critical thinking is associated with skepticism respect disbelief contrariness

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Exploring Skepticism and Doubt: A Philosophical and Critical Thinking Perspective
Philosophical thinking

From Socrates to the present day, skepticism and doubt have been at the forefront of philosophical thought. Skepticism has been used to challenge existing beliefs and assumptions, while doubt has been used to question and probe ideas, concepts, and beliefs. In this article, we explore the philosophical and critical thinking perspectives on skepticism and doubt. We will look at how they have been used throughout history to shape our thinking and inform our decisions.

We will also examine the implications of skepticism and doubt for our society today and how they can be used to foster greater understanding and collaboration. Skepticism and doubt have long been seen as tools of inquiry and analysis. They have been used to challenge established conventions, challenge accepted wisdom, and explore new ideas. As such, skepticism and doubt can be seen as essential elements of philosophical thinking. This article will explore the various ways in which skepticism and doubt have been employed by philosophers throughout history, as well as their implications for critical thinking. We will also examine the implications of skepticism and doubt in today's world.

We will look at how they can be used to promote greater understanding, collaboration, and progress in our society. We will also explore the potential pitfalls of relying too heavily on skepticism and doubt, such as the tendency to become too skeptical or too trusting of ideas. Finally, we will discuss how skepticism and doubt can be used in a constructive manner to promote meaningful dialogue and progress. Skepticism and doubt are two closely related concepts that have been discussed in philosophy and critical thinking for centuries. They involve questioning beliefs or assumptions, and seeking evidence in order to form one’s own conclusions.

Historically, skepticism and doubt have been used to challenge existing beliefs and accepted truths

Today, skepticism and doubt can still be used to think more critically about our beliefs and assumptions, by questioning our beliefs and assumptions, we can avoid making decisions based on false information or our own biases, when we question our beliefs and assumptions, it can help us to think more deeply about our positions and arguments, if taken too far, they can lead to a sense of cynicism or apathy, which can prevent us from forming meaningful connections with others or taking meaningful action.

By questioning our beliefs and assumptions, we can avoid making decisions based on false information or biases. We can also identify potential pitfalls in our reasoning and uncover alternative perspectives that we may not have considered before. Finally, when engaging in debates or discussions, skepticism and doubt can help us to think more deeply about our positions and arguments. However, it is important to use skepticism and doubt judiciously in order to avoid falling into a state of cynicism or apathy. For those looking to learn more about skepticism and doubt, there are a number of resources available.

What is Skepticism and Doubt?

Philosophical skepticism can be divided into several different types, including Cartesian skepticism, Pyrrhonism, Academic skepticism, and Humean skepticism. Cartesian skepticism is the view that nothing can be known with absolute certainty, while Pyrrhonism holds that nothing can be known with absolute certainty and that one should suspend judgement until further evidence is obtained. Academic skepticism maintains that no knowledge is certain and that wisdom is achieved through doubt, while Humean skepticism suggests that knowledge is based on experience and can never be certain. Scientific skepticism is a form of inquiry that uses scientific methods to investigate claims made in the absence of definitive proof. This type of skepticism is based on the premise that extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence in order to be accepted as valid.

The Historical Roots of Skepticism and Doubt

Descartes argued that people should use their own reason and experience to form beliefs, rather than relying solely on the teachings of others. He was an advocate of the “method of doubt”, which instructed people to doubt all of their beliefs until they could be proven true. Descartes’ ideas were highly influential and were taken up by other philosophers such as David Hume. Hume argued that humans are limited in their knowledge, and that we should not assume our beliefs to be true unless there is sufficient evidence for them.

The Application of Skepticism and Doubt

Additionally, by applying doubt to our problem-solving abilities, we can avoid the potential pitfalls of relying too heavily on instinct or intuition. For example, if we are presented with a complicated problem, we may be tempted to rush to a solution without considering the wider implications of our decision. However, by taking a moment to consider the implications of our decision and question any underlying assumptions, we can make sure that our solution is as informed and well-considered as possible. In addition to helping us think more critically, skepticism and doubt can help us develop a healthier sense of self-awareness. By questioning our own beliefs and assumptions, we can gain a better understanding of our own thought processes and the biases which might be influencing them.

Resources for Learning More About Skepticism and Doubt

Carroll 2.The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: A Peer-Reviewed Academic Resource 3.The Skeptics Society: Promoting Science and Reason Since 1992 4.Doubtful News: Keeping You Informed on Strange and Unusual Claims Podcasts: 1.Skeptoid: Critical Analysis of Pop Phenomena 2.The Partially Examined Life: Philosophy for the Rest of Us 3.Reasonable Doubts: Exploring the Claims of Christianity 4.Think Twice: Exploring the Relationship between Science and ReligionIn conclusion, skepticism and doubt are important philosophical and critical thinking tools that can help us better understand our world, beliefs, assumptions, and perspectives. By engaging in questioning and challenging our beliefs and assumptions, we are able to think more critically and gain new insights. Furthermore, skepticism and doubt can be used to inform our decision-making processes, problem-solving abilities, and more. Finally, there are a variety of resources available for readers to learn more about skepticism and doubt and how to apply them to their everyday lives.

Skepticism , doubt , critical thinking , philosophical thinking , and decision-making are all key concepts explored in this article.

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Open-Mindedness and Skepticism in Critical Thinking

How the two traits work together..

Posted April 26, 2019

In my most recent post, 12 Important Dispositions for Critical Thinking, I presented a list of dispositions that are likely to enhance the quality of one’s thinking—specifically, disposition toward critical thinking refers to an inclination, tendency, or willingness to perform a given thinking skill (Dwyer, 2017; Facione, Facione & Giancarlo, 1997; Ku, 2009; Norris, 1992; Siegel, 1999; Valenzuela, Nieto & Saiz, 2011). Though there is overlap among some of the dispositions (e.g., inquisitiveness, truth-seeking, and resourcefulness), there are, of course, important distinctions. However, in one particular case—open-mindedness and scepticism—it almost seems that the dispositions are at odds with one another.

I received feedback on the piece, and one reader recommended that, though they agree that it's good to have an open mind, some viewpoints are simply foolish, and it would be a waste of time to dwell on them. I responded with agreement, to some extent. However, even if an idea appears foolish, sometimes its consideration can lead to an intelligent, critically considered conclusion. In this way, open-mindedness follows the same mechanics as ‘brainstorming’ ideas, in that no idea is a bad one because the ‘bad ones’ sometimes provide a foundation for a ‘good one.’ I advised, furthermore, that there are important subtleties that require consideration with respect to understanding the relationship between scepticism and open-mindedness.

To better understand this relationship, it is important to first operationally define the two dispositions. Open-mindedness refers to an inclination to be cognitively flexible and avoid rigidity in thinking; to tolerate divergent or conflicting views and treat all viewpoints alike, prior to subsequent analysis and evaluation; to detach from one’s own beliefs and consider, seriously, points of view other to one’s own without bias or self-interest; to be open to feedback by accepting positive feedback and to not reject criticism or constructive feedback without thoughtful consideration; to amend existing knowledge in light of new ideas and experiences; and to explore such new, alternative or ‘unusual’ ideas. On the other hand, seemingly, the disposition towards scepticism refers to an inclination to challenge ideas; to withhold judgment before engaging all the evidence or when the evidence and reasons are insufficient; to take a position and be able to change position when the evidence and reasons are sufficient; and to look at findings from various perspectives.

Though on a foundational level, the two dispositions may seem to reside on a kind of continuum (e.g., scepticism at one end and open-mindedness at the other end), they are distinct concepts, even if there is overlap. That is, an individual can be both sceptical and open-minded at the same time. Perhaps the key issue here is to recognise that open-mindedness doesn’t mean you have to accept divergent ideas, rather just consider them.

Even with that, isn’t consideration of a foolish idea still a ‘waste of time?' Well, the decision-making behind determining whether or not something is foolish is still consideration—some level of evaluation, no matter how easy, was required to make the decision. That’s where the scepticism comes in: rejection of the ‘foolish’ idea is the outcome of appropriate evaluation. However, knowing that the idea is foolish isn’t necessarily the end of the story. You may ask yourself whether anything can be salvaged from the bad idea or the thought process behind it, for the purpose of turning it into a good one; thus, being open-minded through idea generation, such as in the aforementioned example of the mechanics behind brainstorming. But with that, there’s more to open-mindedness than that.

Open-mindedness is about being open to changing your mind in light of new evidence. It’s about detaching from your beliefs and focusing on unbiased thinking void of self-interest. It’s about being open to constructive criticism and new ideas. People who are sceptical do all of this as well—they challenge ideas and they withhold judgment until sufficient evidence is provided—they are open to all possibilities until sufficient evidence is presented. Scepticism and open-mindedness go hand-in-hand, but they may not seem that way from the surface—not until they are adequately and comprehensively defined. Once described accordingly, it is hard not to equate both with critical thinking. Well, I’d be sceptical of it, anyway.

Dwyer, C.P. (2017). Critical thinking: Conceptual perspectives and practical guidelines. UK: Cambridge University Press.

Facione, P. A., Facione, N. C., & Giancarlo, C. A. (1997). Setting expectations for student learning: New directions for higher education. Millbrae: California Academic Press.

Ku, K. Y. L. (2009). Assessing students’ critical thinking performance: Urging for measurements using multi-response format. Thinking Skills and Creativity, 4(1), 70–76.

Norris, S. P. (Ed.). (1992). The generalizability of critical thinking: Multiple perspectives on an educational ideal. New York: Teachers College Press.

Siegel, H. (1999). What (good) are thinking dispositions? Educational Theory, 49(2), 207–221.

Valenzuela, J., Nieto, A. M., & Saiz, C. (2011). Critical thinking motivational scale: A contribution to the study of relationship between critical thinking and motivation. Journal of Research in Educational Psychology, 9(2), 823–848.

Christopher Dwyer, Ph.D., is a lecturer at the Technological University of the Shannon in Athlone, Ireland.

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3.2: Skepticism

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Jim Marteney
Los Angeles Valley College via ASCCC Open Educational Resources Initiative (OERI)

Our first step involves being skeptical of new ideas and arguments. When someone tells you something or you read it over the internet or see it on television, are you more likely to believe it or disbelieve it? As long as it does not clash with previous beliefs we hold, science suggests that we are more likely to accept new information. In fact, in order to understand a new concept our minds must first accept the concept to even understand what it means.

In a landmark 1991 paper, Harvard psychologist Dan Gilbert proposed that we process information in two steps. First, we accept information as true, and then we interrogate whether it may actually be false. In other words, we let the Trojan horse past the gate before we check to see if it’s full of Greek soldiers. “Humans,” wrote Gilbert, are “very credulous creatures who find it very easy to believe and very difficult to doubt.”

Cognitive Science Offers Tools To Rebuff Climate Deniers 1

As Dan Gilbert argues, understanding a new idea requires two steps.

Accept that the new information is accurate to understand the new ideas.
Once the ideas are understood, then test them to see if they are accurate.

Silence Does Not Always Mean Consent, Especially in Romance

Silence means consent is not an actual legal term and should not actually be relied on for all situations. This is especially accurate when “romance” is involved. More and more social situations, however, demand that if romantic advances are being made by an individual, that person must receive an affirmation of those advances before the romance is continued. Silence here does not mean consent.

But as you might imagine, once we accept the accuracy of a concept it becomes a challenge to then reject it. Since we are naturally prone to accept new information, our human nature is not to be initially skeptical. Being skeptical is a skill we must develop.

Our skepticism skill is challenged even more when we are presented with many “lies.” Again, Jeremy Deaton writes:

It takes energy to scrutinize a lie.
It takes more energy to scrutinize it when we hear that lie again and again.
We don’t like to scrutinize a lie that supports our worldview. 2

There is a misconception over what it means to be skeptical and I am guessing that now is a good time to clearly define what it means to be skeptical. Michael Shermer is the publisher of Skeptic magazine and is frequently asked what it means to be a skeptic. He answers this question by saying,

As the publisher of Skeptic magazine, I am often asked what I mean by skepticism, and if I’m skeptical of everything or if I actually believe anything. Skepticism is not a position that you stake out ahead of time and stick to no matter what.

...science and skepticism are synonymous, and in both cases, it’s okay to change your mind if the evidence changes. It all comes down to this question: What are the facts in support or against a particular claim?

There is also a popular notion that skeptics are closed-minded. Some even call us cynics. In principle, skeptics are neither closed-minded nor cynical. We are curious but cautious. 3

This passage by Shermer points out four key thoughts about skeptics:

No position is staked out ahead of time. This allows for you to examine the argument with an open mind and then decide whether you accept it or reject it.
Skepticism follows the procedure of scientific inquiry looking to see if the evidence provided in the argument adequately supports the claim.
It is okay to change your mind. You may have one position, but after listening to a new argument, with new and additional evidence you can now make a better decision and actually changing your mind is a good thing.
Skeptics are not cynics. Instead Skeptics are curious, but are cautious and resist leaping to a comfortable conclusion.

An additional and often used method of learning a concept is to look at the origin of a word. For those of you who want to impress your friends, the term for this is etymology . The Basics of Philosophy website has a nice, brief examination of the term skeptic.

The term is derived from the Greek verb "skeptomai" (which means "to look carefully, to reflect"), and the early Greek Skeptics were known as the Skeptikoi. In everyday usage, Skepticism refers to an attitude of doubt or incredulity, either in general or toward a particular object, or to any doubting or questioning attitude or state of mind. It is effectively the opposite of dogmatism, the idea that established beliefs are not to be disputed,doubted or diverged from. 4 (Maston,2008)

I like the idea that this passage clearly states that being a skeptic is the opposite of being dogmatic.

Jamie Hale describes the difference between being cynical and being a skeptic.

“Cynics are distrustful of any advice or information that they do not agree with themselves. Cynics do not accept any claim that challenges their belief system. While skeptics are open-minded and try to eliminate personal biases, cynics hold negative views and are not open to evidence that refutes their beliefs. Cynicism often leads to dogmatism.” 5

He continues by stating that dogmatism “opposes independent thinking and reason.” If we want to be successful critical thinkers we need to become much more skeptical and less cynical.

In his TEDTalk Michael Shermer explains the relationship between the process of skepticism and science.

Screen Shot 2020-09-05 at 12.46.10 PM.png

Skeptics question the validity of a particular claim by calling for evidence to prove or disprove it. In other words, skeptics are from Missouri -- the "Show Me" state. When we skeptics hear a fantastic claim, we say, "That's interesting, show me the evidence for it." 6

A key goal here is to encourage you to be more skeptical. Instead of blindly accepting or rejecting claims made by others, take the time to demand proof. Make the person or organization prove the claim they are making. And remember, you need to be open minded when listening to the argument.

Over three centuries ago the French philosopher and skeptic René Descartes, after one of the most thorough skeptical purges in intellectual history, concluded that he knew one thing for certain: “Cogito ergo sum” — “I think therefore I am.”

By a similar analysis, to be human is to think. Therefore, to paraphrase Descartes: Sum Ergo Cogito —I Am Therefore I Think 7

An effective critical thinker who is successful in arguing is a person who is more skeptical of the messages they receive. This advice is not just for those who wish to be argumentative. This advice is for every citizen.

“What we all need, as citizens, is to develop more skill in applying our skepticism. We need to spot false narratives, and also turn aside those who would replace them with pure fiction. Either we get this right or we cease to be free citizens.” 8

The problem we all experience is that it is not natural to be skeptical. Our natural state is to either flee a conflict or stand and argue. This can be explained by how our brains are structured.

Deaton, Jeremy. "Cognitive Science Offers Tools To Rebuff Climate Deniers." CleanTechnica, https://cleantechnica.com/2017/03/29/cognitive-science-offers-tools-rebuff-climate-deniers/ . Accessed 10 June 10 2017.
Shermer, Michael. "What is Skepticism, Anyway." Awaken , https://awaken.com/2013/02/what-is-skepticism-anyway/ . Accessed 30 October 2019.
Maston, Luke. "Skepticism." The Basics of Philosophy , https://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_skepticism.html . Accessed 10 June 2017.
Hale, Jamie. "Thinking Like a Skeptic." PsychCentral , psychcentral.com/blog/think-like-a-skeptic/. Accessed 30 October 2019.
Shermer, Michael. "Why People Believe Weird Things." TED , February 2006, https://www.ted.com/talks/michael_shermer_why_people_believe_weird_things .
Shermer, Michael. "A Skeptical Manifesto." Skeptic , https://www.skeptic.com/about_us/manifesto/ . Accessed 16 November 2020.
Inskeep, Steve. "A Finder’s Guide to Facts." NPR , https://www.npr.org/2016/12/11/505154631/a-finders-guide-to-facts .

