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Political Realism in International Relations

In the discipline of international relations there are contending general theories or theoretical perspectives. Realism, also known as political realism, is a view of international politics that stresses its competitive and conflictual side. It is usually contrasted with idealism or liberalism, which tends to emphasize cooperation. Realists consider the principal actors in the international arena to be states, which are concerned with their own security, act in pursuit of their own national interests, and struggle for power. The negative side of the realists’ emphasis on power and self-interest is often their skepticism regarding the relevance of ethical norms to relations among states. National politics is the realm of authority and law, whereas international politics, they sometimes claim, is a sphere without justice, characterized by active or potential conflict among states, where ethical standards do not apply.

Not all realists, however, deny the presence of prescriptive ethics in international relations. The distinction should be drawn between classical realism—represented by such twentieth-century theorists as Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau—and radical or extreme realism. While classical realism emphasizes the concept of national interest, it is not the Machiavellian doctrine “that anything is justified by reason of state” (Bull 1995, 189). Nor does it involve the glorification of war or conflict. The classical realists do not reject the possibility of moral judgment in international politics. Rather, they are critical of moralism—abstract moral discourse that does not take into account political realities. They assign ethical value to successful political action based on prudence: the ability to judge the rightness of a given action from among possible alternatives on the basis of its likely political consequences.

Realism encompasses a variety of approaches and claims a long theoretical tradition. Among its founding fathers, Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes are the names most usually mentioned. Twentieth-century classical realism has today been largely replaced by neorealism, which is an attempt to construct a more scientific approach to the study of international relations. Both classical realism and neorealism have been subjected to criticism from IR theorists representing liberal, critical, and post-modern perspectives. The growing tensions among superpowers have revived the realist-idealist debate in the twenty-first century and have led to a resurgence of interest in the realist tradition.

1.1 Thucydides and the Importance of Power

1.2 machiavelli’s critique of the moral tradition, 1.3 hobbes’s anarchic state of nature, 2.1 e. h. carr’s challenge to utopian idealism, 2.2 hans morgenthau’s realist principles, 3.1 kenneth waltz’s international system, 3.2 objections to neorealism, 4. conclusion: the cautionary and changing character of realism, other internet resources, related entries, 1. the roots of the realist tradition.

Like other classical political theorists, Thucydides (c. 460–c. 400 B.C.E.) saw politics as involving moral questions. Most importantly, he asks whether relations among states to which power is crucial can also be guided by the norms of justice. His History of the Peloponnesian War is in fact neither a work of political philosophy nor a sustained theory of international relations. Much of this work, which presents a partial account of the armed conflict between Athens and Sparta that took place from 431 to 404 B.C.E., consists of paired speeches by personages who argue opposing sides of an issue. Nevertheless, if the History is described as the only acknowledged classical text in international relations, and if it inspires theorists from Hobbes to contemporary international relations scholars, this is because it is more than a chronicle of events, and a theoretical position can be extrapolated from it. Realism is expressed in the very first speech of the Athenians recorded in the History —a speech given at the debate that took place in Sparta just before the war. Moreover, a realist perspective is implied in the way Thucydides explains the cause of the Peloponnesian War, and also in the famous “Melian Dialogue,” in the statements made by the Athenian envoys.

1.1.1 General Features of Realism in International Relations

International relations realists emphasize the constraints imposed on politics by the nature of human beings, whom they consider egoistic, and by the absence of international government. Together these factors contribute to a conflict-based paradigm of international relations, in which the key actors are states, in which power and security become the main issues, and in which there is little place for ethical norms. The set of premises concerning state actors, egoism, anarchy, power, security, and ethics that define the realist tradition are all present in Thucydides.

(1) Human nature is a starting point for classical political realism. Realists view human beings as inherently egoistic and self-interested to the extent that self-interest overcomes moral principles. At the debate in Sparta, described in Book I of Thucydides’ History , the Athenians affirm the priority of self-interest over morality. They say that considerations of right and wrong have “never turned people aside from the opportunities of aggrandizement offered by superior strength” (chap. 1 par. 76).

(2) Realists, and especially today’s neorealists, consider the absence of government, literally anarchy , to be the primary determinant of international political outcomes. The lack of a common rule-making and enforcing authority means, they argue, that the international arena is essentially a self-help system. Each state is responsible for its own survival and is free to define its own interests and to pursue power. Anarchy thus leads to a situation in which power has the overriding role in shaping interstate relations. In the words of the Athenian envoys at Melos, without any common authority that can enforce order, “the independent states survive [only] when they are powerful” (5.97).

(3) Insofar as realists envision the world of states as anarchic, they likewise view security as a central issue. To attain security, states try to increase their power and engage in power-balancing for the purpose of deterring potential aggressors. Wars are fought to prevent competing nations from becoming militarily stronger. Thucydides, while distinguishing between the immediate and underlying causes of the Peloponnesian War, does not see its real cause in any of the particular events that immediately preceded its outbreak. He instead locates the cause of the war in the changing distribution of power between the two blocs of Greek city-states: the Delian League, under the leadership of Athens, and the Peloponnesian League, under the leadership of Sparta. According to him, the growth of Athenian power made the Spartans afraid for their security, and thus propelled them into war (1.23). Referring to this situation, Graham Allison has popularized the expression “Thucydides trap” to describe the danger which occurs when a rising power rivals an established one (2017).

(4) Realists are generally skeptical about the relevance of ethics to international politics. This can lead them to claim that there is no place for morality in the prescriptive sense in international relations, or that there is a tension between demands of morality and requirements of successful political action, or that states have their own morality that is different from customary morality, or that morality, if employed at all, is merely used instrumentally to justify states’ conduct. A clear case of the rejection of ethical norms in relations among states can be found in the “Melian Dialogue” (5.85–113). This dialogue relates to the events of 416 B.C.E., when Athens invaded the island of Melos. The Athenian envoys presented the Melians with a choice, destruction or surrender, and from the outset asked them not to appeal to justice, but to think only about their survival. In the envoys’ words, “We both know that the decisions about justice are made in human discussions only when both sides are under equal compulsion, but when one side is stronger, it gets as much as it can, and the weak must accept that” (5.89). To be “under equal compulsion” means to be under the force of law, and thus to be subjected to a common lawgiving authority (Korab-Karpowicz 2006, 234). Since such an authority above states does not exist, the Athenians argue that in this lawless condition of international anarchy, the only right is the right of the stronger to dominate the weaker. They explicitly equate right with might, and exclude considerations of justice from foreign affairs.

1.1.2 The “Melian Dialogue”—The First Realist-Idealist Debate

We can thus find strong support for a realist perspective in the statements of the Athenians. The question remains, however, to what extent their realism coincides with Thucydides’ own viewpoint. Although substantial passages of the “Melian Dialogue,” as well as other parts of the History support a realistic reading, Thucydides’ position cannot be deduced from such selected fragments, but rather must be assessed on the basis of the wider context of his book. In fact, even the “Melian Dialogue” itself provides us with a number of contending views.

Political realism is usually contrasted by IR scholars with idealism or liberalism, a theoretical perspective that emphasizes international norms, interdependence among states, and international cooperation. The “Melian Dialogue,” which is one of the most frequently commented-upon parts of Thucydides’ History , presents the classic debate between the idealist and realist views: Can international politics be based on a moral order derived from the principles of justice, or will it forever remain the arena of conflicting national interests and power?

For the Melians, who employ idealistic arguments, the choice is between war and subjection (5.86). They are courageous and love their country. They do not wish to lose their freedom, and in spite of the fact that they are militarily weaker than the Athenians, they are prepared to defend themselves (5.100; 5.112). They base their arguments on an appeal to justice, which they associate with fairness, and regard the Athenians as unjust (5.90; 5.104). They are pious, believing that gods will support their just cause and compensate for their weakness, and trust in alliances, thinking that their allies, the Spartans, who are also related to them, will help them (5.104; 5.112). Hence, one can identify in the speech of the Melians elements of the idealistic or liberal world view: the belief that nations have the right to exercise political independence, that they have mutual obligations to one another and will carry out such obligations, and that a war of aggression is unjust. What the Melians nevertheless lack are resources and foresight. In their decision to defend themselves, they are guided more by their hopes than by the evidence at hand or by prudent calculations.

The Athenian argument is based on key realist concepts such as security and power, and is informed not by what the world should be, but by what it is. The Athenians disregard any moral talk and urge the Melians to look at the facts—that is, to recognize their military inferiority, to consider the potential consequences of their decision, and to think about their own survival (5.87; 5.101). There appears to be a powerful realist logic behind the Athenian arguments. Their position, based on security concerns and self-interest, seemingly involves reliance on rationality, intelligence, and foresight. However, upon close examination, their logic proves to be seriously flawed. Melos, a relatively weak state, does not pose any real security threat to them. The eventual destruction of Melos does not change the course of the Peloponnesian War, which Athens will lose a few years later.

In the History , Thucydides shows that power, if it is unrestrained by moderation and a sense of justice, brings about the uncontrolled desire for more power. There are no logical limits to the size of an empire. Drunk with the prospect of glory and gain, after conquering Melos, the Athenians engage in a war against Sicily. They pay no attention to the Melian argument that considerations of justice are useful to all in the longer run (5.90). And, as the Athenians overestimate their strength and in the end lose the war, their self-interested logic proves to be very shortsighted indeed.

It is utopian to ignore the reality of power in international relations, but it is equally blind to rely on power alone. Thucydides appears to support neither the naive idealism of the Melians nor the cynicism of their Athenian opponents. He teaches us to be on guard “against naïve-dreaming on international politics,” on the one hand, and “against the other pernicious extreme: unrestrained cynicism,” on the other (Donnelly 2000, 193). If he can be regarded as a political realist, his realism nonetheless prefigures neither realpolitik , in which prescriptive ethics is rejected, nor today’s scientific neorealism, in which moral questions are largely ignored. Thucydides’ realism, neither immoral nor amoral, can rather be compared to that of Hans Morgenthau, Raymond Aron, and other twentieth-century classical realists, who, although sensible to the demands of national interest, would not deny that political actors on the international scene are subject to moral judgment.

Idealism in international relations, like realism, can lay claim to a long tradition. Unsatisfied with the world as they have found it, idealists have always tried to answer the question of “what ought to be” in politics. Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero were all political idealists who believed that there were some universal moral values on which political life could be based. Building on the work of his predecessors, Cicero developed the idea of a natural moral law that was applicable to both domestic and international politics. His ideas concerning righteousness in war were carried further in the writings of the Christian thinkers St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas. In the late fifteenth century, when Niccolò Machiavelli was born, the idea that politics, including the relations among states, should be virtuous, and that the methods of warfare should remain subordinated to ethical standards, still predominated in political literature.

Machiavelli (1469–1527) challenged this well-established moral tradition, thus positioning himself as a political innovator. The novelty of his approach lies in his critique of classical Western political thought as unrealistic, aiming too high, and in his separation of politics from ethics. He thereby lays the foundations for modern politics focussed on self-interest. In chapter XV of The Prince , Machiavelli announces that in departing from the teachings of earlier thinkers, he seeks “the effectual truth of the matter rather than the imagined one.” The “effectual truth” is for him the only truth worth seeking. It represents the sum of the practical conditions that he believes are required to make both the individual and the country prosperous and strong. Machiavelli replaces the ancient virtue (a moral quality of the individual, such as justice or self-restraint) with virtù , ability or vigor. As a prophet of virtù , he promises to lead both nations and individuals to earthly glory and power.

Machiavellianism is a radical type of political realism that is applied to both domestic and international affairs. It is sometimes called realpolitik , and is a doctrine which denies the relevance of ethics in politics, and claims that all means (moral and immoral) are justified to achieve certain political ends. Although Machiavelli never uses the phrase ragione di stato or its French equivalent, raison d’état , what ultimately counts for him is precisely that: whatever is good for the state, rather than ethical scruples or norms

Machiavelli justified immoral actions in politics, but never refused to admit that they are evil. He operated within the single framework of traditional morality. It became a specific task of his nineteenth-century followers to develop the doctrine of a double ethics: one public and one private, to push Machiavellian realism to even further extremes, and to apply it to international relations. By asserting that “the state has no higher duty than of maintaining itself,” Hegel gave an ethical sanction to the state’s promotion of its own interest and advantage against other states (Meinecke 357). Thus he overturned the traditional beliefs about morality. The good of the state was perversely interpreted by him as the highest moral value, with the extension of national power regarded as a nation’s right and duty. Then, referring to Machiavelli, Heinrich von Treitschke declared that the state was power, precisely in order to assert itself as against other equally independent powers, and that the supreme moral duty of the state was to foster this power. He considered international agreements to be binding only insofar as it was expedient for the state. The idea of an autonomous ethics of state behavior and the concept of realpolitik were thus introduced. Traditional, customary ethics was denied and power politics was associated with a “higher” type of morality. These concepts, along with the belief in the superiority of Germanic culture, served as weapons with which German statesmen, from the eighteenth century to the end of the Second World War, justified their policies of conquest and extermination.

Machiavelli is often praised for his prudential advice to leaders (which has caused him to be regarded as a founding master of modern political strategy) and for his defense of the republican form of government. There are certainly many aspects of his thought that merit such praise. Nevertheless, it is also possible to see him as the thinker who bears foremost responsibility for the de-moralization of Europe. The argument of the Athenian envoys presented in Thucydides’ “Melian Dialogue,” that of Thrasymachus in Plato’s Republic , or that of Carneades, to whom Cicero refers—all of these challenge the ancient and Christian views of the unity of politics and ethics. However, before Machiavelli, this amoral or immoral mode of thinking had never prevailed in the mainstream of Western political thought. It was the force and timeliness of his justification of resorting to evil as a legitimate means of achieving political ends that persuaded so many of the thinkers and political practitioners who followed him. The effects of Machiavellian ideas, such as the notion that the employment of all possible means was permissible in war, would be seen on the battlefields of modern Europe, as mass citizen armies fought against each other to the bitter end without regard for the rules of justice. The tension between expediency and morality lost its validity in the sphere of politics. The concept of a double ethics that created a further damage to traditional morality, was invented. The doctrine of raison d’état ultimately led to the politics of Lebensraum , two world wars, and the Holocaust.

Perhaps the greatest problem with realism in international relations is that it has a tendency to slip into its extreme version, which accepts any policy that can benefit the state at the expense of other states, no matter how morally problematic the policy is. Even if they do not explicitly raise ethical questions, in the works of Waltz and of many other of today’s neorealists, a double ethics, public and private, is presupposed, and words such realpolitik no longer have the negative connotations that they had for classical realists, such as Hans Morgenthau.

Thomas Hobbes (1588–1683) was part of an intellectual movement whose goal was to free the emerging modern science from the constraints of the classical and scholastic heritage. According to classical political philosophy, on which the idealist perspective is based, human beings can control their desires through reason and can work for the benefit of others, even at the expense of their own benefit. They are thus both rational and moral agents, capable of distinguishing between right and wrong, and of making moral choices. They are also naturally social. With great skill Hobbes attacks these views. His human beings, extremely individualistic rather than moral or social, are subject to “a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceases only in death” ( Leviathan XI 2). They therefore inevitably struggle for power. In setting out such ideas, Hobbes contributes to some of the basic conceptions fundamental to the realist tradition in international relations, and especially to neorealism. These include the characterization of human nature as egoistic, the concept of international anarchy, and the view that politics, rooted in the struggle for power, can be rationalized and studied scientifically.

One of the most widely known Hobbesian concepts is that of the anarchic state of nature, seen as entailing a state of war—and “such a war as is of every man against every man” (XII 8). He derives his notion of the state of war from his views of both human nature and the condition in which individuals exist. Since in the state of nature there is no government and everyone enjoys equal status, every individual has a right to everything; that is, there are no constraints on an individual’s behavior. Anyone may at any time use force, and all must constantly be ready to counter such force with force. Hence, driven by acquisitiveness, having no moral restraints, and motivated to compete for scarce goods, individuals are apt to “invade” one another for gain. Being suspicious of one another and driven by fear, they are also likely to engage in preemptive actions and invade one another to ensure their own safety. Finally, individuals are also driven by pride and a desire for glory. Whether for gain, safety, or reputation, power-seeking individuals will thus “endeavor to destroy or subdue one another” (XIII 3). In such uncertain conditions where everyone is a potential aggressor, making war on others is a more advantageous strategy than peaceable behavior, and one needs to learn that domination over others is necessary for one’s own continued survival.

Hobbes is primarily concerned with the relationship between individuals and the state, and his comments about relations among states are scarce. Nevertheless, what he says about the lives of individuals in the state of nature can also be interpreted as a description of how states exist in relation to one another. Once states are established, the individual drive for power becomes the basis for the states’ behavior, which often manifests itself in their efforts to dominate other states and peoples. States, “for their own security,” writes Hobbes, “enlarge their dominions upon all pretences of danger and fear of invasion or assistance that may be given to invaders, [and] endeavour as much as they can, to subdue and weaken their neighbors” (XIX 4). Accordingly, the quest and struggle for power lies at the core of the Hobbesian vision of relations among states. The same would later be true of the model of international relations developed by Hans Morgenthau, who was deeply influenced by Hobbes and adopted the same view of human nature. Similarly, the neorealist Kenneth Waltz would follow Hobbes’ lead regarding international anarchy (the fact that sovereign states are not subject to any higher common sovereign) as the essential element of international relations.

By subjecting themselves to a sovereign, individuals escape the war of all against all which Hobbes associates with the state of nature; however, this war continues to dominate relations among states. This does not mean that states are always fighting, but rather that they have a disposition to fight (XIII 8). With each state deciding for itself whether or not to use force, war may break out at any time. The achievement of domestic security through the creation of a state is then paralleled by a condition of inter-state insecurity. One can argue that if Hobbes were fully consistent, he would agree with the notion that, to escape this condition, states should also enter into a contract and submit themselves to a world sovereign. Although the idea of a world state would find support among some of today’s realists, this is not a position taken by Hobbes himself. He does not propose that a social contract among nations be implemented to bring international anarchy to an end. This is because the condition of insecurity in which states are placed does not necessarily lead to insecurity for their citizens. As long as an armed conflict or other type of hostility between states does not actually break out, individuals within a state can feel relatively secure.

The denial of the existence of universal moral principles and norms in the relations among states brings Hobbes close to the Machiavellians and the followers of the doctrine of raison d’état . His theory of international relations, which assumes that independent states, like independent individuals, are enemies by nature, asocial and selfish, and that there is no moral limitation on their behavior, is a great challenge to the idealist political vision based on human sociability and to the concept of the international jurisprudence that is built on this vision. However, what separates Hobbes from Machiavelli and associates him more with classical realism is his insistence on the defensive character of foreign policy. His political theory does not put forward the invitation to do whatever may be advantageous for the state. His approach to international relations is prudential and pacific: sovereign states, like individuals, should be disposed towards peace which is commended by reason.

What Waltz and other neorealist readers of Hobbes’s works sometimes overlook is that he does not perceive international anarchy as an environment without any rules. By suggesting that certain dictates of reason apply even in the state of nature, he affirms that more peaceful and cooperative international relations are possible. Neither does he deny the existence of international law. Sovereign states can sign treaties with one another to provide a legal basis for their relations. At the same time, however, Hobbes seems aware that international rules will often prove ineffective in restraining the struggle for power. States will interpret them to their own advantage, and so international law will be obeyed or ignored according to the interests of the states affected. Hence, international relations will always tend to be a precarious affair. This grim view of global politics lies at the core of Hobbes’s realism.

2. Twentieth Century Classical Realism

Twentieth-century realism was born in response to the idealist perspective that dominated international relations scholarship in the aftermath of the First World War. The idealists of the 1920s and 1930s (also called liberal internationalists or utopians) had the goal of building peace in order to prevent another world conflict. They saw the solution to inter-state problems as being the creation of a respected system of international law, backed by international organizations. This interwar idealism resulted in the founding of the League of Nations in 1920 and in the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 outlawing war and providing for the peaceful settlements of disputes. U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, scholars such as Norman Angell, Alfred Zimmern, and Raymond B. Fosdick, and other prominent idealists of the era, gave their intellectual support to the League of Nations. Instead of focusing on what some might see as the inevitability of conflict between states and peoples, they chose to emphasize the common interests that could unite humanity, and attempted to appeal to rationality and morality. For them, war did not originate in an egoistic human nature, but rather in imperfect social conditions and political arrangements, which could be improved. Yet their ideas were already being criticized in the early 1930s by Reinhold Niebuhr and within a few years by E. H. Carr. The League of Nations, which the United States never joined, and from which Japan and Germany withdrew, could not prevent the outbreak of the Second World War. This fact, perhaps more than any theoretical argument, contributed to the development of the realist theory. Although the United Nations, founded in 1945, can still be regarded as a product of idealist political thinking, the discipline of international relations was profoundly influenced in the initial years of the post-war period by the works of “classical” realists such as John H. Herz, Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan, and Raymond Aron. Then, during the 1950s and 1960s, classical realism came under challenge of scholars who tried to introduce a more scientific approach to the study of international politics. During the 1980s it gave way to another trend in international relations theory—neorealism.

Since it is impossible within the scope of this article to introduce all of the thinkers who contributed to the development of twentieth-century classical realism, E. H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau, as perhaps the most influential among them, have been selected for discussion here.

In his main work on international relations, The Twenty Years’ Crisis , first published in July 1939, Edward Hallett Carr (1892–1982) attacks the idealist position, which he describes as “utopianism.” He characterizes this position as encompassing faith in reason, confidence in progress, a sense of moral rectitude, and a belief in an underlying harmony of interests. According to the idealists, war is an aberration in the course of normal life and the way to prevent it is to educate people for peace, and to build systems of collective security such as the League of Nations or today’s United Nations. Carr challenges idealism by questioning its claim to moral universalism and its idea of the harmony of interests. He declares that “morality can only be relative, not universal” (19), and states that the doctrine of the harmony of interests is invoked by privileged groups “to justify and maintain their dominant position” (75).

Carr uses the concept of the relativity of thought, which he traces to Marx and other modern theorists, to show that standards by which policies are judged are the products of circumstances and interests. His central idea is that the interests of a given party always determine what this party regards as moral principles, and hence, these principles are not universal. Carr observes that politicians, for example, often use the language of justice to cloak the particular interests of their own countries, or to create negative images of other people to justify acts of aggression. The existence of such instances of morally discrediting a potential enemy or morally justifying one’s own position shows, he argues, that moral ideas are derived from actual policies. Policies are not, as the idealists would have it, based on some universal norms, independent of interests of the parties involved.

If specific ethical standards are de facto founded on interests, Carr’s argument goes, there are also interests underlying what are regarded as absolute principles or universal moral values. While the idealists tend to regard such values, such as peace or justice, as universal and claim that upholding them is in the interest of all, Carr argues against this view. According to him, there are neither universal values nor universal interests. He claims that those who refer to universal interests are in fact acting in their own interests (71). They think that what is best for them is best for everyone, and identify their own interests with the universal interest of the world at large.

The idealist concept of the harmony of interests is based on the notion that human beings can rationally recognize that they have some interests in common, and that cooperation is therefore possible. Carr contrasts this idea with the reality of conflict of interests . According to him, the world is torn apart by the particular interests of different individuals and groups. In such a conflictual environment, order is based on power, not on morality. Further, morality itself is the product of power (61). Like Hobbes, Carr regards morality as constructed by the particular legal system that is enforced by a coercive power. International ethical norms are imposed on other countries by dominant nations or groups of nations that present themselves as the international community as a whole. They are invented to perpetuate those nations’ dominance.

Values that idealists view as good for all, such as peace, social justice, prosperity, and international order, are regarded by Carr as mere status quo notions. The powers that are satisfied with the status quo regard the arrangement in place as just and therefore preach peace. They try to rally everyone around their idea of what is good. “Just as the ruling class in a community prays for domestic peace, which guarantees its own security and predominance, … so international peace becomes a special vested interest of predominant powers” (76). On the other hand, the unsatisfied powers consider the same arrangement as unjust, and so prepare for war. Hence, the way to obtain peace, if it cannot be simply enforced, is to satisfy the unsatisfied powers. “Those who profit most by [international] order can in the longer run only hope to maintain it by making sufficient concessions to make it tolerable to those who profit by it least” (152). The logical conclusion to be drawn by the reader of Carr’s book is the policy of appeasement.

Carr was a sophisticated thinker. He recognized himself that the logic of “pure realism can offer nothing but a naked struggle for power which makes any kind of international society impossible” (87). Although he demolishes what he calls “the current utopia” of idealism, he at the same time attempts to build “a new utopia,” a realist world order ( ibid .). Thus, he acknowledges that human beings need certain fundamental principles or beliefs that are shared across different cultures, and contradicts his own earlier argument by which he tries to deny universality to any norms or values. To make further objections to his position, the fact, as he claims, that the language of universal values can be misused in politics for the benefit of one party or another, and that such values can only be imperfectly implemented in political institutions, does not mean that such values do not exist. There is a deep yearning in many human beings, both privileged and unprivileged, for peace, order, prosperity, and justice. The legitimacy of idealism consists in the constant attempt to reflect upon and uphold these values. Idealists fail if in their attempt they do not pay enough attention to the reality of power. On the other hand, in the world of “pure realism,” in which all values are made relative to interests, life turns into nothing more than a power game and is unbearable.

The Twenty Years’ Crisis touches on a number of universal ideas, but it also reflects the spirit of its time. While we can fault the interwar idealists for their inability to construct international institutions strong enough to prevent the outbreak of the Second World War, this book indicates that interwar realists were likewise unprepared to meet the challenge. Carr frequently refers to Germany under Nazi rule as if it were a country like any other. He says that should Germany cease to be an unsatisfied power and “become supreme in Europe,” it would adopt a language of international solidarity similar to that of other Western powers (79). The inability of Carr and other realists to recognize the perilous nature of Nazism, and their belief that Germany could be satisfied by territorial concessions, helped to foster a political environment in which the latter was to grow in power, annex Czechoslovakia at will, and be militarily opposed in September 1939 by Poland alone.

A theory of international relations is not just an intellectual enterprise; it has practical consequences. It influences our thinking and political practice. On the practical side, the realists of the 1930s, to whom Carr gave intellectual support, were people opposed to the system of collective security embodied in the League of Nations. Working within the foreign policy establishments of the day, they contributed to its weakness. Once they had weakened the League, they pursued a policy of appeasement and accommodation with Germany as an alternative to collective security (Ashworth 46). After the annexation of Czechoslovakia, when the failure of the anti-League realist conservatives gathered around Neville Chamberlain and of this policy became clear, they tried to rebuild the very security system they had earlier demolished. Those who supported collective security were labeled idealists.

