philosophical reflection essay example

Philosophical Thinking and Reflection Essay

Philosophical thinking.

It is important to note that philosophy is a discipline that systematically applies reason to deepen the overall understanding of existence, reality, and the nature of knowledge as well as wisdom through a thorough examination. The question about knowledge is strongly associated with a branch of philosophy called epistemology. The latter focuses on defending and analyzing the key concepts of knowledge, including the core methodological frameworks utilized to attain it. When it comes to understanding reality itself, the most relevant branch of philosophy is metaphysics. It seeks to describe the nature of reality by addressing the underlying matters beyond science’s capabilities, but the principles are grounded in reason and logic. Lastly, the ideas about the good life and proper way of living stem from the branch of philosophy called ethics. It assesses and thoroughly defends the critical concepts of value by determining what is wrong and right.

In the case of the question of knowledge, Socrates offered solid methodologies to uncover what is true. It should be noted that dialectic was a cornerstone of the pursuit of knowledge through wisdom, which is focused on a mutually respectful discourse between several people of opposing views to attain the truth (The Socratic Approach, n.d.). However, when it comes to delivering the known truth to people, who do not know, such as students, Socrates used the Socratic Method. The latter focused on asking questions about known matters and pushing the boundaries of knowledge to attain new ones (The Socratic Approach, n.d.).

Arguments played a central role in the process of structuring and obtaining the truth since they were vigorously evaluated and assessed in regard to their validity. Even during his last trial and sentencing to death, Socrates adhered to his reasoning by proving why death should not be feared. He claimed that death is either something or nothing; in the former case, one can communicate with the dead, and in the latter case, it is dreamless sleep. Therefore, both cases present no valid reason to fear death, which makes it irrational for him to be fearful of his sentencing (The Apology: A Defense of Philosophy, n.d.).

In the case of the question about reality, Plato offered insightful knowledge and a framework to understand the nature of reality. The philosopher’s core claim about metaphysics is rooted in the concept of flux or change. His argument is that the world is constantly changing, which makes knowledge impossible, but since knowledge is possible, then there are some essences outside the world in the metaphysical one (Plato Forms: The Foundations of Being, n.d.). Reality is grounded on forms, which are entities such as paradigms and ideals (Plato Forms: The Foundations of Being, n.d.).

In the case of the question of epistemology, Aristotle offered virtue ethics to distinguish what is wrong from what is right. It is important to note that virtue ethics focuses on character or actor rather than the action itself. He claimed that when a person needs to act, he or she will act in accordance with his or her character (Aristotle’s Highest Good, n.d.). Virtue is located between two extremes, and vice is either deficiency or excess.

Reflection on Virtue Ethics

Thinking philosophically means thinking structurally with awareness of the premises and arguments being made to come to a certain conclusion. Such an approach can help me immensely by making me more resilient to groupthink, biases, and logical fallacies. It deepens my understanding of what is true, what is right, and what is real.

The impact of the ideas of the Ancient Greek philosophers on my opinions and views is significant. For instance, virtue ethics taught me that ethics is not binomial in terms of one side being wrong and the other side is right. The given framework tells that goodness is in between two extremes, which is balance. The notion holds true in regard to almost everything, such as eating, exercising, sleeping, using social media, working, and many more. In addition, the Socratic Method allowed me to converse with myself by asking questions about what I know and expanding my knowledge further. For example, I was able to observe how I subconsciously justify my procrastination, but asking simple questions can reveal the invalidity of the underlying arguments.

Aristotle’s virtue ethics holds true even today, if not more relevant. The modern world reached new extremes of excess and depravity, where our capability to go to either extreme is unparalleled. A person can have millions of friends through social media, the wealthy have a net worth in billions, certain political leaders can influence the world, one can eat whatever and however he or she wants, people of the planet are suffering from extreme obesity and hunger, the higher level of comfort is achieved, the pollution impacting the planet, and these are only a few examples of extremes of the modernity. For example, Aristotle developed the doctrine of the mean, where he provided the example of courage. Too much courage leads to foolishness since there is a fine line between bravery and stupidity, and the lack of courage results in cowardice (Aristotle’s Highest Good, n.d.).

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• What is the Socratic Method?
• The Socratic Method: Fostering Critical Thinking
• Philosophy. The Socratic Method: What Is It?
• Epistemology and Metaphysics in Relation to Skepticism, Rationalism, and Materialism
• How Socratic Dialogue Differs From Other Conversations
• The Socratic Legacy or the Cynic Legacy
• "Meno" a Socratic Dialogue by Plato - Philosophy
• Socratic Knowledge of Ignorance vs. Descartes' Doubt
• Plato’s “Parable of the Cave”: The Socratic Method
• What is Socratic Method
• Act Utilitarianism and Virtue Ethics: Pros and Cons
• Care Ethics Theory and Its Analysis
• The Concept of Aristotle’s Virtue Ethics
• Ethical and Psychological Egoism
• The Value of Ethics: What Does It Mean to Be Ethical?

Reflection Paper On Philosophy

This essay is reflection about my understanding from what I have learned during this class about what philosophy is. Philosophy is a broad topic and can be hard to understand. What we learn is class about philosophy defiantly makes me think and makes my brain turn all the time, but so far, my understanding is that philosophy is the study of knowledge. It breaks down what everything is. Examples used in class are chariness, deskness, and the main one sued in class “cupness”. According to Aristotle, philosophy is the study of fundamental nature of knowledge; it starts with wonder. Philosophy makes us ask specific question like “Why” why did this happen and how did it come to be. Philosophy had its origin in ancient Greece. Philosophy recognizes that everything is somehow connected. Philosophy and ‘science’ are the same project; to do philosophy is to do science and to do science is to do philosophy. It is connected because philosophy/science was attempting to discover the fundamental unity principle that lies at the basis of all reality and all experience. This is why we refer to Garret Strong many times throughout our class discussions The earliest philosopher/scientist are called Pre-Socratic philosophers. They came before the great philosopher Socrates. Thales is to be the first. Thales is referred to as the father or founder of philosophophy/science he lived in the sixth century BCE. Thales began to search for the unity principle, which is the ground of all things. At the

Ancient Greece Dbq

Philosophy in Ancient Greece greatly influenced future civilizations and generations to come. The definition of Philosophy is lover of wisdom. Socrates who lived from around 470 B.C to 399 B.C was known as the “father of philosophy”. Socrates taught the people of Greece to question everything. One of his most famous quotes is in Document 3 which states, “The unexamined life is not worth living”. Socrates suggests that people who don't analyze, question, or examine their lives, beliefs, ideas and culture they do not deserve to live. The Socratic Method is used ask and answer questions with critical thinking. Socrates inspired many, even after his execution in 399 B.C where he

Socrates, Plato, Euthyphro, Apology and the Republic

As discussed in class, philosophy is about engaging yourself in conversation to the extent of thinking what other people are saying with virtues in mind. It is interesting to figure out how one comes to an opinion or thought and where the evidence comes

How Does Plato 's Allegory Of The Cave Illuminate The Value Of Philosophy?

To begin, it is important to understand and analyze what philosophy is and ultimately what a philosophical question is. Philosophy is a quest after knowledge. Philosophy is the action of thought and analysis, in fact, it is a pretty unique type of

Philosophy 101 Essay

Philosophy is defined by Webster as "Love and pursuit of wisdom by intellectual means and moral self-discipline" or "Investigation of the nature, causes, or principles of reality, knowledge, or values, based on logical reasoning rather than empirical methods." This essay is a general look at those who pursued that intellectual means, those who investigated, even those who reasoned Reason. Because volumes could be written and this is a rather quick, unworthy paper: apologizes.

What Does It All Mean? By Thomas Nagel

The meaning of philosophy is the love of wisdom, questioning everything including ourselves. Philosophizing is about questioning the meaning of life.

Intelligent Design: Science or Faith Essay

In taking close at philosophy, it is the study of problems linked with existence, values, knowledge, mind, language and reason. This implies that, philosophy is the study that involves addressing problems based on the rational argument. It is a well-documented fact: the word philosophy is a Greek word that means love of wisdom. Just like the name entails, philosophy is linked with many subjects such as politics, religion and ethics among others that involve absolute wisdom. In this regard, there are various concepts under philosophy subject including intelligent design claim, science and faith. For the past years, researchers have raised continuous issue regarding the subjects outlining various criticisms emerging under the subject of

My Philosophy : Critical Thinking

Philosophy is one of the most important subjects taught today. Philosophy can teach us things as broad as secrets of the universe and as personal as knowing right from wrong. In the following paragraphs, I will explain each concept, as well as its importance to myself.

Voltaire And Socrates

Philosophy is a subject that has deep roots in human civilization. People have always asked questions from the dawn of time. However, there are those that strive to go a step further to gain true understanding of things. These people analyze basic questions of existence that many would accept just the way they are. These people are philosophers. Socrates’ and Voltaire are two of the most recognizable names in philosophy. Socrates was from Athens in the 400s B.C.E. Voltaire was a French writer in the 1700s. While they are both considered great philosophers, their attitudes toward the subject were a bit different.

Compare And Contrast Materialism And Dualism

The original idea of the word 'philosophy ' was a 'love of wisdom ' (Cowan 2). Philosophy is meant to explore the 'big questions ' and try to find answers as best we can in the time we have been given. One of the areas of study in philosophy is metaphysics, which deals in the ideas of the nature of reality. "We look at the world, and we assume that it is the way it appears to be. It is not." (Carreira 7). There is much to reality that can be discussed, debated, and disagreed upon. Within metaphysics is the realm of ontology, which poses the question 'what is there? ' (Cowan 146). Two of the major views in ontology are Dualism and Materialism, both of which deal with the nature of the

Mortality In The Movie : The Lovely Bones

The main goal in philosophy is to shows us the right way on how to live a great life and to understand its meaning and purpose. Every philosopher has their own blueprint, which includes different methods and rules on how to reach that goal; these include backing up your opinions with reason, seeking secure foundations in ‘objective truth’, thinking outside of your own perspective, and seeking intellectual and moral excellence, wisdom and prudence. Philosophy will help you analyze and learn about your own knowledge, freedom, morality, religion, and the meaning of life.

Myth Of The Cave

Philosophy means the love of wisdom. The goal of philosophy is to make you think about things very critically and come up with answers on your own. Plato witch was a Greek philosopher came up with the best known passages. The most famous one was the Myth of the Cave. The story tells how he discovered the light outside of the cave he was a prisoner in. Philosophy makes you question the things you discover and your beliefs. When you are trying the reason with your thought it means that you will come up with a conclusion. Critical thinking keeps you from getting make believe facts into your conclusion. Philosophy divides up into three divisions’ epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics. Epistemology deals with the questions of knowledge. Metaphysics

Value of Philosophy Essay

Philosophy is the study of examining and thinking about questionable ethical problems and/or generally accepted certainties. Philosophy aims at knowledge that combines a variety of academic fields as well as convictions, prejudices and beliefs.

