thesis and antithesis hegel

Newest Articles

Exploring Aristotle's Four Causes
Exploring Infallibility, Verifiability, and the Coherence Theory of Truth
Exploring the Nature of Art
Understanding Normative Ethics
Metaphysics
Theory of Forms
Epistemology
Materialism
Moral relativism
Utilitarianism
Virtue ethics
Normative ethics
Applied ethics
Moral Psychology
Philosophy of art
Philosophy of language
Philosophy of beauty
Nature of Art
Philosophy of Film
Philosophy of Music
Deductive reasoning
Inductive reasoning
Justification
Perception and Knowledge
Beliefs and Truth
Modern philosophy
Romanticism
Analytic philosophy
Enlightenment philosophy
Existentialism
Enlightenment
Ancient philosophy
Classical Greek philosophy
Renaissance philosophy
Medieval philosophy
Pre-Socratic philosophy
Hellenistic philosophy
Presocratic philosophy
Rationalism
Scholasticism
Jewish philosophy
Early Islamic philosophy
Reasoning and Argumentation
Seeking Justice After a Tractor-Trailer Accident: Why You Need an Experienced Lawyer
Critical Thinking
Fallacies and logical errors
Skepticism and doubt
Creative Thinking
Lateral thinking
Thought experiments
Argumentation and Logic
Syllogisms and Deductive Reasoning
Fallacies and Rebuttals
Inductive Reasoning and Analogy
Reasoning and Problem-Solving
Critical Thinking and Decision Making
Creative Thinking and Problem Solving
Analytical Thinking and Reasoning
Philosophical Writing and Analysis
Argumentative Writing and Analysis
Interpreting Philosophical Texts
Writing Essays and Articles on Philosophy
Philosophical Research Methods
Qualitative Research Methods in Philosophy
Quantitative Research Methods in Philosophy
Research Design and Methodology
Ethics and Morality
Aesthetics and Beauty
Metaphysical terms
Ontological argument
Ethical terms
Aesthetic terms
Metaphysical theories
Kant's Categorical Imperative
Aristotle's Four Causes
Plato's Theory of Forms
Hegel's Dialectic
Ethical theories
Aesthetic theories
John Dewey's aesthetic theory
Immanuel Kant's aesthetic theory
Modern philosophical texts
Foucault's The Order of Things
Descartes' Meditations
Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil
Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
Ancient philosophical texts
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason
Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics
Plato's Republic
Ancient philosophers
Modern philosophers
Modern philosophical schools
German Idealism
British Empiricism
Ancient philosophical schools
The Skeptic school
The Cynic school
The Stoic school
The Epicurean school
The Socratic school
Philosophy of Language
Semantics and Pragmatics of Language Usage
Analytic-Synthetic Distinction
Meaning of Words and Phrases
Philosophy of Science
Scientific Realism and Rationalism
Induction and the Hypothetico-Deductive Model
Theory-Ladenness and Underdetermination
Philosophy of Mind
Mind-Body Dualism and Emergentism
Materialism and Physicalism
Identity Theory and Personal Identity
Philosophy of Religion
Religious Pluralism and Exclusivism
The Problem of Evil and Suffering
Religious Experience and Faith
Metaphysical Theories
Idealism and Realism
Determinism, Fatalism, and Libertarianism
Phenomenalism and Nominalism
Epistemological Theories
Intuitionism, Skepticism, and Agnosticism
Rationalism and Empiricism
Foundationalism and Coherentism
Aesthetic Theories
Formalist Aesthetics, Emotional Aesthetics, Experiential Aesthetics
Relational Aesthetics, Sociological Aesthetics, Historical Aesthetics
Naturalistic Aesthetics, Immanent Aesthetics, Transcendental Aesthetics
Ethical Theories
Virtue Ethics, Utilitarianism, Deontology
Subjectivism, Egoism, Hedonism
Social Contract Theory, Natural Law Theory, Care Ethics
Metaphysical Terms
Cause, Necessity, Possibility, Impossibility
Identity, Persistence, Time, Space
Substance, Attribute, Essence, Accident
Logic and Argumentation Terms
Analogy, Syllogism, Deduction, Induction
Inference, Validity, Soundness, Refutation
Premise, Conclusion, Entailment, Contradiction
Epistemological Terms
Perception and Knowledge Claims
Infallibility, Verifiability, Coherence Theory of Truth
Justification, Beliefs and Truths
Ethical Terms
Modern Texts
A Vindication of the Rights of Woman by Mary Wollstonecraft
Thus Spoke Zarathustra by Friedrich Nietzsche
The Critique of Pure Reason by Immanuel Kant
Medieval Texts
The Guide for the Perplexed by Moses Maimonides
The Summa Theologiae by Thomas Aquinas
The Incoherence of the Incoherence by Averroes
Ancient Texts
The Nicomachean Ethics by Aristotle
The Art of Rhetoric by Cicero
The Republic by Plato
Hegel's Dialectic: A Comprehensive Overview
Philosophical theories

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's dialectic is one of the most influential philosophical theories of the modern era. It has been studied and debated for centuries, and its influence can be seen in many aspects of modern thought. Hegel's dialectic has been used to explain a wide range of topics from politics to art, from science to religion. In this comprehensive overview, we will explore the major tenets of Hegel's dialectic and its implications for our understanding of the world. Hegel's dialectic is based on the premise that all things have an inherent contradiction between their opposites.

It follows that any idea or concept can be understood through a synthesis of the two opposing forces. This synthesis creates a new and higher understanding, which then leads to further progress and development. Hegel's dialectic has been used in many different fields, from philosophy to economics, and it provides an important framework for understanding how our world works. In this article, we will explore the historical origins and development of Hegel's dialectic. We will also examine its application in various fields, from politics to art, from science to religion.

Finally, we will consider the implications of Hegel's dialectic for our understanding of the world today. Hegel's dialectic is a philosophical theory developed by German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel in the early 19th century. It is based on the concept of thesis, antithesis and synthesis , which are steps in the process of progress. The thesis is an idea or statement that is the starting point of an argument. The antithesis is a statement that contradicts or negates the thesis.

The synthesis is a combination of the two opposing ideas, which produces a new idea or statement. This process can be repeated multiple times, leading to an evolution of ideas. Hegel's dialectic has been used in many fields, such as politics and economics . It has been used to explain how ideas progress through debate and discussion.

In politics, it has been used to explain how different points of view can lead to compromise or resolution. In economics, it has been used to explain how different economic theories can lead to new solutions and strategies. Hegel's dialectic can also be applied to everyday life. For example, it can be used to resolve conflicts between people or groups.