Hans J. Morgenthau (1904–1980) developed realism into a comprehensive international relations theory. Influenced by the Protestant theologian and political writer Reinhold Niebuhr, as well as by Hobbes, he places selfishness and power-lust at the center of his picture of human existence. The insatiable human lust for power, timeless and universal, which he identifies with animus dominandi , the desire to dominate, is for him the main cause of conflict. As he asserts in his main work, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace , first published in 1948, “international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power” (25).

Morgenthau systematizes realism in international relations on the basis of six principles that he includes in the second edition of Politics among Nations . As a traditionalist, he opposes the so-called scientists (the scholars who, especially in the 1950s, tried to reduce the discipline of international relations to a branch of behavioral science). Nevertheless, in the first principle he states that realism is based on objective laws that have their roots in unchanging human nature (4). He wants to develop realism into both a theory of international politics and a political art, a useful tool of foreign policy.

The keystone of Morgenthau’s realist theory is the concept of power or “of interest defined in terms of power,” which informs his second principle: the assumption that political leaders “think and act in terms of interest defined as power” (5). This concept defines the autonomy of politics, and allows for the analysis of foreign policy regardless of the different motives, preferences, and intellectual and moral qualities of individual politicians. Furthermore, it is the foundation of a rational picture of politics.

Although, as Morgenthau explains in the third principle, interest defined as power is a universally valid category, and indeed an essential element of politics, various things can be associated with interest or power at different times and in different circumstances. Its content and the manner of its use are determined by the political and cultural environment.

In the fourth principle, Morgenthau considers the relationship between realism and ethics. He says that while realists are aware of the moral significance of political action, they are also aware of the tension between morality and the requirements of successful political action. “Universal moral principles,” he asserts, “cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract universal formulation, but …they must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place” (9). These principles must be accompanied by prudence for as he cautions “there can be no political morality without prudence; that is, without consideration of the political consequences of seemingly moral action” ( ibid .).

Prudence, the ability to judge the rightness of a given action from among possible alternatives on the basis of its likely political consequences, and not conviction of one’s own moral or ideological superiority, should guide political decisions. This is stressed in the fifth principle, where Morgenthau again emphasizes the idea that all state actors, including our own, must be looked at solely as political entities pursuing their respective interests defined in terms of power. By taking this point of view vis-à-vis its counterparts and thus avoiding ideological confrontation, a state would then be able to pursue policies that respected the interests of other states, while protecting and promoting its own.

Insofar as power, or interest defined as power, is the concept that defines politics, politics is an autonomous sphere, as Morgenthau says in his sixth principle of realism. It cannot be subordinated to ethics. However, ethics does still play a role in politics. “A man who was nothing but ‘political man’ would be a beast, for he would be completely lacking in moral restraints. A man who was nothing but ‘moral man’ would be a fool, for he would be completely lacking in prudence” (12). Political art requires that these two dimensions of human life, power and morality, be taken into consideration.

While Morgenthau’s six principles of realism contain repetitions and inconsistencies, we can nonetheless obtain from them the following picture: Power or interest is the central concept that makes politics into an autonomous discipline. Rational state actors pursue their national interests. Therefore, a rational theory of international politics can be constructed. Such a theory is not concerned with the morality, religious beliefs, motives or ideological preferences of individual political leaders. It also indicates that in order to avoid conflicts, states should avoid moral crusades or ideological confrontations, and look for compromise based solely on satisfaction of their mutual interests.

Although he defines politics as an autonomous sphere, Morgenthau does not separate ethics from politics. The act of protecting one’s country has for him a deep moral significance. Ultimately directed toward the objective of national survival, it involves prudence that is related to choosing the best course of action. The effective protection of citizens’ lives from harm in case of an international armed conflict is not merely a forceful physical action; it also has prudential and moral dimensions.

Morgenthau regards realism as a way of thinking about international relations and a useful tool for devising policies. However, some of the basic conceptions of his theory, and especially the idea of conflict as stemming from human nature, as well as the concept of power itself, have provoked criticism.

International politics, like all politics, is for Morgenthau a struggle for power because of the basic human lust for power. But regarding every individual as being engaged in a perpetual quest for power—the view that he shares with Hobbes—is a questionable premise. Human nature cannot be revealed by observation and experiment. It cannot be proved by any empirical research, but only disclosed by philosophy, imposed on us as a matter of belief, and inculcated by education.

Morgenthau himself reinforces the belief in the human drive for power by introducing a normative aspect of his theory, which is rationality. A rational foreign policy is considered “to be a good foreign policy” (7). But he defines rationality as a process of calculating the costs and benefits of all alternative policies in order to determine their relative utility, i.e. their ability to maximize power. Statesmen “think and act in terms of interest defined as power” (5). Only intellectual weakness of policy makers can result in foreign policies that deviate from a rational course aimed at minimizing risks and maximizing benefits. Hence, rather than presenting an actual portrait of human affairs, Morgenthau emphasizes the pursuit of power and the rationality of this pursuit, and sets it up as a norm.

As Raymond Aron and other scholars have noticed, power, the fundamental concept of Morgenthau’s realism, is ambiguous. It can be either a means or an end in politics. But if power is only a means for gaining something else, it does not define the nature of international politics in the way Morgenthau claims. It does not allow us to understand the actions of states independently from the motives and ideological preferences of their political leaders. It cannot serve as the basis for defining politics as an autonomous sphere. Morgenthau’s principles of realism are thus open to doubt. “Is this true,” Aron asks, “that states, whatever their regime, pursue the same kind of foreign policy” (597) and that the foreign policies of Napoleon or Stalin are essentially identical to those of Hitler, Louis XVI or Nicholas II, amounting to no more than the struggle for power? “If one answers yes, then the proposition is incontestable, but not very instructive” (598). Accordingly, it is useless to define actions of states by exclusive reference to power, security or national interest. International politics cannot be studied independently of the wider historical and cultural context.

Carr and Morgenthau concentrate primarily on international relations. However, their political realism can also be applied to domestic politics. To be a classical realist is in general to perceive politics as a conflict of interests and a struggle for power, and to seek peace by recognizing common interests and trying to satisfy them, rather than by moralizing. Bernard Williams and Raymond Geuss, influential representatives of the new political realism, a movement in contemporary political theory, criticize what they describe as “political moralism” and stress the autonomy of politics against ethics. However, political theory realism and international relations realism seem like two separate research programs. As noted by several scholars (William Scheuerman, Alison McQueen, Terry Nardin. Duncan Bell), those who contribute to realism in political theory give little attention to those who work on realism in international politics.

3. Neorealism

In spite of its ambiguities and weaknesses, Morgenthau’s Politics among Nations became a standard textbook and influenced thinking about international politics for a generation or so. At the same time, there was an attempt to develop a more methodologically rigorous approach to theorizing about international affairs. In the 1950s and 1960s a large influx of scientists from different fields entered the discipline of International Relations and attempted to replace the “wisdom literature” of classical realists with scientific concepts and reasoning (Brown 35). This in turn provoked a counterattack by Morgenthau and scholars associated with the so-called English School, especially Hedley Bull, who defended a traditional approach (Bull 1966).

As a result, the discipline of international relations has been divided into two main strands: traditional or non-positivist and scientific or positivist (neo-positivist). At a later stage the third strand: post-positivism has been added. The traditionalists raise normative questions and engage with history, philosophy and law. The scientists or positivists stress a descriptive and explanatory form of inquiry, rather than a normative one. They have established a strong presence in the field. Already by the mid-1960s, the majority of American students in international relations were trained in quantitative research, game theory, and other new research techniques of the social sciences. This, along with the changing international environment, had a significant effect on the discipline.

Notwithstanding their methodological differences, realists’ assumption is that the state is the key actor in international politics, and that competitive and conflictual relations among states are the core of actual international relations. However, with the receding of the Cold War during the 1970s, one could witness the growing importance of other actors: international and non-governmental organizations, as well as of multinational corporations. This development led to a revival of idealist thinking, which became known as neoliberalism or pluralism. While accepting some basic assumptions of realism, the leading pluralists, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, have proposed the concept of complex interdependence to describe this more sophisticated picture of global politics. They would argue that states could effectively cooperate with each other for mutual benefit and there can be progress in international relations, and that the future does not need to look like the past.

The realist retort came most prominently from Kenneth N. Waltz, who reformulated realism in international relations in a new and distinctive way. In his book Theory of International Politics , first published in 1979, he responded to the liberal challenge and attempted to cure the defects of the classical realism of Hans Morgenthau with his more scientific approach, which has become known as structural realism or neorealism. Whereas Morgenthau rooted his theory in the struggle for power, which he related to human nature, Waltz made an effort to avoid any philosophical discussion of human nature, and set out instead to build a theory of international politics using microeconomics as a model. In his works, he argues that states in the international system are like firms in a domestic economy and have the same fundamental interest: to survive. “Internationally, the environment of states’ actions, or the structure of their system, is set by the fact that some states prefer survival over other ends obtainable in the short run and act with relative efficiency to achieve that end” (93).

Waltz maintains that by paying attention to the individual state, and to ideological, moral and economic issues, both traditional liberals and classical realists make the same mistake. They fail to develop a serious account of the international system—one that can be abstracted from the wider socio-political domain. Waltz acknowledges that such an abstraction distorts reality and omits many of the factors that were important for classical realism. It does not allow for the analysis of the development of specific foreign policies. However, it also has utility. Notably, it assists in understanding the primary determinants of international politics. To be sure, Waltz’s neorealist theory cannot be applied to domestic politics. It cannot serve to develop policies of states concerning their international or domestic affairs. His theory helps only to explain why states behave in similar ways despite their different forms of government and diverse political ideologies, and why, despite their growing interdependence, the overall picture of international relations is unlikely to change.

According to Waltz, the uniform behavior of states over centuries can be explained by the constraints on their behavior that are imposed by the structure of the international system. A system’s structure is defined first by the principle by which it is organized, then by the differentiation of its units, and finally by the distribution of capabilities (power) across units. Anarchy, or the absence of central authority, is for Waltz the ordering principle of the international system. The units of the international system are states. Waltz recognizes the existence of non-state actors, but dismisses them as relatively unimportant. Since all states want to survive, and anarchy presupposes a self-help system in which each state has to take care of itself, there is no division of labor or functional differentiation among them. While functionally similar, they are nonetheless distinguished by their relative capabilities (the power each of them represents) to perform the same function.

Consequently, Waltz sees power and state behavior in a different way from the classical realists. For Morgenthau power was both a means and an end, and rational state behavior was understood as simply the course of action that would accumulate the most power. In contrast, neorealists assume that the fundamental interest of each state is security and would therefore concentrate on the distribution of power. What also sets neorealism apart from classical realism is methodological rigor and scientific self-conception (Guzinni 1998, 127–128). Waltz insists on empirical testability of knowledge and on falsificationism as a methodological ideal, which, as he himself admits, can have only a limited application in international relations.

The distribution of capabilities among states can vary; however, anarchy, the ordering principle of international relations, remains unchanged. This has a lasting effect on the behavior of states that become socialized into the logic of self-help. Trying to refute neoliberal ideas concerning the effects of interdependence, Waltz identifies two reasons why the anarchic international system limits cooperation: insecurity and unequal gains. In the context of anarchy, each state is uncertain about the intentions of others and is afraid that the possible gains resulting from cooperation may favor other states more than itself, and thus lead it to dependence on others. “States do not willingly place themselves in situations of increased dependence. In a self-help system, considerations of security subordinate economic gain to political interest.” (Waltz 1979, 107).

Because of its theoretical elegance and methodological rigor, neorealism has become very influential within the discipline of international relations. In the eyes of many scholars, Morgenthau’s realism has come to be seen as anachronistic—“an interesting and important episode in the history of thinking about the subject, no doubt, but one scarcely to be seen as a serious contribution of the rigorously scientific theory” (Williams 2007, 1). However, while initially gaining more acceptance than classical realism, neorealism has also provoked strong critiques on a number of fronts.

In 1979 Waltz wrote that in the nuclear age the international bipolar system, based on two superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union—was not only stable but likely to persist (176–7). With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent disintegration of the USSR this prediction was proven wrong. The bipolar world turned out to have been more precarious than most realist analysts had supposed. Its end opened new possibilities and challenges related to globalization. This has led many critics to argue that neorealism, like classical realism, cannot adequately account for changes in world politics.

The new debate between international (neo)realists and (neo)liberals is no longer concerned with the questions of morality and human nature, but with the extent to which state behavior is influenced by the anarchic structure of the international system rather than by institutions, learning and other factors that are conductive to cooperation. In his 1989 book International Institutions and State Power , Robert Keohane accepts Waltz’s emphasis on system-level theory and his general assumption that states are self-interested actors that rationally pursue their goals. However, by employing game theory he shows that states can widen the perception of their self-interest through economic cooperation and involvement in international institutions. Patterns of interdependence can thus affect world politics. Keohane calls for systemic theories that would be able to deal better with factors affecting state interaction, and with change.

Critical theorists, such as Robert W. Cox, also focus on the alleged inability of neorealism to deal with change. In their view, neorealists take a particular, historically determined state-based structure of international relations and assume it to be universally valid. In contrast, critical theorists believe that by analyzing the interplay of ideas, material factors, and social forces, one can understand how this structure has come about, and how it may eventually change (Cox 1986). They contend that neorealism ignores both the historical process during which identities and interests are formed, and the diverse methodological possibilities. It legitimates the existing status quo of strategic relations among states and considers the scientific method as the only way of obtaining knowledge. It represents an exclusionary practice, an interest in domination and control.

While realists are concerned with relations among states and national security, the focus for critical theorists is human security and social emancipation. They focus on social, economic and environmental security for the individual and the group. Despite their differences, critical theory, postmodernism and feminism all take issue with the notion of state sovereignty and envision new political communities that would be less exclusionary vis-à-vis marginal and disenfranchised groups. Critical theory argues against state-based exclusion and denies that the interests of a country’s citizens take precedence over those of outsiders. It insists that politicians should give as much weight to the interests of foreigners as they give to those of their compatriots and envisions political structures beyond the “fortress” nation-state. Postmodernism questions the state’s claim to be a legitimate focus of human loyalties and its right to impose social and political boundaries. It supports cultural diversity and stresses the interests of minorities. Feminism argues that the realist theory exhibits a masculine bias and advocates the inclusion of woman and alternative values into public life.

Since critical theories and other alternative theoretical perspectives question the existing status quo, make knowledge dependent on power, and emphasize identity formation and social change, they are not traditional or non-positivist. They are sometimes called “reflectivist” or “post-positivist” (Weaver 165) and represent a radical departure from the neorealist and neoliberal “rationalist” or “positivist” international relation theories. For critical security theorists, security is not an objective phenomenon. It is essentially social, socially constructed and serves a political agenda. It legitimizes and imposes a political program on society that serves the dominant group. According to the critical securitization theory, the securitizing actor, who could be a politician or the governing party, “encodes a subject or a group as an existential threat to the reference object” (Ari 147). The object could be a state or a non-state group. Such a discursive practice defines threat and danger.

Constructivists, such as Alexander Wendt, try to build a bridge between these two approaches, positivist and post-positivist, by on the one hand, taking the present state system and anarchy seriously, and on the other hand, by focusing on the formation of identities and interests. Countering neorealist ideas, Wendt argues that self-help does not follow logically or casually from the principle of anarchy. It is socially constructed. Wendt’s idea that states’ identities and interests are socially constructed has earned his position the label “constructivism”. Consequently, in his view,“self-help and power politics are institutions, and not essential features of anarchy. Anarchy is what states make of it” (Wendt 1987 395). There is no single logic of anarchy but rather several, depending on the roles with which states identify themselves and each other. Power and interests are constituted by ideas and norms. Wendt claims that neorealism cannot account for change in world politics, but his norm-based constructivism can.

A similar conclusion, although derived in a traditional way, comes from the non-positivist theorists of the English school (International Society approach) who emphasize both systemic and normative constraints on the behavior of states. Referring to the classical view of the human being as an individual that is basically social and rational, capable of cooperating and learning from past experiences, these theorists emphasize that states, like individuals, have legitimate interests that others can recognize and respect, and that they can recognize the general advantages of observing a principle of reciprocity in their mutual relations (Jackson and Sørensen 167). Therefore, states can bind themselves to other states by treaties and develop some common values with other states. Hence, the structure of the international system is not unchangeable as the neorealists claim. It is not a permanent Hobbesian anarchy, permeated by the danger of war. An anarchic international system based on pure power relations among actors can evolve into a more cooperative and peaceful international society, in which state behavior is shaped by commonly shared values and norms. A practical expression of international society are international organizations that uphold the rule of law in international relations, especially the UN.

An unintended and unfortunate consequence of the debate about neorealism is that neorealism and a large part of its critique (with the notable exception of the English School) has been expressed in abstract scientific and philosophical terms. This has made the theory of international politics almost inaccessible to a layperson and has divided the discipline of international relations into incompatible parts. Whereas classical realism was a theory aimed at supporting diplomatic practice and providing a guide to be followed by those seeking to understand and deal with potential threats, today’s theories, concerned with various grand pictures and projects, are ill-suited to perform this task. This is perhaps the main reason why there has been a renewed interest in classical realism, and particularly in the ideas of Morgenthau. Rather than being seen as an obsolete form of pre-scientific realist thought, superseded by neorealist theory, his thinking is now considered to be more complex and of greater contemporary relevance than was earlier recognized (Williams 2007, 1–9). It fits uneasily in the orthodox picture of realism he is usually associated with.

In recent years, scholars have questioned prevailing narratives about clear theoretical traditions in the discipline of international relations. Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes and other thinkers have become subject to re-examination as a means of challenging prevailing uses of their legacies in the discipline and exploring other lineages and orientations. Morgenthau has undergone a similar process of reinterpretation. A number of scholars (Hartmut Behr, Muriel Cozette, Amelia Heath, Sean Molloy) have endorsed the importance of his thought as a source of change for the standard interpretation of realism. Murielle Cozette stresses Morgenthau’s critical dimension of realism expressed in his commitment to “speak truth to power” and to “unmask power’s claims to truth and morality,” and in his tendency to assert different claims at different times (Cozette 10–12). She writes: “The protection of human life and freedom are given central importance by Morgenthau, and constitute a ‘transcendent standard of ethics’ which should always animate scientific enquiries” (19). This shows the flexibility of his classical realism and reveals his normative assumptions based on the promotion of universal moral values. While Morgenthau assumes that states are power-oriented actors, he at the same time acknowledges that international politics would be more pernicious than it actually is were it not for moral restraints and the work of international law(Behr and Heath 333).

Another avenue for the development of a realist theory of international relations is offered by Robert Gilpin’s seminal work War and Change in World Politics . If this work were to gain greater prominence in IR scholarship, instead of engaging in fruitless theoretical debates, we would be better prepared today “for rapid power shifts and geopolitical change ”(Wohlforth, 2011 505). We would be able to explain the causes of great wars and long periods of peace, and the creation and waning of international orders. Still another avenue is provided by the application of the new scientific discoveries to social sciences. The evidence for this is, for example, the recent work of Alexander Wendt, Quantum Mind and Social Science . A new realist approach to international politics could be based on the organic and holistic world view emerging from quantum theory, the idea of human evolution, and the growing awareness of the role of human beings in the evolutionary process (Korab-Karpowicz 2017).

Realism is thus more than a static, amoral theory, and cannot be accommodated solely within a positivist interpretation of international relations. It is a practical and evolving theory that depends on the actual historical and political conditions, and is ultimately judged by its ethical standards and by its relevance in making prudent political decisions (Morgenthau 1962). In place of the twentieth-century Cold War ideological rivalry, the main competition in the twenty-first-century is between the ideologies justifying the expansion of the US-dominated unipolar world and those supporting the reestablishment of a multipolar one (Müllerson 2017). Consequently, the growing tensions among superpowers have contributed to the revival of the idealist-realist debate and have caused a resurgence of interest in realism. John Mearsheimer is an important thinker in this respect, known for his pessimistic concept of offensive realism, which assumes that powerful states, such as the United States, would aim at the maximization of power and domination over others (Mearsheimer 2001). His late work, The Liberal Delusion (Mearsheimer 2019), in which he presents realist arguments against a liberal position, can already be considered a classic of the theory of international relations.

As the current revival of interest proves, realism is a theory for difficult times, when security becomes a real issue. This happens when countries face the danger of an armed conflict. In such situations, realism performs a useful cautionary role. It warns us against progressivism, moralism, legalism and other orientations that lose touch with the reality of self-interest and power. It is a necessary corrective to an overoptimistic liberal belief in international cooperation and change resulting from interdependence, as well as to a critical theory claim that our insecurity is merely a result of securitization.

Nevertheless, when it becomes a dogmatic enterprise, by focusing on conflict alone, realism fails to perform its proper function as a theory of international relations. By remaining stuck in a state-centric and excessively simplified “paradigm” such as neorealism and by denying the possibility of any progress in interstate relations, it turns into an ideology. Its emphasis on power politics and national interest can be misused to justify aggression. It has therefore to be supplanted by theories that take better account of the dramatically changing picture of global politics. To its merely negative, cautionary function, positive norms must be added. These norms extend from the rationality and prudence stressed by classical realists; through the vision of multilateralism, international law, and an international society emphasized by liberals and members of the English School; to the cosmopolitanism and global solidarity advocated by many of today’s writers.

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• Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War , trans. Rex Warner, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1972.
• –––. On Justice, Power, and Human Nature: The Essence of Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War , Paul Woodruff (ed. and trans.), Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993.
• Vasquez, John A., 1998. The Power of Power Politics: From Classical Realism to Neotraditionalism , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Waltz, Kenneth, 1979. Theory of International Politics , Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill.
• Walzer, Michael, 1977. Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations , New York: Basic Books.
• Wendt, Alexander, 1987. “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization , 46: 391–425.
• –––, 1999. Social Theory of International Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Weaver, Ole, 1996. “The Rise and the Fall of the Inter-Paradigm Debate,” in International Theory: Positivism and Beyond , Steven Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 149–185.
• Wight, Martin, 1991. International Theory: Three Traditions , Leicester: University of Leicester Press.
• Williams, Bernard, 1985. Ethics and the Limit of Philosophy , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• –––, 2005. “Realism and Moralism in Political Theory,” in In the Beginning was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argument , ed. G. Hawthorn, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1–17.
• Williams, Mary Frances, 1998. Ethics in Thucydides: The Ancient Simplicity , Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
• Williams, Michael C., 2005. The Realist Tradition and the Limit of International Relations , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• –––, 2007. Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International Relations , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Wohlforth, William C., 2008. “Realism,” The Oxford Handbook of International Relations , Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• –––, 2011. “Gilpinian Realism and International Relations,” International Relations , 25(4): 499–511.

How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

• Political Realism , entry the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy .
• Political Realism , entry in Wikipedia .
• Melian Dialogue , by Thucydides.
• The Prince , by Machiavelli.
• The Twenty Years’ Crisis (Chapter 4: The Harmony of Interests), by E.H. Carr.
• Principles of Realism , by H. Morgenthau.
• Peace and War , by Raymond Aron.
• Globalization and Governance , by Kenneth Waltz.

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State of the Field Essay: On the Unreality of Realism in International Relations 52 min read

I n 1939, E.H. Carr published The Twenty Years’ Crisis , [1] which argued that the world was divided into two camps: utopians and realists. Utopians like President Woodrow Wilson and his followers had made a mess of the world through their well-intentioned but naïve attempts at international cooperation. Realists were those, like Carr, who recognized that the struggle for power and survival were perennial features of human life and politics among nations. Carr wanted policymakers to face the facts, acknowledge reality, and not get lost in idealistic dreams. ‘Realism’ as a professionalized academic school of international relations was born.

H- Diplo | ISSF Essay 49 State of the Field Essay: On the Unreality of Realism in International Relations

Essay by paul d. miller , georgetown university, published 2 october 2019 | issforum.org, editors: robert jervis, joshua rovner , and diane labrosse production editor: george fujii, https://issforum.org/essays/49-realism, pdf version.

To understand ‘realism,’ it helps to ask what function the ideology tries to perform. What do its advocates think realism does? What problem does it purport to solve? Realism is an ideology defined in opposition to “idealism,” “ideology” (including religious ideology), “utopianism,” or, these days, “liberal hegemony.” It is principled opposition to moral aspiration in politics. But why? Realists claim that moral aspiration is dangerous because it is “unrealistic,” that is, it cuts against the grain of reality. Going against reality or trying to change other people’s beliefs or behavior is always hard, often impossible, and inevitably costly and risky. Catholic and Protestant zealotry plunged Europe into the Wars of Religion; French revolutionary utopianism plunged Europe into the Napoleonic Wars; and Wilsonian utopianism lost the peace after World War I and set the stage for its sequel. If such catastrophes are the consequence of ideological crusading, better leave off and accept the world as it is.

Realists advocate the path of least resistance: go with the grain of reality for a low-cost, low-opposition foreign policy. In popular usage, realism means being hawkish; realism in the academic sense means something closer to the opposite. Carr’s 1939 book was a defense of appeasement towards Nazi Germany. George Kennan, probably the most prominent American realist of the Cold War, was hesitant about the formation of NATO, thought the democratization of Japan a waste of time, opposed the Truman Doctrine and the recognition of Israel, and criticized most the American government’s implementation of his policy of “containment.” [2] Today’s realists, like John Mearsheimer and Steve Walt, advocate ‘restraint’ or ‘offshore balancing,’ and have called for a dramatic reduction of American involvement abroad to avoid what they see as needless conflicts and ideological crusades.

There is an oddity in realists’ policy positions. Why would they bother having any in the first place? One of the often-noted chief problems with realism is that it blurs the line between description and prescription. It usually begins by presenting itself as a neutral description of the way the world is—but then it becomes a policy agenda and tries to persuade policymakers to comport themselves with realists’ understanding of reality. But if realism is an accurate description of reality, why do policymakers need persuading? Policymakers’ behavior is, by definition, part of the reality that realism purports to explain. If policymakers are not acting in accordance with realism—as when they repeatedly embark on ideological crusades—realism is not a very good description of reality. If they are acting in accordance with realism, realism is entirely superfluous as prescription.