Philosophy can be described as a chance for person to undertake an opportunity to understand themselves, our world and society, and relations between ourselves and one another. Those who are able to study philosophy, can find out what is to be human, what kind of person is it good to be, and especially how are we to live a good life. I, myself, have had an opportunity to take a philosophy class and as my time in philosophy is starting to come to a close, I am suddenly realizing how Philosophy has changed the aspects and my outlook upon my life.

Essay about The Importance of Philosophy

“All things in life are philosophical.” This is a well-known quote by the renowned Greek scientist/philosopher Aristotle. When one is to imagine life without thought, free will or knowledge, they are left to only imagine the oblivion they would be left to reside in. To me, philosophy is more than ethics, esthetics, and epistemology... it is the ability to stand ones ground with certain viewpoints, attitudes and beliefs.

Personal Philosophy Reflection Paper

For the past six weeks, I learned how philosophy has influenced the world globally. Learning that when human beings voice their thoughts with others, they receive a chance to change the world, especially if one person speaks one on one, one personage can change the world of one body. My belief in the power of language is strengthened by philosophy. This philosophy course has encouraged me to share my opinions that are not influenced by other peers or older adults, but to deeply reflect and research my beliefs and opinions. Looking at how philosophy has shaped the United States, I grant my thankfulness towards the Constitution, and the democracy and freedom we now have, compared to other countries.

Related Topics

• Pre-Socratic philosophy

Reflections on Doing Philosophy in High School by Steve Goldberg

  I’ve been teaching philosophy, an honors elective taken mainly by seniors, for the past twenty-six years at a suburban high school outside Chicago. The class is organized topically around a set of perennial questions in ethics, political philosophy, metaphysics, and philosophy of mind. I encourage conversation and debate in my classroom, but I also ask students to work out their ideas independently in writing assignments. The kinds of writing I assign reflect my own thinking about what it means to do philosophy. Followed by each dimension of philosophy, I sketch strategies for teacher assessment and student exploration through writing. I hope this blog sparks a conversation about how we feature writing in philosophy instruction.

Philosophy is a reflective activity that invites students to make explicit their fundamental assumptions and beliefs. Self-reflection should take the further backward step of inspecting these assumptions and beliefs for internal coherence and consistency. Students also should discern implications of their beliefs, including any “bullets” they need to bite for the sake of consistency. And they should investigate sources of inconsistency and possibilities for revising their beliefs.

Questionnaires or surveys can be effective in helping students clarify their basic beliefs and inspect them for internal coherence and consistency. For example, “Battleground God,” a questionnaire on the TPM Online’s website , enables students to examine their beliefs on the rationality of religious belief. Journal entries create opportunities for students to explore a question in writing before being introduced to formal arguments in assigned readings or class discussion. For example, before discussing the merit of ethical relativism, students might be asked to respond in their journal to the question whether disagreement about right and wrong is comparable to disagreement about the shape of the earth. They also might revisit the same question at the end of a unit to reflect upon changes in their thinking.

Philosophy is at least partly a matter of thinking about thinking , or more specifically, thinking about arguments. Before students are in a position to appraise an argument, they must understand and master it. What is the structure of the argument? What are its background assumptions? What are its implications for the philosophical question(s) under consideration? I ask students to annotate an assigned reading and to identify the central argument in preparation for class. I then divide the class into groups and ask each group to reach consensus and write their version of the central argument on the board. The argument must be concise and represented as a set of propositions that includes premises and conclusion. The class then discusses which arguments on the board approximate the author’s intended argument in the reading. Examples include Nagel’s “What Is It Like to Be a Bat” as an argument against identity theory, Descartes’ dream and conceivability arguments in the Meditations , and Mackie on the paradox of omnipotence.

Early in each unit, I hand out a set of study questions on the readings. We often refer to the questions in class. I then select some of the study questions for an in-class essay exam. For example, I might divide an exam on free will into three sections, each one representing a major position on the question (e.g., hard determinism, compatiblism, libertarianism). Students select one question from each set. Here are two sample questions: (1) Explain van Inwagen’s Principle and its appeal to “untouchable facts.” How does the Principle justify hard determinism and challenge classical compatiblism? (2) How is the personal predicament of Dostoevsky’s Underground Man attributable to the philosophical problem of free will and determinism? Why does he care deeply about whether he has free will? So, study questions guide reading, discussion, and review; and students’ mastery of the questions is assessed on the in-class essays.

Philosophy also engages arguments by evaluating them . Once students have demonstrated a firm grasp of an argument, we expect them to analyze and appraise it. What objections might be raised? How would the argument handle counter-examples? Where does the argument suffer from a lack of clarity, consistency, or plausibility? How might the argument answer objections? How might it be revised or strengthened to meet objections? Does an alternative argument better defend the same position? For example, in the ethics unit I introduce plausibility, consistency, justification, and usefulness as criteria. After giving them a model by applying the criteria to Mill’s utilitarianism, I ask them to write an essay in which they apply the criteria to another ethical theory (e.g., Kant’s deontological ethics, Aristotle’s teleological ethics; Wilson and Pinker’s sociobiology).

As an alternative to a thesis-based question, I ask students to write a dialogue representing major positions on an issue (e.g., memory, body, soul as candidates for personal identity). The dialogue invites students to probe and challenge competing arguments from their respective points of view. I also assign essay questions that ask students to compare two philosophers who represent opposing points of view and to show why one philosopher’s position is more defensible than the other (e.g., Hick and Mackie on the problem of evil, Rawls and Nozick on distributive justice).

Philosophical reasoning also calls for the creative application of philosophical concepts and theories to contemporary issues, to works of art, to problems and puzzles. I ask students to analyze a film for its philosophical themes or as a thought experiment that tests philosophical arguments they have studied. Here are a few examples: How does the popular film “Groundhog Day” dramatize Aristotle’s views on virtuous character and friendship? How does “Crimes and Misdemeanors” dramatize Plato’s ring of Gyges? Does the thought experiment of Leondard’s condition in “Memento” reinforce the views of Parfit, Locke, or Hume on personal identity?

I also ask students to apply competing views on distributive justice to the issue of affirmative action and Aristotle’s theory of human flourishing to the ethics of genetic enhancement. Students apply competing views on free will to the case of someone who committed brutal crimes as an adult and suffered terrible abuse as a child. They also apply act utilitarian, rule utilitarian, and Kantian procedures to cases in cases in bioethics.

I do think the above strategy can constrain students who are more eager to investigate a question on their own than to demonstrate that they can deftly use the tools of others. That’s why the best questions are often open-ended and invite students’ independent thinking. At the same time, such questions needs to be framed carefully and should encourage students to draw judiciously from the arguments and readings they have encountered in the unit. Here is a good example drawn from a student essay competition on the Hi Phi website at University of Virginia:

“Think about all the physical and psychological changes a person goes through from birth to adulthood. It is not too much of a stretch to say that everything important about you—how you look, how you act, what kinds of things you like, how you spend your time, and so on—changes throughout your life. What, then, makes someone who is, say, age 17, the same person as at, say, age 3? Is it the continuity of memories, the same, the same brain, the judgment of friends or elders, the continuity of desires? Each of these answers has a potential serious problem—or problems—associated with it. Your task is to consider carefully the question, what makes a person the same person at different stages of their life?”

I look forward to learning about how writing is inscribed in the teaching of pre-college philosophy in your classroom. And I’m eager to read both supportive and critical responses to how it is featured in mine.

When I’m not teaching high school history and philosophy, I like to tinker in my garage. Merging my interests in philosophy and craftsmanship, I have built happiness boxes, teletransporters, trolley cars, and Chinese rooms. (I’ve also tortured some of my students in the morning but not before swapping their memories with Lady Gaga’s.) After putting away my tools, I enjoy taking Kulu on long walks. “Kulu” is patois for moonshine and Kulu is an Arubian Cunucu, a faux breed that descends from Portuguese hounds brought to the Caribbean islands on 16th century slave ships. Or so I’ve read on the official Arubian Cunucu website. I should add that I am a willing addict who has a second order desire to watch Breaking Bad. I satisfy the urge each summer with the help of Netflix. And with the help of Roberta Israeloff, I have generated an impossibly long list of great fiction that mocks both my ambition and debt to amazon.com. I have two adult daughters who nod in disbelief at their father. Their mother looks on approvingly, a glass of wine in hand.

Thank you for this inspiring post, Steve. I would have really loved to take your class when I was in high school. Although I was lucky enough to attend a well-regarded school, in general my educational experiences weren’t nearly as relevant, compelling, provocative or exciting as those you’ve described.

As a practitioner of philosophy with children, I aspire to offer activities as rich and challenging as those you’ve written about. And while I work with much younger children who are a lot less philosophically sophisticated, I do explore similar themes and ask the same reflective, evaluative and metacognitive questions that you mention.

I see how the individual writing tasks you assign can help to achieve a delicate balance between collaborative and independent thinking processes – a balance that tends to be strongly weighted towards collaboration in the dialogue-driven enquiries that I facilitate. I have the impression that many children find writing onerous. I’d be interested to hear from anyone who has had success in incorporating a significant element of independent writing into their philosophy programs for primary school children.

[…] my earlier post, I mentioned assigning a dialogue as an alternative to a formal essay. Here is an example of each […]

[…] also recommend Steve Goldberg’s blog post that explores the nature of philosophy from the perspective of a high school […]

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How to Write a Philosophy Essay: Ultimate Guide

What Is a Philosophy Essay: Definition

Philosophical writing isn't your typical assignment. Its aim isn't to provide an overview of professional philosophers' works and say whether you agree with them.

Philosophy demands becoming a philosopher for the time of writing, thinking analytically and critically of ideas, pondering the Big Questions, and asking 'Why?'. That's why it requires time and energy, as well as a lot of thinking on your part.

But what is philosophy essay, exactly? If you're tasked with writing one, you'll have to select a thesis in the philosophical domain and argue for or against it. Then, you can support your thesis with other professional philosophers' works. But it has to contain your own philosophical contribution, too. (This is only one definition of philosophy essay, of course.)

What's a Good Philosophy Paper Outline?

Before you start writing your first line, you should make a philosophy essay outline. Think of it as a plan for your philosophy paper that briefly describes each paragraph's point.

As for how to write a philosophy essay outline, here are a few tips for you:

• Start with your thesis. What will you be arguing for or against?
• Read what philosophical theory has to say and note sources for your possible arguments and counterarguments.
• Decide on the definitions of core concepts to include precise philosophical meanings in your essay.
• After careful and extended reflection, organize your ideas following the structure below.

How To Structure a Philosophy Paper?

Like any other essay, a philosophy paper consists of an introduction, a main body, and a conclusion. Sticking to this traditional philosophy essay structure will help you avoid unnecessary stress.

Here's your mini-guide on how to structure a philosophy essay:

• Introduction - Clarify the question you will be answering in your philosophy paper. State your thesis – i.e., the answer you'll be arguing for. Explain general philosophical terms if needed.
• Main body - Start with providing arguments for your stance and refute all the objections for each of them. Then, describe other possible answers and their reasoning – and counter the main arguments in their support.
• Conclusion - Sum up all possible answers to the questions and reiterate why yours is the most viable one.

What's an Appropriate Philosophy Essay Length?

In our experience, 2,000 to 2,500 words are enough to cover the topic in-depth without compromising the quality of the writing.

