by a local man, Maurice Trumper, for over 25 years . The church was saved from demolition in the 1980s in what Friends chairman Roger Evans described as “a rallying point for the conservation movement” following a “tooth and nail” battle with the Church in Wales to save it. The church, an Arts and Crafts masterpiece with its original, fully restored sgrafitto paneling by George Heywood Sumner, is now the Friends’ “pride and joy”, according to Evans.

Service at St Mary the Virgin, Llanfair Kilgeddin, Monmouthshire, due for demolition in the 1980s but now the ‘pride and joy’ of the Friends of Friendless churches

Morley gives the example of the sgrafitto panels at Llanfair when describing the importance of the churches being viewed in the context of the landscapes around them. One extraordinary panel, O ye Mountains and Hills, features the landscape directly outside the church walls – the River Usk, Sugar Loaf Mountain and the tower of the nearby church of St Michael’s in Llanfihangel Gobion. Before the Friends intervention in the 1980s, the panels were scheduled to be pulled out and sent to a museum, while the rest of the building was demolished. Morley says: “The art and artwork in churches is worthy of being in any national museum. What is brilliant is that it is in context, and that could be in the middle of a field or sitting at the side of a road, and that is hugely important. Most of our churches are open 24/7 and we want the public to enjoy them and celebrate them because we are so lucky to have them.”

St Mary the Virgin in Llanfair Kilgeddin (top row) is an Arts and Crafts masterpiece and the only church in Wales to feature sgraffito on every wall. The Church of St Jerome (bottom left) is a 12th century chapel standing in the settlement of Llangwm Uchaf, Monmouthshire. A detail from the stained glass windows in St Mary of the Angels in Brownshill, Gloucestershire (bottom right)

The perseverance on behalf of the local communities surrounding the churches is demonstrated by the case of St Mary of the Angels in Brownshill, Gloucestershire, when in 2011 villagers purchased the church from the diocese and entrusted its care to the Friends in perpetuity. One of the great fears of the FoFC is that short-sighted decisions on behalf of church authorities looking to balance the books could seriously and irrevocably damage the nation’s greatest architectural legacy – removing centuries old buildings from existence or public access over the course of a single generation. Nearly half of the Grade I-listed buildings in England are churches, and around 30 are put up for sale or closed every year.

The Friends receive no public funding in England and only modest support from the Church of Wales. Otherwise, they are entirely reliant on support from their members and donations from the general public. Though many churches petition the Friends for support, they don’t have the budget to rescue all those that are in need. In fact, the organisation has a long list of churches that are under threat or that in some cases have been closed and have stood locked and deteriorating for over 12 years. “There are more churches added to our list every quarter. Some have been on this list for well over a decade,” says Morley.

The Friends stress that cared for and cherished should not mean fossilised, and instead they want offer their churches for public events such as concerts, knitting groups, seasonal lectures, art exhibitions, supper clubs and the occasional religious ceremony. They intend to carry on working tirelessly to preserve what Shakespeare described as our magnificent “sermons in stone” for generations to come.

Ancient and beautiful: a service at St Mary the Virgin in Monmouthshire

For more information on Friends of Friendless churches, visit: friendsoffriendlesschurches.org.uk/

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Getting Inspiration from Inspiration

In his Phaedrus , Plato claimed that the spoken word was more powerful than the written word. Presence and gravitas could be conveyed through speech. Print, on the other hand, muted one's rhetoric. The great philosopher intended this as a blanket statement, true with respect to all persons. Plato's observation was prophetic, with regard to the zest of many religious persons for direct and unmediated revelation from God. Indeed, there has not been a single century in which the church has not been assaulted by those who lay claim to or seek after a divine light or heavenly voice. ( 1 ) Paul's writings are secondhand, say these persons, and what we need is our own Damascus Road encounter.

This desire for unmediated spiritual experience has been exacerbated by a number of factors in our own day. Chief among them, surely, would be the development of a visual culture, where previously the oral and textual dominated society. Such shifts would be only moderately important for Christians, except that our religion is coupled to a book. We are a people of the book. We are birthed by the Word. We must read. While it is sad that we are "amusing ourselves to death," it is far worse that we are less capable to engage with the written Word of God.

In this article, however, I want to focus on another challenge of our day. Many persons-even within the world of conservative, evangelical Protestantism-have stumbled over the inspiration of Scripture. It seems that lack of clarity regarding how the Bible relates to God's speech leads to lack of resolve regarding personal devotion to Bible reading and study. This makes perfect sense. Inasmuch as the Bible contains something less than a word from God, it can be useful only in the same way that a self-help book may. Take it, leave it, pick it up when wanted. To the extent that the Bible is God's own Word, though, it is something else entirely. And, in a culture less and less enamored with print media, we need to ask if there is a divine mandate for fixing our attention to these pages and placing our hope in its message.

By focusing on the inspiration of Scripture, we may lay the groundwork for a deeper commitment to meditation upon and interpretation of its treasures. The claim is simple: The nature of Scripture shapes the use of Scripture. We will consider these in turn.

Human Words

Many suggest that a doctrine of Scripture must be shaped not by theological inferences or deductions, but by reflection upon the phenomena of the Bible itself. By observing the style and sources of the Bible, we may learn something of its nature. For example, knowledge of the place of koine Greek within the ancient world tells us something of the communicative intent of God, who chose to use this particular type of language to reveal his truth, aiming to reveal himself to the poor as well as the rich. Yet we must couple these observations with consideration of the Bible's teaching regarding its own production. In other words, it would deny the Bible's final authority if we did not ask what it teaches about itself. So we must look to the teaching as well as the phenomena of the Bible. We can note at least four signs of human involvement explicitly noted by the biblical authors.

First, there is human purpose in writing. The apostle Peter notes that the writing of the revealed Word serves to preserve divine revelation for later memory and future generations:

Therefore I intend to keep on reminding you of these things, though you know them already and are established in the truth that has come to you. I think it right, as long as I am in this body, to refresh your memory, since I know that my death will come soon, as indeed our Lord Jesus Christ has made clear to me. And I will make every effort so that after my departure you may be able at any time to recall these things. (2 Pet. 1:12-15)

Second, research goes into the production of some biblical texts. The evangelist Luke points to the historiographic task that he undertook to compose his Gospel:

Since many have undertaken to set down an orderly account of the events that have been fulfilled among us, just as they were handed on to us by those who from the beginning were eyewitnesses and servants of the word, I too decided, after investigating everything carefully from the very first, to write an orderly account for you, most excellent Theophilus, so that you may know the truth concerning the things about which you have been instructed. (Luke 1:1-4)

Luke is clear that he searches out and proceeds to write only "after investigating everything carefully from the very first."

Third, editors select some material for inclusion. John's Gospel concludes by telling us, "Now there are also many other things that Jesus did. Were every one of them to be written, I suppose that the world itself could not contain the books that would be written" (John 21:25). So a process of editorial selection must have taken place: discerning what to include and what to omit.

Fourth, writers structure the teachings in various forms. Most obvious, the various Gospels place things in different order (e.g., the Temple cleansing). They are clearly shaping their account to make a case, to rhetorically and argumentatively drive home a point. And their points, within their different contexts, are not entirely the same: whereas Matthew is dealing polemically with Jewish Christianity, Luke is clearly writing his Gospel in a way that shows its links with the ongoing mission of the early churches in Gentile territory (see its sequel: the Acts of the Apostles). Similar observations can be made about the relationship of 1 and 2 Kings and 1 and 2 Chronicles.

All told then, the Bible pressures us to say that humans have composed these writings. At least in certain occasions, they made use of all manner of normal writing practices: research, selecting, editing, and so forth. While there may be some texts within the canon that came without such extensive human preparation (e.g., certain prophetic visions do not involve research), the biblical accounts show no hesitation in admitting their human composition.

Divine Words

More must be said. Not only is the Bible a human book, but it comes to us from heaven. Indeed, it is right to call this "God's Word." The Bible not only pressures us to say that it is a human book, but it simultaneously mandates us to speak of it as inspired by God. Again, at least four observations are explicit in the Bible.

First, the prophets speak on God's behalf and with God's authority. Numerous episodes can be found in the Old Testament where a prophet is recognized as the bearer of God's own words. Paradigmatic is Jeremiah's calling:

Now the word of the Lord came to me, saying, "Before I formed you in the womb I knew you, and before you were born I consecrated you; I appointed you a prophet to the nations." Then I said, "Ah, Lord God! Behold, I do not know how to speak, for I am only a youth." But the LORD said to me, "Do not say, 'I am only a youth'; for to all to whom I send you, you shall go, and whatever I command you, you shall speak. Do not be afraid of them, for I am with you to deliver you, declares the Lord." Then the Lord put out his hand and touched my mouth. And the Lord said to me, "Behold, I have put my words in your mouth. See, I have set you this day over nations and over kingdoms, to pluck up and to break down, to destroy and to overthrow, to build and to plant." (Jer.1:4-10)

Jeremiah's calling is much like that of Moses, Joshua, and others (see, for example, Exod. 4:10-16; Num. 12:6-8; Deut. 18:17-20). God's words are put in the prophet's mouth.

Second, the written words of the prophets are treated as divinely authoritative:

In the fourth year of Jehoiakim the son of Josiah, king of Judah, this word came to Jeremiah from the LORD: "Take a scroll and write on it all the words that I have spoken to you against Israel and Judah and all the nations, from the day I spoke to you, from the days of Josiah until today. It may be that the house of Judah will hear all the disaster that I intend to do to them, so that every one may turn from his evil way, and that I may forgive their iniquity and their sin." Then Jeremiah called Baruch the son of Neriah, and Baruch wrote on a scroll at the dictation of Jeremiah all the words of the Lord that he had spoken to him. (Jer. 36:1-4)

Here the prophet is told to record the word of the Lord for posterity's sake. The written word is treated like the prophetic sermon, for God's wrath is poured out on Jehoiakim when he had the scroll burned bit by bit (see verses 27-31). God invests the written word with the quality and necessity of the spoken word. Scripture (writings) conveys proclamation beyond the life of the prophet. Eventually, the apostle Peter will share the same reasoning with his readers, explaining why he recorded his apostolic teaching for the sake of those who would live beyond his lifetime (2 Pet. 1:12-15).

Third, the New Testament writers are considered peers of the Old Testament prophets:

And count the patience of our Lord as salvation, just as our beloved brother Paul also wrote to you according to the wisdom given him, as he does in all his letters when he speaks in them of these matters. There are some things in them that are hard to understand, which the ignorant and unstable twist to their own destruction, as they do the other Scriptures. (2 Pet. 3:15-16)

Peter observes that Paul writes difficult truths at times, which are twisted by some. What is important for our purposes is to note that Paul's teachings are mistaken by these ignorant persons just as, Peter adds, "they do with the other Scriptures," which shows that Peter views Paul's writings on par with the Hebrew Scriptures. Other texts could be adduced to show that the apostolic teaching, like that of the Israelite prophets before them, was "of God" (see Gal. 1:11-12; 1 Thess. 2:13; 1 Cor. 2:12-13).

Fourth, the doctrine of inspiration is unveiled in Paul's second letter to Timothy as a way to explain how God's words flow through human instruments: the Scriptures. ( 2 )

All Scripture is breathed out by God and profitable for teaching, for reproof, for correction, and for training in righteousness, that the man of God may be competent, equipped for every good work. (2 Tim. 3:16-17)

The Greek word theopneustos has been studied up and down, left and right. The image is that of God breathing out, a notion surely informed by the creation account when God breathed life into the dust and made man (Gen. 2:7). Just as God created by his word in Genesis, so God brings about the new creation by the proclamation of his gospel. To that end, God inspires or breathes out life into and through the writing of the apostles. The picture is not of texts, already written, now receiving blessing; rather, the notion is of texts produced by God's very breath. ( 3 ) As John Webster says, "Talk of inspiration indicates that the generative impulse of the biblical text is not human spontaneity…it is not a voluntary, self-originating movement, but a 'being moved.'" ( 4 ) The doctrine of the inspiration of Scripture honors the biblical pressure to speak of the Bible as coming from God.

A Biblical "Compatibilism"

If the Bible is both human and divine, as the Bible forces us to say, then we are pressured to say that something can be done by both creatures and the Creator. To say this, and to maintain that this is not a logical contradiction, can be explained with the help of a term called "compatibilism." God wrote the Bible. Humans wrote the Bible. These two statements are compatible.