Ignorance, misconceptions and critical thinking

Knowing the Unknown
Published: 07 January 2020
Volume 198 , pages 7473–7501, ( 2021 )

Cite this article

Sara Dellantonio ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-2281-7754 1 &
Luigi Pastore ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-5892-6928 2

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In this paper we investigate ignorance in relation to our capacity to justify our beliefs. To achieve this aim we specifically address scientific misconceptions, i.e. beliefs that are considered to be false in light of accepted scientific knowledge. The hypothesis we put forward is that misconceptions are not isolated false beliefs, but rather form part of a system of inferences—an explanation—which does not match current scientific theory. We further argue that, because misconceptions are embedded in a system, they cannot be rectified simply by replacing false beliefs with true ones. To address our misconceptions, we must rather act on the system of beliefs that supports them. In the first step of our analysis, we distinguish between misconceptions that are easy to dispel because they represent simple errors that occur against the background of a correct explanatory apparatus and misconceptions that are, on the contrary, very difficult to dispel because they are the product of pseudo explanations. We show that, in the latter case, misconceptions constitute an integral part of an incorrect explanation and the reasons that support such misconceptions are deeply misleading. In the second step, we discuss various approaches that have been adopted to address the problem of misconceptions. Challenging the notion that directly addressing and criticizing specific misconceptions is an effective approach, we propose that critical thinking is the most fruitful means to deal with misconceptions. We define the core competences and knowledge relevant for the practice of critical thinking and discuss how they help us avoid misconceptions that arise from accepting beliefs that form part of a mistaken explanation.

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Don’t get it wrong! On understanding and its negative phenomena

Haomiao Yu & Stefan Petkov

Scepticism, closure and rationally grounded knowledge: a new solution

Ignorance, knowledge, and two epistemic intuitions.

Pierre Le Morvan

In the literature, the approach to ignorance that considers the possession of true justified beliefs as a necessary condition for having knowledge and, by contrast, the absence of one of these conditions as sufficient to establish ignorance is called the Standard View of Ignorance (Le Morvan 2011 , 2012 , 2013 ; Le Morvan and Peels 2016 ). Recently, epistemological research has developed a new approach called the New View of Ignorance in which the role assigned to justification and to the capacity to explicitly offer reasons in support of our beliefs has been weakened and in which a person is considered to be ignorant primarily in the case in which s/he holds false beliefs. (On the so-called New View see Peels 2010 , 2011 , 2012 ; Le Morvan and Peels 2016 ). On the one hand, the New View denies—contrary to what we suggest—that justification plays a central function in determining whether we are or are not ignorant about some topic. However, on the other hand, it takes a step towards our approach: it not only places stronger emphasis on the cognizing powers of the subject than the "standard view" but also considers the possibility of distinguishing between various degrees of ignorance. In fact, by discussing the impossibility of providing a complete justification for a belief, it makes it possible to consider ignorance as a continuum rather than in a categorical manner, distinguishing between various degrees in which a person can be said to be ignorant as for the reasons s/he has to hold his/her beliefs (for a conception of ignorance as an epistemic status that comes in degrees and ignorance as the incapacity to adequately and completely answer questions concerning our beliefs cf. Nottelmann 2016 ). Of course, we cannot expect that people are able to provide a complete justification for their beliefs and even the issue of what an acceptable justification should look like is controversial. However, especially when considering beliefs concerning (relatively simple) phenomena that have a widely accepted , we can take a practical stance and assume that scientific theories which are commonly accepted by the scientific community at a given time provide us a measure for which beliefs should be considered to be true or false at that time and what a justification of them would ideally look like. On this basis, we can also assess (or approximate) the distance between scientific knowledge and individual beliefs as well as the distance between the way scientific theories justify specific pieces of knowledge and the way in which people justify their beliefs about the same phenomena.

In fact, it is not impossible for an individual to hold a belief that is inconsistent with other beliefs s/he holds, and yet it would be irrational for him/her to do so. As Davidson argues: “Strictly speaking, then, the irrationality consists not in any particular belief but in inconsistency within a set of beliefs.” (Davidson 1985 /2004, p. 192) According to a widely shared view in psychology developed by Leon Festinger ( 1957 ), inconsistencies cannot be psychologically accepted by the subject who will make every possible effort to rationalize and thus resolve them. In the same vein, Davidson ( 1982 /2004, 1986 /2004) points out how the inconsistencies we are sometimes victim of can be explained only by postulating a kind of compartmentalization of the mind. However, generally people seek internal congruency among their beliefs and coherence plays a pivotal role in the way we interpret human thinking (on this cf. also Thagard 2000 ).

In epistemology, justification has been viewed in various ways. Justification might be conceived as being linear: in this case an individual belief is proven to be true by a set of other beliefs and those other beliefs are proven to be true by another set and so on, until we reach some beliefs that are based on experience and are therefore considered—if not indisputable—at least well-grounded: as BonJour ( 1985 , p. 26) formulates it, “sufficient by itself to satisfy the adequate justification condition for knowledge”. Alternatively, justification can be viewed holistically as an interferential network of beliefs that are interconnected within a system and providing mutual support but are supported by experience only altogether as a whole. In this case, what justifies a belief is primarily its coherence with the system (this form of holism is commonly discussed in relation to Quine 1951 ; for a discussion of different justification models cf. Elgin 2005 ; van Cleve 2005 ). While strong forms of holism would consider a belief to be justified only if it is coherent with the whole system of beliefs that includes it, more moderate forms of holism support the view that justification depends on some chunks of this system. Typically, they also embrace some weak form of foundationalism in which some beliefs are considered more basic than others because they are closer to experience, i.e. observational, and thus serve as a foundation for others. (On moderate vs. strong holism from the point of view of Quine’s philosophy and on Quine’s later arguments in favor of a moderate form of holism cf. De Rosa and Lepore 2004 ). To numerous epistemologists, the idea that we can always apply linear models of justification that lead us to some fundamental beliefs appeared to be implausible in the light of the complexity of our system of knowledge. For this reason, they argued for a holist picture of knowledge in which beliefs are connected to each other within an inferential network and mutually sustain each other (cf. van Quine and Ullian 1970 ; Bonjour 1985 ; Harman 1993 ; Thagard 2007 ). At the same time, the view that all the beliefs of a complex beliefs system are also involved in the justification of each appeared to be too extreme as well as problematic from an epistemological point of view. In fact, this implies that, when even one single belief in the system is changed, all others must be modified accordingly. This excessive interdependence of beliefs makes the system as a whole too instable (cf. Fodor and Lepore 1992 , chap. 2). For this reason, many epistemologists have considered a moderate form of holism as the most plausible option. And yet, independently of which view of the structure of knowledge we favor and thus of which is the specific model of justification we prefer, at least some principles of inferential justification can be considered to be shared by all these models. Indeed, independently of whether we think that our beliefs are structured “like a building that rests upon a foundation” or "like a web where the strength of any given area depends on the strength of the surrounding areas" (Steup 2018 ), we always presuppose that beliefs form a congruent structure and that their relationships are somehow explanatory . We will say something more on this last factor below, but—since we will consider scientific theory as a benchmark to assess misconceptions—we will mainly just assume that the inferential relationships presupposed by scientific theories are explanatory, i.e. that they are form part of an appropriate explanation.

Even though this remains implicit in his paper, Reichenbach’s analysis is inspired by a specific model of explanations, i.e. by the Hempel and Oppenheim’s ( 1948 ) Deductive-Nomological Model. However, his description is general enough to also be compatible with other positions on what a consists of. The Deductive-Nomological Model of explanation does not explicitly rely on the notion of causation. But many advocates of this model argue that it still captures the causal component of explanations since “all causal claims imply the existence of some corresponding regularity (a “law”) linking cause to effect” (Woodward 2017 , cf. this article also for a brief discussion of the main modes of explanation that are currently under debate).

Reichenbach suggests that—when people do not have the means to develop an actual explanation—they try to account for phenomena by analogy with something else they understand better: since human experience is something everybody has firsthand knowledge of, people usually resort to analogies with human experience. Reichenbach intuition on this is confirmed by a number of contemporary, empirical studies showing that people with a poor understanding of the physical word have a strong tendency to anthropomorphize. They tend to explain physical phenomena using the same principles they would use to explain the behavior of human agents and thus they project human-like characteristics onto non-human things (Epley et al. 2007 ; Willard and Norenzayan 2013 ; Lindeman and Svedholm-Häkkinen 2016 ). And yet, the opposite also occurs, even if more rarely: people who exhibit a poor knowledge of the human mind and of social dynamics, but have a better comprehension of mechanisms and physical systems tend to interpret human phenomena according to non-human but better known mechanical principles (Lindeman and Svedholm-Häkkinen 2016 ).

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Dellantonio, S., Pastore, L. Ignorance, misconceptions and critical thinking. Synthese 198 , 7473–7501 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02529-7

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One of the primary aims of education is to enable students to secure reliable standards and procedures by which they can acquire beliefs that are, if not true, at least likely to be true. The questions of belief acquisition and the manner in which those beliefs are held, although epistemic, are also distinctively ethical. Implicit within epistemological concepts such as truth, justification and objectivity are ethical concerns such as honesty, integrity and responsibility. In response to the question “What ought I to believe?”, any serious critical thinker must examine the reasons for holding (or not holding) a belief, and ascertain whether or not they are good reasons. Good reasons involve attention to rational or intellectual standards such as evidential support, objectivity, justification and truth. My discussion of the moral dimensions of epistemological questions will follow the path delineated by W.K. Clifford (1877) in his essay “The Ethics of Belief”. Within the context of the notions of intellectual virtues and vices, I will argue that intellectual integrity and epistemic responsibility entail the acceptance of the aforementioned standards and an avoidance of credulity. Recently, however, the Enlightenment project of rationality has come under serious attack from feminist philosophers, neo pragmatists, post-modernist philosophers and proponents of the “sociology of knowledge” who, in their efforts to avoid dogmatism, claim that knowledge lacks foundations, truth is relative to culture or “conceptual scheme,” and objectivity a myth. Although a thorough treatment and discussion of the views advanced by these groups far exceeds the scope of this thesis, their claims are, I shall argue, self-refuting and entail a destructive relativism and possible descent into radical skepticism. For the most part, I will focus my criticisms on Pragmatism, particularly the variety espoused by Richard Rorty, arguably the most influential contemporary philosopher. If the extremes of radical skepticism and dogmatism are to be averted, educators must adopt the premise that knowledge is possible but at the same time accept the fact that much of what we claim to know is uncertain. Hence, many of our beliefs should be regarded as transitory and, therefore, held tentatively. I shall argue that by assuming a posture of humility in the face of knowledge claims, holding to a realist and fallibilist theory of knowledge, entertaining beliefs with a healthy skepticism and abandoning the “quest for certainty” (as Dewey has asserted), we can avoid dogmatism, indoctrination and the intellectual vice of credulity. If we value autonomous critical thinkers as an important component within a liberal democratic society, then these dispositions ought to be fostered in our students. This dispositional approach to critical thinking I refer to as constructive skepticism and will argue that it is a necessary requirement for any serious critical inquirer.

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Critical thinking skills: the essential tool for combatting coercive control

What is critical thinking.

Critical thinking is a deliberate thought process used to evaluate information. It means specifically and intentionally examining information to determine its validity and relevance. It is an essential skill in improving your cognitive processes, but importantly is your first line of defense for preventing coercion and coercive control, including identifying misinformation and fake news.

Critical thinking, sometimes called healthy skepticism, is a learned skill, using reflective, analytical thinking to make a reasonable, rational decision on what to believe or do. Even the most intelligent people have to learn it and practise it consciously. Once learned, critical thinking helps us to resist emotional appeals that might otherwise undermine our reasoning.

critical thinking is associated with skepticism respect disbelief contrariness

No Test for Politicians

It is surprising that there is no test to ensure that politicians are psychologically competent. We need to inhibit psychopaths and narcissists, and we should seek compassionate people to lead us, but good leadership will only win out if we are courageous followers.

Courageous followership is absolutely about questioning, when needed; about helping positional leaders see their blind spots, and helping them understand the impact of their actions on success and on morale, as well as taking an ethical stand when needed. Crucially, these actions are effective if the follower performs their own job well and authentically supports the leader.

Test of Core Values

If what the leader is asking has a reasonable chance of success, and doesn’t violate core human values, even if the follower would prefer a different course, following is inherent to the follower role. In other words, following requires not continuously competing for the lead role. So the courage to serve or support the leader and the mission is foundational. In that context the positional follower can then successfully question, offer candid critiques, suggest alternative courses, and so forth.

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The EURO 2016: A “Critical Juncture” for European Politics and the EU?

Lucien engelen and the medicine of the future, openmind books, scientific anniversaries, what happened to amelia earhart, featured author, latest book, skeptical activism and critical thinking.

In everyday life, normally we do not explicitly declare ourselves “skeptics” even though we may have some disbeliefs, and we certainly need to be sure about any information we are going to use in a formal manner. We can talk about skepticism in terms of the afterlife, or the possible reversal of climate change ; but in our daily routines, we especially try to verify the information we possess to prevent reflections that lead us to erroneous positions or solutions.

Around three decades ago, in order to properly deal with the increasing amount of information of varying quality we receive, the information literacy movement gained significant momentum; in sync with the more popular critical thinking movement . The goal was for everyone – starting in school – to think more and better (well-documented, with an open and flexible mind, aware of our prejudices, more objectively), and not to be given ideas that have already thought out for us.

The “critical thinking” construct (to which philosophers, psychologists, educators, etc. have contributed) described a cognition that was autonomous, meticulous, insightful, disciplined, self-demanding – each of us with our own unique intellect. This is how we should be educated in order to incorporate and apply knowledge more effectively, and certainly, to be less susceptible to deception, manipulation and post-truths. Without critical thinking, there is no room for personal growth or development.

The skeptical movement

At the time, 30 years ago, another movement gained momentum, one that is currently very well-known: the skeptical movement, whose activists are commitment to a specific dialectical activism. This cause is embraced above all to serve as a warning, as a sort of whistleblowing regarding the so-called pseudosciences and paranormal phenomena, all of which are generally considered deceptive. There are numerous expressions of this global trend, which is also fairly active in Spain (ARP, Círculo Escéptico and other platforms). Online we immediately come across skeptics with a variety of different attitudes, some with fervor.

This cause/trend is presented to us soundly aligned with science and the scientific method, but also – the reason for these paragraphs – with critical thinking. Yes, with this desirable way of thinking that has been understood in different ways, even outside of the critical thinking movement. For example, Círculo Escéptico even considers skepticism and critical thinking synonyms, which suggests an ad hoc interpretation of the latter.

Skeptic messages question the credibility of numerous topics (homeopathy, osteopathy, acupuncture, psychoanalysis, hypnosis, pilates, reiki, yoga, kinesiology, astrology, aliens, tarot, spiritualism, clairvoyance, telepathy, ouija, haunted houses, etc.). While considering that believers surely have their legitimate reasons to believe and will continue to do so, voices emerge that question the intentions or utility of the movement. It does not seem to address the cardinal topic of faith: religion is not one of the priorities.

BBVA-OpenMind-Jose Enebral-Activismo escéptico y pensamiento crítico

Critical thinking to educate us

It is worth asking what the critical thinking we are discussing has in common with this skeptical-scientific thinking with a set focus. It’s possible that the overlap is small. Indeed, the connection is stressed, and observers may end up merging, or confusing critical thinking with skepticism, the scientific method or reproving criticism.

In this respect, by taking a look at the critical thinking movement , and being aware of its desire to improve our cognitive education, it may be helpful to point out the following in the profile of a critical thinker:

Their predisposition is not aimed at reporting deception or errors, but at properly documenting and obtaining responses that seem convincing and sound.
They attempt to verify and confirm information before using it, but this attitude does not come from skeptical criticism, rather from the desire to get the task right.
They think for themselves. They believe what they decide to believe and respect this attitude in others. It’s not about imposing their positions, even if they support them assertively.
They are inquisitive (but not questioning) in their inquiries, and are therefore sometimes creative and innovative.
Of their intellectual virtues, humility and caution stand out, and they certainly avoid assuming they are right or possess the truth, even though they strive for both.
They are aware of their prejudices, concerns, feelings, intentions and interests, and reflect on their own thoughts. They are not impulsive or intemperate thinkers.
They try to see things from different perspectives, with sufficient empathy, aware that the reality shown to us is at times complex and relative.