However, see whether you have an assigned word limit before getting started. If it's shorter or longer than we recommend, stick to that word limit in writing your essay on philosophy.

What Format Should You Use for a Philosophy Paper?

As a philosophy and psychology essay writing service , we can attest that most students use the APA guidelines as their philosophy essay format. However, your school has the final say in what format you should stick to.

Sometimes, you can be asked to use a different college philosophy essay format, like MLA or Chicago. But if you're the one to choose the guidelines and don't know which one would be a good philosophy argumentative essay format, let's break down the most popular ones.

APA, MLA, and Chicago share some characteristics:

• Font: Time New Roman, 12 pt
• Line spacing: double
• Margins: 1" (left and right)
• Page number: in the header

But here's how they differ:

• A title page required
• Sources list: 'References' page
• No title page required
• Sources list: 'Works cited' page
• Sources list: 'Bibliography' page
• Footnotes and endnotes are required for citations

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Guideline on How to Write a Philosophy Essay

If you still don't feel that confident about writing a philosophy paper, don't worry. Philosophical questions, by definition, have more than one interpretation. That's what makes them so challenging to write about.

To help you out in your philosophical writing journey, we've prepared this list of seven tips on how to write a philosophy essay.

• Read Your Sources Thoughtfully

Whether your recommended reading includes Dante's Divine Comedy or Jean-Paul Sartre's Existentialism Is a Humanism , approach your sources with curiosity and analytical thinking. Don't just mindlessly consume those texts. Instead, keep asking yourself questions while you're reading them, such as:

• What concepts and questions does the author address?
• What's the meaning behind key ideas and metaphors in the text?
• What does the author use as a convincing argument?
• Are there any strange or obscure distinctions?

As for which sources you should turn to, that all depends on your central question; philosophy topics for essay are diverse and sometimes opposed. So, you'll have to do your fair share of research.

• Brainstorm & Organize Your Ideas

As you're reading those texts, jot down what comes to your mind. It can be a great quote you've stumbled upon, an idea for an argument, or your thoughtful, critical responses to certain opinions.

Then, sort through and organize all of those notes into an outline for your essay in philosophy. Make sure that it holds up in terms of logic. And ensure that your arguments and counterarguments are compelling, sensible, and convincing!

Now, you might be wondering how to write a philosophy essay introduction. Don't worry: there's an explanation right below!

• Craft Your Introductory Paragraph

Think of your introduction as a road map preparing your reader for the journey your essay will take them on. This road map will describe the key 'stops' in your essay on philosophy: your topic, stance, and how you will argue for it – and refute other stances.

Don't hesitate to write it out as a step-by-step guide in the first or third person. For example: 'First, I will examine... Then, I will dispute... Finally, I will present….'

Need an example of an excellent introduction for a philosophy paper? You’ll be thrilled to know that we have one of our philosophy essay examples below!

• Present Your Key Arguments & Reflections

Philosophy papers require a fair share of expository writing. This is where you demonstrate your understanding of the topic. So, make your exposition extensive and in-depth, and don't omit anything crucial.

As for the rest of the main body, we've covered how to structure a philosophy essay above. In short, you'll need to present supporting arguments, anticipate objections, and address them.

Use your own words when writing a philosophy paper; avoid pretentious or verbose language. Yes, some technical philosophical terms may be necessary. But the point of a philosophical paper is to present your stance – and develop your own philosophy – on the topic.

• Don't Shy Away from Critical Ideas

Whenever you examine a philosophical theory or text, treat it with a fair share of criticism. This is what it means in practice – and how to structure a philosophy essay around your critical ideas:

• Pinpoint what the theory's or idea's strengths are and every valid argument in its support;
• See the scope of its application – perhaps, there are exceptions you can use as counterarguments;
• Research someone else's criticism of the theory or idea. Develop your own criticism, as well;
• Check if the philosopher already addressed those criticisms.
• Ponder Possible Answers to Philosophical Questions

Writing an essay in philosophy is, in fact, easier for some students as the topic can always have multiple answers, and you can choose any of them. However, this can represent an even tougher challenge for other students. After all, you must consider those possible answers and address them in the paper.

How do you pinpoint those possible answers? Some of them can come to your mind when you brainstorm, especially if you'll be writing about one of the Big Questions. Others will reveal themselves when you start reading other philosophers' works.

Remember to have arguments for and against each possible answer and address objections.

• Write a Powerful Conclusion

The conclusion is where you sum up your paper in just one paragraph. Reiterate your thesis and what arguments support it. But in philosophical writing, you can rarely have a clear, undebatable answer by the end of the paper. So, it's fine if your conclusion doesn't have a definitive verdict.

Here are a few tips on how to write a conclusion in a philosophy essay:

• Don't introduce new arguments or evidence in conclusion – they belong in the main body;
• Avoid overestimating or embellishing the level or value of your work;
• Best conclusions are obvious and logical for those reading the paper – i.e.; a conclusion shouldn't be surprising at all;
• Stay away from poorly explained claims in conclusion.

Philosophical Essay Example

Sometimes, it's better to see how it's done once than to read a thousand guides. We know that like no one else, so we have prepared this short philosophy essay example to show you what excellent philosophy papers look like:

Like this example? Wondering how to get a custom essay as great as it is? You're in luck: you can buy online essay at EssayPro without breaking the bank! Keep in mind: this example is only a fraction of what our writers are capable of!

30 Philosophy Paper Topic Ideas

Philosophical writing concerns questions that don't have clear-cut yes or no answers. So, coming up with philosophy essay topics yourself can be tough.

Fret not: we've put together this list of 30 topics for philosophy papers on ethics and leadership for you. Feel free to use them as-is or tweak them!

15 Ethics Philosophy Essay Topics

Ethics deals with the question of right and wrong. So, if you're looking for philosophy essay topic ideas, ethics concerns some of the most interesting – and most mind-boggling – questions about human behavior.

Here are 15 compelling philosophy essay topics ethics has to offer you:

• Is starting a war always morally wrong?
• Would it be right to legalize euthanasia?
• What is more important: the right to privacy or national security?
• Is justice always fair?
• Should nuclear weapons be banned?
• Should teenagers be allowed to get plastic surgery?
• Can cheating be justifiable?
• Can AI algorithms behave ethically?
• Should you abide by an unfair law?
• Should voting become mandatory?
• When can the right to freedom of speech be limited?
• Is it the consumers' responsibility to fight climate by changing their buying decisions?
• Is getting an abortion immoral?
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The Cognitive Philosophy of Reflection

• Original Research
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• Published: 12 September 2020
• Volume 87 , pages 2219–2242, ( 2022 )

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Hilary Kornblith argues that many traditional philosophical accounts involve problematic views of reflection (understood as second-order mental states). According to Kornblith, reflection does not add reliability, which makes it unfit to underlie a separate form of knowledge. We show that a broader understanding of reflection, encompassing Type 2 processes, working memory, and episodic long-term memory, can provide philosophy with elucidating input that a restricted view misses. We further argue that reflection in fact often does add reliability, through generalizability, flexibility, and creativity that is helpful in newly encountered situations, even if the restricted sense of both reflection and knowledge is accepted. And so, a division of knowledge into one reflexive (animal) form and one reflective form remains a plausible, and possibly fruitful, option.

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1 Introduction

Throughout the history of Western philosophy, reflection has been considered an especially important human ability. Its role has long been prominent and can still be found at the center of theories by contemporary scholars such as, for example, BonJour ( 1985 , 1998 ), Chisholm ( 1989 ), and Sosa ( 2007 , 2009 ). Accordingly, a lot of effort has been invested in the inquiry of its role for thinking, knowledge, and justification. Common traditional positions have included that reflection is necessary in order to guarantee that an agent’s knowledge is acceptable and certain, that her epistemic duty is fulfilled, that her knowledge is accessible, and that faulty beliefs due to inferential errors are avoided (see, e.g., Pappas 2017 ; see also Bortolotti 2011 ).

But in contrast to the above-described positions, Hilary Kornblith in his book On reflection ( 2012 ) points out that the common interpretation of reflection is problematic since reflection actually cannot provide that which many believe it can. Indeed much relevant research seems to indicate that rather than providing trustworthy knowledge, reflection can be quite unreliable. Numerous psychological studies, seemingly, show how human reflection often fails due to, for example, various biases (see, e.g., Stanovich and West 2000 ; Kahneman 2011 ). With this in mind, the importance of reflection, and its role for human thinking, knowledge, and justification, should arguably be deemphasized.

This leaves us at an interesting junction. On the one hand, reflection seems to underlie the very essence of human greatness and is commonly seen as a particularly important phenomenon. On the other hand, empirical evidence seems to support Kornblith’s view and suggest that reflection only brings a false sense of certainty.

We recognize that inquiries are affected by the inquirer’s stance (approach, commitments), which makes it important to briefly clarify our own. In line with Kornblith (see, e.g., 1993 , 2002 , 2012 ), we heed a naturalistic stance where philosophy needs to take relevant scientific results into account whenever such results are available. Accordingly, we accept both ontological and (cooperative) methodological naturalism, where natural phenomena and relevant scientific results are seen as more important than language or intuitions (see, e.g., Papineau 2016 ; Rysiew 2017 ; Cellucci 2017 ). We claim, as does Kornblith, that such a stance can offer philosophy new insights that are crucial for keeping the field relevant as well as for dissolving old problems.

In short, we believe that Kornblith’s discussion of reflection is problematic due to its too-narrow understanding of what reflection brings to the table. Given this position, our aim in this article is to investigate reflection more broadly by examining relevant psychological constructs and their neural underpinnings. By stepwise investigating reflection on multiple levels of analysis, a synthesizing understanding of reflection that is biologically plausible can arguably be reached (see, e.g., Hassabis et al. 2017 ). This allows us to triangulate essential features of the natural phenomenon that Kornblith downplays or ignores (Horst 2016 ). We will, however, also argue that even if we accept a restricted view of reflection as ‘second-order mental states,’ as well as Kornblith’s insistence on that reliability is the only epistemic value to consider, reflection, in fact, often does offer the subject added reliability. Importantly, this would leave the division of knowledge into a reflexive (animal) form and a reflective form a plausible option.

This article comprises five sections. In Sect.  2 , we outline and discuss Kornblith’s account of reflection. In Sect.  3 , we investigate how reflection can be further elucidated by cognitive psychology, also outlining the neural correlates of reflection. In Sect.  4 , we then explore philosophical consequences of the reached position pertaining to reliability and knowledge. Finally, in Sect.  5 , we offer some concluding remarks.

2 Kornblith on Reflection

Kornblith ( 2012 ) argues that most traditional philosophers have valued reflection too highly due to faulty understandings of what it involves. And this overestimation has, in his view, led them to suggest, or even demand, that reflection is necessary when, in fact, such a view is wrong. Traditional philosophers, on Kornblith’s view, tend to call on reflection when problems are recognized at a first-order level. Second-order reflection is then supposed to provide a solution by removing unreliability. This, however, according to Kornblith, is problematic since neither first-order processes nor second-order reflective scrutiny are entirely reliable. Kornblith argues that his points concerning reflection are generalizable and relevant for discussions of knowledge, reasoning, freedom of the will, and normativity. In this article we will focus on his discussion of knowledge.