Given realists’ record of advocacy, they seem to recognize that the first problem is the bigger one. Realism is not a very good description of reality. In fact, it is not a description of reality at all: it is an ideology, one that cloaks itself with the rhetoric of ‘reality’ as a biased framing device designed to make itself look natural, truthful, hard-nosed, no-nonsense, and data-driven, while its opponents are supposedly the opposite. Realism uses its rhetorical trappings to try to convince us that moral aspiration is dangerous and that we should instead accept that the pursuit of national power and national security is the telos of international politics.

But realism is unable to account for the very real, and very universal, moral dimension of the human experience. Human beings have moral aspirations; only rarefied scholars in elite universities could convince themselves otherwise. The idea that human beings can or should act without reference to morality when they enter the political sphere is a strikingly unrealistic view—no small irony for an ideology that labels itself ‘realist.’ Realism can become an uncomfortably dogmatic and un-empirical ideology in its refusal to acknowledge the lived experience of human life. Hans Morgenthau’s attempt at a pared-down definition of realism in his classic 1948 text, Politics Among Nations—the pursuit of national interest defined in terms of power—solves no problems. [3] It only raises the question: what is ‘interest’ and what is ‘power’? What is the nation? The entire burden of liberalism and constructivism is to highlight how values, identity, and culture can—and should—influence human behavior, human politics, and human societies. When we simply recognize that these things are real, they immediately become more realistic than so-called realism.

Realism and History

Like all schools, realists mined the past to construct a useable history. The work of Thucydides, Niccolò Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, the culture of realpolitik in eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe, and perhaps scholarship in the parallel field of strategy all served to give the emerging school of realism a sense of roots and the authority of a tradition. Having a lineage gives one confidence that comes from inheriting the wisdom of the ages, even if that lineage is only discovered ex post facto. The narrative that realists tell about themselves—that they are the inheritors of the mantle of Thucydides—is a self-serving fiction (as all narratives are), because there is no continuous tradition of Thucydidean interpretation, and realpolitik originally meant something close to the opposite of how most people understand the term. [4]

Hobbes is a plausible figurehead for the founding of realism. We could view intellectual history since 1648 as a prolonged debate about how to organize Europe and the world in the aftermath of Christendom. On the one hand were the loosely connected ideas of realism, nationalism, and absolutism; on the other side, liberalism. Hobbes is a father of realism not just because he ascribed to mankind “a perpetual and restless desire for power after power, that ceaseth only in death.” [5] His banishment of religious ideology from the public square, his reinterpretation of sovereignty, his insistence on unrestricted national autonomy, and his emphasis on anarchy and competition as the natural state of humanity were all essential parts of this way of viewing the world. This meshed well, first, with absolutism; subsequently, with nationalism, both of which overlapped with Hobbes’s foundational ideas.

The realist-nationalist tradition in Western thought continued after Hobbes in the work of continental philosophers and jurists like Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1694), Christian von Wolff (1679-1754), and Emer de Vattel (1714-1767). Writing in the century after the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, their burden was to explain and defend a new understanding of sovereignty and a new meaning of statehood, and to describe how independent sovereign units should aspire to maintain an “equilibrium of power” amongst themselves (the phrase is Vattel’s). [6] Previously, sovereignty meant responsibility for the commonweal, for upholding abstract notions of justice and peace, starting with one’s own realm but not excluding the wider world. Crucially, this sense of responsibility came from standards external to the state (God, Scripture, Church, or Nature), standards to which the sovereign was ultimately accountable. Wars over which standard to use, Catholic or Protestant, or what the standards actually meant ultimately led thinkers to deny that there was any standard at all.

Hobbes and his successors reinterpreted sovereignty to mean the only thing it could mean in a world shorn of Christendom’s cosmology: the sanctity of borders, territorial integrity, political independence, and freedom from interference from outsiders. It also meant freedom from any standard of accountability to which sovereigns had to pay court. For them, the defense of the state elided into the security of the state, in turn evolving into the power of the state under the guise that power was necessary for security. In that way the Westphalian tradition gave birth in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to the doctrine that states should pursue power for its own sake. The state became self-legitimating, and raison d’état became a recognized principle. “In regard to those things which affect nations, natural reasons are to be derived from the purposes of the state,” Wolff had argued, “from which is to be measured the right of the whole against individuals.” [7] The “purposes of the state” are the measure of right, and are not measured by it. Prior to Westphalia, the major question of political theory was how to salvage a world of common values; afterwards, it was about how to consolidate power at home and balance power abroad.

Realism and Nationalism

This is an important history to keep in mind as we enter the contemporary debate about realism, nationalism, and classical liberalism. Realism is, as John Mearsheimer rightly argues in his recent magnum opus, The Great Delusion, a good fit with nationalism. [8] That was true historically because early modern nationalists’ keenness to secure their independence and build their nations drew them to a strong Westphalian understanding of sovereignty. It was also true for the theorists of Westphalian sovereignty because they envisioned a world of mutually distinct, fully autonomous, internally coherent national units whose competition for power and prestige was to be the defining fact about the world.

For Mearsheimer, realism means embracing nationalism because nationalism is a natural and universal aspect of human politics. “Nationalism is more in sync with human nature than liberalism” (215) because nationalism “satisfies individuals’ emotional need to be part of a large group with a rich tradition and a bright future” (2056) while liberalism, with its emphasis on individualism, leaves us wanting something more. National identity and national loyalty are, for Mearsheimer, of defining, overriding importance in human life and human history, more so than allegiance to ideals of human rights, limited government, or reciprocal tolerance. The nation “fundamentally shapes [people’s] identities and behavior,” he argues, going so far as to claim that nations “help shape their essences and command their loyalties” (1598). These are bold claims about human nature, psychology, and political fundamentals. “Allegiance to the nation usually overrides all other forms of an individual’s identity,” (1614) which is why “nationalism is much like a religion” (1832).

That nations exist and command primary allegiance over human lives is important for Mearsheimer’s overall argument. His brand of realism depends on nationalism being more powerful than liberalism. He is a realist because he argues that we cannot and will never arrive at a common understanding of the good life across cultural and national lines; we therefore band together in tribes or nations that serve as survival vehicles; and these national units compete with one another for power, wealth, and survival in an anarchic world. He thinks that a politics of moral aspiration necessarily involves trying to impose a vision of the good life on one another, and he wants us to abandon such efforts. This is essentially Hobbes’s argument against the belligerents of the English Civil War and Pufendorf’s against the combatants in the Thirty Years’ War.

Despite the importance of the concept of the ‘nation,’ Mearsheimer spends strikingly little time interrogating it. Nations are characterized by six features: “a powerful sense of oneness, a distinct culture, a marked sense of specialness, a historical narrative that emphasizes timelessness, a deep attachment to territory, and a strong commitment to sovereignty or self-determination” (1814). That, for Mearsheimer, is sufficient for his purposes. Mearsheimer neither defends nor provides empirical evidence for his assertion that that there exist mutually distinct and internally coherent nations. “The human population is divided into many different nations composed of people with a strong sense of group loyalty,” (1613) he says, and now that nations have acquired states, “The world is now entirely populated with sovereign nation-states” (2800).

That is an extraordinary claim because of how much evidence there is against it. Excluding micro-sovereignties, there are almost no nation-states in the world today. This is a clear example of how realism has little connection to reality. Early modern efforts to create nations with a homogenous culture, language, or ethnicity were legendarily brutal, and almost all were unsuccessful. Virtually every state in the international system today is a pluralistic, multiethnic, multilingual polity in which questions of who or what defines the polity are live debates. Perhaps only Japan and a few European countries have the strong sense of oneness and a cultural consensus that Mearsheimer says defines nations (and Europe is in the midst of a fractious debate about immigration and national identity).

Most developed Western states today are more akin to the multiethnic empires of the past than the culturally homogenous units of the nineteenth century’s aspirations. The postcolonial states of Africa and Asia are even less “national.” Indonesia and India have scores and hundreds of constituent ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups. Nationalism—the correspondence between nations and states—has always been more aspiration than reality, in part because of the ambiguity surrounding what exactly a “nation” is. Realism is, in one perspective, the effort to decide the matter by fiat, announcing that “national” identity will take priority over more particular identities, and that the state’s efforts to bolster that identity are presumptively legitimate. But no one seems to be able to give a clear and consistent answer to the question of what national identity really is, which is a far greater problem for realism than is widely recognized.

Mearsheimer relies on a view of national origins that is consistent with the story nations tell themselves and their citizens. Nations weave myths about their naturalness, antiquity, and rootedness in smaller forms of affiliation. In this myth, the family, tribe, and nation are simply different versions of each other at different scales. We owe to our fellow nationals the same familial devotion, attachment, and loyalty we owe to our siblings and parents. (Yoram Hazony recently made the same argument at greater length in The Virtue of Nationalism.) [9] Of course, this story is untrue. A nation is not simply a large tribe; it is the conquest by one tribe over many other tribes and their assimilation—usually coerced—into a larger unit. Nationalism is internal imperialism, typically the rule by a majority group over minority groups under the ruling group’s language, culture, or religion. As a nation’s definition gains specificity—as it settles on a particular language, culture, or religion—it necessarily excludes those who do not share the nation’s identity. In fact, nationalism is not the opposite of a politics of moral aspiration; it is another version of the same, substituting Nation for God, Scripture, Church, or Nature.

That is why everywhere nationalism has actually been tried, it has rarely resulted in states that are at peace with themselves and their neighbors. Nationalism is virtually always contested: once citizens come to believe that their state should embody something called a “nation,” people immediately begin to fight over what that nation is and who counts as a member. Historically, nationalism has an unsettling tendency to attract racist, xenophobic, and sectarian fellow-travelers. The age of nationalism is the age of civil wars, insurgencies, terrorism, and “national” liberation movements, to say nothing of inter-national competition and war. “Nations” are not very realistic, and efforts to act like they are tend to be destructive and harmful.

Mearsheimer acknowledges some—but only some—of this reality. He acknowledges that nationalism oftentimes comes with chauvinism, but implies that this can be addressed through some form of federalism or power-sharing. In his telling, some “nations” are actually composites of majority and minority constituent nations. They have to fabricate a sense of shared unity at a higher level to allow themselves to coexist and develop a thicker sense of peoplehood at lower levels. He describes more homogenous nations as those with a “thick” national culture, while pluralistic polities that are better understood as confederations of nations come together and create a “thin” national culture. Somewhat bafflingly, he puts the United States in the category of states with a “thick” national culture that “largely comprises one nation,” despite the United States’ long history as a melting pot of the world (2045).

Mearsheimer is right that a thin national culture may be the right path to keep the peace domestically. But the problem remains: even thin national identities exclude those who do not share them. Mearsheimer recommends the solution used by absolutists, autocrats, and nation-builders throughout history: “The key to success is to eliminate heterogeneity,” (1962) such as by enforcing a single national language. There are, of course, even less savory ways of eliminating heterogeneity. The problem with nationalism is that plenty of people do not want to be part of whatever culture the state tries to enforce as the national model. If nationalism is much like a religion, it does not often admit room for heresy. Eliminating heterogeneity may be pragmatic, but it is not liberal.

Realism is, at root, the ideology of state power. The defense, maintenance, and increase of state power is a self-justifying principle, the standard of legitimacy against which other policies are judged. Nationalism goes well with this agenda because it involves the state using its power to create a more homogenous, governable nation, one that can be taxed, conscripted, and pacified at lower cost. But to the extent that realism is entwined with nationalism, it is taking its cue from a distorted version of reality at the expense of the empirical data. Nations do not have a natural existence, meaningful human lives does not depend on there being mutually distinct and internally coherent nations, and the effort to create such nations is usually exclusionary and violent in practice. In fact, the effort to create nations goes against the grain of reality, an effort to impose an artificial construct on human society—the criticism realists usually lodge against their opponents.

Classical Liberalism

Hobbes and his followers were not wrong that Christendom had fractured and that the world needed new principles of sovereignty, legitimacy, and world order. But theirs were not the only ideas in currency. The alternative to realism and nationalism is, and has always been, classical liberalism. Liberalism was just as fast off the blocks as realism in the race to define the coming world order after Westphalia, most famously articulated by John Locke (1632-1704), but also the Baron Charles-Louise de Montesquieu (1689-1755), and Adam Smith (1723-1790), among others. For that matter, some religious thinkers started advocating early liberal ideas even before Locke in recognition of the flawed political theology of their predecessors, thinkers like John Smyth (1570-1612), John Milton (1608-1674), and Roger Williams (1629-1676).

Liberalism argues that the fundamental unit of politics is the individual, not the nation; that sovereignty derives from those individuals and is accountable to them; that sovereignty is therefore not a plenary grant of power to do with whatever the sovereign pleased; that the state’s jurisdiction is limited in an important sense by the fundamental rights of its citizens; and that states can escape endless competition and anarchy through cooperation, especially with like-minded states. Liberalism holds out the promise of a different basis of politics both domestically and internationally. It is unapologetically an aspirational ideology, hoping to ameliorate the human condition, liberate human beings, and enable human flourishing through applied reason. In that sense, it is inimical to realism. It is also at odds with nationalism and tribalism because it stresses the individual over the group and minority rights over social cohesion. For realism to be persuasive, it has to offer a better explanation of the world than liberalism.

Thinkers have spent centuries trying to reconcile versions of realism, liberalism, and nationalism with each other. The intellectual and political currents weaved and sometimes overlapped, especially when nationalists looked to liberalism to structure their national political life. But the broad trend is of realists, absolutists, nationalists, and other reactionary forces defining themselves in opposition to liberalism. That was as true of Carr, defining himself in opposition to the Wilsonian project after the Great War as it was of Otto von Bismarck and other practitioners of machtpolitik in the nineteenth century. For that matter, it was true of the Holy Alliance as it sought to contain liberalism after Napoléon.

It is also true of today’s realists. Mearsheimer’s arguments are predictably hostile to liberalism. This hostility to liberalism is odd because, on the surface, it seems to match much more neatly with his insistence that human beings cannot and will never agree on ultimate truths. Mearsheimer rightly says that, “A liberal state seeks to stay out of the business of telling people what kind of behavior is morally correct or incorrect” (985). Interestingly, that distinguishes the liberal state from the nationalist state. The nationalist state tells people that national identity is an essential part of the good life and national loyalty is morally correct behavior (a point Mearsheimer does not address). If liberal neutrality is viable, we do not have to put up with the illiberality of nationalism.

Mearsheimer must therefore argue that such neutrality is not possible. He suggests that liberal neutrality is a façade—which amounts to saying that liberalism is impossible at root. “The rules that govern social groups reflect a particular vision of the good life and invariably favor some individuals’ or factions’ interests over others,” (783) he says, “The state is unable to be neutral” (1018). It cannot be neutral because disputes over the good are intractable; “There is no such thing as a neutral state that merely acts as an umpire among rival factions” (2244). Liberalism is an exercise in hypocrisy: “When liberals talk about inalienable rights, they are effectively defining the good life,” despite their protestations of neutrality (2115). This is all the more true when liberalism goes abroad. When the liberal hegemon tries to foster liberalism in illiberal societies, Mearsheimer claims, it discovers that many people do not like liberalism. “Many people around the world do not privilege individual rights,” (2327) he says, “There is little evidence that most people think individual rights are inalienable or that they matter greatly in daily political life” (2617).

Mearsheimer asserts this as fact without citing evidence. In fact, a 2017 poll by the Pew Research Center across 38 states across the world found 78 percent of respondents supported representative democracy, which is tightly correlated with individual rights. [10] The poll included respondents in non-Western states like the Philippines, Turkey, and Kenya, and autocratic states like Russia. Another worldwide Pew poll in 2015 found 65 percent support for women’s rights, 74 percent support for religious freedom, and 56 percent support for the freedom of speech. Even the notoriously illiberal Middle East registered 73 percent support for religious freedom and 43 percent support for free speech. [11]

One might question the depth of commitment behind those numbers and emphasize that people are unlikely to prioritize rights when survival is threatened. But then again, women across the world registered much higher support for women’s rights than did men, probably because to them, rights are survival—and that points to a key flaw in Mearsheimer’s dismissal of the universal appeal of liberalism. This is the same argument that powerful men in autocratic states make about why their country is never quite ready for liberal rights. Sunni Pashtun men were the most hostile to the arrival of democracy in Afghanistan—but democracy proved wildly popular among women, Shia, Tajiks, Hazara, and others. Mearsheimer spends no time discussing the empirical evidence about the appeal of liberalism around the world, particularly to the disenfranchised and powerless. Like Mearsheimer’s comments about nations and nationalism, his arguments about liberalism are strikingly detached from any empirical analysis. (I have written elsewhere about the surprising strength and resilience of non-western liberalism.) [12]

It is, in fact, an odd time to doubt the global appeal of liberalism and democracy because the post-Cold War era is the high point of human freedom in recorded human history. Mearsheimer claims that “true Liberal democracies have never made up a majority of states in the international system,” (1608). The word “true” does a lot of work in that sentence. Freedom House estimates that 45 percent of states in the world are “free” today and another 30 percent are “partly free”—and that is after a decade of democratic decline. By another measure, Freedom House counts a majority—114 of the world’s 195 states—to be electoral democracies. [13] There is nothing uniquely Western about not wanting to be oppressed. Liberalism is far stronger and more broadly popular than Mearsheimer grants.

The legacy of realism is to set itself in opposition to one of the greatest achievements of human political institutions in history. The question of whether liberal neutrality really is possible is a complex and difficult question for political theorists. For our purposes, we can simply note that if Mearsheimer is right that liberal neutrality is impossible and that liberalism is actually smuggling in a vision of the good life, then we seem to have come extraordinarily close to global consensus on a vision of the good life, or at least one aspect of it, disproving one of the key philosophical presuppositions behind Mearsheimer’s realism. If, alternatively, liberal neutrality is possible, it makes his realism unnecessary because we can then conclude liberalism truly is universalizeable across cultures and nations and might hold out the promise of fostering international peace among liberal democracies.

The Democratic Peace Theory

That, of course, is anathema to the foreign policy that realists prefer. The idea that liberalism might lead to world peace is a cornerstone of liberalism, one of its strongest selling points to scholars and practitioners, and a potential death-blow to realism. The idea of a liberal or democratic peace is almost as old as liberalism itself, having first been outlined by Immanuel Kant in Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch (1795). Kant argued with remarkable prescience that a confederation of republican governments could be the anchor of world peace. Two centuries later, Jack Levy famously would observe that “the absence of war between democracies comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations.” [14] Despite the initial failure of the Wilsonian project, subsequent decades have gradually vindicated much of it through the spread of democracy and international cooperation. If it is true that liberal democracies do not fight each other, then a foreign policy that champions and encourages democracy abroad holds out the promise of spreading peace, stability, and prosperity—and to do so on grounds antithetical to realism. If the democratic peace theory is true, realism is not only false, it is basically immoral for leading humanity away from its best hope for peace.

Given the challenge that the democratic peace theory presents to realism, it is striking how rarely realists engage with it. In research for my last book, I found almost no effort to rebut it in the major recent works advocating for restraint or retrenchment. Mearsheimer commendably tries to fill the gap. He argues that for the democratic peace theory to be relevant, it has to trump concerns about survival. Clearly it does not; states and people care more about survival than about freedom, Mearsheimer claims, and so the theory is of limited applicability. Mearsheimer seemingly argues that this scope condition is a weakness of the democratic peace theory: “These conditions do not always exist. The world has never been populated with democracies alone, which significantly restricts the scope of democratic peace theory” (3579). Democracies will always have to live by realist logic, like the balance of power, when dealing with non-democratic powers. He later notes that democracies can backslide, making the democratic peace not apply to them anymore.

Mearsheimer’s argument is a non-sequitur; he is refuting an argument no one makes. Advocates of the democratic peace theory do not argue that democracy is or will be global, or that it must become global for the democratic peace theory to be relevant. We do not claim that democracy is more important than survival or that it exempts democracies from acting according to realist logic in relation to non-democratic powers. (In my book I specifically argue that the two logics operate in tandem). We claim that the question of survival does not arise in the first place between two liberal democracies, and thus does not have to be trumped. And I was taught in graduate school that specifying your theory’s scope conditions strengthens your case; it does not weaken it. By contrast, Mearsheimer claims “Realism is a timeless theory,” (2551) which is simply false, arising as it did in the unique conditions of post-Westphalian Europe to explain the era’s new interpretation of sovereignty. In any case, if it were timeless, realists would be unable to explain variance across history.

Mearsheimer is not engaging with a fair version of his critics’ arguments. This is particularly on display with his treatment of Francis Fukuyama, whose arguments he repeatedly mischaracterizes. Fukuyama’s “End of History” essay is essentially a restatement of the democratic peace theory, resting as it does on the potent idea that liberal democracy and capitalism are superior to their alternatives and that their spread will also spread peace, liberty, and human flourishing. But in his critique of liberalism, Mearsheimer returns several times to Fukuyama and uses a caricatured version of it as a foil for himself. “According to Fukuyama, [democratic] nations would have virtually no meaningful disputes, and wars between great powers would cease,” Mearsheimer argues (165). In his reading, Fukuyama believed “liberal democracy would steadily sweep across the globe, spreading peace everywhere” (3635).

What Fukuyama actually wrote was very different from what Mearsheimer recounts. Fukuyama wrote in his original essay that the ‘end of history’ does not mean “there will no longer be events to fill the pages of Foreign Affairs’ yearly summaries of international relations.” Fukuyama did not suggest that every state would immediately convert to liberal democracy. “At the end of history, it is not necessary that all societies become successful liberal societies, merely that they end their ideological pretensions of representing different and higher forms of human society.” Nor does the End of History mean the end of war: “This does not by any means imply the end of international conflict per se… terrorism and wars of national liberation will continue to be an important item on the international agenda.” Conflict would continue and many states would remain within “History” for the foreseeable future. “Russia and China are not likely to join the developed nations of the West as liberal societies any time in the foreseeable future,” he wrote. [15]

More positively, in contrast to his discussion of nationalism and liberalism, Mearsheimer’s treatment of the democratic peace theory does engage with some of the empirical data. Mearsheimer argues there are four clear-cut cases of democracies fighting against each other: Germany against the Allies in World War I; the Boer War (1899-1902); the Spanish-American War of 1898; and the Kargil War between India and Pakistan in 1999. Along the same lines, he also claims that the United States “has a rich history of toppling democratically elected governments,” further disproving the democratic peace theory. He cites Guatemala in 1954, Iran in 1953, Brazil in 1964, and Chile in 1973 as examples. None of these cases hold up.

Mearsheimer gives prominent place to his claim that Wilhelmine Germany was a liberal democracy, and thus that World War I falsifies the democratic peace theory. (Christopher Layne makes the same argument in Peace of Illusions). [16] The claim is false. The Polity IV project gives Germany in 1914 a score of 2 on its scale of -10 (full autocracy) to 10 (full democracy). Like many hybrid, transitional, or incomplete democracies, Wilhelmine Germany blended traits of democracy and autocracy. It held elections and had a parliament; it also censored the press and established a military dictatorship over foreign and defense policy with no democratic checks on war-making powers. This is not the kind of regime that scholars of the democratic peace have in mind.

The Boer War and Spanish-American War and coups in Guatemala, Iran, and Brazil fail by the same measures. One or the other party in the war or coup simply were not full democracies. As importantly, Mearsheimer does not engage with more recent historiography on these cases; he is recycling old talking points by critics of U.S. foreign policy. [17] Suffice to say, the coups are more complicated than Mearsheimer’s single sentence makes them out to be. (Chile, in particular, was emphatically not a U.S.-sponsored coup, despite what your college professor told you). If these cases are to be used to disprove the democratic peace theory, more is needed.

Mearsheimer’s discussion of the democratic peace theory has more problems. “Perhaps the most damning evidence against the case for liberal democratic norms is found in Christopher Layne’s careful examination of four cases where a pair of liberal democracies marched to the brink of war, but one side pulled back and ended the crisis,” (3772) he writes. No, in fact these cases are not evidence against the democratic peace theory; if anything, they could be seen as evidence for it because the democracies in question did not go to war. Whatever the causal mechanism at work, the cases simply do not comment on the democratic peace theory because they do not include examples of democracies going to war against each other.

The Kargil War is perhaps the single case of a militarized crisis between two democracies (Pervez Musharraf overthrew the Pakistani democracy months later), though one that was so small and brief, and killed so few people, that the Uppsala Data Conflict Program (UDCP) codes it as falling below the conventional threshold of 1,000 battle deaths that political scientists use to define “war” (UDCP estimates 886 battle deaths). [18] That is a technicality, however, and the case does raise a potential problem for the democratic peace theory. But not a large one. As I often tell my students, the fact that scholars have spent so much time debating the marginal cases proves that the democratic peace theory is true the rest of the time—which is to say, it is true for the other 99.9 percent of cases. It is true enough for policymaking: scholars can reliably trust that democracies virtually never go to war against each other. And if it is true, realism is not just a faulty guide; it is a treacherous one, leading us in exactly the opposite direction we should go.

Liberal Hegemony: Realism’s Straw Man

Today the debate between realism and liberalism is most vividly on display in the debate over U.S. grand strategy. The central complaint of realists like Mearsheimer—and Steve Walt, whose The Hell of Good Intentions is another recent attempt to vindicate realism [19] —is that the United States has pursued a grand strategy of liberal hegemony, which is costly, self-defeating, and doomed to fail. Like past realists complaining of religious violence, revolutionary utopianism, or Wilsonian naïveté, Walt and Mearsheimer take issue with the moral aspiration to foster a more liberal international order. Their views are an excellent test case of realism today. They offer a perfect illustration of how realism is historically myopic, morally stunted, and strategically incoherent.

Mearsheimer claims that liberal hegemony aims “to turn as many countries as possible into liberal democracies while also fostering an open international economy and building formidable international institutions” (40). Mearsheimer characterizes liberal hegemony in bold language: “In essence, the United States has sought to remake the world in its own image” (41). Liberal states “have a crusader mentality hardwired into them that is hard to restrain” (121). The United States “is likely to end up fighting endless wars” (130). Again, he argues that “the costs of liberal hegemony begin with the endless wars a liberal state ends up fighting to protect human rights and spread liberal democracy around the world. Once unleashed on the world stage, a liberal unipole soon becomes addicted to war” (2861). He warns that if the United States continues to pursue this strategy, it “is likely to end up in a perpetual state of war” (2935) because liberal hegemony “calls for doing social engineering all across the globe” (3489).

Walt, similarly, is unsparing in his critique. Like Mearsheimer, he accuses the United States of pursuing liberal hegemony since the end of the Cold War. “The United States spent the past quarter century pursuing an ambitious, unrealistic, and mostly unsuccessful foreign policy,” (49) he argues. Advocates of liberal hegemony are guilty of “viewing the United States as the ‘indispensable nation’ responsible for policing the globe, spreading democracy, and upholding a rules-based, liberal world order” (122). He agrees with Mearsheimer that “Washington sought to remake other countries in its own image” (391).