The above does not at all attempt to describe the profile of a critical thinker. It simply explains what separates a critical thinker from an activist skeptical thinker (whose legitimacy and contribution we are not questioning).

In order to cite greater overlap between both profiles, we would have to make the critical thinkers’ minds more rigid, give greater dominance to their left hemisphere, attribute in them the desire to guide others’ beliefs, and place emphasis on the purpose of reflection instead of on the way of thinking. And that would take us very far from the “critical thinking” construct.

José Enebral Fernández

Related publications.

Sociocentrism and Critical Thinking
Post-Truth Politics, the Fifth Estate and the Securitization of Fake News
The Challenge of Incorporating Empathy to the Educational Model

More about Humanities

Communications, more publications about josé enebral fernández, comments on this publication.

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6.3: Skepticism

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Knowledge: Is it Possible?

Skepticism in epistemology.

Skepticism is the belief that some or all human knowledge is impossible. Since even our best methods for learning about the world sometimes fall short of perfect certainty, skeptics argue, it is better to suspend belief than to rely on the dubitable products of reason. (28)

Review Philosophical skepticism from Wikipedia. (29)

Descartes and Methodical Skepticism

The first great philosopher of the modern era was René Descartes, whose new approach won him recognition by some as the progenitor of modern philosophy. Descartes’s pursuit of mathematical and scientific truth soon led to a profound rejection of the scholastic tradition in which he had been educated. Much of his work was concerned with the provision of a secure foundation for the advancement of human knowledge through the natural sciences. Fearing the condemnation of the church, however, Descartes was rightly cautious about publicly expressing the full measure of his radical views. The philosophical writings for which he is remembered are therefore extremely circumspect in their treatment of controversial issues.

After years of work in private, Descartes finally published a preliminary statement of his views in the Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason (1637). Since mathematics had genuinely achieved the certainty for which human thinkers yearn, he argued, we rightly turn to mathematical reasoning as a model for progress in human knowledge more generally. Expressing perfect confidence in the capacity of human reason to achieve knowledge, Descartes proposed an intellectual process no less unsettling than the architectural destruction and rebuilding of an entire town. In order to be absolutely sure that we accept only what is genuinely certain, we must first deliberately renounce all of the firmly held but questionable beliefs we have previously acquired by experience and education . (30)

The progress and certainty of mathematical knowledge, Descartes supposed, provided an emulable model for a similarly productive philosophical method, characterized by four simple rules :

Accept as true only what is indubitable.
Divide every question into manageable parts.
Begin with the simplest issues and ascend to the more complex.
Review frequently enough to retain the whole argument at once.

This quasi-mathematical procedure for the achievement of knowledge is typical of a rationalistic approach to epistemology.

In this context, Descartes offered a brief description of his own experience with the proper approach to knowledge. Begin by renouncing any belief that can be doubted, including especially the testimony of the senses; then use the perfect certainty of one’s own existence, which survives this doubt, as the foundation for a demonstration of the providential reliability of one’s faculties generally. Significant knowledge of the world, Descartes supposed, can be achieved only by following this epistemological method, the rationalism of relying on a mathematical model and eliminating the distraction of sensory information in order to pursue the demonstrations of pure reason.

Later sections of the Discourse (along with the supplementary scientific essays with which it was published) trace some of the more significant consequences of following the Cartesian method in philosophy. Descartes’s mechanistic inclinations emerge clearly in these sections, with frequent reminders of the success of physical explanations of complex phenomena. Non-human animals, in Descartes’s view, are complex organic machines, all of whose actions can be fully explained without any reference to the operation of mind in thinking. In fact, Descartes declared that most of human behavior, like that of animals, is susceptible to simple mechanistic explanation. Cleverly designed automata could successfully mimic nearly all of what we do. Thus, Descartes argued, it is only the general ability to adapt to widely varying circumstances—and, in particular, the capacity to respond creatively in the use of language—that provides a sure test for the presence of an immaterial soul associated with the normal human body.

But Descartes supposed that no matter how human-like an animal or machine could be made to appear in its form or operations, it would always be possible to distinguish it from a real human being by two functional criteria . Although an animal or machine may be capable of performing any one activity as well as (or even better than) we can, he argued, each human being is capable of a greater variety of different activities than could be performed by anything lacking a soul . In a special instance of this general point, Descartes held that although an animal or machine might be made to utter sounds resembling human speech in response to specific stimuli, only an immaterial thinking substance could engage in the creative use of language required for responding appropriately to any unexpected circumstances . My puppy is a loyal companion, and my computer is a powerful instrument, but neither of them can engage in a decent conversation. (30)

Please read the following passages from Descartes from the Meditations on First Philosophy: Meditations 1 and ll. Focus on the big ideas written by Descartes. The passages are available here: (1)

Meditations on First Philosophy/Meditation I (Med. I) from Wikisource (31)
Meditations on First Philosophy/Meditation II (Med. II) from Wikisource (32)
Authored by : Florida State College at Jacksonville. License : CC BY: Attribution
Skepticism . Authored by : Garth Kemerling. Located at : http://philosophypages.com/dy/s5.htm#skep . License : CC BY-SA: Attribution-ShareAlike
Descartes: A New Approach . Authored by : Garth Kemerling. Located at : http://www.philosophypages.com/hy/4b.htm . License : CC BY-SA: Attribution-ShareAlike
Philosophical skepticism . Provided by : Wikipedia. Located at : https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_skepticism#Sextus_Empiricus . License : CC BY-SA: Attribution-ShareAlike
Meditations on First Philosophy/Meditation I . Provided by : Wikisource. Located at : https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Meditations_on_First_Philosophy/Meditation_I . License : CC BY-SA: Attribution-ShareAlike
Meditations on First Philosophy/Meditation II . Provided by : Wikisource. Located at : https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Meditations_on_First_Philosophy/Meditation_II . License : CC BY-SA: Attribution-ShareAlike

The Importance of Skepticism

When it comes to critical thinking, one might assume that skepticism is kind of a no-brainer. And one would be right (in my opinion, anyway). What I think is interesting is how often skepticism is perceived to conflict with open-mindedness . First, let’s look at what skepticism means, then the importance of skepticism in relation to other critical thinking skills.

PS: I wrote skepticism so many times in this post, that its starting to look really, really weird .

What is Skepticism, Really?

Skepticism has a couple of meanings. The first, pretty straight-forward, is “doubt as to the truth of something”. So when someone tells you something, if you don’t believe it right away, you are treating it with skepticism. So thinking back to the critical thinking skills we talked about in week one , in one respect, someone who doesn’t believe anything might be confused with someone who is not open-minded.

But consider this: another meaning of skepticism is the philosophy that certain knowledge is impossible. In other words, the idea that anyone can know anything for sure is impossible. So in that respect, skepticism is like, the ultimate in open-mindedness. A true skeptic may disbelieve something not because they refuse to consider the truth, but because they believe nothing can be known for sure.

Can You Be Skeptical and Open-Minded?

I think people get confused with open-mindedness, and therefore skepticism, because they think being open-minded means believing everything. Instead, I believe that being open-minded is accepting that others believe differently than I do, and being open to considering other points of view. It doesn’t mean I have to believe the same thing. Therefore, I don’t see a conflict between open-mindedness and skepticism.

Here’s an example I came across in an article I linked last week , called “ The Problem With Being Too Open-Minded “, by Steven Novella. In it, he talks about how the sometimes-fantastical beliefs held by others are many times justified by the idea that you have to “keep an open mind”. In his example, someone who believes that humans were transplanted here by our alien forebears justifies this belief by saying, “You have to keep an open mind”.

Now, I read a lot of science fiction. A LOT. But even I have a hard time swallowing that given all the scientific evidence of evolution, humans were just dropped off here by aliens. I guess it’s possible I’m wrong. Given the facts I have access to, however, I’m comfortable holding the opinion that humans were not, in fact, deposited on earth millennia ago by aliens.

Skepticism: not automatically believing in things. Even aliens.

And Why is it Important?

Skepticism is what allows us the space to investigate before taking action or making a decision. When we treat what we hear with skepticism, that gives us the necessary pause to gather more information, process what we’re hearing, and to form a more balanced opinion.

I’m not sure that you have to be a total skeptic in order to be a critical thinker. I think you just need to apply a certain degree of skepticism to what you hear and are told by others. However, in real life, whether it’s work or home, at some point we need to make a decision and move on. If we’re stuck in the idea that we can never know the truth for sure, then we may become paralyzed by the unknown.

So when it comes to critical thinking and skepticism, I say apply a healthy dose of skepticism to what you’re learning and hearing, but be careful that you don’t get stuck. Eventually, you have to make a judgement of what is most likely, or what the right direction is, and move on from there.

Let’s Get Skeptical!

So how do you apply enough skepticism but not too much?

1. Avoid taking things at face value.

When someone tells you something, you’re influenced by your own opinions, experiences, and even your level of trust with the person or entity that is giving you information. You are more likely to believe what you hear when your opinions and experiences align with what you’re being told. If you trust the person giving you information, you may also be more likely to trust the information itself. Be mindful of this, and remember that even if what you’re hearing is what you want to hear or want to believe, you should still be a little skeptical until you learn more.

2. Ask questions.

Heather talked about this in last Friday’s post . You have to ask questions to learn more. You can also ask questions to challenge what you’re hearing, or just find out more facts. Learn about the motivations of the person telling you information. Learn the facts related to what you’re being told, and do your best to separate fact from opinion. Do your research. Ask yourself questions – interrogate your own reality. Don’t just ask questions, ask probing questions. Get to the bottom of the issue, or the root of the problem.

3. Suspend judgement.

My husband teases me sometimes because when we watch a movie, I sometimes have a hard time getting into it. I sometimes laugh or make fun of it because it seems so ridiculous. At times like those, he reminds me that I need to practice suspending my disbelief. When it comes to skepticism and critical thinking, though, I firmly believe you need to suspend judgement (including automatic belief or disbelief in something). Really try not to form a firm judgement until you have more information.

4. Be willing to form an opinion (eventually).

Call it a “working theory” if that makes you feel most comfortable. The point is, collect facts before forming an opinion or making a decision, but eventually, make one . Suspending judgement is all very well, but not indefinitely. Get comfortable with the idea that you’ll never know everything. Collect the information you have, and know when enough is enough to go on with.

5. Be willing to revise.

Just because you settle on an opinion and make a decision, it doesn’t mean it will always be the right one. New information may come along. You may need to change direction. Be willing to continue investigating and finding new information, and practice being flexible enough to change your opinions if new, compelling evidence is presented.

It’s Not Personal

Applying skepticism doesn't mean passing judgement on someone as a person.

The last point I’d like to make as I wrap up is that being skeptical is not necessarily a judgement on a person. If someone treats something you tell them skeptically, it’s not always because they don’t trust you or what you’re telling them. Likewise when you are skeptical about what someone else is telling you. You will be influenced by your level of trust in the person telling you things. However, you’re not doing them or you any favors by automatically believing what they tell you. If you investigate and still arrive at the same opinion, great. If you challenge what you’re hearing and form a different opinion, that’s okay too.

Ideas take root because people are willing to believe them, and believe in them. This can be good or bad. Just because something is widely held or believed to be true doesn’t automatically make it true. It doesn’t make it untrue, either. Be willing to investigate, interrogate, then arrive at your opinion in your own time, according to your own values and beliefs.

What’s your thoughts? Something I missed? Do you have an alternative viewpoint? Share in comments!

Dianne Whitford

I believe I was put here for a purpose: to write, create, and inspire people! Therefore, most of the time, you can find me doing (or trying to do) one of those things. When I'm not vegging out to video games or stuffing my face full of cheesy poofs.

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Critical thinking skills can be developed just like any other set of skills

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Critical Thinking

Critical thinking is a widely accepted educational goal. Its definition is contested, but the competing definitions can be understood as differing conceptions of the same basic concept: careful thinking directed to a goal. Conceptions differ with respect to the scope of such thinking, the type of goal, the criteria and norms for thinking carefully, and the thinking components on which they focus. Its adoption as an educational goal has been recommended on the basis of respect for students’ autonomy and preparing students for success in life and for democratic citizenship. “Critical thinkers” have the dispositions and abilities that lead them to think critically when appropriate. The abilities can be identified directly; the dispositions indirectly, by considering what factors contribute to or impede exercise of the abilities. Standardized tests have been developed to assess the degree to which a person possesses such dispositions and abilities. Educational intervention has been shown experimentally to improve them, particularly when it includes dialogue, anchored instruction, and mentoring. Controversies have arisen over the generalizability of critical thinking across domains, over alleged bias in critical thinking theories and instruction, and over the relationship of critical thinking to other types of thinking.

2.1 Dewey’s Three Main Examples

2.2 dewey’s other examples, 2.3 further examples, 2.4 non-examples, 3. the definition of critical thinking, 4. its value, 5. the process of thinking critically, 6. components of the process, 7. contributory dispositions and abilities, 8.1 initiating dispositions, 8.2 internal dispositions, 9. critical thinking abilities, 10. required knowledge, 11. educational methods, 12.1 the generalizability of critical thinking, 12.2 bias in critical thinking theory and pedagogy, 12.3 relationship of critical thinking to other types of thinking, other internet resources, related entries.

Use of the term ‘critical thinking’ to describe an educational goal goes back to the American philosopher John Dewey (1910), who more commonly called it ‘reflective thinking’. He defined it as

active, persistent and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it, and the further conclusions to which it tends. (Dewey 1910: 6; 1933: 9)

and identified a habit of such consideration with a scientific attitude of mind. His lengthy quotations of Francis Bacon, John Locke, and John Stuart Mill indicate that he was not the first person to propose development of a scientific attitude of mind as an educational goal.

In the 1930s, many of the schools that participated in the Eight-Year Study of the Progressive Education Association (Aikin 1942) adopted critical thinking as an educational goal, for whose achievement the study’s Evaluation Staff developed tests (Smith, Tyler, & Evaluation Staff 1942). Glaser (1941) showed experimentally that it was possible to improve the critical thinking of high school students. Bloom’s influential taxonomy of cognitive educational objectives (Bloom et al. 1956) incorporated critical thinking abilities. Ennis (1962) proposed 12 aspects of critical thinking as a basis for research on the teaching and evaluation of critical thinking ability.

Since 1980, an annual international conference in California on critical thinking and educational reform has attracted tens of thousands of educators from all levels of education and from many parts of the world. Also since 1980, the state university system in California has required all undergraduate students to take a critical thinking course. Since 1983, the Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking has sponsored sessions in conjunction with the divisional meetings of the American Philosophical Association (APA). In 1987, the APA’s Committee on Pre-College Philosophy commissioned a consensus statement on critical thinking for purposes of educational assessment and instruction (Facione 1990a). Researchers have developed standardized tests of critical thinking abilities and dispositions; for details, see the Supplement on Assessment . Educational jurisdictions around the world now include critical thinking in guidelines for curriculum and assessment. Political and business leaders endorse its importance.

For details on this history, see the Supplement on History .

2. Examples and Non-Examples

Before considering the definition of critical thinking, it will be helpful to have in mind some examples of critical thinking, as well as some examples of kinds of thinking that would apparently not count as critical thinking.

Dewey (1910: 68–71; 1933: 91–94) takes as paradigms of reflective thinking three class papers of students in which they describe their thinking. The examples range from the everyday to the scientific.