Thesis, Antithesis and Synthesis

Thesis and antithesis are two conflicting ideas, while synthesis is the result of their interaction. The dialectic process is a way of understanding how the world works, as it helps to explain the constant flux of ideas and events. It also helps to explain how change and progress are possible. Thesis and antithesis can be thought of as two sides of a coin. One side represents an idea or opinion, while the other side represents its opposite.

When the two sides come together, they create a synthesis that incorporates both sides. This synthesis can then be used to create new ideas or opinions. The dialectic process can be applied in various contexts, such as politics and economics. In politics, it can be used to explain how different factions come together to create policies that are beneficial to all parties. In economics, it can be used to explain how supply and demand interact to create a stable market. Hegel's dialectic can also be used in everyday life.

Applications of Hegel's Dialectic

For example, in the political sphere, it can be used to explore how different ideologies can be reconciled or how compromises can be reached. In economics, Hegel's dialectic has been used to explain the process of economic growth and development. It can be seen as a way of understanding how different economic systems interact with each other and how different economic actors are affected by changes in the marketplace. For example, it can help to explain how different economic policies can lead to different outcomes. Hegel's dialectic has also been applied to other social sciences, such as sociology and anthropology. In particular, it has been used to explore how different social systems interact with each other and how different social groups are affected by changes in their environment.

Using Hegel's Dialectic in Everyday Life

This process can be used to explain how various aspects of life, such as career or relationships, evolve over time. Thesis represents an idea or concept, while antithesis represents the opposite of that idea or concept. Synthesis is the resolution between the two opposing forces. This process is repeated until a conclusion is reached.

For example, in a career conflict between two people, one might present an idea while the other presents the opposite idea. Through discussion and negotiation, the two parties can come to a synthesis that meets both their needs. Hegel's dialectic can also be used to resolve conflicts between groups of people. It involves each party presenting their ideas and opinions, then engaging in dialogue to reach a compromise or agreement.

This process can be applied to any area of life, from politics and economics to relationships and personal growth. It helps to create understanding and respect between different perspectives, allowing everyone to come together in a meaningful way. By understanding and applying Hegel's dialectic in everyday life, we can better navigate our relationships and interactions with others. Through dialogue, negotiation, and compromise we can work towards resolutions that benefit all parties involved.

In economics, it has been used to explain how market forces interact with each other and how different economic theories can be used to explain the same phenomenon. The dialectic has also been used in other fields such as philosophy, science, and psychology. In philosophy, it has been used to explain the relationship between theory and practice and how theories evolve over time. In science, it has been used to explain the relationship between empirical evidence and logical reasoning.

This theory can be applied to any area of life, from career to relationships. The core of Hegel's dialectic involves the concept of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, which is a way of understanding how ideas evolve over time. In this way, the dialectic helps to identify contradictions in a situation and find a resolution through synthesis. In terms of its application to everyday life, the dialectic can be used to find common ground between two opposing sides. For example, if two people are in disagreement, the dialectic can help them identify the underlying issues and then work to resolve them.

Additionally, it can help individuals and groups identify areas where they have common interests, which can lead to more productive conversations and outcomes. The dialectic is also useful in understanding how different perspectives can lead to different solutions. By recognizing different points of view, individuals and groups can gain insight into why certain solutions may not work for everyone involved. This can help to create a more productive environment for collaboration. Finally, the dialectic can be used as a tool for self-reflection. By understanding how different ideas evolve over time and how different perspectives interact, individuals can gain insight into their own views and values.

For example, it can be used to explain the development of a new policy proposal or a new form of government. In economics, Hegel's dialectic can be used to explain the dynamics of supply and demand, or the emergence of a new economic system. In addition, Hegel's dialectic has been applied in other areas, such as education and religion. In education, this theory can be used to explain the process of learning and understanding new concepts. In religion, it can be used to explain the evolution of religious beliefs and practices over time.

This is followed by a synthesis of the two, which creates a new, higher form of understanding. This new understanding then forms the basis for further analysis, which can lead to further synthesis and resolution. Hegel's dialectic can be applied to any area of life, such as career or relationships. For example, if two people have different approaches to a problem, they can use the dialectic to work together to find a solution that works for both of them.

This could involve identifying their respective points of view and then looking for common ground where they can agree. As the synthesis forms, it can provide a basis for further discussion, which may eventually lead to a resolution. The same process can be used to resolve conflicts between groups, such as political parties or countries. By recognizing each side's point of view and then looking for common ground, it is possible to find ways to bridge the divide between them.

This can help create an atmosphere of mutual understanding and respect, which can lead to constructive dialogue and positive outcomes. Hegel's dialectic is a valuable tool for helping people and groups come to agreement and harmony despite their differences. By recognizing both sides' points of view and then looking for common ground, it is possible to create a synthesis that can provide a basis for further discussion and resolution. Hegel's dialectic is a powerful philosophical tool that helps to explain how ideas evolve over time. Through the concept of thesis, antithesis and synthesis, it provides a framework for understanding how opposing forces interact and ultimately create new ideas and solutions.

This theory has been applied to many areas, such as politics and economics, and can be used in everyday life. The article has provided a comprehensive overview of Hegel's dialectic and its various applications.

Exploring Deductive Reasoning

Exploring the Philosophy of Beauty
Exploring Inference: A Philosophical Thinking Primer
Lateral Thinking: An Overview
Understanding Utilitarianism: An Overview
Exploring the Principles of Virtue Ethics
Thought Experiments: Exploring Creative and Philosophical Thinking
Exploring Skepticism and Doubt: A Philosophical and Critical Thinking Perspective
Exploring Hellenistic Philosophy: An Introduction
Exploring the Ontological Argument
Exploring Egoism: What It Is and What It Means
Altruism: Exploring the Power of Selflessness
Exploring the Ethical Theory of Utilitarianism
Exploring Plato's Theory of Forms
Exploring Virtue Ethics: The Philosophical Theory
A Comprehensive Overview of Foucault's The Order of Things
Socrates: An In-Depth Exploration of the Ancient Philosopher
Exploring Immanuel Kant's Aesthetic Theory
Descartes' Meditations: An Introduction for None
Exploring Kant's Critique of Pure Reason
Aristotle: A Comprehensive Overview
Exploring Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit
Exploring the Life and Legacy of Cicero: An Introduction
Exploring Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil
Exploring Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics
Epicurus - An Introduction to His Philosophy
Descartes: A Comprehensive Overview
Sublime: An Introduction to Aesthetic and Philosophical Terms
Exploring Plato's Republic
Exploring Pragmatism: A Modern Philosophical School
Exploring Humanism: A Comprehensive Overview
Exploring the Life and Works of David Hume
Exploring the Skeptic School of Ancient Philosophy
The Cynic School: An In-depth Look
The Stoic School: An Overview
German Idealism: A Comprehensive Overview
Analytic Philosophy: A Primer
Exploring the Socratic School: An Overview