Before we examine Walt’s and Mearsheimer’s critique of liberal hegemony, we should ask if this is an accurate description of U.S. foreign policy. Realists claim to be the empiricists in the room: how well have Walt and Mearsheimer taken stock of the empirical reality of U.S. foreign policy? As I wrote in my book, a liberal hegemon worth the name that was trying to enforce liberalism and entrench American hegemony would have acted differently than the United States has since 1989. [20] Walt claims the United States should have “retrench[ed] slightly” after the Cold War but “the foreign policy establishment never considered this possibility for more than a moment” (372).

Walt is reiterating a piece of conventional wisdom that is false. The notion that the United States expanded its overseas commitments after the Cold War is one of those frustrating notions that most people seem to believe because they have never paused to examine it. In fact, the United States retrenched considerably after the Cold War: it cut its military and intelligence budgets by a third, reduced the size of its standing military forces by the same amount, severely cut foreign aid, public diplomacy, and the diplomatic corps, demobilized and destroyed its own chemical weapons stockpile, decommissioned three-quarters of its nuclear warheads, and withdrew half of its troops from East Asia and over three-quarters of its troops from Europe. These are not the choices of a state hell-bent on hegemony.

We see the same restraint in American foreign policy choices. Realists emphasize the handful of American interventions in the 1990s and after the terrorist attacks of 2001, but rarely consider everything the United States did not do. The United States did not insist on the democratization of Kuwait after its liberation from Iraq in 1991. When it did intervene in Afghanistan, after 2001, it did so in response to a direct attack and made only desultory and unimpressive efforts to liberalize and rebuild the country. The United States did not go to war against North Korea or Iran to enforce the nonproliferation regime.

Nor did the United States prioritize liberalism. It did not halt Hugo Chávez’s rise to power in Venezuela or Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s in Turkey; did not halt or reverse coups against democratically elected governments in Turkey, Mali, Pakistan, Thailand, or Egypt; did not find opportunities to use the Arab Spring to advance liberalism in the Middle East; and did not invest in the reconstruction of Libya after overthrowing its government. The United States did not join a host of beloved liberal institutions and treaties, such as the International Criminal Court, the Kyoto Protocol, the Law of the Sea Treaty, or the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and in fact pulled out of several others. Perhaps most damningly, it made only a paltry and ineffective effort to push for the democratization of Russia after the fall of the Soviet Union and did nothing to stop Vladimir Putin’s reestablishment of autocracy there.

Whether you think these are good policies or bad policies, the fact remains that they do not add up to the strategy of a crusading liberal hegemon. The United States demonstrably has not tried to do “social engineering all across the globe,” is not “addicted to war” and has no “crusader mentality.” Mearsheimer’s and Walt’s books exemplify the way in which so much of the foreign policy commentary in the past decade has fallen prey to recency bias over Iraq: because the United States’ most recent large foreign policy initiative went poorly, commentators read that failure backwards and forwards in history and find Iraq-like problems everywhere they look. Walt blames the strategy of liberal hegemony for the “costly quagmires in Afghanistan, Iraq, and several other countries,” (272) as if the United States invaded those countries with the express and sole purpose of forcibly democratizing them. Of course, that isn’t the case: the United States got into those wars out of concern for terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Regardless of one’s views of those wars, it hardly seems fair to blame them on a purported strategy of liberal hegemony.

Walt complains that U.S. leaders did not pursue hegemony “in order to protect the American homeland from invasion or attack. Rather, they sought it in order to promote a liberal order abroad,” (1136) later criticizing military deployments to “faraway places” (1143) such as Afghanistan, Bosnia, Iraq, Kosovo, and others. Afghanistan was, of course, in direct response to an attack on America. Bosnia and Kosovo were related to European allies’ security. Iraq was (mistakenly) thought to be a threat to U.S. security because of weapons of mass destruction. But more importantly, the dichotomy between American security and liberal order is a false one. The heart of the case for a more engaged, internationalist grand strategy is that liberal order is the outer perimeter of American security, an argument Walt and Mearsheimer do not engage with.

Walt supports his claim about America’s expansionism by highlighting that the United States’ treaty commitments have grown. It is true that NATO has increased its membership, but the larger number of states in NATO did not increase the United States’ defense commitments; it simply moved the boundary line of the United States’ singular commitment to European security. Worse, Walt lists the 1947 Rio Treaty as another example of America’s overstretched defense commitments. The Rio Treaty, ostensibly a mutual defense treaty across the Western Hemisphere, is dead, having never made a single claim on U.S. resources or attention in 70 years. Several states have formally left the treaty in recent years, and no one treats it as a serious entity, much less a drain on U.S. defense.

Indeed, it is not even clear if Walt actually believes in his own boogeyman. He acknowledges the many ways in which the United States did not pursue liberal hegemony—but then ties his arguments in knots characterizing those policies as exceptions or aberrations to the broad pattern of liberal hegemony. Everything bad about U.S. foreign policy is because of liberal hegemony, and everything that is good is because the U.S. did not pursue liberal hegemony but actually exercised wise restraint instead. He treats the Cold War similarly: by and large, it was an example of wise offshore balancing—except Vietnam, which was liberal hegemony. Occam’s razor is useful here: a simpler way of reading the data is that the United States never actually pursued the elusive strategy of liberal hegemony in the first place.

Mearsheimer and Walt overstate the extent of American interventionism and bellicosity—sometimes dramatically—and consider none of the ways in which the United States has retrenched or held back from the many opportunities it had to further advance liberal ideals or American power over the past three decades. “Liberal hegemony” is a straw man concocted by Mearsheimer and Walt with which to pillory U.S. policymakers. It is a rhetorical exaggeration, a caricature of their opponents’ arguments in terms they would not recognize, designed to make their opponents’ arguments look extreme and theirs moderate by comparison. If this is “realism,” it is detached from empirical reality and offers little insight into the real successes and failures of American grand strategy in recent decades.

American Foreign Policy

Despite the problems with realism as a theory, Walt and Mearsheimer both use it as their main interpretive lens in long editorial commentaries on the Clinton, Bush, and Obama foreign policy records in which they make plain their disdain for American policy. In this, they are solidly in the tradition of Carr and his commentary on British policy in the 1930s. Mearsheimer asserts that the United States “helped start” the war in Syria (3144) and “played a central role in escalating the conflict” (3126); argues that “Washington has played a key role in sowing death and destruction across the Greater Middle East” (183); repeats his infamous claim that “American policymakers also played the key role in producing a major crisis with Russia over Ukraine” (2882); says the Bush administration created a “virtual gulag” at Guantanamo Bay (3447); blames the United States for interventions in Egypt, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria; and says the United States has waged seven wars since the Cold War (it is unclear what or how he is counting).

The only consistent thread in this list of accusations is that America is always to blame. The United States invaded Iraq in main force but refrained from doing the same in Syria, yet Mearsheimer counts them both as blameworthy “interventions” that prove America is on a crusade for liberal hegemony. The United States undertook nation building in Afghanistan and notoriously failed to do so in Libya, yet both are counted against America’s record. Bashar al-Assad gets no credit for the war in Syria nor Vladimir Putin for the one in Ukraine. In his eagerness to prove that America is addicted to war, Mearsheimer is apparently counting peacekeeping missions and airstrikes alike as “war.” It is hard to avoid the conclusion that this version of ‘realism’ is less scholarly analysis than dogmatic anti-Americanism.

Walt offers a similar list of American sins, with a similar double standard. The war in Ukraine? America’s fault for expanding NATO. ISIS? America’s fault because of the Iraq war. The election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Iran’s hostility to the United States? America’s fault for pressuring Iran. Walt overemphasizes the United States’ agency to the exclusion of other world actors such that even their direct actions and choices, like the Russian invasion of Ukraine, are always explained as rational responses or reactions to American mistakes. He rarely considers the alternative: that the United States choices are rational responses to other actors’ threats.

Mearsheimer’s engagement with the Ukraine crisis is illustrative. He argues that “Western elites were surprised by events in Ukraine because most of them have a flawed understanding of international politics” (3316). I was not surprised, having accurately predicted Russia’s invasion of Ukraine two years before it happened. [21] More importantly, he blames the United States for antagonizing Russia by expanding NATO. “Ukraine serves as an enormously important strategic buffer to Russia,” he explains (3303). In Mearsheimer’s telling, Russia was justifiably upset by Ukraine’s tilt westward and NATO’s 2008 promise of eventual membership. In response to American policymakers’ insistence that Russia’s security perceptions are invalid, Mearsheimer replies that “It is the Russians, not the West, who ultimately get to decide what counts as a threat to them” (3315).

So do the Ukrainians, of course, who figure nowhere in Mearsheimer’s analysis. Ukraine, understandably upset by Russia’s history of aggression, was just as entitled to seek security however and wherever it could, including from the West. For that matter, the United States is also entitled to its own security perceptions. Why can’t it decide that a Europe “whole and free” is essential to the peace and prosperity of its biggest trading partners? Mearsheimer’s analysis of the Ukraine crisis involves a double-standard. When Russia demands a sphere of influence in Europe as part of its security, Mearsheimer accepts its demand at face value. When the United States does the same, Mearsheimer argues that American policymaker’s claims are not only mistaken, but illegitimate. Mearsheimer carries water for the Russians but speaks truth to power to the Americans. And when Ukrainians define their security as not being under Russian dominance, Mearsheimer pays them no attention whatsoever. Given Mearsheimer’s endorsement of nationalism, it makes one wonder why Ukrainian nationalism does not figure in his arguments anywhere.

In truth, there is no moral equivalence between Russia’s expansionist view of its security requirements and the nesting of American, European, and Ukrainian security in liberal order. Superficially, both states define their security in extraterritorial terms, but Russia’s depends on the unilateral dominance of other states, while the liberal order helps secure the independent aspirations of those uninterested in belonging to Russia’s sphere of influence. Mearsheimer does not accept this and instead places the blame for the world’s conflicts solely at America’s feet. This sort of analysis of contemporary events leaves one with little confidence that realism can see clearly or offer meaningful insight into world affairs.

Walt goes further. He takes his criticism of U.S. foreign policy to the individual level, spending the bulk of his book on pointed criticisms of the American foreign policy elite. Walt does the work of an anthropologist or ethnographer, describing the ecosystem and the epistemic community of scholars, policymakers, think tankers, journalists, and others who make up America’s foreign policy establishment. His description is apt and the chapter could serve as a useful career map for aspiring foreign policy professionals (probably not what Walt intended). He damns the community for a culture of lax accountability, which is true, and he is dead on about the “activist bias” of the U.S (2118) foreign policy establishment, the inveterate need to “do something” in response to the headline of the day.

But he goes further. “Today’s foreign policy elite is a dysfunctional caste of privileged insiders who are frequently disdainful of alternative perspectives and insulated both professionally and personally from the consequences of the policies they promote” (1684). This, I think goes too far. In the most questionable accusation of the book, he argues that foreign policy elites support the strategy of liberal hegemony because it is a “full-employment policy” for themselves (285). The establishment “understood that [liberal hegemony] was very good for them. Open-ended efforts to remake the world in America’s image gave the foreign policy establishment plenty to do, appealed to its members self-regard, and maximized their status and political power” (281).

To be clear, Walt offers no evidence for this claim. Instead, he simply highlights the alignment of interest. He pays perfunctory lip service to foreign policy professionals’ patriotism and sincerity, but doubles down on the claim that liberal hegemony is attractive to the foreign policy elite because of the prestige, power, and employment opportunities it provides. (His argument is out of date: the job market has already moved in his direction more than he recognizes.) Certainly, this might be an unconscious motive for some in the “Blob,” but if it were systematically true of a preponderant portion of foreign policy professionals in America, we would expect to see evidence in private memoirs, letters, or emails; or in public sources, such as job postings, job training programs, university advertisements, think tank reports, and more. Walt provides none, in the absence of which his accusation is scurrilous and cannot be taken seriously.

Academic realists today advocate a strategy of restraint, offshore balancing, or retrenchment that pays much less attention to liberal ideals and the liberal international order that the United States has painstakingly constructed over the past 75 years. Their views ignore the reality of liberalism and depend on unrealistic assumptions about how the world works. In the alternative reality Walt sketches, for example, the U.S. exercised restraint after the Cold War, and in subsequent years, avoided every bad thing that has actually happened in the past quarter-century. Just one example: Walt argues that his strategy would have prevented terrorism from becoming a serious problem because restraint would have prevented the United States from getting involved with democracy promotion and military occupations abroad, thus avoiding the nationalist backlash that he thinks fuels terrorism. This makes sense only if he is talking about terrorism within Iraq and Afghanistan aimed mostly at other Iraqis and Afghans. The international terrorist attacks of the past three decades—for example, by Egyptians, Saudis, Pakistanis, Jordanians, Kashmiris, and Chechens—were not motivated by anger at democracy in their home countries, because there is none.

What is remarkable is that, despite decades of scholarship and centuries of change in global politics, today’s realists have revised or changed almost none of their views. Nationalism’s historical baggage and troubling fellow-travelers have not given realists pause. The straitjacket of Westphalian sovereignty, the paralysis it forces on the citizens and governments of the world in the face of genocide and ethnic cleansing, is greeted by silence from academic realism. Even more, the rise of China, the return of multipolarity, and the emergence of cyberspace and artificial intelligence have not any updated ore revised conclusions in either Mearsheimer’s or Walt’s books. After the Cold War the United States cut its military and diplomatic budget and personnel and withdrew most of the troops it had stationed overseas (only slightly and temporarily slowed by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan)—yet realists continue to call for more retrenchment. It is unclear just how far the United States should retrench to meet the demands of realists.

It is also surprising that realists have never offered a serious response to the longest-standing criticism against them: that amorality is unrealistic, that it is an inaccurate description of human beings, that it cannot serve as a sustainable basis of foreign policy, and that calls for amorality are, functionally, immoral. Mearsheimer, in fact, doubles down on this aspect of realism by developing a defense of moral equivalence—or, more accurately, moral relativism. “There are no universal truths regarding what constitutes the good life,” (216) he writes. Humans have divergent views of the good; we have never reached consensus; and so Mearsheimer concludes we should admit there is no such thing as an objective or universal good. That is why Mearsheimer’s arguments idealize a world of nation-states grouped around distinct cultures and competing visions of the good vying for power and wealth, without too much concern for which state has the better side of the moral argument. The various ideological explanations and justifications that states give for their policies are so much rhetorical window-dressing, epiphenomenal to the true underlying driving forces.

This leads Mearsheimer into an odd contradiction. “The fact that many people believe universal truth exists and that they have found it only makes the situation worse, as thinking in terms of absolutes makes it hard to promote compromise and tolerance” (853). Mearsheimer is here echoing a cliché that believing things to be true is tantamount to being a fanatic, a zealot, a theocrat, or a fascist—which is obviously false. But there is another difficulty. Mearsheimer very clearly holds up tolerance and compromise as goods. But within the framework he has advanced, he gives us no reason to prefer tolerance and compromise over their opposites. Why should we value tolerance and compromise as components of the good life if “There are no universal truths regarding what constitutes the good life”?

Why are realists so afraid of moral aspiration? The answer may lie in the age in which realism was born, or the ages in which it is reborn again and again. Hobbes blamed the Wars of Religion on ideological zealotry, as his successors would do for the Napoleonic Wars and the Great War. Realists in the twentieth century saw the initial failure of the Wilsonian project and attributed it to overweening moralistic ambition. But as importantly, they interpreted the rise of fascism as another example of moralistic crusading idealism. Fascism, after all, was a political religion, an example (realists thought) of how dangerous it can be to infuse politics with idealistic zealotry.

Realism, in this perspective, looks like a typical example of a movement taking shape in overreaction to something it opposed. Wilsonianism failed, and so we have to throw out liberalism forever; Nazism was evil, and so we have to throw out all political morality of any kind. Napoléon nearly conquered Europe, so we must turn our backs on the Revolutionary ideas that gave him birth. The War of Religion wrecked Europe, so we must banish religion to the “private” sphere and teach statesmen to act as if values do not (and should not) affect their decision-making.

Overreactions rarely have anything to commend them. Liberalism is obviously salvageable, having outlived Wilson’s failure and spread across the globe over the past century. As for political morality, it seems too obvious to point out that one can believe in morality without being a Nazi—but that obvious point seems lost on many realists, for whom any form of moral aspiration is a dangerous sign of incipient fascism. As constructivists would argue, political morality is inevitable: everyone carries a morality with them. What matters is the content of that morality. A liberal morality that says all humans have equal moral dignity and deserve a chance at flourishing is about as good as it gets—better, certainly, than a realist morality that counsels the singular pursuit of national power above all else.

In fact, there is at least as good a case to be made that the catastrophes of the past two centuries are due in part to realism’s success as its failure; that Napoléon and Hitler understood the ideology of state power too well; and that the solution should have been more liberalism, not less of it. It was precisely during the age when statesmen took least heed of conventional morality, when they took to heart the ideology of state power, that they involved themselves in foolish crusades for national glory. When you define political morality as the pursuit of political power, but refrain from defining what power is responsible for, you open the door to the untrammeled pursuit of power for its own sake—which is a pretty good description of the wars of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the return to which is no rational person’s aspiration.

After almost a century of formal development in the academy, and four centuries in broader cultural currents, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that realism is polemic against moral aspiration masquerading as scholarship that takes little note of empirical data and whose analysis of foreign policy is riddled with double standards. Worse, realism cuts us off from the very moral resources we need to envision a better world. Students of international relations may be forgiven for fearing that realism has deteriorated from a viable research program into a dogmatic intellectual straightjacket. The field deserves better.

Dr. Paul D. Miller is a professor of the practice of international affairs at Georgetown University and a senior nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council.

©2019 The Authors | Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 United States License

[1] Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939 : Reissued with a new preface from Michael Cox. (New York: Springer, 2016).

[2] For a record of Kennan’s views, see John Lewis Gaddis, George F. Kennan: An American Life . (London: Penguin Books, 2012).

[3] Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle For Power and Peace, 5 th ed., revised (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc, 1978).

[4] John Bew, Realpolitik: A History . (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

[5] Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan, or, the Matter, Form, and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil , in The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, Vol. III ., Sir William Molseworth, ed. (London: C. Richards, Printer, 1845), 85-86.

[6] Emer de Vattle, The Law of Nations, Or, Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns, with Three Early Essays on the Origin and Nature of Natural Law and Luxury , edited and with an introduction by Bela Kapossy and Richard Whitmore (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund: 2008), 496.

[7] Christian von Wolff, The Law of Nations Treated According to a Scientific Method. Carnegie Institute Classics of International Law 13:2, James Brown Scott, ed., Joseph H. Drake, trans. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934), 173.

[8] John J. Mearsheimer, The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018). All references in text are to Kindle locations. See the H-Diplo/ISSF roundtable at https://issforum.org/roundtables/11-2-delusion . Some of this material is drawn from Miller, “Structural Realism Has No Clothes,” Law and Liberty , 15 April 2019. The material is reprinted with permission. https://www.lawliberty.org/book-review/structural-realism-has-no-clothes/

[9] Yoram Hazony, The Virtue of Nationalism (London: Hachette UK, 2018).

[10] Pew Research Center, “Globally, Broad Support for Representative and Direct Democracy,” 16 October 2017. https://www.pewglobal.org/2017/10/16/globally-broad-support-for-representative-and-direct-democracy/ .

[11] Pew Research Center, “Global Support for Principle of Free Expression, But Opposition to Some Forms of Speech,” 18 November 2015, https://www.pewglobal.org/2015/11/18/global-support-for-principle-of-free-expression-but-opposition-to-some-forms-of-speech/ .

[12] Paul D. Miller, “Non-“Western” Liberalism and the Resilience of the Liberal International Order,” The Washington Quarterly 41:2 (Summer 2018): 137-153.

[13] Freedom House, “Freedom in the World, 2018,” https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2018 and “List of Electoral Democracies,” https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/List%20of%20Electoral%20Democracies%20FIW%202018.xlsx

[14] J. S. Levy, “Domestic Politics and War,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18:4 (Winter 1988): 653-673, 662.

[15] Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” The National Interest 16 (1989): 3-18.

[16] Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present (Ithaca: Cornell University Press; 2006).

[17] See, for example, Foreign Affairs , Special Section on “The Cold War’s Cold Cases,” 93:4 (July/August 2014): 1-42. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/issues/2014/93/4 .

[18] Uppsala Data Conflict Program, “Government of India—Government of Pakistan,” https://ucdp.uu.se/#statebased/422 .

[19] Stephen M. Walt, The Hell of Good Intentions: America’s Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of US Primacy (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2018). References in the text refer to Kindle locations. See also the H-Diplo/ISSF roundtable at https://issforum.org/roundtables/10-31-walt . Some of this material is drawn from Miller, “To Hell and Back,” Law and Liberty , 20 August 2019. The material is repritned with permission. https://www.lawliberty.org/2019/08/20/to-hell-and-back-stephen-walt-good-intentions-review/ .

[20] Miller, American Power and Liberal Order: A Conservative Internationalist Grand Strategy . (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2016).

[21] Miller, “I Predicted Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine,” Foreign Policy , 7 March 2014. https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/03/07/i-predicted-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/

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An Introduction to Realism in International Relations

Published: July 21, 2022

Author: Notre Dame International Security Center

Within the study of international relations (IR), there are many ideologies practitioners of this political science investigate and frequently find themselves gravitating towards. Whether the theory is liberalism, Marxism, constructivism, or any of the other dominant theories, realism in international relations is still one of the most dominant. What is realism and why does it continue to maintain its dominance in IR studies? What is its history and who are the most famous realists? 

What is Realism? 

Since World War II, realism has been considered the most dominant school of thought, and it remains an ever-present in twenty-first century politics. The theory of realism posits five basic outlines: 

• International politics are anarchic; 
• Sovereign states are principal actors in international politics; 
• States are rational unitary actors acting under their own national interests; 
• The state’s primary goals are its own national security and survival; 
• National power and capabilities are a key litmus test for relationships between states. 

In summation, realism says nation-states (or ‘states’) are the main characters in the unfolding tale of international relations. Other characters exist—individual people and businesses, in particular—but they have limited power. In times of war, states will speak and act as one with their own national interests in mind. 

A Brief History of Realism in International Relations 

Like many other aspects of international relations, the theory of realism finds its roots in Thucydides’ “History of the Peloponnesian War.” While Thucydides is not considered among the realists since the theory wasn’t given a name until the twentieth century, modern scholars and theorists have made comparisons between the thought patterns and behaviors he wrote about in Ancient Greece and those of a more modern context. This lends credence to the idea that realism is, in fact, a timeless theory that is part of our history. 

Notre Dame International Security Center (NDISC) Director Michael Desch says, “Almost 2500 years ago, the Athenian historian claimed that his history of the war between Athens and Sparta would be a lasting work because it captured the core dynamics of international politics: the continuous struggle for power.  Thinkers and statesmen keep coming back to Thucydides because they continually discover and rediscover this core insight.” 

Not long after Thucydides, but in a different part of the world, Indian writer Chanakya wrote “Arthashastra,” which translates to ‘The Science of Material Gain’ or ‘Science of Polity.’ In it, Chanakya said that a king’s main goal is to increase the power of his state, expand his empire, and destroy his enemy. “One should neither submit spinelessly nor sacrifice oneself in foolhardy valor,” he said, “it is better to adopt such policies as would enable one to survive and live to fight another day.” 

Other writers who helped develop the theory of realism include Niccolo Mechiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Hans J. Morgenthau . 

Morgenthau’s 6 Principles of Realism 

In his book “Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace,” Hans J. Morgenthau identified six principles of political realism: 

• Politics, like society, is governed by objective laws rooted in human nature; 
• International politics are shaped by a state’s interests, especially in terms of power; 
• Interest in power is objective and universal, but not fixed—there is room for nuance; 
• Realism is aware of the moral significance of political action. In other words, if a friendly country is being attacked, as much as we may want to help, it may be unrealistic to believe that we can do so without unacceptable risks; 
• Realism does not liken the moral aspirations of a particular nation to the moral laws which govern the universe. So, if one country invades another on the basis of God’s will, realists don’t identify this as a justifiable cause of war; 
• Realism is profoundly different from other schools of thought. Realists are aware of the existence and relevance of other fields and the experts within, but sometimes politics must be separated from economics, morality, and even law: 

Morgenthau says the realist “thinks in terms of interest defined as power, as the economist thinks in terms of interest defined as wealth; the lawyer, of the conformity of action with legal rules; the moralist, of the conformity of action with moral principles.” 

What Does the Future Hold for Realism in International Relations? 

As noted, realism has been the dominant IR theory for nearly a century—especially prevalent during the Cold War—but many IR scholars find themselves wondering what the future holds for the theory and its role going forward in international security. In a 2018 “Foreign Policy” article , Harvard international relations professor Stephen Walt said that despite government official claims of actions on the basis of realism, both Democrats and Republicans have shown a tendency to view foreign policy through the lens of liberal idealism, framing the political climate as a rigid divide between virtuous allies (usually democracies) and evil adversaries (usually dictatorships). 

So, what does the future hold for realism? The answer lies in the hands of emerging scholars and practitioners of international relations. 

Desch says, “Realism has proven so durable as a theoretical lens to understanding international relations and as a guide to statecraft because it is based upon a cold-blooded recognition of the realities of international relations: first, there is no global 9-1-1 states can call when they get in trouble, so they have to take care of themselves. Second, the best way to take care of yourself is to have sufficient power to do so.” 

If you or someone you know is interested in being one of those scholars or practitioners, the Notre Dame International Security Center wants to talk to you. 

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Article contents

Realism in foreign policy analysis.

• Anders Wivel Anders Wivel Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen
• https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.475
• Published online: 26 September 2017

Realists explain foreign policy in terms of power politics. They disagree on the exact meaning of power and on how and to what extent politics is likely to influence policy. But they all find that power has a strong materialist component and that the influence of domestic politics on foreign policy is likely to vary with security challenges stemming from the external environment. The relative size of a state’s material resources is likely to influence its ability to set agendas and influence specific decisions and outcomes in international affairs. And the nature of the strategic environment, most importantly whether the security and survival of the state is under immediate threat, is likely to influence the relative weight of domestic influences on foreign policy. In sum, great powers enjoy a bigger external action space in their foreign policies than weaker states, and secure states enjoy a bigger external action space in their foreign policies than insecure states.