Transit : “The other day, when I was down town on 16th Street, a clock caught my eye. I saw that the hands pointed to 12:20. This suggested that I had an engagement at 124th Street, at one o'clock. I reasoned that as it had taken me an hour to come down on a surface car, I should probably be twenty minutes late if I returned the same way. I might save twenty minutes by a subway express. But was there a station near? If not, I might lose more than twenty minutes in looking for one. Then I thought of the elevated, and I saw there was such a line within two blocks. But where was the station? If it were several blocks above or below the street I was on, I should lose time instead of gaining it. My mind went back to the subway express as quicker than the elevated; furthermore, I remembered that it went nearer than the elevated to the part of 124th Street I wished to reach, so that time would be saved at the end of the journey. I concluded in favor of the subway, and reached my destination by one o’clock.” (Dewey 1910: 68-69; 1933: 91-92)

Ferryboat : “Projecting nearly horizontally from the upper deck of the ferryboat on which I daily cross the river is a long white pole, having a gilded ball at its tip. It suggested a flagpole when I first saw it; its color, shape, and gilded ball agreed with this idea, and these reasons seemed to justify me in this belief. But soon difficulties presented themselves. The pole was nearly horizontal, an unusual position for a flagpole; in the next place, there was no pulley, ring, or cord by which to attach a flag; finally, there were elsewhere on the boat two vertical staffs from which flags were occasionally flown. It seemed probable that the pole was not there for flag-flying.

“I then tried to imagine all possible purposes of the pole, and to consider for which of these it was best suited: (a) Possibly it was an ornament. But as all the ferryboats and even the tugboats carried poles, this hypothesis was rejected. (b) Possibly it was the terminal of a wireless telegraph. But the same considerations made this improbable. Besides, the more natural place for such a terminal would be the highest part of the boat, on top of the pilot house. (c) Its purpose might be to point out the direction in which the boat is moving.

“In support of this conclusion, I discovered that the pole was lower than the pilot house, so that the steersman could easily see it. Moreover, the tip was enough higher than the base, so that, from the pilot's position, it must appear to project far out in front of the boat. Morevoer, the pilot being near the front of the boat, he would need some such guide as to its direction. Tugboats would also need poles for such a purpose. This hypothesis was so much more probable than the others that I accepted it. I formed the conclusion that the pole was set up for the purpose of showing the pilot the direction in which the boat pointed, to enable him to steer correctly.” (Dewey 1910: 69-70; 1933: 92-93)

Bubbles : “In washing tumblers in hot soapsuds and placing them mouth downward on a plate, bubbles appeared on the outside of the mouth of the tumblers and then went inside. Why? The presence of bubbles suggests air, which I note must come from inside the tumbler. I see that the soapy water on the plate prevents escape of the air save as it may be caught in bubbles. But why should air leave the tumbler? There was no substance entering to force it out. It must have expanded. It expands by increase of heat, or by decrease of pressure, or both. Could the air have become heated after the tumbler was taken from the hot suds? Clearly not the air that was already entangled in the water. If heated air was the cause, cold air must have entered in transferring the tumblers from the suds to the plate. I test to see if this supposition is true by taking several more tumblers out. Some I shake so as to make sure of entrapping cold air in them. Some I take out holding mouth downward in order to prevent cold air from entering. Bubbles appear on the outside of every one of the former and on none of the latter. I must be right in my inference. Air from the outside must have been expanded by the heat of the tumbler, which explains the appearance of the bubbles on the outside. But why do they then go inside? Cold contracts. The tumbler cooled and also the air inside it. Tension was removed, and hence bubbles appeared inside. To be sure of this, I test by placing a cup of ice on the tumbler while the bubbles are still forming outside. They soon reverse” (Dewey 1910: 70–71; 1933: 93–94).

Dewey (1910, 1933) sprinkles his book with other examples of critical thinking. We will refer to the following.

Weather : A man on a walk notices that it has suddenly become cool, thinks that it is probably going to rain, looks up and sees a dark cloud obscuring the sun, and quickens his steps (1910: 6–10; 1933: 9–13).

Disorder : A man finds his rooms on his return to them in disorder with his belongings thrown about, thinks at first of burglary as an explanation, then thinks of mischievous children as being an alternative explanation, then looks to see whether valuables are missing, and discovers that they are (1910: 82–83; 1933: 166–168).

Typhoid : A physician diagnosing a patient whose conspicuous symptoms suggest typhoid avoids drawing a conclusion until more data are gathered by questioning the patient and by making tests (1910: 85–86; 1933: 170).

Blur : A moving blur catches our eye in the distance, we ask ourselves whether it is a cloud of whirling dust or a tree moving its branches or a man signaling to us, we think of other traits that should be found on each of those possibilities, and we look and see if those traits are found (1910: 102, 108; 1933: 121, 133).

Suction pump : In thinking about the suction pump, the scientist first notes that it will draw water only to a maximum height of 33 feet at sea level and to a lesser maximum height at higher elevations, selects for attention the differing atmospheric pressure at these elevations, sets up experiments in which the air is removed from a vessel containing water (when suction no longer works) and in which the weight of air at various levels is calculated, compares the results of reasoning about the height to which a given weight of air will allow a suction pump to raise water with the observed maximum height at different elevations, and finally assimilates the suction pump to such apparently different phenomena as the siphon and the rising of a balloon (1910: 150–153; 1933: 195–198).

Diamond : A passenger in a car driving in a diamond lane reserved for vehicles with at least one passenger notices that the diamond marks on the pavement are far apart in some places and close together in others. Why? The driver suggests that the reason may be that the diamond marks are not needed where there is a solid double line separating the diamond line from the adjoining lane, but are needed when there is a dotted single line permitting crossing into the diamond lane. Further observation confirms that the diamonds are close together when a dotted line separates the diamond lane from its neighbour, but otherwise far apart.

Rash : A woman suddenly develops a very itchy red rash on her throat and upper chest. She recently noticed a mark on the back of her right hand, but was not sure whether the mark was a rash or a scrape. She lies down in bed and thinks about what might be causing the rash and what to do about it. About two weeks before, she began taking blood pressure medication that contained a sulfa drug, and the pharmacist had warned her, in view of a previous allergic reaction to a medication containing a sulfa drug, to be on the alert for an allergic reaction; however, she had been taking the medication for two weeks with no such effect. The day before, she began using a new cream on her neck and upper chest; against the new cream as the cause was mark on the back of her hand, which had not been exposed to the cream. She began taking probiotics about a month before. She also recently started new eye drops, but she supposed that manufacturers of eye drops would be careful not to include allergy-causing components in the medication. The rash might be a heat rash, since she recently was sweating profusely from her upper body. Since she is about to go away on a short vacation, where she would not have access to her usual physician, she decides to keep taking the probiotics and using the new eye drops but to discontinue the blood pressure medication and to switch back to the old cream for her neck and upper chest. She forms a plan to consult her regular physician on her return about the blood pressure medication.

Candidate : Although Dewey included no examples of thinking directed at appraising the arguments of others, such thinking has come to be considered a kind of critical thinking. We find an example of such thinking in the performance task on the Collegiate Learning Assessment (CLA+), which its sponsoring organization describes as

a performance-based assessment that provides a measure of an institution’s contribution to the development of critical-thinking and written communication skills of its students. (Council for Aid to Education 2017)

A sample task posted on its website requires the test-taker to write a report for public distribution evaluating a fictional candidate’s policy proposals and their supporting arguments, using supplied background documents, with a recommendation on whether to endorse the candidate.

Immediate acceptance of an idea that suggests itself as a solution to a problem (e.g., a possible explanation of an event or phenomenon, an action that seems likely to produce a desired result) is “uncritical thinking, the minimum of reflection” (Dewey 1910: 13). On-going suspension of judgment in the light of doubt about a possible solution is not critical thinking (Dewey 1910: 108). Critique driven by a dogmatically held political or religious ideology is not critical thinking; thus Paulo Freire (1968 [1970]) is using the term (e.g., at 1970: 71, 81, 100, 146) in a more politically freighted sense that includes not only reflection but also revolutionary action against oppression. Derivation of a conclusion from given data using an algorithm is not critical thinking.

What is critical thinking? There are many definitions. Ennis (2016) lists 14 philosophically oriented scholarly definitions and three dictionary definitions. Following Rawls (1971), who distinguished his conception of justice from a utilitarian conception but regarded them as rival conceptions of the same concept, Ennis maintains that the 17 definitions are different conceptions of the same concept. Rawls articulated the shared concept of justice as

a characteristic set of principles for assigning basic rights and duties and for determining… the proper distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation. (Rawls 1971: 5)

Bailin et al. (1999b) claim that, if one considers what sorts of thinking an educator would take not to be critical thinking and what sorts to be critical thinking, one can conclude that educators typically understand critical thinking to have at least three features.

It is done for the purpose of making up one’s mind about what to believe or do.
The person engaging in the thinking is trying to fulfill standards of adequacy and accuracy appropriate to the thinking.
The thinking fulfills the relevant standards to some threshold level.

One could sum up the core concept that involves these three features by saying that critical thinking is careful goal-directed thinking. This core concept seems to apply to all the examples of critical thinking described in the previous section. As for the non-examples, their exclusion depends on construing careful thinking as excluding jumping immediately to conclusions, suspending judgment no matter how strong the evidence, reasoning from an unquestioned ideological or religious perspective, and routinely using an algorithm to answer a question.

If the core of critical thinking is careful goal-directed thinking, conceptions of it can vary according to its presumed scope, its presumed goal, one’s criteria and threshold for being careful, and the thinking component on which one focuses As to its scope, some conceptions (e.g., Dewey 1910, 1933) restrict it to constructive thinking on the basis of one’s own observations and experiments, others (e.g., Ennis 1962; Fisher & Scriven 1997; Johnson 1992) to appraisal of the products of such thinking. Ennis (1991) and Bailin et al. (1999b) take it to cover both construction and appraisal. As to its goal, some conceptions restrict it to forming a judgment (Dewey 1910, 1933; Lipman 1987; Facione 1990a). Others allow for actions as well as beliefs as the end point of a process of critical thinking (Ennis 1991; Bailin et al. 1999b). As to the criteria and threshold for being careful, definitions vary in the term used to indicate that critical thinking satisfies certain norms: “intellectually disciplined” (Scriven & Paul 1987), “reasonable” (Ennis 1991), “skillful” (Lipman 1987), “skilled” (Fisher & Scriven 1997), “careful” (Bailin & Battersby 2009). Some definitions specify these norms, referring variously to “consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it and the further conclusions to which it tends” (Dewey 1910, 1933); “the methods of logical inquiry and reasoning” (Glaser 1941); “conceptualizing, applying, analyzing, synthesizing, and/or evaluating information gathered from, or generated by, observation, experience, reflection, reasoning, or communication” (Scriven & Paul 1987); the requirement that “it is sensitive to context, relies on criteria, and is self-correcting” (Lipman 1987); “evidential, conceptual, methodological, criteriological, or contextual considerations” (Facione 1990a); and “plus-minus considerations of the product in terms of appropriate standards (or criteria)” (Johnson 1992). Stanovich and Stanovich (2010) propose to ground the concept of critical thinking in the concept of rationality, which they understand as combining epistemic rationality (fitting one’s beliefs to the world) and instrumental rationality (optimizing goal fulfillment); a critical thinker, in their view, is someone with “a propensity to override suboptimal responses from the autonomous mind” (2010: 227). These variant specifications of norms for critical thinking are not necessarily incompatible with one another, and in any case presuppose the core notion of thinking carefully. As to the thinking component singled out, some definitions focus on suspension of judgment during the thinking (Dewey 1910; McPeck 1981), others on inquiry while judgment is suspended (Bailin & Battersby 2009), others on the resulting judgment (Facione 1990a), and still others on the subsequent emotive response (Siegel 1988).

In educational contexts, a definition of critical thinking is a “programmatic definition” (Scheffler 1960: 19). It expresses a practical program for achieving an educational goal. For this purpose, a one-sentence formulaic definition is much less useful than articulation of a critical thinking process, with criteria and standards for the kinds of thinking that the process may involve. The real educational goal is recognition, adoption and implementation by students of those criteria and standards. That adoption and implementation in turn consists in acquiring the knowledge, abilities and dispositions of a critical thinker.

Conceptions of critical thinking generally do not include moral integrity as part of the concept. Dewey, for example, took critical thinking to be the ultimate intellectual goal of education, but distinguished it from the development of social cooperation among school children, which he took to be the central moral goal. Ennis (1996, 2011) added to his previous list of critical thinking dispositions a group of dispositions to care about the dignity and worth of every person, which he described as a “correlative” (1996) disposition without which critical thinking would be less valuable and perhaps harmful. An educational program that aimed at developing critical thinking but not the correlative disposition to care about the dignity and worth of every person, he asserted, “would be deficient and perhaps dangerous” (Ennis 1996: 172).

Dewey thought that education for reflective thinking would be of value to both the individual and society; recognition in educational practice of the kinship to the scientific attitude of children’s native curiosity, fertile imagination and love of experimental inquiry “would make for individual happiness and the reduction of social waste” (Dewey 1910: iii). Schools participating in the Eight-Year Study took development of the habit of reflective thinking and skill in solving problems as a means to leading young people to understand, appreciate and live the democratic way of life characteristic of the United States (Aikin 1942: 17–18, 81). Harvey Siegel (1988: 55–61) has offered four considerations in support of adopting critical thinking as an educational ideal. (1) Respect for persons requires that schools and teachers honour students’ demands for reasons and explanations, deal with students honestly, and recognize the need to confront students’ independent judgment; these requirements concern the manner in which teachers treat students. (2) Education has the task of preparing children to be successful adults, a task that requires development of their self-sufficiency. (3) Education should initiate children into the rational traditions in such fields as history, science and mathematics. (4) Education should prepare children to become democratic citizens, which requires reasoned procedures and critical talents and attitudes. To supplement these considerations, Siegel (1988: 62–90) responds to two objections: the ideology objection that adoption of any educational ideal requires a prior ideological commitment and the indoctrination objection that cultivation of critical thinking cannot escape being a form of indoctrination.

Despite the diversity of our 11 examples, one can recognize a common pattern. Dewey analyzed it as consisting of five phases:

suggestions , in which the mind leaps forward to a possible solution;
an intellectualization of the difficulty or perplexity into a problem to be solved, a question for which the answer must be sought;
the use of one suggestion after another as a leading idea, or hypothesis , to initiate and guide observation and other operations in collection of factual material;
the mental elaboration of the idea or supposition as an idea or supposition ( reasoning , in the sense on which reasoning is a part, not the whole, of inference); and
testing the hypothesis by overt or imaginative action. (Dewey 1933: 106–107; italics in original)

The process of reflective thinking consisting of these phases would be preceded by a perplexed, troubled or confused situation and followed by a cleared-up, unified, resolved situation (Dewey 1933: 106). The term ‘phases’ replaced the term ‘steps’ (Dewey 1910: 72), thus removing the earlier suggestion of an invariant sequence. Variants of the above analysis appeared in (Dewey 1916: 177) and (Dewey 1938: 101–119).

The variant formulations indicate the difficulty of giving a single logical analysis of such a varied process. The process of critical thinking may have a spiral pattern, with the problem being redefined in the light of obstacles to solving it as originally formulated. For example, the person in Transit might have concluded that getting to the appointment at the scheduled time was impossible and have reformulated the problem as that of rescheduling the appointment for a mutually convenient time. Further, defining a problem does not always follow after or lead immediately to an idea of a suggested solution. Nor should it do so, as Dewey himself recognized in describing the physician in Typhoid as avoiding any strong preference for this or that conclusion before getting further information (Dewey 1910: 85; 1933: 170). People with a hypothesis in mind, even one to which they have a very weak commitment, have a so-called “confirmation bias” (Nickerson 1998): they are likely to pay attention to evidence that confirms the hypothesis and to ignore evidence that counts against it or for some competing hypothesis. Detectives, intelligence agencies, and investigators of airplane accidents are well advised to gather relevant evidence systematically and to postpone even tentative adoption of an explanatory hypothesis until the collected evidence rules out with the appropriate degree of certainty all but one explanation. Dewey’s analysis of the critical thinking process can be faulted as well for requiring acceptance or rejection of a possible solution to a defined problem, with no allowance for deciding in the light of the available evidence to suspend judgment. Further, given the great variety of kinds of problems for which reflection is appropriate, there is likely to be variation in its component events. Perhaps the best way to conceptualize the critical thinking process is as a checklist whose component events can occur in a variety of orders, selectively, and more than once. These component events might include (1) noticing a difficulty, (2) defining the problem, (3) dividing the problem into manageable sub-problems, (4) formulating a variety of possible solutions to the problem or sub-problem, (5) determining what evidence is relevant to deciding among possible solutions to the problem or sub-problem, (6) devising a plan of systematic observation or experiment that will uncover the relevant evidence, (7) carrying out the plan of systematic observation or experimentation, (8) noting the results of the systematic observation or experiment, (9) gathering relevant testimony and information from others, (10) judging the credibility of testimony and information gathered from others, (11) drawing conclusions from gathered evidence and accepted testimony, and (12) accepting a solution that the evidence adequately supports (cf. Hitchcock 2017: 485).

