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  • Published: 11 May 2018

The Syrian conflict: a case study of the challenges and acute need for medical humanitarian operations for women and children internally displaced persons

  • Rahma Aburas 1 ,
  • Amina Najeeb 2 ,
  • Laila Baageel 3 &
  • Tim K. Mackey   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-2191-7833 3 , 4 , 5  

BMC Medicine volume  16 , Article number:  65 ( 2018 ) Cite this article

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After 7 years of increasing conflict and violence, the Syrian civil war now constitutes the largest displacement crisis in the world, with more than 6 million people who have been internally displaced. Among this already-vulnerable population group, women and children face significant challenges associated with lack of adequate access to maternal and child health (MCH) services, threatening their lives along with their immediate and long-term health outcomes.

While several health and humanitarian aid organizations are working to improve the health and welfare of internally displaced Syrian women and children, there is an immediate need for local medical humanitarian interventions. Responding to this need, we describe the case study of the Brotherhood Medical Center (the “Center”), a local clinic that was initially established by private donors and later partnered with the Syrian Expatriate Medical Association to provide free MCH services to internally displaced Syrian women and children in the small Syrian border town of Atimah.

Conclusions

The Center provides a unique contribution to the Syrian health and humanitarian crisis by focusing on providing MCH services to a targeted vulnerable population locally and through an established clinic. Hence, the Center complements efforts by larger international, regional, and local organizations that also are attempting to alleviate the suffering of Syrians victimized by this ongoing civil war. However, the long-term success of organizations like the Center relies on many factors including strategic partnership building, adjusting to logistical difficulties, and seeking sustainable sources of funding. Importantly, the lessons learned by the Center should serve as important principles in the design of future medical humanitarian interventions working directly in conflict zones, and should emphasize the need for better international cooperation and coordination to support local initiatives that serve victims where and when they need it the most.

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The Syrian civil war is the epitome of a health and humanitarian crisis, as highlighted by recent chemical attacks in a Damascus suburb, impacting millions of people across Syria and leading to a mass migration of refugees seeking to escape this protracted and devastating conflict. After 7 long years of war, more than 6 million people are internally displaced within Syria — the largest displacement crisis in the world — and more than 5 million registered Syrian refugees have been relocated to neighboring countries [ 1 , 2 ]. In total, this equates to an estimated six in ten Syrians who are now displaced from their homes [ 3 ].

Syrian internally displaced persons (IDPs) are individuals who continue to reside in a fractured Syrian state now comprising a patchwork of government- and opposition-held areas suffering from a breakdown in governance [ 4 ]. As the Syrian conflict continues, the number of IDPs and Syrian refugees continues to grow according to data from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). This growth is continuing despite some borders surrounding Syria being closed and in part due to a rising birth rate in refugee camps [ 5 , 6 ]. This creates acute challenges for neighboring/receiving countries in terms of ensuring adequate capacity to offer essential services such as food, water, housing, security, and specifically healthcare [ 4 , 7 , 8 ].

Though Syrian refugees and IDPs face similar difficulties in relation to healthcare access in a time of conflict and displacement, their specific challenges and health needs are distinctly different, as IDPs lack the same rights guaranteed under international law as refugees, and refugees have variations in access depending on their circumstances. Specifically, there are gaps in access to medical care and medicines for both the internally displaced and refugees, whether it be in Syria, in transit countries (including services for refugees living in camps versus those living near urban cities), or in eventual resettlement countries. In particular, treatment of chronic diseases and accessing of hospital care can be difficult, exacerbated by Syrian families depleting their savings, increased levels of debt, and a rise in those living in poverty (e.g., more than 50% of registered Syrian refugees in Jordan are burdened with debt) [ 9 ].

Despite ongoing actions of international humanitarian organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to alleviate these conditions, healthcare access and coverage for displaced Syrians and refugees is getting worse as the conflict continues [ 4 , 10 ]. Although Syria operated a strong public health system and was experiencing improved population health outcomes pre-crisis, the ongoing conflict, violence, and political destabilization have led to its collapse [ 11 , 12 , 13 ]. Specifically, campaigns of violence against healthcare infrastructure and workers have led to the dismantling of the Syrian public health system, particularly in opposition-held areas, where access to even basic preventive services has been severely compromised [ 14 , 15 , 16 , 17 ].

Collectively, these dire conditions leave millions of already-vulnerable Syrians without access to essential healthcare services, a fundamental human right and one purportedly guaranteed to all Syrian citizens under its constitution [ 4 ]. Importantly, at the nexus of this health and humanitarian crisis are the most vulnerable: internally displaced Syrian women and children. Hence, this opinion piece first describes the unique challenges and needs faced by this vulnerable population and then describes the case study of the Brotherhood Medical Center (the “Center”), an organization established to provide free and accessible maternal and child health (MCH) services for Syrian IDPs, and how it represents lessons regarding the successes and ongoing challenges of a local medical humanitarian intervention.

Syria: a health crisis of the vulnerable

Critically, women and children represent the majority of all Syrian IDPs and refugees, which directly impacts their need for essential MCH services [ 18 ]. Refugee and internally displaced women and children face similar health challenges in conflict situations, as they are often more vulnerable than other patient populations, with pregnant women and children at particularly high risk for poor health outcomes that can have significant short-term, long-term, and inter-generational health consequences [ 10 ]. Shared challenges include a lack of access to healthcare and MCH services, inadequate vaccination coverage, risk of malnutrition and starvation, increased burden of mental health issues due to exposure to trauma, and other forms of exploitation and violence such as early marriage, abuse, discrimination, and gender-based violence [ 4 , 10 , 19 , 20 ]. Further, scarce medical resources are often focused on patients suffering from acute and severe injury and trauma, leading to de-prioritization of other critical services like MCH [ 4 ].

Risks for women

A 2016 United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) report estimated that 360,000 Syrian IDPs are pregnant, yet many do not receive any antenatal or postnatal care [ 21 , 22 ]. According to estimates by the UNFPA in 2015, without adequate international funding, 70,000 pregnant Syrian women faced the risk of giving birth in unsafe conditions if access to maternal health services was not improved [ 23 ]. For example, many women cannot access a safe place with an expert attendant for delivery and also may lack access to emergency obstetric care, family planning services, and birth control [ 4 , 19 , 24 , 25 , 26 , 27 , 28 ]. By contrast, during pre-conflict periods, Syrian women enjoyed access to standard antenatal care, and 96% of deliveries (whether at home or in hospitals) were assisted by a skilled birth attendant [ 13 ]. This coverage equated to improving population health outcomes, including data from the Syrian Ministry of Health reporting significant gains in life expectancy at birth (from 56 to 73.1 years), reductions in infant mortality (decrease from 132 per 1000 to 17.9 per 1000 live births), reductions in under-five mortality (from 164 to 21.4 per 1000 live births), and declines in maternal mortality (from 482 to 52 per 100,000 live births) between 1970 and 2009, respectively [ 13 ].

Post-conflict, Syrian women now have higher rates of poor pregnancy outcomes, including increased fetal mortality, low birth weights, premature labor, antenatal complications, and an increase in puerperal infections, as compared to pre-conflict periods [ 10 , 13 , 25 , 26 ]. In general, standards for antenatal care are not being met [ 29 ]. Syrian IDPs therefore experience further childbirth complications such as hemorrhage and delivery/abortion complications and low utilization of family planning services [ 25 , 28 ]. Another example of potential maternal risk is an alarming increase in births by caesarean section near armed conflict zones, as women elect for scheduled caesareans to avoid rushing to the hospital during unpredictable and often dangerous circumstances [ 10 ]. There is similar evidence from Syrian refugees in Lebanon, where rates of caesarean sections were 35% (of 6366 deliveries assessed) compared to approximately 15% as previously recorded in Syria and Lebanon [ 30 ].

Risks for children

Similar to the risks experienced by Syrian women, children are as vulnerable or potentially at higher risk during conflict and health and humanitarian crises. According to the UNHCR, there are 2.8 million children displaced in Syria out of a total of 6.5 million persons, and just under half (48%) of Syrian registered refugees are under 18 years old [ 1 ]. The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) further estimates that 6 million children still living in Syria are in need of humanitarian assistance and 420,000 children in besieged areas lack access to vital humanitarian aid [ 31 ].

For most Syrian internally displaced and refugee children, the consequences of facing lack of access to essential healthcare combined with the risk of malnutrition (including cases of severe malnutrition and death among children in besieged areas) represent a life-threatening challenge (though some studies have positively found low levels of global acute malnutrition in Syrian children refugee populations) [ 24 , 32 , 33 , 34 ]. Additionally, UNICEF reports that pre-crisis 90% of Syrian children received routine vaccination, with this coverage now experiencing a dramatic decline to approximately 60% (though estimating vaccine coverage in Syrian IDP and refugee populations can be extremely difficult) [ 35 ]. A consequence of lack of adequate vaccine coverage is the rise of deadly preventable infectious diseases such as meningitis, measles, and even polio, which was eradicated in Syria in 1995, but has recently re-emerged [ 36 , 37 , 38 ]. Syrian refugee children are also showing symptoms of psychological trauma as a result of witnessing the war [ 4 , 39 ].

A local response: the Brotherhood Medical Center

In direct response to the acute needs faced by Syrian internally displaced women and children, we describe the establishment, services provided, and challenges faced by the Brotherhood Medical Center (recently renamed the Brotherhood Women and Children Specialist Center and hereinafter referred to as the “Center”), which opened its doors to patients in September 2014. The Center was the brainchild of a group of Syrian and Saudi physicians and donors who had the aim of building a medical facility to address the acute need for medical humanitarian assistance in the village of Atimah (Idlib Governorate, Syria), which is also home to a Syrian displacement camp.

Atimah (Idlib Governorate, Syria) is located on the Syrian side of the Syrian-Turkish border. Its population consisted of 250,000 people pre-conflict in an area of approximately 65 km 2 . Atimah and its adjacent areas are currently generally safe from the conflict, with both Atimah and the entire Idlib Governorate outside the control of the Syrian government and instead governed by the local government. However, continued displacement of Syrians seeking to flee the conflict has led to a continuous flow of Syrian families into the area, with the population of the town growing to approximately a million people.

In addition to the Center, there are multiple healthcare centers and field hospitals serving Atimah and surrounding areas that cover most medical specialties. These facilities are largely run by local and international health agencies including Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), Medical Relief for Syria, and Hand in Hand for Syria, among others. Despite the presence of these organizations, the health needs of IDPs exceeds the current availability of healthcare services, especially for MCH services, as the majority of the IDPs belong to this patient group. This acute need formed the basis for the project plan establishing the Center to serve the unique needs of Syrian internally displaced women and children.

Operation of the Center

The Center’s construction and furnishing took approximately 1 year after land was purchased for its facility, a fact underlining the urgency of building a permanent local physical infrastructure to meet healthcare needs during the midst of a conflict. Funds to support its construction originated from individual donors, Saudi business men, and a group of physicians. In this sense, the Center represents an externally funded humanitarian delivery model focused on serving a local population, with no official government, NGO, or international organization support for its initial establishment.

The facility’s primary focus is to serve Syrian women and children, but since its inception in 2014, the facility has grown to cater for an increasing number of IDPs and their diverse needs. When it opened, facility services were limited to offering only essential outpatient, gynecology, and obstetrics services, as well as operating a pediatric clinic. The staffing at the launch consisted of only three doctors, a midwife, a nurse, an administrative aid, and a housekeeper, but there now exist more than eight times this initial staff count. The staff operating the Center are all Syrians; some of them are from Atimah, but many also come from other places in Syria. The Center’s staff are qualified to a large extent, but still need further training and continuing medical education to most effectively provide services.

Though staffing and service provision has increased, the Center’s primary focus is on its unique contribution to internally displaced women and children. Expanded services includes a dental clinic 1 day per week, which is run by a dentist with the Health Affairs in Idlib Governorate, and has been delegated to cover the dental needs for the hospital patients . Importantly, the Center facility has no specific policy on patient eligibility, its desired patient catchment population/area, or patient admission, instead opting to accept all women and children patients, whether seeking routine or urgent medical care, and providing its services free of charge.

Instead of relying on patient-generated fees (which may be economically prohibitive given the high levels of debt experienced by IDPs) or government funding, the Center relies on its existing donor base for financing the salaries for its physicians and other staff as well as the facility operating costs. More than an estimated 300 patients per day have sought medical attention since its first day of operation, with the number of patients steadily increasing as the clinic has scaled up its services.

Initially the Center started with outpatient (OPD) cases only, and after its partnership with the Syrian Expatriate Medical Association (SEMA) (discussed below), inpatient care for both women and children began to be offered. Patients’ statistics for September 2017 reported 3993 OPD and emergency room visits and 315 inpatient admissions including 159 normal deliveries and 72 caesarean sections, 9 neonatal intensive care unit cases, and 75 admissions for other healthcare services. To better communicate the clinic’s efforts, the Center also operates a Facebook page highlighting its activities (in Arabic at https://www.facebook.com/مشفى-الإخاء-التخصصي-129966417490365/ ).

Challenges faced by the Center and its evolution

The first phase of the Center involved its launch and initial operation in 2014 supported by a small group of donors who self-funded the startup costs needed to operationalize the Center facility’s core clinical services. Less than 2 years later, the Center faced a growing demand for its services, a direct product of both its success in serving its targeted community and the protracted nature of the Syrian conflict. In other words, the Center facility has continuously needed to grow in the scope of its service delivery as increasing numbers of families, women, and children rely on the Center as their primary healthcare facility and access point.

Meeting this increasing need has been difficult given pragmatic operational challenges emblematic of conflict-driven zones, including difficulties in securing qualified and trained medical professionals for clinical services, financing problems involving securing funding due to the shutdown of banking and money transferring services to and from Syria, and macro political factors (such as the poor bilateral relationship between Syria and its neighboring countries) that adversely affect the clinic’s ability to procure medical and humanitarian support and supplies [ 40 ]. Specifically, the Center as a local healthcare facility originally had sufficient manpower and funding provided by its initial funders for its core operations and construction in its first year of operation. However, maintaining this support became difficult with the closure of the Syrian-Turkish border and obstacles in receiving remittances, necessitating the need for broader strategic partnership with a larger organization.

Collectively, these challenges required the management committee and leadership of the Center to shift its focus to securing long-term sustainability and scale-up of services by seeking out external forms of cooperation and support. Borne from this need was a strategic partnership with SEMA, designed to carry forward the next phase of the Center’s operation and development. SEMA, established in 2011, is a non-profit relief organization that works to provide and improve medical services in Syria without discrimination regarding gender, ethnic, or political affiliation — a mission that aligns with the institutional goals of the Center. Selection of SEMA as a partner was based on its activity in the region; SEMA plays an active role in healthcare provision in Idlib and surrounding areas. Some other organizations were also approached at the same time of this organization change, with SEMA being the most responsive.

Since the Center-SEMA partnership was consummated, the Center has received critical support in increasing its personnel capacity and access to medicines, supplies, and equipment, resulting in a gradual scale-up and improvement in its clinical services. This now includes expanded pediatric services and the dental clinic (as previously mentioned and important, as oral health is a concern for many Syrian parents and children). The Center also now offers caesarean deliveries [ 41 ]. However, the Center, similar to other medical humanitarian operations in the region, continues to face many financial and operational challenges, including shortage of medical supplies, lack of qualified medical personnel, and needs for staff development.

Challenges experienced by the Center and other humanitarian operations continue to be exacerbated by the ongoing threat of violence and instability emanating from the conflict that is often targeted at local organizations and international NGOs providing health aid. For example, MSF has previously been forced to suspend its operations in other parts of Syria, has evacuated its facilities after staff have been abducted and its facilities bombed, and it has also been subject to threats from terrorist groups like the Islamic State (IS) [ 42 ].

The case study of the Center, which evolved from a rudimentary medical tent originally located directly in the Atimah displacement camp to the establishment of a local medical facility now serving thousands of Syrian IDPs, is just one example of several approaches aimed at alleviating the suffering of Syrian women and children who have been disproportionately victimized by this devastating health and humanitarian crisis. Importantly, the Center represents the maturation of a privately funded local operation designed to meet an acute community need for MCH services, but one that has necessitated continuous change and evolution as the Syrian conflict continues and conditions worsen. Despite certain successes, a number of challenges remain that limit the potential of the Center and other health humanitarian operations to fully serve the needs of Syrian IDPs, all of which should serve as cautionary principles for future local medical interventions in conflict situations.

A primary challenge is the myriad of logistical difficulties faced by local medical humanitarian organizations operating in conflict zones. Specifically, the Center continues to experience barriers in securing a reliable and consistent supply of medical equipment and materials needed to ensure continued operation of its clinical services, such as its blood bank, laboratory services, operating rooms, and intensive care units. Another challenge is securing the necessary funding to make improvements to physical infrastructure and hire additional staff to increase clinical capacity. Hence, though local initiatives like the Center may have initial success getting off the ground, scale-up and ensuring sustainability of services to meet the increasing needs of patients who remain in a perilous conflict-driven environment with few alternative means of access remain extremely challenging.

Despite these challenges, it is clear that different types of medical humanitarian interventions deployed in the midst of health crises have their own unique roles and contributions. This includes a broad scope of activities now focused on improving health outcomes for Syrian women and children that are being delivered by international aid agencies located outside of the country, international or local NGOs, multilateral health and development agencies, and forms of bilateral humanitarian assistance. The Center contributes to this health and humanitarian ecosystem by providing an intervention focused on the needs of Syrian women and children IDPs where they need it most, close to home.

However, the success of the Center and other initiatives working to end the suffering of Syrians ultimately relies on macro organizational and political issues outside Atimah’s border. This includes better coordination and cooperation of aid and humanitarian stakeholders and increased pressure from the international community to finally put an end to a civil war that has no winners — only victims — many of whom are unfortunately women and children.

Abbreviations

the Brotherhood Women and Children Specialist Center

Internally displaced persons

Maternal and child health

Medecins Sans Frontieres

Non-governmental organizations

Outpatient department

Syrian Expatriate Medical Association

United Nations Population Fund

the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

The United Nations Children’s Fund

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Joint Masters Program in Health Policy and Law, University of California - California Western School of Law, San Diego, CA, USA

Rahma Aburas

Brotherhood Medical Center for Women and Children, Atimah, Syria

Amina Najeeb

Department of Anesthesiology, University of California, San Diego School of Medicine, San Diego, CA, USA

Laila Baageel & Tim K. Mackey

Department of Medicine, Division of Global Public Health, University of California, San Diego School of Medicine, San Diego, CA, USA

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We note that with respect to author contributions, all authors jointly collected the data, designed the study, conducted the data analyses, and wrote the manuscript. All authors contributed to the formulation, drafting, completion, and approval of the final manuscript.

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This community case study did not involve the direct participation of human subjects and did not include any personally identifiable health information. Hence, the study did not require ethics approval.

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Amina Najeeb and Laila Baageel, two co-authors of this paper, were part of the foundation of the Center, remain active in its operation, and have a personal interest in the success of the operation of the clinic. The remaining authors declare that they have no competing interests.

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Aburas, R., Najeeb, A., Baageel, L. et al. The Syrian conflict: a case study of the challenges and acute need for medical humanitarian operations for women and children internally displaced persons. BMC Med 16 , 65 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1186/s12916-018-1041-7

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Marko Valenta, Jo Jakobsen, Drago Župarić-Iljić, Hariz Halilovich, Syrian Refugee Migration, Transitions in Migrant Statuses and Future Scenarios of Syrian Mobility, Refugee Survey Quarterly , Volume 39, Issue 2, June 2020, Pages 153–176, https://doi.org/10.1093/rsq/hdaa002

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This article analyses the international migrations and statuses of people who left Syria after the outbreak of the civil war. In addition to exploring the dynamics of Syrian refugee migrations since 2011, we also discuss future prospects and possibilities of return. The ambition of the article is twofold. First, we aim to develop and nuance the typology of migrations of Syrians. Secondly, the article seeks to explore useful lessons from former large-scale refugee migrations; that is, knowledge which may hopefully contribute to preparing the relevant institutions and organisations for Syrian migrations in the eventual post-war period. Based on experiences from other post-conflict situations, several possible future scenarios of Syrian migrations are discussed. The proposed typologies of migrants and repatriation regimes may help us understand the nuances, the dynamic of status change and the complexity of the forced migrations. It is maintained that migration trends, reception, and repatriation conditions and policies are highly interconnected. Refugees’ responses to reception and repatriation regimes result in transitions in their legal statuses in receiving countries and changing motivations for migration and repatriation.