A Comprehensive Overview of Presocratic Philosophy

Exploring the Philosophy of Immanuel Kant
Exploring British Empiricism
Justification: A Comprehensive Overview
Exploring Beliefs and Truth: A Philosophical Guide
Exploring Syllogisms and Deductive Reasoning

Exploring Cosmology: What We Know and What We Don't

Understanding Fallacies and Rebuttals
Exploring Critical Thinking and Decision Making
Exploring Theology: A Comprehensive Overview
Philosophy of Film: Exploring Aesthetics and Types of Philosophy
Philosophy of Music: Exploring the Aesthetics of Sound
Exploring the Semantics and Pragmatics of Language Usage
Materialism and Physicalism: Exploring the Philosophical Concepts
Exploring Identity Theory and Personal Identity
Exploring Quantitative Research Methods in Philosophy
The Problem of Evil and Suffering: A Philosophical Exploration
Exploring Theory-Ladenness and Underdetermination
Exploring the Interplay between Religious Experience and Faith
Exploring the Concepts of Cause, Necessity, Possibility, and Impossibility
Intuitionism, Skepticism, and Agnosticism: A Comprehensive Overview
Perception and Knowledge Claims: Understanding Epistemological Terms
Exploring Naturalistic, Immanent and Transcendental Aesthetics
Exploring Rationalism and Empiricism
Exploring Identity, Persistence, Time, and Space
Understanding Virtue Ethics, Utilitarianism and Deontology
Exploring Phenomenalism and Nominalism
Exploring Subjectivism, Egoism, and Hedonism
Understanding Social Contract Theory, Natural Law Theory, and Care Ethics
Exploring Mary Wollstonecraft's A Vindication of the Rights of Woman
Exploring Subjectivism, Egoism and Hedonism
The Art of Rhetoric by Cicero: A Comprehensive Overview
The Critique of Pure Reason by Immanuel Kant: A Comprehensive Overview
Exploring 'The Summa Theologiae' by Thomas Aquinas

New Articles

Which cookies do you want to accept?

Corrections

What Is Hegel’s Dialectic Method?

A brief presentation of Hegel’s metaphysical doctrine, while exploring his conception of logic and dialectic method.

When considering Hegel’s contribution to logic, nothing is more significant than his dialectic method. The method is prevalent in almost all of his works, the most notable being Logic , Philosophy of History , and Phenomenology of Spirit . He describes it as “the only true method” and the basic principle of all his theories. Thanks to his dialectics, we get the peculiar kind of philosophy that he comes up with. But what does the dialectic method consist of? And, more importantly, how did it shape his philosophy?

Hegel’s Conception of Logic

First, let’s look at Hegel’s conception of logic to understand his dialectic method in its entirety. In the introduction to his Science of Logic , Hegel tells us that the goal of logic is truth. However, he is not referring to the traditional understanding of logic, analyzing the statement purely by its form and not diving into the content of it. Because, after all, the content can be anything. Logic usually studies forms of argument such as follows:

Everything that is A is B

Therefore, x is B

Get the latest articles delivered to your inbox

Please check your inbox to activate your subscription.

Here, we have a form without content. We could write ‘human’, ‘mortal’, and ‘Socrates’ for A, B, or x. The argument would be valid in either case but not necessarily true. That’s why logicians conclude that logic tells us nothing about the actual world. Hegel takes this stance as well. And when he says that the goal of logic is truth, he is certainly not referring to the formal logic we mentioned here but to something else. Logic, he says, is the study of thought. But in his Phenomenology of Spirit, he shows that there is no objective reality independent of thought. Thought is objective reality, and objective reality is thought. Therefore, when logic studies thought, it must also be studying reality.

So, in saying that logic is not about the world of nature, Hegel accepts part of the traditional view. However, he goes further with the idea that reality, or truth, can be found only in the world of nature and people. Ultimate reality is to be found in what is mental or intellectual, not in what is material. It is to be found in rational thought. Logic is the study of this ultimate reality in its pure form, abstracted from the particular forms it takes in the finite minds of human beings or the natural world.

The Dialectic Method

Now, let’s see the connection between logic and the dialectic method to determine precisely what the method consists of. Hegel describes the dialectic method as “the only true method” of scholarly and scientific exposition. He uses this method in Logic to uncover the form of pure thought.

Let’s explain his dialectic with an example from his Philosophy of History . Here, Hegel tells us that one immense dialectical movement has dominated world history from the Greek world to the present. Greece was a society based on customary morality, a harmonious society in which citizens identified themselves with the community and had no thought of acting in opposition. This customary community forms the starting point of the dialectical movement known as the thesis .

The next stage is for the thesis to show itself to be inadequate or inconsistent. In ancient Greece, this inadequacy is revealed through the life and death of Socrates. Socrates was the one who initiated the citizens of the community to think for themselves, and thus, intellectual thought was born. As a result, the community based on custom collapsed in the name of the principle of independent thought. This reformation brings acceptance of the supreme right of individual conscience. The harmony of the Greek community has been lost, but freedom is triumphant. This is the second stage of the dialectical movement. It is the opposite or negation of the first stage, known as antithesis .

The second stage then also shows itself to be inadequate. Freedom, taken by itself, turns out to be too abstract and barren to serve as the basis of society. When put into practice, the principle of absolute freedom turns into the terror of the French Revolution . We can then see that individuals’ customary harmony and abstract freedom are one-sided. They must be brought together and unified in a manner that preserves them and avoids their different forms of one-sidedness. This results in a third and more adequate stage, the synthesis .

In the Philosophy of History, the synthesis in the overall dialectic movement is the German society of Hegel’s time. He saw it as harmonious because it was an organic community yet preserved individual freedom because it was rationally organized. To summarize, every dialectical movement takes the following path:

thesis – antithesis – synthesis

Every dialectical movement terminates with a synthesis, but not every synthesis stops the dialectic process. The synthesis, though adequately reconciling the previous thesis and antithesis, will be one-sided in some other aspect. It will then serve as the thesis for a new dialectical movement, so the process will continue.