Importantly, Kornblith addresses reflection specifically seen as consisting in ‘second-order mental states.’ He further considers reliability as being the only important criteria for belief acquisition processes (Kornblith 2012 , p. 34). Kornblith then attacks the traditional view from two angles. Firstly, he argues that a reliance on reflection leads to an infinite regress and that reflection thus cannot provide the sought after reliability for first-order problems. Secondly, he argues that empirical evidence indeed indicates that the processes involved in reflection often are unreliable. Both these arguments, which will be presented more fully in the following subsections, according to Kornblith shows that reflection fails to be relevant for knowledge.

2.1 Infinite Regress

As a first argument against the traditional view, Kornblith claims that demands for reflection lead to an infinite regress since it continuously would require demands of ever higher-level reflections. Footnote 1

According to Kornblith, knowledge, in its paradigmatic formulation, is commonly held to require justified true belief. And, as pointed out by Kornblith, according to many theoreticians, justification involves reflection on the epistemic status of one’s beliefs. It is then only reflection that can guarantee the right epistemic status to one’s beliefs. An omission to reflect would result in beliefs that cannot be considered knowledge.

We regard this a reasonable estimate of the common-sense view, although it arguably involves an implicit internalist view of knowledge. Indeed, Kornblith starts his discussion by presenting the famous ‘Norman the clairvoyant’ case by BonJour ( 1985 ). In short, BonJour (an internalist) argues that an agent needs active reflection, that makes her epistemically responsible, for knowledge. This is presented, by BonJour, as an argument against reliabilism (a form of externalism) that views knowledge as involving reliably produced true beliefs, hinging on the external connection between the agent and the world.

Now, Kornblith, who is an outspoken reliabilist (see, e.g., Kornblith 2002 ) argues that if an agent is to meet BonJour’s requirements and reflect on her beliefs, the reached beliefs would themselves, in turn, need to be justified by higher-order reflection, leading to an infinite regress (Kornblith 2012 , pp. 12–13).

If one accepts Kornblith’s strict understanding of reflection as second-order mental states and knowledge as being dependent on reliability, this indeed seems to be the forced conclusion.

2.2 Empirical Evidence Against the Reliability of Reflection

As a second argument against the traditional view, Kornblith claims that a wide range of empirical evidence shows that reflection often is unreliable. Reflective scrutiny does then most often not succeed in making us able to more reliably judge our first-order beliefs, but seems to make subjects more confident when in fact this is not motivated (Kornblith 2012 , pp. 3, 25). This would indicate that it is not a tenable option to accept the aforementioned infinite regress as an inevitability and claim that having some reflective scrutiny at least is better than having none.

Sidestepping the merely logical matter of things, a large amount of empirical evidence seemingly does support Kornblith’s interpretation where reflection is best seen as only bringing a false sense of certainty to the table. In defense of his position Kornblith presents, and interprets, several empirical findings that cohere with his account. Notably, he acknowledges the tentative nature of such findings and theorizing (Kornblith 2012 , p. 136). It is also important to point out that Kornblith does not claim that reflection is useless, rather he argues that reflection might be useful if a more realistic account of it is accepted.

Kornblith focuses on cognitive psychology and the influential dual process theory. Briefly put, reflection figures distinctly in this framework, which partitions the mental into two forms. The first form (the old mind, System 1, or Type 1) is considered to be intuitive, automatic, non-conscious, and implicit, whereas the second form (the new mind, System 2, or Type 2) is reflective, controlled, conscious, and explicit. Footnote 2 On this account, the first form generate fast reflexive responses, which the second form sometimes reflectively inhibits (Tversky and Kahneman 1974 , 1983 ; Sloman 1996 ; Barrett et al. 2004 ; Kahneman 2011 ; Evans 2007 , 2008 ; Samuels 2009 ; Lizardo et al. 2016 ; Bago and De Neys 2017 ).

We consider Kornblith’s choice to focus on dual process theory reasonable since that framework is canonical and directly addresses aspects of cognition that are highly relevant for understanding reflection and knowledge, being supported ‘… by a wide range of converging experimental, psychometric, and neuroscientific methods’ (Evans and Stanovich 2013 , p. 224). But, we want to point out that many interpretations of dual process theory exist, addressing, for example, types, systems or modes. This said, most interpretations of dual process theory can, arguably, be integrated into a common format which makes it fruitful to explore dual process theory as a, more or less, unified field although this should be done with care (Smith and DeCoster 2000 , p. 110; Evans 2003 , p. 458). Moreover, it should be mentioned that there are researchers critical of dual process theory, where critics have pointed out both faults and alternative interpretations (see, e.g., Gigerenzer and Regier 1996 ; Keren and Schul 2009 ; Kruglanski et al. 2003 ; Osman 2004 ; Kruglanski and Gigerenzer 2011 ). The force of these lines of critique, though, hinge on which specific form of dual process theory they attack, and, for example, Evans and Stanovich ( 2013 ) in our view convincingly counters a number of the more common ones.

Importantly, if dual process theory, more generally, is not accepted as a provider of valid empirical input, Kornblith’s argument would indeed be severely stifled. However, our main point here does not involve questioning dual process theory per se. Rather we claim that Kornblith’s interpretation of cognitive psychological theorizing and evidence is problematic since it too narrowly only focuses on dual process theory. To remain a plausible option, Kornblith’s restricted position needs to be developed in a pluralist direction that investigates the many important roles reflection fills for how a subject (organism) acts in her (its) environment (see, e.g., Shah and Vavova 2014 ). We will in the following Sect.  3 explore what such an account of reflection involves and how it can offer philosophy elucidating input.

2.3 Reflection as Decoupled from Knowledge

Taken together, Kornblith’s arguments, indeed, seem to capture essential problems with the traditional positions that he criticises; it is, it seems, deeply questionable whether reflection can solve the problems often assumed that it can. And since reflection, indeed, does take such a center stage in much philosophical discussion, Kornblith’s focus is highly relevant. Kornblith interprets the reached position as indicating that theoreticians ought to abandon any false hopes regarding what reflection can provide (Kornblith 2012 , p. 7).

Kornblith discusses how Sosa’s ( 1991 ; see also 2007 ; 2009 ) distinction between ‘animal knowledge’ and ‘reflective knowledge’ can offer a way out of the infinite regress. On this account, animal knowledge governs direct responses to one’s sensory impacts, whereas reflective knowledge governs a wider understanding of one’s responses and how they came about (Sosa 1991 , p. 240). Animal knowledge is then more or less what externalist theories focus on, and reflective knowledge is what internalist theories focus on. Kornblith claims that this distinction, indeed, would resolve the issue of an infinite regress. Nonetheless he continues to argue that the reflective knowledge of the bisection does not add anything extra that is superior to ‘mere’ animal knowledge. Kornblith discusses, and rejects, the possibility that what reflective knowledge adds is increased reliability, which is also what Sosa argues (Kornblith 2012 , pp. 16–17; Sosa 1991 , p. 240). Since Kornblith considers reliability crucial for knowledge he then rejects a division of knowledge, even though he acknowledges that reflection might fill some other important role(s) (Kornblith 2012 , pp. 19–20).

Yet, even if we accept the restricted view of reflection as second-order mental states, and accept that reliability is of sole importance (something we believe indicates a rather strong externalist position), then if it turned out that reflective processes do add to a subject’s reliability, this would, on Kornblith’s own account, rebut the infinite regress and make reflection eligible as underlying a distinct form of knowledge.

Kornblith accepts this possibility but emphatically denies that this is the case:

We have examined a number of alternative motivations, and found that these motivations as well cannot bear the weight of the tempting distinction. It seems that there really is no ground at all for drawing a distinction between unreflective knowledge and something better, knowledge which involves reflection. (Kornblith 2012 , p. 40)

We will in Sect.  4 specifically address how reflection can add reliability, even if the narrow account of it as only involving second-order mental states is accepted. This can be done by providing the subject with an opportunity to remember previous experiences and internally reflect on them in order to find patterns in them and then adjusting ensuing behaviors in accordance with the found patterns. In doing so the subject gains generalizability, flexibility, and creativity that is helpful in newly encountered situations. Therefore, a division of knowledge into one reflexive (animal) form and one reflective form remains a plausible, and possibly fruitful, option (see, e.g., Perrine 2014 ; Shah and Vavova 2014 ; Smithies 2016 ). So, although Kornblith ( 2012 , pp. 16, 19) discusses how an allowance of two forms of knowledge could be seen as arbitrary and might risk leading to that infinitely many multiple forms must be allowed, we will below present a discussion that instead argues that two forms are biologically plausible.

But before we do this, we will next explore what a biologically plausible broader account of reflection involves and how it can offer philosophy elucidating input.

3 A Broader Understanding of Reflection

In this section, we follow Kornblith in focusing on cognitive psychology but, importantly, strive to stepwise develop a deeper multi-level investigation into reflection and its underlying processes that go beyond Kornblith’s sole focus on dual process theory. This account, which also encompasses memory systems and neural correlates, offers a broader understanding of reflection that is not restricted to only involve second-order mental states. It is our belief that this account can provide philosophy with elucidating input that Kornblith’s restricted focus misses.

In Fig.  1 we present a schematic illustration of how influential models from three levels of analysis cohere with each other, and how they relate to reflection. Although this is not an exhaustive account, we aim to substantiate this interdisciplinary approximation in the following discussion:

Schematic illustration of relations between cognitive models, on different levels of analysis, and their relation to reflection. Four perspectives are represented: epistemology (dotted square); psychology level 2 (top row); psychology level 1 (middle row); neuroscience (bottom row). Boxes indicate model categories. Arrows indicate functional relationships

We now move to a description of how reflection is understood in cognitive psychology and find that a broader interpretation than the one Kornblith presents is motivated.

3.1 Reflection in Cognitive Psychology

In the dual process theory-literature, which is Kornblith’s specific focus, reflection tends to be explicitly highlighted as an important phenomenon (see, e.g., Carruthers 2009 ; Mercier and Sperber 2009 ; Stanovich 2009 ; Evans and Stanovich 2013 ). According to dual process theory, reflection is considered to involve many specific functions linked to Type 2 processes (Evans 2008 , p. 257). These complex functions encompass, for example, internal linguistics sequences or ‘sentences of inner speech’ (Frankish 2009 , pp. 11–12; see also Carruthers 2009 , p. 118), the ability to connect mental images to language, comprehend visual semantics, as well as visual manipulation (visual management) (Frankish 2010 , p. 921; Carruthers 2009 , p. 112). Moreover, from the perspective of dual process theory, the reflective mind is considered to include decision making, mental simulation, goal-adoption, belief-fixation, the ability for making comparisons, reasoning, metacognition in the form of second-order mental states, as well as hypothetical thinking (Evans and Stanovich 2013 ). Furthermore, recollection and the binding of information are dependent on reflection. It is crucial for a sense of time and to make out specific events (Yonelinas 2013 , p. 2). In addition, Type 2 processes are linked to explicit rule learning (Evans 2008 , pp. 257, 261, 267).