The biblical compatibilist affirms that we must hold together two truths without offering a philosophical or theoretical resolution of the apparent tension between them on the surface. Compatibilism does not remove mystery; rather, it locates mystery where the Bible does: affirming all that the Scriptures affirm and confessing that a higher coherence is possible. These discussions typically arise in debates regarding divine sovereignty and human responsibility. How can God foreordain horrendous evils and yet hold the agents of these events responsible for such actions? For example, how can the crucifixion of Jesus be predetermined by the counsel of God while Judas and others are nevertheless held responsible for his death? While some texts are difficult to understand, the Bible unequivocally affirms both, such as in Acts 2:23: "This Jesus, delivered up according to the definite plan and foreknowledge of God, you crucified and killed by the hands of lawless men." Biblical compatibilism as an explanation may also be applied to the Bible itself. In other words, the doctrine of the inspiration of Scripture is one instance in the wider panoply of human history, where God superintends and guides historical processes in such a way that the result is from God yet humans are genuinely active. So the text is guaranteed by divine authorship even while it is delivered through the hands of men. That the production of these Scriptures is ensured by God's providential governance in no way undermines, negates, reduces, offsets, or eliminates the many layers of human involvement: researching, selecting, editing, polishing, and so on. ( 5 ) In short, the divine and human authors do not compete, they cooperate.

Too often we fail to note that the Arminian-Calvinist debate has connections to other doctrines. The Augustinian approach should be maintained, not only so that God may be given all glory but also so that other cherished doctrines can be coherently explained, such as Christology and the Eucharist that are also clarified by Augustinian compatibilism. ( 6 ) The key point here is to note that the same Bible can only be construed as "the word of the Lord" and "the word according to human authors" if God is working through the creaturely writers. Whereas Augustinianism lets both biblical truths stand (divine sovereignty and human agency), Arminian notions modify one aspect in order to alleviate tension and remove mystery.

Inspiration is therefore a subset of providence. God's guidance of human history to suit his redemptive purposes involves his superintending care of the whole process of Scripture's production. Just as providence does not negate human history, neither does inspiration negate the human authorship of the Bible. Herman Bavinck explained that "God's Spirit in divine inspiration will confirm and strengthen, not destroy, the self-activity of human beings." He continued, "The Spirit of the Lord entered into the prophets and apostles themselves and so employed and led them that they themselves examined and reflected, spoke and wrote as they did. It is God who speaks through them; at the same time it is they themselves who speak and write." ( 7 ) In the end, therefore, a compatibilist explanation of the inspiration of the Bible avoids a doctrine of divine dictation of the Word of God to the human authors.

Receiving Inspiration from Inspiration: The Use of a Doctrine

My theology students delight in reading Thomas Watson's A Body of Divinity for many reasons, chief of which is that Watson exemplifies the Puritan tradition of highlighting the various "uses" of a doctrine. In our own day, Ellen Charry has spoken of the "aretegenic" function of Christian doctrine; that is, the way belief shapes virtue and encourages human flourishing. ( 8 ) Kevin Vanhoozer has been more specific, suggesting that doctrine provides the stage notes by which performers fill their roles in the script-in this case the ongoing drama of redemption. ( 9 ) If such ways of thinking about doctrine are correct, what use might the doctrine of Scripture's inspiration have?

Surely the value of Bible reading increases exponentially inasmuch as one believes this book is distinguished from others. Here, the nature of the Bible determines the use of the Scriptures.

Thomas Watson offers wisdom regarding the practical implications of biblical inspiration:

If the Scripture be of divine inspiration, then be exhorted to, Study the Scripture. Prize the written Word. Believe it. Love the written Word. Conform to it. Contend for it. Be thankful to God for it. Adore God's distinguishing grace, if you have felt the power and authority of the Word upon your conscience. ( 10 )

Each exhortation is worthy of an article, if space would permit. In conclusion, note that each of these refrains is based on, fueled even, by the reality of God's inspiring production of the Bible. The Bible must be treated as Watson here describes: studied, prized, believed, loved, and more, because it is from God and presents Christ and the gospel. If many of us fail to fulfill these exhortations, perhaps some of our failure can be attributed to our less than thorough grasp of the truly inspired nature of Scripture. Perhaps we need to get some inspiration for a renewed commitment to study of the Bible from this very doctrine of biblical inspiration.

Michael Allen

From the issue: inspiration and inerrancy, vol.19 , no.2 , mar/apr 2010, related resources, "creature of the word".

The modern age sees Martin Luther as a hero for standing up to the might of both pope and emperor with his famous trial at Worms: "Here I stand." Yet such admirers often forget that the German reformer was not inaugurating a new era of the enlightened and autonomous individual. We recognize that simply by […]

What the Bible is All About

The hit TV show Seinfeld has been called a show about nothing. One of the most pernicious falsehoods about the Bible is that it, too, is a book about nothing, that it is a random collection of ancient myths and moral aphorisms. Strangely, some Christians seem to regard Scripture this way. Others find unity in […]

The Qur'an's Challenge to the Bible

Passages from the Qur'an said to be revealed in the earliest days of Islam suggest that Muhammad (570-632) viewed his religion as a reassertion of the monotheism of Christianity. As contacts between Christians and the nascent Muslim sect in Mecca increased, he even reportedly dissuaded his followers from debating with Christians. Instead the Muslims were […]

Thinking Clearly About the Clarity of Scripture

Are the Scriptures clear? Most of us would tend to answer: "sometimes yes, sometimes no." There are passages that seem straightforward and other passages that appear really confusing. What else could we expect of a collection of books written over the course of 1,500 years, by so many diverse authors, in so many diverse styles? […]

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Don Stewart :: Is There a Difference Between Revelation and Divine Inspiration?

Is There a Difference Between Revelation and Divine Inspiration?

Is the Bible the Authoritative Word of God – Question 9

Yes. Although the terms revelation and divine inspiration are often used synonymously, there are differences between the two concepts.

Understanding the Terms Revelation and Divine Inspiration

It is essential that we have a correct understanding of the terms revelation and divine inspiration. Much confusion will be avoided if we have a proper view of how each of these terms are used.

Revelation: God’s Disclosure of Truth

Revelation means, “God disclosing to humanity truths we would not otherwise know”—human beings could not find out these truths for themselves. It refers to God giving truth to humanity. This is the idea behind the term revelation.

For example, when Peter confessed Jesus as the Messiah or the Christ, Jesus told Peter that his confession was something that was divinely revealed to him. It was not something that he concluded on his own. We read the following in Matthew:

Simon Peter replied, “You are the Christ, the Son of the living God.” And Jesus answered him, “Blessed are you, Simon Barjona! For flesh and blood has not revealed this to you, but my Father who is in heaven.” ( Matthew 16:16-17 RSV )

The understanding of Peter as to Jesus’ identity did not come from any human source, but rather was the result of God’s revelation to Peter through the Spirit; it was divinely disclosed.

Divine Inspiration: Humans Recording God’s Truth

Divine inspiration, on the other hand, refers to the recording of God’s truth. It means that God preserved the writers from recording error when they wrote the various parts of Scripture. All of the things they recorded are accurate. The words were actually said and the events actually happened. Revelation, therefore, is concerned with the giving of truth, while divine inspiration refers to the recording of truth. It is important that we understand the difference.

This brings us to an important point. The Bible is divinely inspired, but not every word was divinely revealed. Divine inspiration does not always imply revelation. To put it another way, we should not necessarily assume that everything in Scripture has been divinely revealed by God.

For example, Moses was divinely inspired by God to record events that he himself witnessed. These events were the actual source of his knowledge on the subject. The subject matter was not beyond human knowledge, but was there for any observer to record. However, the interpretation of the meaning of the event could only come from God. He alone explained the significance of what occurred.

We also have to distinguish between certain words of Scripture and the faithful recording of them. There are statements in the Bible that are lies. Yet the lies are correctly recorded. The statements are not given by divine revelation. The devil was certainly not speaking for God when he made the various statements that are attributed to him in Scripture. Jesus told the religious leaders of His day that they were of their father “the devil.” The devil is someone who lies whenever he speaks. Jesus said:

You are from your father the devil, and you choose to do your father’s desires. He was a murderer from the beginning and does not stand in the truth, because there is no truth in him. When he lies, he speaks according to his own nature, for he is a liar and the father of lies. ( John 8:44 NRSV)

The Contemporary English Version reads:

Your father is the devil, and you do exactly what he wants. He has always been a murderer and a liar. There is nothing truthful about him. He speaks on his own, and everything he says is a lie. Not only is he a liar himself, but he is also the father of all lies. ( John 8:44 CEV)

The devil lies every time that he speaks; yet the devil’s words are part of Scripture. This is because the Bible records what actually happened.

Revelation Sometimes Refers to Illumination

Something else needs to be emphasized. In the New Testament, the word translated “revelation” sometimes refers to what is known as illumination.

Paul wrote the following to the Ephesians:

I pray that the God of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Father of glory, may give you spiritual wisdom and revelation in your growing knowledge of him,?since the eyes of your heart have been enlightened?so that you may know what is the hope of his calling, what is the wealth of his glorious inheritance in the saints. ( Ephesians 1:17-18 NET )

Paul wanted the Ephesians to gain spiritual wisdom and revelation in their knowledge of Christ. Revelation, in this context, refers to what we call illumination—the ability to understand the truths that God has already revealed. Human beings are not able to impart divine revelation; they are only able to receive it.

In addition, all believers do not receive supernatural revelation to impart to others. That was granted only to a special few. Consequently, in this context, the word translated “revelation” does not mean the giving of God’s truth, but rather the understanding of it.

Conclusion: It Is Important to Understand the Distinction Between Divine Inspiration and Divine Revelation

Because the terms revelation and divine inspiration are referring to two different, but important, concepts, it is crucial that we have an understanding of the meaning of each term and how they are used in explaining the nature of the Bible.

Revelation refers to God’s giving of His truth to humanity while divine inspiration refers to the recording of God’s Word. The Bible, while true in all that it records, was not divinely revealed in all its parts.

Summary – Question 9 Is There a Difference Between Revelation and Divine Inspiration?

Divine inspiration and revelation are not synonymous terms. Revelation is God disclosing truth to humankind that we would not otherwise know. Divine inspiration deals with the recording of God’s Word—it does not always imply revelation.

Statements recorded in Scripture are divinely inspired in the sense that they are the things that God wanted revealed to humanity. However, not everything found in Scripture is divine revelation, neither is everything found in the Scripture true. Furthermore, there are things in Scripture that any observer could record.

However, what they could not record was the divine explanation of the event. Scripture correctly records what occurred—this includes misstatements and lies. What is assured with divine inspiration is that each event and each saying is accurately recorded.

Revelation can refer to what we call illumination—the ability to understand what God has revealed in His Word. Divine revelation has been given to very few people, while all believers are able to receive God’s illumination through the work of the Holy Spirit. We must keep these distinctions in mind.

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Divine Revelation

“Revelation” (lat. revelatio ) is a translation of the Greek word apokalypsis , which means the removal of a veil so that something can be seen. Many religions appeal to purported divine revelations in order to explain and justify their characteristic beliefs about God, and revelation has usually been understood as an epistemic notion. [ 1 ] Paradigmatically, it refers to alleged instances of divine speaking or special divine acts in history, although in a more general sense “revelation” can denote any means of divine self-disclosure, for example through nature. The topic of divine revelation has been a long-standing and central focus in theology, and philosophical discussions have often taken their cues from Christian theological debates. [ 2 ] This entry will treat theological perspectives only in so far as they are relevant for philosophical questions about the purported nature and means of divine revelation and the justification of revelatory claims.

1.1 General/Natural and Special Revelation

1.2 manifestational and propositional revelation, 1.3 models of revelation, 2.1 traditional views, 2.2.1 perceptual models, 2.2.2 the a/c-model, 2.2.3 testimonial models, 2.3.1 a probabilistic argument, 2.3.2 holism, 2.3.3 voluntarism, 2.3.4 hybridism, 2.4 sui generis approaches, other internet resources, related entries, 1. conceptions of divine revelation.