In Logic, the same method is applied to the abstract categories in which we think. Hegel starts with the most indeterminate concept: being, or bare existence. Pure being, he says, is pure indeterminateness. Pure being has in it no object for thought to grasp. It is entirely empty. In fact, it is nothing. From this beginning, the dialectic of his Logic moves forward. The first thesis, being , has turned into its antithesis, nothing . Being and nothing are opposite and the same – their truth, therefore, is that movement into and apart from each other. In other words, it is becoming . So, the dialectic leads on and on (Peter Singer, Hegel: A Very Short Introduction, 103).

For Hegel, dialectics is a method of exposition, and it works because the world works dialectically.

The Absolute Idea

The dialectic method has its end in the absolute idea. It is the ending point for the method – from the thesis to the antithesis, then with the synthesis, we try to overcome the one-sidedness until we reach “the absolute idea.”

It seems as though the Logic parallels the Phenomenology of Spirit , except that it moves in the realm of concepts instead of in the realm of consciousness. Accordingly, it has as its goal not absolute knowledge but the absolute idea itself. But what is the absolute idea? Well, it is everything. Although that may seem like we’re explaining too much with just one word, it literally means everything. Hegel says that the absolute idea “contains every determinate-ness.” By that, he means that it includes within itself every determinate or distinct thing – every human being, every tree, every star, every flower, every grain of sand. Nature and mind, he says, are different ways in which their existence is manifested – they are different forms of the absolute idea.

It is the essence of the absolute idea to manifest itself in distinct, limited forms and then return to itself. Self-comprehension is the form in which it returns to itself. This is the process we observed in his Logic , Philosophy of History, and the Phenomenology of Spirit .

The End of Transcendental Idealism

Hegel’s dialectic approach, known as Absolute Idealism or Absolute Spirit, can be seen as a response to Kant’s dualism between the noumenal and phenomenal realms. Hegel rejected the notion of a fixed and unknowable realm of things-in-themselves and instead proposed that reality is fundamentally a dynamic and interconnected process.

According to Hegel, reality unfolds through a dialectical process of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. He argued that the development of consciousness and knowledge occurs through the clash and reconciliation of opposing concepts or categories. Hegel believed that an inherent impulse toward self-realization and self-understanding drives the movement of thought, history, and spirit.

In Hegel’s view, the Absolute Spirit is the ultimate reality that encompasses and transcends all particular manifestations of thought and existence. It is a dynamic and evolving process that includes reality’s subjective and objective dimensions. By embracing the dialectical method and expanding the scope of inquiry beyond the limits of Kant’s dualism, Hegel aimed to reconcile the subjective and objective aspects of reality and provide a comprehensive account of knowledge and existence. In this sense, he transcends Kant’s transcendental idealism by presenting a more expansive and holistic understanding of reality.

What is Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Political Philosophy?

By Antonio Panovski BA Philosophy Antonio holds a BA in Philosophy from SS. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje, North Macedonia. His main areas of interest are contemporary, as well as analytic philosophy, with a special focus on the epistemological aspect of them, although he’s currently thoroughly examining the philosophy of science. Besides writing, he loves cinema, music, and traveling.

Frequently Read Together

Where Was Ancient Greece Located?

What Were the City States of Ancient Greece?

The French Revolution in 5 Iconic Paintings

Hegel-by-HyperText Resources

Excerpt from Hegel for Beginners

Source : Hegel for Beginners , by Llyod Spencer and Andrzej Krauze, Published by Icon Books, 14 of 175 pages reproduced here, minus the abundant illustrations.

"Classical reasoning assumes the principle of logical identity: A = A or A is not non-A".

"But in writing that book I became aware of employing a new and unprecedented way of thinking".

Dialectical Thinking

Aufhebung or sublation, a grammar of thinking.

"I liken my study of logic to the study of grammar. You only really see the rewards when you later come to observe language in use and you grasp what it is that makes the language of poetry so evocative".

Three Kinds of Contradiction

The three divisions of the Science of Logic involve three different kinds of contradiction. In the first division Being the opposed pair of concepts at first seem flatly opposed, as if they would have nothing at all to do with one another: Being Nothing / Quantity Quality. Only be means of analysis or deduction can they be shown to be intimately interrelated.
In the second division Essence the opposed pairs immediately imply one another. The Inner and the Outer, for example: to define one is at the same time to define the other.
In the third division the Concept [ Notion ] we reach an altogether more sophisticated level of contradiction. Here we have concepts such as identity whose component parts, Universality and Particularity, are conceptually interrelated.

Triadic Structure

The analytic logic of understanding which focuses the data of sense-experience to yield knowledge of the natural phenomenal world.
The dialectical logic of understanding which operates independently of sense-experience and erroneously professes to give knowledge of the transcendent noumena ("things in themselves" or also the "infinite" or the "whole")
Analytic understanding is only adequate for natural science and practical everyday life, not for philosophy.
Dialectic reason s not concerned with Kant's "transcendent", nor with the abstract "mutilated" parts of reality, but with reality as a totality , and therefore gives true knowledge.

What is Knowing?

"the whole of philosophy resembles a circle of circles".

Further Reading: Introduction to Shorter Logic | Meaning of Hegel's Logic

— Hegel-by-HyperText Home Page @ marxists.org —

Your complimentary articles

You’ve read one of your four complimentary articles for this month.

You can read four articles free per month. To have complete access to the thousands of philosophy articles on this site, please

Hegel & History

Hegel’s understanding of history, jack fox-williams outlines the basics of how history works for hegel..

One of Hegel’s most interesting but misunderstood areas of enquiry concerns history, particularly his so-called ‘dialectical’ approach to understanding the development of human society. This article aims to provide a brief but useful outline of Hegel’s historical theory, and demonstrate its relevance to the modern age.

Hegel’s Classification of History

In his Introduction to Lectures on the Philosophy of World History (1837), Hegel argues that there are three ways of doing history.

The first of these is original history. Original history refers to first-hand accounts of events, actions and situations, collected or verified by the historian himself. It includes the historian’s own experiences as part of the history he’s recording. Hegel says that the purpose of original history is to create a ‘mental representation’ of phenomena. Contemporary historians aim to record recent and current events with precision and accuracy, explaining and summarising it simply.