Checklist conceptions of the process of critical thinking are open to the objection that they are too mechanical and procedural to fit the multi-dimensional and emotionally charged issues for which critical thinking is urgently needed (Paul 1984). For such issues, a more dialectical process is advocated, in which competing relevant world views are identified, their implications explored, and some sort of creative synthesis attempted.

If one considers the critical thinking process illustrated by the 11 examples, one can identify distinct kinds of mental acts and mental states that form part of it. To distinguish, label and briefly characterize these components is a useful preliminary to identifying abilities, skills, dispositions, attitudes, habits and the like that contribute causally to thinking critically. Identifying such abilities and habits is in turn a useful preliminary to setting educational goals. Setting the goals is in its turn a useful preliminary to designing strategies for helping learners to achieve the goals and to designing ways of measuring the extent to which learners have done so. Such measures provide both feedback to learners on their achievement and a basis for experimental research on the effectiveness of various strategies for educating people to think critically. Let us begin, then, by distinguishing the kinds of mental acts and mental events that can occur in a critical thinking process.

Observing : One notices something in one’s immediate environment (sudden cooling of temperature in Weather , bubbles forming outside a glass and then going inside in Bubbles , a moving blur in the distance in Blur , a rash in Rash ). Or one notes the results of an experiment or systematic observation (valuables missing in Disorder , no suction without air pressure in Suction pump )
Feeling : One feels puzzled or uncertain about something (how to get to an appointment on time in Transit , why the diamonds vary in frequency in Diamond ). One wants to resolve this perplexity. One feels satisfaction once one has worked out an answer (to take the subway express in Transit , diamonds closer when needed as a warning in Diamond ).
Wondering : One formulates a question to be addressed (why bubbles form outside a tumbler taken from hot water in Bubbles , how suction pumps work in Suction pump , what caused the rash in Rash ).
Imagining : One thinks of possible answers (bus or subway or elevated in Transit , flagpole or ornament or wireless communication aid or direction indicator in Ferryboat , allergic reaction or heat rash in Rash ).
Inferring : One works out what would be the case if a possible answer were assumed (valuables missing if there has been a burglary in Disorder , earlier start to the rash if it is an allergic reaction to a sulfa drug in Rash ). Or one draws a conclusion once sufficient relevant evidence is gathered (take the subway in Transit , burglary in Disorder , discontinue blood pressure medication and new cream in Rash ).
Knowledge : One uses stored knowledge of the subject-matter to generate possible answers or to infer what would be expected on the assumption of a particular answer (knowledge of a city’s public transit system in Transit , of the requirements for a flagpole in Ferryboat , of Boyle’s law in Bubbles , of allergic reactions in Rash ).
Experimenting : One designs and carries out an experiment or a systematic observation to find out whether the results deduced from a possible answer will occur (looking at the location of the flagpole in relation to the pilot’s position in Ferryboat , putting an ice cube on top of a tumbler taken from hot water in Bubbles , measuring the height to which a suction pump will draw water at different elevations in Suction pump , noticing the frequency of diamonds when movement to or from a diamond lane is allowed in Diamond ).
Consulting : One finds a source of information, gets the information from the source, and makes a judgment on whether to accept it. None of our 11 examples include searching for sources of information. In this respect they are unrepresentative, since most people nowadays have almost instant access to information relevant to answering any question, including many of those illustrated by the examples. However, Candidate includes the activities of extracting information from sources and evaluating its credibility.
Identifying and analyzing arguments : One notices an argument and works out its structure and content as a preliminary to evaluating its strength. This activity is central to Candidate . It is an important part of a critical thinking process in which one surveys arguments for various positions on an issue.
Judging : One makes a judgment on the basis of accumulated evidence and reasoning, such as the judgment in Ferryboat that the purpose of the pole is to provide direction to the pilot.
Deciding : One makes a decision on what to do or on what policy to adopt, as in the decision in Transit to take the subway.

By definition, a person who does something voluntarily is both willing and able to do that thing at that time. Both the willingness and the ability contribute causally to the person’s action, in the sense that the voluntary action would not occur if either (or both) of these were lacking. For example, suppose that one is standing with one’s arms at one’s sides and one voluntarily lifts one’s right arm to an extended horizontal position. One would not do so if one were unable to lift one’s arm, if for example one’s right side was paralyzed as the result of a stroke. Nor would one do so if one were unwilling to lift one’s arm, if for example one were participating in a street demonstration at which a white supremacist was urging the crowd to lift their right arm in a Nazi salute and one were unwilling to express support in this way for the racist Nazi ideology. The same analysis applies to a voluntary mental process of thinking critically. It requires both willingness and ability to think critically, including willingness and ability to perform each of the mental acts that compose the process and to coordinate those acts in a sequence that is directed at resolving the initiating perplexity.

Consider willingness first. We can identify causal contributors to willingness to think critically by considering factors that would cause a person who was able to think critically about an issue nevertheless not to do so (Hamby 2014). For each factor, the opposite condition thus contributes causally to willingness to think critically on a particular occasion. For example, people who habitually jump to conclusions without considering alternatives will not think critically about issues that arise, even if they have the required abilities. The contrary condition of willingness to suspend judgment is thus a causal contributor to thinking critically.

Now consider ability. In contrast to the ability to move one’s arm, which can be completely absent because a stroke has left the arm paralyzed, the ability to think critically is a developed ability, whose absence is not a complete absence of ability to think but absence of ability to think well. We can identify the ability to think well directly, in terms of the norms and standards for good thinking. In general, to be able do well the thinking activities that can be components of a critical thinking process, one needs to know the concepts and principles that characterize their good performance, to recognize in particular cases that the concepts and principles apply, and to apply them. The knowledge, recognition and application may be procedural rather than declarative. It may be domain-specific rather than widely applicable, and in either case may need subject-matter knowledge, sometimes of a deep kind.

Reflections of the sort illustrated by the previous two paragraphs have led scholars to identify the knowledge, abilities and dispositions of a “critical thinker”, i.e., someone who thinks critically whenever it is appropriate to do so. We turn now to these three types of causal contributors to thinking critically. We start with dispositions, since arguably these are the most powerful contributors to being a critical thinker, can be fostered at an early stage of a child’s development, and are susceptible to general improvement (Glaser 1941: 175)

8. Critical Thinking Dispositions

Educational researchers use the term ‘dispositions’ broadly for the habits of mind and attitudes that contribute causally to being a critical thinker. Some writers (e.g., Paul & Elder 2006; Hamby 2014; Bailin & Battersby 2016) propose to use the term ‘virtues’ for this dimension of a critical thinker. The virtues in question, although they are virtues of character, concern the person’s ways of thinking rather than the person’s ways of behaving towards others. They are not moral virtues but intellectual virtues, of the sort articulated by Zagzebski (1996) and discussed by Turri, Alfano, and Greco (2017).

On a realistic conception, thinking dispositions or intellectual virtues are real properties of thinkers. They are general tendencies, propensities, or inclinations to think in particular ways in particular circumstances, and can be genuinely explanatory (Siegel 1999). Sceptics argue that there is no evidence for a specific mental basis for the habits of mind that contribute to thinking critically, and that it is pedagogically misleading to posit such a basis (Bailin et al. 1999a). Whatever their status, critical thinking dispositions need motivation for their initial formation in a child—motivation that may be external or internal. As children develop, the force of habit will gradually become important in sustaining the disposition (Nieto & Valenzuela 2012). Mere force of habit, however, is unlikely to sustain critical thinking dispositions. Critical thinkers must value and enjoy using their knowledge and abilities to think things through for themselves. They must be committed to, and lovers of, inquiry.

A person may have a critical thinking disposition with respect to only some kinds of issues. For example, one could be open-minded about scientific issues but not about religious issues. Similarly, one could be confident in one’s ability to reason about the theological implications of the existence of evil in the world but not in one’s ability to reason about the best design for a guided ballistic missile.

Critical thinking dispositions can usefully be divided into initiating dispositions (those that contribute causally to starting to think critically about an issue) and internal dispositions (those that contribute causally to doing a good job of thinking critically once one has started) (Facione 1990a: 25). The two categories are not mutually exclusive. For example, open-mindedness, in the sense of willingness to consider alternative points of view to one’s own, is both an initiating and an internal disposition.

Using the strategy of considering factors that would block people with the ability to think critically from doing so, we can identify as initiating dispositions for thinking critically attentiveness, a habit of inquiry, self-confidence, courage, open-mindedness, willingness to suspend judgment, trust in reason, wanting evidence for one’s beliefs, and seeking the truth. We consider briefly what each of these dispositions amounts to, in each case citing sources that acknowledge them.

Attentiveness : One will not think critically if one fails to recognize an issue that needs to be thought through. For example, the pedestrian in Weather would not have looked up if he had not noticed that the air was suddenly cooler. To be a critical thinker, then, one needs to be habitually attentive to one’s surroundings, noticing not only what one senses but also sources of perplexity in messages received and in one’s own beliefs and attitudes (Facione 1990a: 25; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001).
Habit of inquiry : Inquiry is effortful, and one needs an internal push to engage in it. For example, the student in Bubbles could easily have stopped at idle wondering about the cause of the bubbles rather than reasoning to a hypothesis, then designing and executing an experiment to test it. Thus willingness to think critically needs mental energy and initiative. What can supply that energy? Love of inquiry, or perhaps just a habit of inquiry. Hamby (2015) has argued that willingness to inquire is the central critical thinking virtue, one that encompasses all the others. It is recognized as a critical thinking disposition by Dewey (1910: 29; 1933: 35), Glaser (1941: 5), Ennis (1987: 12; 1991: 8), Facione (1990a: 25), Bailin et al. (1999b: 294), Halpern (1998: 452), and Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo (2001).
Self-confidence : Lack of confidence in one’s abilities can block critical thinking. For example, if the woman in Rash lacked confidence in her ability to figure things out for herself, she might just have assumed that the rash on her chest was the allergic reaction to her medication against which the pharmacist had warned her. Thus willingness to think critically requires confidence in one’s ability to inquire (Facione 1990a: 25; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001).
Courage : Fear of thinking for oneself can stop one from doing it. Thus willingness to think critically requires intellectual courage (Paul & Elder 2006: 16).
Open-mindedness : A dogmatic attitude will impede thinking critically. For example, a person who adheres rigidly to a “pro-choice” position on the issue of the legal status of induced abortion is likely to be unwilling to consider seriously the issue of when in its development an unborn child acquires a moral right to life. Thus willingness to think critically requires open-mindedness, in the sense of a willingness to examine questions to which one already accepts an answer but which further evidence or reasoning might cause one to answer differently (Dewey 1933; Facione 1990a; Ennis 1991; Bailin et al. 1999b; Halpern 1998, Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001). Paul (1981) emphasizes open-mindedness about alternative world-views, and recommends a dialectical approach to integrating such views as central to what he calls “strong sense” critical thinking.
Willingness to suspend judgment : Premature closure on an initial solution will block critical thinking. Thus willingness to think critically requires a willingness to suspend judgment while alternatives are explored (Facione 1990a; Ennis 1991; Halpern 1998).
Trust in reason : Since distrust in the processes of reasoned inquiry will dissuade one from engaging in it, trust in them is an initiating critical thinking disposition (Facione 1990a, 25; Bailin et al. 1999b: 294; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001; Paul & Elder 2006). In reaction to an allegedly exclusive emphasis on reason in critical thinking theory and pedagogy, Thayer-Bacon (2000) argues that intuition, imagination, and emotion have important roles to play in an adequate conception of critical thinking that she calls “constructive thinking”. From her point of view, critical thinking requires trust not only in reason but also in intuition, imagination, and emotion.
Seeking the truth : If one does not care about the truth but is content to stick with one’s initial bias on an issue, then one will not think critically about it. Seeking the truth is thus an initiating critical thinking disposition (Bailin et al. 1999b: 294; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001). A disposition to seek the truth is implicit in more specific critical thinking dispositions, such as trying to be well-informed, considering seriously points of view other than one’s own, looking for alternatives, suspending judgment when the evidence is insufficient, and adopting a position when the evidence supporting it is sufficient.

Some of the initiating dispositions, such as open-mindedness and willingness to suspend judgment, are also internal critical thinking dispositions, in the sense of mental habits or attitudes that contribute causally to doing a good job of critical thinking once one starts the process. But there are many other internal critical thinking dispositions. Some of them are parasitic on one’s conception of good thinking. For example, it is constitutive of good thinking about an issue to formulate the issue clearly and to maintain focus on it. For this purpose, one needs not only the corresponding ability but also the corresponding disposition. Ennis (1991: 8) describes it as the disposition “to determine and maintain focus on the conclusion or question”, Facione (1990a: 25) as “clarity in stating the question or concern”. Other internal dispositions are motivators to continue or adjust the critical thinking process, such as willingness to persist in a complex task and willingness to abandon nonproductive strategies in an attempt to self-correct (Halpern 1998: 452). For a list of identified internal critical thinking dispositions, see the Supplement on Internal Critical Thinking Dispositions .

Some theorists postulate skills, i.e., acquired abilities, as operative in critical thinking. It is not obvious, however, that a good mental act is the exercise of a generic acquired skill. Inferring an expected time of arrival, as in Transit , has some generic components but also uses non-generic subject-matter knowledge. Bailin et al. (1999a) argue against viewing critical thinking skills as generic and discrete, on the ground that skilled performance at a critical thinking task cannot be separated from knowledge of concepts and from domain-specific principles of good thinking. Talk of skills, they concede, is unproblematic if it means merely that a person with critical thinking skills is capable of intelligent performance.

Despite such scepticism, theorists of critical thinking have listed as general contributors to critical thinking what they variously call abilities (Glaser 1941; Ennis 1962, 1991), skills (Facione 1990a; Halpern 1998) or competencies (Fisher & Scriven 1997). Amalgamating these lists would produce a confusing and chaotic cornucopia of more than 50 possible educational objectives, with only partial overlap among them. It makes sense instead to try to understand the reasons for the multiplicity and diversity, and to make a selection according to one’s own reasons for singling out abilities to be developed in a critical thinking curriculum. Two reasons for diversity among lists of critical thinking abilities are the underlying conception of critical thinking and the envisaged educational level. Appraisal-only conceptions, for example, involve a different suite of abilities than constructive-only conceptions. Some lists, such as those in (Glaser 1941), are put forward as educational objectives for secondary school students, whereas others are proposed as objectives for college students (e.g., Facione 1990a).

The abilities described in the remaining paragraphs of this section emerge from reflection on the general abilities needed to do well the thinking activities identified in section 6 as components of the critical thinking process described in section 5 . The derivation of each collection of abilities is accompanied by citation of sources that list such abilities and of standardized tests that claim to test them.

Observational abilities : Careful and accurate observation sometimes requires specialist expertise and practice, as in the case of observing birds and observing accident scenes. However, there are general abilities of noticing what one’s senses are picking up from one’s environment and of being able to articulate clearly and accurately to oneself and others what one has observed. It helps in exercising them to be able to recognize and take into account factors that make one’s observation less trustworthy, such as prior framing of the situation, inadequate time, deficient senses, poor observation conditions, and the like. It helps as well to be skilled at taking steps to make one’s observation more trustworthy, such as moving closer to get a better look, measuring something three times and taking the average, and checking what one thinks one is observing with someone else who is in a good position to observe it. It also helps to be skilled at recognizing respects in which one’s report of one’s observation involves inference rather than direct observation, so that one can then consider whether the inference is justified. These abilities come into play as well when one thinks about whether and with what degree of confidence to accept an observation report, for example in the study of history or in a criminal investigation or in assessing news reports. Observational abilities show up in some lists of critical thinking abilities (Ennis 1962: 90; Facione 1990a: 16; Ennis 1991: 9). There are items testing a person’s ability to judge the credibility of observation reports in the Cornell Critical Thinking Tests, Levels X and Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005). Norris and King (1983, 1985, 1990a, 1990b) is a test of ability to appraise observation reports.

Emotional abilities : The emotions that drive a critical thinking process are perplexity or puzzlement, a wish to resolve it, and satisfaction at achieving the desired resolution. Children experience these emotions at an early age, without being trained to do so. Education that takes critical thinking as a goal needs only to channel these emotions and to make sure not to stifle them. Collaborative critical thinking benefits from ability to recognize one’s own and others’ emotional commitments and reactions.