This article discusses the refugee and migrant outflows that have been generated by the war in Syria. In combination, refugees’ human agency and the responses of receiving countries to the inflows of Syrian refugees have resulted in distinct patterns of refugee flows and a variety of changing legal categories of Syrian refugees and migrants. Our study fits within the strand of recent research that has explored the reception policies and conditions Syrians have faced in a range of different states. 1 Drawing on these studies, this article develops a categorisation of the altering patterns of Syrian migrations and the concomitant migrant statuses that appeared largely as a response to the variety of policies and conditions that the migrants were confronted with in the host states.

The dynamics of change in migrant statuses is thus the centrepiece of this study whose concrete ambitions are twofold. First, we aim to offer a more exhaustive conceptualisation of Syrian mobility after initiation of the war in 2011. Of importance is that this conceptualisation captures the dynamic of migrant status changes in a way that goes well beyond more common, formal definitions of asylum seekers and refugees, such as those used by the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and host-country authorities. The second aim of our conceptualisation is to include in the typology possible future prospects, including the conceivable transformations of reception regimes and refugee statuses in the post-war period.

In 2019, after some eight years of fighting, it appeared that the Syrian conflict was approaching its final stage. Among politicians and scholars alike, this resulted in an increased focus on the issue of the return of Syrian refugees. Several recent research reports acknowledge the relevance of discussing possible future mobility prospects that may unfold in Syria henceforth. For example, since 2017 the UNHCR has published several regional surveys on Syrian refugees’ perceptions of and intentions to return to Syria. 2 Furthermore, in a recent report published by the World Bank, researchers develop a quantitative simulation model of push and pull factors and present various return scenarios that may hopefully contribute to preparing the relevant institutions and organisations for Syrian migrations in the eventual post-war period. 3 Such contributions are important and timely. Yet, we believe that, in order to obtain a complete picture of the likely emerging migration patterns, the aforementioned surveys and quantitative models need to be supplemented with experiences from refugee migrations in other, comparable post-conflict contexts.

We draw primarily on experiences from Bosnia–Herzegovina. Partly this is because we are particularly familiar with this case. More substantially, the Bosnian and Syrian conflicts share several similarities. Both countries suffered complex full-scale wars that involved several local factions as well as regional and international actors. The wars in both countries also resulted in rapid and large-scale displacements of people, affecting more than half of the population in each country. However, there are also dissimilarities as each of the conflicts, and the migrations that they triggered, happened in quite specific geographical and historical contexts. As we shall see, there are several other differences between the two cases as well, such as the magnitude of destruction, the size of the displaced population, the contents of the reception regimes that the refugees faced, and the migration options they had in different stages of the conflict. Therefore, we will also relate to experiences from other post-war societies, such as Afghanistan, Kosovo, Lebanon, and Croatia. 4 We believe that they may teach us important lessons. Surely, such analogies have significant limitations, and they cannot be stretched too far considering that each post-conflict context has its own idiosyncrasies. The migration systems that emerge during the post-conflict period are embedded in unique historical contexts – inter alia , the specific migration and return regimes that enable and restrict people’s mobility in post-conflict societies. Nevertheless, we argue that some aspects of the former post-conflict migrations are clearly applicable to the Syrian case.

The article is divided into several interrelated parts. In the first part, we outline the main categories of international migrants from Syria and analyse the status transformations among these migrants that emerged since the start of the civil war. In the second part, we discuss the future categories of Syrian migrants, migration prospects and the anticipated status transformations in the post-war period. Here, we argue that the post-conflict experiences from Bosnia–Herzegovina, together with lessons provided by other post-conflict societies, may be used to predict patterns and construct projections about Syrian migrations in the years ahead.

Our conceptualisation of Syrian refugee migrations builds on relevant academic publications and on reports from the UNHCR, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and press releases and reports from various Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). We combine these secondary data with statistics provided by the UNHCR, the UN’s Population Division, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the Pew Research Centre – and with our own earlier research.

In the period 2002–2019, we participated in several interconnected studies on refugee migrations pertinent to the discussion in this article. These studies may be divided into several categories. In the first category is research we did on receiving countries in the Middle East . Most of this research were desk studies conducted between 2016 and 2019, primarily focusing on the reception policies of the Persian/Arab Gulf countries and Syria’s neighbouring countries.

In addition, in the period 2014–2019, we had meetings with employees of the Norwegian Refugee Council in Jordan, former employees of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) in Syria and Jordan, and employees of the UNHCR in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Jordan. The interviews and meetings centred on refugee reception and migration trends in Syria and in Syria’s neighbouring countries. Our research on the host countries in the region also included interviews with refugees and migrants. In 2015–2020, we and our research partners in the region conducted interviews with Syrian and Iraqi refugees and migrants in Jordan, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia. The interviews centred on their experiences with the context of reception and their migratory trajectories and plans.

The second category includes research we did on large-scale refugee migrations related to the disintegration of Yugoslavia . We participated in several fieldworks to Bosnia in 2002 and 2010, which included interviews with returnees and meetings with local migration specialists, representatives of Bosnian authorities and representatives of the UNHCR and local NGOs. In addition, we produced several overviews of secondary migrations at different stages of the Bosnian conflict, and we explored the experiences of the Bosnian diaspora and the migrants’ transnational practices and their contacts with the home country.

The third category encompasses research on responses to large-scale migrations from Syria in transit countries . We interviewed refugees transiting Western Balkan in 2014 and 2015, and, in the period 2014–2019, we also participated in meetings and seminars with people working with refugees; representatives of migration authorities and specialists; and local NGO’s in Macedonia, Serbia, Bosnia, Greece, and Croatia. This research was combined with desk studies on local responses to increased refugee migrations in the region. We have also explored experiences in the destination countries in the West . Between 2017 and 2020, we participated in three shorter fieldworks in Norway where we met service providers working with refugees and asylum seekers in municipalities that received Syrian refugees. During these fieldworks, we also met refugees from Syria who migrated to Europe and Norway via different regular and irregular channels. These people shared with us their experiences of war, transit migration and their encounters with authorities and the reception systems in Europe and Scandinavia. We also gained valuable knowledge through participation at various specialised conferences and workshops on the reception of Syrian refugees. These sessions included discussions with migration specialists exploring Syrian migrations to Germany, Turkey, Sweden, Australia, Norway, Finland – and several other countries.

In sum: the discussion in this article is based on extensive desk studies on various regimes for the reception of Syrians, combined with the invaluable experiences we accumulated from the above-mentioned studies and encounters. 5 These sources have provided us with multiple insights on developments in the reception systems, the corresponding transformations in migrant statuses and the changes in migration patterns in post-war societies. These insights are supplemented by and contrasted to findings from studies on refugee migrations in other post-war contexts. 6

Estimates are that the war in Syria has produced around 13 million displaced people (Connor 2018), which encompasses over 60 per cent of Syria’s pre-war population. According to official estimates, almost a half of these people, or 5.6 million, are international migrants/refugees, while 6.1 million are internally displaced persons (IDPs) still residing in Syria. 7 The internal displacements were, however, for millions of Syrians but just an initial stage in the migration process; they eventually metamorphosed into emigrations from the country. These emigrations have spawned a number of different categories of migrants – formal as well as informal ones. Our data suggest that we can, among other categories, distinguish between Syrian refugees, asylum seekers, forced migrants, transit migrants, stranded migrants, unaccompanied minors, irregular migrants, mixed migrants, naturalised migrants, labour migrants, entrepreneurs, investors, and students. Moreover, this list is only partial, and many of the categories are not mutually exclusive. And neither are the categories static, as we argue later in the article.

With the exception of Israel, Syria’s immediate neighbours are the states that host the largest numbers of Syrian refugees. This includes Turkey (which is the biggest such host), Lebanon and Jordan (the second and third largest receiver, respectively), while Iraq is the fifth biggest receiver (Germany is number four). 8 Figure 1 shows Syrian refugee stocks in ten largest host countries.

One can categorise refugees in the host countries in various ways. For example, distinctions can be made according to the type of accommodation provided to them; the trajectory they have followed during their migration experience; their formal status and type of residence; the social rights they enjoy; their socioeconomic position in the receiving society; and their living conditions. 9 It is important to distinguish among these categories as they may help spur new migrant statuses of relevance for the patterns of Syrian migrations in the post-war period. For example, we may expect that very few Syrians who have been awarded with permanent protection in Western Europe will return to Syria or migrate to third countries. However, those who merely received temporary protection status may face various hardships. When temporary statuses cease, this could result in a transformation into irregular statuses, involuntary returns, and secondary migration. 10

As for the first of these distinctions – type of accommodation – one can separate between Syrians who reside in informal settlements and those who live in some sort of private accommodation, or in refugee camps and reception centres for asylum seekers. The vast majority of Syrian refugees live outside the refugee camps. A major feature of the Syrian displacement crisis is that it is mainly an urban phenomenon. Less than 10 percent of all city-based Syrian refugees live in camps, 11 and humanitarian aid policies are not in place to cater for this group of refugees, which result in many being self-settled, unemployed, and unaided. This also has policy implications for future return, as will be discussed later in the article. 12

A useful distinction can also be made with regard to types of protection and reception standards. On the one hand, many Syrians are granted permanent protection and generous social rights. This includes refugees who have been resettled through the UNHCR’s official programme and those who have been awarded permanent refugee status in Western Europe. Others have been less fortunate, though, enjoying only very scarce access to basic services and having only temporary residence entitlement. Within the latter group fall the vast majority of refugees in Syria’s neighbouring states: Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan. These states, which are the top three receivers of Syrians, offer only temporary protection to the refugees. Furthermore, reception standards are usually fairly deficient, which often acts to spur motivations for transit and fragmented migrations. 13

As for migration policies, we can distinguish between regimes that have, at least in certain periods, offered regular immigration opportunities to large numbers of Syrians, and those that have flatly denied Syrians any legal access. 14 Syria’s neighbours generally fall within the former category, while most European states are associated with the latter. In the European context, we may distinguish between Syrians who entered the host countries in European Union (EU) via irregular pathways and those who arrived via legal migration channels. In the former category are Syrian asylum seekers, while in the latter are primarily Syrians who were resettled via the UNHCR’s resettlement programme and reunited family members. Figure 2 shows the composition of Syrian migrant stock in four largest receivers of Syrians in EU.

Syrian refugee stocks in ten largest host countries.

Syrian refugee stocks in ten largest host countries.

Different categories of Syrians in four largest receivers of Syrians in EU.

Different categories of Syrians in four largest receivers of Syrians in EU.

As we can see from the figure, asylum seekers were the largest group. Syrian asylum seeker normally cannot enter Western European countries legally; those who do manage to enter are often offered both permanent protection and fairly generous integration assistance. Still, the substantial increase in the numbers of Syrian asylum seekers in Western Europe in 2015 effectuated the more frequent use of subsidiary or temporary protection status. 15

Finally, some receiving countries that do not provide refugee status to Syrians under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees are not included in the UNHCR statistics. Bakewell reminds us that we have to be quite attentive when we construct analytical categories within the field of refugee migration studies; among other things, we have to take care to distinguish between categories of policy and analysis, which are only partially overlapping. 16 He points out:

…the search for policy relevance has encouraged researchers to take the categories, concepts and priorities of policy makers and practitioners as their initial frame of reference for identifying their areas of study and formulating research questions…academic researchers in refugee studies have adopted definitions of refugees based on those of concern to UNHCR, or falling within the UN convention definition or some other protocol or agreement…This over-reliance on policy categories is a fundamental weakness in the field of refugee studies. In particular, it leaves large groups of forced migrants invisible in both research and policy. 17

For many Syrians, life as a labour migrant – or some other non-refugee status – may be seen as a better option than temporary refugee status, dependence of humanitarian aid or living in refugee camps in Syria’s neighbouring countries. Those states are not included in the UNHCR statistics; yet, they are hosting many Syrians who either did not have the opportunity or resources to reach their preferred destination countries via refugee-resettlement pathways, or did not want to expose themselves to the dangers associated with illegal migrations routes to Europe.

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries – which encompass Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Kuwait, Oman and Bahrain – are the largest receives of Syrians who do not enjoy refugee status. This is because the GCC states’ kafala regime has attracted hundreds of thousands of temporary labour migrants from Syria. This was the case before the war broke out in 2011 as well; the UN estimates (which may well understate real numbers) suggest that in 2010 more than 500,000 Syrians resided in Saudi Arabia, with a further 70,000 spread across the five other GCC states. In addition, a substantial number of Syrians migrated to the GCC after the war commenced. Again, according to data from the UN, the Syrian migrant stock in Saudi Arabia increased by nearly 250,000 in the period 2011–2017. Similar numbers apply for the UAE as well, while Kuwait received an additional 120,000 Syrians in this period. 18 Virtually none of these migrants are defined as Convention Refugees. Instead, they are counted as temporary labour migrants, which means that they are excluded from the UNHCR’s refugee statistics. A case can nevertheless be made that Syrians in the GCC – both those who arrived prior to and during the war – have, after the war started, harboured other motives than purely economic ones to prolong their temporary residence. 19

Theorists on international migration policies propose that the migration system should be defined by: (i) a set of interacting elements (e.g. flows of people, strategies of migrants and various institutions and migration policies of governments); and (ii) the dynamics governing the way in which the system and the elements develop and change through different feedback mechanisms. 20 Various migrant statuses and migration trajectories have proliferated in interactions with the various reception regimes. In this section, we want to stress that these migration flows and statuses are not in any way static. Indeed, they are changing in the nexus of interactions between the above-mentioned elements of the system and personal agencies of Syrians, i.e. their responses to life circumstances as defined by the outlined structures and regimes. Our empirical material contains many examples of such dynamics. Due to space limitations, however, we only present a selection of the many intricate and dynamic trajectories.

One such example that clearly demonstrates the complexity of the migrations and of the transitions in statuses is offered by Syrians whom we encountered in Jordan. There, we met people who at first had fled their homes and found shelter in other parts of Syria, thereby becoming IDPs. Later, they proceeded to move to Jordan, thus changing from IDP status to the status of international refugees. Initially, they lived in the Zaatari refugee camp, close to the Syrian border. Later, they found accommodation in the capital, Amman, where they had different statuses – such as that of refugee, of irregular migrant and of temporary labour migrant. Some of these people were waiting for resettlement to third countries though the UNHCR’s refugee admittance programme. Some of them were eventually admitted for resettlement and awarded with permanent protection in host countries outside the region.

Another case that neatly illustrates the dynamic and complexity of migrant trajectories and transitions in status is one that we have encountered during our studies in the GCC. It involves Syrians who originally migrated on visitor visas from neighbouring countries to the GCC, but who then proceeded to overstay their visas and thus become illegal migrants. After temporary amnesties were instituted by the GCC governments, they regularised their status, becoming temporary labour migrants instead. 21 Complex migrant trajectories and status transitions were also observed among many of the refugees who migrated from Syria to Lebanon during 2015 and who continued further to Egypt and later to Europe via Mediterranean routes. Furthermore, Tripoli in Lebanon was in periods an important transit hub for Syrians who continued from there with boats to Turkey and further to Western Europe. During these journeys, these people also oscillated between different irregular and regular statues. 22

Status transitions may also be detected among many of the Syrian refugees who originally fled to Turkey. They lived for a period there; but with the establishment of the Balkan corridor, they migrated northward from Turkey. 23 While in Turkey, some of them were formally defined as refugees, but with the further migration to Europe, their status changed. They first become irregular migrants, and in the Western Balkans, they oscillated between statuses of irregular migrant, (reluctant) asylum seeker and transit migrant. 24 After arriving in other European destination countries, their status changed yet again: from irregular migrant to asylum seeker, and from asylum seeker to permanent refugee.

For the majority of refugees, a prolongation of conflict in their home country spurs them into focusing ever more on the long-term prospects of integrating into their host country. If such prospects are inadequate, they will instead seek them in a third country. 25 This has generally been the case for refugees in Syria’s neighbouring states – and for Syrians in Southern Europe, notably Greece and Italy, which have provided only less-than-sufficient reception and integration conditions for the bulk of Syrian refugees. These countries have consequently functioned largely as both transit and receiving states for Syrians.

4.1. Dynamic of transitions within transit and fragmented migrations to Europe

The above-mentioned migrant trajectories and the status transitions sometimes unfolded slowly within the frame of ‘fragmented migrations’. 26 In such cases, the refugees stayed for longer periods, sometimes years, at different places and countries, before arriving at their perceived final destinations. Their accounts indicated that various redirections in migration trajectories, and the status transitions that these people experienced, were not planned in advance; they rather happened as a response to changing circumstances of life in exile. 27 Yet, we can also observe transitions between fragmented and transit migrations, and from transit to stranded/fragmented migrations. For example, in 2015, we met refugees who were transiting the Balkan corridor. These people perhaps represent the clearest example of swift transit migrations. 28

Figure 3 shows developments in numbers of Syrian asylum seekers in the largest receiving countries in Western Europe, where the peak in numbers and the subsequent decline may be associated with the rise and fall of the Balkan corridor. 29

Syrian asylum seekers in the largest receiving countries in EU, 2011–2017.

Syrian asylum seekers in the largest receiving countries in EU, 2011–2017.

During a short period, hundreds of thousands of Syrians made their transit journeys to Europe while oscillating between different irregular and regular statuses. For example, most Syrians entered Turkey as regular migrants and got temporary protection status in Turkey. However, during 2015, many of these people decided to migrate to their desired destinations in Western Europe via the Western Balkans, entering Greece as irregular migrants. Afterwards, continuing their journeys toward Western Europe, they entered Macedonia and Serbia, where they got a short-term transit visa and in this way regained their status as regular migrants. Thereafter, they reentered illegally the EU Schengen Area at the border between Serbia and Hungary and transited the Schengen zone as irregular migrants. Finally, when they reached their desired destinations in Western Europe, they became asylum seekers and refugees, thereby regaining regular status.

The closure of the Balkan corridor in spring 2016 led to an end of swift transit migrations and to a reduction in the numbers of Syrian asylum seekers in the core of the European Union. The closure of the corridor also led to an increase in the numbers of stranded asylum seekers from Syria in Southern Europe. Since 2016, many new measures aimed at deterring asylum seekers have been implemented in Europe. 30 These measures have altered migrant trajectories. On the one hand, it is now, after the closure of the Balkan corridor, much more difficult to reach the destination countries in Western Europe. On the other hand, new illegal routes to the EU have emerged – such as those through Albania, Montenegro, and Bosnia–Herzegovina. 31 Furthermore, after the closure of the Balkan corridor in 2016, the composition of irregular and regular flows has also changed: while the numbers of asylum seekers have been drastically reduced, the relative share of family permits has increased. Figure 4 shows changes in the composition of Syrian migrations to Germany, the largest receiver of Syrians in EU.

Numbers of Syrian asylum seekers and family permits given to Syrians in Germany.

Numbers of Syrian asylum seekers and family permits given to Syrians in Germany.

In addition to the above-described trends, we can also anticipate that new categories of migrants will emerge in the future. One such category is returnees . Thousands of IDPs and refugees have already returned to their homes, which they did as soon as the minimal conditions for their return had been created. 32 However, discussions on Syrian migrations in the eventual post-war period have intensified since 2018, in conjunction with perceptions that the war was approaching its final stage. 33 Several studies show that a majority of Syrian refugees in the neighbouring countries wish to return provided, that is, that the preconditions for a safe and sustainable return are fulfilled. 34 However, lessons from other post-conflict societies – such as Bosnia, Kosovo, Rwanda, Croatia, and Afghanistan – indicate that for a large proportion of refugees these preconditions will likely not be in place for many years. 35 Therefore, we can expect that the post-war migration trajectories of Syrians will be equally complex as those that prevailed during the conflict. It is against this background that we, on the next pages, discuss in more detail the prospects of Syrian migrations in an eventual post-conflict Syria.

Migrations in different post-conflict societies have several common features with respect to experiences with return migrations, internal migrations and out-migrations. As we are especially familiar with migrations in post-war Bosnia, we use that case as our central reference.

Bosnian and Syrian refugee migrations share some important characteristics. In both countries, forced migrations occurred extremely rapidly. Both have also experienced complex, devastating full-scale wars that involved multiple local, regional and international combatants. Furthermore, neighbouring countries were in both of these cases heavily involved in the conflict, and they also emerged as the largest receivers of refugees.

Syria and Bosnia emerged from the conflicts as broken and unstable countries. In both contexts, refugee returns were eminently unsustainable as the refugees faced considerable insecurity, discrimination and economic problems. However, there were also many differences: inter alia , with respect to the length and the scale of the conflict, the prevalence of a temporary migration regime and the options available for secondary migration to Europe and other countries. Furthermore, Syria’s and Bosnia’s neighbouring countries, as well as the receiving countries in Europe, had and have specific agendas and approaches that have produced different migration opportunities for refugees at various stages of the conflicts. 36 In what follows, we discuss these similarities and dissimilarities in more detail. As we will see over the next pages, the two contexts differ in several other ways, which have resulted in dissimilar migration trends in the post-war period.