However, as Duncan Forbes writes in his introduction to the Introduction , “the first, most primitive (that is logically primitive) kind of history, ‘original’ history, is barely history at all in so far as it represents an immediate unity between the historian’s consciousness; this sort of contemporary history is necessarily limited.” Forbes argues that it is impossible for the original historian to provide much theory on, or even reflect very comprehensively on, events he has only just witnessed. As Hegel notes, original history constitutes a ‘portrait of a time’ rather than an academic analysis of past events. Hegel cites Thucydides and Herodotus as prime examples of original historians, since their accounts constitute a “history whose spirit the historian has shared in.” Consequently, their accounts express “the maxims of their nation and their own personality, their consciousness of their political position and of their moral spiritual nature, and the principles which underlie their designs and conflict.” So by examining this sort of history, we can acquire a greater understanding of a culture’s customs, beliefs, and practices, and so penetrate into the essence of a specific period. Speeches recorded in historical accounts are uniquely valuable in this regard, since they embody a particular time and place; they constitute ‘effective actions in their very essence’, and provide us with a sense of history as it unfolded at the time. They cannot be regarded as disinterested reflections on the historical process, but as ‘integral components of history’ recorded by historians who embody the cultural consciousness of the speaker. As Hegel observes in his Introduction , “speeches are actions among human beings; indeed, they are extremely important momentous actions… Speeches on a national or international plane, issuing from nations themselves or from their sovereigns, are actions and, as such, are an essential object of history (and particularly of earlier history).”

According to Hegel, it is possible to distinguish three stages of original history. In antiquity, it was primarily statesmen (or their scribes) who recorded history. During the Middle Ages, monks assumed the role, since they had the time and education to record the world around them. Hegel observes that in his own time “all this has changed… Our culture immediately converts all events into reports for intellectual representation.”

A second type of history discussed by Hegel is reflective history . Unlike original history, reflective history is not limited to a particular timeframe. It transcends the present culture. It attempts to provide a summary of histories or historical events that have already occurred – in other words, records of a particular culture, country, or period.

Hegel separates reflective history into universal history, pragmatic history, critical history, and specialised history. Universal history aims to provide an entire history of, say, a people, or even of the world. In the case of world histories, significant events must be condensed into brief statements, and the author’s own opinions are integral to the account. Pragmatic history, on the other hand, has a theory or ideology behind it; events are “connected into one pattern in their universal and inner meaning.” The pragmatic account also has more to do with reflections on the historical process, and is not merely about reporting what occurred during a specific period.

Critical reflective history is based on research into the accuracy of historical accounts, and presents alternative explanations and narratives. Hegel is himself critical of this particular type of history, which apparently ‘extorts’ new discourse from existing accounts. He believes that this is a crude and futile way to achieve ‘reality’, that is, understanding, in history, since it replaces facts with subjective impressions and call these impressions reality.

The last type of reflective history that Hegel mentions is ‘specialised history’. Specialised history focuses on a specific historical topic, such as the history of art, law, or religion.

History & Reason

Hegel’s third way of doing history, philosophical history , prioritises thought above event-commentary, synthesising philosophical concepts and ideas with historical information. Hegel himself is doing this kind of activity when he famously argues that the process of human history is a process of self-recognition guided by ‘the principle of reason’.

For Hegel, nature is the embodiment of reason. In the same way that nature strives towards increasing complexity and harmony, so does the world spirit through the historical process. The Presocratic philosopher Anaxagoras (c.500-428 BC) was the first person to argue that nous (meaning reason, or maybe understanding in general) ultimately governs the world – not as an intelligence, but like a fundamental essence of being. Hegel stresses the importance of this distinction, using the solar system as an example. He writes:

“The motion of the solar system proceeds according to immutable laws; these laws are its reason. But neither the sun nor the planets which according to these laws rotate around it, have any consciousness of it. Thus, the thought that there is reason in nature, that nature is ruled by universal, unchangeable laws, does not surprise us; we are used to it and make very little of it…” ( Reason in History ).

Moreover, Hegel argues that evidence of reason is revealed through religious truth, which demonstrates that the world is governed not by chance but by a Providence. During profound moments of spiritual epiphany, we come to the realisation that a divine order presides over the world. Providence is wisdom endowed with an infinite power, which realises its own purpose, that is, the absolute, rational, final purpose of the world; reason is “thought determining itself in absolute freedom.” Hegel suggests that many stages of human history appear irrational and regressive because society is made up of individuals guided by passions, impulses and external forces. However, behind the seeming irregularity of human history lies a divine plan that is hidden from view and yet actualises itself through the historical process. As a result of the many conflicts, revolutions and revolts that society endures, humanity attains a greater glimpse of reason.

Hegel goes even further in the development of his argument and suggests that the realisation of reason in history also serves as a justification for belief in God. He acknowledges that history reveals the cruelty and sadism of human nature, but urges “recognition of the positive elements in which the negative element disappears as something subordinate and vanquished.” Through the consciousness of reason, we recognise that the ultimate purpose of the world is incrementally actualised through those occasional historical events which bring about positive transformation and change. In this sense, Hegel presents a highly progressive view of history, perceiving the development of human society as a dynamic process by which our rational faculties become ever more refined and cultivated. Although, there is evil in the world, reason ultimately triumphs.

History as a Manifestation of Spirit

Hegel’s providence is not the providence of the Judeo-Christian God. Rather, Hegel argues that universal history is itself the divine Spirit or Geist manifesting or working.

Hegel claims that “all will readily assent to the doctrine that Spirit, among other properties, is endowed with Freedom… Freedom is the soul truth of Spirit” ( Introduction ). For Hegel, history unfolds as the self-actualisation of Spirit, eventually resolving itself into the manifestation of true human liberty through the freest form of government. He further argues that self-consciousness is synonymous with the freedom of Spirit – freedom is self-consciousness – since self-consciousness depends on its own being to come into actuality, so must create itself in absolute freedom. And in regards to history, Hegel argues that universal history is the ultimate exhibition of Spirit “in the process of working out the knowledge of that which it is potentially” ( Introduction ). And that which it potentially is, in essence, is freedom. This is why the culmination of the process of history which is the Spirit’s developing knowledge of itself is a knowledge of absolute freedom, through the freest possible political state.

Hegel uses historical examples to demonstrate the process by which the freedom of Spirit becomes actualised through human history. First, he asserts that the origin of the state is not through a ‘social contract’ freely entered into by people, as philosophers such as Hobbes had argued. Rather, to be human means to inhabit a society with other human beings, following basic codes, laws, rules and norms. In other words, it is impossible that humanity existed in a pre-political condition, because politics is a fundamental part of our nature.

According to Hegel’s understanding, politics passes through three stages: from that of the family (or tribe) to civil society, to the state. The state is the ultimate manifestation of Spirit since its development marks an increasing human autonomy. As Hegel writes, “the freedom of nature… is not anything real; for the state is the first realisation of freedom” ( Introduction ). This is due to the fact that members of a state give up their individualism to support the freedom of the community as a whole, and for Hegel, true freedom is communal. We might explain this by saying that without the state, the rights of the individual would become paramount, compromising the greater good of humanity, and so the greater freedom of the Spirit.