Realism is a top-down approach to explaining foreign policy. Realists begin from the anarchic structure of the international system. They argue that the absence of a legitimate monopoly of power in the international system create a strong incentive for states to focus on survival as their primary goal and self-help as the most important means to achieving this goal. However, “survival” and “self-help” may take many forms. These forms are shaped by mechanisms of socialization and competition in the international system and systemic incentives are filtered through the perceptions of foreign policy decision makers and domestic institutions enabling and restraining the ability of decision makers to respond to external incentives. Neoclassical realists combine these factors in order to explain specific foreign policies. Offensive realists and defensive realists focus on the effects of structure on foreign policy, but with contrasting assumptions about the typical behavior of states: defensive realists expect states to pursue balancing policies, whereas offensive realists argue that only by creating an imbalance of power in its own favor will a state be able to maximize its security.

In addition to being an analytical approach for explaining foreign policy, realists often serve as foreign policy advisors or act in the function of public intellectuals problematizing and criticizing foreign policy. This illustrates the potential for realism as an analytical, problem-solving and critical approach to foreign policy analysis. However, it also shows the strains within realism between ambitions of creating general theories, explaining particular foreign policies, and advising on how to make prudent foreign policy decisions.

• foreign policy
• power politics
• neoclassical realism
• structural realism
• offensive realism
• defensive realism

Introduction

Realists explain foreign policy in terms of power politics. By itself, power politics does not make foreign policy different from other policy areas. Realists would tend to agree with Harold Lasswell that politics is fundamentally a struggle on who gets what, when, and how (Lasswell, 1950 ) and that struggle for power among rival groups is a fundamental and endemic feature of human life (Gilpin, 1996 , p. 6). However, realists argue that the conditions for power politics are different in international politics and therefore also in the conduct of foreign policy from domestic politics; this is because of the absence of a legitimate monopoly of violence. As noted by Joseph Grieco: “States recognize that in anarchy there is no overarching authority to prevent others from using violence, or the threat of violence, to dominate or destroy them. This is in fact the core insight of realism concerning international politics” (Grieco, 1990 , p. 38). Or in the words of John Mearsheimer: “Because other states are potential threats, and because there is no higher authority to come to their rescue when they dial 9-1-1, states cannot depend on others for their own security” (Mearsheimer, 2014 , p. 33).

The absence of a central authority that could protect states against each other leads every state to focus primarily on its own security and survival, and, in particular, how it might best protect itself from the attack of other states. When every state ultimately depends on itself to take care of its own security, it worries about its relative power vis-a-vis other states. Since there is no overarching authority to prevent states from taking advantage of each other, and since states cannot be sure about one another’s future intentions, they tend to base their foreign policy on power calculations rather than ideational factors. Simply put, they cannot afford to base their foreign policy on ideology or culture: this would put their survival at risk.

For this reason, realism is a top-down approach for understanding foreign policy. If we are to explain foreign policy, we need to understand the international conditions for foreign policy making. Thus, the balance of power may serve as a starting point for analyzing foreign policy as we gradually move down the “explanatory ladder” adding complexity and reducing parsimony (Mouritzen & Wivel, 2012 , pp. 24–26). For this reason, realist foreign policy analysis is a contrast to what we conventionally understand as the field of foreign policy analysis, which has been concerned with state-level and human decision making (Hudson, 2008 ; Rynning & Guzzini, 2001 ) and may therefore be seen as closely related to the study of public policy (Carlsnaes, 2002 ). Graham Allison’s iconic study of the Cuban missile crisis—used in universities across the world to teach foreign policy—is arguably a direct challenge to a realist understanding of foreign policy pointing out how organizational processes and governmental politics rather than the rational response of foreign policy decision makers to external threats determine the course of foreign policy (Allison, 1969 ).

There seems to be a built-in contradiction in the realist view of foreign policy. On the one hand, realists tend to view foreign policy as extremely important, as it is intrinsically linked to the security and survival of the state. Thus, bad foreign policy choices may have fatal consequences not only for the foreign policy decision maker but for the state he or she represents and its citizens. Then again, the scope for foreign policy action is limited in a realist world. The international realm is characterized by “recurrence” and “repetition” (Wight, 1960 ), and engaging with this realm is a “ruthless and dangerous business, and it is likely to remain that way” (Mearshemer, 2014 , p. 2). Power politics prevail, and a state attempting to base its own foreign policy on any other type of calculations is likely to be punished. Thus, the foreign policy decision maker is left to decipher the signals from international politics in order to defend the interests of the state rather than pursue the greater good.

To the realist this is not a contradiction built into realist thinking about foreign policy but a consequence of the nature of international relations. Intentions do not always correspond with outcomes in an anarchic world, where there is plenty of room for misperception and the abuse of power (Spirtas, 1996 ). The external constraints on the individual state’s foreign policy action space do not reduce foreign policymaking to a “technical” issue of reading the international power structure correctly. In contrast, whereas structural realists run the risk of a somewhat mechanical analysis of the policy consequences of variations in power distribution in the anarchic international system, classical realists and increasingly neoclassical realists acknowledge the imperfect and sometimes intangible complexity of navigating a world of limited information, inadequate resources, and imperfect moral choices that is the everyday life of the foreign policy decision maker.

The rest of this article explores and explains realism in foreign policy analysis in two steps. First, the article explores the history of realist thinking on foreign policy over the course of history. The aim is to identify a number of recurrent themes in realist engagement (practical and analytical) with foreign policy and identify shared characteristics in how realists think about foreign policy. Secondly, the logic of realism is explored. What do different types of realism tell us about foreign policy? What are the opportunities for explaining foreign policy by use of the theoretical tools offered by realism? What are the challenges to these ways of understanding foreign policy, and which analytical strategies may realists use to enhance their understanding of foreign policy?

Exploring the History of Realism in Foreign Policy

The history of realism is also a history of analyzing, critiquing, and advising foreign policy. Viewed as a “philosophical position” about how the struggle for power among rival groups is a “fundamental condition for human existence,” realist thinking about foreign policy spans 2,500 years (Gilpin, 1996 , p. 6). Understood in this way, the group of realist foreign policy thinkers is highly diverse and includes historians, policymakers, and political thinkers. Prominent members of this group include Thucydides, Thomas Hobbes, Niccoló Machiavelli, Benedict de Spinoza, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Otto von Bismarck, Max Weber, Theodore Roosevelt, E. H. Carr, Reinhold Niebuhr, Winston Churchill, George F. Kennan, Hans Morgenthau, Henry Kissinger, Raymond Aron, Stanley Hoffmann, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Kenneth Waltz, Robert Gilpin, Samuel Huntington, John Mearsheimer, and Stephen M. Walt. Although it is impossible to do justice to these scholars and practitioners as individual thinkers and doers, it is possible to distill from the rich tradition of realism a number of recurrent themes and challenges.

Collective Selfishness and the Politics of Necessity

The conventional starting point of the realist canon is a vivid (but unfinished) account of The Peloponnesian War by Greek historian and military strategist Thucydides, arguing that “the growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Lacedaemon, made war inevitable” (Thucydides, 431 bc , 1.23). In the work of Thucydides can be found some of the enduring characteristics of realist foreign policy analysis: a concern with power politics and how it influences decisions on war and peace, a writing style attempting to unpack the factual development of events, and a focus on foreign policy decision makers.

Niccolò Machiavelli’s The Prince is another pre- 20th-century signpost of realist foreign policy analysis. The short book has been widely marketed as the bible of realpolitik , and over the past centuries “Machiavellian” has become synonymous with cunning but amoral statecraft. First published in 1532 and based on Machiavelli’s own experience as a senior civil servant during the era of the Florentine Republic, the book proved a direct challenge to the dominant faith-based scholastic and Catholic idealism of the time. Machiavelli justified the use of amoral and immoral means to achieve the goals of the prince (e.g., glory and survival), and he argued that statecraft, including the acknowledgement that in international politics you cannot rely on anyone but yourself, is decisive for state success (Machiavelli, 1961 ). In that sense, The Prince is as much an exercise in political theory as it is a work on foreign policymaking and diplomacy. It professes a philosophy of realism as a “collective selfishness” of necessity (Strauss, 1978 , p. 10). Self-perseverance is a goal worth pursuing for its own sake, because it serves as the necessary foundation for pursuing any other goals. However, in order to pursue this substantive goal in foreign policy, the decision maker must pursue a processual goal: prudence—that is, governing by use of reason (Machiavelli, 1961 , chapters 20–26). Thus, the good (foreign) policymaker is the anti-idealist attempting to view the world as it is in order to rationally and cool-headedly employ the means necessary to preserve the political community he is the leader of.

Machiavelli’s experience was with an early development of the European states system. However, from the 19th century as the modern European states system was taking form and expanding so did the practice and thinking behind realpolitik as a both a descriptive and prescriptive theory symbolized by the minister-president of Prussia, Otto von Bismarck. Bismarck epitomized the practice and thinking about realism during this historical era through his infamous statement that the big questions of the time would be decided by “iron and blood,” not “speeches and majority resolutions” (Bismarck, 1862 ). Bismarck’s statement was a critique of the liberal optimism of the democratic revolutions, which had swept across Europe in the mid- 19th century . However, it was closely affiliated with the assertion by his fellow Prussian and a veteran general of the Napoleonic wars, Carl von Clausewitz, who a few years earlier had stressed the close relationship between foreign policy and military power in On War : war was a continuation of politics by other means (Clausewitz, 1976 ).

Realism as Road to Peace and Stability

If Bismarckian realism was a reaction against the liberal revolutions of the mid- 19th century then 20th-century realist thinking about foreign policy may be understood as the reaction against the reaction. Realists such as E. H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau continued to grapple with the challenge of understanding the world “as it is” and acknowledging the limitations of foreign policy action. However, in the context of the two world wars followed by the Cold War, they were concerned to avoid the trap of disillusionment and inaction. As noted by E. H. Carr, “Every solution of the problem of political change, whether national or international, must be based on a compromise between morality and power” (Carr, 1981 , p. 192). Moreover, to understand foreign policy, we must acknowledge the insights of the expert as well as those of the bureaucrat: “The former trained to think mainly on a priori lines, the latter empirically.” According to Carr, theory and practice are interdependent, and utopia and reality should be combined in order to understand the world and the opportunities and challenges that we all face (Carr, 1981 , p. 14). To Hans Morgenthau, these opportunities and challenges were essentially political in nature, and the prudent response was a contextualized choice of the lesser evil (Morgenthau, 1946 ). The limited action space left the political decision makers to navigate according to context and capability (Molloy, 2009 ). Thus, Morgenthau argued that realists must consider “prudence—the weighing of the consequences of alternative political actions—to be the supreme virtue in international politics” (Morgenthau, 1967 , p. 10).

One of the most influential post–Second World War realists, diplomat and historian George F. Kennan, inspired the Truman Doctrine and U.S. Cold War containment policy through his “Long Telegram” from Moscow, where he served as a U.S. diplomat. Also important was his subsequent 1947 Foreign Affairs article (under the pseudonym “X”) on “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” arguing that Soviet policies were expansionist and needed to be contained (Kennan, 1945 , 1947 ). In the following decades, Kennan continued to influence the debate on U.S. foreign policy, initially as a civil servant in the State Department and U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, but then subsequently as a scholar and vocal critic of policies he saw as overly ideologized, utopian, and legalistic. Foreign policy, in Kennan’s view, too often fell victim to the fads of public opinion, leading political decision makers to respond inadequately to the realities of international politics (Kennan, 1984 ).

Thomas Schelling, a Nobel-winning economist, and another veteran of the Truman administration, came to influence both international relations game theory and realism through his work on nuclear deterrence, which showed that the United States and the Soviet Union had a fundamental interest in avoiding nuclear war during the Cold War (Schelling, 1960 ). Schelling’s work had a profound influence on U.S. foreign policy, in particular during the Kennedy administration and more generally in the 1960s and 1970s. He is given credit for the idea of the “red telephone,” a direct connection between the Kremlin and the White House to be used to diffuse crises and reduce the risk of nuclear superpower war. In addition, Schelling was one of the founding fathers of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, successfully creating a hub for the education of public servants by some of the world’s finest public policy and diplomacy scholars.

Henry Kissinger, a third Cold War realist, served as the national security advisor and secretary of state during the Nixon and Ford administrations. Kissinger played a decisive role in U.S. Cold War foreign policy in the 1970s, having a hand in such developments as détente with the Soviet Union, closer relations with China, and the end of the Vietnam War. These policies were grounded in Kissinger’s aim to maximize U.S. national interest from a pragmatic realist and nonideological position, leading him not only to rapprochement with Communist states openly opposed to the liberal democracy of the United States but also to support the political leaderships of South Africa (thereby supporting continued apartheid rule in South Africa while actively working for the end of white minority rule in Rhodesia) and Pakistan, despite their regime’s massive violations of human rights. He also supported CIA involvement in Chile, working against the democratically elected government of pro-Cuban Salvador Allende, because he thought it was in the U.S. interest. While Kennan was a historian and Schelling was an economist, Kissinger was a political scientist with a PhD from Harvard University on 19th-century European diplomacy (Kissinger, 1957 ).

Recurrent Themes and Developments in Realist Foreign Policy Thinking

This brief history of realist thinking and practice of foreign policy illustrates how realism has been used as the point of departure for analysis, conduct, and advice, as well as a critique of foreign policy. It allows for identification of five recurrent concerns in realist engagements with foreign policy.

First, realists share an “emphasis on self-interest” (Donnelly, 2000 , p. 56) but derive many different predictions and prescriptions about foreign policy behavior from this assumption. Over the centuries, the focus of the prescriptions seems to have shifted from a primary concern with winning wars to a primary concern with avoiding wars: this partly reflects that post- 1918 realists are all part of a more self-conscious “discipline of international relations,” which was founded in the immediate aftermath of the First World War with the first chair in international relations at Aberystwyth University in Wales named in honor of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson in order to avoid the horrors of the war.

Second, realists emphasize the importance of international conditions for national foreign policymaking. It is a top-down approach for understanding foreign policy and claims that to understand foreign policy, one must begin with an understanding of the most fundamental characteristics of the international realm. Whereas scholars may use different theories to understand different political systems across the international system and over the course of history, international relations is the “realm of recurrence and repetition” (Wight, 1960 , p. 43). In that sense, realism claims to hold a “timeless wisdom” (Buzan, 1996 ): international anarchy and power politics will remain inescapable features of international relations, because any policymaker who refuses to obey the self-help logic of anarchy runs the risk of endangering the security or even survival of the state he or she represents.

Third, from this follows a strong universalist claim about the nature of foreign policy and our ability to use realism as a tool to understand it: A realist starting point may be employed to understand, advise, conduct, and criticize foreign policy across time and space. Thus, realism has been used as an analytical framework for understanding the foreign policy of, for example, Communist states such as the Soviet Union or China during the Cold War (Wohlforth, 1993 ; Christensen, 1996 ), the great powers in the 19th century (Kissinger, 1957 ), the great powers in the interwar period (Brawley, 2009 ; Taliaferro, Ripsman, & Lobell, 2012 ), contemporary Russia (Götz, 2015 ; Mearsheimer, 2014 ), contemporary China (Schweller & Pu, 2011 ; Sørensen, 2013 ), the United States in any historical period since independence (Thies, 2010 ; Dueck, 2009 ; Zakaria, 1998 ), as well as Third World states (Ayoob, 2002 ; David, 1991 ), European states (Rosato, 2011 ; Toje, 2011 , Wivel, 2008 ), Latin American states (Neto & Malamud, 2015 ) and Asian states (Cha, 2000 ).

Fourth, the realist focus on maximizing (collective) self-interest in a conflictual and potentially dangerous international environment means that ideas and ideals are often viewed as “noise” interrupting and distorting the prudent pursuit of foreign policy. The anti-ideological raison d’etre of Machiavelli is echoed by modern realists in the criticism of U.S. military intervention in Vietnam by Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz (Rafshoon, 2001 ; Humphreys, 2013 ), and more recently, when “almost all realists in the United States—except for Henry Kissinger—opposed the war against Iraq” in 2003 (Mearsheimer, 2005 ). These critiques levied against U.S. administrations in the 20th and 21st centuries are based on realist assessments that the foreign policy decision makers engaged the country in conflicts to defeat Communism (Vietnam) or the spread liberal democracy (Iraq) in a way that was inconsistent with (or even detrimental to) U.S. security interests. Realists were also critical of the continuance of U.S. military interventions during the Obama administration 2009–2017 , which were viewed as unnecessary overstretch policies detrimental to U.S. interests (Walt, 2016 ). Over time there seems to have been a long-term trend from realists acting mainly as advisors to foreign policymakers to realists acting increasingly as critics of foreign policy. Why is this? One reason, pointed out by George Kennan, is the democratization—or less positively—the politicization of foreign policy. Even at the height of the Cold War public opinion played an increasingly significant role in foreign policymaking. After the end of the Cold War, the relaxing of structural constraints gave many states, in particular in Europe and North America, the opportunity to pursue a foreign policy that was more directed by choice and domestic politics than necessity, which moved mainstream foreign policy further away from the realist axiom of prudently pursuing the national interest (although this trend seems to have reversed since the mid-2000s as a consequence of a more offensive Russian foreign policy and continued conflict in the Middle East).

Finally, as pointed out by Barry Buzan, realism offers an ideologically pluralist approach to understanding international relations (Buzan, 1996 ). Realist foreign policy is not bound by ideology. It provides a method rather than a route to a substantive end goal (e.g., liberal democracy or the abandonment of capitalism). Seeking to distance themselves (with varying degrees of success) from specific ideas (religious or secular) about how the world ought to be, realists claim to see the world as it really is. Whether or not we agree on how successful an approach it is, realism does provide an intersectional meeting point for different ideologies (e.g., a conservative such as Henry Kissinger, a liberal such as Stephen Walt, and a Marxist such as E. H. Carr are all realists). However, while ideologically pluralist, realism is not necessarily ideologically or culturally neutral. The logic of realpolitik is closely tied to the development of the European states system. Consequentially, most realist analyses of international relations are tied to an unselfconscious acceptance of the nation-state as the “natural” unit for domestic and foreign policymaking and territorial military conflict as a tool of statecraft. By emphasizing the recurring patterns of international relations over the centuries, realism leaves only limited room for foreign policies aiming to transform or transcend international relations (Gilpin, 1981 , p. 209). For this reason, the realist analysis of foreign policy and the realist conduct of foreign policy run a high risk of being stuck in what Robert Cox termed problem solving: “It takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized, as the given framework for action” (Cox, 1986 , p. 208).

Exploring the Logic of Realism in Foreign Policy

All realists are concerned with foreign policy, but not all realists include a foreign policy dimension in their theory. Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics is the most influential realist work over the past fifty years. Waltz’s book is a self-conscious study of international politics, not foreign policy. Waltz regards the two domains as separate spheres of policymaking with different dynamics. One reason for this is Waltz’s particular view of foreign policy. Whereas most realists equate foreign policy with the external behavior of states, Kenneth Waltz understands foreign policy analysis as linked to the analysis of state goals (Waltz, 1996 ). Although some analysts agree with Waltz that structural realist claims about foreign policy are too indeterminate to stand alone in explanations of foreign policy (Ripsman, Taliaferro, & Lobell, 2016 ; Schweller, 2003 ), others find that the ability of structural realism to explain foreign policy is an empirical question (Elman, 1996 ; Mouritzen & Wivel, 2012 ).

Realists understand international politics as a struggle for power in international anarchy. This understanding of the international realm has important consequences for how they understand foreign policy. Most importantly, realists tend to understand foreign policy in terms of self-help policies aimed at maximizing national security. Most realist analyses of foreign policy start from a structural realist understanding of the international system (Rathbun, 2008 ), but they not only vary in how they combine different levels of explanation but also in how they combine their starting point in material power capabilities with ideational factors (e.g., Mouritzen, 2017 ; Ripsman, Taliaferro, & Lobell, 2016 ). Therefore, the following discussion proceeds in two main steps. Firstly, there is the most parsimonious structural realist logics of foreign policy, focusing (almost) exclusively on incentives for particular foreign policies created by anarchy and polarity. From there the discussion moves to a discussion of how neoclassical realists seek to analyze the transmission of these systemic logics and incentives into foreign policy through a transmission belt of domestic political factors.

Structural Realism: Offensive and Defensive Logics of Security and Survival

Structural realists aim to tell us a few important things about international relations. Their theories allow us to make assumptions about the behavior of states and the outcome of international politics. But what do they say about foreign policy? According to Kenneth Waltz, “In itself a structure does not lead to one outcome rather than another. Structure affects behavior within a system but does so indirectly” (Waltz, 1979 , p. 74). Therefore, his theory “does not tell us why state X made a certain move last Tuesday” (Waltz, 1979 , p. 121). In order to explain foreign policy, we must combine structural realism with theories about the internal structures of states (Waltz, 1979 , p. 122; Waltz, 1996 ). Thus, structural realism tells us little about specific foreign policies: “What it does explain are the constraints that confine all states. The clear perception of constraints provides many clues to the expected reactions of states, but by itself the theory cannot explain those reactions” (Waltz, 1979 , p. 122). Yet Beach notes that “the core argument of structural realist theories is that the anarchical and conflictual international system pushes states to adopt survival as their most basic foreign policy goal” (Beach, 2012 , p. 34)

How does this basic foreign policy goal translate in to foreign policy behavior? Realists offer two contrasting logics. Defensive realists argue that the typical foreign policy behavior of states in international anarchy is “defensive positionalist”: that is, states seek to preserve their position in the international system but renounce the chance of expansion (Grieco, 1990 ; p. 10). Expansion is viewed as counterproductive to survival because other states will respond by forming defensive alliances against the expanding state, thereby endangering the international position and ultimately the security and survival of that state. Defensive realists believe that balancing power is the predominant type of foreign policy behavior because it is the safest route to security in anarchic system (Waltz, 1979 , p. 121). Whether or not this is the case empirically remains debatable with critics pointing to examples of international systems that may not be characterized as anarchic (and therefore the conditions for balancing were not present) or arguing that even in anarchy there is no clear tendency to balance (Little, 2007 ; May, Rosecrance, & Steiner, 2010 ; Schroeder, 1994 ; Schweller, 1998 ; Watson, 1992 ). Others have argued that balancing is increasingly “soft,” in the sense that it is conducted by diplomatic and institutional means rather than military means (He, 2015 ; Pape, 2005 ; Paul, 2005 ; Saltzman, 2012 ).

To structural realists, anarchy is the root cause of conflict, and to defensive structural realists wars are typically the unintended consequence of the actions of states aiming to secure their own survival in the international anarchy. Therefore, in the defensive realist logic, grappling effectively with the security dilemma is at the core of any state’s foreign policy. Balancing is an imperfect way of ameliorating the security dilemma, which defensive realists see as the main cause of conflict in international anarchy (Glaser, 1997 ; Jervis, 1978 ). There is a strong affiliation with Schelling’s work to create methods of communication and signaling to avoid unintended superpower war discussed above, but Kenneth Waltz emphasizes how the specific dangers vary with type of international system. In multipolar systems, it is difficult to discern the power and intensions of other states and dangerous misperceptions of intentions and miscalculations of power lead to war, but in bipolar systems the simplicity of the conflict between two great powers reduces the dangers of miscalculation and misperception, whereas the risk of overreaction increases (Waltz, 1979 , pp. 171–172). The most direct (and controversial) foreign policy advice coming out of defensive structural realism is that the controlled spread of nuclear weapons is making balancing more credible by making the costs of war potentially unbearable and thereby ameliorates the security dilemma and reduces the likelihood of military conflict (Waltz, 1981 ).

Balance of threat theory allows for a more fine-grained defensive realist analysis of foreign policy (Walt, 1987 , 1996 ). Like structural realist balance of power theory, balance of threat theory argues that the strategic choices of states are mainly conditioned upon the uncertainty about the capabilities and intentions of other actors created by the anarchic structure of the international system. However, as argued by Stephen Walt, the balance of power tells us little about the likely foreign policy behavior of states since the “power of other states can be either a liability or an asset, depending on where it is located, what it can do, and how it is used” (Walt, 1987 , p. viii). Therefore, we need to add perception of intent, the offense-defense balance, and geographic proximity to relative material power in order to understand the threat calculations of states. Balance of threat theory may be regarded as a rival theory of Waltz’s neorealist balance of power theory with more explanatory power (Walt, 1987 ), as a defensive realist foreign policy model building on the insights of balance of power theory (Waltz, 1997 ) or as turning the logic of structural realism upside down by arguing that “intention, not power, is crucial” (Walt, 1987 , p. 26; Mouritzen, 1997 )

In contrast to defensive realist logic, offensive realists argue that the anarchic self-help system creates strong incentives for expansion: “Apprehensive about the ultimate intentions of other states, and aware that they operate in a self-help system, states quickly understand that the best way to ensure their survival is to be the most powerful state in the system” (Mearsheimer, 2014 , p. 33). Therefore, all states are revisionist states. States want to maximize their capabilities because this maximizes their chance of withstanding an attack from other states. Since all states possess offensive capabilities, and all states want to expand at the same time, no state can feel secure unless it achieves a hegemonic position in the international system. While defensive realists posit that states achieve security by creating a balance of power, offensive realists posit that states achieve security by creating an imbalance of power to their own advantage (Layne, 1998 ). Typically, this imbalance of power can only be translated into political hegemony in the region, where the great power is geographically located, because of the costs and difficulties of winning wars on other continents. This does not leave states with military expansion as the only strategic option as states tend to choose between—and combine—a range of different diplomatic tools such as blackmailing (threatening a rival to make concessions), blood-letting and bait-and-bleed strategies (keeping a rival in costly protracted conflicts), or using balancing and buck-passing for keeping rivals in check (Mearsheimer, 2014 , pp. 147–162; Toft, 2005 , pp. 385–386).

What is the Contribution of Structural Realism?

Defensive and offensive realism are both based on a structural realist logic of anarchy leading states to focus on their security and survival in an international self-help system, but they present mirror images of the typical foreign policies of states within that system. They provide us only with very blunt tools for analyzing the foreign policy of individual countries and are concerned only with the structural incentives for this policy. To be sure, structural incentives sometimes dominate foreign policy, but the occasions are rare and limited to short, but important, periods of time in a state’s history when there is a clear and present danger to national security. Thus, as in the case of international politics in general, structural realists tell us a “small number of big and important things” about foreign policy (Waltz, 1986 , p. 329).