5.1. Patterns of Bosnian refugee migrations

During the 1992–1995 Bosnian War, two million people – that is, half of the Bosnian population – were uprooted and forced to flee their homes. Indeed, many of them were displaced multiple times, transiting between IDP status, refugee status and other statuses. It is estimated that 1.2 million people left the country during the conflict. Bosnia’s neighbours, in particular Croatia and Serbia, became large receiving and transit countries, while Germany, Austria, and Sweden emerged as the largest receivers of Bosnian refugees in Western and Northern Europe.

Bosnians were initially granted collective temporary protection in most Western European countries. In many states, this status was later converted, though, so that Bosnians were granted permanent protection that provided pathways to permanent residence and citizenship. However, several countries – including Germany, the largest receiver of Bosnian refugees – upheld the temporary protection regime, the Duldung . 37 After the war ended, Germany instituted a large-scale repatriation programme for Bosnian refugees. 38

Repatriation policies towards Bosnian refugees may be categorised according to three major dimensions which characterised the various regimes: protection policy, return policy and return assistance. The first two dimensions are closely interrelated: the degree of coercion in the return policy was a logical consequence of the temporary protection regime chosen by some of the receiving countries. The degree of return assistance did not follow the same logic; some of the countries that were not so generous regarding their protection policy were at the same time among the most proactive ones on the return issue, typically offering refugees pay-to-go schemes. 39

While Germany forced Bosnian refugees to return, those states that created voluntary repatriation regimes offered instead possibilities for integration and legal pathways to permanent residence. The existence of such opportunities predictably resulted in few voluntary returns. For example, less than 10 per cent of Bosnian refugees in the Scandinavian countries and in the Netherlands have returned, even though these states offered Bosnian refugees the most extensive voluntary return programmes and pay-to-go schemes. In contrast, a majority of Bosnians did return from the countries that had chosen the coercive return regimes. For example, after the peace agreement was signed, almost 300,000 Bosnians moved from Germany. 40

To escape coerced return from Germany and other countries, tens of thousands of Bosnians chose to migrate to third countries, such as the United States and Australia, or Croatia and Serbia. The so-called ‘chain migration’ – with migrants assisting family members, friends and neighbours to migrate and join them in desired destinations in third countries – has been a key feature of the post-war migration of Bosnians. Furthermore, tens of thousands of those who were returned to Bosnia-Herzegovina never migrated to their original domiciles, as their homes were situated in parts of the country now dominated by another ethnic group or faction. 41

In the first part of article, we distinguished between Syrian refugees who got permanent residence and those who did not. Other categories and distinctions were also introduced, such as that between Syrians who were regular and irregular migrants, between labour migrants and refugees and between those who lived in refugee camps and those occupying private accommodations in large cities. We believe that the statuses that Syrians have in various receiving countries may prove to have important implications for the patterns of Syrian migration in the eventual post-war period. Based on signals from authorities in the host countries, and considering experiences from other post-conflict situations, we can anticipate how the above-mentioned statuses will evolve.

Drawing on experiences from Bosnia and other post-conflict societies, several assumptions can be made with regard to Syrian war migrations, encompassing features such as conversions of reception regimes and the future prospects of Syrian mobility in the eventual post-war period. At this point, it may be relevant to outline these experiences and trends:

Temporary protection regimes may convert into coercive repatriation regimes.

Temporary protection regimes sometimes transform into permanent protection regimes.

Permanent protection regimes tend to focus on voluntary return programmes rather than on coercive repatriation of refugees.

Uncertainty of status and living prospects in a receiving country may result in desirability of resettling in a third country.

Refugees often choose to oppose coerced repatriation.

After a long residence in exile, refugees may be reluctant to return, opting instead for alternative solutions, most notably for durable solutions such as local integration.

Coercive repatriation regimes often result in large numbers of unsustainable returns.

A termination of refugees’ protection status and attempts of forced repatriation often result in secondary migrations and remigration of refugees.

In the post-war period, emigration from the post-conflict society and transnational strategies proliferate.

Several of these and other trends will be discussed in more detail later in the article. It is at this point it is relevant to discuss whether these experiences may be applicable to post-war Syria. We believe that some parallels can be drawn. Based on these experiences, we can expect that most of those who got permanent protection in Europe and North America will never return to Syria even if they are offered generous repatriation assistance. We may also anticipate that many Syrians in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan will lose their temporary protection status, and that these host countries will coerce them to leave. As we will soon see, several other trends – reflected in the list above – are expected to affect Syrian refugees. However, we also argue that such analogies do come with certain limitations; it is surely possible to indicate several important dissimilarities, which may effectively lead to different migration outcomes. 42

5.2. Repatriation of Syrian refugees and the other scenarios of future Syrian migrations

The repatriation of Syrian refugees has already started. According to the UNHCR, more than 230,000 Syrian refugees returned home from the neighbouring countries in the period 2016–2019. 43 Figure 5 shows spontaneous refugee returns from Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq in this period.

Self-organised Syrian refugee returns to Syria.

Self-organised Syrian refugee returns to Syria.

Projections are that many Syrians will return voluntarily in the near future, in particular in order to reunite with their families in Syria and to escape their protracted refugee situation in refugee camps in neighbouring countries. 44 However, we cannot exclude the possibility that a large proportion of Syrian refugees risk being forced to return to their home country when the war eventually ends. 45 In line with the Bosnian case and previous repatriation regimes, 46 we can expect that the degree of coercion in the return policy will differ significantly among the host countries, and that some of these states will provide extensive repatriation assistance.

Furthermore, one important lesson from the attempts to repatriate refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan and other war-ridden states is that return assistance (such as economic assistance and pay-to-go schemes) will not be sufficient to motivate most refugees to return. Likewise, we can surely expect that Syrians who have received permanent protection and residence in Western countries will prefer to stay. Most Bosnian refugees did so, and Syrians have been even longer in exile than Bosnians. The length of the time spent in exile, in addition to push factors in the home country, generally reduce the desire to return. 47

Yet, we anticipate that Syrians risk a higher degree of coercion than what Bosnians experienced in the post-war period. This would at least be the logical consequence of the reception regimes in the host countries. In contrast to the experience of Bosnians, who in most cases obtained permanent residence in the host states, large receivers of Syrian refugees have generally shown scant willingness to grant Syrians permanent protection status. 48 Syrians in Germany and other host countries in Europe, who only have temporary residence and subsidiary protection, are anxious with regard to their status and forced returns. 49 Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan offer only temporary protection to Syrians, which produces similar concerns. Huge numbers of Syrians currently reside in these neighbouring states, which, in previous years, received large numbers of refugees from other countries as well. It seems that these host states do not want to repeat the earlier experiences they have had; for instance, those involving Palestinians resettling permanently in Jordan and Lebanon. Furthermore, Syria’s neighbours have they own strategic, political and security concerns that may motivate them to forcibly return Syrian refugees. Although some attempts to integrate Syrian refugees have been done in Turkey, the focus on refugee return seems to prevail. Political elites in Turkey have repeatedly announced their plan to establish safe zones in North Syria to which Syrian refugees would eventually be returned. 50 Likewise, political factions in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq have their own political agendas and concerns. 51 Finally, large numbers of refugees in Syria’s near-abroad already lack legal residence permits and thus risk being arrested and deported. For example, in 2017 more than 70 per cent of Syrians aged 15 or above in Lebanon lacked resident permits. 52 Against this background, we cannot exclude the possibility that the temporary protection granted to Syrians will gradually be converted into coercive repatriation regimes resulting in forced returns. 53

5.3. Mobility as survival strategy in the post-conflict period

One general lesson from the repatriation of refugees to post-conflict societies is that no matter how much aid such states receive, more often than not they are unable to provide satisfactory conditions for a sustainable repatriation of refugees. For example, in the post-conflict period, Bosnia–Herzegovina was given the largest development and reconstruction aid in modern history. 54 In addition, a huge international peacekeeping force helped secure peace and stability in the country. 55 Nevertheless, a majority of international Bosnian refugees felt that the necessary preconditions for a sustainable return remained unfulfilled. Instead, as Bosnia failed to recover fully from the war, the post-war context itself produced new internal and international migrants. 56 Twenty years after the war ended, there were almost 100,000 IDPs in the country. 57 Furthermore, an estimated 1.6 million Bosnians are currently scattered all over the world, where they have permanently settled and established distinct diaspora communities. 58

The number of displaced Syrians is several times higher than the corresponding number of displaced Bosnians was in the 1990s. The Syrian war has also lasted longer, and the magnitude of the destruction is significantly larger than it was in Bosnia, which certainly will make reconstruction of Syria, and repatriation, even more challenging. Furthermore, there is still no peace plan in sight for Syria, and there is limited international support for rebuilding and reconstruction. In addition, the general insecurity prevailing in Syria, significant threats to returnees, the scope for forced conscription in the army, and the spectre of post-return detention and extra-juridical killings also deter Syrians from returning. 59

Security problems, challenges related to reconstruction of demolished domiciles and a lack of any prospects for a decent and stable income are often mentioned as major obstacles to a sustainable return of refugees in any post-war context. Experiences not only from Bosnia–Herzegovina, but also from other post-conflict societies – such as Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Croatia – remind us that large numbers of refugees are reluctant to return for the above-mentioned reasons, opting instead for alternative solutions. 60 Based on these experiences, we expect that many Syrians would resist returning, attempting instead to stay in the host countries. Faced with the threat of deportation, many will try to convert their refugee status into other legal statuses, such as that of temporary labour migrants or permanent residence and citizenship through intermarriages with locals or fellow compatriots with residential status. Others will have no other opportunity than to live in the host state as overstayers and irregular migrants, whose protection or other legal statuses are cancelled or withdrawn.

Refugees in reception centres in Syria’s neighbouring states will probably be the first to find themselves exposed to coercive repatriations to Syria. However, as already noted, most of these Syrians live at private addresses and are employed in the informal economy of these countries. We can expect that this group of people will oppose returning to Syria. Many have already gotten used to life as irregular migrants, and it will require enormous resources to locate, round up, and repatriate these people. Therefore, we may expect that large numbers of Syrians in Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon – and in other countries in the region – will continue to live as irregular migrants.

Among those Syrians who will eventually return, we anticipate various forms of mobility – again based on knowledge from other post-conflict contexts. 61 Indeed, one important lesson to be learned from the Bosnian and other post-war experiences is that coercive repatriation regimes result in large numbers of unsustainable returns; such migrations, in fact, tend to trigger new waves of internal and international migrations. 62 Furthermore, the distinction between ‘minority and majority returnee’ experiences that emerged in many previous post-conflict countries will likely also become apparent in Syria. 63 That is, post-war migrations often result in ethnic homogenisation as IDPs and returnees mostly move to parts of the country that are controlled by their own group. It is already evident that many Syrians are very reluctant to return to parts of the country controlled by other factions than their own, which may result in new internal displacements as well as out-migrations, a scenario also seen in Bosnia. 64

Conforming to experiences from Bosnia–Herzegovina and other post-war societies, we can expect that the post-war migrations of Syrians will, in addition to return migrations and internal migrations, include a variety of transnational strategies, temporary labour migrations, seasonal, chain and circular migrations and other forms of mobility. 65 Yet, like most migrants from other post-conflict societies, a majority of Syrians will have few legal opportunities to (re)migrate. Even so, a substantial share of the refugees from the Yugoslav Wars were in periods an exception to this general trend. For example, the US provided legal permanent residence status to more than 100,000 Bosnians in the post-war period. Similarly, Australia increased its annual refugee and humanitarian intake to resettle a larger number of Bosnians during the late 1990s. Political elites in Serbia and Croatia also provided permanent residence to hundreds of thousands of their co-ethnics who fled wars in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Croatia. 66

It is highly unlikely that Syrians will face an equal variety of opportunities for legal and permanent resettlement. The US has a much more restrictive stance on the admittance of Syrian refugees than they had in the case of Bosnia. 67 Most Syrian refugees in the US have come from Syria’s neighbouring countries via the UNHCR’s resettlement programme, but in recent years, US authorities have been reluctant to take in Syrians. Figure 6 shows developments in resettlements of Syrians to the US and other ‘large’ countries of resettlement.

UNHCR Resettlement of Syrians to the five largest receivers (2011–2018).

UNHCR Resettlement of Syrians to the five largest receivers (2011–2018).

As we can see, few Syrians migrate via the UNHCR, and the numbers of resettlements are in decline. In the period of 2011–2018, some 600,000 refugees were resettled via the UNHCR refugee resettlement programmes; however, just a fraction of them were Syrians. In total, 120,000 Syrians migrated from Syria’s neighbouring countries via such programmes (in the period 2011–2018). The number of resettlements reached its peak in 2016, with almost 50,000 resettled people. In the years that followed, numbers of resettlements have drastically declined. In 2018, only 23,000 Syrians were resettled this way. Most of these people were resettled in North America and Europe, while other relatively large receivers of resettled refugees, such as Australia, have received very few Syrian refugees in recent years. 68 Therefore, for millions of Syrians who have temporary protection in neighbouring countries, the UNHCR resettlement programme does not represent a real option for permanent protection and residence.

Furthermore, Syria’s neighbouring countries do not offer pathways to permanent residence and citizenship that are in any way equivalent to those that Croatia and Serbia provided to Bosnian Croats and Serbs, respectively. For example, there are almost 3.5 million Syrians in Turkey, but only 50,000 of them have obtained Turkish citizenship. 69 Thus, here as well we can draw a parallel to Afghan, Lebanese, Somali or North and South Sudanese post-conflict migrations, which relied substantially on transnational strategies, irregular migrations to neighbouring countries and temporary labour migrations to the countries in the Persian/Arab Gulf. 70 This would, in fact, be the most likely scenario with regard to out-migrations in post-conflict Syria.

A widespread pattern of out-migrations from post-conflict societies is the continuation of migrations to the countries that were large host states during the conflict. 71 Syrians in Western countries will probably sponsor at least some of their family members left in Syria or other countries to join them in the places of their settlement. It is not hard to imagine that some would be able to stay or to come through the system of private sponsorship, like in the Canadian case. 72 Yet, one major option left to Syrians would be to migrate to states in the region via irregular labour migration channels. Another option is offered by regular, temporary labour migration regimes in the region. The scale of temporary labour migrations will depend significantly on the stance taken by the neighbouring countries. The reestablishment of migration pathways and policies that existed before the conflict will be an important precondition for such migration pathways. Agreements on circular migrations between Syria, Lebanon and Jordan that existed before the war were suspended after hostilities broke out due to the mass influx of Syrian refugees. 73 Syrians may therefore hope that the bilateral migration agreements with neighbouring countries will be re-established and that large receivers of temporary labour migrants in the region will be more open to accept Syrian labour migrants in the post-war period than they had been during the war. If this happens, we can expect a significant increase in the numbers of Syrian labour migrants in the Gulf – and in other states in the region.

This article has focused on the shifting legal statuses of Syrian refugees in several countries. Our ambition has been two-fold. First, we have sought to explore the nexus of migrations, migrant statuses and reception regimes. Secondly, we have discussed the expected future patterns of Syrian mobility. Based on the experiences from other post-conflict situations, such as Bosnia, several possible future scenarios of Syrian migrations have been discussed and outlined.

With regard to the conceptualisation of Syrian migrations, we have developed and nuanced the typology of migrations of Syrians, and we have identified varieties of the status changes. It is maintained that migration trends, asylum policies and the positioning of the Syrian migrants are dynamic, multi-layered and highly interconnected, resulting in transitions in statuses and changing motivations for migration. Here, we have argued that the transitions in refugees’ statuses and the secondary migrations happen in the nexus of social structure and human agency. Indeed, the dynamic of Syrian migration is shaped by the interaction between the specific migration policies and the context of reception – and the refugees’ responses to these structures. For example, Syrians who escaped the war and moved to neighbouring countries later tried to flee the inadequate conditions and the protracted refugee situations they faced in their host state. The above-mentioned structures allowed in periods swift secondary movements that evolved into large-scale transit migrations. However, some of the transit migrants become instead stranded migrants due to the various policy restrictions in place. Due to the changes in policies, refugees later engaged in fragmented migrations characterised by long-term residence in various host countries.

With respect to future prospects, we have discussed how certain categories of Syrians may adjust in the post-war period, whenever that period commences. We have outlined possible transitions in statuses and reception regimes. The largest concern here are transitions from temporary protection statuses into statuses of irregular migrants followed by deportations and unsustainable returns. The transformations of receiving states’ reception regimes into specific repatriation regimes, in combination with refugees’ reactions to transitions in statuses, may result in new forms of mobility. Here, we can expect that return migrations and status changes will unfold in parallel with complex internal migrations and secondary migrations. 74 It is patently clear that when Syria eventually emerges from the war, it will do so as a broken country, impoverished by the conflict, politically unstable and generally unsafe. Lessons from other post-conflict societies indicate that these grim realities on the ground will undermine preconditions for a safe and sustainable return. No matter how extensive the international aid Syria receives, we can expect that many Syrian refugees will oppose returning from their host countries. Among these people, we await to find those who will try to stay in receiving countries as irregular migrants, but also those who will manage to convert their refugee status into other legal statuses, as well as those who will migrate to third countries, as happened with Bosnian refugees in the 1990s. Indeed, a general lesson that could be drawn from other war-torn countries – such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sri Lanka, Croatia, Afghanistan, Sudan and Lebanon – is that mobility becomes a key livelihood strategy in post-conflict contexts. As Black and Gent point out, ‘continued mobility after an initial return – including circulation and the development of a “transnational” lifestyle – may be more “sustainable” than a single and definitive return to the refugee’s place of origin’. 75 It is against this background that we expect that, for many Syrians, the ability to migrate and work in other countries will, at least in periods, be an important family-survival strategy. Experiences from post-war contexts can be of significant political relevance, as they may contribute to preparing host countries, local receiving communities in Syria and the relevant local NGOs and international organisations. The previous cases of large-scale returns make us cognisant of the human costs of such forced migrations. They also teach us about the preconditions for the sustainability of such returns. Furthermore, they remind us that various forms of return support and pay-to-go schemes have relatively weak effects on sustainable refugee returns. Finally, they instruct us that the post-war period will create new needs for out-migrations, which preferably should be managed through the legal channels for migration, such as various resettlement opportunities, visa-free regimes and circular and labour migration agreements with the countries in the region.

L. Turner, “Explaining the (non-) Encampment of Syrian Refugees: Security, Class and the Labour Market in Lebanon and Jordan”, Mediterranean politics , 20(3), 2015, 386–404; N.E.G Aras & Z.S. Mencutek, “The International Migration and Foreign Policy Nexus: The Case of Syrian Refugee Crisis and Turkey”, Migration Letters , 12 (3), 2015, 193–208; M. Janmyr, “ProClarity in Exile: The Legal Status of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon”, Refugee Survey Quarterly , 35(4), 2016, 58–78; A.J. Knudsen, “The Great Escape? Converging Refugee Crises in Tyre, Lebanon”, Refugee Survey Quarterly , 37(1), 2018, 96–115, F. Baban, S. Ilcan & K. Rygiel, “Syrian Refugees in Turkey: Pathways to Precarity, Differential Inclusion, and Negotiated Citizenship Rights”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies , 43(1), 2017, 41–57; R. Mhaissen & E. Hodges, Unpacking Return: Syrian Refugees' Conditions and Concerns , Beirut: SAWA for Development and Aid, 2019.

See https://reliefweb.int/report/turkey/fifth-regional-survey-syrian-refugees-perceptions-and-intentions-return-syria-rpis (last visited 28 Aug. 2019).

World Bank, The Mobility of Displaced Syrians: An Economic and Social Analysis , Washington DC, WB Research reports, 2019

See R. Black, “Return and Reconstruction in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Missing Link, or Mistaken Priority?” SAIS Review , 21(2), 2001, 177–199; W. Englbrecht, “Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Kosovo: Voluntary Return in Safety and Dignity?”, Refugee Survey Quarterly , 23(3), 2004, 100–148; G. Hourani & E. Sansening-Dabbous, Insecurity, Migration and Return: The Case of Lebanon Following the Summer 2006 War , Florence, European University Institute, 2007; A. Monsutti, “Afghan Migratory Strategies and the Three Solutions to the Refugee Problem,” Refugee Survey Quarterly” , 27(1), 2008, 58–73; M. Mesić & D. Bagić, “Serb Returnees in Croatia – the Question of Return Sustainability”, International Migration , 48(2), 2010, 133–160; C. Karooma, Reluctant to Return? The Primacy of Social Networks in the Repatriation of Rwandan Refugees in Uganda , Working Paper Series No. 103, Oxford, Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford, 2014.