Revelation, as commonly understood, has to do with the dispelling of ignorance. The counterpart of “the revealed”, therefore, is “the hidden” (Wolterstorff 1995: 23). However, the term has many meanings or uses—religious as well as non-religious—which are related to each other analogically. A distinction should be made, first, between the process and product meaning of the word. “Revelation” can either refer to the act/process of revealing something, or to the content that is revealed. Second, while in ordinary discourse one can “have a revelation” without there being a revealer (an agent that reveals), in religious contexts revelation is usually understood as a “person-to-person affair” (Helm 1982: 14; Mavrodes 1988: 96).

The following scheme (S) identifies the elements that are necessary for a revelatory claim (a claim that a revelation has occurred) to be true:

In addition to a revealer ( m ) and an audience ( n ), an act of revelation must have a content ( a ) that is made known or available to the audience through some means ( k ). Given this scheme, several areas of controversy can be pin-pointed. Since the topic is divine revelation, m is of course identified with God. However, in contemporary Christian thought, there is a debate about the nature of a . Is the content of divine revelation propositions about or related to God, or is it God himself, or both (O‘Collins 2016a: Ch. 1)? Many theologians emphasize that God reveals himself rather than propositions or “information”. This debate (to which we will return) must be understood against the background of the Christian doctrine of the incarnation, which claims that God “became flesh and lived among us” (John 1: 14).

Furthermore, there is a debate about whether n —the audience—includes only those who have actually acquired knowledge through the revelation, or if n can also include those who potentially could have acquired such knowledge, but in fact did not. In other words, is revelation a “success word” or does it cover cases where knowledge is merely made available? (For different views, see Sluys 2000; Blaauw 2009; Gunton 1995: 113; O’Collins 2016a: 76).

A common distinction that relates to the audience ( n ) is between general and special (or particular ) revelation , where the former refers to a revelation that is universally available, and the latter to a revelation made (directly or initially) to a limited group of people. Often, general revelation is identified with natural revelation , even though the latter concept has to do with the means of revelation ( k ) rather than the audience. The natural world, including human nature, is available to all, and would be the most plausible candidate as a means for a general revelation. However, it is conceivable that God could have made a general revelation by acting outside of the natural order, for example by making miracles visible to all (Helm 1982: 17). Strictly speaking, therefore, the counterpart to natural revelation—if there is a counterpart—is supernatural revelation rather than special revelation. “Supernatural”, in a theological context, refers to putative divine action that is not included in God’s ordinary activity of creating and sustaining the world. For the most part, however, “general revelation” and “natural revelation” are used interchangeably, as are their counterparts “special revelation” and “supernatural revelation” (for criticism of the distinction, see Downing 1964).

Some philosophers make a distinction between natural revelation and natural theology (e.g., King 2012; Helm 1982: 22–26; Wolterstorff 1995: 24–25). According to Helm, for something to qualify as divine revelation it must be immediate, and the human recipients must be passive. Since natural theology includes the activity of inferring knowledge of God from publicly available evidence, natural theology is not a species of natural revelation, Helm argues. It is unclear, however, why God could not reveal himself in a way that requires inferential activity on the part of the recipients, and many thinkers make no distinction between natural revelation and natural theology (Davies 2009: 36; O’Collins 2016b: 287). In the context of this entry, however, it is necessary to exclude traditional natural theology from treatment, and “natural revelation” will therefore be understood in accordance with Helm’s restrictive definition. The major focus, however, will be on special revelation. [ 3 ]

The very idea of special revelation has often been viewed with suspicion since the Enlightenment (Abraham 2002). Why is not natural revelation enough? Why would God in addition need to reveal himself to certain people at certain points in history? A related critique takes issue with divine hiddenness. If God exists, why does he seem to be “hidden”, so that a revelation is necessary in the first place? Since objections of this kind concern the coherence of religious outlooks based on a purported “special” revelation, it is reasonable for defenders of revelation to appeal to the doctrines of their own religious tradition. Christian thinkers have traditionally explained divine hiddenness and the need for special revelation with reference to humanity’s fall into sin. Sin has cognitive effects, and revelation is typically seen as the epistemic aspect of salvation (O‘Collins 2011: 70–74). When God acts in history to save humanity, he reveals himself and what he is doing. Nevertheless, as a result of the Enlightenment critique, nineteenth century theologians started to downplay special revelation. Instead, they emphasized what could be ascertained about God on the basis of

rational argument, historical enquiry, analysis of the structures of human perception or moral motivation, or any combination of these. (Quash 2007: 328)

This “reduction” of special revelation to a vague form of general revelation, however, generated a counter-reaction in the twentieth century by theologians such as Karl Barth, who emphasized a unique divine revelation in Christ.

When it comes to the means ( k ) of revelation, philosophical reflection can either consider a priori possibilities for how revelation might proceed, or study ideas and claims about revelation found in a particular religious tradition, such as Christianity. Perhaps it is most fruitful to combine analysis of religious claims with conceptual or metaphysical reflection in order to map the possible means of divine revelation. Using this kind of method, William Abraham has described revelation as a “polymorphous concept” like “teach” and “farm” (Abraham 1997: 206). Just like one can teach by doing a variety of different concrete things (lecturing, using pictures or models, grading papers, etc.), so God could reveal by doing many different things, such as speaking, doing “might acts” in history, causing dreams, visions or other experiences, or “making Himself present and manifesting Himself” by means of an incarnation (Vatican II, Dei Verbum § 4).

A useful distinction related to the means of revelation ( k ) is between manifestational and non-manifestational revelation (Wolterstorff 1995: 26). Manifestational revelation happens when somebody “shows” or in some other way makes some reality manifest, while non-manifestational revelation takes place when something is revealed without being shown or manifested—for example, by means of verbal communication. According to Wolterstorff, the essential difference between these two ways of revealing is that in the case of manifestational revelation, the means of revelation is a natural sign of the reality revealed (such as the reality itself, or a characteristic causal effect of it). In the case of non-manifestational revelation, the means is not a natural sign. Instead it can be conventional sign (e.g., a sentence), or some other entity, such as a belief implanted in somebody’s mind by God.

Mavrodes has subdivided non-manifestational varieties of revelation into two categories which he calls “the communication model” and “the causation model” (in addition to these, he suggests a “manifestation model”). In the communication model, revelation is understood as something analogous to speech and related linguistic activities. In the causation model, revelation happens by God causing beliefs in people, either from the beginning of a person’s existence, or at some later time (Mavrodes 1988: 73–74).

A concept that has figured importantly in debates about the means of revelation is “propositional revelation”. Wolterstorff claims that this is just another name for non-manifestational revelation. Since propositions are an essential part of the means ( k ) of non-manifestational revelations (as we will see), there seems to be good reason for this identification. However, in twentieth century theology, “propositional revelation” has received something of a bad reputation. A typical criticism is expressed by Hordern: “What God reveals is not propositions or information—what God reveals is God” (Hordern 1959: 61–62; see also Baillie 1956: 28; Kelsey 1975: 32; Schwöbel 1990: 34; Williams 2000: 131). In modern theology, “propositional” accounts of revelation are often said to have given way to a focus on divine “self-revelation”.

The locus of revelation is not propositions but events, and its content is not a body of truths about God, but “the living God” revealing himself in his actions toward man. (Hick 1967: 190)

In order to address this debate about the role of propositions in revelation, and to assess the theological critique, it is helpful to distinguish between two questions:

• How do propositions figure in the means of revelation ( k )?
• How do propositions figure in the content of revelation ( a )?

There is no consensus about the nature or even existence of propositions, but most philosophers would agree that propositions (if they exist) can be true or false, and that they are “sharable”. Many people can believe the same proposition at the same time, and many different sentences can express the same proposition (e.g., “Schnee is Weiss” and “Snow is white”). Assuming this view, there are at least two ways in which propositions could figure in the means ( k ) of revelation. First, if God speaks—in a literal sense of “speaks”, that is, if he uses sentences to communicate—then sentences would be the primary means of revelation. However, if propositions constitute the meaning of sentences, then propositions would figure importantly as well. Second, suppose that God does not speak in this literal sense, but instead directly causes certain people to have certain beliefs. In that case, the beliefs that God causes would be the primary means of revelation. However, since propositions constitute the cognitive contents of beliefs, propositions would figure importantly too.

In manifestational revelation, the means is (paradigmatically) a direct presentation or manifestation of the very reality that God wishes to reveal—for example himself . In this kind of “means”, propositions are not involved. God is not a proposition, obviously, and neither does God have a proposition as his “content”. Hence, a central difference between manifestational and propositional (non-manifestational) revelation seems to be, unsurprisingly, that propositions figure importantly in the means of the latter, but not in the means of the former.

However, and perhaps more surprisingly, when it comes to the content of revelation, the same does not seem to be true. Propositions must, arguably, figure as part of the content of manifestational revelations as well as in the content of propositional revelation. We can see this by the following example. Suppose a person reveals an object manifestationally by showing it to someone. This will not only reveal the object itself, but also some propositions about it. Otherwise, it is hard to see how the act could count as a revelation . Since revelation is an epistemic concept (or at least has an epistemic dimension), any act of revelation must make something known or knowable, and this means making at least some proposition known or knowable (Wahlberg 2014: 30–31).

In response, it can be argued that there is such a thing as “knowledge by acquaintance” that is not reducible to propositional knowledge. Or perhaps knowing a person is irreducible to knowing about that person (see, e.g., Stump 2010: Ch. 3–4). Even so, it is difficult to see how one could get acquaintance-knowledge or “personal” knowledge of a person (or of God) without also having a good deal of propositional knowledge about him. For example, how could one know somebody by acquaintance without at the same time knowing that this person exists (which is a piece of propositional knowledge)? (Wellington 2019: 166; Lamont 2004: 7–8).

This reasoning will not convince those who deny the existence of propositions (see, e.g., Westphal 1999 for an anti-realist critique). However, among those who accept propositions, many have taken the contrast that Hordern and others draw between revelation of propositions and divine self-revelation to be misconceived. God could not reveal himself without simultaneously revealing (making knowable) some propositions about himself. Propositions must figure in the content ( a ) of both propositional and manifestational revelations. In manifestational revelations, however, they do not figure as means ( k ).

Another important difference between propositional and manifestational revelation concerns the need for interpretation. In manifestational revelation, the audience is confronted with “raw reality”—for example “God himself”, or some spectacular historical event. Such media of revelation contain a wealth of information, and it is up to the recipient to decide which aspects of the manifestation to focus on. In propositional revelation, on the other hand, the audience is confronted with entities such as words and sentences that are specially designed to express a determinate message. Something similar is presumably true in cases of divine direct communication of knowledge to a person’s mind. Hence, even though interpretation is involved in the reception of both propositional and manifestational revelation, in the case of propositional revelation, less of it is needed (Wolterstorff 1995: 29). Arguably, it follows from this that if God wants to convey a fairly determinate cognitive content, he will have good reason to use some form of propositional revelation (perhaps in addition to manifestational revelation) (Mansini 2018: 260).

Why, then, are some theologians critical of propositional revelation? While here are different kinds of critique (Helm 1972; Gunton 1995: 7–13), the main objection has to do with how the notion of propositional revelation is thought to affect biblical interpretation. Standardly, the critics’ argument (made from a Christian perspective) goes something like this:

• If there is such a thing as propositional revelation, it is found in the Bible.
• If there is propositional revelation in the Bible, then it is communicated through literal language that straightforwardly expresses divinely revealed propositions (Dulles 1992: 48).
• However, it is very implausible that God communicates in this way, since the Bible often uses metaphor and narrative rather than literal language. Moreover, the Bible contains erroneous and problematic claims and views, and historical-critical scholarship has shown that the text is shaped by the contingent historical, cultural and political contexts of the human authors (Dulles 1992: 49).
• Hence, the Bible does not contain propositional revelation.
• Hence, there is no propositional revelation.

An “easy” response to this argument points out that it assumes that either the whole Bible constitutes propositional revelation, or else there is no propositional revelation in the Bible at all. However, it is possible that parts of the Bible record propositional revelations that were originally given to prophets, apostles and others. Moreover, some original divine communications of this kind might not even be recorded in the Bible but instead preserved and interpreted through an oral tradition, as traditional Catholic and Orthodox perspectives hold (however, see Ratzinger 1966: 46).