This does not mean that structural realism is without merit if we want to understand foreign policy. First, pointing to the importance of structural incentives as drivers of foreign policy contrasts with most studies on national foreign policy around the world, which tend to focus on the specificities of national foreign policymaking and the “uniqueness” of the state studied. Most countries have national communities of foreign policy experts—academics and practitioners—with expertise in the specific traditions, procedures, and challenges of their own country and often publishing analyses in their own language on how this affects the grand strategies and individual foreign policy decisions in this particular country. Thus, a focus on the effects of international structure on national foreign policy provides an important corrective to—or at least problematization of—national narratives about the specificities and uniqueness of national foreign policy. Used in this way, realism may be viewed as a critical foreign policy theory, raising important questions about almost any country’s self-perception of foreign policy. Thus, structural realism “can aid in the mental experiments that lie at the core of foreign policy analysis” by providing a heuristic tool for critically examining the taken-for-granted beliefs about foreign policy held by foreign policy elites and experts (Wohlforth, 2008 , p. 46).

Second, structural realism may be used as a starting point for more comprehensive analyses of foreign policy incorporating domestic-level variables (Mouritzen & Wivel, 2012 ; Rathbun, 2008 ; Sterling–Folker, 1997 ). This is characteristic of neoclassical realism, which has developed as the closest thing we have to a realist foreign policy theory since the end of the Cold War (Ripsman, Taliaferro, & Lobell, 2016 ; Rose, 1998 ).

Neoclassical Realism: Translating Power into Policy

A purely structural view of foreign policy leaves us with important blind spots not only with regard to the national peculiarities of individual states but also with regard to more systematic differences between states over time and space. Anarchy and polarity may be master variables in the realist analysis, but they present us only with a general “ ceteris paribus -understanding” of foreign policy. Since the Westphalian Peace in 1648 , which is conventionally viewed as the birth of the modern states system, the conditions for foreign policymaking have changed in important ways related to the increasing “interaction capacity” of the international system (Buzan, 1993 ).

Recognizing the indeterminant nature of structural and systemic incentives, neoclassical realists posit that “anarchy is a permissive condition rather than an independent causal force” (Walt, 2002 , p. 211). Therefore, they incorporate systemic process variables such as interaction capacity and domestic-level intervening variables such as strategic culture, the images and perceptions of foreign policy decision makers, domestic institutions, and state-society relations to explain the external behavior of states (Ripsman, Taliaferro, & Lobell 2016 , pp. 52–57; 59–79). There is “no smoothly functioning mechanical transmission belt” from structural incentives to foreign policy and “the translation of capabilities into national behavior is often rough and capricious over the short and medium term” (Rose, 1998 , p. 158).

By tracing this transmission between power and foreign policy, neoclassical realists have been able to explain anomalous cases deviating from structural realist expectations and to construct fully fledged foreign policy explanations filling out the void left by the general structuralist explanations as well as exploring the connection between international politics and foreign policy (Ripsman, Taliaferro, & Lobell, 2016 , pp. 26–31). As summarized by Randall Schweller, neoclassical realists “emphasize problem-focused research that (1) seeks to clarify and extent the logic of basic (classical and structural) realist propositions, (2) employs the case-study method to test general theories, explain cases and generate hypotheses, (3) incorporates first, second and third image variables, (4) addresses important questions about foreign policy and national behaviour, and (5) has produced a body of cumulative knowledge” (Schweller, 2003 , p. 317). Most recently, neoclassical realism has taken one step further in developing a theory of both foreign policy and international politics. It has specified the relationship between the nature and clarity of the international environment and the likely influence of specific domestic factors on national foreign policy (Ripsman, Taliaferro, & Lobell, 2016 ). In order to trace explanations of foreign policy and the relationship between international developments and foreign policy, neoclassical realism “straddles diplomatic history and international relations theory” (Schweller, 2003 , p. 344).

Neoclassical realism seeks “to identify the appropriate intervening variables that can imbue realism’s structural variant with a greater explanatory richness” (Kitchen, 2010 , p. 118). One important achievement is to bring the state back in to realist foreign policy analysis (Lobell, Ripsman, & Taliaferro, 2009 ). This may be done by focusing on, for example, institutional balances between the foreign policy executive and legislature (Zakaria, 1998 ) or between foreign policy executives and key societal supporters (Lobell, 2009 ) or by exploring how the incentives stemming from international anarchy are translated into foreign policy through ideational factors related to grand strategy, tribalism, or the historically contingent identity of the state (Kitchen, 2010 ; Sterling-Folker, 2009 ; Wivel, 2013 ). In this understanding, the international system provides “states with information about the costs and benefits of particular courses of action, but how that information is processed and weighed depends on the way states understand the world, their preferences, their ideas and their ethics” (Kitchen, 2010 , p. 143). More recently, neoclassical realists have sought to theorize the systemic structural modifiers that affect the clarity and permissiveness of strategic environments, including “geography, the rates of technological diffusion and the offense defense balance in military technologies” (Ripsman, Taliaferro, & Lobell, 2016 , p. 40). These variables add to the explanatory power of neoclassical realism but also to the complexity of the approach.

The Challenges of Neoclassical Realist Foreign Policy Analysis—and the Strategies to Meet Them

As pointed out by critics, this kind of foreign policy analysis risks walking into an “identity dilemma” between either distinctly realist but indeterminate explanations or more comprehensive and precise but indistinctive explanations (Guzzini, 2004 ), where “variation in other exogenous influences on state behaviour—state preferences, beliefs, and international institutions—… trump the direct and indirect effects of material power” (Legro & Moravcsik, 1999 , p. 6; see, for example, Vasquez, 1997 ). More importantly, the inclusion of different explanatory factors at different levels and different stages of the foreign policy decision-making process may allow for a rather messy analysis—with factors having different weight and potentially contradictory effects at different stages of foreign policymaking (Tang, 2009 , p. 801).

On the one hand, this may be interpreted as an acknowledgement of the complexity inherent in international politics and foreign policy and emphasized by classical realists. Neoclassical realism, thus understood, is a return to a “problem focused” rather than “pattern focused” realism and a realism more about understanding the context than making general predictions about foreign policy (Barkin, 2009 ). As noted by Morgenthau in Politics among Nations , “The first lesson the student of international politics must learn and never forget is that the complexities of international affairs make simple solutions and trustworthy prophesies impossible. Here the scholar and the charlatan part company. Knowledge of the forces that determine politics among nations, and of the ways by which their political relations unfold, reveals the ambiguity of the facts of international politics” (Morgenthau, 1967 , p. 19). To the classical realist, exploring the intricate connections between systemic, national, and individual levels was a necessary route to understanding war, peace, and foreign policy. The inseparability of foreign policy and international politics was a given that served as a point of departure for this understanding (see, for example, Rynning & Ringsmose, 2008 ). This is also the argument of neoclassical realists pointing out that the bulk of foreign policy and international politics is determined by neither domestic nor structural factors (Ripsman, Taliaferro, & Lobell, 2016 , p. 5).

On the other hand, at least two challenges follow from this ambition (Wivel, 2005 ). First, how can structural factors be combined with other variables without ending up with an ad hoc argument? Second, how can emphasis on the continued importance of objective, materialist factors be combined with the observation that these factors are interpreted and perceived by human beings making foreign policy? Neoclassical realists may employ three different analytical strategies to meet these challenges.

The first strategy provides an explanatory ladder that makes it possible to move from parsimonious assumptions about anarchy and polarity—over intervening systemic variables such as interaction capacity and geopolitics—to domestic politics (Mouritzen & Wivel, 2012 ; Wivel, 2005 ). Analyzing foreign policy offers no clear-cut, either/or choice between parsimony and contextual subtlety, but in order “to achieve a more finely tuned understanding of how resources affect behaviour in particular situations, one needs to specify the policy-contingency framework more precisely. The domain of the theory is narrowed to achieve greater precision” (Keohane, 1986 , p. 188; see, for example, Schweller, 2003 , p. 336, 346). Consequently, the realist foreign policy analysis proceeds in stages and gradually adds complexity. As we move down this analytical ladder we move from the general conditions for foreign policymaking in anarchy (i.e., the international system is a self-help system creating a strong incentive for foreign policies aiming at security and survival) to more specific conditions relevant only for a select group of states (e.g., geographical proximity to Russia) to state-specific conditions unique to the state being analyzed (e.g., specific lessons of history from victories or defeats in wars). Each step gets further away from the general theory of purely structural realism and closer to specific foreign policy explanations. There can be no a priori determination where a satisfactory explanation on the ladder is achieved, as this is an empirical question.

The second strategy aims at amalgamation. Structural incentives explain the similarity of states but not why they differ (Waltz, 1979 , p. 88), “Yet the impact of domestic process explains why the choices in response to the environment are not identical,” and foreign policy is what happens in the “amalgamation” between systemic effects and individual state responses by incorporating discursive identity construction into the explanation (Sterling–Folker, 1997 , p. 21). Material structures remain the starting point, but state responses to the challenges, opportunities and incentives following from these structures depend on the combination of the state’s relative capabilities (determining what the state can do) and the discursive construction of national identity (determining what the state would like to do) (Wivel, 2013 ). This amalgamation may be understood as embedded in social understanding of “self” and “other” constructed and reconstructed in relation to other groups (Sterling-Folker, 2009 ). So whereas the first analytical strategy is one of stages, and one could in principle stop after the first stage if the purely systemic explanation is adequate, the amalgamative strategy posits that the different analytical stages only makes sense with regard to understanding foreign policy when they are analyzed together. Foreign policy expresses the interaction between “self” and “other” in international anarchy and the differentiation of “self” (the foreign policy elite and sometimes the electorate) from “other” (foreign countries). The amalgamative strategy may be combined with the explanatory ladder suggested above by proceeding toward amalgamation in stages by ordering the assumptions along interrelated explanatory levels and gradually supplementing with additional assumptions (Mouritzen, 2017 , p. 636).

The third strategy provides a bridge or meeting point between different levels. Building on the literature of state socialization in international relations, it is possible to view the transmission belt between the systemic incentives and foreign policy as constituted by foreign policy roles (Thies, 2010 , 2017 ). These roles are understood as “repertoires of behaviour, inferred from other expectations and one’s own conceptions, selected at least partly as responses to cues and demands” (Walker, 1992 , p. 23; see, for example, Holsti, 1970 , pp. 260–270). By exploring how foreign policy decision makers define themselves and the state they represent in an interplay with the expectations they face from other states as well as from domestic society (e.g., the good ally, the liberal hegemon, or the representative of the oppressed and marginalized) and how the costs and benefits of taking on this role shapes specific foreign policy decisions as well as grand strategies of states, neoclassical realists can explore the complex mix of change and continuity in state foreign policy.

To be sure, none of these strategies will by themselves meet all challenges of neoclassical realist explanations of foreign policy. There still seems to be a bias in the literature toward selecting cases on international conflicts rather than cases on international cooperation (and as a consequence to focus on security policy rather than economic statecraft) and to explore cases that illustrate the usefulness of neoclassical realism rather than challenging the perspective by testing it on hard cases (Tang, 2009 ). Also, neoclassical realism tends to be better at understanding big decisions of state leaders than any of the day-to-day foreign policy decisions made by officials and politicians at various levels in the diplomatic services and bureaucracies of states. Furthermore, neoclassical realism shares with structural realism a bias in favor of focusing on great powers rather than the small powers that make up the vast majority of states in international relations. This bias is understandable in studies of international relations in general, as realists will expect the great powers to be the agenda setters internationally and therefore the main drivers of war, peace, and change. However, in the case of foreign policy analysis, it is exactly the relative weakness of small powers—making them susceptible to the forces of anarchy at the same time as their foreign policy elites seek to navigate these forces—that makes them data rich cases on both the effects of the international environment and the attempt at pushback from domestic societies (Pedi, 2016 ).

Realist foreign policy analysis is characterized by an engagement with foreign policy practice as well as a strong commitment to theoretical development. Rather than viewing the dual ambition of real-life relevance and theoretical development as a potential challenge to the realist perspective, realists tend to view this duality as necessary, good, and an important raison d’etre not only for realism but for the study of international relations and foreign policy in general (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2013 ).

Realist foreign policy analysis is at the same time characterized by enduring analytical dilemmas and important conceptual and theoretical progress over the past decades that have resulted in a large and growing number of empirical studies of foreign policy from a realist starting point. This literature is rich and focuses on a wide range of thematics and cases from around the world, but two issues seem to have received comparatively little attention. First, most realists continue to eschew questions related to the increasing institutional complexity of the international realm where “the proliferation of international agreements multiplies the number of actors and rules relevant for any given decision of international cooperation” (Alter & Meunier, 2009 , p. 13). How is this complexity affecting the goals and means of foreign policy decision makers when viewed through the realist lens? What are the prospects for great powers and small powers, industrialized states, and states in the Third World to maximize national interests in an anarchic system with many overlapping international institutions? Second, the election of Donald J. Trump as the president of the United States and the decision of the United Kingdom to leave the European Union following a referendum on the issue have alerted foreign policy elites to the direct and indirect influence of the electorate on foreign policy. What is the realist contribution to understanding the relation between elite and population? How do deeply embedded national economic and ideational structures and the transformation of these structures affect foreign policy and the ability of foreign policy decision makers to respond to systemic incentives?

This article has shown how realism provides us with a top-down approach for understanding the foreign policy of states in international anarchy and discussed how realists have grappled with the translation of systemic incentives into foreign policy. As noted previously, realists have emphasized collective self-interest as both an observation on how foreign policy is made and as a normative starting point for a prudent foreign policy. However, as societies are becoming increasingly globalized and multicultural, identifying the collective self-interest is becoming increasingly complex (Hill, 2013 ). Thus, one important future task for realist scholars and practitioners concerned with foreign policy will be to discuss the meaning of and conditions for foreign policy prudency in a globalized world.

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International Relations: Realism in the 21st Century Essay

Introduction.

The theory of Realism in the International Relations has been a dominant concept. The dominion lasted long. However, in the 21 st century, realism, particularly in the context of international relations, is no longer valid and could be termed as out of date. It generally fails to satisfy when relation of democratic states is taken into consideration. It is also confusing and debate oriented with six different variants that adds to the confusion. Even the balance of power theory has been found to be inaccurate and the tendency of making self serving adjustments to avoid criticisms has also contributed to the fact that realism in international relation is no longer valid in the 21 st century.

International Relations

The International Relations Theory or the IR theory is the tool to understand international politics. It is necessary to apply a tool like the International Relations Theory to understand the international politics because of its vastness and complexity. The field of international politics is so huge that the virtually covers everything happening around the world including the wars, revolutions, gender inequalities and human rights. The IR Theory is applied in order to understand this deep field of complex diversities. Cynthia Weber in the book “ International Relations Theory: A critical understanding ” (Weber 2005) says about IR theory that “IR Theory is a ….looks like” (Weber 2005, 182).

International Relational theory can be called a framework of concepts relating to the understanding and analysis of the international relations. The IR theory can be divided into two broad categories, rationalist school giving priority to state level analysis, and post – positivist school extending the meaning of security and incorporating class, gender and postcolonial security within the scope. There are three very popular theories related to the International Relations. These are realism, liberalism and Marxism.

The above mentioned theories have seen a lot of changes and evolved in newer forms. Afterwards, many other theories like the “constructivism and feminism have entered in the arena with the intention of drawing attention ” (Spegele 2003, 208). The definition of realism, its attributes, origin, different varieties and criticisms, all are necessary elements which can give idea of the relevance of the theory, or the lack of it, today (Bilandzic 2006, 267).

Realism: an Introduction

Realism is a theory that puts the national interest and power politics ahead of any other point of views like ideology, social reconstruction or morality. Realism is distinctive but diverse. It has emerged as a tool to analyze the international relations through the contributions of a number of analysts. Though it is a very well established theory it can not be defined that easily as there are considerable number of variations in the definitions of the elements that constitute realism and this complication has made way to make this theory irrelevant in the 21 st century.

The problem starts with the fact that no definite sets of propositions and assumptions are there to define realism. Realism places emphasis on the concept that the human nature has placed constraints “ over politics and the absence of international government ” (Spegele 2003, 205). International relations are nothing but a sphere of power and interest.

Realism has been involved in all the major events since the last half a century. There are six main varieties of realism that had been used in the study of international relationship in the twentieth century. All of them bear their own set of different beliefs. But they in common believe in the fact the relations among the states either never alters basically or if they do they do it in a repetitive manner. Either defensive directives of the anarchic international system or the corrupt nature of the leaders of the state is the main determining force behind behavior of the state. Realism actually has believers with a pessimistic view who consider the human power thirst or the necessity to gather resources to survive in a self – help world as the reasons behind all the conflicts and wars occurring one after another (Butler 2004, 17) but with each variant pointing different results the reliability lessens in the 21 st century.

How realism originated

Understanding realism demands the tracing the roots of the discipline back to its history. In the ancient histories of Rome, Greece, India and China realism in some or the other form can be spotted. Thucydides has been argued by many realists to explain the relation between the states in Greece according to their position in power. Niccolo Machiavelli (1469–1527) is considered by one of them by the realists. He had been a supporter of rulers who consider power and security of the state as the only concerns without caring for any morality. Another prominent name stated by the realists as a pillar of realism is Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679). Hobbes describes the lives of individuals as “ solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short ” (Spegele 2003, 207) as they are engulfed by succession of conflicts with each other in a state where no overriding authority is present.

There are many arguments among the latter analysts that whether those classical ancient works can be termed as realist or not and whether there was any conception of balance of power at all in the ancient time. But it is a fact that there have been several conflicts which tends to support the pessimistic point of view expressed by realism (Finlay 2007, 829) and thus, historically, the theory becomes irrelevant today.

Types of realism

Realism as such can be subdivided into two broad categories, the Classical Realism and the Neorealism. But worthy of mention are four other branches of “ contemporary realism, namely, ‘rise and fall’ realism, neoclassical realism, structural defensive realism and structural offensive realism ” (Spegele 2003, 201).

Classical realism

Classical realism was a discipline of research originating in 1939. The most powerful and recognized work on political realism on classical realism was the “ Politics among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace ” by Morgenthau (Kulviksi 2008, 348). It could be called the standard reference for realism in the international relations.

Classical realism considers the flaws present in the human nature as the reason for a reason for constant conflict between the states. The human nature is ever thirsty for more and more power and drives the states to struggle against each other in order to go up in the power status. Because there is no existence of an authority equivalent to a state government at the international level, the states can get no hindrances when they greed for more power. Human failings thus are the root causes of confliction in the behaviors of the states. Wars take place because of the self serving narrow minded tendencies of expansionist statesmen.

Classical realism is of the opinion that the behavior of the state is rational. The benefits and costs of each course of action are considered before creating any strategies. The classical realism started to decline after the 1960s as it faced some criticisms for inconsistencies. It gave way to the quantitative and behavioral theories (Hare 2010, 767).

Neorealism was responsible for brining back the focus on realism again after it faded out in the 1960s. This revival took place after Kenneth Waltz’s ‘ Theory of International Politics ’ (Spegele 2003, 199) arrived in 1979 to replace Morgenthau’s ‘Politics Among Nations ’ (Spegele 2003, 199). According to Waltz political systems comprise of three elements: an anarchical or hierarchical ordering principle, the functionally similar or differentiated characters of the units and the distribution of capabilities. Two of these elements are constants; absence of overarching system means anarchy and the self help principle indicates functionally alike units. The only variable element is the distribution of capacities.

In contrast to classical realism neorealism does not consider the internal make up of the states and does not hold the characters of leaders as a deciding factor in the behavior of the state. Neorealism denies the state strategies being decided rationally and argues that strategies are the products of competition between states or socialization (McArthur 2003, 82) and this is unacceptable in the 21 st century globalization.

Rise and fall realism

Rise and fall realism considers the international system as being directed by the most powerful or the leading state. The leader state gathers a lot of power and the international politics run according to the wishes of that state. This leading position is sought by all the major powers of the world. According to the rise and fall realism the states come to the leading position after gaining power, lead the international politics and then fall from their position. The wars for power take place among states which bring about the changes in the leading position (Page 2004, 254).

This theory is based on the rational behavior of the states. The first ranker takes preventive measures when the second ranker tries to catch up and if it fails the second ranker night overpower the leader through a war.

Neoclassical realism

Neoclassical realism places emphasis on the domestic characters of the state as the determinant of the state’s behavior. A state behaves in the way largely in which its domestic preferences motivate it to. Rasler and Thompson point to the tendency of the ideology and ambition of some states getting disruptive. And because of that those actors in world politics form predatory strategies that keep on leading to some conflict or other. For the analysis of international outcomes the neoclassical realists put stress on the material capabilities and distribution of power (Patterson 2010, 120) but this fails to cover the wider view and thus fails to define international relation of the 21 st century.

Defensive structural realism

Holding some similar views with the neorealism but keeping the own distinctiveness intact the defensive structural realism believes in the theory of state motivation. It emphasizes on the assumption that in an anarchical system the main threat of the state comes from the other states and that’s why it looks for security. The main differences of this theory with the neorealism are: firstly, it has multiple microfoundations; secondly, it takes the offense – defense balance as a variable and thirdly, as an outcome of the combination of rationality with the offense – defense balance favoring defense this theory advocates the necessity of the state to support the status quo (Finlay 2007, 836). However, this theory cannot be applicable in the market oriented scenario of the 21 st century

Offensive structural realism

Holding an opposite view with the defensive structural realism which advocates the accumulation of an appropriate power by the state, the offensive structural realism supports the accumulation of as much power as possible by the states. Mearsheimer (2001) in “ The Tragedy of Great Power Politics ” (Spegele 2003, 209) has argued that in an international environment that is unstable and poses threat of harm like overriding by the other states it is absolutely necessary to gather power for security. This again, holds no truth 21 st century because the concept of power has shifted from predominance of military to finance.

Conclusion: is realism out of date in the 21 st century?

After considering the various aspects of realism and the point of views held by the variants of this discipline it is time to conclude by analyzing whether it is really out of date in the twenty first century or not.

There is no doubt that realism is a very adaptable and multifaceted theory it faces certain criticisms as well. Some of these criticisms are:

• Realism does not hold true for the relation of democratic states with each other.
• Realism is said to open up debates rather than closing them.
• The six variants of realism differ in points of view from each other. The assumptions of each variant do not agree with each other.
• Realists have been criticized for the tendency of making self serving adjustments to avoid criticisms of their theory.
• The balance of power theory has been termed as inaccurate by Vasquez. It was also termed degenerative when judged by Lakatos’ criteria (Hare 2010, 765).

Apart from the about mentioned criticisms realism has also been discredited by “ Legro and Moravcsik (1999) for including arguments in the area of their theory that are meant for competing with the other theories like liberalism or constructivism ” (Patterson 2010, 120). All these criticisms together definitely argue very strongly that realism has become less coherent and the determining power of the theory has become very weak. If they are to be believed then it has to be accepted that realism is becoming really out of date in the twenty first century.

However, the realists protest against this opinion. They have brought forward vigorous debated whenever any criticism has tried to prove them outdated. They consider their role in the international relations analysis as still relevant and their own theory as fruitful. They deny becoming weak. Therefore though there are definite proofs of realism getting weaker and people becoming skeptical of the theory (Spegele 2003, 204), it will need some more time to be considered as totally outdated in the 21 st century.

Bilandzic, H., 2006. Fictionality and Perceived Realism in Experiencing Stories: A Model of Narrative Comprehension and Engagement. Communication Theory , 18 (2), pp. 255-280.

Butler, D., 2004. Meaning And Metaphysics In The Moral Realism Debate. The Southern Journal of Philosophy , 26 (1), pp. 9-27.

Finlay, S. 2007. Four Faces of Moral Realism. Philosophy Compass , 2 (6), pp. 820-849.

Hare, C., 2010. Realism About Tense and Perspective. Philosophy Compass , 5 (9), pp. 760-769.

Kulviksi, J. 2008. Pictorial Realism as Verity. The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism , 64 (3), pp. 343-354.

McArthur, D., 2003. Is Pickering’s ”Pragmatic Realism” Viable? Dialectica , 57 (1), pp. 71-88.

Page, S., 2004. Searle’s Realism Deconstructed . The Philosophical Forum , 35 (3), pp. 249-274.

Patterson, J., 2010. The Art of Swinging Left in the 1930s: Modernism, Realism, and the Politics of the Left in the Murals of Stuart Davis. Art History , 33 (1), pp. 98-123.

Spegele, R., 2003. Three Forms of Political Realism. Political Studies , 35 (2), pp.189-210.

Weber, C., 2005. International relations theory: a critical introduction . London: Routledge.

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8 The Ethics of Realism

Jack Donnelly is Andrew W. Mellon Professor in the Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver.

• Published: 02 September 2009
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This article focuses on the standard realist argument that international politics ‘is a practical exercise and not a moral one’, that ‘no ethical standards are applicable to relations between states’, and that ‘universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states’. The article also looks at the idea that the ‘reality’ of international politics ‘justifies and necessitates political policies which a purely individualistic ethic must always find embarrassing’. It is shown that such categorical denials of the ethical dimension of international relations, although rooted in important insights, are both descriptively inaccurate and prescriptively perverse. Realism is best read as a cautionary ethic of political prudence rooted in a narrow yet insightful vision of international politics.

This and the preceding chapter treat political realism 1 as a loose but distinctive tradition of international theory centered on four propositions.

Anarchy . The absence of government makes international relations a qualitatively distinct domain of political action.

Egoism . Individuals and groups tend to pursue self‐interest narrowly defined.

Groupism . Politics takes place within and between groups.

Power politics . Egoistic groups interacting in anarchy generate a politics of power and security. “International politics are always power politics” ( Carr 1946, 145 ).

The priority of the pursuit of power marginalizes all other objectives. This chapter focuses on the standard realist argument that international politics “is a practical exercise and not a moral one” ( Kennan 1954, 48 ), that “no ethical standards are applicable to relations between states” ( Carr 1946, 153 ). “Universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states” ( Morgenthau 1954, 9 ). The “reality” of international politics “justifies and necessitates political policies which a purely individualistic ethic must always find embarrassing” ( Niebuhr 1932, xi ).

I show that such categorical denials of the ethical dimension of international relations, although rooted in important insights, are both descriptively inaccurate and prescriptively perverse. Sophisticated realists, however, acknowledge that the “realities” of power politics are but one dimension of an adequate theory or practice of international politics. Initial appearances to the contrary, most leading realists grant ethics a necessary if subordinate place in international relations—although they generally fail to grapple with the contradictions between this account and their more familiar calls for an amoral foreign policy.