Questioning abilities : A critical thinking process needs transformation of an inchoate sense of perplexity into a clear question. Formulating a question well requires not building in questionable assumptions, not prejudging the issue, and using language that in context is unambiguous and precise enough (Ennis 1962: 97; 1991: 9).

Imaginative abilities : Thinking directed at finding the correct causal explanation of a general phenomenon or particular event requires an ability to imagine possible explanations. Thinking about what policy or plan of action to adopt requires generation of options and consideration of possible consequences of each option. Domain knowledge is required for such creative activity, but a general ability to imagine alternatives is helpful and can be nurtured so as to become easier, quicker, more extensive, and deeper (Dewey 1910: 34–39; 1933: 40–47). Facione (1990a) and Halpern (1998) include the ability to imagine alternatives as a critical thinking ability.

Inferential abilities : The ability to draw conclusions from given information, and to recognize with what degree of certainty one’s own or others’ conclusions follow, is universally recognized as a general critical thinking ability. All 11 examples in section 2 of this article include inferences, some from hypotheses or options (as in Transit , Ferryboat and Disorder ), others from something observed (as in Weather and Rash ). None of these inferences is formally valid. Rather, they are licensed by general, sometimes qualified substantive rules of inference (Toulmin 1958) that rest on domain knowledge—that a bus trip takes about the same time in each direction, that the terminal of a wireless telegraph would be located on the highest possible place, that sudden cooling is often followed by rain, that an allergic reaction to a sulfa drug generally shows up soon after one starts taking it. It is a matter of controversy to what extent the specialized ability to deduce conclusions from premisses using formal rules of inference is needed for critical thinking. Dewey (1933) locates logical forms in setting out the products of reflection rather than in the process of reflection. Ennis (1981a), on the other hand, maintains that a liberally-educated person should have the following abilities: to translate natural-language statements into statements using the standard logical operators, to use appropriately the language of necessary and sufficient conditions, to deal with argument forms and arguments containing symbols, to determine whether in virtue of an argument’s form its conclusion follows necessarily from its premisses, to reason with logically complex propositions, and to apply the rules and procedures of deductive logic. Inferential abilities are recognized as critical thinking abilities by Glaser (1941: 6), Facione (1990a: 9), Ennis (1991: 9), Fisher & Scriven (1997: 99, 111), and Halpern (1998: 452). Items testing inferential abilities constitute two of the five subtests of the Watson Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal (Watson & Glaser 1980a, 1980b, 1994), two of the four sections in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level X (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005), three of the seven sections in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005), 11 of the 34 items on Forms A and B of the California Critical Thinking Skills Test (Facione 1990b, 1992), and a high but variable proportion of the 25 selected-response questions in the Collegiate Learning Assessment (Council for Aid to Education 2017).

Experimenting abilities : Knowing how to design and execute an experiment is important not just in scientific research but also in everyday life, as in Rash . Dewey devoted a whole chapter of his How We Think (1910: 145–156; 1933: 190–202) to the superiority of experimentation over observation in advancing knowledge. Experimenting abilities come into play at one remove in appraising reports of scientific studies. Skill in designing and executing experiments includes the acknowledged abilities to appraise evidence (Glaser 1941: 6), to carry out experiments and to apply appropriate statistical inference techniques (Facione 1990a: 9), to judge inductions to an explanatory hypothesis (Ennis 1991: 9), and to recognize the need for an adequately large sample size (Halpern 1998). The Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005) includes four items (out of 52) on experimental design. The Collegiate Learning Assessment (Council for Aid to Education 2017) makes room for appraisal of study design in both its performance task and its selected-response questions.

Consulting abilities : Skill at consulting sources of information comes into play when one seeks information to help resolve a problem, as in Candidate . Ability to find and appraise information includes ability to gather and marshal pertinent information (Glaser 1941: 6), to judge whether a statement made by an alleged authority is acceptable (Ennis 1962: 84), to plan a search for desired information (Facione 1990a: 9), and to judge the credibility of a source (Ennis 1991: 9). Ability to judge the credibility of statements is tested by 24 items (out of 76) in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level X (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005) and by four items (out of 52) in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005). The College Learning Assessment’s performance task requires evaluation of whether information in documents is credible or unreliable (Council for Aid to Education 2017).

Argument analysis abilities : The ability to identify and analyze arguments contributes to the process of surveying arguments on an issue in order to form one’s own reasoned judgment, as in Candidate . The ability to detect and analyze arguments is recognized as a critical thinking skill by Facione (1990a: 7–8), Ennis (1991: 9) and Halpern (1998). Five items (out of 34) on the California Critical Thinking Skills Test (Facione 1990b, 1992) test skill at argument analysis. The College Learning Assessment (Council for Aid to Education 2017) incorporates argument analysis in its selected-response tests of critical reading and evaluation and of critiquing an argument.

Judging skills and deciding skills : Skill at judging and deciding is skill at recognizing what judgment or decision the available evidence and argument supports, and with what degree of confidence. It is thus a component of the inferential skills already discussed.

Lists and tests of critical thinking abilities often include two more abilities: identifying assumptions and constructing and evaluating definitions.

In addition to dispositions and abilities, critical thinking needs knowledge: of critical thinking concepts, of critical thinking principles, and of the subject-matter of the thinking.

We can derive a short list of concepts whose understanding contributes to critical thinking from the critical thinking abilities described in the preceding section. Observational abilities require an understanding of the difference between observation and inference. Questioning abilities require an understanding of the concepts of ambiguity and vagueness. Inferential abilities require an understanding of the difference between conclusive and defeasible inference (traditionally, between deduction and induction), as well as of the difference between necessary and sufficient conditions. Experimenting abilities require an understanding of the concepts of hypothesis, null hypothesis, assumption and prediction, as well as of the concept of statistical significance and of its difference from importance. They also require an understanding of the difference between an experiment and an observational study, and in particular of the difference between a randomized controlled trial, a prospective correlational study and a retrospective (case-control) study. Argument analysis abilities require an understanding of the concepts of argument, premiss, assumption, conclusion and counter-consideration. Additional critical thinking concepts are proposed by Bailin et al. (1999b: 293), Fisher & Scriven (1997: 105–106), and Black (2012).

According to Glaser (1941: 25), ability to think critically requires knowledge of the methods of logical inquiry and reasoning. If we review the list of abilities in the preceding section, however, we can see that some of them can be acquired and exercised merely through practice, possibly guided in an educational setting, followed by feedback. Searching intelligently for a causal explanation of some phenomenon or event requires that one consider a full range of possible causal contributors, but it seems more important that one implements this principle in one’s practice than that one is able to articulate it. What is important is “operational knowledge” of the standards and principles of good thinking (Bailin et al. 1999b: 291–293). But the development of such critical thinking abilities as designing an experiment or constructing an operational definition can benefit from learning their underlying theory. Further, explicit knowledge of quirks of human thinking seems useful as a cautionary guide. Human memory is not just fallible about details, as people learn from their own experiences of misremembering, but is so malleable that a detailed, clear and vivid recollection of an event can be a total fabrication (Loftus 2017). People seek or interpret evidence in ways that are partial to their existing beliefs and expectations, often unconscious of their “confirmation bias” (Nickerson 1998). Not only are people subject to this and other cognitive biases (Kahneman 2011), of which they are typically unaware, but it may be counter-productive for one to make oneself aware of them and try consciously to counteract them or to counteract social biases such as racial or sexual stereotypes (Kenyon & Beaulac 2014). It is helpful to be aware of these facts and of the superior effectiveness of blocking the operation of biases—for example, by making an immediate record of one’s observations, refraining from forming a preliminary explanatory hypothesis, blind refereeing, double-blind randomized trials, and blind grading of students’ work.

Critical thinking about an issue requires substantive knowledge of the domain to which the issue belongs. Critical thinking abilities are not a magic elixir that can be applied to any issue whatever by somebody who has no knowledge of the facts relevant to exploring that issue. For example, the student in Bubbles needed to know that gases do not penetrate solid objects like a glass, that air expands when heated, that the volume of an enclosed gas varies directly with its temperature and inversely with its pressure, and that hot objects will spontaneously cool down to the ambient temperature of their surroundings unless kept hot by insulation or a source of heat. Critical thinkers thus need a rich fund of subject-matter knowledge relevant to the variety of situations they encounter. This fact is recognized in the inclusion among critical thinking dispositions of a concern to become and remain generally well informed.

Experimental educational interventions, with control groups, have shown that education can improve critical thinking skills and dispositions, as measured by standardized tests. For information about these tests, see the Supplement on Assessment .

What educational methods are most effective at developing the dispositions, abilities and knowledge of a critical thinker? Abrami et al. (2015) found that in the experimental and quasi-experimental studies that they analyzed dialogue, anchored instruction, and mentoring each increased the effectiveness of the educational intervention, and that they were most effective when combined. They also found that in these studies a combination of separate instruction in critical thinking with subject-matter instruction in which students are encouraged to think critically was more effective than either by itself. However, the difference was not statistically significant; that is, it might have arisen by chance.

Most of these studies lack the longitudinal follow-up required to determine whether the observed differential improvements in critical thinking abilities or dispositions continue over time, for example until high school or college graduation. For details on studies of methods of developing critical thinking skills and dispositions, see the Supplement on Educational Methods .

12. Controversies

Scholars have denied the generalizability of critical thinking abilities across subject domains, have alleged bias in critical thinking theory and pedagogy, and have investigated the relationship of critical thinking to other kinds of thinking.

McPeck (1981) attacked the thinking skills movement of the 1970s, including the critical thinking movement. He argued that there are no general thinking skills, since thinking is always thinking about some subject-matter. It is futile, he claimed, for schools and colleges to teach thinking as if it were a separate subject. Rather, teachers should lead their pupils to become autonomous thinkers by teaching school subjects in a way that brings out their cognitive structure and that encourages and rewards discussion and argument. As some of his critics (e.g., Paul 1985; Siegel 1985) pointed out, McPeck’s central argument needs elaboration, since it has obvious counter-examples in writing and speaking, for which (up to a certain level of complexity) there are teachable general abilities even though they are always about some subject-matter. To make his argument convincing, McPeck needs to explain how thinking differs from writing and speaking in a way that does not permit useful abstraction of its components from the subject-matters with which it deals. He has not done so. Nevertheless, his position that the dispositions and abilities of a critical thinker are best developed in the context of subject-matter instruction is shared by many theorists of critical thinking, including Dewey (1910, 1933), Glaser (1941), Passmore (1980), Weinstein (1990), and Bailin et al. (1999b).

McPeck’s challenge prompted reflection on the extent to which critical thinking is subject-specific. McPeck argued for a strong subject-specificity thesis, according to which it is a conceptual truth that all critical thinking abilities are specific to a subject. (He did not however extend his subject-specificity thesis to critical thinking dispositions. In particular, he took the disposition to suspend judgment in situations of cognitive dissonance to be a general disposition.) Conceptual subject-specificity is subject to obvious counter-examples, such as the general ability to recognize confusion of necessary and sufficient conditions. A more modest thesis, also endorsed by McPeck, is epistemological subject-specificity, according to which the norms of good thinking vary from one field to another. Epistemological subject-specificity clearly holds to a certain extent; for example, the principles in accordance with which one solves a differential equation are quite different from the principles in accordance with which one determines whether a painting is a genuine Picasso. But the thesis suffers, as Ennis (1989) points out, from vagueness of the concept of a field or subject and from the obvious existence of inter-field principles, however broadly the concept of a field is construed. For example, the principles of hypothetico-deductive reasoning hold for all the varied fields in which such reasoning occurs. A third kind of subject-specificity is empirical subject-specificity, according to which as a matter of empirically observable fact a person with the abilities and dispositions of a critical thinker in one area of investigation will not necessarily have them in another area of investigation.

The thesis of empirical subject-specificity raises the general problem of transfer. If critical thinking abilities and dispositions have to be developed independently in each school subject, how are they of any use in dealing with the problems of everyday life and the political and social issues of contemporary society, most of which do not fit into the framework of a traditional school subject? Proponents of empirical subject-specificity tend to argue that transfer is more likely to occur if there is critical thinking instruction in a variety of domains, with explicit attention to dispositions and abilities that cut across domains. But evidence for this claim is scanty. There is a need for well-designed empirical studies that investigate the conditions that make transfer more likely.

It is common ground in debates about the generality or subject-specificity of critical thinking dispositions and abilities that critical thinking about any topic requires background knowledge about the topic. For example, the most sophisticated understanding of the principles of hypothetico-deductive reasoning is of no help unless accompanied by some knowledge of what might be plausible explanations of some phenomenon under investigation.

Critics have objected to bias in the theory, pedagogy and practice of critical thinking. Commentators (e.g., Alston 1995; Ennis 1998) have noted that anyone who takes a position has a bias in the neutral sense of being inclined in one direction rather than others. The critics, however, are objecting to bias in the pejorative sense of an unjustified favoring of certain ways of knowing over others, frequently alleging that the unjustly favoured ways are those of a dominant sex or culture (Bailin 1995). These ways favour:

reinforcement of egocentric and sociocentric biases over dialectical engagement with opposing world-views (Paul 1981, 1984; Warren 1998)
distancing from the object of inquiry over closeness to it (Martin 1992; Thayer-Bacon 1992)
indifference to the situation of others over care for them (Martin 1992)
orientation to thought over orientation to action (Martin 1992)
being reasonable over caring to understand people’s ideas (Thayer-Bacon 1993)
being neutral and objective over being embodied and situated (Thayer-Bacon 1995a)
doubting over believing (Thayer-Bacon 1995b)
reason over emotion, imagination and intuition (Thayer-Bacon 2000)
solitary thinking over collaborative thinking (Thayer-Bacon 2000)
written and spoken assignments over other forms of expression (Alston 2001)
attention to written and spoken communications over attention to human problems (Alston 2001)
winning debates in the public sphere over making and understanding meaning (Alston 2001)

A common thread in this smorgasbord of accusations is dissatisfaction with focusing on the logical analysis and evaluation of reasoning and arguments. While these authors acknowledge that such analysis and evaluation is part of critical thinking and should be part of its conceptualization and pedagogy, they insist that it is only a part. Paul (1981), for example, bemoans the tendency of atomistic teaching of methods of analyzing and evaluating arguments to turn students into more able sophists, adept at finding fault with positions and arguments with which they disagree but even more entrenched in the egocentric and sociocentric biases with which they began. Martin (1992) and Thayer-Bacon (1992) cite with approval the self-reported intimacy with their subject-matter of leading researchers in biology and medicine, an intimacy that conflicts with the distancing allegedly recommended in standard conceptions and pedagogy of critical thinking. Thayer-Bacon (2000) contrasts the embodied and socially embedded learning of her elementary school students in a Montessori school, who used their imagination, intuition and emotions as well as their reason, with conceptions of critical thinking as

thinking that is used to critique arguments, offer justifications, and make judgments about what are the good reasons, or the right answers. (Thayer-Bacon 2000: 127–128)

Alston (2001) reports that her students in a women’s studies class were able to see the flaws in the Cinderella myth that pervades much romantic fiction but in their own romantic relationships still acted as if all failures were the woman’s fault and still accepted the notions of love at first sight and living happily ever after. Students, she writes, should

be able to connect their intellectual critique to a more affective, somatic, and ethical account of making risky choices that have sexist, racist, classist, familial, sexual, or other consequences for themselves and those both near and far… critical thinking that reads arguments, texts, or practices merely on the surface without connections to feeling/desiring/doing or action lacks an ethical depth that should infuse the difference between mere cognitive activity and something we want to call critical thinking. (Alston 2001: 34)

Some critics portray such biases as unfair to women. Thayer-Bacon (1992), for example, has charged modern critical thinking theory with being sexist, on the ground that it separates the self from the object and causes one to lose touch with one’s inner voice, and thus stigmatizes women, who (she asserts) link self to object and listen to their inner voice. Her charge does not imply that women as a group are on average less able than men to analyze and evaluate arguments. Facione (1990c) found no difference by sex in performance on his California Critical Thinking Skills Test. Kuhn (1991: 280–281) found no difference by sex in either the disposition or the competence to engage in argumentative thinking.