See M. Valenta & S. Ramet, Bosnian Diaspora, Integration in Transnational Communities , Surrey, Ashgate, 2011; M. Valenta & Z. Strabac, “The Dynamics of Bosnian Refugee Migrations in the 1990s, Current Migration Trends and Future Prospects” , Refugee Survey Quarterly , 32(3), 2013, 1–22; M. Valenta, D. Zuparic-Iljic & T. Vidovic, “The Reluctant Asylum-Seekers: Migrants at the Southeastern Frontiers of the European Migration System”, Refugee Survey Quarterly , 34 (3), 2015, 95–113; M. Valenta & J. Jakobsen, “Mixed Migrations to the Gulf: An Empirical Analysis of Migrations from Unstable and Refugee-producing Countries to the GCC, 1960–2015”, Refugee Survey Quarterly , 36 (2), 2017, 33–56; M. Valenta & J. Jakobsen, “Nexus of Armed Conflicts and Migrations to the Gulf: Migrations to the GCC from War-torn Source Countries in Asia, Africa and the Arab Neighbourhood,” Middle Eastern Studies , 54(1), 2018, 22–47; A. Kvittingen, M. Valenta, H. Tabbara et al. , “The Conditions and Migratory Aspirations of Syrian and Iraqi Refugees in Jordan”, Journal of Refugee Studies , 32(1), 2019, 106–124; M. Valenta, M.N. Lønning, J. Jakobsen et al. , “European Asylum Policies and the Stranded Asylum Seekers in Southeastern Europe”, Journal of Refugee Studies , 32(1), 2019, 162–171

See W.H., Moore & S.M. Shellman, “Refugee or Internally Displaced Person?: To Where Should One Flee?”, Comparative Political Studies , 39(5), 2006, 599–622; W.H., Moore & S.M. Shellman, “Whither Will They Go? A Global Study of Refugees’ Destinations, 1965–1995”, International Studies Quarterly , 51(4), 2007, 811–834; Monsutti, 2008; Karooma, 2014.

See https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria_durable_solutions (last visited 28 June 2019).

It is worth noting that the actual number of refugees in neighbouring countries probably exceeds those in official statistics.

See Turner, 2015; Aras & Mencutek, 2015; Janmyr, 2016.

See K. Koser & R. Black, “Limits to Harmonisation: The Temporary Protection of Refugees in European Union”, International Migration , 37(3), 1999, 521–543; see also Valenta & Strabac, 2013

See https://products.hiu.state.gov/Syria_ConflictWithoutBorders_Displacement_2018Feb09_HIU_U1750.pdf (last visited 25 July 2019).

See https://carnegie-mec.org/2018/04/16/policy-framework-for-refugees-in-lebanon-and-jordan-pub-76058 ; See https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/5 (last visited 24 February 2019);

See https://website.aub.edu.lb/ifi/publications/Documents/books/20180601_101_facts_and_figures_on_syrian_refugee_crisis.pdf see also https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/36 (last visited 24 February 2019).

See Turner, 2015; Janmyr, 2016; See also U. Korkut, “Pragmatism, Moral Responsibility or Policy Change: The Syrian Refugee Crisis and Selective Humanitarianism in the Turkish Refugee Regime”, Comparative Migration Studies , 4(2), 2016, 1–20.

See F. Düvell, “The ‘Great Migration’ of Summer 2015: Analysing the Assemblage of Key Drivers in Turkey”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies , 45(12), 2019, 2227–2240; see F. Fakhoury, “Multi-level Governance and Migration Politics in the Arab World: the Case of Syria’s Displacement”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies , 45(8), 2019, 1310–1326; See also Knudsen, 2018.

In 2015, 96 per cent of Syrian refugees were granted permanent refugee status in Germany. In 2016 and 2017, however, German authorities gave subsidiary protection to 42 per cent and 56 per cent, respectively, of asylum seekers from Syria. We may observe similar trend in other European countries. For an overview of practices in different EU member states, see https://www.asylumineurope.org/sites/default/files/shadow-reports/aida_refugee_rights_subsiding.pdf (last visited 24 February 2019). See also https://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/germany/asylum-procedure/treatment-specific-nationalities (last visited 25 July 2019). See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/614200/IPOL_STU(2018)614200_EN.pdf (last visited 25 July 2019).

O. Bakewell, “Research Beyond the Categories: The Importance of Policy Irrelevant Research into Forced Migration”, Journal of Refugee Studies , 21(4), 2008, 432–453.

Bakewell, 2008, 432–436.

It is difficult to assess realities and scale of Syrian migrations to the GCC, due to the lack of accurate data. Therefore, we rely on UN’s general estimates and various local sources. See

https://www.apnews.com/9cfb46113644483798391911c841a2a7 (last visited 25 February 2019); see https://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/2-8-million-syrians-moved-to-gcc-since-start-of-civil-war-1.82927 (last visited 25 February 2019); see also https://gulfnews.com/world/mena/kuwait-extends-residency-permits-for-syrians-1.1577117 (last visited 25 July 2019).

Valenta & Jakobsen, 2017.

See Bakewell, 2014, 310.

Large amnesties were implemented in Kuwait, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia (the largest receiver of Syrian migrants). Most of the countries in the Gulf have implemented amnesties and allowed visitor visas to families of Syrian residents in the GCC; see De Bel-Air, A Note on Syrian Refugees in the Gulf: Attempting to Assess Data and Policies , Florence, European University Institute, 2015; see also G, Hitman, “Charity before Hospitality: Gulf States Policy towards Syrian Refugees”, Asian Affairs , 50(1), 2019, 80–101.

They did not need in periods visas to enter Turkey, but were required visas to enter Lebanon. They had to use irregular migration pathways from Turkey to enter Greece and West Europe, see https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/11/lebanon-tripoli-transit-hub-syrian-refugees-151106140234138.html (last accessed 25 July 2019).

The window of opportunity that triggered such secondary movements was the opening of the migrant corridor via Turkey and the Western Balkans to Western Europe.

Many did their best to keep their status as irregular migrants during their transit to the preferred destinations in Western Europe. They did that since they were aware that the ‘Dublin agreement’ agreed on by EU member states forbids multiple asylum applications in different member states, and thus that registering in any transit country in Europe would undermine their chances to obtain refugee status in preferred destinations in the core of the EU.

See M. Collyer, “Stranded Migrants and the Fragmented Journey”, Journal of Refugee Studies , 23(3), 2010; see also Knudsen, 2018; See also http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2015/oct/25/six-reasons-why-syrians-are-fleeing-to-europe-in-increasing-numbers (last visited 25 July 2019).

Collyer, 2010.

For example, our Syrian informants spoke about friends and relatives who moved to neighbouring countries with a hope that the war would soon be over, planning eventually to return. After prolonged stays in the neighbouring countries, they decided to enter a new stage in their fragmented migrations.

Later, after the closure of the corridor, we met Syrians in Bosnia, who after several interruptions of their journey to Western Europe along the ‘Balkan route’ were now stuck close to the EU border, in the Bosnian town of Bihać.

See Valenta et al., 2019

For an extensive discussion on these deterring measures see Düvell, 2019.

See https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Risk_Analysis/Risk_Analysis_for_2018.pdf (last visited 26 February 2019); see https://balkaninsight.com/2018/06/04/region-on-alert-as-migrants-open-new-balkan-route-06-03-2018/ (last visited 26 February 2019).

See https://data2.unhcr.org/ar/documents/download/64999 (last visited 26 February 2019); see https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria_durable_solutions (last visited 26 February 2019).

Authorities in the receiving countries have already started to forecast the return of Syrian refugees to their home country. See https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/01/erdogan-safe-zones-syria-refugees-return-190128094136080.html (last visited 26 February 2019); see https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-russia-syria-refugees/russian-envoy-urges-syrian-refugee-return-idUSKBN1KG2C8 (last visited 26 February 2019).

See https://website.aub.edu.lb/ifi/publications/Documents/books/20180601_101_facts_and_figures_on_syrian_refugee_crisis.pdf (last visited 26 February 2019).

See Koser & Black, 1999; See also Englbrecht, 2004; R. Black & S. Gent, “Sustainable Return in Post-conflict Contexts”, International Migration , 44(3), 2006, 15–38; See Monsutti 2008; See Mesić & Bagić, 2016; See also http://www.artf.af/images/uploads/AFG_ILM_Background_Paper_2a_Online_-_Migration_Patterns_-_Macro.pdf (accessed 26 February 2019).

For example, the Middle East region was from 2015 subsumed into the EU’s migration policies to effect regional containment of refugees and an “externalization” of migration control. In contrast, during the Bosnian war, and in the post-war period, European countries, Australia and the US allowed a large (legal) influx of Bosnian refugees.

Valenta & Strabac, 2013.

Koser & Black, 1999; Valenta & Ramet, 2011; Valenta & Strabac, 2013.

For a more detailed description of return policies towards Bosnians, see Valenta & Strabac, 2013.

Approximately 30 per cent of Bosnian refugees were coerced to return, while the majority of a total of 1.2 million Bosnians were granted permanent residence status in the host countries.

In the post-war period, the political parties and local authorities that were involved in the ethnic cleansing and atrocities represented the obstacle for the return of refugees belonging to ethnic minorities. Consequently, minority returnees felt stigmatised and unsafe in these areas. Thus, many sold or exchanged their properties and resettled in parts of the Bosnia dominated by their own group.

For example, in the Syrian case, the host countries are, with the partial exception of Turkey, not signatories to the Refugee Convention. They have been reluctant hosts to millions of refugees, denying them permanent protection. In contrast, European countries and Bosnia’s neighboring countries awarded a large share of Bosnian refugees with permanent residence and citizenship.

See https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria_durable_solutions (last visited 10 March 2020).

See World Bank, 2019

This is in line with experiences from several post-war contexts, such as the returns of Afghans from Iran and Pakistan and the returns of refugees to Kosovo from several European countries. See Englbrecht, 2004; Monsutti, 2008; See K. Koser, Transition, Crisis and Mobility in Afghanistan: Rhetoric and Reality , Geneva, IOM, 2014

See also https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/SR268Fagen.pdf (last visited 26 February 2019); see also http://www.artf.af/images/uploads/AFG_ILM_Background_Paper_2a_Online_-_Migration_Patterns_-_Macro.pdf (last visited 26 February 2019).

Englbrecht, 2004; Black and Gent, 2006; Monsutti, 2008; Valenta & Strabac, 2013.

This was also the case in other contexts. See D. Turton & P. Mardsen, Taking Refugees for a Ride? The Politics of Refugee Return to Afghanistan , Kabul: The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2002; See also Mesić and Bagić 2010.

In the Bosnian case, temporary protection status was converted into permanent residence in most receiving countries. One large exception was Germany. German authorities started a large-scale return of Bosnians in the post-war period. Furthermore, most Bosnians in the two largest receiving neighbouring countries – Serbia and Croatia – were Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs. As co-ethnics, these people were entitled to permanent residence and citizenship in these receiving countries.

There are several examples of such conversion. As already noted, Germany ended their temporary protection regime after the war in Bosnia–Herzegovina ended, commencing instead on a return of Bosnians. After the 1999 war in Kosovo, temporary refugee protection was converted into coercive return in most European countries that had received refugees from Kosovo. See also https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/articles/2018/02/06/syrians-given-temporary-refuge-in-germany-fear-being-set-up-to-fail (last visited 25 July 2019).

The return of Syrian refuges seems to be highly politicised. It is argued that the safe zones proposed by Turkey may also function as buffer zones against Kurdish factions in Northern Syria. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/24/erdogan-proposes-plan-for-refugee-safe-zone-in-syria (last visited 2 October 2019); see also https://www.irinnews.org/news-feature/2018/08/20/return-syrian-refugees-lebanon-hezbollah ; see also https://www.voanews.com/a/syrian-refugees-russia-involvement/4537372.html (last visited 26 February 2019); see also https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/11/syrias-neighbours-press-for-help-to-return-refugees (last visited 26 June 2019); see https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/01/syria-safe-zone-long-term-problem-solution-190130081549394.html (last visited 26 June 2019).

Several other concerns are addressed by the authorities in the host countries; inter alia , the economic and political burden the refugees represent. See https://en.qantara.de/content/syrian-refugees-the-burden-of-hospitality ; https://www.ft.com/content/f2106a88-72d6-11e7-aca6-c6bd07df1a3c (last visited 26 February 2019). See https://lobelog.com/the-future-of-syrian-refugees-in-lebanon/ (last visited 26 February 2019).

See https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/VASyR%202017.compressed.pdf (last visited 25 July 2019).

See https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2018/08/20/return-syrian-refugees-lebanon-hezbollah (last visited 25 July 2019);

See also https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/08/world/middleeast/lebanon-syria-refugees-arsal.html (last visited 25 July 2019).

It is estimated that Bosnia received seven billion dollars from 1996 to 2004, which is the largest ever per-capita financial assistance for reconstruction and development, see https://wiiw.ac.at/financial-and-technical-assistance-in-the-reconstruction-and-development-of-post-conflict-bosnia-and-herzegovina-dlp-3229.pdf (last visited 26 February 2019); see also http://www.balkanalysis.com/bosnia/2011/06/21/bosnia%E2%80%99s-vast-foreign-financial-assistance-re-examined-statistics-and-results/ (last visited 26 February 2019).

In the post-war period, Bosnia–Herzegovina hosted tens of thousands of peacekeepers. The largest number of foreign peacekeeping forces (60,000) was deployed in the years 1995-1996.

Bosnia Herzegovina Migration Profile for Year 2011 . [Online: Ministry of Security of Bosnia Herzegovina 2011, Sarajevo]. Available at: http://www.mhrr.gov.ba/iseljenistvo/Publikacije/Migration_Profile_EENG%202011.pdf (last visited 31 December 2018).

See http://reporting.unhcr.org/node/15810 (last visited 19 February 2019).

The estimate is provided by UN’s Population Division database.

According to some studies, Syrian refugees who have not heeded calls to return and to register their homes, land and properties may have these expropriated, demolished, or resold. The difficult conditions inside Syria are also reflected in the deep social tensions and divisions that prevail, with a culture of fear, a lack of accountability and a history of forced disappearances and intimidation all serving as very strong disincentives to any voluntary return. See Mhaissen & Hodges, 2019; See also World Bank, 2019.

Englbrecht, 2004; Black & Gent, 2006; Monsutti, 2008; Mesić & Bagić, 2010; Valenta & Strabac, 2013.

Black & Gent, 2006; Monsutti, 2008; Valenta & Ramet, 2011

Englbrecht, 2004; Jenne 2010; Valenta & Strabac, 2013; Koser, 2014

Black, Eastmond & Gent, 2006; M. Eastmond, “Transnational Returns and Reconstruction in Post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina,” International Migration , 44(3), 2006, 143–160; E.K. Jenne, “Barriers to Reintegration after Ethnic Civil Wars: Lessons from Minority Returns and Restitution in the Balkans,” Civil Wars , 12(4), 2010, 370–394; Mesić & Bagić, 2010

For example, it is already reported that many Syrian refugees are reluctant to move to areas controlled by the Assad regime. See https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/30/we-cant-go-back-syrias-refugees-fear-for-their-future-after-war (last visited 26 February 2019); https://openmigration.org/en/analyses/syrian-refugees-in-lebanon-still-reluctant-to-go-home/ (last visited 26 February 2019).

Al-Ali; Black & Koser, 2001; D. Sriskandarajah, “The Migration–Development Nexus: Sri Lanka Case Study”, International Migration , 40(5), 2002, 283–307; Monsutti, 2008; Kosher, 2014

Furthermore, with the admission of Croatia in the EU, many Bosnian Croats got an opportunity to migrate and to obtain temporary or permanent residence in various EU countries.

Therefore, it may be more relevant to draw a parallel to Afghan, Somali or North Sudanese post-conflict migrations; these involved a substantial amount of irregular migrations to neighbouring countries and temporary labour migrations to the countries in the Persian/Arab Gulf.

According to UNHCR’s statistics, Australia has received about 50,000 resettled refugees in period 2011–2019, but only 2,700 of them were Syrians. Most of Syrians were resettled before 2017. Similarly, Australia’s tough policy on asylum seekers, involving mandatory offshore detention, has limited the number of Syrians obtaining a refugee status and resettling in this country.

See https://sirajsy.net/en/investigations/what-backgrounds-of-granting-nationality-to-tens-thousands-of-syrian-in-turkey/ (last visited 25 July 2019).

Hourani & Sansening-Dabbous, 2007; Valenta and Jakobsen, 2017

Monsutti, 2008; Valenta & Strabac, 2013; Valenta and Jakobsen, 2018

See http://www.rstp.ca/en/refugee-sponsorship/the-private-sponsorship-of-refugees-program/ (last visited 12 August 2019).

K. Dorai, “ Conflict and Migration in the Middle East: Syrian Refugees in Jordan and Lebanon” , in M. Karakoulaki, L. Southgate & J. Steiner (ed.) Critical Perspectives on Migration in the Twenty-First Century . Bristol: E-International Relations Publishing, 2018.

See Monsutti, 2008; See Hourani & Sansening-Dabbous, 2007; Valenta & Jakobsen, 2017.

Black & Gent, 2006, 15.

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March 14, 2023

Syria Refugee Crisis Explained

Map of Syria

Here's What You Need to Know:

1. when did the syrian refugee crisis begin, 2. how are the türkiye-syria earthquakes impacting syrians, 3.   where do syrian refugees live do all syrian refugees live in refugee camps, 4. what are syrian’s greatest challenges, 5. how are syrian children impacted by this crisis, 6. what is the un refugee agency doing to help syrians, when did the syrian refugee crisis begin.

The Syrian refugee crisis began in March 2011 as a result of a violent government crackdown on public demonstrations in support of teenagers who were arrested for anti-government graffiti in the southern town of Daraa. The arrests sparked public demonstrations throughout Syria which were violently suppressed by government security forces. The conflict quickly escalated and the country descended into a civil war that forced millions of Syrian families to flee their homes. Twelve years later, the conflict is ongoing with Syrians continuing to pay the price—more than 15.3 million people in Syria are in need of humanitarian assistance, accounting for 70 percent of the population.

Syrian children displaced from their homes in east Aleppo, Syria

How are the Türkiye-Syria Earthquakes impacting Syrians?

On February 6, 2023,  two powerful earthquakes  struck south-eastern Türkiye and northern Syria, claiming thousands of lives and causing untold destruction to homes and infrastructure across the region. This is a crisis on top of existing crises already impacting internally displaced Syrians and Syrian refugees.

In Türkiye, the heavily impacted areas are regions where Syrian refugees live in high numbers. Syrian refugees were already vulnerable, living with protection risks and economic insecurity. For people inside Syria, the earthquake has only brought on more misery and pain and catapulted some of the most in need communities in the country into utter desperation. 

As of March 2023, the earthquake has claimed 54,000 lives in the two countries and caused massive destruction to an area where more than 23 million people live. Widespread destruction of buildings and homes has displaced 150,000 households across Syria and 900,000 people are in urgent need of shelter. 

The immediate impact of the earthquake has been devastating, but the full extent of the damage is yet to be seen. The long-term impacts of the earthquakes pose serious challenges for Syrians and will require a robust response on multiple fronts.

forced migration in syria case study

Where do Syrian refugees live? Do all Syrian refugees live in refugee camps?     

Syrian refugees have sought asylum in more than 130 countries, but the vast majority live in neighboring countries within the region, such as Türkiye, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt. Türkiye alone hosts the largest population of Syrian refugees: 3.6 million. Approximately 92 percent of refugees who have fled to neighboring countries live in rural and urban settings, with only roughly five percent living in refugee camps . However, living outside refugee camps does not necessarily mean success or stability. More than 70 percent of Syrian refugees are living in poverty, with limited access to basic services, education or job opportunities and few prospects of returning home.

Syrian refugee looking out over a refugee camp in Iraq

What are Syrians' greatest challenges?

Protracted displacement, economic decline in host countries due to COVID-19, the war in Ukraine, global inflation and the earthquakes that struck south-eastern Türkiye and northern Syria are some of the biggest challenges Syrians currently face. 

Poverty and unemployment are widespread within Syria, with over 90 percent of the population in Syria living below the poverty line. High levels of inflation and a record increase in prices of more than 800 percent in the last two years are making basic goods and services unaffordable for many people. An estimated 12.1 million people are food insecure as a result of the economic crisis. 

The situation for Syrian refugees living in neighboring host countries has deteriorated as well. Economic challenges in neighboring countries like Lebanon have pushed Syrians in the country into poverty with more than 90 percent of Syrian refugees reliant on humanitarian assistance to survive. In Jordan, nine out of ten refugee households reported being in debt. Ninety percent of Syrian refugees living in Türkiye cannot fully cover their monthly expenses or basic needs. 