Even though human agents might not always be as in control as they believe themselves to be, these functions of reflection are important for their self-awareness and sense of agency. All these abilities are thus plausible to see as comprising a first outline.

There is a line of critique arguing that cognition is better seen as a continuum of processes than as two distinct ones (see, e.g., Osman 2004 ). This has some intuitive plausibility, however, by highlighting the difference of various forms of dual process theories this issue can, arguably, be circumvented. As Evans and Stanovich ( 2013 , p. 229) point out, there are indeed modes of processing (‘cognitive styles applied in Type 2 processing’) that can vary on a continuum. Specific Type 2 reflections can thus be performed in a variety of different manners. But, what most dual process theories try to point out is that there are two distinct types of cognitive processes, where Type 2 processes stand out as being flexible and linked to reflection. And so, ‘[c]ontinuous variation in both cognitive ability and thinking dispositions can determine the probability that a response primed by Type 1 processing will be expressed—but the continuous variation in this probability in no way invalidates the discrete distinction between Type 1 and Type 2 processing’ (Evans and Stanovich 2013 , pp. 229–230).

So, even though there are pending issues concerning how we should view reflection from the perspective of cognitive psychology, we consider it initially plausible to link reflection to Type 2 processes. To reiterate, rather than viewing reflection as problematic, dual process theory indicates that it underlies several important cognitive functions such as internal linguistics sequences or ‘inner speech,’ visual semantic comprehension, visual manipulation, and mental simulation (visual management for short), decision making, goal-adoption, belief-fixation, reasoning, metacognition in the form of second-order mental states, hypothetical thinking, self-awareness, and our sense of agency.

To broaden our understanding of reflection and Type 2 processes we continue by focusing on a second, ‘lower,’ cognitive psychological level of analysis where the human memory systems are seen as consisting of many interconnected functional processes that encode, store, retrieve, and manage information. On this level, an influential division is made between long-term memory (LTM) and working memory (WM), where LTM can store information over a lifetime whereas WM governs active information handling (see, e.g., Repovš and Baddeley 2006 ). Footnote 3

LTM is commonly partitioned into an implicit (non-declarative, non-conscious) system and an explicit (declarative, conscious) system. The non-declarative system is thought to govern automatic actions, whereas the declarative system is thought to govern abstracted knowledge about the world and autobiographical remembrance. In Tulving’s (see, e.g., 1972 , 1985 , 2002 , 2005 ) canonical and very influential three-part model of LTM, involving procedural, semantic and episodic memory, procedural memory governs perceptual and motor skills, semantic memory governs conceptual and categorical knowledge, whereas episodic memory governs remembrance of events (Tulving 1985 , p. 2). According to Tulving ‘… procedural memory entails semantic memory as a specialized subcategory, and… semantic memory, in turn, entails episodic memory as a specialized subcategory.’ (Tulving 1985 , pp. 2–3, italics in original).

Regarding WM, various models have been proposed although a very influential multi-component ‘standard model’ presents it as consisting of four parts: the phonological loop, the visuospatial sketchpad, the central executive, and the episodic buffer (Baddeley and Hitch 1974 ; Baddeley 2000 , 2007 ; Repovš and Baddeley 2006 ; D’Esposito and Postle 2015 ; Chai et al. 2018 ). In short, the phonological loop controls auditory information, the visuospatial sketchpad controls visual and spatial information, the central executive controls attention and decisions, whereas the episodic buffer binds together information from different domains, working as a link to (episodic) LTM. Footnote 4

Since it is through WM we actively handle information (see, e.g., Miller 1956 ; Cowan 2001 ) we argue that it is this system—on this level of analysis—which is primarily involved in Type 2 processes and reflection (Evans 2008 ). To substantiate this claim we show below how WM coheres with reflection as well as to the various previously mentioned features of Type 2 processes.

The phonological loop includes the articulatory network and the sensorimotor interface (Hickok and Poeppel 2007 ). It is thought to consist of a phonological store that can hold acoustic information for a couple of seconds, and an articulatory rehearsal process governing subvocalization by which verbal information is kept in memory. Apart from auditory information and speech, information needs to be re-coded through articulatory rehearsal before it can enter the phonological store. Accordingly, the phonological loop connects WM to language, and thus coheres with internal linguistics sequences and inner speech (Repovš and Baddeley 2006 , p. 7).

The visuospatial sketchpad consists of two separate subsystems governing visual and spatial information respectively. It is crucially connected to how we perceive the world. Interestingly, we rely on a quite small amount of information from the surrounding world—since it tends to be stable, offering us a continuing ‘external memory.’ However, this bottom-up information also relies on top-down predictions when being interpreted into meaningful percepts (see, e.g., Friston 2010 ; Hohwy 2013 ; but see Firestone and Scholl 2016 for a recent challenge). The visuospatial sketchpad thus coheres with previously mentioned visual management abilities (Repovš and Baddeley 2006 , pp. 8, 12).

The central executive is thought to be a form of control system for the other parts of WM (Rottschy et al. 2012 , Sect.  1 ). By controlling attention, it governs how we prioritise, choose, and execute tasks. It is also involved in all information-manipulation (Repovš and Baddeley 2006 , p. 14), composing reasoning as well as decision making and planning. But although being a central hub within WM, the central executive nonetheless has a limited degree of attention (see, e.g., Miller 1956 ; Cowan 2001 ). This means that the central executive coheres with abilities such as decision making, goal-adoption, belief-fixation, reasoning, metacognition in the form of second-order mental states, and hypothetical thinking.

The episodic buffer works as an interface between WM and LTM systems (Repovš and Baddeley 2006 , p. 15). More specifically, it relates information between the central executive and episodic LTM ‘… forming a limited-capacity system for the ultrashort-term, intermediate storage of incoming sensory information’ (Rottschy et al. 2012 , Sect.  1 ). Through a store of limited capacity, it integrates information from the other components of WM into episodes. In doing so the episodic buffer is involved in creating conscious awareness. The episodic buffer binds recollected information, connecting to episodic LTM, which composes explicit rule learning (Strange et al. 2001 , p. 1045). This interface thus processes and stores multi-dimensional representations (Rudner and Rönnberg 2008 , p. 21). By doing so it helps to create a unitary experience, which is central for our self-awareness, sense of agency, and first-person phenomenological experience:

Measures of working memory capacity have been shown to be predictive of performance in a wide variety of cognitive tasks… and highly correlated with fluid intelligence… It is the engagement of this system specifically that… has [been] emphasized in the definition of Type 2 processing and which underlies many of its typically observed correlates: that it is slow, sequential, and correlated with measures of general intelligence. [It] has also [been] suggested that Type 2 thinking enables uniquely human facilities, such as hypothetical thinking, mental simulation, and consequential decision making. (Evans and Stanovich 2013 , p. 235)

In summary, we have shown that WM governs our internal linguistics sequences and connects to language (the phonological loop), our visual management (the visuospatial sketchpad), our attention, information-manipulation, reasoning, metacognition in the form of second-order mental states, and decision making (the central executive), as well as binds recollected information (the episodic buffer and episodic LTM). In view of the above discussion, we, therefore, claim that Type 2 processes and WM (also relying on episodic LTM) plausibly cohere with reflection.

3.2 Neural Correlates

By exploring the neural underpinnings of reflection, we in this subsection substantiate and ground our understanding of reflection in cognitive neuroscience. We argue that cognitive neuroscience is a suitable level at which to stop for our purposes, as this level provides information about plausible functionality of neural populations. Notably, such information can be effectively mapped to neural network architectures in a computer.

From the neuroscientific perspective, bottom-up perceptive pathways can be disassociated from top-down feedback pathways. The bottom-up pathways are activated by sensory stimuli, tending to align with statistical regularities in the sensorium by various process-signal amplifications (Pozo and Goda 2010 ). Collectively these processes contribute to the formation of distinctive receptive fields in the sensory cortices. The sensory streams are associated and bound together in association areas, which make up concept-like complexes that are presented to frontal populations involved in executive control (Tanaka 1996 ; Tsunoda et al. 2001 ; Caporale and Dan 2008 ; Magee and Johnston 1997 ; Ralph et al. 2010 ).

These frontal networks project back into the sensory pathways, which afford modulation of the perceptive streams via excitation and inhibition. This is the filter of attention, where certain aspects are turned down while others are amplified. Although the particulars of this process are still not fully known, there are indications that such top-down amplification is necessary to realize fine detail from a coarser bottom-up signal (Ahissar and Hochstein 2004 ).

Focusing on WM, it is closely associated with the processes and pathways of selective attention and executive control (Awh et al. 2006 ). Information may flow from the exterior world via the senses, or it may come from LTM.

The act of reflecting is, as described above concerning the phonological loop, often associated with internal linguistic sequences—internal monologues (Alderson-Day and Fernyhough 2015 ). An internal monologue involves both the production of speech as well as its interpretation. The former is realized by the posterior inferior temporal gyrus, premotor cortex, and the anterior insula, making up the articulatory network, along with the sensorimotor interface consisting of the sylvian parietal-temporal area (Hickok and Poeppel 2007 ). Interpretation, on the other hand, is realized by populations in the posterior middle temporal gyrus and posterior inferotemporal gyrus, making up the lexical interface (Kemmerer 2014 ). Semantic and grammatical aspects are integrated by the combinatorial network found predominantly in the lateral anterior temporal lobe. Together these pathways mediate understanding of conceptual content of speech. In short, this suggests that the articulatory network (posterior inferior temporal gyrus, premotor cortex, anterior insula), and the sensorimotor interface (sylvian parietal-temporal area) cohere with the phonological loop.

Although there are indications that all sensory modalities are available to WM (vision and audition: Baddeley and Hitch 1974 ; Baddeley 1986 ; tactility: Katus et al. 2012 ; proprioception: Smyth et al. 1988 ; olfaction: Zelano et al. 2009 ; somatosensation: Zhou and Fuster 1996 ), humans, as a species, are to a large degree reliant on vision in order to navigate and interact with the world (D’Ardenne et al. 2012 ; Brewer et al. 2011 ; Mason et al. 2007 ). The visuospatial sketchpad handles the visual and spatial information we encounter, which can be broken down into a number of sub-functions (Repovš and Baddeley 2006 ). For example, there appears to be a dissociation between purely visual representation, and representation of space as such (Constantinidis and Wang 2004 ). Spatial WM may be representing space generally, for visual, auditory, or other stimuli, and appears to be mediated by a network involving the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, superior temporal cortex, posterior parietal cortex, and the lateral intraparietal lobe (Constantinidis and Wang 2004 ). These sites are lateral. On the medial side, the anterior cingulate cortex, posterior cingulate and retrosplenial cortices, and the parahippocampal cortex are involved (Constantinidis and Wang 2004 ). Parietal areas generally mediate integration of sensory streams, while the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is usually thought to be responsible for maintaining and storing representations (though see Mackey et al. 2016 for a challenge to this in humans). Visual representations in particular also make use of networks in the occipital lobe (see, e.g., Schurgin 2018 ). These areas thus together cohere with the visuospatial sketchpad.