The critics propose a variety of remedies for the biases that they allege. In general, they do not propose to eliminate or downplay critical thinking as an educational goal. Rather, they propose to conceptualize critical thinking differently and to change its pedagogy accordingly. Their pedagogical proposals arise logically from their objections. They can be summarized as follows:

Focus on argument networks with dialectical exchanges reflecting contesting points of view rather than on atomic arguments, so as to develop “strong sense” critical thinking that transcends egocentric and sociocentric biases (Paul 1981, 1984).
Foster closeness to the subject-matter and feeling connected to others in order to inform a humane democracy (Martin 1992).
Develop “constructive thinking” as a social activity in a community of physically embodied and socially embedded inquirers with personal voices who value not only reason but also imagination, intuition and emotion (Thayer-Bacon 2000).
In developing critical thinking in school subjects, treat as important neither skills nor dispositions but opening worlds of meaning (Alston 2001).
Attend to the development of critical thinking dispositions as well as skills, and adopt the “critical pedagogy” practised and advocated by Freire (1968 [1970]) and hooks (1994) (Dalgleish, Girard, & Davies 2017).

A common thread in these proposals is treatment of critical thinking as a social, interactive, personally engaged activity like that of a quilting bee or a barn-raising (Thayer-Bacon 2000) rather than as an individual, solitary, distanced activity symbolized by Rodin’s The Thinker . One can get a vivid description of education with the former type of goal from the writings of bell hooks (1994, 2010). Critical thinking for her is open-minded dialectical exchange across opposing standpoints and from multiple perspectives, a conception similar to Paul’s “strong sense” critical thinking (Paul 1981). She abandons the structure of domination in the traditional classroom. In an introductory course on black women writers, for example, she assigns students to write an autobiographical paragraph about an early racial memory, then to read it aloud as the others listen, thus affirming the uniqueness and value of each voice and creating a communal awareness of the diversity of the group’s experiences (hooks 1994: 84). Her “engaged pedagogy” is thus similar to the “freedom under guidance” implemented in John Dewey’s Laboratory School of Chicago in the late 1890s and early 1900s. It incorporates the dialogue, anchored instruction, and mentoring that Abrami (2015) found to be most effective in improving critical thinking skills and dispositions.

What is the relationship of critical thinking to problem solving, decision-making, higher-order thinking, creative thinking, and other recognized types of thinking? One’s answer to this question obviously depends on how one defines the terms used in the question. If critical thinking is conceived broadly to cover any careful thinking about any topic for any purpose, then problem solving and decision making will be kinds of critical thinking, if they are done carefully. Historically, ‘critical thinking’ and ‘problem solving’ were two names for the same thing. If critical thinking is conceived more narrowly as consisting solely of appraisal of intellectual products, then it will be disjoint with problem solving and decision making, which are constructive.

Bloom’s taxonomy of educational objectives used the phrase “intellectual abilities and skills” for what had been labeled “critical thinking” by some, “reflective thinking” by Dewey and others, and “problem solving” by still others (Bloom et al. 1956: 38). Thus, the so-called “higher-order thinking skills” at the taxonomy’s top levels of analysis, synthesis and evaluation are just critical thinking skills, although they do not come with general criteria for their assessment (Ennis 1981b). The revised version of Bloom’s taxonomy (Anderson et al. 2001) likewise treats critical thinking as cutting across those types of cognitive process that involve more than remembering (Anderson et al. 2001: 269–270). For details, see the Supplement on History .

As to creative thinking, it overlaps with critical thinking (Bailin 1987, 1988). Thinking about the explanation of some phenomenon or event, as in Ferryboat , requires creative imagination in constructing plausible explanatory hypotheses. Likewise, thinking about a policy question, as in Candidate , requires creativity in coming up with options. Conversely, creativity in any field needs to be balanced by critical appraisal of the draft painting or novel or mathematical theory.

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Behav Anal Pract
v.1(2); Winter 2008

Science, Skepticism, and Applied Behavior Analysis

Matthew p normand.

University of the Pacific

Pseudoscientific claims concerning medical and psychological treatments of all varieties are commonplace. As behavior analysts, a sound skeptical approach to our science and practice is essential. The present paper offers an overview of science and skepticism and discusses the relationship of skepticism to behavior analysis, with an emphasis on the types of issues concerning behavior analysts in practice.

“In science, keeping an open mind is a virtue—just not so open that your brains fall out.” – James Oberg 1

In science, being skeptical does not mean doubting the validity of everything, nor does it mean being cynical. Rather, to be skeptical is to judge the validity of a claim based on objective empirical evidence. David Hume, the 18 th century philosopher, asserted that we should accept no things as true unless the evidence available makes the non-existence of the thing more miraculous than its existence. Even extraordinary claims can be true, but the more extraordinary the claim, the more extraordinary the evidence required. Not too long ago, the notion of human flight seemed like pure fancy. Today, scores of people take to the sky almost as routinely as they take to the highway. To be skeptical does not mean dismissing claims—even extraordinary claims—out of hand. It means examining the available evidence before reaching a decision or withholding judgment until sufficient evidence is had. One should not start with the assumption that a claim cannot be true any more than one should start with the assumption that a claim must be true. All reasonable evidence on both sides should be considered.

Skepticism is a critical feature of a scientific repertoire. Indeed, many of the most prominent skeptics are and have been some of the world's most prominent scientists, including Richard Dawkins, Stephen Jay Gould, and Carl Sagan. Even B. F. Skinner was among the signers of the 1976 letter announcing the formation of the Committee for the Scientific Investigation of the Paranormal, an organization dedicated to the promotion of scientific skepticism and publication of the Skeptical Inquirer ( Kurtz, 1996 ). 2 The relationship of skepticism to behavior analysis is the relationship between skepticism and science in general. The experimental analysis of behavior is a natural science, and this natural science is the foundation of all behavior analytic research and practice. Moreover, the practical importance of a skeptical repertoire for those engaged in behavior analytic practice cannot be overstated. Pseudoscience abounds in so many of the areas behavior analysts tread, including developmental disabilities, education, and psychotherapy. According to physicist Robert Park, pseudoscience is characterized by claims purportedly supported by well-established scientific evidence when, in truth, such evidence is misinterpreted, misunderstood, or wholly lacking ( Park, 2000 ).

This paper is aimed primarily at behavior analysts in practice who are likely to encounter various pseudoscientific claims in the course of their work and who might not immediately identify themselves as scientists, although it will be argued, they should. Pseudosciences know no professional boundaries and thrive in many areas of research and practice. Claims regarding the effectiveness of sensory integration therapy, facilitated communication, and inclusion qualify as pseudoscience. All are offered as legitimate therapies or useful practices when, in fact, the evidence available fails to support them ( Jacobson, Foxx, & Mulick, 2005 ). Today, one would be hard pressed to find an area more widely affected by rampant pseudoscience than that of autism treatment, which also happens to be one of the largest single areas of application for behavior analysts ( Shook, Johnston, & Mellichamp, 2004 ). In the sections that follow, I discuss scientific standards of evidence as they relate to the practice of behavior analysis, describe some of the common characteristics of pseudoscientific claims, and offer suggestions to promote skepticism in applied behavior analysis.

Standards of Evidence

Interobserver agreement.

When gathering and evaluating relevant evidence, scientists take careful steps to minimize bias in observation. What scientists say should be controlled primarily by what is seen, rather than what one hopes to see. Bias in observation cannot be entirely eliminated, but it can be controlled. The ideal case might be one in which some automated recording system can be utilized, as often is the case in basic research. Though not without precedent, such automated recording is fairly uncommon in applied research and practice. Where human observers collect behavioral data, steps must be taken to ensure that changes in behavior over time are actually changes in the behavior of interest, and not the behavior of the observer ( Baer, Wolf, & Risley, 1968 ). That is, the veracity of the data are assessed through some form of interobserver agreement measures or through the use of double-blind control procedures. In this way, the primary source of control over the verbal behavior of the observer is more likely to be the actually transpired events.

Experimental Design

Even the most careful observations are not sufficient to inform about, say, the effects of a given cold remedy. Many of us do not visit the doctor when experiencing mild symptoms characteristic of the common cold. Instead, we visit the doctor only when we've been struggling with the symptoms for some prolonged period of time or when the symptoms become so severe that we have a difficult time coping. Typically, we receive a brief exam, are prescribed some medication, and go on our way. Within a few days we are feeling better and able to resume our normal activities. The wonders of modern medicine? Not necessarily. We might well have gotten better in about the same amount of time had we never visited the doctor. We visited the doctor only after some extended period of time suffering with symptoms or after we noticed the symptoms become severe. Either circumstance might suggest that we were nearing the end of our illness. The medication might have dampened our symptoms, but our recovery might not have been hastened. No matter how carefully we observed what happened, we would be unable to drawn any firm conclusions about cause and effect.

Now consider an analogous case concerning a behavior analytic intervention. A young child is referred by his classroom teacher for behavior analytic services because he rarely works on assigned tasks during the class time allotted. The behavior analyst sets about taking careful records of the time the child is engaged in assigned class work for a period of one week, with observations distributed across times of day and academic domains. Once these data are analyzed, and it is determined that the child is engaged in assigned academic work about 30% of the time he should be so engaged, a token reinforcement system is implemented with points awarded each time he is engaged continuously with his work for 60 s. The points are, of course, later exchanged for back-up reinforcers such as preferred activities or items. The behavioral observation system is continued and, after a few weeks of intervention, the child is now observed to be on-task approximately 80% of the time and the teacher reports that his assignment completion is greatly improved, even better than some of his peers.

The wonders of modern behavioral science? Not necessarily. The intervention could have produced the changes observed, but so could have any number of other uncontrolled variables. Perhaps the type of work assignments changed during the same period of time, resulting in easier or more interesting assignments. Or the referral might have increased the overall amount of attention provided to the student by the teacher and other school personnel, thereby improving performance due to changed motivating conditions or more effective academic instruction or behavior management. It is impossible to know why the student's performance improved based on the types of observations made. But, you say, we can be more certain of our success because what we did was based on solid behavioral principles and, moreover, we are successful again and again with different children. Perhaps, but it could very well be that our token economy intervention regularly recruits one or more of the extraneous variables mentioned (e.g., increased attention by school personnel), which is the actual agent of change. Then again, maybe not. The point is that we cannot know from the information obtained.

Experimental evaluation is critical for all sciences and is the mechanism that ultimately provides us the ability to predict and control our subject matter. In most behavior analytic experimental designs, prediction is made possible through repeated measures of behavior during a baseline condition before any experimental or clinical manipulation is made. Such measures then provide a basis against which to compare behavioral observations made under the changed conditions. We use the baseline measures to predict what we would see if our manipulation did not affect the behavior. If the observed behavior under our changed conditions (e.g., during intervention) deviates from our prediction, an experimental or clinical effect is suggested. The extent to which we are able to replicate this effect through experimental manipulations such as reversals to baseline or multiple-baseline arrangements determines the strength of the conclusions that can be drawn. When we can predict the likelihood of behavior occurring or not occurring under certain conditions, and when we can alter such likelihoods through our manipulations, we have demonstrated a cause-effect relationship.

Of course, a well-developed science of behavior should presumably offer well-established technologies for the practitioner, technologies that do not require continued experimental evaluation. In medicine, for example, the diagnosis of a bacterial infection can readily lead to a prescription of antibiotics. The effectiveness of the antibiotic prescription is, however, heavily predicated on an accurate diagnosis. In behavior analytic practice, the prescription of intervention strategies also is heavily predicated on accurate diagnosis or, in behavioral terms, a functional behavior assessment. At present, the varying rigor with which functional assessments are conducted across practitioners and settings suggests that the easy prescription of well-established behavioral technologies is not practically at hand, with some exceptions. A powerful reinforcement-based intervention such as a token economy, superimposed on existing but unknown contingencies, is likely to be beneficial even without a rigorous functional assessment. Ideally, as behavioral science matures, we will have evidence-based procedures of a fairly standardized sort that have been demonstrated to work for a large majority of people with whom they are used. When non-responders are identified, more careful functional assessments can be conducted on an individual basis and individualized interventions prescribed as necessary, much the way a physician might alter the prescription of antibiotics if your health is not improved in the expected period of time.

Replication and Self-Correction

Methods applied in any specific case are not failsafe. Fortunately, the majesty of science is that although it is fallible, it also is self-correcting. Careful technological description of procedures allows others to replicate the same procedures at different times, in different places, and with different participants ( Baer et al., 1968 ). In the best cases, the peer-review process of publication in scientific journals identifies flawed studies or erroneous conclusions drawn from otherwise solid studies before they are widely disseminated. Once findings are disseminated, failures to replicate the reported findings or the discovery of new findings that refute or attenuate some earlier findings lead to revisions of scientific language and, ultimately, to a greater ability to describe, predict, and control our world. Sadly, many non-scientists view this as insufferable flip-flopping. The politician who alters an opinion or policy is thereafter chastised for being indecisive or insincere. The government agency that revises the guidelines for a healthy diet is mistrusted. In the public arena, it often is better to be true to some core conviction than responsive to a changing world. Science embraces “flip-flopping” so long as it is due to changes in evidence rather than extraneous sources of control. The scientific community arranges explicit and powerful contingencies of reinforcement for such behavior, and the scientist who treads lightly as preliminary data are gathered is in a much better position to alter his or her stance as emerging evidence dictates. A hallmark of the pseudoscientist is the propensity to make bold statements and draw firm conclusions in the absence of sufficient evidence. Once so committed, the aversive consequences for changing course can trump those arranged by the scientific community.

Perhaps it is not so difficult to see how one can succeed in making claims absent any supporting evidence, but how does someone succeed in promoting a claim in the face of existing evidence to the contrary? In psychology and the related social sciences, part of the answer is that markedly lesser standards of evidence are accepted than in the so-called hard sciences (e.g., physics, chemistry, and biology), and society seems to follow suit. It is not entirely clear why this is so. To be sure, a physicist need not labor to convince an engineer of the importance of basic physical laws. If the engineer does not abide by the laws of physics, the building falls down. This outcome is obvious and the cause is not attributed to some unknowable random process beyond the control of the engineer. It is attributed to some flaw in design or construction. Even the layperson doesn't assume that buildings sometimes fall down spontaneously because we can't hope to control nature well enough to ensure otherwise. As a result, the engineer or builder is blamed and the failed methods revised or discarded. However, when a psychological therapy fails to demonstrably change behavior, the blame is not necessarily laid upon the therapist or the therapy, though the consequences of the failure can be as great or greater than the collapsed building. Instead, many laypeople and scientists alike assume it impossible to reliably influence human behavior, because human behavior is complex and not entirely lawful. Therefore, to demonstrate that one therapy does not succeed as reliably as another is not necessarily a fatal blow for the less successful therapy. This is an unfortunate state of affairs.

So what is to be made of the proposition that some things cannot be known with certainty, human behavior or otherwise? Nothing is known for certain, but much is known for which the likelihood of alternative explanations is so small as to be unworthy of consideration. When discussing what we know, we are really describing the strength of a prediction we can make. If we state that the sun will rise in the east tomorrow, we state this because it has never been observed to do otherwise. 3 Based on historical observations of both the daily rising of the sun and, more importantly, scores of physical regularities observed by scientists at multiple levels of analysis, we can state the probability of the sun rising in the east as being so high as to be practically certain. Is it possible that the sun will rise in the west? Yes, but to say something is possible is not to say much at all. Science deals with probability, not possibility.

But perhaps the foregoing description of the general philosophy of science is just one of many equally valid philosophies about the world and our knowledge of it. Rubbish. The superiority of science is quite well-established, as science is the only “philosophy” that regularly provides the ability to predict and control that which it purports to explain. One might argue that prediction and control are not the ultimate demonstrations of truth, but such arguments seem to hold better in conversation than in practice. As the biologist Richard Dawkins eloquently put it, “Show me a cultural relativist at 30,000 feet and I'll show you a hypocrite” ( Dawkins, 1995 , p. 31). When it really matters, we rely on science; we fly in the plane designed in accordance with the laws of physics.

The Practical Limits of Scientific Rationalism

Ideally, we would behave as scientific rationalists in matters as diverse as nutrition, economics, and global warming. That is, we would be able to respond to direct empirical evidence as we confront important matters affecting our lives. But what if experimentation or the analysis of existing experimental data is beyond reach? Most of us are extremely limited in our ability to distinguish between fact and fiction in unfamiliar areas such as quantum mechanics or even automobile repair. What we “know” comes from our contact with others who describe the evidence for us rather than from our evaluation of the relevant research. As a result, we are almost unavoidably dogmatic in practice, insofar as a great deal of what we do is influenced by statements of truth professed by people of authority (or notoriety) rather than our own examination of the evidence. That this is so should be no great surprise. We haven't the skills necessary to personally investigate all the phenomena that impact us in our day-to-day affairs.