Millions of refugees have lost their livelihoods and are increasingly unable to meet their basic needs - including accessing clean water, electricity, food, medicine and paying rent. The economic downturn has also exposed them to multiple protection risks, such as child labor, gender-based violence, early marriage and other forms of exploitation.

Refugees living in  refugee camps  or camp-like situations also face an increased risk of COVID-19 infection. Overcrowded conditions in refugee camps make it difficult to practice public health measures like frequent handwashing and physical distancing.

Syrian family in Azraq refugee camp

How are Syrian children impacted by this crisis?

Twelve years of crisis have had a profound impact on Syrian children. They have been exposed to violence and indiscriminate attacks, losing their loved ones, their homes, their possessions and everything they once knew. They have grown up knowing nothing but the crisis. Today, over 47 percent of Syrian refugees in the region are under 18 years old and more than a third of them do not have access to education. In Syria, more than two million children are out of school and 1.6 million children are at risk of dropping out.

Children’s rights during the crisis are undermined on a daily basis. An increasing number of Syrian children have fallen victim to child labor, with cases in Lebanon almost doubling in just one year.

Read some of their stories

Syrian girl outside of her shelter in Iraq

What is the UN Refugee Agency doing to help Syrians?

The UN Refugee Agency has been on the ground since the start of the crisis providing shelter, lifesaving supplies, clean water, hot meals and medical care to families who have been forced to flee their homes. UNHCR has also helped repair civilian infrastructure – including homes, school facilities and recreation centers, supported educational activities for children and provided psycho-social support.

During the pandemic, UNHCR ramped up efforts to confront and contain the spread of COVID-19 through the provision of protective equipment to hospitals and health clinics, the distribution of medicine, and the construction of quarantine areas and hygiene facilities. It has also supported close to 800,000 additional Syrian refugees with emergency cash assistance to help them meet their most basic and urgent needs.

UNHCR and humanitarian partners are responding to the Türkiye-Syria Earthquakes by stepping up their assistance in the two countries, something that requires greater and urgent international support. Since the earthquake, UNHCR alone has delivered tens of thousands of tents, beds, mattresses, thermal blankets and other desperately needed support.

Syrian refugee children in Iraq

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Forced Migration Review Issue 57: Syrians in displacement

  • Forced Migration Review

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Foreword: Syria in 2018 – in search of solutions

Noor Al Hussein

This important issue of Forced Migration Review draws our attention to the current challenges facing displaced Syrians and the continuing search for solutions. The statistics of Syrian displacement are staggering – and the numbers continue to rise. Half of Syria’s population has been displaced: five and a half million are registered refugees and over six million are internally displaced.

The tragedy of Syria’s conflict and the levels of displacement of its people reflect specific stresses and shortcomings in our region that often mirror similar global patterns. These stresses and shortcomings include the legacies of erratic modern political and economic governance that we cannot change but they are mostly triggered by issues that are fully within our control: inadequate and wavering political will; poor or absent host state responses to accommodating refugees in the short term; insufficient and uncoordinated humanitarian and development aid; continued internal stresses and violence that perpetuate displacement; and direct participation in warfare inside Syria by half a dozen foreign countries from within and beyond our region.

Many countries and organisations have offered assistance, yet we are also witnessing the world’s weariness and its inability to devise a coherent, effective response that could end the suffering of these millions of displaced people. Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey host the majority of Syrian refugees. They have opened their borders, schools and clinics, with the help of substantial international humanitarian assistance.

Many communities and individuals have welcomed and helped the newcomers. However, the arrival of refugees in lowincome and vulnerable communities also exacerbates existing problems and creates new tensions, notably regarding jobs, wages and overburdened infrastructure. Sadly, some host countries eventually reach a breaking point, and close their doors to new refugees. Donor and compassion fatigue lead to more restrictive reception and hosting policies within and beyond the Middle East, as fear, anger and even desperation assert themselves.

The traumas that displaced people experience are caused by the same underlying and persistent deficiencies, disparities and dysfunctions that create large-scale human marginalisation and vulnerabilities in some societies. If the underlying drivers of human indignity are not addressed, displacement will continue, with all the accompanying challenges.

Such lessons – including the reality that many displaced people will never return home – have long been debated.

Researchers, humanitarian agencies, local non-governmental organisations and host governments should now pursue a vital yet elusive strategy; it must merge temporary asylum and emergency humanitarian aid mechanisms with the longer-term promises of development and dignity that emanate from access to work and residency opportunities. Doing so will lift up both displaced people and host communities.

Refugees need protection and hosting until a durable solution is possible – which for those who choose to return must be under safe, voluntary and dignified conditions. We must generate the political will and international mobilisation that are needed in order to assist displaced people and host communities alike, and must also better resource the work of local humanitarian organisations helping displaced Syrians.

Recent initiatives such as the Global Compact for Migration and the Global Compact on Refugees offer the possibility of progress but can only succeed with significant support and commitments by governments. We must support displaced people to regain the chance to live fulfilling, dignified lives – to return home in peace, or to build a new life elsewhere that allows them and their neighbours to flourish together.

Her Majesty Queen Noor Al Hussein of Jordan

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The Syrian Regime’s Strategy of Forced Migration

May 12, 2019

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forced migration in syria case study

F ollowing the eruption of the Syrian uprising, the Assad regime has not hesitated to use any tactics to crack down on the uprising and reinstall its iron fist over Syrian territory. Using chemical weapons and barrel bombs are just among the many inhumane measures that the Assad regime has used.

However, despite all of its brutal methods, the Syrian regime was unable to maintain its control over Syrian territory. Since the first year of the crisis, the opposition forces have started to control different areas of Syria where it established its modus operandi of governing, and challenging the regime’s claims of sovereignty.

The Syrian control map has been changing dramatically. The expansion of the Syrian opposition territorial control reached its peak in mid-2013. However, the rise of Daesh at the expense of the opposition, and its loss of territorial control to the U.S.-backed PYD/SDF has marginalized the opposition, forced and limited its territorial control to non-connected separated pockets.

Yet, the Russian intervention at the end of September 2015, which radically changed the balance of power, and led to the Assad regime being able to re-stand on its feet. Backed by Russian Air Forces and associated by Iran’s paramilitary groups on the ground, the Assad regime started to choke the opposition’s controlled pockets, and apply its policy of forced migration. 

Encircle, starve and migrate

The Syrian regime has used forced displacement as a method to crack down on rebelled areas and to ensure the maintenance of its control since the first year of the uprising, as in the case of the Bab Amr district of Homs in February 2012. This method was accelerated and applied in several areas after the regime gained an upper hand with Russian intervention.

‘Encircle–starve–migrate’ was the tactic that Assad regime and its allies started to apply against the opposition-controlled pockets. Benefiting from Russian and Iranian support, and misusing the announced ceasefire and de-escalation agreements, the Syrian regime has accelerated its offensive campaigns.  

Dealing with each opposition pocket separately, the regime forces started to apply its tactics by encircling the pocket, starving its inhabitants, and displace the people who reject the regime’s rule – via what the regime and its allies preferred to call ‘reconciliation agreements.’ However, the ‘reconciliation agreements’ were nothing more than forced evacuation agreements, which came after long sieges and bombardment.   

‘Encircle-starve-migrate’ is the tactic being deployed by the Assad regime in order to crack down on rebel areas and to ensure the maintenance of its control. 

The evacuation agreements have enabled the Assad government to reclaim its sovereignty, but also to interfere in the demographic composition of the evacuated regions. The evacuation agreements of the towns of Madaya and al Zabadani in April, Darayya in August, Muaddamiye in September (in Western Ghouta), and East Aleppo in December 2016, evacuation agreement of Duma in Eastern Ghouta in April 2018, evacuation of northern Homs opposition pocket in May 2018, and Daraa pocket in July 2018, have all concluded with the forced evacuation of hundreds of thousands of Syrian people. Idlib was the final destination for the evacuated people, while Afrin and Euphrates Shield Operations have received a proportion of the displaced people, mainly in the latest waves.      

What is more important, is that the Assad regime seems to have taken measures to render permanent these coerced demographic changes instituted in various districts and even entire cities, and is set to accelerate these changes in the reconstruction phase of these areas. Among the most significant of these measures is the expropriation of former residents’ rights to their property, which would be transferred to Iran-backed pro-regime militants and their families.

Law No. 10 of 2018: Legalization of demographic engineering

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The signing of law no. 10 of 2018 on April 2, 2018, represented a serious step by the Assad regime to ‘legalize’ the unlawful ‘de facto’ displacement. It is expected that this legislation will facilitate the legalization of demographic changes instigated by forced migration and deportation. The law, which has been voted on and signed into the Syrian legal code by the Parliament and al Assad respectively, authorizes the formation of new administrative units, in accordance to general administrative regulations. The measure in question will codify de facto demographic shifts by allowing for the reestablishment of administrative institutions in areas where residents had been compelled to abandon their homes due to armed clashes or forced migration, as it made it more difficult for former residents to retain their rights on their property, and enables those who have seized such property to register these properties under their own ownership. As such, this formerly unlawful action currently underway is now in the process of becoming legal .

As mentioned above, the latest legislation, which builds on the prior law no:66 of 2012, allows for the confiscation of property rights of lawful residents of areas having underwent forced expulsion and migration, by authorizing the establishment of new institutions in existing administrative units. The new law dictates that former residents must apply to these nascent institutions in order to acquire documents proving their ownership of their property within the first 30 days after the institutions’ establishment. While the law’s second clause of its second article, allows for the use of deputation of family members or other representatives by property owners in their application to the related institutions, it is foreseeable that evacuees will not easily be able to utilize this right. This is due to the fact that state institutions tend to be inactive in these areas of concern, as well as that it is usually entire families at a time that are expelled from their homes and towns, making options for potential representatives quite limited, if at all existent. In any case, it is not likely that those who have taken refuge abroad or in opposition-held territory to return to their former homes for fear of arrest, torture, and revenge, until these risks are eliminated.

Law No 10 of 2018, passed by the Parliament and al Assad respectively, attempts to legalize the unlawful de facto displacement of Syrian people.

The new law can also be interpreted to allow for incoming occupants of evacuees’ homes to claim ownership of these properties, based on the sixth clause of the second article, which permits the application for ownership based purely on a claimant’s word in the absence of documentation. The legislation is worded as such: ‘In the absence of documentation authenticating the claimant’s property ownership, the applicant must […] specify the location, perimeter, shareholders, and type of property for which they are applying.’ As can be seen here, the law’s phrasing is quite ambiguous and can be utilized by regime allies to claim ownership over property which is not claimed within the specified timeframe, or over property created by new administrative structures.

Following this new legislation, the Ministry of Local Government announced that it would be working on the necessary arrangements for the revision of administrative structures both in Homs and East of the capital. It has also been announced that these arrangements would apply to the Bab Amr district which had been evacuated in 2012 after its siege by regime allies, as well as the eastern entrance of Damascus and especially the Harasta District near Eastern Ghouta, which had been evacuated of most of its residents during the past weeks.

Another issue raising concern of evacuated real estate being distributed among regime allies is the statement that either official identification cards or passports must be presented during the process of claiming properties in newly formed administrative units, as is stipulated in clause 19 of the second article. The basis for this concern is the fact that the Damascus Directorate of Migration and Passports has recently distributed 200.000 Syrian passports to foreign militants transferred to the country by Iran. It is believed that these passports will be assigned to Iranian, Afghan, and even Iraqi Shiite militants and their families, thus giving them permanent residency in the country.

Long-term impact

The Syrian regime seems to continue its strategy of forced migration to win the battle on the ground and he would apply it in Idlib as well. Hence, while the Idlib region, which has remained as the latest pocket in the hand of the opposition, may represent a puzzle for international actors, it is not for the Syrian regime. Being the last destination for hundred thousands of displaced people, and the refuge of almost four millions Syrian would not prevent the Syrian regime from applying its strategy of scorched earth that generated new waves of displaced people. The ongoing offensive by the regime forces in southern Idlib has forced almost 150 thousand people to flee their hometowns towards the Turkish borders in its early days, generating the possibilities of new refugee waves .      

It is impossible for the Syrian state in the long-term to re-stand on its feet without the efforts of the young generations of well-educated and professional Syrian refugees.

The Syrian regime strategy of legalizing its unlawful measures will impact the future of Syria. Those forced to leave their homes in Syria either to the Idlib region, which would end as a temporary shelter, or to other countries, represent a remarkable proportion of the Syria Arab Sunni population. Taking into consideration that there will be limited proportion of returnees under current conditions, the exclusion of the displaced people from the Syrian population will recreate the Syrian social fabric, and thus have strategic impact.  

On the other hand, those who fled Syria to other countries represent the vast majority of the young generation, educated and professional class, as well as the main businessmen community of the Syrian society. Hence, it will be impossible for the Syrian state in the long-term to re-stand on its feet without their efforts.     

forced migration in syria case study

Bilal Salaymeh

Bilal Salaymeh holds a Bachelor’s (AYBU) and an MS (METU) degree in International Relations. Currently, he is pursuing his PhD in International Relations at METU. Salaymeh is also serving as a research assistant at the SETA Foundation Foreign Policy Research Department. His research interests revolve around the Middle East with particular focus on Syria and the Palestinian Issue.

forced migration in syria case study

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Internet Geography

International migration from Syria to Europe

forced migration in syria case study

Civil war erupted in Syria in March 2011 and continues today. Millions of Syrians have fled their homes and in some cases the country to escape the war. It is estimated that 11 million people fled their homes, with 6.6 million people being internally displaced (forced to move to another area of the country).

Syrians have sought refuge in neighbouring countries such as Turkey. The graph below illustrates the impact of the civil war in Syria on net migration in Turkey. Prior to the conflict in Syria, net migration was negative, meaning more people were leaving Turkey than were arriving. However, following the outbreak of war net migration increased rapidly.

The map below shows the refugee population by country of asylum. Following the start of the conflict in 2009 it is clear that refugee numbers not only increase in countries close to Syria, including Turkey but also in Europe. There has been a significant increase in the number of people seeking asylum in European countries, for example, in Germany the number of asylum seekers has doubled.

What are the push and pull factors causing Syrians’ to migrate to Europe?

Push factors include:

  • Unemployment due to war
  • Lack of food due to war
  • Lack of access to clean water due to war
  • Forced migration due to war

Pull factors include:

  • The opportunity to be safe from conflict
  • The opportunity of a better standard of living
  • Availability of public services such as education, welfare and health care
  • A reliable source of food and water
  • Safe and secure shelter

What are the impacts of Syrian migration to Europe?

Origin country (Syria)

  • Less pressure on resources and aid
  • Reduced risk of citizen targets
  • Money can be sent back to friends and family still in Syria

Destination country 

  • Greater cultural diversity
  • Low-wage workforce to do the jobs local people do not want
  • Opportunity to experience Syrian culture e.g. food

Migrants 

  • Safety from the risks associated with civil war
  • Opportunity to have a better quality of life
  • Opportunity to access education and healthcare

Negative impacts

  • A reduction in the number of people available to work, therefore less money is collected in taxes resulting in restricted economic growth
  • Loss of younger people who are more likely to migrate leaving behind an ageing population
  • Greater pressure on services such as healthcare and education
  • Greater pressure on resources such as food, water and energy
  • Language may be a barrier
  • Difficulty in adjusting to the culture
  • Migrants may be exploited as cheap labour
  • May experience discrimination and racism

Many Syrian migrants are being exploited for money by people traffickers offering them transportation across the Mediterranean Sea. This is an illegal practice, that forces authorities to accept an application for asylum. Traffickers charge considerable fees for transporting people in low quality, dangerous and overcrowded boats.

The image below shows poor quality boats and life jackets discarded by Syrian refugees.

Life jackets and boats left behind by Syrian refugees

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Syrian refugees arriving in Germany: choice of corridor and individual characteristics of forced migrants

Associated data.

The panel survey of the Institute for Employment Research (IAB), the Research Center of the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF-FZ), and the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) at the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin) is the dataset of this article. The dataset is available by applying to the institutions. The dataset is only available to the scientific community, and all users need to sign a data distribution contract. Requests to access these datasets should be directed to ed.wid@liampeos .

In 2015 and 2016, almost two and a half million forced migrants entered the European Union. Most of them arrived in the European Union from Syria, but there were also forced migrants from Iraq, Afghanistan, and other countries. While many of these migrants used the so-called Balkan route after passing through Turkey, others arrived in Greece via Lebanon or Turkey, and some traveled via North African countries, mainly Egypt and Libya. Why did refugees use such different migration corridors? Was it a matter of economic resources, of education and knowledge, or of family ties and social networks? In this paper, we statistically analyze the migration corridors used by Syrian refugees who arrived in Germany between 2014 and 2016. Using a unique dataset of 3,125 refugees, we identify the main migration corridors used Syrian forced migrants and analyze the sociodemographic and journey-related contextual factors associated with the use of these routes. Use of different escape routes was found to correlate with person-related variables and with journey-related contextual factors. The study contributes the debate on the dynamics of forced migration and onward migration.

1. Introduction

During the years 2015 and 2016, the European Union (EU) registered almost two and a half million asylum applications. 1 Most of the applicants came from Syria, but others also came from Iraq, Afghanistan, and other countries. Many traveled via the so-called Balkan route after passing through Turkey; others arrived in Greece via Lebanon or Turkey; meanwhile, other groups traveled via North African countries, mainly Egypt and Libya. Why did refugees use such different migration corridors? In order to reach the EU, e.g., from the global South, it seems to be more dangerous and more expensive than other options to travel through North African countries and cross the Mediterranean, given that between 2014 and 2022 more than 21,000 people lost their lives in the Central and Western Mediterranean—a death rate 12 times higher than in the Eastern Mediterranean (International Organization for Migration, 2022 ). Is it a matter of economic resources, of education and knowledge, or of family ties and social networks? In this paper, we address forced migration from Syria to the EU, especially to Germany. Although many studies exist on the dynamics of the arrival and integration of Syrian refugees in Germany and other EU member states, we know less about the specific conditions and contexts under which such refugees make use of different corridors in their migration.

Studies on the formation of migration corridors among forced migrants and their underlying decision-making processes are relatively limited. If we consider the traditional drivers of migration more generally, several sets of factors fuel the decision on where and how to migrate; these range from rational economic choices and the existence of dual labor markets to historical ties and colonial relationships. Concerning forced migration, the absence of security, violations of human rights, and the presence of (armed) criminal groups in countries of residence are the core drivers. A report by European Asylum Support Office ( 2016 ) highlights the challenge of distinguishing these political factors from economic factors and the entwinement of lack of security and economic instability as push factors. As in the case of other types of migration, the forced migration process is also not static (European Asylum Support Office, 2016 ); in fact, it can be a much more dynamic process than the usual forms of migration movement.

Crawley and Hagen-Zanker ( 2019 , p. 21) analyze destination preferences and the effectiveness of migration control for 250 Syrian, Eritrean, and Nigerian migrants and explain the determinants of the migration decision as follows: “…there is strong evidence that migrant decision-making is a dynamic process, one which is influenced and shaped by a complex interaction between macro, meso, and micro level factors including historical and geographical ties between origin and destination countries and the economic, political and social resources that refugees and other migrants are able to mobilize.” Recent studies underline the non-linear character of migration, and this also holds for forced migration. Erdal et al. ( 2023 ) question the concept of “the destination” based on semi-structured interviews with 30 nurses. Against the classic assumption of a linear, clearly defined plan for migration, Crawley and Jones ( 2021 ) argue that experiences gained during the course of migration and in the places of arrival are crucial and frequently alter migrants' original ideas. Migration trajectories are more complicated and multi-layered than is assumed under traditional approaches (Crawley and Jones, 2021 ; Della Puppa et al., 2021 ; Formenti, 2023 ). We should analyze forced migration trajectories as segmented and fragmented or as a dynamic ongoing process (Della Puppa et al., 2021 ; Ahrens and King, 2023 ).

By considering the concept of onward migration, scholars have provided a better understanding of the complex and dynamic structure of migration trajectories. Ahrens and King ( 2023 , p. 5) define onward migration as “…a spatial trajectory that involves extended stays in two or more destination countries. Acknowledging that any migrant can be a potential onward (or return) migrant allows for a more open-ended and processual understanding of migration. After living in one destination country, migrants may decide to move to one or more new destinations. Countries and places thus can change from being destinations to becoming points of departure.” However, Della Puppa et al. ( 2021 ) conceptualize onward migration within a narrow framework by focusing on the reactivation of intra-European migration movement among third-country nationals living in the EU under secure legal status. In their study, various forms of capital (such as economic, social, and cultural 2 ) and their impact on migration trajectories are discussed; migration capital can be considered as a set of potential and actual dividends, such as knowledge of migration-related processes, EU citizenship, or permanent settlement rights, acquired through migration experiences. In this paper, we examine the characteristics of migrants instead of analyzing forms of capital, but we pay special attention to migrants' resources.