Many defenders of propositional revelation believe that this “easy” response concedes too much ground to the critics. They argue that the Bible as a whole can reasonably be believed to be “authored” by God and expressive of propositional revelation. Attacking premise 2 , the defenders of divine authorship point out that propositions can be expressed by metaphorical and other non-literal forms of language. A propositional construal of biblical revelation does not mean that a narrowly literalistic approach to the Bible is necessary (Lamont 2004: Ch. 5; Wolterstorff 1995: Ch. 11–12; McCall 2009). Attacking premise 3 , they furthermore argue that divine authorship is compatible with the text being shaped by the cultural and personal perspectives of the human authors. God could, for example, author the Bible by “appropriating” or “authorizing” human discourse, thereby making human utterances or speech-acts into vehicles of his own discourse. In a similar way as a president can authorize an ambassador to speak on her behalf, or a speaker can appropriate the utterances of others by quotation or paraphrase, so God could “borrow” human speech-acts without depriving the human authors of genuine authorship (Wolterstorff 1995: Ch. 3. For criticism, see Wisse 2002; Levine 1998). If this is what God has done, then biblical interpretation will require that we distinguish between the intentions and message of the human authors, and the intention and message of the divine, appropriating discourse. The former may contain erroneous or morally problematic views, which are not asserted by the divine author.

Another way of explaining how a medium of divine propositional revelation could possibly contain errors, is by distinguishing between the statements that are expressed through the medium (the biblical text), and the sometimes problematic cultural presuppositions in terms of which they are expressed (Swinburne 2007: Ch. 2). Since it is probably impossible to make statements that do not depend on the presuppositions of any particular culture, and since all cultures embody some false beliefs and problematic conceptions, it is to be expected, argues Swinburne, that a divine revelation will be expressed by means of presuppositions some of which are false (for criticism, see Stump 1994: 740–741).

The discussion about propositional revelation in the Bible or other sacred documents raises questions about God’s causal role in the production of the text. A common view is that the Bible (or the Qur’an) acquires its status as revelation and/or as being “authored” by God as a result of its being inspired by God. According to a common understanding, inspiration is a special divine influence on the writers of the biblical books. (Not all theologians accept this view of biblical inspiration, however, see, e.g., Trembath 1987: 5, 109–118; Burtchaell 1969: Ch. 5.) The divine influence could conceivably take different forms (Davies 2009: 41–44; Burtchaell 1969). According to theories of “verbal inspiration”, God provides a quite detailed guidance by controlling the authors’ choice of words. This theory does not necessarily entail divine “dictation”, however; dictation theories are best conceived as a subspecies of verbal inspiration. “Content theories” also come in different forms. Some involve a detailed divine guidance on the level of statements or propositions, while other versions portray inspiration as limited to the main ideas of the text. It is also possible to posit different degrees and modes of inspiration in different parts of the Bible (O’Collins 2016a: 160–161). Another, rather recent theory suggests that God, through his “middle-knowledge”, could providentially have controlled the human authors of the Bible without taking away their freedom (Craig 1999). Lastly, the theory of “social inspiration” (sometimes “ecclesial inspiration”) tries to account for the fact that the biblical books have a complex history of origin which involves, besides authors and redactors, processes of oral transmission in liturgical and other social contexts (Benoit 1965: 24–26; Barr 1983: 27; Farkasfalvy 2010: 211). Presumably, if God is to control the outcome of such a process, he must influence social groups over extended periods of time.

What is the relationship between divine inspiration and the idea of divine authorship of the Bible? According to Wolterstorff, these are quite distinct phenomena. Inspiration has to do with God’s superintendence over the production of a text, while divine authorship has to do with God’s authorization of a text (Wolterstorff 1995: 41–42). In principle, God could authorize or appropriate a certain text—making it his own by “signing” it, as it were—without having superintended or influenced its production in any way. Of course, God must do something in order for authorization to happen, for example influencing the process of canonization. For Wolterstorff, however, the Bible’s status as authored by God does not essentially depend on its being inspired. That said,

it would be bizarre to think of God as just finding these books lying about and deciding to appropriate them. (Wolterstorff 1995: 187)

Some kind of divine inspiration seems very probable also on Wolterstorff’s view. (For the justification of belief in inspiration, see Crisp 2009.)

According to traditional Christian perspectives, on the other hand, divine inspiration is an essential condition for divine authorship (see, e.g., Feingold 2016: 284). This is true of traditional Catholic as well as Protestant views, which both assume a pervasive divine guidance that extends to all parts of the biblical text and guarantees the aptness of the authors’ choice of words (without necessarily involving “dictation”). Traditional views also presume that inspiration entails inerrancy—that is, freedom from errors in all respects, not just with respect to essential contents (Burtchaell 1969: 1–2; for a critique of inerrancy, see Abraham 1981: Ch. 1).

Can a “strong” theory of inspiration of this sort be defended? Besides challenges from contemporary biblical criticism, such views also face the challenge to explain how inspiration is compatible with the freedom of the human authors (which few would want to deny) and their status as genuine authors rather than mere puppets. Perhaps the best shot at success belongs to those who defend a traditional view from the standpoint of a Thomistic understanding of divine causality. From such a perspective, God is the principal cause and the human authors of the Bible are secondary or instrumental causes (see Feingold 2016: 289–295; for criticism, see Rahner 1964). Instrumental causes are real causes, so the human authors are real authors. Moreover, God presumably does not choose instrumental causes arbitrarily, but with an eye to their aptness for the effects he has in mind (i.e., the texts). The diversity found in the Bible could hence be precisely what God aimed at in choosing people with different temperaments, skills, and experiences as his instruments. Still, since the effect of an instrumental cause transcends the power of that cause taken alone and manifests the power of the principal cause, it is appropriate to say that God is the principal author of the Bible. Moreover, according to the Thomistic view, God acts through instrumental causes in a way that respects their nature, and this is true also when God uses human free will as an instrument. The human authors, hence, are “living and free instruments” rather than puppets (Feingold 2016: 290).

A potential weakness of this account is that it presumes a controversial (and possibly incoherent) view about the compatibility of human freedom and divine causality. On the other hand, precisely by adopting this view, the account avoids the implausible conclusion that God and human authors are involved in a kind of “division of labor” (God being responsible for some aspects of the text, e.g., the ideas, and human authors for other aspects, e.g., the words). If divine and human causality are not related in the manner of a “zero-sum game”, both God and the human authors could be involved in shaping all aspects of the text. However, some authors claim that a “Molinistic” approach, based on God’s “middle knowledge”, could also account for the divine-human character of the Bible as a whole, while avoiding some problematic aspects of the Thomistic view (Craig 1999).

The distinction between propositional and manifestational revelation is very general, and a more fine-grained classification of conceivable means of revelation is desirable. We have already seen that propositional (or non-manifestational) revelation can be subdivided into “the causation model” and “the communication model”. Beyond this, the theologian Avery Dulles has suggested a typology useful for categorizing theories of manifestational revelation. He divides contemporary theological accounts of revelation into five major classes depending on “their central vision of how and where revelation occurs” (Dulles 1992: 27). Besides propositional revelation (which he calls “Revelation as Doctrine”), Dulles discerns four basic models for manifestational revelation.

Revelation as History . This model identifies revelation with God’s “great deeds” in salvation history. The Bible is seen as the record of these deeds, for example the Exodus or the resurrection of Jesus. The biblical text itself, however, is not part of revelation. Some representatives of this approach hold that revelation must include a supernatural cognitive assistance (illumination) so that the historical events can be interpreted correctly (Baillie 1956: 65). Others deny that this is necessary (Pannenberg 1968).

Revelation as Inner Experience . According to this model, revelation consists in some kind of “privileged interior experience of grace or communion with God” (Dulles 1992: 27). Some proponents claim that the interior experience is “pre-conceptual” and occurs at a depth-level of consciousness that transcends and embraces our ordinary experience of the world (Schleiermacher 1799 [1996: 25–26]; 1830 [1999: 16–17]; Rahner 1978: Ch. V). Others take the relevant experiences to be conceptually structured and more like perceptual experiences (Alston 1991; Pike 1992). The pre-conceptual view encounters epistemological puzzles about how non-conceptual inner occurrences can justify beliefs about God, or how the experiences can be about God in the first place (Proudfoot 1985).

Revelation as Dialectical Presence . This model intends to capture the thought of Karl Barth—who is one of the most influential figures of revelation-theology in the twentieth century—and his followers in the school of “dialectical theology”. For Barth, revelation is a “non-objectifiable” encounter with God himself in Christ, an event that is mediated by the Bible and the church’s proclamation about Christ. The Bible itself, however, is not revelation but merely the channel through which revelation “flows” whenever God wills this to happen. Moreover, since God is “Wholly Other” and as such unknowable for humans, revelation must be described in terms of a paradoxical dialectic of simultaneous “unveiling” and “veiling”. “Revelation”, says Barth, “means the self-unveiling, imparted to men, of the God who by nature cannot be unveiled to men” (Barth 1975: 320; see also Hart 2000). It is unclear whether this model manages to present a coherent account of divine revelation (for a sympathetic discussion, see McCormack 2008: 28–35). The intention behind the model, however, is to reconcile the claim that revelation provides real, objective knowledge of God with the claim that God radically transcends all human categories and all created media of revelation.

Revelation as New Awareness . According to this model, revelation means a transformation of human subjectivity, a “fulfillment of the inner drive of the human spirit toward fuller consciousness”. Revelation does not disclose God as an “object”, even though God might be “mysteriously present as the transcendent dimension of human engagement in creative tasks”. In essence, revelation is more about seeing the self and the world in a new light than about knowledge of God (Dulles 1992: 98, 99, 28).

Dulles’s models are theoretical constructions or “ideal-types”, and elements from different models can be combined. For example, theologians like Paul Tillich and Karl Rahner combine the “new awareness” model with experiential and historical elements (Tillich 1951: 111–118, 120–122; Rahner 1966). It has been argued, however, that none of the manifestational models presented above can provide—either separately or in combination—a reasonable account of how knowledge of God’s “theistic properties” (omnipotence, omniscience and infinite goodness) comes about. Such an account requires appeal to propositional revelation at some point, or at least to traditional natural theology (Wahlberg 2014: Ch. 3).

2.The Justification of Revelatory Claims

A revelatory claim is a claim to the effect that a certain divine revelation (propositional or manifestational) has taken place—that God has revealed x to P (Menssen & Sullivan 2007: 69). The existence of revelatory claims in different religions raises the question of epistemic justification: Could such claims be justified, and in that case, how? “Being justified” will here be understood in the very general sense of having “positive epistemic status” (the status of being “right, or proper, or acceptable, or approvable or up to standard” (Plantinga 1988: 1).

In the contemporary debate, there are both non-inferential and inferential (evidentialist) models of justification for revelatory claims. In addition, there are positions that some might characterize as fideistic, but that are perhaps better described as portraying the justification of revelation as “totally sui generis ”. Below non-inferential, inferential and “sui generis” positions will be treated in turn. However, since the contemporary debates about justification draw inspiration from a long tradition of reflection within theology, it will be useful first to consider some historical background.

In historical Christian thought, the concepts of (special) revelation and faith go together. Faith is the believing response to the divine revelation (Dulles 1992: 4). There has been a broad consensus that the act of faith requires grace in the sense of an internal, divine influence or assistance. However, classical Christian thinkers also agree that the act of faith is reasonable, and that Christian belief is epistemically justified to an eminent degree (Lamont 2004: 46). In modern parlance, “faith” is often understood as synonymous with “unsupported belief”, but this understanding is alien to the historical tradition, for which faith constitutes a form of knowledge. It is traditionally agreed, moreover, that faith has this rational status because it is based on the authority of God’s own testimony. In much pre-modern theology it is unclear, however, exactly how God’s testimony or speech is identified as such, and what warrants this identification.

Important church fathers such as Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Chrysostom and Augustine all held that there are good arguments from publicly accessible evidence for the veridicality of the Christian revelation—arguments that establish the claim that God has spoken beyond reasonable doubt. Patristic arguments typically appeal to fulfilled prophecies, miracles,

the extension and holiness of the Church, the transformative power of the Christian message and the independently establishable goodness and truth of Christian teaching. (Lamont 2004: 46, 38)

However, the major church fathers did not seem to view these apologetic arguments as necessary for proper faith, or as the epistemic basis for faith. Instead, the divine revelation itself—the word of God—is often portrayed as having the power to non-inferentially justify Christian beliefs. As Clement of Alexandria writes,

He who has believed in the divine Scriptures, with a firm judgement, receives as an irrefutable demonstration the voice of God who gave us those Scriptures. So faith is no longer something that is confirmed by demonstration. ( Stromate II , 2, 9, quoted in Lamont 2004: 32)

Augustine, likewise, emphasized that Christian belief is produced by God working internally in the believer through grace.