The most important cortical area for executive function, or cognitive control, appears to be the frontal cortex. A recent review by Badre and Nee ( 2018 ) identifies several regions within frontal cortices that mediate central executive control functionality of varying concreteness. In general, more abstract control is found in rostral areas, while concreteness increases caudally, closer to sensory cortices. Thus, the frontal eye fields and the premotor and motor cortices handle concrete sensory-motor control (Badre and Nee 2018 ). Contextual control is found more rostrally in the dorsal- and ventral anterior (pre) premotor areas, also including the inferior frontal junction area (Badre and Nee 2018 ). More rostrally still are areas that handle control of context-independent schemas. These include the mid-dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and the rostrolateral prefrontal cortex (Badre and Nee 2018 ). In this context, schemas may be thought of as a kind of mental structures that organize classes of percepts and their relationships (Bartlett 1932 ). These, and other areas such as the frontostriatal circuits, brainstem, and superior parietal cortex cohere with the central executive.

As mentioned, the episodic buffer functions as a mediator between many memory systems, especially between the central executive and episodic LTM (Baddeley et al. 2010 ). When retrieval is needed for planning and executive control, the episodic buffer helps integrate relevant information (Strange et al. 2001 , p. 1045; Rudner and Rönnberg 2008 ). Although the exact role and underpinnings of the episodic buffer remain unclear, particularly the parietal lobe and the left anterior hippocampus is thought to play a crucial role, in how this temporary storage, with a limited capacity, merge information (Berlingeri et al. 2008 ; Baddeley et al. 2010 ). This is enabled by a capacity for multi-dimensional coding, giving the episodic buffer a central role for conscious awareness, as well as for immediate- and episodic recall. Episodic memory is a broad concept, integrating sensory streams along with a sense of space, place, and time, but also a sense of agency. In the brain, this means that diverse and widespread networks are recruited to encode and reconstruct episodes. One of the most important networks is thought to be the hippocampus. Coarsely, it is responsible for spatiotemporal aspects of memory organization, as well as for relations between memories (Eichenbaum 2018 ). Also involved is the parahippocampal gyrus which more specifically processes aspects of place (Eichenbaum 2018 ). The ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the angular gyrus process self-referential aspects, and the feeling of agency respectively (Dede and Smith 2018 ). The middle temporal gyrus is thought to handle semantic aspects of episodes (Dede and Smith 2018 ). Included in episodic memory networks are neural populations related to attention. The retrosplenial and posterior cingulate cortices are involved in reducing attention and engaging the default network, which can reconstruct episodes. The ventrolateral prefrontal cortex is also thought to be able to break established attentional patterns to direct attention to other salient events (Corbetta and Shulman 2002 ; Eriksson et al. 2015 ). Similar mechanisms to manipulation of chunks may make up the affordance of mental time-travel and mental simulation, which appear to rely on recalling sequences from LTM and somehow parameterizing them. The hippocampus, in particular, appears to be involved with this, but likely in concert with prefrontal populations (Hassabis et al. 2007 ). Information from LTM route via the default network (Brewer et al. 2011 ; Mason et al. 2007 ). Specifically, there are indications that the fusiform gyrus, the inferior temporal and parahippocampal gyri, as well as the left posterior insula, are activated above baseline when gating of LTM is in effect (Brewer et al. 2011 ).

In this subsection, we have investigated the neural underpinnings of reflection and WM. Although the various parts of WM are interconnected, working in parallel with LTM and numerous other systems, a number of specific brain areas pertaining to selective attention and executive control do stand out. The articulatory network (posterior inferior temporal gyrus, premotor cortex, anterior insula), and the sensorimotor interface (sylvian parietal-temporal area) coheres with the phonological loop. The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, superior temporal cortex, posterior parietal cortex, lateral intraparietal lobe, anterior cingulate cortex, posterior cingulate, retrosplenial cortices, and the parahippocampal cortex, as well as the occipital lobe, coheres with the visuospatial sketchpad. The frontal and prefrontal cortex, the premotor and motor cortices, also involving frontostriatal circuits, brainstem, and superior parietal cortex coheres with the central executive. The parietal lobe and the (left anterior) hippocampus coheres with the episodic buffer. And, the prefrontal, ventral fronto-temporal, medial temporal, retrosplenial, and posterior cingulate cortices, the parahippocampal, angular, middle temporal, the fusiform, and inferior temporal gyrus, as well as the left posterior insula and the hippocampus coheres with episodic LTM. Footnote 5 In short, the processes and pathways of selective attention and executive control cohere with WM and so Type 2 processes and reflection (Awh et al. 2006 ).

The reached position is thus that reflection involves Type 2 processes, WM and episodic LTM, as well as attentional and executive neural pathways. Reflection can thus be differentiated from Type 1 processes, procedural and semantic LTM, as well as perceptual, motor, and associative neural pathways. Footnote 6

We want to point out that even though this partitioning is well-established, highlighting an essential feature of human cognition, both reflexive and reflective processes involve complex intertwined bottom-up and top-down signals that work together. In the following Sect.  4 , we will try to elaborate on this interaction.

3.3 Interpreting, Operationalizing and Measuring Reflection

Above, psychological constructs and their neural underpinnings, on multiple levels of analysis, have shown the natural phenomenon reflection to be multifaceted and complex, involving much more than just second-order mental states. This broader understanding of reflection thus provides input that more narrow accounts risk to miss. It is a dual understanding of cognition that emerges, which seemingly ought to influence our view of what a plausible account of knowledge should consist in.

But Kornblith questions the philosophical relevance of psychological findings and theories on the matter of reflection generally. He argues that there is an important difference between how ‘reflection’ is used in psychology and how it is used in philosophy (Kornblith 2012 , pp. 141–142):

While System 2 is often the source of second-order belief, not all of the beliefs produced by System 2 are second-order, and thus when psychologists speak of System 2 as involved in reflection, their use of that term better accords with everyday usage, which allows that we may reflect on various features of the world around us and not just on features of our mental life, than it does with the technical usage here which ties reflection to second-order states. (Kornblith 2012 , p. 140)

Here Kornblith points out that he uses reflection in a technical sense. Accordingly, he accepts that Type 2 processes (System 2) involve other aspects, but considers that the only philosophically relevant aspect is the link to second-order mental states. From a cooperative methodological naturalistic perspective philosophers should look to science for answers rather than make up their own based on intuition, which makes it questionable to restrict scientific input in this manner. And as we have shown above, a broader interpretation is motivated. However, if the traditional view that Kornblith wants to counter demands that reflection is restricted to one of its aspects—second-order mental states—it might be necessary to do so for argument’s sake. It is then only the empirical evidence specifically addressing metacognitive second-order mental states that should be considered.

But Kornblith goes further. According to Kornblith, psychological theorists ‘mean to say nothing more [with the term reflection] than that the kind of thought characteristic of System 2 is conscious’ (Kornblith 2012 , p. 141). Reflection should then be understood as ‘nothing more than’ conscious reasoning in System 2 (Type 2 processes)—also involving non-conscious processes from System 1 (Type 1 processes). But we consider this interpretation to be insufficient and problematic. It is one thing to restrict one’s focus (to second-order mental states)—against the scientific usage found in cognitive psychology. However, in claiming that cognitive psychologists (or even only dual process theorists) mean nothing more than ‘consciousness’ when they speak of reflection, we believe Kornblith is in the wrong.

Contrary to Kornblith’s interpretation, cognitive psychologists point out how ‘the reflective mind’ governs our thinking dispositions, having a number of important specific roles, where ‘reasoning and decision making sometimes requires both (a) an override of the default intuition and (b) its replacement by effective Type 2, reflective reasoning.’ (Evans and Stanovich 2013 , p. 236). Rather than indicating ‘nothing more’ than consciousness, reflection can be seen to encompass many particular states in human cognition, but importantly second-order mental states about one’s own thoughts is a focal point where ‘[c]onclusions accepted for a reason are not intuitive but are, we will say, “reflective”… and the mental act of accepting a reflective conclusion through an examination of the reasons one has to do so is an act of reflection’ (Mercier and Sperber 2009 , p. 12).

Currently, a common way of operationalizing reflection in the context of cognitive psychology research is by means of the ‘cognitive reflection test’ (CRT) (see, e.g., Frederick 2005 ; Campitelli and Labollita 2010 ; Toplak, West, and Stanovich 2011 ; Vandekerckhove et al. 2014 ; Gronchi et al. 2016 ). The idea of this experimental test is to measure the disposition or ability of a subject to resist the first answer that comes to mind when posed with a set of questions. These questions are deliberately posed in a way to yield different answers if the subject uses quick intuitions, or if they deliberate and reflect. Here is a common example: A bat and a ball cost $1.10. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?

The intuitive, quick answer is that the ball costs 10 cents. The correct answer, however, is 5 cents. The original CRT consists only of three questions, including the one posed above and two similar ones, and subjects are given the following instruction: Below are several problems that vary in difficulty. Try to answer as many as you can . The measure consists in counting the number of correct answers. Having said that, the test is usually not presented alone, but as part of a larger questionnaire where time and risk preferences are asked for. Perhaps unsurprisingly, studies using the CRT show a correlation between correct answers and reduced temporal discounting (Fredrick 2005 ). In other words, people that tend to answer correctly tend also to be more patient than those who go with the intuitive answer.

This is all very well, but what does it tell us about the epistemic value of reflection? First of all, it indicates that reflexive, or first-order beliefs may not always be reliable since there is a tendency for the brain to jump to conclusions when effort is involved in making an inference. Second, in the cases pertinent to the CRT, reflection is limited to second-order; i.e., there is no infinite regress. Thirdly, it implies that in many cases truth checking may have to be done with external support, e.g., with pen and paper. The point of this is only that representing symbols in the environment saves on mental energy as it were, since the symbols no longer have to be kept stable in the mind. This makes it less likely that energy saving processes get activated, which again can yield inaccurate conclusions.

In a sense, this can be interpreted as lending weight to Kornblith’s criticism of reflection; it can be unreliable. However, importantly so can reflexive processes. The CRT supports that trains of thought can indeed be unreliable since the brain is prone to be miserly with its resources, and this can lead to inaccurate conclusions. But it appears that at least some of these limitations can be overcome by cognitive offloading onto the external world. Hence the process of second-order thought understood as truth checking intuitions can add reliability and epistemic value.

We have looked to cognitive psychology and gained a multi-level understanding of reflection going beyond second-order mental states, which has enabled a more informed interpretation. While this indicates the advantage of a broader understanding of reflection, we will in the next section grant the more restrictive view of reflection and knowledge. It will however be shown that even on such an account, a division of knowledge into a reflexive and a reflective form remains a plausible option.

4 The Plausibility of Two Forms of Knowledge

As shown in the previous section, reflection fills many important roles, but most crucially for our discussion we will in this section discuss how it adds reliability—even restrictively understood as ‘second-order mental states,’ which from a scientific perspective involves a view of reflection as consisting purley of metacognition. In accordance with Kornblith’s own argument, a division of knowledge into one reflexive (animal) form and one reflective form thus remains a plausible option.