Crawley et al. ( 2018 ) differentiate between the primary drivers of forced migrants' motives to leave their country of origin, and secondary drivers that are relevant in onward migration (Crawley et al., 2018 ). Reasons for onward migration among forced migrants are feelings of security, inadequate employment opportunities, and the need for a sense of future (Crawley et al., 2018 ). Analyzing the return aspirations of Syrian refugees in Turkey, Kayaoglu et al. ( 2022 ) emphasize security, regime changes, and opportunities for a better life in Syria as elements of onward migration. Additionally, experiences of discrimination, the feeling of occasionally being exposed to discrimination, and socio-cultural distance are considered to influence return migration. A study based on qualitative and quantitative primary data from Syrians living in Turkey and Lebanon emphasizes family obligations, household income, political factors, and discrimination in the current country of residence as the main elements of desires to return (Müller-Funk and Fransen, 2020 ). Rottmann and Kaya ( 2021 ) explain how migration experiences in the transit country influence the migration aspirations of Istanbul's Syrians, and they underline the relevance of relations between culture, religion, and gender on the biographical projects of migrants. Topgül and Adali ( 2021 ) analyze internal onward migration among Syrian women migrants in Turkey, and show that year of arrival and choice of the first place of settlement in Turkey strongly influence onward movement within Turkey. In analysis of forced migration and onward migration, another frequently discussed element is the impact of border regimes and migration policies. Crawley and Hagen-Zanker ( 2019 ) emphasize that state efforts to reduce immigration seldom determine the preferred destinations. In their study, a mix of several elements, including access to protection, family reunification, information availability, economic climate, and social networks, are identified as drivers of destination selection. Additionally, perceptions of migration policies may matter more than their actual content, since their ramifications are often unknown or misinterpreted (Crawley and Hagen-Zanker, 2019 ). All of these aspects of aspirations play a role in the formation of the routes taken by forced migrants.

In this study, which is based on a unique dataset, we analyze the migration trajectories of 3,125 Syrian refugees who started their journey to Germany between 2014 and 2016. 3 In this study, by considering migration by forced migrants not as a one-time decision, but as a process and a prolonged part of the life-course, we sought answers to the following questions. Which typical corridors of forced migration could we identify? How are variables such as time and cost of the journey and means of transportation interrelated with these corridors? How are these variables related to socio-demographic characteristics, such as number of household members, family status before migration, level of education, gender, and religious or ethnic ascriptions? By analyzing a broad person- and household-related dataset, we integrate socio-demographic facts with subjective experiences. Based on current research, we were able to derive six hypotheses that we considered relevant to test: (1) forced migrants with greater personal resources may choose a more direct route; (2) forced migrants who begin their migration journey earlier may select a more direct route; (3) the longer the route, the more expensive it may be; (4) forced migrants will choose their arrival countries according to the economic conditions of their desired destination; (5) forced migrants will choose their arrival countries according to social capital—i.e., where relatives/friends already live; and (6) forced migrants will choose their arrival countries according to the general sociocultural image of the desired destination. In the following sections of this article, we first summarize the important findings of recent studies that have focused on refugees under conditions of prolonged escape using the method of secondary analysis. We focus especially on Syrian refugees in Turkey, based on existing studies (Section 1). We then sketch out the general characteristics of refugee movement from Syria into the EU since the 2010's (Section 2). Based on these findings, we analyze a broad dataset based on surveys of Syrian refugees who started their journey to Germany between 2014 and 2016 and were surveyed in Germany between 2016 and 2017 (Section 3). The article ends with some concluding reflections on forced migration as a prolonged stage in the life-course and desiderata for further research (Section 4).

2. The general landscape of forced migration

As of 2021, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) counts some 97 million people of concern, including some 21 million international refugees and 49 million internally displaced persons (IDP), 4.8 million asylum seekers, 6.2 million returned asylum seekers and IDPs, and more than 12 million other persons of concern (United Nations High Commissions for Refugees, 2021 ). From 2010 to 2020, the growth in the world population was ~12%, international migration increased by 27%, and forced migration (counted as persons of concern as defined by the UNHCR) grew by 123% (United Nations High Commissions for Refugees, 2010 , 2021 ; Migration Data Portal, 2021 ). 4 Beside this increasing relevance, the challenges of forced migration are concentrated in certain places and in specific social groups. In 2019, some two-thirds of all refugees came from Syria, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Myanmar, and Somalia. These refugees mainly do not travel to the EU, but are hosted in Turkey, Pakistan, Uganda, and Sudan (United Nations High Commissions for Refugees, 2020a , p. 3; for international displacement: p. 6–10; for refugees: p. 18–20.) Meanwhile, in 2015, refugees hosted in Lebanon, Jordan, or Turkey represented between 5 and 16% of the population, while in Germany—as a quite rich country—in the same year, the proportion was just one percent. Although Germany received the fifth-highest number of arriving forced migrants in 2015, in 2019 the number of first-time asylum applicants fell to 142,400, and the EU as a whole received only 612,700 first-time applicants, which represents only 2.5% of all international refugees worldwide (EUROSTAT, 2020 ).

In countries like Somalia, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Chad, organized violence and armed conflicts, together with weak states and insufficient public authority and security, fuel migratory processes. Since 2010/11, the so-called Arab Spring and various forms of violence (whether attributed to state authorities, to organized crime, or to political movements) have given rise to emigration from multiple Middle Eastern and North African countries to neighboring countries as well as to European countries. During the past two decades, organized violence has emerged as a key factor fueling mixed migration. This term refers to the use of physical force in a collective and organized way in order to achieve collective goals, and it can be executed in the form of state, political, criminal, or paramilitary (state-sponsored) violence, as well as including non-state-sponsored group violence committed by religious and ethnic organizations, terrorist groups, and criminal gangs engaged in kidnapping, armed robbery, reprisal attacks, rape, and murder. 5

This context is relevant for understanding the situation of forced migrants from Syria, who had to find a way out of their country, travel through other countries, and find a secure place. Concerning the Middle East, Syria was one of the countries that hosted the greatest number of refugees and asylum seekers worldwide until 2010. After this point, the country became the state with the largest numbers of IDPs (some 6.6 million) and refugees abroad (some 6.3 million; International Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2020 ; United Nations High Commissions for Refugees, 2020a ). Since 2014, armed organized groups and terrorist groups like Islamic State and Syrian Democratic Forces have taken control of certain areas. As a result, from 2011 onwards, in addition to the IDPs, some 5.6 million refugees moved from Syria to Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan. Two main escape corridors, understood as clusters of individual migration routes, stabilized. One led to the north, for refugees intending to stay in Turkey or travel on toward the EU. Due to historical ties, the border between Turkey and Syria has always been easy to cross. Syrian migrants first arrived in the southern cities of Turkey, and later in its metropolitan cities. In 2019, the number of Syrian forced immigrants living in Turkey under temporary protection, including Syrian asylum seekers with pending cases, had reached 3.9 million persons of concern (United Nations High Commissions for Refugees, 2020a ). As Syrians had no opportunities to flee to Israel, Palestine, or many Arabian countries (these countries did not accept them), the second refugee corridor opened to several other Arabian and North African countries, such as Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, and Algeria (Hudson, 2018 ). In 2020, with 865,531 Syrian migrants, Lebanon hosted the greatest number of refugees within this migration corridor (United Nations High Commissions for Refugees, 2020b ). Almost 40% of these refugees live in Bekaa, some 27% in North Lebanon, and 24% in Beirut. The second most relevant country on this migration line is Jordan, with some 12% of the total Syrian forced migrants; this is followed by some 242,000 Syrian externally displaced persons living in Iraq and some 130,000 in Egypt.

When the conflict in Syria began in 2011, migration patterns indicated that Turkey was a transit country. Legislation and institutional infrastructure were designed neither for immigrants nor for refugees or asylum seekers. Two legal regulations were of significance for forced migrants. The first was the 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1967 Additional Protocol on the status of refugees; however, Turkey accepted the corresponding stipulations only with respect to European citizens. The second was the 1994 Regulation on Asylum, the first legal document regulating asylum issues, which was prepared in light of forced migration from Iraq to Turkey during the early 1990's (Içduygu, 2015 ). 6 When the first group of 252 Syrian forced migrants arrived in Turkey in April 2011, Turkey had no inclusive legal regulation for immigrants and refugees; however, during 2011, Turkey began to adopt an open-door policy (Içduygu, 2015 ; Erdogan, 2020 ).

In October 2011, at UN meetings in Geneva, the Turkish government announced, as a first step, a policy of temporary protection for Syrians. A second announcement declared that incoming forced migrants would be treated according to the principle of non-refoulement , which means not sending anyone back without their request. The third component announced was the promise to provide for the basic human needs of those who had escaped from the violent environment in Syria (Kirisci, 2013 ; Içduygu, 2015 ; Kaya, 2020 ). At the end of 2019, the United Nations High Commissions for Refugees ( 2020a , p. 75) documented 3,579,531 refugees and people in refugee-like situations, as well as 328,257 asylum seekers with pending cases. In 2020 alone, 31,334 migrants applied for international protection in Turkey, consisting of 72% Afghan citizens, 19% Iraqi citizens, 5% Iranian citizens, and 4% citizens of other countries (Directorate General of Migration Management, Ministry of Interior Turkey, 2021a ). The number of irregular migrants, as recorded by the Directorate General of Migration Management in Turkey (DGMM), reached its highest level in 2019 (454,662); this figure also sheds light on the scale of forced migration into the country (Directorate General of Migration Management, Ministry of Interior Turkey, 2021b ). Among such migrants, the majority were from Afghanistan (201,437 persons), followed by Pakistan, Syria, Palestine, and Iraq.

In sum, Turkey has played a crucial role in migration paths throughout history. Due to economic growth, it remained a transit country, although it also started to become a destination country for immigration. However, the war in Syria caused Turkey to become the host country with the most internationally displaced persons in the world (United Nations High Commissions for Refugees, 2020a ). As a special feature, only 1.8% (67,000 persons) of the Syrian population in Turkey live in camps across five provinces (Erdogan, 2019 ). The vast majority of the Syrian population live in urban areas concentrated in the border provinces with Syria and in provinces with Turkish citizens of Arabian ancestry. Almost half of all Syrian forced migrants (a total of 1,790,669 people) live in Gaziantep, Hatay, Sanliurfa, Adana, and Mersin. Additionally, developed economic areas and regions with very large labor markets have also attracted forced migrants, especially Istanbul, which hosts 525,529 Syrian migrants (Directorate General of Migration Management, Ministry of Interior Turkey, 2021c ).

Concerning the sociodemographic profiles of Syrian migrants living in Turkey, there is an inadequate registration system. 7 According to the Turkish Demography and Health Survey (Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies, 2019 ), the sex ratio of Syrians in Turkey (male:female) is 108:100. Syrians in Turkey are younger than the average age of the population in Turkey (Adali and Türkyilmaz, 2020 ). More than one million of the Syrians living in Turkey are under 18, and over two million are of active working age, between 15 and 64 (Erdogan, 2019 ). Households of Syrian forced migrants in Turkey are male-headed and consist of an average of six members (Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies, 2019 ). Syrian migrants on average have lower levels of education than the Turkish population (Erdogan, 2019 ). During the initial years of forced migrants' arrival in Turkey, more than half of Syrians registered in camps reported their education level as a maximum of primary school; outside camps, this percentage increased to some six out of 10. The proportion who reported having a high school or higher degree was 21% within camps and 19% outside camps (Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency Ministry of Interior Turkey, 2013 ). At the end of the 2010's, an estimated one-third of Syrian refugees were illiterate (Erdogan, 2019 ). According to Erdogan ( 2019 ), the low educational levels reflect the extraction of refugees primarily from rural and traditional regions of northern Syria. Female migrants were found to have lower educational levels than male migrants (Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies, 2019 ). It is thought that the 100's of 1,000's of Syrian refugees who have left Turkey—either toward the EU or back to Syria—on average have higher levels of education (Erdogan, 2019 ). A recent study reveals that most refugees report having had a regular job in Syria before leaving; only 17% were unemployed (Turkish Red Crescent and World Food Program, 2019 ).

In sum, what was thought of as a temporary escape from Syria to Turkey has often become a prolonged stay and has often led migrants to reconsider their life courses and biographical futures. This perspective also takes into account the “unanticipated consequences of purposive social action” (Merton, 1936 ), e.g., leaving one's home for a projected short period and then having to arrange a new life in Turkey or being invited by relatives to further migrate to another country, e.g., in the EU. Criteria and priorities for action and decision-making shift over time and have to be negotiated within broader social networks of families and friendships, as well as in the context of national and local migration regimes. As no panel studies or retrospective life trajectory surveys have yet been conducted in Turkey, it would be interesting to know whether Syrian forced migrants who arrived in the EU share the same or similar characteristics with those living in Turkey. In addition, why did they travel there and through which migration routes?

3. Characteristics of recently arrived Syrian refugees in Germany

The scientific literature on Syrian forced migration to Germany concentrates on the dynamics since the so-called Arab Spring in 2010. However, migration from Syria to Germany was already occurring before this point, mainly among more highly qualified Syrian elites. During the 1980's, the Syrian immigrant population living in Germany consisted mainly of students (Ragab et al., 2017 ; Worbs et al., 2020 ). From a forced migration perspective, a considerable influx from Syria to Germany occurred because of the riots in Hama in the early 1980's (Ragab et al., 2017 ). A second wave of forced migration then occurred in the context of the civil war in Syria after 2010. By 2010, some 30,000 Syrian immigrants already lived in Germany (Worbs et al., 2020 ). Over a single decade, and mainly due to organized violence and forced migration, the number of Syrians living in Germany increased to more than 780,000 in 2020 (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, 2020 ).

Among first-time asylum applicants, until 2012, Kurdish ethnicity was dominant among Syrians living in Germany. After 2015 and 2016, this shifted toward persons indicating Arabic ethnicity (almost two-thirds). In terms of religious beliefs, the majority declare themselves to be Muslims, with minorities describing themselves as Catholics or Yazidis (Worbs et al., 2020 ). In the first wave of the IAB-BAMF-SOEP Refugee Survey, reasons given for leaving the country of origin were concentrated on the context of organized violence (“fear of violent conflict/war,” “persecution,” “fear of forced conscription”). In response to the question of why the interviewee chose Germany, almost three-quarters mentioned “respect for human rights.” Some 43% referred to the quality of the German education system, and 42% declared that they felt welcome in Germany. Smaller proportions (from one-quarter to some 12%) of respondents reported reasons relating to the welfare system or economic situation, or already having relatives, friends, or people from the same country of origin in Germany (Brücker et al., 2016 ). Those refugees who came to Germany directly from their country of origin reported a mean cost of 7,137 euros for transportation, housing, and border crossing. 8 Those who spent a longer period in a transit country reported total costs, on average, of 5,231 euros. In the case of refugees from the West Balkans, Soviet Union, Syria, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine, almost 90% of refugees reported having arrived in Germany within only 2 years of having left their country of origin. Interestingly, the total cost, as well as the average duration of the migration trajectory, fell substantially from 2013 to 2014 and from 2014 to 2015 (Brücker et al., 2016 , p. 5f).

Educational levels varied substantially according to country of origin. In general, more than 70% reported having attended middle or secondary school, and more than half of all refugees interviewed reported having graduated from these schools. Some 58% of respondents indicated that they had spent at least 10 years in formal schooling; for the overall population living in Germany, this rate is 88% (Brücker et al., 2016 , 2018 ). Language, writing, and reading skills varied substantially between refugees by country of origin, with forced migrants from Syria ranking above average (Brücker et al., 2018 , p. 34). Considering the religious affiliation of all refugees who participated in the IAB-BAMF-SOEP Refugee Survey (second wave v.34), Syrian refugees had the highest share of affiliation to Islam, whereas, e.g., the majority of refugees from Iran—also a predominantly Islamic country—described themselves as Christian (Siegert, 2020 ). Almost three-quarters of the refugees interviewed were male (of these, almost half had no partner in 2017); only one-quarter were female (of these, almost three-quarters had a partner). Notably, rates of mental health and depressive symptoms and risk of post-traumatic stress disorder are substantially higher in refugees than the general population in Germany (Brücker et al., 2019 ).

Examining the Syrian population living in Germany in general, according to data from the Federal Office of Statistics, in 2017 some two-thirds of this population were men. This is 12% higher than the average share of men among all foreigners living in Germany and reflects the high proportion of refugees in the overall Syrian population (Worbs et al., 2016 ). As in Turkey, the Syrian refugee population in Germany is quite young, with an average age of 24.2 years in 2017 and a share of persons aged up to 15 of almost one-third (Worbs et al., 2020 ); by comparison, this share was 40% in Turkey in 2020 (see Directorate General of Migration Management, Ministry of Interior Turkey, 2021c ). In fact, with an average age of 38 years, Syrians in Germany in general are younger than the overall population of foreigners in Germany. Because of the age-selective nature of Syrian migration to Germany, a large proportion of Syrians continue in the education system (Ragab et al., 2017 ).

Studies show that the population of Syrian forced migrants in Germany is male-dominated (some 70% being male in 2015 and 61% in 2017; Juran and Broer, 2017 ; Worbs et al., 2020 ). Considering the marital status of Syrians in Germany at the end of 2017, 58% reported being single (63% of Syrian men and 51% of Syrian women). At the end of 2017, only 31% of Syrians were married, whereas this proportion was 43% among all foreign residents (Worbs et al., 2020 ). Until 2015, Syrians mostly lived in North Rhine-Westphalia, Lower Saxony, Bavaria, and Baden-Wuerttemberg (Ragab et al., 2017 ). The distribution quota system among asylum seekers and refugees subsequently led to a more balanced geographical distribution of Syrians (Worbs et al., 2020 ). Although the education level of Syrian refugees is lower than that of the overall residents in Germany, it is higher than that of other refugee groups (Worbs et al., 2020 , p. 221). The share of Syrian first-time applicants with no formal education was 3%, compared to some 8% among all first-time asylum applicants (Ragab et al., 2017 , p. 21). 9 The pattern of gender differences in education level among Syrian forced migrants in Germany is similar to the pattern seen in Turkey, with women having lower levels of education overall (Worbs et al., 2020 ). Employment opportunities for refugees are an integral component of integration efforts, but finding employment is more challenging than for native citizens in OECD countries (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2017 ). In addition, their living standards are directly related to their employment circumstances. Worbs et al. ( 2020 ) calculated that in 2017 the average income among Syrians was < 60% of the median income in Germany, meaning that 80% were living at risk of poverty. In the same year, some 9% of all job-seekers in Germany were forced migrants (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2017 ).

We can conclude that, in the case of both countries, forced migration is often not simply a brief event in the life course followed by a unidirectional integration process in a new country. Forced migration needs to be studied as prolonged social practice and a form of everyday life, in which people must negotiate and reconstruct their aims, identities, and framings of their biographical projects (Pries, 2018 , chapters 6 and 7). Given these commonalities and differences, it is to be expected that forced migrants from Syria seek out different and new geographic routes and corridors by which to migrate. They might plan to transit through Turkey and become stuck in that country; or, conversely, they might plan with the aim of staying in Turkey and then decide to move on. During 2015 and 2016, the refugee movement from Syria triggered the creation of new migration routes (Yüceşahin and Sirkeci, 2017 ; Hudson, 2018 ), and this was not mainly prompted by Merkel's famous statement “We will manage it” (Pries, 2019 ). One important question is by which routes the Syrian refugees came to Germany and why they did so. Are there particular features of different migration routes and of the individuals using them? In addition to the route across the Aegean Sea to Greece, there was also the Balkan route and the route from North Africa to Italy. Who takes which route and why? As demonstrated elsewhere, the routes of forced migrants toward the EU vary in time and space according to many factors. To some extent, these factors are related to the characteristics, motivations, and experiences of the forced migrants themselves; on the other hand, they are also dependent on macro-level drivers, such as the political conditions, migration policies and regimes, and the obstacles and risks found on the routes. In particular, border restrictions normally do not stop migration movements, but redirect them toward other corridors (for refugee immigration to the EU, see Pries, 2018 , chapter 4). Which factors influence refugees' choices of individual escape routes, thereby forming the basis of clustered corridors?