In the Middle Ages, Thomas Aquinas affirms both the supernatural, grace-induced character of Christian belief and its rational warrant. Since Aquinas is a common reference point in contemporary discussions about faith and revelation, it will be helpful to consider his thought in a bit more detail. (For a comparison between Aquinas’s thought on revelation with Jewish and Islamic medieval perspectives, see Dobie 2019.) Aquinas believes that the Christian revelatory claim can be justified, at least to a significant degree, by inferential arguments (see, e.g., Summa Contra Gentiles I, Ch. 6). Sometimes he seems to suggest that arguments are necessary for rational assent to revelation ( Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 2, a. 9, ad. 3). At other times, however, it appears that faith is justified without arguments ( ST II-II, q. 27, a. 3, ad. 2. See also Niederbacher 2012: 342–343). Due to this tension, there are different interpretations of Aquinas. John Jenkins has helpfully distinguished between the Naturalist Interpretation , the Voluntarist Interpretation , and the Supernatural Externalist Interpretation (Jenkins 1997: Ch. 6). These interpretations emphasize different elements of Aquinas’s thought that are also found in traditional theology in general. As we will see in the following sections, similar elements recur in contemporary theories.

According to the Naturalist Interpretation , at least some persons assent to the articles of the Creed because, first, they accept a cluster of arguments from natural theology, second, they believe on the basis of human testimony and other evidence that miracles and other signs have occurred in biblical history and in the history of the church. From these considerations they conclude that God has made a revelation in history, which is contained, in its essence, in the Creed. The Christian revelatory claim is justified on this inferential basis. Grace and God’s supernatural influence has little epistemic significance in this process—grace just makes the believer accept God’s revelation without reluctance (Penelhum 1977: 146; see also Hick 1988: 11–31).

The Voluntarist Interpretation , on the other hand, claims that a consideration of the evidence is insufficient to elicit firm assent to revelation. What brings this forth, instead, is something like “wishful thinking” or utilitarian considerations. Aquinas says:

We are moved to believe the words of God insofar as the reward of eternal life is promised to us if we have believed; and this moves the will to assent. ( De Veritate , q. 14, a. 1, quoted in Jenkins 1997: 176)

An act of the will compensates for the “gap in the evidence”. However, since the activity of the will—when it comes to belief in God—is part of a reliable belief-forming process put in place by grace, the beliefs that it produces are warranted. Aquinas, hence, was an epistemological reliabilist of sorts, according to this view (Ross 1985; Stump 1991).

The Supernatural Externalist Interpretation gives arguments from public evidence a role in preparing a person for the assent of faith. However, the actual assent is the product of a supernaturally infused cognitive habit. The supernatural “light of faith” makes it possible for a person immediately and non-inferentially to grasp the articles of the Creed as divinely revealed. Belief in the revelatory claim is hence a basic belief, and it is justified

because it was arrived at by the proper operation of a cognitive process which, though infused and not [natural], was nevertheless designed to attain the truth in this sphere. (Jenkins 1997: 190–191)

Most contemporary Aquinas scholars now reject the Naturalist Interpretation, which cannot do justice to the textual evidence. Hence, even though Aquinas indeed presents a collection of credibility arguments, he seems to have held that belief in divine revelation can be—and usually is—justified in some other, non-inferential way. It is therefore unfortunate that the view represented by the Naturalist Interpretation is sometimes taken to be “the traditional view” of how revelatory claims are justified (Penelhum 1997: 67–86).

Although Aquinas might not be a good fit for “the traditional view”, some later thinkers are. Starting with Duns Scotus, the role of inferential arguments in the rational acceptance of revelation was gradually expanded and made more precise in mainstream Christian thought. From the seventeenth century to the mid-twentieth century, most Catholic theologians saw “credibility arguments” as necessary for faith and as capable of establishing beyond reasonable doubt that God has revealed the Christian religion (Lamont 2004: 87–88). The act of faith was reduced to the drawing of the necessary inference from this insight to the conclusion that Christian beliefs are true. On the Protestant side, this development continued and culminated in thinkers such as William Chillingworth, John Tillotson and John Locke, whose views—ironically—are the closest matches to what Penelhum describes as the “traditional view”. As we have seen, however, the church fathers and Thomas Aquinas held more complex views in which elements of both inferential and non-inferential justification are found, and where supernatural grace and the will play important epistemic roles. Below we will encounter again these elements in the accounts of contemporary philosophers and theologians.

2.2 Non-Inferential Justification

A claim is non-inferentially justified when its positive epistemic status is a result of some form of direct cognition, as opposed to being achieved through a process of inference from evidence. The notion of “direct cognition” includes having a belief that is “properly basic”, but also having a belief that directly represents the content of a perceptual experience (assuming that experiences have conceptual content).

There are non-inferential views concerning both the justification of “natural” and “special” revelation. In this section, three varieties of non-inferential justification will be addressed: Perceptual models, Plantinga’s A/C-model, and testimonial models.

Some philosophers have suggested a perceptual interpretation of natural revelation , according to which “intentional design” is a property that can be directly perceived in nature as well as in human behavior and art. Since intentional design by definition entails a designer, this means that our experiences of nature could give us immediate knowledge of the existence of a creator (Ratzsch 2003; Wahlberg 2012; Plantinga 2011: Ch. 8). For related views, see Mullen 2004 and Evans 2010).

The putative plausibility of this hypothesis depends on the phenomenological observation that the appearance of design in nature is something that forcefully strikes most people, even atheists. As Hume lets Cleanthes say:

Consider, anatomize the eye … and tell me, from your own feeling, if the idea of a contriver does not immediately flow in upon you with a force like that of a sensation? . ( Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion , Part III, (p. 65))

Psychological research, moreover, indicates that teleological beliefs about nature come natural to humans. Some even argue that humans are “intuitive theists” (Kelemen 2004; Barrett 2012). A related consideration in favor of design-perception is that it could potentially explain why beliefs about design in nature are so widespread and often held so persistently, even though they have turned out to be hard to justify by argument (Ratzsch 2003: 135–136).

A standard move by those who claim that belief in revelation is non-inferentially justified, is to appeal to the “parity-argument” (first found in Thomas Reid [1710–1796], see Wolterstorff 2001: 197–206; see also Plantinga 1990: 271; Alston 1983). Adapted to the present context, the argument runs something like this: Since beliefs about intentional design in nature arise in a similar way as (ordinary) perceptual beliefs and memory beliefs, there is no reason to discriminate among these classes of beliefs with respect to their prima facie epistemic status. Hence, if we regard perceptual and memory beliefs as prima facie justified without argument, we should regard design-beliefs in the same way.

It could be objected that in order to have beliefs about design, a rather complex conceptual background is necessary. Design beliefs, therefore, cannot be understood as perceptual. However, the necessity of a conceptual background for having a certain kind of perceptual beliefs does not necessarily entail that those beliefs are inferentially derived from the background (McDowell 2004: 296; Wahlberg 2012: 128–130. See also McGrath 2008: Ch. 5). Even the most primitive perceptual beliefs (“red here now”) presuppose a network of concepts.

Is evolution a defeater for the idea of design-perception? (De Cruz and De Smedt 2014: 195). Perhaps not. The hypothesis that God creates indirectly, through the evolutionary process, entails that God exerts a certain control over the outcomes of that process. This means that God has intended at least certain features of the outcome, and these features would hence count as divinely designed. Since divine design in this sense seems to be compatible with evolution, design-perception might be as well (Wahlberg 2012: 172–190; Kojonen 2018).

Another objection proceeds from the claim that design-beliefs about nature are generated by mechanisms that are too unreliable to confer positive epistemic status. One version of this argument contends that the “hyperactiveness” of our HADD (“Hyper-Active Agency Detection Device”)—which is an evolutionary adaptation for detecting possibly dangerous agency in the natural environment—means that it produces too many false positives to be trusted when it “detects” design in natural structures. The debate about this is ongoing (Barrett 2004: 31; Visala 2011: Ch. 5; De Smedt and De Cruz 2020).

In the realm of special revelation , there are also theories of direct, perceptual justification. William Alston has argued for the possibility that God could be (nonsensorially) perceived, and that such “mystical perception” can justify beliefs about God (Alston 1991). Different religions have different, socially established “doxastic practices” (belief-forming habits) built on purported experiences of God. Appealing to the parity argument, Alston contends that such mystical practices can be on more or less equal footing, epistemically, with basic doxastic practices such as sense-perceptual and memory-based belief-forming. In general, basic doxastic practices cannot be shown to be reliable without circularity, but if they are socially established and their outputs are reasonably internally consistent and consistent with the outputs of other practices, they can be rationally engaged in. The case for the rationality of a doxastic practice is also strengthened if it generates significant “self-support”—for example by making predictions that are later confirmed.

Beliefs generated by rational doxastic practices can, however, be defeated by “over-rider”-systems internal to the practices themselves. In the case of “mystical perception”, the overrider-system includes a religion’s doctrinal teaching, by which the veridicality of purported mystical perceptions is tested. Alston argues that the “Christian mystical practice”, which generates significant self-support by the way it can “predict” or guide spiritual development, can be rationally engaged in, and hence produce beliefs about God that are prima facie justified. While mystical perceptions of the kind Alston deals with are often regarded as rare, Michael Rea has argued that experiences of God’s presence and of communication from God might be “widely available” (Rea 2018: Ch. 6–7). He suggests that the ability to experience God can be improved through spiritual practices and disciplines—an idea that is common in mystical traditions (see also Wynn 2013: 73–74).

The main problem for the idea of direct perceptual encounters with God is the fact of religious diversity and the seeming incompatibility between the outputs of rival mystical practices. One approach to this problem is to view the incompatibility as merely apparent. Building on Kant’s distinction between noumena and phenomena, Hick argues that God or ultimate reality is unknowable in itself, and that the different descriptions of this reality produced by different religions only apply within the realm of human experience (1989: Ch. 14. For critique of the Kantian picture, see Plantinga 2000b: Ch. 1–2; Menssen and Sullivan 2007: 22–30; Macdonald 2009b: Ch. 2). Nevertheless, those descriptions allow people to respond to and interact with the Real in ways that are conducive to salvation.

Hick’s solution to the problem of religious diversity is bought at the price of denying the incompatibility that religious believers themselves see between their religious beliefs and those of other religions. Finding this price too high, Alston takes the disagreements between religions to be real, and argues that there could be realms of reality

that are so difficult for us to discern that widespread agreement is extremely difficult or impossible to attain, even if some veridical cognition of that realm is achieved. (Alston 1991: 267)

A position that lies between Hick’s non-cognitivist pluralism and Alston’s cognitivist exclusivism is Keith Ward’s “open theology” that is attentive to the possibility of revelation in all religions. This possibility entails, for Ward, that believers must be prepared to critically question their own tradition in light of insights from other religions (Ward 1994: 339–340). Another option is Griffiths’ “open inclusivism”, based on the claim that “it is possible that alien religions teach truths of religious significance to the Church” (2001: 63).

Besides experiences that have God as their putative object, other kinds of religious experiences could be revelatory as well. Mark Wynn has drawn attention to the “materially mediated or sacramental character of much religious experience” and suggested that the experiential impact of certain “material contexts” (such as special places with an existentially charged history) could mediate an awareness of God (Wynn 2009: 147; see also Wynn 2013: Ch. 3).

Non-inferential justification of revelatory claims need not be construed as perceptual. Alvin Plantinga, while sympathetic to perceptual theories of natural revelation (2000b: 286–289; 2011: Ch. 8), has proposed a broader account involving both general and special revelation. He suggests that humans have a natural cognitive faculty which “in a wide variety of circumstances produces in us beliefs about God”. Those beliefs are “occasioned” by the circumstances—for example by the sight of a mighty scenery or a beautiful sunset—but they are not conclusions from them, not even “quick and sotto voce inferences”. However, the theistic beliefs thus caused could have positive epistemic status if the cognitive faculty that produces them is “functioning properly in a congenial epistemic environment according to a design plan successfully aimed at truth” (Plantinga 2000: 172, 175, 178). Beliefs generated by such a faculty—which Plantinga, following Calvin, calls a “ sensus divinitatis ”—would be “properly basic” in the sense that they are non-inferentially warranted as long as they are undefeated.