Realism fits the structure of this part of this Handbook quite well. It has typically been understood by its leading proponents and critics alike as both an explanatory account of the way the world is (the subject of the preceding chapter) and a set of prescriptions, based on this reading of political “reality,” for how societies and their leaders ought to practice international relations (my subject here). The difference in substantive focus, however, leads this chapter to deal with a rather different part of the realist literature. Where the preceding chapter focused on relatively recent work by (primarily American) social scientists, this chapter draws primarily on the work of earlier generations. Part of the reason is that social scientists today are much less inclined than their predecessors to address moral issues in their professional work. No less important, though, is the unrivaled power and vitality of the arguments of these “classical” realist authors.

1 Moral Relativism

Some realists claim that morality is relative to a particular community rather than widely shared across states, societies, or cultures. For example, E. H. Carr (1946, 2, 87) claims that “morality can only be relative, not universal.” “Supposedly absolute and universal principles [are] not principles at all, but the unconscious reflexions of national policy based on a particular interpretation of national interest at a particular time.” George Kennan (1954 , 103, 47, 36) similarly contends that “our own national interest is all that we are really capable of knowing and understanding” and counsels against assuming that “our moral values … necessarily have validity for people everywhere.” Kennan even claims that “in most international differences elements of right and wrong, comparable to those that prevail in personal relations, are—if they exist at all, which is a question—simply not discernable to the outsider.”

In fact, however, we can and do have considerable knowledge of the values and interests of others. Numerous international issues do involve genuine questions of right and wrong. And in contemporary international relations there is widespread agreement, for example, that aggressive war is impermissible and that genocide is a legitimate subject of international concern and action.

The breadth, depth, and policy implications of such shared values certainly are matters of intense controversy. The claim that political values are merely national, however, is descriptively false. An admirable caution against an inappropriate belief in the universality of one's own values has been overgeneralized into a deeply mistaken denial of shared values.

Kennan (1985 – 6 , 206) also confuses the discussion when he claims that the national interest is a matter of “unavoidable necessit[y]” and therefore “subject to classification neither as ‘good’ or ‘bad’. ” This is clearly false. Any “necessity” is neither natural nor inescapable. And unless the national interest is in some sense good, there is no obvious reason to follow it.

Not surprisingly, then, most realists reject moral relativism, particularly in its stronger forms. Reinhold Niebuhr (e.g. 1932 ; 1941 ; 1953 ) and Herbert Butterfield (e.g. 1960 ; 1953 ) are the most prominent of many Christian realists. Among secular realists, Hans Morgenthau (1979, 10) argues that “there is one moral code … [which] is something objective that is to be discovered” (cf. Morgenthau 1946 , 178–80, 195–6; 1962 b , 43, 237). This view is also shared by no less radical a realist than Niccolò Machiavelli (1970 ; 1985 ).

Consider Machiavelli's conception of “cruelties well used.” “Those can be called well used (if it is permissible to speak well of evil) that are done at a stroke, out of the necessity to secure oneself, and then are not persisted in but are turned to as much utility for the subjects as one can” ( The Prince , ch. 8 , para. 4; cf. ch. 17 , para. 1). Although morality cannot be applied directly to politics, Machiavelli insists that one must “not depart from good, when possible, but know how to enter into evil, when forced by necessity” ( The Prince , ch. 18 , para. 5). Note his very conventional understandings of good and evil. Might does not make right. Immoral means are intrinsically bad and thus should be kept to a minimum—and even when necessary must be judged by the standard of “utility for the subjects,” the common public good.

Rather than reject conventional notions of morality and justice, most realists claim instead that these standards either do not apply to (international) politics or are appropriately overridden by other considerations. Human nature, international anarchy, and the special character of the state and statesmanship are the principal grounds on which realists argue that “other criteria, sadder, more limited, more practical, must be allowed to prevail” (Kennan 1954, 49) .

2 Natural Impulsion

The Athenian envoys in Thucydides' “Melian Dialogue” (1982, bk. V, chs. 85–111) present the most radical, and probably best‐known, realist rejection of ethics in international affairs. “Right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must” (bk. V, ch. 89). “Of the gods we believe, and of men we know, that by a necessary law of their nature they rule wherever they can” (bk. V, ch. 105). As another group of anonymous Athenians claimed just before the outbreak of the war, they acquired and held their empire under “the pressure of three of the strongest motives, fear, honor, and interest. And it was not we who set the example, for it has always been the law that the weaker should be subject to the stronger” (bk. I, ch. 76; cf. bk. I, ch. 72).

Even setting aside the difficulties of establishing such “facts” and “laws” and of deriving “ought” from “is,” these arguments are deeply problematic. If the impulse to rule were indeed an overwhelming force of nature, then, following the moral maxim “ought implies can,” conquerors and tyrants might be excused from the requirements of justice. Thucydides' Athenians, however, do not act out of irresistible natural compulsion. Immediately after appealing to the law of the rule of the stronger, they claim that they have treated their allies with greater respect for justice than their position compelled them to do (bk. I, ch. 76). And at Melos they could have taken justice into consideration. They chose, rather than were compelled, to act unjustly—in the end, killing all the men and enslaving the women and children, because the Melians refused to abandon their neutrality.

Even if “all men lust for power” (Morgenthau 1962 a , 42) , most realists appreciate that such impulses are not inevitably overwhelming. For example, Thomas Hobbes (1986) in Chapter 13 of Leviathan stresses the roots of violent conflict lying in the passions of competition, diffidence, and glory, and the associated desires for gain, safety, and reputation. He concludes the chapter, however, by noting that human nature also includes passions that incline us to peace, as well as reason, which allows us to devise alternatives to war. Likewise, Niebuhr, although he emphasizes “the universality of … egoistic corruption” ( 1953 , 13), also insists that we are, and always remain, under a moral obligation to struggle against our fallen nature. “The Christian doctrine of original sin with its seemingly contradictory assertions about the inevitability of sin and man's responsibility for sin is a dialectical truth which does justice to the fact that man's self‐love and self‐centeredness is inevitable, but not in such a way as to fit into the category of natural necessity” ( 1941 , 263).

This vacillation between one‐sided and bifurcated accounts of human nature reflects a tension that, as we shall see, runs through realist arguments. Realists regularly, sometimes spectacularly, overstate the nature and significance of the “facts” that constrain the pursuit of moral objectives in (international) politics. Yet some realists—often the same individuals in more reflective moods— recognize that these “facts” do not justify, let alone require, amoral power politics.

International anarchy, the absence of government above the level of the state, regularly leads realists to argue that “the cleavage between individual morality and international morality corresponds to the difference between social relations in a community and those in a society bordering on anarchy” (Schwarzenberger 1951, 231) . But international relations simply is not a domain where “the law of the jungle still prevails” (Schuman 1941, 9) . And it is obviously false to claim that “states in anarchy cannot afford to be moral. The possibility of moral behavior rests upon the existence of an effective government that can deter and punish illegal actions” (Art and Waltz 1971, 6) . Just as individuals may behave morally in the absence of government enforcement of moral rules, so moral behavior is possible in international relations.

Once more, the archetypical realist argument stretches an important insight well beyond the breaking point. The absence of centralized enforcement of norms and agreements will increase the incidence of immoral or illegal behavior. But all national interests and objectives run up against anarchy. No one would argue that we should abandon pursuing economic interests or stop trying to avoid war with our adversaries because anarchy complicates realizing such objectives. Similarly, anarchy does not require abandoning ethical goals of foreign policy. The difficulty of achieving particular ethical, economic, military, or political objectives in anarchic orders is no reason never to try.

4 Reason(s) of State

Perhaps the strongest realist arguments appeal to the nature of states and statesmanship. The doctrine of raison d'état (reason(s) of state) holds that, “where international relations are concerned, the interests of the state predominate over all other interests and values” (Haslam 2002, 12) . In international relations, it is claimed, the interests of one's own political group appropriately take priority over the interests of other groups and other normative considerations. Because the “primary obligation” of any government “is to the interests of the national society it represents,” “the same moral concepts are no longer relevant to it” ( Kennan 1985 – 6 , 206; 1954 , 48).

Such arguments, however, are ethical arguments. They concern which values are appropriate in international relations, not whether foreign policy is appropriately subject to normative evaluation. “Power politics may be defined as a system of international relations in which groups consider themselves to be ultimate ends”   (Schwarzenberger 1951, 13) . Thus Morgenthau (1951, 33) talks of “the moral dignity of the national interest,” and Heinrich von Treitschke (1916, 54) considers the state “a high moral good in itself.”

Unfortunately, though, realists rarely present an explicit defense for choosing these values over others when they conflict. Raison d'état arguments usually simply draw our attention to the values associated with states and other political communities. Other rationalities and normative standards typically are set aside rather than argued against. And the limits that other values place on the pursuit of national interests and values are generally ignored.

A more limited, and more powerful, realist argument appeals to the preemptory value of (national) survival. For example, Henry Kissinger (1977, 46) argues that “the statesman manipulates reality; his first goal is survival.” Robert Tucker likewise claims that “the statesman has as his highest moral imperative the preservation of the state entrusted to his care” ( Osgood and Tucker 1967 , 304 n. 71). When survival truly is at stake, all else may indeed appropriately give way, much as domestic law and most moral theories permit private individuals to use deadly force in self‐ defense.

Survival, however, rarely is at stake. It simply is not true that “the struggle for power is identical with the struggle for survival” (Spykman 1942, 18) . Only rarely is it the case that “the system forces states to behave according to the dictates of realism, or risk destruction” (Mearsheimer 1995, 91) .

Other national interests, though, no matter how “vital,” lack the preemptive force of survival. They must be balanced against competing political, legal, moral, and other imperatives. The resulting dilemmas are real and important. But realists typically ignore these problems. And at their worst they advance the monstrously misguided claim that national interests ought always to take precedence over all other values in the decisions of statesmen.

6 The Office of the Statesman

Turning from states to statesmen, realists regularly argue that different standards apply to the public actions of national leaders and the actions of private individuals (e.g. Carr 1946, 151 ; Kennan 1954, 48 ; Thompson 1985, 8 ). Like other professionals, statesmen have a professional obligation to give priority to the interests of their “clients.” Much as a defense lawyer is ethically bound to (within certain limits) give an aggressive defense to a guilty client, and a doctor (within certain limits) is required to do what is best for her patient rather than society as a whole, so a statesman is, by the nature of her office, required to do what is best for her state and its interests. “Unlike the solitary individual who may claim the right to judge political action by universal ethical guidelines, the statesman will always make his decision on the basis of the state's interest” (Russell 1990, 51) .

This regularly leads to policies that treat the lives and interests of nationals and foreigners differently. For example, Western embassies evacuated their own nationals but few locals when the genocide began in Rwanda in April 1994. Morally problematic as this may be, we not only expect and regularly accept but often even demand such behavior. National leaders are agents charged with a special ethical responsibility to protect the rights and further the interests of their citizens, the principals for whom they work.

The resulting foreign policy may be “amoral” in the sense that it is not shaped or directly judged by the principles of ordinary morality. It is, however, neither “value free” nor beyond ethical or other normative limits. Much as an attorney is obliged to divulge knowledge of a future crime planned by her client or a doctor is prohibited from purchasing an organ for her patient, there are limits on how statesmen may legitimately pursue the interests of their citizens.

Some limits arise from international law and the ethical (and other) norms of the society of states. 2 For example, today states may legitimately use force only in self‐defense and only within the restrictions imposed by the laws of war and humanitarian law.

National interests and values, however, may also constrain a state's foreign policy. Consider, for example, the commitment of many states to famine and disaster relief, democracy promotion, development assistance, or human rights. “The national interest” is what the term manifestly indicates—namely, those interests/values that are held by the nation. The insistence of some realists (e.g. Morgenthau 1954, 5, 10 ) that states define their interest in terms of power reflects a deeply contentious, and descriptively inaccurate, prescriptive theory of foreign policy.

There is no compelling theoretical reason why a state should not place a high value on, for example, fighting communism, or Islamo‐fascism, or world poverty. Appeals to raison d'état and statesmanship cannot determine what interests the state has or ought to have. These questions of values exceed the reach of the insights of realism.

An even more explicitly ethical argument for an “amoral” foreign policy appeals to “prudence,” which Machiavelli defines as “knowing how to recognize the qualities of inconveniences, and … picking the less bad as good” ( The Prince , ch. 21 , para. 6). Because “one always finds that, bound up with what is good, there is some evil,” Machiavelli counsels emulating the Romans, who “always took the lesser evil to be the better alternative” ( Discourses , bk. III, ch. 37 , para. 1; bk. I, ch. 38 , para. 2).

Morgenthau similarly argues that “prudence—the weighing of the consequences of alternative political actions—[is] the supreme virtue in politics. Ethics in the abstract judges action by its conformity with the moral law; political ethics judges action by its political consequences” (1954, 9) . “Political ethics is indeed the ethics of doing evil … choose, since evil there must be, among several possible actions the one that is least evil” ( 1946, 202 ; cf. Thompson 1985, 13 ). This is a variant on Max Weber's famous distinction between an ethic of ultimate ends and an ethic of responsibility. 3

The public good of one's own state, however, is not the only appropriate standard for judging the actions of statesmen. Prudence does regularly conflict with morality, religion, and other values. There is no reason to believe, though, that it always appropriately takes priority over all other values and concerns. And strikingly absent from most realist discussions is any account of how to balance these competing normative demands.

I suspect that much of the realist tendency to exaggerate arises from failing to explore the complex but unavoidable interactions of the demands of power, morality, and statesmanship. Dazzled by the power of their insights into the (undeniably important) limits on pursuing moral, legal, and humanitarian objectives, realists typically fail to reflect systematically on the limits of power politics. And it is particularly tragic for a tradition that emphasizes responsible statesmanship that realists not only fail to grapple seriously with the problems of balancing competing values but that their characteristic exaggerations short‐circuit serious engagement with this central issue of statesmanship.

8 Realism and Moralism

A defensible realist ethic is perhaps best seen as a warning against the inappropriate application of moral standards to international political action. “The realist target is, or should be, not morality but certain distortions of morality, distortions that deserve the name of moralism” ( Acheson 1958 ; cf. Thompson 1985, 5 ; Lefever 1998 , ch. 9 ; Coady 2005, 123 ). Thus leading figures such as Carr, Niebuhr, and Kennan explicitly cast their work as a critique of “idealism,” understood as a combination of rationalism, moralism, and legalism.

Here too, though, a valuable caution regularly is unreasonably exaggerated. For example, Carr (1946, 153) claims that “theories of international morality tend to fall into two categories. Realists … hold that relations between states are governed solely by power and that morality plays no part in them. The opposite theory, propounded by most utopian writers, is that the same code of morality is applicable to individuals and to states.” In fact, though, not only are there many other positions but few people actually hold either of these views. Most people, both lay and professional, understand that statesmen are subject to the demands of competing systems of values. And, on careful examination, we find that most leading realists acknowledge that moral and ethical principles are, as Kenneth Thompson (1985, 22) puts it, “operative but not controlling.”

Carr (1946, 235) himself, in a more restrained moment, argues that “it is an unreal kind of realism which ignores the element of morality in any world order.” Morgenthau talks of “the curious dialectic of ethics and politics, which prevents the latter, in spite of itself, from escaping the former's judgment and normative direction” (1946, 177) and allows that “nations recognize a moral obligation to refrain from the infliction of death and suffering under certain conditions despite the possibility of justifying such conduct in the light of … the national interest” (1948, 177). Niebuhr (1932, 233, xxiv) not only insists that “an adequate political morality must do justice to the insights of both moralists and political realists” but argues that the “ultimate purpose” of realist analysis “is to find political methods which will offer the most promise of achieving an ethical social goal for society.”

Realists rightly remind us of the dangers of ignoring “realities” rooted in groupism, egoism, and anarchy. A narrow vision of “the national interest defined in terms of power” (Morgenthau 1954, 5, 10) certainly deserves consideration in debates over a state's international objectives. But arguments that “no ethical standards are applicable to relations between states” (Carr 1946, 153) and that “universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states” (Morgenthau 1954, 9) not only cannot bear critical scrutiny but prove not even to reflect the considered views of most leading self‐identified realists—despite their unfortunate tendency to repeat and emphasize such indefensibly exaggerated claims. 4 As John Herz (1976 , 11) notes, “the mitigation, channeling, balancing, or control of power has prevailed perhaps more often than the inevitability of power politics would lead one to believe.”

9 The Contributions and Limits of Realism

The implication of the preceding assessment is that realism is best read as a cautionary ethic of political prudence rooted in a narrow yet insightful vision of international politics. 5 But realism can avoid encouraging a monstrously distorted foreign policy only if we take to heart Carr's insistence (1946, 89) that “we cannot ultimately find a resting place in pure realism.” “Political action must be based on a co‐ordination of morality and power.” “Sound political thought and sound political life will be found only where both [reality and utopia, power and morality] have their place” ( Carr 1946, 97 ; cf. Schwarzenberger 1951, xv ). 6

We must also guard against a very different sort of exaggeration. Not every appeal to anarchy, egoism, or groupism is realist, in either inspiration or application. Analysts of virtually all traditions and theoretical perspectives take anarchy as a defining feature of international relations. Only radical cosmopolitans, libertarians, and anarchists challenge the assumption of groupism. Most ethical traditions and moral theories see the struggle with egoism as central to the problems of moral action. Realism does not have a monopoly or copyright on these explanatory variables, let alone on conflict.

Nonetheless, the combination of anarchy, egoism, and groupism, leading to strong pressures to conflict‐generating power politics, does give realist analyses a recognizable style and character—and value. So long as realism does not claim too much for itself, its central place in the discipline is deserved. Realism, however, is not, and cannot be, the general theory of international politics or international ethics that many of its proponents present it to be.

I thus share William Wohlforth's stress, at the end of the preceding chapter, on the importance of modesty among realists. I am, however, less sanguine about the systematic change that he discerns. For example, John Mearsheimer seems to me hardly modest in his theoretical aspirations or claims and Stephen Walt's arguments (2002; 1997) for “the enduring relevance of the realist tradition” and “the progressive power of realism” are not much more modest than those of his teacher, Kenneth Waltz. Conversely, the more consistent modesty of recent realists such as Charles Glaser or Randall Schweller is no greater than that of, say, Niebuhr, Herz, Tucker, or Glenn Snyder. I see more continuity and recurrence than change. In particular, I expect the peculiar mixture of modesty and exaggeration, and a striking tendency to forget or suppress the limits that one “knows” apply, to remain characteristic of the realist tradition in the coming years.

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Political realism has no obvious connection with either moral realism, the view that moral judgments refer to or are based on natural or objective features of the world, or scientific realism, the view that theory‐independent knowledge of unobservable entities is possible, making it in principle possible to obtain accurate scientific knowledge of the “true” nature of reality.

If an international society has few if any shared norms and values, that is an empirical fact about that particular international society rather than a general theoretical feature of international relations.

See Weber's 1919 essay, “Politics as a vocation,” widely reprinted—e.g. in Weber (1958 ; 2004) ; cf. also Williams (2005 , ch. 5 ). For an excellent brief account of Weber as a realist, see Smith (1986 , ch. 2 ).

Joel Rosenthal's social history (1991) of the postwar generation of American realists, Righteous Realists , nicely captures the crusading spirit of these critics of moralism, who in their deeply held belief in their own insight and righteousness were unusually prone to exaggerating both the power of realism and the shortcomings of other approaches. Consider, for example, the inaccurate and unfair labels “idealists” and “utopians” with which they regularly tarred analysts who took seriously the demands of morality, law, or reason in international relations.

Elsewhere ( Donnelly 2005, 52–4 ; 2000 , ch. 9 ) I make a parallel argument about realism as a social scientific theory. For other summary assessments of realism, in addition to the preceding chapter, see Gilpin (1986) , Keohane (1986) , Doyle (1997) , Grieco (1997) , Guzzini (1998) , Jervis (1998) , Vasquez (1998) , and Walt (2002) .

Niebuhr (1944, 14–15) similarly stresses combining the insights of “the children of darkness” and “the children of light;” that is, “moral cynics, who know no law beyond their will and interest,” and thus are characteristically evil but wise, and “those who believe that self‐interest should be brought under the discipline of a higher law,” who Niebuhr paints as characteristically virtuous but foolish.

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The Realist Paradigm in International Relations: A Critical Assessment

This paper traces the evolution of the Realism school of thought in International Relations by relying on History and Historical accounts of various thinkers who have since been labeled as the originators and influentials of Realism.

Related Papers

Arsenio Castro Zandamela

arsenio zandamela

This paper seeks to assess the major approaches of realism theory of International Relations, examining their features, scopes, variances, and differences over time. Among a range number of approaches of realism in International Relations, only some have marked their generations. Going through those that achieve this feat allows us understanding realism and international relations widely as long realism is the dominant approach of International Relations. By ending this paper, I assess the realism contemporary value by examining whether this theory can explain the most meaningful events today. My conclusion is the variations and differences within the realism family have contributed to making this theory further consistent and valid contemporarily.

European Journal of International Relations

Stefano Guzzini

The present article argues that the discipline of international relations is bound to repeat its rounds of debates about realism as long as the underlying dynamic intrinsic to the realist tradition is not understood. Whereas present debates tend to criticize contemporary realists for going astray (an unhappy conjuncture, as it were), this article claims that there exists a systematic theoretical problem with the way realist theorizing has developed within international relations, and consisting of two fundamental dilemmas. The first or ‘identity dilemma’, the choice between distinctiveness and determinacy, results from the characteristics of the central concept ‘power’ — realists either keep a distinct and single micro–macro link through concepts of power/influence which provides indeterminate explanations or they improve their explanations, but must do so by relaxing their assumptions, thereby losing distinctiveness. The second or ‘conservative dilemma’, the choice between tradition and justification, results from the fact that realism is a form of practical knowledge, which needs some form of justification other than the recourse to mere tradition. Hence, realists either update the practical knowledge of a shared diplomatic culture while losing scientific credibility or, reaching for logical persuasiveness, cast their maxims in a scientific mould which distorts the realist tradition. Realism in international relations is fated to return to these dilemmas until it abandons its own identity as derived from the ‘first debate’ between realism and idealism. By doing so, however, it would be free to join a series of metatheoretical and theoretical research avenues which it has so far left to other schools of thought.

Jack Donnelly

Realism and International Relations provides students with a critical yet sympathetic survey of political realism in international theory. Using six paradigmatic theories - Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz, the Prisoners&#39; Dilemma, Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes - the book examines realist accounts of human nature and state motivation, international anarchy, system structure and the balance of power, international institutions, and morality in foreign policy. Donnelly argues that common realist propositions not only fail to stand up to scrutiny but are rejected by many leading realists as well. He argues that rather than a general theory of international relations, realism is best seen as a philosophical orientation or research program that emphasizes - in an insightful yet one-sided way - the constraints imposed by individual and national egoism and international anarchy. Containing chapter-by-chapter guides to further reading and discussion questions for students, this book ...

International Scholar Journal of Arts

Multimeans Media International International

This paper studies the realist theory of International Relations and attempts an explanation of how it illuminates our understanding of interstate relations. We analyse the key assumptions of the realist theory and look at the main criticisms of the theory with the purpose of establishing how relevant it is to the study of International Relations and world problems today. The thematic, chronological methods and secondary sources are employed in the gathering and presentation of data. The researchers conclude that, despite its criticisms, realism remains a key theory in explaining international relations issue.