4. Migration corridors used by Syrian refugees to Germany

The following analysis of the migration trajectories of Syrian forced migrants to Germany is based on a unique dataset. The Institute for Employment Research (IAB), the Research Center of the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF-FZ), and the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) at the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin) jointly initiated a representative and detailed panel survey. Between June and October 2016, an initial wave of interviews with 2,349 individuals from 1,766 households were conducted; later in 2016, a further 2,467 individuals were interviewed. In 2017, a total of 4,525 individuals were interviewed; due to interview problems and quality checks, this number was reduced to 4,463 for this second wave of the panel carried out in 2017. 10 Only adults older than 18 years of age were interviewed, but data were also registered for minors in the corresponding households. The study provides information on the drivers of forced migration decisions, routes of travel, sociodemographic characteristics, life history in terms of education and employment, family composition, accommodation conditions, asylum procedure status, and subjective values and orientations. 11 The IAB-BAMF-SOEP Refugee Survey has provided the most comprehensive and representative dataset in the area of forced migration.

The survey includes retrospective questions relating to earlier stages of the respondent's forced migration journey to Germany; nevertheless, it provides data only on the beginning and end dates of all migration stays, in cases where the interviewee spent a minimum of 3 months in a particular location. This rather extended period impedes identification of all the places that migrants have passed through on their journeys to Germany. However, based on the information about these trajectories and the corresponding sequences of countries that the refugees had passed through, as a first step, 10 different migration corridors can be identified ( Table 1 ). 12 As expected, most (59%) of the people from Syria surveyed, all of whom had started their journey between 2014 and 2016 and subsequently arrived in Germany, reported a migration journey of < 3 months' duration and did not report a residential stay of < 3 months during their flight. Another considerable proportion (18%) reported having lived in Turkey for at least 3 months before arriving in Germany. More than 200 of the people interviewed (7%) indicated that they had taken a route that included a stay of at least 3 months in Lebanon or Iraq before coming to Germany. In addition to these three types of case, covering the vast majority of interviewees (some 84%), there were quite a considerable number of people who reported more than one residential stay of a minimum of 3 months before arriving in Germany. Similarly large numbers were counted for the Syria–Iraq or Lebanon–Germany route and for a journey via the Middle East and North African (MENA) region, now with a minimum of two residential stays in each case. The remainder of the interviewees (almost a tenth) reported having taken rather complex routes from Syria to Germany, including a minimum of two residential stays in more than one country.

Main routes taken by Syrian forced migrants.

Source: own analysis based on the IAB-BAMF-SOEP Refugee Survey v.34.

How might we explain these very different trajectories followed by forced migrants? Does use of the different corridors vary according to the time at which an individual's migration from Syria started? This could be the case when, e.g., some escape routes have closed or became more challenging. For instance, during 2015 and beginning of 2016, the land borders between Turkey and Greece and between Turkey and Bulgaria and the sea border between Turkey and Greece happened to be either closed and strongly controlled or quite easy to cross. The same holds during other periods for the MENA–Italy route, etc. Therefore, we conducted an analysis based on the month when each refugee started their emigration from Syria, differentiating between the six most common corridors. Based on the second wave of the IAB-BAMF-SOEP Refugee Survey (v.34), Figure 1 indicates the share of respondents who left Syria by a certain route each month as a percentage of the total number of refugees from Syria in the overall period (January 2014 to December 2016). To reduce the complexity of examining many different routes, we analyzed only six main corridors (Syria–Germany, Syria–Turkey–Germany, Syria–Balkans–Germany, Syria–EU countries–Germany, Syria–MENA countries–Germany, and Syria–Iraq/Lebanon–Germany). As can be seen, the two routes Syria–Balkans–Germany and Syria–EU countries–Germany (in terms of a stay of at least 3 months mid-trajectory) were not so important in relative terms.

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Corridor selection by month of leaving Syria. Source: own analysis based on the IAB-BAMF-SOEP Refugee Survey v.34.

The sequence of columns shown in Figure 1 reveals a certain seasonal dynamic for 2014 and 2015, with the summer months (here June to October) being the peak season for flight. Similar seasonal waves can also be observed for all other corridors of forced migration into the EU over many years (showing more flight occurring during the warmer summer months). 13 However, the substantial increase in June 2014 (as shown in Figure 1 ) must be explained by other events. On 3 June 2014, a presidential election was held in Syria, and 1 day later, the Syrian government declared President Assad to be the winner; meanwhile, western countries believed that the election was manipulated and the result meaningless. On 29 June 2014, the so-called Islamic State proclaimed its own Caliphate on the territory of Iraq and Syria and began to distribute its own currency. From then onward, repression by the Syrian Assad government, totalitarian control of some regions by the so-called Islamic State, and complex armed conflicts between different groups involved in organized violence intensified all over the northern parts of Syria. 14 In sum, the forced migration that occurred in 2014 and 2015 has to be explained in the context of the turbulent situation with respect to organized violence. Looking only at the period from June to December 2015, almost a third of all surveyed Syrian refugees, who left the country between January 2014 and December 2016, made their way directly to Germany without any residential stop (lowest part of the stacked columns). During the same period, more than a tenth of all interviewees reported having first fled to Turkey and stayed there for a minimum of 3 months before arriving in Germany (second part of the stacked columns). The other four corridors were of less quantitative weight, with the route via Lebanon or Iraq being the third most important during the months of August to November 2016.

As outlined in Figure 1 , according to the representative data, a mass emigration from Syria began in June 2015. Of interviewees who began their journey that month, 130 (or 4% of all interviewees) took a direct migration route from Syria to Germany without any intermediate stay longer than 3 months. Including the other five routes shown in Figure 1 , some 6% of all migrants interviewed started their journey during this month. Considering all routes, the period between June 2015 and February 2016 (with the addition of June 2014) was when the highest rates of monthly departures from Syria occurred. The data also suggest that there was no direct impact of the highly debated statement by Germany's Chancellor Merkel, made in August 2015, that “We will manage it,” given that the highest rate of growth in emigration across all routes occurred from June to August 2015. Merkel's press conference in which she made the famous statement took place on the last day of August; therefore, it could have taken effect only from September onward (for a deeper discussion, see Pries, 2019 ). As can be seen in Figure 1 , the rate of flight from Syria to Germany accelerated from June 2015 until February 2016, and all routes expanded in volume of use during this period.

Can we identify specific variables that explain the use of such different corridors of refuge as (on the one hand) migrating directly from Syria to Germany within less than a quarter of a year and (on the other) migrating via long distances, sometimes traveling back and forth (as in the case of fleeing from Syria initially for a long stay in Iraq or Lebanon), and then continuing onward to Germany? Why did some forced migrants take a route via North Africa? Could we explain this with reference to the time taken or the costs associated with the different corridors? For deeper analysis, we grouped the corridors into five categories according to their numerical relevance: Syria–Germany, Syria–Turkey–Germany, Syria–MENA countries–Germany, Syria–Iraq/Lebanon–Germany, and Other Routes. Table 2 presents the average time (in days) spent in transit after leaving the last country of stay, as well as the money spent in traveling via these different corridors. As expected, the routes via Iraq and Lebanon and through other Middle Eastern or North African countries took significantly longer than the direct route from Syria to Germany or the route following a long stay in Turkey. Even the category of “other routes,” which often included circular or back-and-forth migration, on average lasted fewer days than the SR-MENA-GR and SR-Leb./Iraq-GR routes. Although the difference between routes was statistically significant, the correlation between corridor taken and mean time taken was relatively weak (η 2 = 0.013).

Average time (in days) and money (in Euros) spent according to type of corridor taken.

When considering the costs of different corridors, we only found an association of corridor taken with the cost of accommodation, and this was only at a low 90% confidence level. Interestingly, the types of costs (including time) varied significantly with the different corridors. This indicates that there seems to be a certain trade-off in the characteristics of the different kinds of route: where costs for smuggling and “professional services” were high, costs for transportation and accommodation appear to have been low, and vice versa. If we assume transparent and intensive communication (Pries, 2018 ) about these issues relating to the time taken and costs of migration, it is surprising that some groups of forced migrants choose an expensive and time-consuming corridor while others opt for a shorter and cheaper one. Chi-squared tests of independence indicated no evidence for an association between route and occupational status (χ 2 = 7.786, p = 0.802), or between route and social status in the migrant's country of origin (χ 2 = 16.735, p = 0.403). In contrast, a chi-squared test of independence examining the association between method of financing of the forced migration and type of route taken was statistically significant (χ 2 = 147.135, p = 0.001). Which factors can help us to understand and explain these different action strategies? Certain survey questions related to the context in which the forced migration trajectory was initiated, some basic factors relating to experiences during flight, and the reasons for choosing Germany as a destination country could provide a better understanding.

Figure 2 presents the frequencies of answers concerning the reasons for and financing of forced migration. Five main reasons stand out, and these could be classified into two main categories: violence-based reasons and economic reasons. Thirteen percent of responses indicated “fear of forced recruitment” in Syria, followed by persecution (13%) and discrimination (12%). In terms of economic reasons, the economic situation of the country and the respondent's personal living conditions were most frequently mentioned (11 and 13%, respectively). 15 Concerning the resources used for financing the flight, the three most frequently mentioned sources were savings (29%), assets sold (29%), and money from relatives (18%). 16

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Context in which forced migration was initiated. Source: own analysis based on the IAB-BAMF-SOEP Refugee Survey v.34.

During flight, migrants can be very vulnerable and may be compelled to experience many adverse circumstances. Among all responses to a question about the most important negative experiences, 20% of responses indicated fraud and exploitation, and the second most frequent response was incarceration (14%). Another question related to the means by which respondents had made a living in their last country of residence during flight ( Figure 3 ). Most responses (40%) indicated that the respondent had earned an income in the country of transit; the second most common answer (26%) was living on savings; and the third (21%) was support from relatives. 17 In the survey, migrants also were asked about their future plans at the time when they were staying for 3 months or longer in another country before arriving in Germany. The most frequent answer (67%) was that they planned to move from there to another country as soon as possible, while 16% of interviewees planned to stay where they were for longer, and 17% reported that they planned to return to their country as soon as possible. This illustrates the iterative and sequential nature of forced migration: one-third of the interviewees changed their plans (to stay longer in a transit country or return to their country of origin) in moving to Germany.

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Context and aspects of migrants' flight. Source: own analysis based on the IAB-BAMF-SOEP Refugee Survey v.34.

Why did migrants choose Germany as their destination country? The most frequently mentioned reason (23% of all responses) was “respect for human rights,” followed by the education system in Germany (17%) and the perception of a welcoming culture (16%). A reason less often given (11%) was the governmental and social welfare system. 18 Other reasons, such as the German procedural system for asylum, the general economic conditions of the country, or having family members already living in Germany, were of minor relevance in the answers. All these data illustrate the nature of flight as an ongoing, protracted period in the life course. Forced migrants must adapt to new conditions in transit countries. They might find (informal) jobs to sustain their income or be dependent on their existing savings or on relatives. They might experience fraud, discrimination, and exploitation. All these factors, in addition to the migration plans of family members and relatives, must be negotiated and balanced. For these reasons, forced migration represents an extended period of social practice and everyday life under highly volatile and challenging conditions.

How can we relate this social practice of forced migration to the different corridors used by Syrian refugees? Additionally, (how) are these corridors related to individuals' specific sociodemographic characteristics? Is there any association between the formation of the corridors and the time at which an individual started their journey? Based on the IAB-BAMF-SOEP Refugee Survey, Table 3 offers insights into the association between migrant routes and the sociodemographic characteristics of refugees. Five main aggregated migration routes were considered, according to their frequency: Syria–Germany, Syria–Turkey–Germany route, Syria–MENA countries–Germany, Syria–Lebanon/Iraq–Germany, and other routes, including complex routes. In terms of sociodemographic characteristics, number of years spent in education, marital status, number of children, and mother tongue were taken into account. Concerning the time period at which each journey started, we focused on political turning points, such as the election in Syria and the signing of the EU–Turkey deal. We considered four time periods from January 2014 to the end of December 2016.

Migration corridors and sociodemographic variables.

In our analysis of the association between education level and migration corridor used, education was operationalized as the grouped number of years spent in formal education. The vast majority of interviewees (93%) indicated that they had received between 6 and 15 years of schooling. A chi-squared test ( n = 1,662) indicated a significant association between number of years spent in education and migration corridor used. Analysis of the adjusted residuals 19 as a measure of each cell's contribution to the chi-squared value revealed that, e.g., migrants with 11–15 years of schooling used the Syria–Germany migration corridor more often than other routes. 20 Users of the SR–MENA–GR corridor were polarized, with a tendency to have either few or many years of education. Additionally, the marital status variable ( n = 1,807) had a significant association with choice of corridor. Single individuals used the SR–TR–GR route more often than expected and the SR–MENA–GR route less often than expected. In the case of interviewees who reported being married, these frequencies were the other way round. Interestingly, we did not have enough evidence to determine any association between having children and choice of migration corridor.

Taking an individual's mother tongue as an indicator of ethnic group, in the sample ( n = 1,768) there was a significant association between ethnic group and choice of corridor. Those indicating Kurdish as their mother tongue indicated having chosen the SR–TR–GR route more frequently than expected. Concerning the time period during which refugees started their journeys ( n = 3,125), the majority (67%) did so between June 2015 and February 2016. A chi-squared test of the association between timing and corridor used revealed a significant association between these variables. The adjusted residuals indicated that refugees who started their journey between January 2014 and May 2014 more often selected routes falling into the category of “other routes,” which also covered cases of return or circular migration. Interviewees who left during the period between the election in Syria and May 2015 selected the SR–MENA–GR corridor more frequently than expected. Finally, during the period between the vast influx of migrants (starting from June 2015) and the month before the signing of the EU–Turkey deal (March 2016), the SR–GR and SR–TR–GR corridors were selected more frequently than expected.

5. Conclusion: forced migration as protracted stage in the life-course

Much of the current attention in studies of refugees focuses on the dynamics of arrival and integration of refugees. Here, we have concentrated on shedding light on forced migration, not as a one-time decision, but as a process and a prolonged component of the life course and social practice of forced migrants. We have highlighted the often-unintended consequences of “temporary” escape from Syria to Turkey. In addition, we have compared the sociodemographic characteristics of those forced migrants with those of Syrian refugees who started their journey to Germany between 2014 and 2016. Based on the large dataset from the IAB-BAMF-SOEP Refugee Survey, we identified different types of corridors used by those fleeing from Syria. Based on clustering of individual migration routes into corridors of refuge, we analyzed the factors that correlate with use of these different corridors.

Concerning our guiding hypotheses, we did not have enough evidence to assert that (1) forced migrants with greater personal resources may choose a more direct route. In particular, chi-squared tests of independence could not provide us with enough information to support this hypothesis. The results of chi-squared tests of the associations between the formation of these corridors and migrants' occupational status, and between choice of corridor and social status, indicated the independence of these factors. There was a statistically significant association only in the case of one proxy variable for resources (the method of financing the escape). Concerning our hypothesis (2) that forced migrants who began their migration journey earlier may have selected a more direct route, our analyses showed that “early” forced migrants preferred to go to neighboring countries with cultural proximity. The analysis indicated that, at the earlier stages, the routes SR–Lebanon/Iraq–GR, SR–MENA–GR, and those falling under “other routes” (which also covered circular migration) were chosen more frequently than expected. Refugees might have hoped to be able to return to Syria soon. We also could not verify our hypothesis (3) that the longer a route, the more expensive it may be. The presence of the migration industry may be a determinant of the cost of travel regardless of the distance between Syria and the target destination. Hypotheses (4) to (6) related to the reasons to select Germany as a destination country. Basic descriptive analyses indicated that refugees chose their arrival countries according to their general sociocultural image. Among the group of Syrian refugees analyzed, social networks played a minor role, as well as economic or social welfare conditions. Basic statistical analyses provided information on specific variables associated with the different routes. Nonetheless, more advanced analyses, including testing of several factors ranging from the characteristics of migrants and motivations for the selection of Germany as a destination to journey-related experiences, could shed more light on the determinants of the formation of different corridors.

Our study underlines the fact that forced migration is a complex and dynamic process with moving targets from the perspective of the people concerned. There is no general pattern underlying the choice of a specific corridor of refuge; neither socio-demographic nor time-related variables explain why certain individuals take a specific route. Many of the Syrians under consideration, who arrived in Germany between 2014 and 2016, traveled via Turkey. Although cultural and linguistic proximity was greater there than in Germany, a reason for continuing onward might have been the prolonged condition for forced migrants of having the status of “tolerated guests” in Turkey, without accountable legal status and living under precarious conditions. As the most recent “Syrian Barometer” in Turkey indicated, the share of Syrian forced migrants in Turkey who were considering moving onward to other countries, mainly in the EU, increased in 2022 (Erdogan, 2022 ). Millions of Syrian citizens have already lived in Turkey for many years without sustainable conditions concerning their future status. They live in the limbo of uncertainty and lack civic rights as a specifically vulnerable group. Forced migrants in countries like Colombia and Mexico, Jordan and Pakistan, or Uganda and Sudan face similar challenges. Further research should investigate the longitudinal dimension of forced migration more deeply.

This paper adds to the debate on onward migration. Especially in terms of the dynamics of forced migration, it is crucial to understand and explain the conditions under which people tend to return to their country of origin or to move on to other countries. Based on a review of the related literature, we derived specific hypotheses concerning the factors influencing onward migration and the country or countries that forced migrants may choose. The analysis of our survey data suggested that we still do not have a consistent model for understanding and explaining agency and decision-making in the context of forced migration. Given the global situation in regard to increasing volumes and increasingly differentiated types of forced migration, much scientific work still remains to be done.

Data availability statement

Author contributions.

LP contributed to the study's conceptualization and developed the main research questions. All authors contributed to allsections in this article. All authors contributed to the article and approved the submitted version.

Acknowledgments

We appreciate the valuable comments and suggestions from the editor, reviewers, and colleagues; Sebastian Gerhartz, Tugba Adali, and Dilek Yildiz.

Funding Statement

This article was supported by a grant of the German Research Foundation (Pr 637/14-1) and Open Access Publication Funds of the Ruhr-Universität Bochum.

1 The total number of asylum applications was 2.5 million, with 2.38 million first time applications; see https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Asylum_statistics .

2 See Bourdieu ( 1986 ) for the three types of capital mentioned.

3 The dataset was collected by a consortium of three leading institutions in Germany: the DIW/Berlin [a scientific research institute that has organized the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) since 1984], the BAMF/Nürnberg (the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees), and the IAB/Nürnberg (the Institute for Employment Research of the German Federal Employment Agency); for details of the dataset, see Section 3. This paper was prepared in the context of a research project funded by the German Research Foundation, Pr 637/14-1.

4 We prefer to use the term “forced migrants” in preference to “refugees” or “asylum seekers,” as the persons we write about might have had quite mixed circumstances of escape and might live under different legal statuses.

5 Concerning the term “organized violence,” see, e.g., Carayannis ( 2003 ), Grawert ( 2008 ), Basham ( 2011 ), Basedau et al. ( 2016 ), Manrique Rueda and Tanner ( 2016 ).

6 Içduygu ( 2015 ) mentions the 1934 Settlement Law as an inital legal document on the status of forced migrants and immigrants.

7 Although the Turkish migration agency DGMM produces statistics on Syrian migrants based on its registration system, comprehensive sociodemographic data on these migrants' profiles are only provided by surveys and scientific research.

8 In the case of Syrian forced migrants in Germany, we use the term “refugee,” as almost all those who arrived in Germany applied for official asylum status.

9 Ragab et al. ( 2017 ) cite a study by Rich ( 2016 ) for these proportions. See Rich ( 2016 ).

10 For details of the survey, see: https://www.diw.de/en/diw_01.c.538695.en/projects/iab-bamf-soep_survey_of_refugees_in_germany.html and https://www.diw.de/en/diw_01.c.616027.en/quality_control_in_the_iab-bamf-soep_survey_of_refugees.html .

11 For the following data analysis, version soep.v34 was used, see: https://www.diw.de/en/diw_01.c.615977.en/soep.v34.html .

12 In the data, stays in separate countries during flight were recorded only if they were of a duration of 3 months or more. In order to identify the routes, we created a new variable representing the number of such stays before arrival in Germany. The mean number of such stays in our selected sample was 3.05. We then decided to include the first five stages of movement in our analysis. In the second phase, we generated custom tables of migratory movements for the first five stages. Next, we defined the corresponding region or specific country. Based on custom tables, we then identified 68 combinations of places as specific routes. For instance, the route Syria–Lebanon–Turkey–any EU country–Germany was used by only one migrant, but the route Syria–Turkey–EU–Germany was used by more migrants. In the last phase, we grouped these combinations of places into ten specific routes according to the number of stages of movement.

13 See, e.g., official Frontex registrations since January 2009: https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Migratory_routes/2020/Monthly/detections_of_IBC_2020_12_08.xlsx .