Hegel states that original historical cultures, which he calls ‘Oriental’ cultures, including for instance ancient Persia and China, did not attain knowledge of Spirit since they believed that man is not ultimately free. He thought that the Oriental mind-set was instead towards tyranny: to think that people should be governed by a divine ruler or absolute king. This is freedom for only one person: the ruler! The Greeks were aware of freedom, and rejected tyranny for democracy, which is political freedom for the voting set. Their freedom was maintained under conditions of slavery – a fact that made “liberty on the one hand only an accidental, transient and limited growth; on the other hand, it constituted a rigorous thraldom of our common nature of the Human.” So according to Hegel, the German nations, under the influence of Christianity, were the first to come to the realisation that man possesses free will. And even while slavery still occurred under Christianity and subsequent political systems, the notion of individual freedom has become central to states, governments, and constitutions, first in the West, then elsewhere.

Hegel’s Dialectic

For Hegel, historical development proceeds not in a straight line “but in a spiral and leading upwards to growth and progress. This is where action follows reaction; from the opposition of action and reaction a harmony or synthesis results” (‘The Individual, The State and Political Freedom in Hegel’, Uchenna Osigwe, 2014). Whereas many other political thinkers have postulated that political history goes through absolute monarchy to despotism to democracy, Hegel believed that it goes from despotism to democracy, to constitutional monarchy, which combines the features of both despotism and democracy while transcending both. So Hegel uses a ‘dialectical’ approach to examine the course of human history. The dialectic is frequently described in terms of a thesis giving rise to its reaction, an antithesis , which contradicts or negates the thesis; and then the tension between the two is resolved by means of a synthesis of them. Then the synthesis becomes the new thesis… However, Hegel never used this specific terminology (which was originally ascribed to Kant).

The notion that history follows a dialectical pattern can be observed in a more modern context. Communist (socialist) ideologies were a reaction against capitalism, but failed to create sustainable social, political and economic systems, and resulted in the deaths of millions of people around the world. But after the end of the two World Wars, European nations adopted the liberal democratic system – a synthesis of socialism and capitalism. While the state is charged with the responsibility of governing certain aspects of society, such as the law or the military, and other key services, it also promotes business and free-trade. In terms of Hegel’s dialectic, the contradiction of views between socialism and capitalism resulted in a liberal democratic synthesis.

Francis Fukuyama, in his 1992 book The End of History and the Last Man famously argued for the Hegelian concept of the end of History. According to Fukuyama, history has already reached its final stage, in which dialectical ideological conflict is finally eradicated and replaced by a single, universal ideology. Thus, when Communist regimes collapsed across Eastern Europe and those countries looked towards the West, this demonstrated the victory of liberalism.

European countries have not engaged in any major conflict with each other since the Second World War, and Europe has since flourished under the principles of liberal democracy, socially, economically and politically. In this sense, Hegel’s vision of history as a progressive development of political freedom is partially supported by recent historical events.

Jack Fox-Williams graduated from Goldsmiths University with a BA (Hons) in History and History of Ideas, then took a Masters in Law at the Open University. He is currently a doctoral student at the University of Portsmouth and is writing a book on the works of Nietzsche.

Bibliography

Academic tools.

Friends PDF Preview
Author and Citation Info
Back to Top

Hegel’s Social and Political Philosophy

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) developed a philosophy based on freedom within a wider philosophical system offering novel views on topics ranging from property and punishment to morality and the state.

Hegel’s main work was the Elements of the Philosophy of Right (“ PR ”) first published in 1821. Many of his other major works include discussions or analyses connected to his social and political philosophy. He also wrote various political essays during his career, many of which have been translated (Hegel 1999). His work has been a major influence on significant figures from Karl Marx to Charles Taylor and beyond.

This entry provides an overview about how Hegel’s ideas have been debated and the core contributions from his PR followed by further readings.

1.1 Conservativism and Progressive Readings

1.2 metaphysical and non-metaphysical readings, 1.3 systematic and non-systematic readings, 1.4 the philosophy of right, 2. freedom and right, 3. property, 4. punishment, 5. morality, 6. ethical life, 8. civil society, 10. the state, 11. war and international relations, primary literature, secondary literature, other internet resources, related entries, 1. the place of hegel’s social and political thought.

Hegel’s social and political thought has been a subject of several debates in terms of its form and content.

One such debate concerned whether or not his views endorsed a dangerous conservativism, sometimes described as quietest or reactionary. His double-saying ( Doppelsatz ) in the Preface to the Philosophy of Right that “the rational is actual and actual is rational” was read by some as saying that the absolutist Prussia that Hegel lived under was somehow rational and so justified (Haym 1857). Yet, the more detailed comments found in the main body of the Philosophy of Right consistently favour the aims of the Prussian Reform era which were opposed by the newly ascendant reactionaries after 1819 making it difficult to situate this work politically at that time.

This position was taken even further to some extremes by Karl Popper (1966) who claimed that Hegel was “the father of modern historicism and totalitarianism.” This view looked selectively at different remarks we can find in the PR about how the state is “the march of God in the world” found not in Hegel’s own text, but in the published lecture note “Additions” (or Zusätze) by his students included in most editions of the PR today (§258 Addition). Moreover, it was motivated by a philosophical and political stance that had little, if anything, to do with what is actually found in Hegel’s work.

This “conservative” reading of Hegel was challenged later by a more “liberal” interpretation that highlighted the reforms and divergences both cultural and political between Prussia and the PR that make clear that Hegel did not support an authoritarian government, but a new form of democratic institutions complete with jury trials that was more progressive (Avineri 1972, Knox 1970). Hegel held a lifelong admiration for the French Revolution toasting the fall of the Bastille throughout his adult life.

Today, most commentators agree that Popper and others were wrong to claim Hegel endorsed some view of authoritarianism. At the same time, Hegel’s social and political philosophy is more ideologically moderate than the conservativism versus progressivism debate had often admitted. While he did advocate for more democratic and progressive elements than a reality at his time, Hegel did also defend the traditional family and constitutional monarchy. Perhaps purposefully, Hegel’s thought is notoriously difficult to categorize given his interest to overcome and transform ordinary distinctions with a virtual consensus today that his work resists tidy classification as conservative, progressive or anything else.