Plantinga’s model for the justification of natural revelation is externalist, and he does not claim to be able to demonstrate that it is true. His agenda, instead, is to defend theistic belief from the “ de jure objection”, which attacks the rational status of theism while leaving open the question of its truth. Plantinga claims that this attack fails. If theism is true, it is very likely that there is a sensus divinitatis , and in that case, belief in God would be warranted.

Plantinga’s model also includes the justification of special revelation. In what he calls the “Extended A/C-model” (after Aquinas and Calvin), Plantinga posits, besides the natural sensus divinitatis , a supernatural belief-forming mechanism consisting mainly in the “internal instigation of the Holy Spirit”. This mechanism is part of God’s plan of salvation that also includes the divine teaching of the Scriptures, and the divine repair of the cognitive and affective damage caused by sin. When confronted with the teachings of Scripture, the Holy Spirit can instigate people to accept them as true by creating faith. Plantinga sees the beliefs accepted in this way as “revealed to our minds” (Plantinga 2000: 241). Even though this process is not an in-built part of human nature, it is ( ex hypothesi ) “a reliable belief-producing process”, and its deliverances will therefore be warranted and qualify as knowledge (Plantinga 2000: 257, 206).

The debate about Plantinga’s proposals is extensive, and critique comes from both theological and philosophical quarters (Baker 2005). Some criticize Plantinga’s model for being phenomenologically inadequate: Many believers seem to be looking for grounds for their faith and feel the need for partial support from other beliefs (Beilby 2005: 195–197). Other critics attack the very idea that religious beliefs can be properly basic, which Plantinga defends by means of a version of the parity-argument (see section 2.2.1 ). Grigg, for example, argues that a major difference between religious beliefs and ordinary perceptual beliefs is that people may have a bias in favor of religious beliefs, since there is a psychological benefit to be gained from believing that God exists (Grigg 1983: 126). In response, it has been argued that the same is true of some perceptual beliefs (e.g., seeing high numbers in one’s bank account) (McLeod 1987: 5).

A related critique is that more or less absurd belief-systems could claim to be based on properly basic beliefs. This is often referred to as the “Great Pumpkin Objection” (see DeRose 1999 in Other Internet Resources ). Michael Martin, developing a version of it, claims that

Plantinga’s proposal would generate many different communities that could legitimately claim that their basic beliefs are rational,

such as voodoo or astrological communities (Martin 1990: 272). In response, Plantinga can point out that basic beliefs are defeasible, and that the basic beliefs of what we take to be obviously irrational belief systems might be easily defeated (Baker 2007: 88–89).

Closely related to the Great Pumpkin Objection is the objection from religious diversity, perhaps the greatest challenge for Plantinga’s as well as for Alston’s theories. Why could not proponents of other religions copy Plantinga’s epistemological moves and adapt them to their own religions? (Hill 2001). Helm, accordingly, suggests that Plantinga’s argument “leaves his defense of the rationality of Christian theism not so much open to refutation as to imitation” (Helm 2001: 1112). In response, it could be argued that if a religion is false, defeaters will probably arise.

Another type of objections focus on the epistemic consequences of religious disagreement. Some critics argue that if other religions “can make as good a case of being knowledge-if-true as Christianity”, it is hard to see why people should remain Christians in the absence of some religiously neutral grounds (Forrest 2002: 111.) Basinger suggests that religious believers who want to maximize truth and avoid error are “under a prima facie obligation to attempt to resolve significant epistemic peer conflict” (Basinger 2002: 11). However, it might not always be easy to determine when people are true “epistemic peers”, and the crucial question is what happens if the disagreement, despite efforts of resolution, remains (Plantinga 1997). Should disagreement be taken as a defeater of belief? Plantinga has claimed that this idea is a “philosophical tar baby”, since it would mean the defeat of the religious pluralist position as certainly as that of his own (2000a: 177; see also Alston 1988). Still, it could be argued that while disagreement is not a defeater of belief, it should lead people to believe with less confidence.

A different kind of charge against Plantinga’s model is that it leaves unaddressed the question of actual warrant (Baker 2007: 87–89).

There is … a monumental issue which Plantinga does not discuss, and which a lot of people will consider needs discussing. This is whether Christian beliefs do have warrant … He has shown that they do, if they are true; so we might hope for discussion of whether they are true. (Swinburne 2001: 206)

Maybe the sense of dissatisfaction expressed by Swinburne can be somewhat mitigated by attending to the distinction between “ being rational in holding a theistic belief” and “ showing that theistic belief is rational” (Sudduth 2003: 311).

The idea of divine testimony is at the core of traditional conceptions of revelation in both Jewish-Christian and Islamic thought (for the latter, see Adeel 2019: 30–35). However, testimony and the justification of testimonial beliefs can be understood in different ways. Within contemporary philosophy of testimony, there are two basic schools. Reductionists hold that beliefs acquired through testimony must be justified by an (implicit or explicit) argument from evidence that establishes the trustworthiness of the witness. Anti-reductionists deny this and regard testimony as a basic, sui generis source of epistemic justification, like perception and memory. Hence, for anti-reductionists, testimonial beliefs are non-inferentially justified. This view has interesting implications for the issue of belief in divine revelation.

Inspired by Aquinas as well as by contemporary anti-reductionism (especially John McDowell), Lamont argues that the ability to gain knowledge from truthful testimony is an intellectual virtue, together with perception and memory (Lamont 2004: Ch. 5). When a hearer H believes a speaker S testifying that p , the very fact that S knows p and sincerely testifies to p gives H knowledge of p , which entails that H has a knowledge-constituting justification for p . This justification is not reducible to H’s evidence for the trustworthiness of S .

Lamont argues, on theological grounds, that God speaks through the Church, and that the Bible is part of this divine speech (Lamont 2004: Ch. 7). When a person believes a biblical statement because it is spoken by God, what the person acquires is testimonial knowledge. This knowledge is justified and counts as knowledge by the very fact that it comes from God’s own testimony. However, a condition for believing a biblical statement because it is spoken by God, is that the hearer is able to recognize it as God’s speech. This recognition happens, according to Lamont, through the effects that the divine message has on the hearer. Following John Owen, Lamont appeals to the moral enlightenment and transformation of the hearer that result when the divine message is heard. These effects, argues Lamont, can only happen through divine power, and they are therefore clear signs that allow the hearer to recognize the divine identity of the speaker (Lamont 2004: 198–206). The hearer, hence, can believe God , and so acquire the satisfactory epistemic standing that God’s testimony provides.

It can be questioned whether there are moral transformations that prove the involvement of a divine power (King 2008: 74). However, supposing that the divine origin of the Christian message could really be established in this way, it seems to follow that Lamont’s anti-reductionist account of testimony has no important epistemic role to play in his analysis of revealed knowledge. If we can infer, from certain effects of the message, that it is God who has spoken, then we can also infer that the message is true (since God would not lie or be mistaken). This seems to make appeal to testimony as a basic source of knowledge/justification superfluous.

Wahlberg (2014) has attempted to formulate a consistently anti-reductionist theory of knowledge by divine testimony. He suggests that one can identify divine speech by relying on God’s own say-so. An example would be if a person believes Jesus when Jesus claims to speak for God (supposing that his claim is true). In such a scenario, one would acquire testimonial knowledge from God’s testimony (through Jesus) without (initially) knowing that it is God who speaks (Wahlberg 2014: Ch. 6; see also Lamont 1996).

However, wouldn’t it be irrational just to believe a guy who claims to speak for God? Wahlberg acknowledges that normally, it would. He argues that in order for a Hearer H to be able to absorb trustworthy testimony from a speaker S in such as way that knowledge ensues, H must exercise doxastic responsibility . This means that she must be sensitive to and on the lookout for evidence and considerations that speak against the trustworthiness of S . If H fails to display such sensitivity, she cannot acquire knowledge from anyone’s testimony, even if it happens to be true. Now, doxastic responsibility clearly demands that testimony that purports to come from God be approached with a healthy dose of skepticism. In order for a responsible hearer to be able to absorb such testimony in a way that yields knowledge (supposing that the testimony really transmits revelation), there must be some circumstance that defeats the natural reasons for mistrust (such as the possibility that a putative prophet lies or is deluded).

Wahlberg claims that a miracle can constitute such a circumstance. If Jesus in fact rose from the dead, his closest disciples who saw his post-mortem appearances would have been in a position to believe (without doxastic irresponsibility) Jesus’ claim to speak for God. This means that they could have known the truth of a revelatory claim on the basis of God’s own testimony.

But what about those people who do not witness a miracle? Wahlberg argues that knowledge of Jesus’ resurrection could be available, through the biblical testimony, to non-witnesses, for example to people who live today. The biblical testimony about the resurrection, in turn, can be believed without doxastic irresponsibility by people who live today due to the historical-critical evidence that supports it and defeats the natural reasons for skepticism. According to Wahlberg, knowledge of the resurrection gained in this way would be non-inferentially justified by testimony (as a basic or sui generis source of justification), rather than by inference from the available historical-critical evidence. The latter evidence is not good enough for knowledge, but only for enabling responsible belief.

Wahlberg’s case for doxastic responsibility depends on a controversial assessment of the strength of the historical-critical case for Jesus’ resurrection. Another potential problem is the fact that most Christians do not know the historical-critical evidence for the resurrection. Does it follow that most Christians do not believe in divine revelation responsibly? (Griffiths 2018). To address this difficulty, Wahlberg appeals to the social nature of knowledge, and argues that individuals can satisfy the requirements of doxastic responsibility in virtue of the epistemic competence inherent in the communities they belong to.

2.3 Inferential Justification

This section will continue, for a while, with the theme of divine testimony, but now from a reductionist perspective. The accounts studied so far work with an anti-reductionist (non-inferential) view of testimonial justification. However, it can be argued that when it comes to believing purportedly divine testimony, the stakes are too high for it to be rational to trust without positive evidence of trustworthiness (King 2008: 78).

According to King, rational belief in divine self-testimony requires that God gives us “sufficient evidence to trust in him” (King 2008: 176). We can know by a priori reasoning what kind of evidence God must provide in order to win our trust, and so we can anticipate that God (if he exists) will provide this kind of evidence. Importantly, a divine revelation must be “discrete” and available only to a few people at first, since a “major” revelation immediately apparent for a global audience would obscure God’s love with overwhelming power. King provides a list of possible evidences that satisfy the requirement of discreetness, including “a sense of [divine] presence”, “internal communication (including dreams, visions)”, “fulfilled prophecies, Resurrection, Incarnation”. Any conceivable revelation must choose its means from this list and hence conform to a necessary structure, which accommodates the cognitive limitations of human beings and makes it possible for them to trust in a rational way. King refers to his epistemological model as “trust-evidentialism” (2008: 174, 176).

Even though King’s account is ostensibly different from the non-inferential testimonial models presented above, the differences might be smaller than first appears. As we have seen, “doxastic responsibility” requires extensive reasoning from evidence in Wahlberg’s account, even though such reasoning is construed as defeater-deflecting rather than as trust-grounding.

As the example of King illustrates, inferential models for the justification of revelation can be construed as testimonial, if testimonial justification is understood in a reductionist way. John Locke is a classic example of this.

Faith … is the assent to any proposition … upon the credit of the proposer, as coming from God, in some extraordinary way of communication. This way of discovering truths to men we call Revelation . ( Essay Concerning Human Understanding , IV, xviii, 2)

However, testimonial justification, for Locke, is reducible to argument from evidence.

In order to see the general strengths and problems of inferential models of justification, it will be helpful to focus on a paradigmatic example in the tradition of Tillotson and Locke. Perhaps the most influential evidentialist account of the justification of revelatory claims is the one proposed by Richard Swinburne. His argument can be formalized using probability calculus and Bayes Theorem (Swinburne 2007: 345–356), but the discussion below will proceed informally. After a presentation of Swinburne’s argument, some critical and complementary perspectives will be addressed.