14 See, e.g., https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_Syrian_Civil_War .

15 Multiple responses to this question were possible. Figure 2 shows the percentage distribution of the answers, the distribution of the respondents regarding to the answers are higher due to the multiple response structure in the question. The percentages as follows: Fear of recruitment was mentioned by 46% of interviewees, while 44% mentioned persecution. Discrimination was selected by 42% of the respondents. Concerning economic reasons, personal living conditions and the economic situation in the country were mentioned by 45 and 38% of the respondents, respectively.

16 Multiple answers to this question were possible. The totals corresponded to 48, 48, and 30% of the cases, respectively.

17 These answers were provided in response to a multiple-response type question. The most frequently mentioned responses were reported by 48, 31, and 26% of migrants, respectively.

18 All percentages reported in the main text represent the share of all responses given. Due to the structure of the multiple-response question, the percentages increase when considering the share of respondents who gave a particular response. In particular, 79% of respondents mentioned respect for human rights as the reason for selecting Germany. The second most frequent answer of the German education system was given by 58 percent of interviewees. A welcoming culture and governmental/social welfare were mentioned by 55 and 38% of migrants, respectively.

19 To calculate the adjusted residuals, the difference between each observed value and the expected value in the case of no statistically significant association between the variables is first standardized and then adjusted by dividing the result by an estimate of the corresponding standard deviation. The resulting standardized residual reflects the number of standard deviations by which the value falls above or below the mean, where 0 represents the mean of the standardized residual and 1 the standard deviation. Values above 1 or below−1 reflect the weight of the differences between observed and expected values in the cell in terms of explaining the overall association between the two variables.

20 While the residuals indicate the general trend, the odds ratio describes the trend in terms of how many times more or less likely migrant in a certain group are to use one corridor as opposed to other corridors (see Agresti, 2002 , p. 81 and 82).

Conflict of interest

The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

Publisher's note

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Forced Migration In Syria Case Study - Coggle Diagram

  • How many people fail in leaving syria each year?
  • What led to forced migration in Syria?
  • why do Syrian refugee often immigrate to european countries?
  • Answer: They leave when they can stand their lives and they fell young anything else is better
  • In March 2011 violent government crackdown on public demonstrations in support of a group of teenagers. Who were arrested for anti-government graffiti in the southern town of Daraa and all of that led to what has happened today before our very eyes.
  • Answer: because they see that european countries are the safes and often has the strongest laws available.
  • The war is set in the North west province of Idlib but it has spread to almost all of syria. The war affects more than 75% of the country, the country's citizens, are migrating by water or land and almost 5.6 million of Syrian refugees are migrating to turkey, because they are one of the neighboring countries of syria.
  • The war has mainly affected the citizens of Syria by changing their point of view of life, and how their life means to them, the war has also affected a lot of countries like, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt because those are the most known countries that Syrian citizens live at.
  • when the war first started the people slowly began to immigrate, the war started because of teenagers he were torrtcher, a group of teenagers who got arrested and tortured because of painting revolutionary slogans on a school property.
  • The war kills more people everyday, about 18,000 people immigrate out of syria daily making it one of the most immigrated countries in the world, this means that 13 million people in total are forcibly displaced. usual the easiest way for the people to flee syria they usually flee to the closest country available, but some people try to flee to countries like Germany or the united kingdom because it has the best care for refugees.
  • It has affected the countries by increasing the population drastically and lowering or raising the countries GDP which could help or hinder the countries economy.
  • People Who choose to immigrate to near my countries such as turkey or Jordan, have been accepted because the country gives pity to them, so they offer them a job, and let them live in their country, temporarily or for the rest of their lives. some foundations keep them sheltered and safe if 6they have a issue, or if they bare afraid for their lives, some foundations offer emotional therapy so they an forget what has happened or to make them think of something alternative. But most of the time the immigrants work so they can help grow the countries economy. some countries give chances to less unfortunate people who migrated or immigrated to another county.
  • This war has costed the economy around $428 Billion
  • Half of the Syrian population forcefully had to leave their homes.
  • The Syrian war created the largest Refugee Displacement ever to be recorded
  • 70 % of the population lack the amount of water
  • 17% of the population lack Adequate shelter
  • 10% of the population are internally displaced in t6he country and they are living in camps
  • 13.5 million people including children do not have humanitarian protection and assistance
  • Almost 60% of syria don’t have food to eat
  • four out of five people in syria live inn poverty
  • The Syrian War has mainly affected 6.5 million people, but it affected more then 10 million people by killing relatives family members, and it has also affected a lot of soldiers who have went to war in syria it has affected a lot of chidden but scaring them for life.
  • Syrian refugees often flee to countries close to syria, like Turkey. Almost 3.6 million Syrian Citizens flee to Turkey and whenever they want to flee to European countries they often go to Germany because they offer free Public education until after collage, so that makes a very good spot for Syrian refugees to go to.
  • The country has affected a lot of its citizens by not having any food or water, not having a place to sleep, and the country is taking risks that kills their citizens everyday thus creating even more any citizens. was has happened for the passed 10 years has affected millions of peoples point of view of life and even made people dislike Arabians because what is going on here paints a different picture about Arabs, and it also endangers children and families, many people wake up and get the news that their family members had died and many people have seen their family members and friends pass away before their vary eyes, and that could lead to a lot of drama that cannot leave the human mind, it could make people afraid for their lives because of what they have seen and many people commit suicide to get away from these memories, and many people feel that the only way to forget about what has happened to them is to kill themselves.
  • but many people have different point of views about this and its mainly because some people seem to not mind about what is going on and many people make assumptions about anything they see

World News in Brief, deadliest year for migrants, Syria refugee support crisis, Shamima Begum appeal

A young Syrian refugee in Jordan studies at a UNICEF-supported centre.

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The UN migration agency (IOM) announced on Wednesday that last year was the deadliest on record for migrants worldwide.

Nearly 8,600 people on the move died in 2023 , a 20 per cent increase from 2022, according to the UN agency’s Missing Migrants Project online platform.

UNmigration

I t details the global movement of people risking their lives to escape conflict, economic crisis and natural disasters, including drought and flooding linked to climate change. IOM says the findings clearly show that there are far too few legal pathways for migrants.

Hundreds of thousands of people are continuing to embark on dangerous and illegal cross-border journeys every year

Death at sea

Data from IOM indicated that drowning accounted for slightly more than half of last year’s deaths, nine per cent involved vehicle accidents and seven per cent of fatalities were victims of violence.

The Mediterranean Sea crossing continues to be the deadliest route for migrants on record, with at least 3,129 deaths and disappearances in 2023 . This is the highest death toll recorded since 2017.

Unprecedented numbers of migrant deaths were recorded across Africa (1,866) and Asia (2,138) last year.

“In Africa, most of these deaths occurred in the Sahara Desert and the sea route to the Canary Islands,” IOM said. “In Asia, hundreds of deaths of Afghan and Rohingya refugees fleeing their countries of origin were recorded last year.”

Support for Syrian refugee dwindles, as needs grow

The world is failing Syrian refugees and the communities that are hosting them as the brutal war inside their homeland enters its 14th year, the latest UN-led regional response plan warns.

At what is a volatile moment for the entire region, with conflict raging in Gaza, the needs of refugees are growing while funding to support them and their hosts is dwindling.

According to the 2024 regional strategic overview (3RP), the main regional platform to support Syrian refugees and their host communities, the urgent needs of more than 6.1 million Syrian refugees and 6.8 million host community members are increasingly going unmet.

In 2024, 3RP partners estimate that $4.9 billion is required to respond to the priority needs of vulnerable populations and institutions affected by the Syria crisis in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Türkiye.

Headwinds multiply

But, the mounting challenges of inflation, higher food and fuel prices, currency devaluation and high unemployment – especially among women and youth – are being aggravated by the ripple effects of Gaza’s humanitarian crisis and climate change.

The 3RP has gone from being over 60 per cent funded on average, between 2015 and 2018, to just 40 per cent from 2020 to 2022. Last year, only 30 per cent of the required funds were received.

This means people are being left out than are being supported, the plan warns.

“Thirteen years on, and with no political solution on the horizon, refugees from Syria continue to be in real need of international protection and asylum ,” stressed Ayman Gharaibeh, UNHCR Regional Director for the Middle East and North Africa.

“ With funding decreasing, millions of refugees and their hosts are plunging further into poverty and are exposed to multiple protection risks”, he added.

“The international community needs to stay the course by providing the required level of support and solutions to the most vulnerable. We must avert a situation where despair settles in.”

In Jordan, reduced funding jeopardizes services for the most vulnerable. Türkiye is grappling with increased vulnerabilities due to last year’s earthquakes and financial pressures.

Underfunding would leave 450,000 refugee children and youth without education. Health gaps, especially in immunization, pose threats to refugees, while 346,000 vulnerable households would lose food assistance.

Rights experts deplore UK appeal court decision on Shamima Begum

Independent UN rights experts have expressed deep concern following the ruling late last month of the United Kingdom’s Court of Appeal in the case of Shamima Begum, who travelled to Syria aged 15 to marry an ISIL fighter.

UN_SPExperts

Ms. Begum “remains stripped of her citizenship, vulnerable and denied assistance and protection as a possible victim of trafficking ”, the Human Rights Council -appointed UN experts said.

The experts called on the UK Government to take urgent action to provide Ms. Begum with assistance and protection, including repatriation, and to review and reconsider the decision to revoke her citizenship by the then Home Secretary.

The Court of Appeal rejected all the arguments presented by Ms. Begum’s lawyers on the ground that national security concerns voiced by the government took precedence over considerations of possible trafficking. She remains a prisoner in a camp in northern Syria, is now stateless and argues that she was brainwashed by the terrorist group.

Protection obligations

“Protections owed to victims of trafficking and those at risk of trafficking, especially children, must be respected to be meaningful,” the UN experts said.

They noted the Special Immigration Appeals Commission had identified potential State failures and possible violations of the State’s corollary duty to protect and prevent serious human rights violations prior to Ms. Begum’s departure from the UK as a vulnerable child, adding that “these circumstances were never properly investigated”.

“There is a credible suspicion that Ms Begum was recruited, transferred and then harboured for the purpose of sexual exploitation,” the experts said. “Human trafficking is an international crime, a form of modern slavery.”

They said that under international, European and UK law, any supposed question of “consent or voluntariness or use of force, deception or coercion is irrelevant where the victim of trafficking is a child ”.

The experts, who do not receive a salary for their work and operate in a strictly independent capacity, said the court judgement renders Ms. Begum effectively stateless, which violates international law.

“Given the continuing serious risk of irreparable harm, we urge British authorities to take steps to ensure Ms Begum’s protection and to follow the lead of many other governments who are now repatriating women and children from northeast Syria,” the experts said.

  • World News in Brief

forced migration in syria case study

The Loss of Ecological Control, Pastoralist Migration and Indigenous Knowledge in Tanzania

  • Christopher S. Awinia Open University of Tanzania

This article is based on a study on the implications of climate change in bringing about loss of ecological control and climate induced, forced pastoralist migration from one ecosystemic basin to another. It brings out a discussion that migration between different ecosystems lead to the inevitable loss of location-specific indigenous knowledge. This in turn contributes to loss of epidemic control which lead to increased livestock and human vulnerabilities in the destination areas. The article is based on empirical evidence demonstrating that pastoralists are increasingly becoming a vulnerable population group, and internally displaced to new ecosystems as a result of migration as a coping mechanism from extreme weather variations. The study was guided by three objectives: a) to determine whether such migration trends are induced by climate change and loss of ecological control; b) to determine recent trends of pastoralist and livestock migration in Tanzania, and c) to determine the implication of pastoralist migration and loss of indigenous knowledge. The article is based on a study that interviewed 544 pastoralist households in seven districts in Tanzania. A total of 54 Focus Group Discussions and 17 Key Informant Interviews were conducted to complement the household survey. The study provided evidence derived from case-study areas in which recent climatic changes and extreme weather conditions have had accelerated loss of ecological control leading to forced out- migration, depletion of location specific indigenous knowledge and increased vulnerability to epidemics. The article concludes that loss of ecological control is closely associated with loss of epidemic control. 

Author Biography

Christopher s. awinia, open university of tanzania.

Department of Economics and Community Economic Development

How to Cite

  • Endnote/Zotero/Mendeley (RIS)

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IMAGES

  1. Cumulative flow (2011–2015) illustrating Syrian forced migration to

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  2. Forced migration in Syria’s Idlib continues

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  3. Forced Migration In Syria Case Study

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  4. Forced migration in Syria’s Idlib continues

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  5. The Syrian refugee crisis, explained in one map

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  6. Forced Migration ( Syria Case Study)

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COMMENTS

  1. The Syrian conflict: a case study of the challenges and acute need for

    The case study of the Center, which evolved from a rudimentary medical tent originally located directly in the Atimah displacement camp to the establishment of a local medical facility now serving thousands of Syrian IDPs, is just one example of several approaches aimed at alleviating the suffering of Syrian women and children who have been disproportionately victimized by this devastating ...

  2. Syrian Refugee Migration, Transitions in Migrant Statuses and Future

    See F. Düvell, "The 'Great Migration' of Summer 2015: Analysing the Assemblage of Key Drivers in Turkey", Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 45(12), 2019, 2227-2240; see F. Fakhoury, "Multi-level Governance and Migration Politics in the Arab World: the Case of Syria's Displacement", Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies ...

  3. PDF Forced Displacement and Transitional Justice in Northern Syria

    sources and on published studies and research on forced displacement in Syria as secondary data sources. I. Forced Displacement in Syria The phenomenon of forced displacement has been part of the Syrian revolution since its outbreak in March 2011, as a result of the security clampdown adopted by the Syrian government in facing the protests.

  4. Refugees, forced migration, and conflict: Introduction to the special

    While existing scholarship uncovered many important aspects of refugee migration, this literature is still relatively new. Much of the initial research has approached the multifaceted determinants and consequences of forced migration via cross-national analyses or examination of individual case studies of notable post-Cold War civil conflicts.

  5. PDF Refugees and Shifted Risk: An International Study of Syrian Forced

    item survey was administered to one hundred Syrian refugees (n=100), and covered quantifiable data including migration dates, costs and circumstances; major events en route including deporta-tions, forced returns, deceptions and forced separations; and means of finding a smuggler and eval-uations of the smuggling experience.

  6. PDF Forced Migration and Transitional Justice in Syria

    3 | Forced Migration and Transitional Justice in Syria: The Case of Idlib and Internal Displacement We left our homes in Qusayr on June 5, 2013, the day that the city fell to Hezbollah after it laid siege to us for about three months. There was intense shelling by Hezbollah forces coming from the south and from the Syrian army

  7. Syria Refugee Crisis Explained

    After over a decade of conflict, Syria remains the world's largest refugee crisis. Since 2011, more than 14 million Syrians have been forced to flee their homes in search of safety. More than 6.8 million Syrians remain internally displaced in their own country where 70 percent of the population is in need of humanitarian assistance and 90 ...

  8. PDF Protection in Europe for refugees from Syria

    The Refugee Studies Centre's (RSC) Forced Migration Policy Briefings series seeks to stimulate debates on issues of key interest to researchers, policy makers and practitioners ... 4 Case study: the UK's response to the Syrian refugee crisis 64 Conclusion 77 Tables Table 1: Refugees from Syria in neighbouring countries 15 ...

  9. Global trends in forced migration: Policy, practice and research

    Although the Syrian crisis has given an unprecedented momentum to global forced displacement issues, the current refugee crisis is not just a European or Middle Eastern concern. ... In the first case, ... Forced migration research and refugee studies primarily focus on gathering testimonials and voices of forcibly displaced persons, as well as ...

  10. Forced Migration Review Issue 57: Syrians in displacement

    Analysis in English on Syrian Arab Republic and 8 other countries about Gender and Protection and Human Rights; published on 22 Feb 2018 by Forced Migration Review

  11. Forced Migration and Protection: Turkey's Domestic Responses to the

    Forced Migration, Refugees and Protection. Conflict and subsequent forced displacement stem from myriad interconnected causes and entail multidimensional costs for source, receiving, and non-receiving countries (Gottwald Reference Gottwald, Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Loescher, Long and Sigona 2014).Forced migration 'refers to the movement of refugees and internally displaced people, as well as people ...

  12. Forced migrants and secure belonging: a case study of Syrian refugees

    In migration literature, belonging is an emerging concept in discussions of a broad range of topics including citizenship (Geddes and Favell 1999; Bloemr... Forced migrants and secure belonging: a case study of Syrian refugees resettled in the United States: Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies: Vol 48 , No 3 - Get Access

  13. Full article: Syrian refugees and other Syrian forced migrants in

    In 30 June 2021, this number was 658,000—almost without changes since the mid-2016. 1 Furthermore, more than half a million other Syrians were in Jordan as forced migrants without official refugee recognition. They often shared similar challenges as officially designated refugees. 2.

  14. Consequences of forced migration: A survey of recent findings

    Forced migration is defined as "movements of refugees and internally displaced people (those displaced by conflicts) as well as people displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine, or development projects."(International Association for the Study of Forced Migration, IASFM) 1. Introduction. At the end of 2017, more than 65 million people were displaced ...

  15. The Syrian Regime's Strategy of Forced Migration

    The Syrian regime has used forced displacement as a method to crack down on rebelled areas and to ensure the maintenance of its control since the first year of the uprising, as in the case of the Bab Amr district of Homs in February 2012. This method was accelerated and applied in several areas after the regime gained an upper hand with Russian ...

  16. International migration from Syria to Europe

    International migration from Syria to Europe. Civil war erupted in Syria in March 2011 and continues today. Millions of Syrians have fled their homes and in some cases the country to escape the war. It is estimated that 11 million people fled their homes, with 6.6 million people being internally displaced (forced to move to another area of the ...

  17. PDF Lesson seven: Force migration case study

    Forced migration case study Syria Lebanon Turkey Jordan. Much of the Middle East including Syria has been politically unstable since the so-called Arab Spring in ... Syria case study. Syria: Fact File POPULATION 24 million 17.9million (estimated) GDP 2,065 US$ LITERACY (%) 85% BIRTH RATE 24.04/1000

  18. Syrian farmers in the midst of drought and conflict: the causes

    Drought, conflict, and migration in Syria. Syria, and the larger Fertile Crescent area in the Middle East, experienced a severe drought that began in the winter of 2007/2008 and lasted three years (Eklund & Seaquist, Citation 2015; Eklund & Thompson, Citation 2017; Trigo et al., Citation 2010).The drought has been portrayed as the 'worst 3-year drought in the instrumental record' (Kelley ...

  19. The Impacts of Forced Migration on Regional Economies: The Case of

    The main objective of the study is to discuss the economic impacts of the Syrian immigrant crisis since 2011 on Southeastern Anatolia region, which is intensely populated by the migration and in ...

  20. Syrian refugees arriving in Germany: choice of corridor and individual

    The scientific literature on Syrian forced migration to Germany concentrates on the dynamics since the so-called Arab Spring in 2010. However, migration from Syria to Germany was already occurring before this point, mainly among more highly qualified Syrian elites. ... Return Aspirations and Coerced Return: A Case Study on Syrian refugees in ...

  21. Migration governance in civil war: The case of the Kurdish conflict

    Footnote 12 The case study uses a synthetic and descriptive methodological approach as a form of grounded theorising based on an integrative ... as well as its regional dimensions and its extension into northern Syria in the context of the Syrian war, forced migration has been actively used by both states and non-state actors as part of their ...

  22. 1.2.5 Case Studies: Forced Migration

    Cause of the migration. The Syrian crisis is an ongoing armed conflict (now in its 12th year -2023) between forces of the government and those opposing them. In March 2011, peaceful protests started. They were in response to widespread corruption, lack of political freedom, and high levels of unemployment. President Bashar al-Assad's ...

  23. Forced Migration In Syria Case Study

    The war is set in the North west province of Idlib but it has spread to almost all of syria. The war affects more than 75% of the country, the country's citizens, are migrating by water or land and almost 5.6 million of Syrian refugees are migrating to turkey, because they are one of the neighboring countries of syria. Who is affected by the war.

  24. World News in Brief, deadliest year for migrants, Syria refugee support

    The UN migration agency (IOM) announced on Wednesday that last year was the deadliest on record for migrants worldwide. Nearly 8,600 people on the move died in 2023, a 20 per cent increase from 2022, according to the UN agency's Missing Migrants Project online platform. It details the global ...

  25. The Loss of Ecological Control, Pastoralist Migration and Indigenous

    This article is based on a study on the implications of climate change in bringing about loss of ecological control and climate induced, forced pastoralist migration from one ecosystemic basin to another. It brings out a discussion that migration between different ecosystems lead to the inevitable loss of location-specific indigenous knowledge.