A second long-standing debate among Anglo-American commentators has concerned the relation of Hegel’s social and political thought to his logic and wider philosophical system. For many decades, the non-metaphysical reading has been the dominant approach. The central position was summed up by Z. A. Pelczynski (1964: 136–37) who said: “Hegel’s political thought can be read, understood, and appreciated without having to come to terms with his metaphysics … some intellectual curiosity may be unsatisfied when metaphysics is left out; a solid volume of political theory and political thinking will still remain.” The non-metaphysical reading follows a broadly analytic philosophical post-Kantian interpretation which sees Hegel as accepting, and even extending, Kant’s critical philosophy (Neuhouser 2000, Pinkard 1994, Pippin 2012). This work is notable for typical focusing attention on the PR grasping it philosophically separately from other parts of Hegel’s system which are sometimes deemed to be overly dark with avoidable metaphysical commitments (Knowles 2002, Wood 1990).

In contrast, the metaphysical reading counters that anti-metaphysical interpretations take a one-sided approach to Hegel’s work (Beiser 2005, Rosen 1984, Taylor 1975). Hegel conceived his PR to be a part of a wider system. Isolating any one text from its wider context may appear to inoculate any such reading from metaphysical claims elsewhere in Hegel’s system. However, only a reading that grasps the full metaphysical foundations of his thought will do justice to his self-understanding (Houlgate 2005).

More recently, scholars have focused on a core contention between metaphysical and non-metaphysical readings about what relation, if any, Hegel’s PR has to his wider philosophical system. Most non-metaphysical readings interpret the PR independently of Hegel’s system whereas all metaphysical readings attempt to situate the PR within Hegel’s system. Viewing the debate from this perspective, the core contention is not about the place of metaphysics but the interpretive place of any work within the system.

A non-systematic reading interprets Hegel’s PR explicitly separately from his wider system. This view has few adherents. It runs clearly against Hegel’s own self-understanding stated in the PR ’s Preface where he says the PR “is a more extensive, and in particular a more systematic, exposition of the same basic concepts which, in relation to this part of philosophy, are already contained in a previous work designed to accompany my lectures, namely my Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences ” ( PR , p. 9). The PR is explicit that it serves as an elaboration of the section “Objective Spirit” within his philosophical system, and so a part of it.

The now orthodox view is the systematic reading which accepts that Hegel’s logic and system have explanatory force in interpreting the PR (Brooks 2013). There is no denying their connection, only its character and strength. There remain differences about how much the system does or should figure as well as related metaphysical issues (Wood 2017). For example, there is a consensus that Hegel’s political philosophy should be understood within its systematic context, but there remains disagreement about whether we need to accept his arguments for the wider philosophical system in order to accept his contributions to political philosophy. This entry will broadly follow the dominant systematic reading, but acknowledges there is not a consensus on how strongly a justificatory role the system plays for his political thought.

Hegel’s main work of social and political thought was the PR . It was published in 1821 when Hegel taught in Berlin. This entry surveys his primary contributions in this work, but with reference to his other texts and political writings.

Hegel says the PR “is a more extensive” exposition of “Objective Spirit,” a section within his philosophical system called his Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (see PM ). The relevant sections of the Encyclopaedia were intended to accompany the lectures that became published as the Philosophy of Right . The full Encyclopaedia begins with an examination of logic and then applies itself to an understanding of nature and the human spirit, where the latter incorporates analyses of psychology, art, history, religion and philosophy in addition to social and political thought.

His approach to form and content is unique. The PR is mostly divided into numbered sections (§). These are occasionally supplemented by later Remarks (R) where Hegel elaborated further in a later edition or Additions (A) which took the form of edited lecture notes of what Hegel had said by his students when teaching the PR . Hegel argues his positions in a dialectical way that is not linear and designed to show how seemingly different perspectives can have their opposition somehow dissolve within a new and higher perspective.

For example, our first apperception of some thing or object of thought might be as a pure being. As it is pure, it may appear to lack determinations – and so be nothing. In this way, Hegel holds that our thought has moved from pure being to pure nothingness. But yet what we apperceive is a something and so this is seen as helping overcome the false opposition of pure being and nothingness to a new, higher category of becoming as what is before is taking further shape as we sharpen our grasp of it. This dialectical method is infused throughout the PR and Hegel says he has “presupposed a familiarity” with his approach found in his logic and wider system ( PR , p. 10, see SL , EL ).

Similarly, the PR moves from basic building blocks that have a somewhat “pure” nature not yet grounded in reality to their negation and then brought together in a higher, concrete reality. After an introduction establishing the PR as primarily a work concerned with freedom, the PR is divided into three parts. The first pure part is Abstract Right covering property and punishment followed by an opposite in Morality covering issues of conscience and moral responsibility. They become unified in a final part Ethical Life providing a more concrete reality that examines the family, civil society, law, the state and ending with war and international relations. Each part shall be discussed in turn.

Hegel conceives the PR primarily as a philosophy of freedom. This is made clear in the PR ’s Introduction, which starts by declaring that “the subject-matter of the philosophical science of right is the Idea of right – the concept of right [ Recht ] and its actualization” ( PR §1). The PR ’s aim to provide a philosophical account of “right” and its realization in the world.

Hegel admits the existence of right is presupposed from his philosophical system, of which the PR elaborates one part ( PR §2). The PR ’s Introduction proceeds to summarise the dialectical argument for the free will discussed at greater length elsewhere in Hegel’s philosophical system. Our will “determines itself” ( PR §4 Addition). The challenge is determining whether or not its content is a product of freedom or mere arbitrariness. We must be able to discern the bare pursuit of being a slave to our passions like, for Hegel, the animal world from the rational world of human beings. Hegel sees the PR as an examination into how “the free will which wills the free will” can be known in form and content ( PR §27).

Hegel defines “right” [ Recht ] as the existence of the free will in the world ( PR §29). So a philosophy of right is necessarily a philosophy of freedom that seeks to comprehend freedom actualized in how we relate to each other and construct social and political institutions.

Following his dialectical method, Hegel approaches the development of our comprehension of right through these stages: Abstract Right, Morality and Ethical Life. We progress from one stage to the next in a distinctive way where apparent contradictions arising in each stage are dissolved through attaining a higher stage, where this cycle is repeated and progress made since the beginning remains present where what was abstract and opaque at first becomes more concrete as we advance to the end of this work. This multi-layered, dialectical nature of Hegel’s argument does give his philosophical work an added complexity, but also a richness that close study rewards – while this entry only focuses on the broad outlines of his arguments.

The first substantive stage is Abstract Right. Somewhat misleading its sections are entitled “Property,” “Contract” and “Wrong” giving the false impression that Hegel is discussing actual possession of property, its sale or punishment for breach of contract. Typically for Hegel, he uses common terminology in uncommon ways.