4.1 Reflection can Add Reliability

Reflection in fact does add reliability since a pure reliance on reflexive processes would in many cases be costly because observations risk being too context-specific (see, e.g., Smithies 2016 ). To test each encounter purely on the merits of current observational stimuli could even lead to disaster. The ability to run multiple test-scenarios, amounting to second-order mental states about previous trials, in one’s head has great survival benefits. Agents can use reflection to generalize and abstract away non-essential information thereby gaining an overarching understanding and knowledge. A sole focus on reflexive processes thus risks to only allow specific context-dependent knowledge of specific cases. Reflection, seen as second-order mental processes (metacognition), adds generalizability, flexibility, and creativity that is helpful in newly encountered situations, and this, in turn, adds reliability (see, e.g., Olsson 2017a ).

The bottom-up pathways that originate in sensory neurons can automatically associate with each other and with behaviour. By being exposed to a variety of stimuli, they can generalize in their own way and do limited extrapolations based on similarities, and on trial and error. These pathways have evolved to support survival and procreation, and are hence usually able to do an admirable job if left to their own devices. The limitation of the bottom-up pathways is in their context-specificity. If there is no outward similarity for the senses to latch on to, no behaviour will match. This can result in arbitrary and inappropriate behaviour, fearful behaviour and withdrawal from the situation, or anxiety and no behaviour at all. This is where top-down pathways, second-order mental states, and reflective behaviour comes in. Away from the situation, in a calm and safe place, sensory sequences can be recalled and be played back. Different alternative behaviours can be simulated and evaluated, amounting to thinking about one’s thinking or second-order mentals tates, so as to hopefully cope better with similar situations in the future.

The top-down pathways, governing second-order mental states, can inhibit particularities in the sensory streams and hence discover common patterns in them. Particularities of instances of a category are often represented by higher frequency information, while commonalities tend to be represented by lower frequency information (Wiskott and Sejnowski 2002 ). In general, however, instance particularity is not limited to high frequencies, and full generalization requires an ability to inhibit any kind of property representation, be it shape, sound, or smell. Inhibition carries a burden of effort though (Dixon and Christoff 2012 ), and humans have learned to use external representations such as drawings to aid in abstract pattern identification and to reduce cognitive load (Risko and Gilbert 2016 ).

Reflection also affords the extraction of patterns from one context, and the re-concretization of those patterns into different contexts, using imagination to fill in required and appropriate detail. This can save a tremendous amount of energy that would otherwise be needed to arrive at the same behaviour in each specific context via trial and error. To be sure, large differences between the constructed scenario and the actual one may occur. And to an extent, the success of such an enterprise depends on the quality of the second-order models that are employed. That is, how well an agent understands the contexts in question. If both source- and target contexts are understood, re-concretization has a good chance of being successful, otherwise, the probability remains low. Even if the projected behaviour fails, a plan can still be made to gather information in the given context such that correct behaviour can be learned.

Crucially, during the reflective phase, information from cultural sources can be integrated to change behaviour. Human beings can communicate and exchange experience and knowledge, and through writing and reading that experience can be communicated across larger distances and over longer time spans. By means of writing, knowledge about the world can also accumulate over time affording later generations better cognitive methods and tools than previous ones. Such information integration is not possible purely by bottom-up experience of concrete situations, even if direct situational information is more accurate than that generated by means of reflection.

So, reflection, even if solely understood as second-order mental states (or metacognition), can add reliability through added flexibility and generalizability for the agent. In the next section, we will go into more depth about the contrast between reflective and reflexive knowledge from the perspective of feedback control.

4.2 Reflective and Reflexive Knowledge

Since it has been shown that reflection can add reliability, Kornblith’s account can be evaluated anew. He agrees that if this is the case, the infinite regress (from Sect.  2.1 ) can be avoided. And this would leave the option of dividing knowledge into two forms, one reflexive (animal) and one reflective. In this subsection we elaborate on this possibility.

Even though the body (including the central nervous system with the brain) forms essentially a unified system under feedback control, it is nevertheless governed by distinct reflexive and reflective pathways (Pezzulo and Cisek 2016 ; see also, e.g., Friston 2009 , 2010 ; Hohwy 2013 ). Top-down pathways continuously predict activity of bottom-up sensory pathways, while prediction errors make their way upwards in the hierarchy until they can be adjusted for by activating effectors. Here ‘effector’ is used as a broad term for processes that bind together and affect other processes, including, for example, low-level hormonal upregulation, reflexive motor actions initiated by spinal cord networks, as well as behaviour guided by high-level plans such as walking to a store to buy food, or even applying to college to get an education. So, albeit that human cognition and knowledge involve several complex intertwined capabilities, they are plausibly partitioned into a reflexive and a reflective form. Footnote 7

Reflection can be interpreted as willful manipulations of WM content using such metaphorical effectors. This process can be applied to question and check the validity of spontaneous intuitions. Take the example from the CRT mentioned above, where the question is what the price of the baseball is given that both the bat and ball cost $1.10, and the bat costs $1 more than the ball. The spontaneous first-order thought is that the ball costs 10 cents. What reflection can do is to check more thoroughly if this is indeed the case. By laboriously setting up an algebraic equation and doing the math step by step, the original intuition can be scrutinized. In this case it was wrong; the mathematics yield the answer 5 cents. As long as this second-order process is trusted, as is usually the case with arithmetics, there is no need for further verification. Footnote 8

Summing up, we claim that Kornblith is correct when he points out that traditional philosophical investigations often do not do justice to the natural phenomenon of reflection. Indeed, folk-psychological notions of reflection ought not to be allowed to take precedence or override scientifically grounded understandings of the natural phenomenon. But the reached conclusion is that philosophy needs to accept a pluralistic account of reflection and knowledge that acknowledges both reflexive and reflective processes that each provide specific information relevant for knowledge (see, e.g., Plotkin 1993 ; Alston 2005 ; Olsson 2017b ). Moreover, Kornblith’s own interpretation of reflection is problematic, even given his own demarcations and demands. Importantly, there is a link between reflection and reliability making two forms of knowledge a plausible option—one reflexive (animal knowledge) and one reflective.

5 Concluding Remarks

We have shown that a better understanding of reflection is possible by looking at how it actually works. We have therefore moved away from a traditional stance focusing on language, concepts, certainty, and truth. Instead, we have adopted a naturalistic stance, in line with Kornblith, focusing on natural phenomena, scientific results, and plausibility. In accordance with this stance, we have explored how reflection coheres with the psychological constructs Type 2, WM, and episodic LTM, as well as to attentional and executive neural pathways. Importantly, reflection has been shown to fill a number of important functions: our inner dialogues, visual management, attention, information-manipulation, reasoning, decision making, metacognition, sense of agency, self-awareness, first-person phenomenology, remembrance, and awareness, motivating a pluralist account.

But we have also argued that this, more fine-grained, understanding of reflection, also acknowledging the influence and role of reflexive processes, does tie reflection to reliability by providing generalizability, flexibility, and creativity that is helpful in newly encountered situations. This indicates that the possibility to divide knowledge into a reflexive form and a reflective form is a plausible option, contrary to Kornblith’s view.

This same point plays out somewhat differently depending on which area of philosophy one is paying attention to, but we will, as aforementioned, here focus on knowledge.

Kornblith uses the terminology ‘System 1’ and ‘System 2’ whereas, for example, Evans and Stanovich ( 2013 , p. 226) argue against such a usage to the benefit of the ‘Type 1’ and ‘Type 2’ nomenclature.

This interpretation follows a development from previous traditional theories and models that placed a more passive short-term memory (STM) in the role now commonly ascribed to an active WM.

There are alternative interpretations that, for example, argue that WM is best viewed as being a part of LTM (see, e.g., Ericsson and Kintsch 1995 ) or as an emergent property of numerous combinations of underlying ‘possible subsystems’ (see, e.g., Postle 2006 ), where ‘… working memory may simply be a property that emerges from a nervous system that is capable of representing many different kinds of information, and that is endowed with flexibly deployable attention.’ (Postle 2006 , p. 29). However, in line with for example Repovš and Baddeley ( 2006 ), we regard the empirical findings as providing a strong case for the standard model. Even so, we do acknowledge that it might have to be revised in a more fine-grained direction in light of coming findings, where feasible examples of such revisions might include, not only auditory- and visual-, but more subsystems based on all our different senses in WM.

Research on the cerebellum indicates that it plays a vital role not only in fine motor behaviour, but also in the automation of mental processes. According to Ito ( 2008 ), the cerebellum has two principal modi of operation: as a forward model, and as an inverse model. The former implies that the cerebellum can learn to generate and hence simulate sensory signals. The latter means that the cerebellum can learn to control, for example, muscles in the motor system, but may also be interpreted as to involve populations of excitatory and inhibitory neurons that affect contents of WM. Thus, the cerebellum can learn to perform volitional operations in WM automatically. Common examples of this is mental calculation, and certain kinds of planning (Ito 2008 ). This can be interpreted as the cerebellum being necessary for higher order thought, or being able to automate sequences of thought into building blocks that can be used for more complex problem solving or planning. Further aspects could, for example, include the function of glial cells in signal delay and the function of protein synthesis in regulating density of receptors or neurotransmitter reuptake mechanisms.

Importantly, semantic memory is connected to both procedural and episodic memory although we will regard it as closer tied to reflexive generalized processes and thus not view it as directly involved in reflection (see, e.g., Binder and Desai 2011 ; Yee, Chrysikou, and Thompson-Schill 2014 ).

This also holds true, to various degrees, for all mammals, and many other organisms (see, e.g., Allen and Fortin 2013 ; Carruthers 2013 ).

Interestingly, the scientific process can be seen as an example of a kind of infinite regress, since there is seldom a 100% sure probability of experimental validity, and 100% validity can never in practice be reached. But experimental results can converge, which means that further experimentation becomes less urgent. Hence the regress, and the reflection, can be halted.

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Acknowledgements

We want to thank Peter Gärdenfors, Martin L. Jönsson, Christian Balkenius, Maximilian Roszko, Asger Kirkeby-Hinrup, Erik J. Olsson, and Ingar Brinck for sharing their vast knowledge concerning this topic. We also want to thank participants at the Research Seminar in Theoretical Philosophy and the PhD Seminar in Philosophy at Lund University, and our anonymous reviewers for comments.

Open access funding provided by Lund University. The authors gratefully acknowledges support from Makarna Ingeniör Lars Henrik Fornanders fond and Stiftelsen Elisabeth Rausings minnesfond: forskning.

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Stephens, A., Tjøstheim, T.A. The Cognitive Philosophy of Reflection. Erkenn 87 , 2219–2242 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-020-00299-0

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Free A Reflection on Philosophy Essay Sample

Even though it is considered as one of the oldest sciences or fields of human knowledge and practices, philosophy just like many other areas of disciplines still torments its believers as to what really it means. The fact that this field of human knowledge has existed for over two thousand years, has not made it any easier for understanding or closer to harmony among the thousands of its adherents. Perhaps I would agree that it is among the hardest things to define and express in explicit words what really philosophy means. Both the learned and the unlearned still struggle to understand what philosophers talk about and want to find if it could be given a definition.