For Swinburne, rational acceptance of a revelatory claim must be based on evidence, and how strong the evidence needs to be depends on what background beliefs we have. If we have good reason to believe, independently of any purported revelation, that God exists and that a revelation from him is to be expected, then rational acceptance of a revelatory claim can be based on more modest evidence than would otherwise be the case. It is hence important for Swinburne to build a case for the existence of God based on natural theology, and then establish the likelihood of a revelation on the basis of a priori reasoning about what God is likely to do.

Swinburne thinks that natural theological arguments make God’s existence at least as probable as his non-existence, and that a priori reasoning about God leads to the conclusion that a revelation is to be expected. A God who has made rational creatures would want to interact with them, and for this to be possible, they would need to know more about God’s nature and character than what is naturally accessible to them. Furthermore, it would be good for humans to receive moral enlightenment from God, and encouragement to live morally good lives. Since God is good, these considerations make a revelation likely. Moreover, Swinburne argues that a good God would have reason to become incarnate in order to atone for sin and to identify with our suffering. If this is to be effectual, a revelation that tells us about the incarnation and atonement is necessary. It is also to be expected that a divine revelation would not come with overwhelming evidence in its favor but require some searching activity on the part of humans. This would encourage human cooperation and co-responsibility and strengthen desire for the goal of salvation. Since a revelation would have to be translated between different cultures and across time, there must also be included in the revelation some means of continuing guidance—a church that can ensure that interpretations and translations are correct (Swinburne 2007: 103–104. For a more fully developed perspective on the ecclesial mediation of revelation, see Levering 2014).

Armed with the purported background knowledge that a certain kind of revelation is likely, Swinburne suggests four “tests” or criteria for credible revelatory claims (Swinburne 2007: Ch. 6). The first criterion is that the content of a purported revelation concerns things that are important for our deepest well-being, and that this content is not very improbable on grounds independent of revelation. This “content test” must be complemented by a “miracle test”, which is the second criterion. If God wants us to be able to identify a divine revelation as such, he must deliver it in a way that only God could do. This requires a divine signature in the form of a confirming miracle, in the sense of a violation of a natural law. Third, if a revelation is to have a determinate content that is not endlessly open to interpretation, a genuine revelation must contain instructions for how an interpretive church is to be constituted, and the interpretations of this church must be plausible as interpretations of the original revelation. The fourth test is that the church’s interpretations of revelation must not be very implausible on other, independent grounds.

When applying these tests to the great world religions, Swinburne claims to find that the purported Christian revelation is the only serious candidate. No other religion can point to a reasonable amount of evidence for a foundational, authenticating miracle like the resurrection of Jesus, nor does any other religion satisfy the other three tests. This shows that the coincidence of the satisfaction of all four tests (even to a moderate degree) “is an extremely unlikely event in the normal course of things” (Swinburne 2007: 337). Since Christianity satisfies all four tests, according to Swinburne, it is very probable that its purported revelation is true. In order to show that Christianity satisfies the tests, Swinburne produces a complex argument based on evidence from many sources (for example, historical arguments about the acts and teachings of Jesus, evidence for the resurrection, arguments for the moral goodness of Christian teachings, etc.). It is the cumulative force of the total evidence that makes belief in the Christian revelatory claim justified.

A general criticism that can be directed against Swinburne’s account—as well as other inferential accounts (e.g., King 2008)—is that it seems to draw on the Christian religion as a kind of intuition-pump for what are supposed to be “ a priori ” features of any genuine revelation. For example, Swinburne argues that it is a priori likely that God will become incarnated and atone for human sin, and that this therefore is a part of the content-criterion by which to test purported revelations. Many would argue, however, that this reasoning is “ ad hoc and post eventum ” and biased in favor of the Christian tradition (Abraham 2006: 73. See also Stump 1994: 740; McLean 2013).

Swinburne’s argument invites detailed objections on practically every point, but he has also defended every step of the argument extensively in separate works about natural theology, the incarnation, atonement theory, and the resurrection (2004a; 1994; 1989; 2003). Especially the historical argument for a resurrection is crucial for Swinburne’s case. The debates generated by criticism of Swinburne’s historical claims and claims about natural theology cannot be addressed here. However, the very fact that Swinburne’s argument, in order to succeed, needs to establish many controversial propositions has been seen, by some, as a fatal weakness (Plantinga 2000b, 271–280; Hasker 2002: 256–257).

Appealing to a general “principle of dwindling probabilities”, Plantinga has argued that complex inferential cases for Christianity of the kind Swinburne presents must necessarily fail. Such complex arguments chain together a number of logically independent propositions, most of which are merely probable given the evidence. For every merely probable proposition that is needed to reach the conclusion, the probability of the hypothesis as a whole will decrease, since the probabilities at each stage of the argument must be multiplied. Plantinga argues that even if the probabilities of the individual propositions are given a very generous estimate—for example, if we assign the probability 0.9 to the proposition that God exists (on our background knowledge)—the overall conclusion about the Christian revelation will still have a probability well below 0.5. Plantinga, therefore, concludes that the inferential case for the Christian revelation

isn’t strong enough to produce warranted belief … at most, it could produce the warranted belief that the main lines of Christian teaching aren’t particularly improbable. (Plantinga 2000b: 271)

Plantinga’s argument seems to threaten the whole inferential project. In response, however, it can be argued that it proves too much. All historical arguments (even secular ones) link together propositions that are merely probable. If the principle of dwindling probabilities is valid and has the implications that Plantinga claims, it could be applied to all historical arguments, with the result that no historical argument could succeed. This, however, is a conclusion that many would be reluctant to draw (Swinburne 2004b: 540; 2007: 356).

Tim and Lydia McGrew have provided what many take to be a strong response to Plantinga’s argument from dwindling probabilities (McGrew 2004; McGrew and McGrew 2006). Basically, they argue that at least the steepness of the “dwindling” is an illusion created by the way Plantinga (mis)represents the inferential-historical case for a Christian revelation. Among other shortcomings, Plantinga’s construal fails to bring out how evidence for a proposition that is “downstream” in the argument (such as “God raised Jesus from the dead”) is relevant for assessing the probability of a proposition that is “upstream” (such as “God exists”). While Plantinga concedes ground to some of the critique (2006), he nevertheless stands by his general argument (2015: 262. For an overview of the debate, see Nickel 2015: 225–235 and Crisp 2009.)

Another response to the purported threat of dwindling probabilities is suggested by Menssen and Sullivan (2007). They defend a basically Swinburnian inferential project, but criticize Swinburne for being insufficiently holistic, in a sense to be explained below (2007: 55–56). With respect to the argument about dwindling probabilities, they acknowledge that a complex proposition cannot have a greater probability than any of its constituent claims. However, they argue that in certain cases, the complex proposition “could still be more believable ” (2007: 61). For example, the claim that “there is a heavenly body beyond Uranus that is perturbing its orbit” is more complex than the weaker claim that “there is a heavenly body beyond Uranus”. Nevertheless, scientists did not first attempt to prove the weaker claim, and then went on to prove the stronger (more complex) claim. Instead, they established the truth of the weaker claim by establishing the truth of the stronger.

The lesson to learn from this, according to Menssen and Sullivan, is that the project of justifying revelatory claims should not await the establishing of God’s existence by means of traditional natural theology (as suggested by Swinburne 2004b: 538 and Mavrodes 1988: 102). Instead, revelatory claims should be investigated as part of the project of justifying theism—the only condition for such investigation being that the existence of a world-creator is not highly unlikely. In fact,

a negative conclusion concerning the existence of a good God is not justified unless the content of a reasonable number of leading revelatory claims has been seriously considered. (Menssen and Sullivan 2007: 63)

This is because the “problem of evil” counts as evidence against God’s existence. To exclude putative revelations from consideration before God’s existence has been established would be to refuse to “listen to the voice of the accused”. What if a putative revelation contains an acceptable explanation of evil, that blocks or weakens the atheistic arguments? Not to take this possibility into account would, arguably, be to handicap the evidentialist project by forcing it to proceed without a “full database” (Kwan 2011: 472). Hence, the “holistic” approach of Menssen and Sullivan might be seen as an improvement in relation to the more traditional, “layered” approach of Swinburne. (However, Swinburne’s distinction between “bare” and “ramified” natural theology point in a holistic direction, see 2004b: 533–535.)

Other critics of Swinburne point out that he ignores the role played by emotions, desires and the will in coming to faith (Hasker 2002: 257–258). Is belief in a divine revelation only a matter of Bayesian calculation of probabilities? This lacuna in Swinburne’s thought—as well as in much evidentialist reflection in general—has been addressed by Paul Moser, who introduces an existential-affective dimension in the inferential project. His central claim is that our access to evidence for God’s existence might depend on our volitional and affective states (2008; 2010. See also Wainwright 2006).

Moser believes that God is “hidden”, at least for some people some of the time, in the sense that his existence is not beyond reasonable doubt. This fact should not be taken as a reason for skepticism, however, since it is to be expected that a perfectly loving God would only make evidence of his existence available when this is likely to elicit the right human response. God does not reveal himself simply in order to slake our curiosity, but only with the purpose of accomplishing, in a non-coercive way, a moral transformation of humans to align their wills and character with God’s character and purposes. We should hence expect evidence for God to be purposively available.

Moser claims that his emphasis on the volitional element in our epistemic responses to divine revelation constitutes “a Copernican Revolution in cognitive matters about God’s existence” (2008: 4). However, it would be more accurate to say that he revives a classical theme, found in the church fathers and Aquinas (Macdonald 2009a: 137). For Aquinas, for example, it is the will that moves the intellect to the assent of faith (as emphasized by the “voluntarist interpretation”, see section 2.1 above).

Another philosopher who stresses the personal dimension of faith and its epistemic relevance is Abraham, who notes that revelation is a “threshold concept”. By accepting a revelatory claim, one’s perception of the world changes in a fundamental way. This is a “profoundly self-involving experience” and a “massive cognitive and spiritual revolution” (Abraham 2006: 87, 89).

Finally, it must be considered whether a “hybrid” approach to revelatory claims—combining inferential and non-inferential modes of justification—might be fruitful. Abraham (2006 and 1982) suggests that this is the case. Inspired by Plantinga’s theory of a sensus divinitatis , Abraham claims that we come equipped with an oculus contemplationis , “a spiritually discerning eye” that allows us to discern God’s presence and activity in nature and history through a “basic cognitive act” (2006: 69).

However, Abraham considers arguments from evidence to be “supplementary to the appeal to the oculus contemplationis ”. Miracles, for example, have a genuine epistemic freight and the kind of data appealed to in evidentialist reasoning about revelation can

operate as corroborating evidence that coheres with and thus strengthens the initial beliefs legitimately formed independently of propositional evidence. (2006: 72, 77)

Abraham’s portrayal of revelation as a “threshold concept” also seems to open up the possibility of a kind of “retroactive” justification: Once a revelatory claim has been accepted, the new perspective one has gained will make one capable of seeing the cognitive errors of one’s previous position. Charles Taylor has described this kind of retroactive justification as a “supersession argument” (2005: 340–341).

A possibility (or purported possibility) that has not been considered so far, is that belief in divine revelation could be justified in a way that is totally sui generis . Inspired by Kierkegaard, Karl Barth seems to suggest something like this. Human nature is not in any way adapted to receive knowledge of God, according to Barth, and hence there can be no philosophical explanation of how knowledge of God comes about. However, God himself could provide such knowledge without respecting the criteria of any epistemological canon. Barth writers:

To say “God with us” is to say something which has no basis or possibility outside itself, which can in no sense be explained in terms of man and man’s situation, but only as knowledge of God from God, as free and unmerited grace. As the Bible bears witness to God’s revelation and as Church proclamation takes up this witness in obedience, both renounce any foundation apart from that which God has given once and for all by speaking (Barth 1975: 119–120).

Critics have accused Barth of portraying revelation

as something having full authority over the insights of reason and sensibility, and as not in any way subject to them. (Quash 2007: 334)

According to Pannenberg, this is equivalent to fideism.

Barth’s apparently so lofty objectivity about God and God’s word turns out to rest on no more than the irrational subjectivity of a venture of faith with no justification outside itself. (1976: 273)

In response to this kind of criticism, theologians in the “postliberal” tradition (inspired by Barth) have argued that revelation is not an epistemological concept at all. The Christian doctrine of revelation does not purport to explain how Christina beliefs are justified. Instead, it provides an intra-theological explication of God’s prevenient grace (Thiemann 1985: 4). Some have even gone so far as to say that “the very idea that the Bible is revealed … is a claim that creates more trouble than it is worth” (Hauerwas 1981: 57). For postliberal theologians in general, Christian beliefs are justified by being part of a coherent web of beliefs (Marshall 2000).