So what is to be made of those areas that are beyond the scope of our direct study but do have an impact on our lives, both personal and professional? For example, how is a behavior analyst to deal effectively with the many claims made about the genetic underpinnings of a variety of conditions, including obesity, a learning disability, or autism? Ultimately, many of us will have to be dogmatic in approach, but we should be carefully dogmatic. At best, we are likely to consult reviews of the research literature in lieu of the literature itself. But in so doing, we are subject to the biases of interpretation in the writing of the reviewer. At worst, we learn of some new fad diet or therapy from someone already convinced of its effectiveness and thereby vested in convincing us of its effectiveness by providing only evidence seeming to support the claim. There is no easy way for the non-specialist to identify pseudoscience in unfamiliar disciplines. However, as discussed in the next section, one or more red flags typically accompany pseudoscientific claims.

Characteristics of Pseudoscience

He said, she said.

Pseudoscientific claims often eschew objective experimental evidence in favor of anecdotes or testimonials. The current autism-vaccine controversy is a case in point. A large vocal contingent of parents and professionals contend that the Measles-Mumps-Rubella (MMR) vaccine or other vaccines that contained a mercury-based preservative called thimerosal are the cause behind the recent autism “explosion.” A commonly cited piece of evidence for the alleged link between certain vaccines and autism is that parents of children with autism report that their child only began to show signs of autism after receiving a vaccination. These parent reports have become even more important in the face of mounting empirical evidence failing to show even a correlation between vaccine administration and autism diagnosis ( Normand & Dallery, 2007 ). When the available scientific evidence is examined, parent testimonies are essentially the only “evidence” that supports a link at all. Despite their best intentions, parent reports are poor sources of evidence, as parents rarely have extensive training in behavioral observation, their observations are not independently corroborated to ensure accuracy, and, being the parents of the children observed, they are far from objective.

Other times, the anecdotal nature of the evidence for a claim is dressed up in scientific garb, as is the case with claims that mega-vitamin regimens produce marked improvements in young children with autism (e.g., Barthelemy et al., 1981 ; Rimland, Callaway, & Dreyfus, 1978 ). The arguments for such treatments are replete with examples of children who reportedly improved after they began a mega-vitamin regimen. A critical problem with such evidence is that the published studies rely almost exclusively on parent reports of changes in child behavior. Rather than being presented as anecdotes, the reports are dressed up as scientific data (usually quantified in some way and analyzed statistically), giving the impression of something more substantial (e.g., Barthelemy et al., 1978). Additionally, steps must be taken to isolate the effects of the vitamins from any other intervention. If the vitamins are only one part of a larger collection of intervention strategies, including intensive behavior analytic intervention, it would be inappropriate to attribute the observed improvement in the child's behavior to vitamins rather than to any of the other strategies or combinations thereof.

The Unfalsifiable Claim

Scientific studies refuting pseudoscientific claims often are criticized and dismissed on grounds of poor methodological rigor or problematic design. Such is the case with facilitated communication (FC) with persons diagnosed with autism. FC proponents claim that it enables these individuals to communicate through the aid of a “facilitator” who physically guides their hand over a keyboard so that they can type messages. A number of well-controlled experiments have demonstrated that it is the facilitators doing the communicating ( Jacobson, Mulick, & Schwartz, 1995 ). Simply put, if the facilitator does not have access to the question posed, a correct answer is not given. Douglas Biklen, one of the main proponents of FC, frequently dismisses this sizeable body of experimental research on the grounds that the studies are poorly designed and conducted, though no acceptable scientific rationale for this claim is offered ( Biklen, 1993 ). These studies all meet the well-established standards of experimental design and appear in reputable peer-reviewed scientific journals. As a defense, Biklen has suggested that the methods employed in the contradictory studies are predicated on the assumption that human behavior can be understood from a natural science perspective, and that traditional scientific standards of evidence are merely a social construction ( Jacobson et al., 1995 ). In whose plane would you rather fly?

It also is common for proponents of a pseudoscientific claim to criticize individual studies or pieces of evidence in minute detail, while the confluence of multiple sources of evidence refuting the claim is ignored. In the area of autism, many opponents of behavior analytic interventions focus on the methodological limitations of Lovaas' (1987) widely cited clinical outcomes study. They point to the lack of random selection and, especially, the lack of random assignment. What they ignore are the other outcome studies supporting the positive results reported by Lovaas (e.g., Howard, Sparkman, Cohen, Green, & Stanislaw, 2005 ; Sallows & Graupner, 2005 ). More importantly, they ignore the decades of sound experimental research employing single-case research designs demonstrating the effectiveness of interventions based on behavior analytic principles, targeting a variety of problems across a variety of populations, including young children with autism.

When evidence obtained by independent investigators using a variety of sound experimental methods points to a common conclusion, the picture is clear. Any single study will have limitations. This is why replication plays such an important role in science. As the body of research in any given area of inquiry grows, it becomes populated by numerous studies, all having different sets of strengths and limitations. As the evidence in one study is verified by other studies, the probability of explanations other than those suggested by the data shrinks.

The Dull Edge of Science

It is sometimes claimed that the very fact that mainstream science rejects a claim offers support of its veracity. The mainstream scientists are characterized as closed-minded and the pseudoscientists as cutting edge. Such characterizations find their way into all manner of pseudoscientific spin doctoring, from those recommending special diets for children with autism to the aforementioned claims of a vaccine-autism link. Despite the absolute rejection by the medical and related scientific establishments, diet and vaccine proponents claim that their information is at the forefront of modern medicine. The establishment, they claim, simply lags behind. There is no shortage of case studies in the history of science that they can dredge up to support their position as noble mavericks. After all, at one point in time the heliocentric view of the universe was widely dismissed and Copernicus, as its chief proponent, suffered great abuse. Even the Wright brothers were initially viewed as curiosities for their conviction that human flight was within reach. True, but as Michael Shermer, founder and director of the Skeptics society and publisher of Skeptic magazine, eloquently stated, “They laughed at Copernicus. They laughed at the Wright brothers. Yes, well, they laughed at the Marx brothers” (1997, p. 50). The reality is that far more people have proved deserving of criticism for their outlandish claims than have been vindicated. Heresy alone does not constitute reasonable evidence.

Implications for Behavior Analysts in Practice

What specific action might a practicing behavior analyst take in light of the preceding discussion? That is difficult to say. In preparing this paper, I found very little in the way of concrete recommendations for skeptical practice in the literature. Most treatises on skepticism emphasize “critical thinking” and highlight pseudoscience warning signs with illustrative examples, much like has been done in this paper. After some consideration, I have compiled a list, far from exhaustive, of possible actions that seem to me feasible and likely to be of benefit, though whether they will be of benefit is most certainly an empirical question.

Read and Read Widely

A sure way to spot pseudoscience is to know the real science. Maintaining contact with the peer-reviewed scientific literature is the primary way of keeping abreast of scientific developments and controversies. One also should read widely. That is, you should read more than just the mainstream behavior analytic journals. It is not reasonable to assume behavior analysts will be intimately familiar with all the sciences or even all of the behavioral sciences, but reading widely within ones' specialty (e.g., education, developmental disabilities, health psychology) is important. When you contact a new claim, even one that is from the behavior analytic community, become practiced at searching the scientific literature for evidence and information before rushing to judgment. In addition, it might not hurt to read or subscribe to a publication such as The Skeptical Inquirer or Skeptic . Doing so will put you in contact with critical analyses of a wide variety of controversial claims, including some directly relevant to your practice.

Be a Scientist-Practitioner

First and foremost, be a proponent of evidence-based practice and good science, not just those things formally identified as “behavior analysis.” Toward this end, incorporate rigorous evaluative systems into your clinical practice, including experimental manipulations whenever possible. For example, if a family is considering placing their child on a special diet as a means of treating “autistic symptoms,” it might be possible to persuade them to evaluate the effects of the diet in a systematic way. A list of clear operationally defined behavioral objectives could be agreed upon in advance, an adequate baseline established, and then the diet introduced and removed systematically over the period of several weeks or months. It might even be possible to arrange for the parents to systematically provide and withhold the diet according to pre-specified guidelines but while keeping the behavior analyst(s) blind to the manipulations until the evaluation is complete.

This approach would both emphasize the role of careful evaluation of treatment and eliminate the need for potentially heated discussion or argument about the merits of the dietary intervention. It might even provide a nice bit of empirical evidence that could be shared through conference presentations or scientific publication. But also be critical of your own practice and be wary of situations such as that described earlier with the example of the on-task student and the “wonders of modern behavioral science.” In short, be a model of skeptical behavior generally. Do you really know that the improvements you see are attributable to your efforts? Even if they are, which of your efforts are most critical? Might any be omitted, thereby making treatment easier or more efficient? These are questions that can and should be answered, not just by researchers, but by those engaged in the practice in question. Be a true scientist-practitioner. This aspect of applied behavior analysis has long been championed as one of its defining features (e.g., Baer et al., 1968 ); it is so described in virtually every textbook and so taught in virtually every training program. As a profession, are we living up to these ideals? I, for one, am skeptical in the most literal sense.

Implications for Applied Behavior Analysis

As a field, behavior analysis would be well served to develop strategies to influence the behavior of its constituents with respect to the issues discussed in this paper. Any reasonable approach to such influence will undoubtedly be multi-faceted, and the actions suggested below constitute only some of the many possible strategies.

Promote Skeptical Research and Scholarship

As mentioned in the previous section, specific recommendations about how to behave skeptically are lacking in the published literature. As I assembled the suggestions for this paper, I found myself wanting a more comprehensive functional analysis of skeptical behavior. That is, under what conditions are we likely to say someone is skeptical or that they are behaving skeptically? Conceivably, if some such conditions are identified, then steps can be taken to evaluate ways to teach a skeptical repertoire to students, professionals and paraprofessionals, families, and behavior analysts alike. Some research does exist in this vein, though conducted for different purposes. For example, a recent article by McKenzie, Wixted, and Noelle (2004) describes a method to evaluate the skepticism of experimental subjects about the possible answers provided in a forced-choice task. Though in the context of this particular study skepticism was an undesirable characteristic, presumably such work also could be used to identify conditions that might be altered to enhance skepticism.

As a way to foster skeptical research and analysis by behavior analysts, explicit solicitation of such papers for behavior analytic journals is an obvious move. The very journal you are reading seems a particularly appropriate vehicle for this work, but such articles would also be at home in other outlets. One might publish a review of existing studies evaluating a controversial treatment or summarizing the evidence-based consensus for an effective intervention in Behavior Analysis in Practice ( BAP ), an experimental evaluation of a fad therapy in the Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis ( JABA ), or an analysis of the potential controlling variables for skeptical or credulous verbal behavior in The Analysis of Verbal Behavior or The Behavior Analyst . Such work is not without precedent in behavior analytic journals (e.g., the excellent experimental evaluation of facilitated communication by Montee, Miltenberger, & Wittrock, 1995 ), but it is not common.

Highlight Non-Behavior Analytic Work with Implications for Behavior Analysts

In a manner similar to JABA 's effort some years ago to highlight basic behavioral research of potential interest to applied behavior analysts, journals such as JABA or BAP could devote a section to reporting on work outside of mainstream behavior analytic circles that nonetheless bears on behavioral research or practice. For example, recent articles have appeared in Current Directions in Psychological Science questioning the validity of claims that there is an autism epidemic ( Gernsbacher, Dawson, & Goldsmith, 2005 ), and in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences demonstrating that contingent, but not noncontingent, maternal attention shapes infant speech ( Goldstein, King, & West, 2003 ). Behavior analysts might not review the contents of such journals on a regular basis or at all and, consequently, are likely to overlook research quite relevant to their interests.

Additionally, workshops and symposia focusing on controversial therapies could be featured events for continuing education at regional and national conferences. These workshops or symposia might not focus specifically on behavior analytic techniques or theory, but could involve careful scientific analysis of research and practice relevant to behavior analysis. It seems only reasonable that steps be taken to ensure that professional behavior analysts keep abreast of developments in behavioral science and practice, and not just attend programs that rehash the same old material originating from the same group of researchers and practitioners.

Organizational Position Statements

Many major scientific and professional organizations release official position statements when some manner of ridiculousness relevant to their purposes comes to light. The American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) issued a statement denying any demonstrated link between vaccines and autism, and the American Psychological Association (APA) issued a resolution describing facilitated communication as unproven and unsupported by scientific evidence, to cite just two examples. Our regional and national behavior analysis organizations have been conspicuously quiet on such matters, though they no less affect the research and practice of their constituents than they do the constituents of AAP or APA (indeed there is at least some overlap among the membership of all three organizations). Clear position statements with at least a summary analysis of why the position is as it is could prove a useful guide to parents and professionals alike. An improved interface with the media to promote such endeavors could enhance the effect. This might be accomplished through the establishment of media sections on organizational websites to post current research summaries, organized responses to pseudoscientific claims, etc., as well as the solicitation of media coverage of national and regional conferences, perhaps with organized panels of experts to be spokespeople. Progress is being made in this direction, with the Association for Behavior Analysis, International and the Florida Association for Behavior Analysis now consulting with public relations professionals and taking these very steps. Hopefully, this is a sign of good things to come.

Do no harm. It is the credo of the helping professions. It is therefore a credo for behavior analysts in practice. Detection of and protection from pseudoscientific practices is an important service for those in need who have limited abilities to detect such foolery themselves. Such need can arise when an unproven therapy is used as an adjunct to a proven therapy and, as a result, the proven therapy is compromised in some way. For example, suppose that a couple has been convinced that sessions in a hyperbaric oxygen chamber will be of great benefit to their young son recently diagnosed with autism. Although the parents have enrolled their son in an intensive behavioral intervention program in which he is making good progress, the hyperbaric oxygen therapy requires them to travel out of state once a month for several days at a time. During these travels, their son does not receive any intensive behavioral intervention. What harm might result from such a diminished intensity of intervention? We cannot know for certain, but we have reason to be concerned. At the very least, we know that considerable benefit can result from early and intensive behavioral intervention and have no evidence that any benefit will result from the time and money spent on the hyperbaric oxygen therapy. If the use of such an unproven treatment with dubious potential for efficacy hinders more proven treatments, it would be unwise to pursue them in non-research settings.

Not only can precious time and money be diverted away from useful and proven practices, but grave physical harm also can result. Consider the case of the 5-year old Pennsylvania boy who, in 2005, reportedly died following complications from chelation therapy, a procedure intended to rid the blood of heavy metals erroneously assumed by some to cause the symptoms of autism. Or the 2000 case in which a young girl in Colorado died from suffocation during “rebirthing,” a form of attachment therapy that involves wrapping the patient in a sheet and requiring that they force their way free, in an attempt to mimic childbirth so that the patient is “reborn” (for a horrifying account of this incident, see Mercer, Sarner, & Rosa, 2003 ).

Pseudoscience can and has produced harm. Behavior analysts should do more than avoid or ignore what they consider to be non-behavior-analytic practices. They should take it upon themselves to consider the scientific and pseudoscientific claims being made in their area of practice, become familiar with the evidence for and against these claims, and consider carefully any potentially harmful implications of the claims should they be adopted as practice. When possible, they should take active roles in the careful experimental evaluation of their own practices, emerging behavior analytic practices, as well as pseudoscientific claims. That is, they should be scientific skeptics and informed behavior analytic practitioners.

I would like to acknowledge the writings of Richard Dawkins, Carl Sagan, and Michael Shermer as primary influences on the present paper. Wherever possible, I cite directly the sources from which specific material is drawn. However, the overall content of the paper cannot be meaningfully disentangled from my extensive history of reading the work of these three authors. I also would like to acknowledge the insightful comments of the reviewers of this manuscript. Their comments were especially useful and contributed to a greatly improved paper.

1 Quote attributed to James Oberg by (Sagan, 1996).

2 Now known as the Committee for Scientific Investigation (CSI).

3 This is, of course, a geocentric description of the behavior of the earth and sun. Although wanting in scientific precision, it should serve the present purpose better than appeals to the regularity of the earth's rotation as it revolves around the sun.

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