Jacob Lucas Samoraj

This paper will assess the alleged relevance of the realist thinking in International Relations by answering the question whether Realism still dominates the theory and practice of International Relations. Examination of some core theoretical assumptions of Realism and assessment of the continuing significance of the realist thinking during the Cold War period and after will be undertaken with regard to both theory and practice. To answer the key research question whether Realism is still dominant, arguments against and in favour of the claim will be presented. Based on evidence, the line of argument establishes that although the realist depiction of International Relations, with its stress upon the distribution of power, provides an important departure and continuous insight, not to mention the ‘timeless wisdom’ into the understanding of the behaviour of states, it is not in itself definitive as Realism has some noticeable weaknesses. This paper begins from the premise that although Realism alone is insufficient for understanding of contemporary international relations, its insights remain necessary to that enterprise. The method adopted is Toulmin model of argument, which serves as a basis for structure and organization. The big idea is an elucidation on ‘an enlightened Realism’, which confirms the continuing validity of Realist principles throughout history. It is explained through a juxtaposition between statecraft by Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski. Despite arguments questioning the relevance of the classical paradigm Realism is nowhere near becoming irrelevant in the practice of some states. Whereas the discipline has witnessed an astounding flourishing of numerous post-classical theories of International Relations. Despite emergence of such new theories, it is reasonable to suggest that Realism has not become obsolete. Undeniably, Realism produces numerous prolific critics, perhaps deservedly, because in its power political mode, it provides instrumental interpretation of the international system. Some would argue even, immoral examination of international politics, as opposed to a normative one, unlocked by the study of alternative International Relations theories, such as the English School, Constructivism, Feminism, Green theories or Global Environmentalism. It will be argued, however, that scholars of international politics cannot totally discard the Realist paradigm since security, rather than economic development, still remains the most important concern for many states in the developing world (although emancipation concerns are coming to the fore as well). Realism’s applicability and ability to explain the current international politics remains unparalleled. Although the world is changing (45% of the world is democratic), in certain fundamentals, it has not changed as much as many contemporary International Relations theorists believe. To a large extent, it remains characterised by anarchy, and its attendant logic of self-help and struggle for survival. The world is still decentralised, the key political actors are states which are competitive. This confirms Realist analyses of power politics with states compelled by their anarchic environment to act in a ‘functionally undifferentiated’ manner while using capability advantages to gain more influence over outcomes based on power accumulation, as timeless. In other words, Realism as one of not many theoretical paradigms remains relevant despite the passing of history, in other words, it aspires to explain events even beyond history as it is the longest tradition of thinking about international political reality. Thus, Realism remains essential to understanding states’ choices and actions. Consequently, despite the emergence of postpositivist approaches, it would be incorrect, some would argue even naïve, to state that Realism is not dominant. However pessimistically it may sound, based on data and evidence of states' practice Realism persists. Realism is far from being an exhaustive theory though, neither has it existed without evident limitations, nor has it remained universally applicable to all times and epochs (despite claims for it being beyond history, i.e. being relevant in all epochs), but its savage, simplistic variant is still evident in the world. Whether in brutal acts of war, acts of avenge, revanchism, competition and breaking of human rights, Realism is still unrivalled when it comes to the conduct of states in the non-democratic world. However, Realism's influence is not monolithic when it comes to theory. Realism persists in acts of states only when weak leaders sacrificing integrity and objectivity decide to allow so, for example, by not disarming an aggressor in time, or by turning a blind eye to unlawful military interventions, or by not being guided by ethics. Hard military power counts for more in the context of international politics than it does in democratic domestic politics. In international relations, conquest, or pure coercion, is not leadership, but mere dictation. In other words, 'offensive' Realism exists, as long as, weak leaders who are on top of states follow the realist precepts and its attendant logic of competition, rivalry, carnal revenge and retort to war. In so doing though dictators put whole societies as well as liberal order in danger. In contrast, strong leaders help groups create and achieve shared goals. Successful transformational leadership is about change. When strong leaders allow for the possibility of transformation of the structure towards security community, then the realist logic no longer holds true and is not accurate. Realism and neo-realism are unable to explain structural change in world order. In line with the evidence, although Realism is not definitive (i.e. even weak leaders have alternatives and societies have democracy to choose strong leaders), it is alive and well, and it looks like it is not likely to disappear anytime soon from both theory and practice of International Relations. Primitive, savage and brutal elements are unfortunately still visible in 21st century civilized world. What can IR scholars do to make Realism less dominant in both IR theory and practice of states? The relationship between theory and practice is that of mutual, dual causality. If Realism persists on top echelons of power, it persists also in the practice of states. To change this, scholars have to initiate a theoretical innovation among the top most powerful statesmen. Realism persists unless IR scholars are actively engaged in innovative refinement and eclectic creation of new theories which could then be, in turn, readily applied by strong, transformational leaders, i.e. leaders who believe in change and bring about real, multiple social change. In principle, good theories lead to good policies since policy problems inspire theoretical innovation. Theories inform policy although policy makers pay relatively little attention to the vast theoretical literature in International Relations. If this trend could be reversed, if more scholars would become more interested in doing policy-relevant work and if more policy makers started to listen to IR scholars, then this would enable more effective bridging of the gap between theory and policy. If it is accepted that the point of IR theory is to enable a convergence in which political theory meets practice. Then, such an analytic activity could be, thereby leading to a smoother and swifter transfer of new, well crafted, fine-tuned, and more innovative theories strengthening 'transmission belt' from theory to policy. This would be followed by implementation of effective, successful policies to enable peaceful change though within the system, in actual reality, leading to the innovative and technological transformation of the whole system. Perhaps, even civilizing the International Society in the way that some of the English School scholars have long time ago envisaged. Creative, original ideas exist, but they are rarely applied by policy makers and statesmen who often discard eco-movements, feminist, postmodernist, pospositivist theories. Thus, if scholars and academics produce useful knowledge, as for example with the theory of 'an enlightened Realism', such constructive ideas could be implemented into the practice of statecraft. When successful, research for policy’s sake could perform an enlightenment function of social sciences (this metaphor illustrates the role of a theory in understanding the world of IR - we can only shed light on what is known, and even then, we cannot be 100% certain about the activity of theorising, for what is unknown remains in the darkness) making the discipline more diverse and the world a better place. Reminding at the same time that each of the theories whether classical or post-classical, reveal only part of truth about contemporary international political reality, and thus, from this standpoint, none is sufficiently satisfactory.

International journal of innovative research and development

Umar Yandaki

Edmund Handby

Sandrina Antunes

In the discipline of International Relations (IR), realism is a school of thought that emphasises the competitive and conflictual side of international relations. Realism’s roots are often said to be found in some of humankind’s earliest historical writings, particularly Thucydides’ history of the Peloponnesian War, which raged between 431 and 404 BCE. Thucydides, writing over two thousand years ago, was not a ‘realist’ because IR theory did not exist in named form until the twentieth century. However, when looking back from a contemporary vantage point, theorists detected many similarities in the thought patterns and behaviours of the ancient world and the modern world. They then drew on his writings, and that of others, to lend weight to the idea that there was a timeless theory spanning all recorded human history. That theory was named ‘realism’.

Thinley Dhondup , Thinley Dhondup

Poowin Bunyavejchewin

The end of the Cold War had led the academia to assume that Realism was obsolete in both theory and practice of International Relations (IR), but the incident of 11 September 2001 has falsified that assumption. This short article argues that IR is hitherto dominated by Realism, because of the four reasons, namely the tradition of the US foreign policy, the heritage of the Cold War, the American dominion of IR academia, and the applicability of its tradition to the present international politics.

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Realism in Today’s International Relations

Introduction, theories that support these assertions, reference list.

Realism is a theory that basis its principle beliefs on self-competiveness. The human nature of self-interest and egoism and lack of international government have led to sphere of power and interest in the international relations. The theory upholds the view that world politics involves sovereign states that compete to attain security. However, this build up of security sometimes come along with greater instability as a result of the competing powers accumulating power arms to defend their territories.

This therefore makes national security search an endless game. The theory also upholds the view that there is no higher source of authority that exists above the great powers (Donnelly 2000, p. 8). These higher powers are the ones that bring order in the international relations; however, realism is against the actions of these higher powers claiming that the international relations should be left in the hands of the control of human nature.

Realism brings out the realist perception that today’s state relations are based on the notion of competition. This is where various nations focus more on what they are to gain from any relation in terms of attaining the ability to help themselves. Firstly, by basing its fundamentals on emphasis on international anarchy and human selfishness, realism only focuses on one side of the issue and ignores the whole general theory of international relations. In addition, its promise to provide an overview explaining the theory of international politics has made this theory to be viewed as a great failure (Galston 2010, p. 388).

Realists’ emphasis on political needs that are derived from lack of international government makes the evil human nature become the order of policy making in the sensitive international relation issues. This is because human nature is known to be controlled by a structured political authority and exercise of rules. Adopting realism in international relations, therefore, serves to empower the exercise of the human nature which when left to reign can express the worst attributes making the world politics unmanageable (Donnelly, 2000, p. 435) This is because human nature is led by egoism that makes nations seek to control the struggle for power and security without considering the limitations of power and space.

Realism fails to provide an ideal political life even during the most favorable circumstances. This is because it holds the view that harmony is unachievable and focuses on amassing security arms to guard a nation from ever present conflict and instability.

From the early times of the history of international relations, realism has not been perceived as an alternative to the idea of transforming the world politics. For instance, many scholars have always viewed the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union as an illustration of a weakness in the adoption of realist international theory. Since this theory of international relations did not cease to exist though most people had predicted its end after resolution of this crisis, its persistence continues to bring harm to the current situation in the international relations.

Despite these weaknesses in the realism theory, it has remained an important theory in the international relations even in the present age. Firstly, the political theory has shown that this theory is still being applied in the international relations. This is due to the nature of the theory to refuse the utopian claim of always expecting the best and adoption of preparation mechanisms to defeat the worst. According to Mearsheimer’s (2001, p.10-11) argument, the atmosphere that the current states have adopted is that which is dominated by a cycle of violence that is not likely to be overcome easily. He proposes this through suggestion of the five basic assumptions that dominate the international relations system.

Firstly, the international system still operates on the system of anarchy. This is where there is no functional central authority to govern or control different states’ actions. This assumption can gain its ground since the few international organizations that assume the position of central authority are either not functional or they are not empowered enough to command much authority from all the nations of the world. Secondly, the renowned great powers in the world have access to military capability that can be used against other states through destruction especially during the times of attacks or inter-state wars.

Mearsheimer’s (2001, p. 11) third assumption about the international system is that different states cannot have the certainty of their counterparts’ intentions. His fourth assumption is that the main objective of all states is attaining their means of survival. Finally, he argues that the international system is governed by the notion that states are able to remain balanced thus claiming that they should be treated as rational actors. When the international system has assimilated the five assumptions, then what result are the negative results of realism.

The consistent fear among both great and even small nations has become a reality in the world today. Nations are in constant fear against their neighbors or other nations that appear to them as a threat. This fear has developed as a result of the possession of the means and ways of inflicting fear by the great powers. In addition there lacks a functional institution that is able to control a given nation from being aggressive to another nation.

The other behavior that has been adopted by various nations today as a result of assimilating realism in their relations is the desire to find ways of assisting themselves. The current state of anarchy in the world has forced the nations to seek ways of ensuring their own safety and survival. They do this by seeking ways of maximizing their own power in order to counterattack any unknown intentions of other states around them.

Different nations are currently investing a lot of their resources in trying to become better than their counterparts. They do this through various strategies; some of these include the use of wars and blackmail to gain more power than others. This is because a situation of war between two nations gives a chance for the warring nations to become certain of the other’s power and also to define their power position. This is after establishing their rival’s capability which gives them a sense of satisfaction.

Realism makes power the basis of international politics. According to Schmidt (2004, p. 429), this view evolves from describing the power of a state based on state machinery and materials that the state has in comparison with other states. This makes a state to measure its power by focusing on its ability to defeat other nations in a situation of war between them.

Even if Mearsheimer (2001, p. 23) focuses on other aspects in determining the strength of a nation like socio-economic components, these aspects zero back to the nation’s ability to come up with a strong military power system. The nations that are known to be the strongest are those that besides being wealthy and having large populations, they also have a strong army and possess strong military mechanism. This has therefore made international politics a consistent security competition where their relations are those of continued struggle to gain a higher position than other nations.

According to realism, the introduction of a relationship where nations depend on each other based on a common ground of trust is unnecessary as this relation would lack benefits since nations would have nothing to gain. In addition, realism argues that when a nation invests its resources in attaining power, there would be no reason for other nations to do the same in an attempt to compete against it. This is because it is doing this in its attempt to secure a security mandate which is important in all states.

While relating the theory of realism to the global political economy, an individual must have the reality that reality is changing. This is in terms of relations of production, power, and forms of states among other forces. These forces are the ones that can describe the current state of the world. Various scholars in their attempt to criticize the approaches of the international relations have focused on the Global Political Economy, GPE.

The theory of orthodoxy which holds close perceptions as those of the theory of positivism leads to the confirmation that realism is still an important concept in the international relations. In coming up with this theory, Hume (1972, p.38) claimed that the main determiner of the prices of products in the market is the availability of the exchange commodity. The application of this claim in the market is that this commodity that is used as the means of exchange controls free trade by ensuring that it remains balanced.

He advanced this claim by the observation that since the demand is determined by prices of the commodity, the countries that produce in surplus will make their exports to drop while those that produce deficit products will go up. This therefore makes markets gain the ability to stabilize independently. All these claims were directed to elimination of the restrictions that are placed to control importation of goods by assuming that this would not be harmful to the global market. Free trade that is in existence today is based on this notion that buyers and sellers can simply continue with their market transactions regardless of existence of any set body to keep check or control how this is done.

Marxist capitalism in the market economy also possesses some realist inclinations. The theory’s basis is founded on expanding oneself without considering the limitations of time and location. This is because it argues on the importance of opening the market which in the long run ends up benefiting the capitalist traders and those who have the power to define the way the market is run due to their influence and power. This therefore leads to a market economy that is dominated by laissez faire capitalism.

The current form of free trade has taken this feature where the most influential nations insist that the other states and especially the developing nations open their borders in order to allow easy flow of goods due to elimination of all restrictions. However, due to lack of a powerful system to control this process, the wealthy nations become hideous by refusing to open theirs or through exercising high taxes on products being imported to their country from other trade partners. This perpetuates economic imbalance and creates ‘master’ and ‘slave’ nations.

Capitalism perceives conflicts that exist between trade partners as necessary in the process of ascertaining the power of an individual nation. This is because these conflicts ensure the possibilities of nations to put up empires and new property in new areas. These views are similar to those of current realism since the current international relations views a conflict in a nation as a chance to empower their power and authority over others.

Feminism is another theory that can also explain the existence of realism in the international relations today. This theory in the international relations aims at making a difference through changing the way the world is perceived. In addition, the theory through its introduction of new ideas aims at giving more emphasis to gender issues in the platform of international relations. The emergence of this theory in the international relations has come to strengthen the current international relations order in which realism has become an important concept.

This is because the theory has brought the discussions on very core aspects of the theory. These include aspects like security, issues of human rights and authority. According to the theory’s view, women have been left behind while the international relations is analyzing the state, political economy and even issues of international security. This can explain why women have remained powerless in the military and foreign arena. This is because according to the feminists view, the constraints that have existed for a long time in the global order and gender relations should be eliminated.

The policies and rules that prevent evenly distribution of power between genders should be removed in order to empower all the genders equally and allow them to compete on a common ground. The adoption of the feminism theory in the current society has encouraged the real exercise of unrestrained human nature between different genders. This is where competition and search for glory has dominated the various fields of gender relations and since there lacks a superior power to control these measures, lack of trust has led to fear and doubt between these relations.

In the view of critical realism, the aspect that determines economic efficiency and growth is through ensuring that there are no market leaders or the financial markets take charge of the developments as these leaders may end up manipulating developments in order to favor their situations (Edkins & Vaughan-Williams 2009, p. 67). This however, may cause conflicts as the situation would encourage unfriendly control and since there is no one to lead or to take charge, the market players may start operating in anarchy. This may end up destroying the principles of market economy. This theory of economics became the basis of current theories of economists, though at first it had been viewed as contradictory.

Politics in the international community is based on the notion of agreement through justice; it also views this as possible through adoption of coordination which is undertaken by a system that checks the balances of power. However, in today’s international relations, the views that have been adopted are those of realism which continue to dominate the politics in the international arena. This is because according to political realists, agreement that is necessary in order to sustain ordered politics in the international relations is not possible.

Realists believe in having autonomy on the political arena since according to them, politics cannot flourish well if there is lack of freedom to exercise judgment without restriction by any forces or principles. Realists view political conflict as a recurrent situation; thus, the need to consistently seek better ways of preventing the individual nation from its effect. The current state of international relations domination of this theory can be identified by the relations between various nations which have been dominated by tension. This has been due to lack of trust which has made nations to relate only with a motive of understanding each other’s intentions. The realist view of political life with perceived skepticism is the order of international relations today.

The current systems that run the political international relations lack a hierarchic structure. The perception that order should be imposed by a higher authority instead of the interactions of political actors that operate on the same level has caused the current state of politics in the international relations. There is however need to level this ground if international relations are to improve. Nevertheless; political, military, and economic might will remain as determinant factors in the field of international relations.

Donnelly, J., 2000. Realism and international relations . Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Edkins, J., & Vaughan-Williams, N., 2009. Critical theorists and international relations. Oxon, OX: Taylor & Francis.

Galston, W. A., 2010. Realism in political theory. European Journal of Political Theory 9 (4), 385–411.

Hume, D., 1972. “Of money”, in E. Rotwein (ed) Writings on economics . Freeport, NY: Hume, Books for Libraries Press. pp. 33-46.

Mearsheimer, J. J., 2001. The tragedy of great power politics . New York, NY: Norton New York.

Schmidt, B. C., 2004. Realism as tragedy. Review of International Studies, 30 : 427-441.

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Realism and Liberalism in International Relations

Any student of international relations can be counted on to study the basic foundations of IR, which are the theories behind the study of IR itself. Among the most prevalent of these theories are realism and liberalism. Until the present, professors still speak of the motto from the 1651 work of Thomas Hobbes, entitled Leviathan , that speaks of the state of nature being prone to what Hobbes calls bellum omnium contra omnes or the war of all against all ( Hobbes : De Cive, 1642 and Leviathan, 1651), as well as Francis Fukuyama naming Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government (Fukuyama : The End of History and the Last Man, 1992).

The above mentioned ‘state of nature’ is a central assumption in realist theory, holding that anarchy is a defined condition of the international system, as well as postulating that statecraft and subsequently, foreign policy, is largely devoted to ensuring national survival and the pursuit of national interests. Realism is, therefore, primarily concerned with states and their actions in the international system, as driven by competitive self-interest. Thus, realism holds that international organizations and other trans-state or sub-state actors hold little real influence, in the face of states as unitary actors looking after themselves.

One supposes then, that with its dark assumptions and premises of antagonistic condition, realism is tied to some of the fundamental questions of what constitutes ‘human nature’ with an emphasis on the limits of humanity’s altruism, well-expressed by Heinrich von Treitschke, saying it is above all important not to make greater demands of human nature than its frailty can satisfy (Treitschke : Politics, 1916). It is then reasonable to contend that realism places man as a creature whose greatest instinct is self-preservation. Following Hans Morgenthau’s thinking that the social world is but a projection of human nature onto the collective plane (Morgenthau: Politics Among Nations, 1948), one can contend as well that perhaps, the international system as viewed from the realist lens, is also a projection of collective human nature (the state) and eventually, this ‘collective nature’ is manifested in the anarchy of the global stage. Insofar as self-preservation and the gain of resources and prestige remain aims of the human creature, then maybe, taken collectively, these aims can and are being projected across state borders. One will remember, I hope, that states act in their own interest, a concept not too far from human choices in the name of self-advancement and the accrual of resources, first for survival, and eventually as whims of luxury, paralleled by the section in Thomas Hobbes work, which says the first [competition] maketh man invade for gain, the second [diffidence] for safety and the third [glory] for reputation (Hobbes : Leviathan, 1651).

Additionally, as long as armed conflict, ideological rifts and possibilities of aggression remain, then realism will continue as a valid means of interpreting international politics, since yet another of its core assumptions lie in the measurement of power in terms of military capability, within an anarchic global system, where natural antagonism presents little possibility for peace and cooperation.

All that said, however accurately realism can account for aggression, conflict and militaristic-expansionist policies, its assumptions prevent it from possessing effective explanatory capacity when it comes to the concept of transnational cooperation, free trade, the relative peacefulness of the international system, the prevalence of democratic governance and the growing emphasis on economic linkage and globalization. These concepts are almost anathema to all but the most hedged and doubtful of realism’s proponents. Among the main faults ascribed to realism are its disability to predict and account for the collapse of the Soviet Union and the pervasive peace between liberal nations (McMurtrie : Towards Just International Relations Theory, Honors Thesis, 2007). Thus, we now have the opposite of realism itself, the liberal school of thought.

Liberalism, in stark contrast to realism, believes in the measurement of power through state economies, the possibility of peace and cooperation, as well as the concepts of political freedoms, rights and the like. Francis Fukuyama, quite notably, believed that progress in human history can be measured by the elimination of global conflict and the adoption of principles of legitimacy and observed the extent to which liberal democracies have transcended their violent instincts (Burchill :  Theories of International Relations 3/E, 2005).

Furthermore, liberals argue for the progress and perfectibility of the human condition as well as a degree of confidence in the removal of the stain of war from human experience (Gardner, 1990/Hoffmann, 1995/Zacher and Matthew, 1995 ; taken from Burchill : Theories of International Relations 3/E, 2005).

That having been established as core assumptions of liberal international theory, can it be supposed, that since there are observable limits to human nature and altruistic action, as in the realist school of thought, liberalism is therefore overly idealistic in its belief in human capacity and the eventual obsolescence of war as the measure of state power in the international system?

As I believe, liberalism offers the possibility of peace even as states amass power, on the basis that power has now taken a less destructive form, from guns to bank notes and exports. In my opinion, there need not be an overarching stress on the frailties of humanity even if world peace seems too lofty of an ideal. I say this on the basis that a shift in the definition of ‘power’ from military capability to economic status. This shift creates the need for greater linkage (therefore, the new emphasis on globalization) as well as increased cooperation. For this reason, states still amass power even under the liberal system, the main difference being the fact that power is now better accrued if more cooperation is realized within the framework of international politics.

This need for linkage and economic progress then accounts for the liberalist’s stress on free trade and market capitalism, as well as allowing for the legitimate selection of government through democratic action. As it stands, in my opinion, liberalism operates under real-world conditions, reflecting state interest and aggrandizement, if only that such advancement results in peace instead of the expected dose of conflict.

Having said that, I think liberalism is no longer just a projection of how politics ought to be, but is now a modern, practical theory of peace achieved in the midst of anarchic conditions and even after the state’s quest for power.

Still, the debate continues as to which school remains the most relevant and timely, with regards to the interpretation of the international system. Some will always say realism is politics as it is while liberalism is an example of politics idealized . However, as the study of IR continues, we will continue to seek the answers to the engaging questions of foreign policy that confront today’s global system. Whichever way we choose to justify or to answer those questions, despite their polar difference, realism and liberalism are both reflections of various aspects of the international system, which we seek to understand. The significance of both lies in their capacity to explain opposite phenomena, and though both are clearly antithetical, perhaps the answer to the question of how the world operates will lie not in the thesis and antithesis, but in the synthesis of both. One pragmatic approach for state advancement blended with a belief in humanity’s inherent potentials. In my opinion, for all the disagreement that has been in existence with both schools of thought, perhaps the true path lies in combination. A state of anarchy as a condition but peace as a result, and a world that knows the obstacles confronting all of its inhabitants, but knows as well that humanity has always been great at overcoming what seems insurmountable.

Sources Used

Written by: Bea Kylene Jumarang Written at: De La Salle University Manila, Philippines (DLSU-M) Written for: Mr. Al James D. Untalan Date written: June 2011

Further Reading on E-International Relations

• Intermestic Realism: Domestic Considerations in International Relations
• Tracing Hobbes in Realist International Relations Theory
• A Critical Reflection on Sovereignty in International Relations Today
• The Limits of the Scientific Method in International Relations
• Rehabilitating Realism Through Mohammed Ayoob’s “Subaltern Realism” Theory
• An Ethical Dilemma: How Classical Realism Conceives Human Nature

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Guest Essay

Keeping U.S. Power Behind Israel Will Keep Iran at Bay

By Reuel Marc Gerecht and Ray Takeyh

Mr. Gerecht is a resident scholar at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Mr. Takeyh is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Until Iran’s barrage of missiles and drones against Israel, the two countries had avoided open military intrusions into each other’s territory. Tehran most often acted through proxies, and Jerusalem via bombing runs and unacknowledged assassinations in the region.

Iran’s unprecedented attack this weekend, which failed to kill a single Israeli, has perhaps now opened the clerical regime to a major reprisal. The White House clearly does not want Jerusalem to undertake such a response, fearing escalation that could bring the United States into a regional war.

But the chances are good that Israel will strike back to deter future direct attacks. And the best way for Washington to limit the expansion of this conflict is to signal clearly its intention to support an Israeli counterattack. It’s the recurring military paradox: To contain a war, a belligerent sometimes needs to threaten its expansion. Iran’s internal situation, its memory about past U.S. military action and a conspiratorial worldview all support this strategy.

An Iranian regime well aware of its weaknesses knows how convulsive a war with Israel and America would be and how unwelcome it would be received by a restive populace already protesting a dysfunctional economy and increasing oppression. Many within the elite are surely angry at having fallen from the inner circles of power and wealth as the 84-year-old supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, engineers his succession.

A powerful Israeli response could include a preventive strike against Iran’s nuclear sites. In what may prove a miscalculation, Ayatollah Khamenei is not known to have given the green light to assemble a nuclear weapon. Why strike Iran hard and leave its atomic ambitions undamaged? Washington will surely want to reduce the consequences in the region from such an attack. To do that, the White House will need to make Tehran understand that U.S. forces will immediately intercede if Iran then tries to escalate.

To be sure, Israel and America may both be at fault for giving Ayatollah Khamenei the impression that they had no appetite for escalation. Tehran has abetted Islamic militants who have killed a lot of Israelis and Americans while seeming to be immune from a direct attack. The occasional Israeli and American assassination of Iranian military men on foreign soil, or in Iran without fanfare, actually highlighted a reluctance to confront Iran more directly.

And yet the Islamic Republic remains careful not to get into direct conflict with America. Senior clergy members and the commanders in the Revolutionary Guards are all old enough to remember that the U.S. Navy inflicted severe damage on the Iranian Navy in 1988 in retaliation for the mining of an American warship. It was one of the biggest U.S. naval operations since World War II. The United States said the downing in 1988 of Iran Air flight 655 by the Navy warship Vincennes was an accident, but Tehran believed it was deliberate and an indication that Washington was ready to intervene in the war with Iraq. It was thought to be a factor in helping to convince Iran to end the conflict. Senior Revolutionary Guardsmen, angry at Israel for the killing of senior commanders on April 1 in a strike in Syria, may doubt Washington’s volition, but they have no doubts about American military hardware.

Sometimes conspiracy-mindedness, instead of interfering with clear thinking, can be useful to an adversary. It is a conceit of the Iranian Islamist elite that Jews manipulate Americans into wars not of their choosing. Ayatollah Khamenei has articulated this idea : “The Western powers are a mafia,” he said in 2022. “At the top of this mafia stand the prominent Zionist merchants, and the politicians obey them. The U.S. is their showcase, and they’re spread out everywhere.”

It is time for Washington to feed this conspiratorial thinking. The United States should augment its presence in the Gulf, dispatch admirals and spy chiefs to Israel and undertake joint Israeli-U.S. military exercises that highlight long-range bombing runs. With its darkest conspiracies reconfirmed, Iran’s elite will search for a way out — even if Israel decides on a frontal assault.

The United States has often favored containment and de-escalation with Iran. When Iran’s proxies killed three American service members in Jordan on Jan. 28, Washington didn’t hold Tehran directly responsible. While attacking the proxies, the White House conveyed to Tehran its non-escalatory intentions. It had even renewed a sanctions waiver granting Iran access to $10 billion held in escrow by Oman for Iraqi electricity purchases.

The strategy has worked. Ayatollah Khamenei clamped down on his surrogates, who desisted from further attack on Americans. But the supreme leader can turn that spigot back on at any time.

Today, the problem with Washington distancing itself from Jerusalem, as it has over the large-scale civilian deaths and humanitarian suffering in the Gaza war, is that it will not defuse a crisis that puts Iran and Israel in direct confrontation. And Ayatollah Khamenei will not allow himself to be seen as backing down to Jews — particularly if they are unmoored from superior American power.

For the United States, standing by Israel would allow Ayatollah Khamenei another path, a way to back down without losing face. There is a precedent for such a retreat. Again, the Iran-Iraq war is instructive. The founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ruhollah Khomeini, opted for an armistice with Iraq, a country he had long denigrated, because of the sheer exhaustion of his nation and the fear that the war could simply not be won. The implicit threat of American involvement was a big factor in this decision.

Now only the United States can again prompt similar foreboding in Tehran about the intercession of an indomitable force. For years Washington has been doing, more or less, just the opposite.

Reuel Marc Gerecht, a former Iranian targets officer in the Central Intelligence Agency, is a resident scholar at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Ray Takeyh is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

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