However, perhaps a better way of defending Barth is suggested by Hans Urs von Balthasar. He shares Barth’s general view of revelation as epistemically self-authenticating and as providing its own warrant, independently of human preconceptions (Chapp 2004: 11). However, Balthasar attempts to make this view intelligible by suggesting an analogy with aesthetic experience. In Mozart’s Jupiter Symphony , for example, every note seems to be necessary in the sense that any change would make the symphony less beautiful. However, nobody (except Mozart himself) could have said in advance that precisely this combination of notes is necessary in order to produce such beauty. Hence, our recognition of the beauty or perfection of the symphony happens without reference to any criteria or rules that we could have stated independently of encountering the symphony itself. In a similar way, revelation possesses its own intrinsic credibility, rooted in the self-authenticating glory of God. “Divine love”, writes Balthasar,

can appear in such an overwhelming way that its glorious majesty throws one to the ground; it shines out as the last word and leaves one no choice but to respond in the mode of pure, blind obedience. (Balthasar 2004: 53, 57)

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How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

• DeRose, Keith, 1999, “ Voodoo Epistemology ”, text of comments on Alvin Plantinga’s book, Warranted Christian Belief , delivered to a meeting of the Society of Christian Philosophers on 27 December 1999.

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Scripture as Divine Revelation

Other essays.

Scripture is the written form of God’s special revelation for his people, both the Old Testament and the New Testament, which provides them with an enduring, permanent witness through which the Spirit brings them into union with the resurrected and ascended Christ.

Divine revelation, which is a remarkable and gracious gift of God, comes in both general and special ways. General revelation is given to everyone everywhere is broad (though far from empty) in what it says about God. This kind of divine revelation is found in creation and in every person’s conscience. Special revelation, on the other hand, is specific in its content and omnipotent in its effect. Through this revelation, God communicates the mysteries of the faith and personal knowledge of Christ to his people. Scripture is the written form of special revelation, providing God’s people with an enduring witness to the work of God in Christ. This Scripture has been “breathed out” by God through his Spirit, carrying along the authors of Scripture as they wrote.

Divine Revelation is Extraordinary

As Christians, we take God’s revelation of himself for granted. But if we think about who God is, it is nothing short of remarkable that he has spoken. This is true for a number of reasons. To begin with, he is the infinite, eternal, and incomprehensible Creator. We, on the other hand, are finite creatures. God is not merely greater in size, as if he is bigger but nevertheless still within our sphere of creaturely experience. No, this God is immeasurable in essence; he is a different type of being altogether. This fundamental distinction between the Creator and the creature pervades the storyline of the Bible because, as the prophets repeatedly point out, it is what distinguishes Yahweh from the created gods of the surrounding nations. Idolatry is a confusion of the creature with the Creator. All that to say, there is an infinite distance between God and man because God is not a created being.

How incredible it is, then, that this incomprehensible Creator would stoop down to make himself known to us brittle creatures, so that in turn we might know him truly, even if never comprehensively. As John Calvin said with such eloquence, God is like that nurse who lisps to a new born babe. Such accommodation is supernatural, but also fitting since God chose to make us in his own image.

But there is yet another reason divine revelation is extraordinary. His holiness not only sets him apart as the infinite, transcendent One, but his holiness also sets him apart as the righteous One. That, however, poses a problem. For we are not righteous but sinners, guilty and corrupted, stained by sin in every component of our being. If it is not astounding enough that the infinite, eternal God created and spoke to those whom he made, he continued to do so even when they fell into sin’s grip. He would have been right to remain silent when Adam and Eve rebelled, and his silence would have resulted in total separation and condemnation. But he did not remain silent; he spoke, and he spoke a redeeming word. Ultimately, that initial word of promise in Genesis 3:15 reached its culmination in the Word made flesh (John 1:1, 14), the revelation of God personified. That Word was none other than the Lord Christ Jesus himself, the eternal Son of God made incarnate for us and our salvation.

For these reasons, revelation is a gift, and an extraordinary one at that.

The Heavens Declare the Glory of God: General Revelation

We should distinguish, however, between two types of revelation. First, there is general revelation. It is called general because it (1) is given to everyone everywhere and (2) is broad (though far from empty) in what it says about God. General revelation, for example, does not communicate the mysteries of the Trinity or the person and work of Jesus Christ, but it does reveal God as Creator of the cosmos and manifests many of his divine attributes (transcendence, majesty, power, sovereignty, etc. (see Pss. 198:3–4; 29:4; 93:2; 104:24; Acts 14:15–17; 17:24–27; Rom. 1:20, 32; 2:15–16). And it does so not to a specific people only but to all people in all times. The reason for its universal scope is found in the medium itself.

So, by what medium does a person receive this general revelation? There are two ways: (1) through man’s internal conscience, and (2) through the created order (e.g., nature). Man is created in God’s image (Gen. 1:27), which means the divine imprint marks him. In “our minds,” says Calvin in his Institutes (1.3.2), lie the “seeds of religion,” so much so that man is characterized by a sensus divinitatis, a sense of the divine. Man cannot escape, no matter how hard he tries, the morality embedded within his very makeup as a creature made to reflect his Creator (Rom. 1:32; 2:14–16).

Yet creation, too, bears witness that there is a Creator. Listen to David in Psalm 19:1–2:

The heavens declare the glory of God,

and the sky above proclaims his handiwork.

Day to day pours out speech,

and night to night reveals knowledge.

One should also consult Psalms 8, 93, and 104, which make similar statements. Paul, too, says this much. God’s “invisible attributes, namely, his eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly perceived, ever since the creation of the world, in the things that have been made” (Rom. 1:20).

The problem is that as sinners we suppress this general revelation, which means it may be sufficient to condemn us (see Rom. 1:20–21; 2:14–16), but it is not sufficient to save us. What is needed, then, is a special revelation, one that is not only specific in its content but omnipotent in its effect, taking root in a particular people through faith. We know God as Creator and Judge due to general revelation, but unless there is special revelation, we will never know this Creator as our Savior.

From Creator to Savior: Special Revelation

Being gracious, God has provided special revelation in a variety of ways. A brief look at how God reveals himself to his people, Israel, in the OT demonstrates that God’s special, saving revelation is rich, communicated through a mosaic of mediums, including theophanies, dreams, visions, angels, direct speech, miracles, and ultimately Christ himself. In fact, all previous revelation pointed to the revelation of God which was none other than the Son of God himself. Jesus not only came, like the prophets of old, to communicate a revelation from God, but Jesus himself is the revelation from God because he is God incarnate (Heb. 1:1; John 1:1). He does not merely bring a message; he is the message.

But as important as each of these mediums may be, God determined—in his wise providence—that his enduring, permanent witness to himself should come through a written word, namely, the Scriptures, what we Christians call the Bible. Even Christ ascended into the heavens after his resurrection from the dead. Scripture, however, is the Spirit’s enduring, ever-present gift to God’s people, and one through which the Spirit brings us into union with the resurrected and ascended Christ, our Lord. We do not know Christ apart from the word of Christ inscripturated; it is through this inspired text that the Spirit makes Christ known to us in a saving way. So, although Scripture may be but one form of special revelation, it is the permanent form God intends his people to possess and live by for faith and practice.

The Inscripturated Word: Inspiration

However, we should not forget that this written word from our triune God did not fall from heaven all at once. Rather, it was revealed progressively over the course of history and through human hands. God’s plan of redemption was revealed through the Scriptures, but at first only in seed form. It then blossomed further as God chose to reveal how that plan of redemption would eventually culminate through the death and resurrection of his Son. This occurred within the context of God’s saving covenants. For example, it was at Sinai that God entered into a covenant with his people, Israel. The constitution of that covenant—the treaty by which Israel was to live by—was given to Moses, written with the very finger of God on tablets of stone (Deut. 9:10).

As the story progresses, God provides further written revelation through his prophets. Not only do they speak the word of God to the people of God, but at times they are told to write it down, serving as prosecutors of the covenant against a people bent on covenant infidelity (see the book of Jeremiah, for example). It’s little surprise, then, that when the promised Messiah arrives—the one the Old Testament Scriptures promised and prefigured—this Messiah intends to pass on the good news of the gospel to his disciples. As his ambassadors, they will spread the good news of salvation about Jesus through their proclamation (see the book of Acts) but also through the writing of letters, letters inspired by the Spirit and for the instruction and edification of the church.

To clarify, these Scriptures, which we now call the Old and New Testaments (Testament meaning covenant), were not typically produced unlitarerally, as if, for example, Zechariah or Peter had to ascend Sinai like Moses to bring down God’s written word. Actually, Sinai would prove the exception, not the norm. God often worked in ordinary ways through ordinary human beings whom he set apart for his work of inspiration (e.g., David, the shepherd boy turned king wrote Psalms; fisherman turned disciples wrote letters to churches).

That word “inspiration” is key. It does not mean the human authors of Scripture merely recorded their religious experience, as if they saw what God did and were so excited that they wrote it down only for God to come along and adopt it as his own. That may be the common use of the word “inspired” today but that is not what the Bible itself means by the term. For example, consider Paul’s words to Timothy about Scripture, and not just some parts but all of it: “All Scripture is breathed out (θεόπνευστος) by God…” (2Tim 3:16).  In other words, the Scriptures do not originate with the human authors but with God himself.

Inspiration as Concursus

How did God breath-out the Scriptures? That may be something of a mystery, but Peter gives us a glimpse into that mystery when he says, “For no prophecy was ever produced by the will of man, but men spoke from God as they were carried along by the Holy Spirit” (2 Pet. 1:21). B. B. Warfield called this concursus, meaning there is a simultaneous operation between the human author and the divine author, though the divine author is primary. That much is apparent when Peter indicates that it was the Spirit that “carried along” the prophets of old. Much like a ship at sea driven along by the wind (e.g., Acts 27:15, 17), the Spirit worked in and upon the human authors in such a way that what they said was exactly what God himself said and intended.

Peter is not alone in this belief, but it can be seen in Jesus’s own teaching whenever he refers to the OT author and the Spirit synonymously (see Mark 12:36-37 for example). The assumption across the New Testament is that the Scriptures of Jesus and the apostles (the Old Testament) is none other than God’s inspired word to his people. And they assume the Scriptures are inspired not just in its overall message but in its totality, down to the very words (inspiration is verbal and plenary).

Assurance of Inspiration: The Gospel

While Paul may say this much explicitly (2 Tim. 3:16), Jesus and the Gospel writers indicate the same but by his constant refrain that the Scriptures have been fulfilled in his person and work (e.g., Luke 4:21; also see Matthew’s Gospel which is full of this “fulfillment” language). The covenant promises of God in the Scriptures have been fulfilled in Jesus Christ, and that is the greatest testimony to their divine origin. Should one seek assurance that the Scripture is nothing less than divine revelation one need look no further than the gospel itself. God has come through on his word.

Further Reading

• B. B. Warfield, Revelation and Inspiration
• D. A. Carson, ed., The Enduring Authority of Christian Scripture
• E. J. Young, Thy Word Is Truth: Some Thoughts on the Biblical Doctrine of Inspiration
• Matthew Barrett, God’s Word Alone: The Authority of Scripture . See an author interview here and here .
• Matthew Barrett, Twenty-one lectures based on God’s Word Alone .
• Matthew Barrett, Ten videos on the doctrine of Scripture .
• Matthew Barrett, Canon, Covenant, and Christology: Rethinking Jesus and the Scriptures of Israel, New Studies in Biblical Theology, ed. D. A. Carson (InterVarsity Press).
• Peter Williams, Video interview: Why is divine authorial intent so important for biblical interpretation ?

This essay is part of the Concise Theology series. All views expressed in this essay are those of the author. This essay is freely available under Creative Commons License with Attribution-ShareAlike, allowing users to share it in other mediums/formats and adapt/translate the content as long as an attribution link, indication of changes, and the same Creative Commons License applies to that material. If you are interested in translating our content or are interested in joining our community of translators,  please reach out to us .

This essay has been translated into French .

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