Different philosophical schools have different perceptions of philosophy. The dilemma grows bigger and bigger and the question arises whether ever such times will come when men will arrive at a definite conclusion. Nothing is harder than a situation where a settlement is required, but all the participants believe that they are right in their own different views. In such a case, the battle boils down between the strong and determined and those who have felt exhausted and cannot sustain the argument: they just surrender and abandon the discussion. A situation where everyone considers himself to be right usually ends when the least interested in the argument yield to the so called ‘talented in the battle of words’.

I believe that philosophy is, if to put in simpler terms, is an art in which everyone contributes his/her own wildest imaginations or perceptions of a thing or an idea and imagines how certain things work or explains phenomena, and all the adherents of the ideas will have to live according to the inventor opinion. Philosophy is to believe that things are explained the way you have thought they can be and it attempts to make everyone obedient to such so called truth; however, this will only happen for as long as there is no other proof of things being done differently. Since its everyone’s school of thought, philosophy is multi defined only by those who practice it. I agree with Lev Shestov, the author of What is Philosophy , that it is hard to define this term.

Considering the great philosophers, such renowned men of thoughts like Socrates, Plato, Napoleon and the rest, and also appreciating the extent of their contribution in the modern social sciences, someone may not be left in doubt that these people lived in their own worlds with little or no harmony amongst their opinions.

Plato, for example, was a great philosopher and thinker, upon whose ideological pillars was that the problem with humanity was simply the moral behaviour, and that when subjected to better moral training and justice, man would live a better life. Plato wanted to uphold justice and do everyone good. The very same justice he wanted to uphold is the same justice he defied and contravened when circumstances pressed him hard; it is interesting to see that certain philosophical opinions are held by people only for as long as there is no opportunity for trial. Much of Plato’s stories could be witnessed in the history of Carl Marx, who also thought that the people’s chief problem was just morality and that if trained, everyone would be a good person. However, it appears that a person’s chief problem is inborn and it lies in what he/she is rather than what he/she does; person’s deeds could not change him/her for better. It is said about Schopenhauer that his philosophical beliefs in virtues were only in books: he went about preaching the gospel of a virtuous society, while in his daily life he himself became too cruel and unjust contravening the vary ideas upon which his philosophy rests.

Even religionists disagree on the nature and character of their gods whom they worship; each camp is right in their defence of what they do. All claim that their deity is superior and all-powerful; all the gods, according to major religions, have some sort of an evil opposing power, which must be fought and eliminated. Be it the Christian Bible, the Islamic Quran or any other religion creed, they all have their own order of belief; each claimed that their belief is the right and that their philosophy is correct; even atheists have their beliefs, who in this case will agree or accept that their philosophy is not correct. Surely, there is no one answer and so philosophy is undefined by any religious thinking.

Considering Napoleon, the Frenchman of his time, what did he do? This was a man who attempted to bring the whole of the world under his dominion and nearly did that. Napoleon, whose philosophy was never to surrender and give up, never knew life without the gun and always walked as a conqueror; he is described as a man who did not fear pestilence, disaster or bullet. However, when he was faced with a capture, he feared and trembled at the point of a gun; when followed to the dark room custody, Napoleon Bonaparte, a great conqueror of all the people, was shivering and looking miserable; who could imagine that. Philosophy is, therefore, a temporary ideology of a time, usually a time of convenience, before the ideological theories are tested. It is like a resort of thinking for times when things are still working in favour of the opinions we hold.

Considering the great philosophers like Socrates and the rest, most of their philosophical arguments were base on human experiences and observations in life. They had seen a lot for long times and so they could be able to draw conclusions; however, the question remains as to how possible it is for two individual livings in two different geographic environments, who go through different experiences, to develop the same theories in life and conclusions; this would mean that these people are not different. It is clear that even among the philosophers there exists a disharmony among their stands; they draw different conclusion about their different experiences. It, therefore, emerges that we can only have schools of thoughts according to these people; everyone has his/her own conclusion about life, and those who can agree with that way of thinking would be called his students or adherents. It could be possible that someone’s theoretical perspective of life may be attractive to a given group of individual, however, to some extent, this can demonstrate a lack of one’s personal stands or perspectives in life: that is why he subscribes to one’s school of thought.

Some people also look at the wider knowledge that can be learned in schools as at some form of philosophy, because in some way they are based on individual theories. This is where the science differs from all other fields of knowledge: in science, things are investigated or tested and proven. However even among all the educated exist disputing and arguments over some matters; when such matters arise the least learned and the uneducated are left wondering what sort of things the few educated are talking about; the less knowledgeable retrieve and withdraw slowly paving way for the most interested in the argument.

This difference in the levels of interest also makes it hard for philosophy. Still there are those who think they can live without boggling their minds with whether philosophy helps them or not.

Even reading the Russian philosopher Lev Shestov comments on philosophy, we can see that he did not fully decide which side to take. He, having investigated the opinions and the behaviours of the renowned philosophers, is rather unready to give a description of what philosophy is about; he is of the opinion that it is dependent on the person.

To conclude, as for me, it is better not to entirely agree or disagree with the opinions of the Russian philosopher or others, but rather to be perspective and rational. I would rather say that philosophers have shown open disagreement among their different philosophical ideologies, and even among the learned there still exist gaps in opinions; it is, therefore, true that there is no single settlement as per what philosophy truly is.

For some people, philosophy is described as an art, but just an art for art’s sake. From their perspectives, they look at philosophers as people who are trying to construct harmony and system; their points are curiously and nicely fashioned, relying upon materials that such a philosopher owns due to his/her intrinsic experience and also upon his/her personal observations in life around and beyond him/her; thus, other opinions are also based on the experiences of others.

It may, therefore, have to take a little longer time for most of us to come to the agreement of what philosophy is all about. In my opinion, philosophy is merely dependent upon ones particular kind of opinions based on their experience and views about life.

In order to bring harmony and unison among the philosophers, we have to bring at first all the interest groups on board: the learned and the unlearned, the educated and the uneducated, the interested and the non-interested. Attempts have to be made to develop the interest of all the people, to make them see the value and the impact of such a branch of science on human life. It is only after this grand effort, the use of philosophy as an ideology only at times of convenience will be eliminated. Philosophers will be able to live according to their talks. As for me, there is still no definition for true philosophy.

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Philosophical Reflection Essay

The impact of the philosophical mindset and ancient Greek philosophy is very significant. It has helped shape how we think about the world and our place in it. It has also helped us better understand ourselves and our relationships with others. The impact of the philosophical mindset and ancient Greek philosophy is evident in many ways. One way is how people think about the world and its place. Ancient Greek philosophy emphasized reason and inquiry, which profoundly impacted how people thought about the world and their place in it. This idea is evident in how people think about life, death, and the nature of reality. It is also evident in how people think about ethics and morality. Another way in which the impact of the philosophical mindset and ancient Greek philosophy is evident is in how people relate to each other. Ancient Greek philosophy emphasized the importance of human relationships, which has significantly impacted how people relate to each other. This idea is evident in how people think about family, friends, and community. It is also evident in how people think about justice and democracy. I believe the impact of the philosophical mindset and ancient Greek philosophy is significant. It has helped shape how we think about the world and our place in it. It has also helped us better understand ourselves and our relationships with others.

Philosophy is a systematic study of the nature of existence, reality, and knowledge. It is concerned with the nature of knowledge, the meaning of life and death, and the world’s true nature; It is the study of human thought and behavior (Sophia Org, n.d.). It answers us about the purpose of existence and the nature of reality in our life.

Philosophy branches into metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. Metaphysics is the study of being or what exists. Metaphysics seeks to understand the fundamental nature of reality, including whether or not there are objective values and what it means for something to be authentic (Sophia Org, n.d.). The study of knowledge and how humans acquire it is known as epistemology. It is the study of knowledge or how we learn about the world around us. If one needs to determine if there is or is not an absolute truth, we might investigate this through philosophy. Ethics is the study of what ought to be done (Sophia Org, n.d.). It’s often divided into three branches; morality, which discusses what ought to be done. Politics discusses how societies should be governed, and aesthetics discusses what should be valued in art.

What is reality? What is the nature of the universe? What is the nature of consciousness and matter? What is the nature of time and space? These and other issues are addressed by metaphysics. The study of epistemology addresses issues such as “What is knowledge?” “How can we know anything?” and “What is the link between knowledge and belief?” What is the good life? What is good and evil? What is the correct thing to do? What separates right from wrong? These are just a few of the ethical questions that are posed. How do we know what we know? and “How do we know the truth?” are some of the problems that epistemology poses. Ethics is a branch of philosophy that explores morality, ethics, and virtue. It asks questions like “what should I do,” or “how should I live my life?”

Socrates would answer the question “What is knowledge?” with a philosophical thesis about knowledge. Socrates would claim that there are two kinds of knowledge: demonstrative knowledge, known from direct perception, and true belief, which is known from experience and use.

Thinking in a philosophical means that you think critically and deeply about questions that do not have easy answers, shaping your thoughts to understand the world better and how it works in acquiring knowledge. It can help you in your own life by teaching you how to question your assumptions and think critically about the world around you. It can help you see problems or challenges from different perspectives, which can help you make more informed and effective decisions (Sophia Org, n.d.). Philosophy helps you think about your life by asking questions about what it means to be human, what government is, why it is evil and suffering in the world, and how we should treat each other as individuals. It’s also an essential part of being able to communicate with others. Philosophical conversations can help people explore ideas together and build a shared understanding between them.

The ideas of the ancient Greek philosophers have significantly impacted my views, knowledge, and opinions. I view all humans as being equal, and this belief has come from my reading of the works of Plato. He believed that people were born with an innate knowledge of good and evil, which he referred to as the “Form of the Good.” He also believed that people’s souls were immortal and could not be destroyed by external factors like disease or war. He also believed that people should strive to live according to their natures rather than following what society tells them is right or wrong. Plato’s idea that humans are born with an innate knowledge of good and evil influenced me greatly when I was younger because it meant that no matter what anyone else did, they could never take away my intrinsic sense of right or wrong. This idea also helped me understand the importance of making choices based on what was suitable for me rather than what others thought was best for me. I consider myself to be a very pragmatic person. Still, I also believe there’s much to be said about knowledge derived from experience and observation. This idea means that while I may have some knowledge about something, it’s not always because I’ve been told about it and memorized it. Instead, it occurs because I’ve experienced it myself or at least observed others doing things.

I would define knowledge as the ability to use information and reason. It is “a way of thinking, rather than merely an accumulation of pieces of information.” In other words, knowledge is a concept that encompasses all those things we understand about the world around us would explain knowledge as the process where one accepts that they were ignorant in the beginning and begins to learn new ideas for dealing with life.

Works Cited

Sophia Org. “Unit 1_Challange 1:Introduction to philosophy &the pre-socratics.”  Sophia :: Welcome , Sophia org, app.sophia.org/spcc/ancient-greek-philosophers-2-challenge-1-1/1/10386/what-is-philosophy-2. Accessed 25 Sept. 2022.

—. “Unit 1_Introduction to philosophy &the pre-Socratics.”  Sophia :: Welcome , Sorphia Org, app.sophia.org/spcc/ancient-greek-philosophers-2-challenge-1-1/2/10387/why-study-philosophy. Accessed 25 Sept. 2022.

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