We must recall the main aim of Hegel’s project is to understand how the free will wills the free will, and not mere arbitrariness. This requires Hegel to find some ground for helping decide when the free will wills freely, versus when it does not. Hegel first turns to taking possession of property. It is noticeable that Hegel’s account is aimed at using property possession as a first step towards finding this ground rather than for building an economic system. For example, Hegel says that “what and how much I possess is…purely contingent as far as right is concerned” ( PR §49). This is because Hegel does not intend to develop a full theory of property yet, but rather to locate a ground for the free will’s freedom.

The importance of property at this stage is its development of our self-consciousness (Benhabib 1984). For Hegel, I give my free will an external existence that others can engage with. My ownership of property is not determined by me alone, but something determined “within the context of a common will” shared between two persons ( PR §71).

Hegel calls the mutual recognition between two persons about property ownership a “contract” ( PR §71–75). This is no ordinary contract. The context in Abstract Right is a hypothetical space of two persons. There is no money or sale of goods. The “contract” is not a written agreement. All common terminology, but given different usages.

The key point, for Hegel, is that only the free will of an individual can ground the free will of another (Stillman 1980). Something is mine when mutually recognized as my possession by another. This is the first appearance of right where the activity of my free will in taking possession is free, and not mere arbitrariness. It is this agreement between two individuals forming a kind of contract which is so important for Hegel. This is because mutual recognition becomes a vehicle for how we can develop further a more concrete understanding of freedom as right in the world. If such recognition was under threat, this would unsettle how we can ground our free will in a free will of another.

This failure of mutual recognition is taken up next at the end of Abstract Right in a section entitled “Wrong” [ Unrecht ]. This section has been widely interpreted by many scholars to offer a clear retributivist theory of crime and punishment (Cooper 1971, Primoratz 1989). At first glance, it is easy to see why.

Hegel distinguishes three kinds of wrongs. The first is unintentional ( PR §84–86). This is where both individuals are adhering to what they believe has been mutually recognized, but one is unwittingly incorrect. This kind of wrong is thought to be unpunishable – and the reason is because both sides see “the recognition of right as the universal and deciding factor” ( PR §85). One side is in error, but there is a strict appeal to the proper recognition of right.

The second kind of wrong is deception ( PR §87–89). This is more serious than unintentional wrongs because while both parties claim to each other that they appeal to right, one side does so insincerely. Thus deception has a different and more serious character than unintentional wrongs.

The third and final kind of wrong is described as “crime” ( PR §90). This is where one party makes no appeal at all to right. The wrong [ Unrecht ] that they seek is to deny an appeal to right. This is a direct and tangible threat to mutual recognition as one party is not merely insincere, but acts regardless of right – and to that extent acts arbitrarily, and so unfreely.

Hegel describes crime as an infringement of right, of mutual recognition ( PR §95 Remark). This requires what Hegel calls punishment as “the restoration of right” whereby what was infringed is reasserted and reaffirmed ( PR §99). For example, the punishment of theft sends a message to the thief and wider community that this crime should not have happened – and in punishing the crime Hegel believes it can help to restore the right violated.

His theory of punishment is widely characterized as retributivist and it is easy to see why. In this section, Hegel is critical of deterrence and rehabilitation approaches claiming “they take it for granted that punishment in and for itself is just” ( PR §99 Remark). Indeed, Hegel says the cancellation of crime “is retribution” ( PR §101).

But this commonly held view is controversial for several reasons. Hegel may call this third kind of wrong “crime,” but this view of crime is understood in a specific way (Nicholson 1982). There is no state or laws, no police or judiciary (Stillman 1976). A hypothetical scenario lacking prisons is hardly any complete theory of punishment. In fact, there is neither judge nor jury in Abstract Right to say who is right or wrong. This is because, when we view this section in its systematic context, Hegel is drawing attention to certain foundational ideas about wrongs more generally (e.g., that they are of three kinds) and how we should respond (e.g., that crimes can deserve punishment) without yet giving his full view at this point in the PR .

However, Hegel does foreshadow his later and more substantive discussion of punishment with a non-retributivist character at this point (Brooks 2017a). He highlights how determinations of crimes “such as danger to public security” have relevance in determining what punishment is ultimately justified ( PR §96 Remark). While he says crimes “more dangerous in itself” are a more serious infringement of right, Hegel is clear from the start that consequentialist factors are relevant to the determination of punishment related to crime’s impact on society although he says little more at this point ( PR §96 Remark). Hegel also rejects the view he is offering a full theory of punishment at this point claiming – in the absence of laws and courtrooms – any action taken by an individual against another to punish takes the form of “revenge” which “becomes a new infringement” creating new problems ( PR §102). It is important to note at this point that these sections discussing commonly used concepts like property and contract as well as crime and punishment in uncommon ways all reappear when Hegel turns his attention to the final part of Ethical Life.

When Hegel concludes Abstract Right, he seeks to resolve a tension. Abstract Right had been focused purely on the external appearance of right through taking possession and forming a contract through mutual recognition. In reasserting and restoring right through “punishment,” we do not merely honour the universality of right for us all but this move “is also at the same time a further advance in the inner determination of the will by its concept” ( PR §104). While we have discussed taking ownership and wrongs in relation to the mutual recognition of external property, this points us forward to our having to grasp the particularity of our inner ownership of right. This perspective leads Hegel to open a new, second stage he calls Morality, but again using common terms in uncommon ways.

The main point about Hegel’s theory of morality is he redefines it in an unusual way. For Hegel, “the moral point of view” is a purely abstract and hypothetical exercise that is logically prior and separate to how morality is related to the world ( PR §105). Hegel focuses on the individual’s power of choice. To this end, Hegel is a champion, not an enemy, of individual liberty as he is clear that there must be space for subjective freedom.

The problem with our individual power of choice is that we may well be mistaken about what we choose ( PR §140 Remark). Recalling our separateness from others in Morality, he says we may intend good but our only guide is our individual conception of the good ( PR §140 Addition). A more substantive guide awaits reflecting about ourselves acting in relation to others concretely in Ethical Life.

Otherwise, the danger arising from such pure, inward abstraction is that morality is an “abstract universality … without content” ( PR §135). Thus, for Hegel, moral philosophy of any kind is by its nature empty.

Perhaps no area of the PR has attracted more controversy than Hegel’s so-called “emptiness charge” against Kant: Kant is accused of offering no more than an empty formula of “duty for duty’s sake” where our task is to avoid contradicting a set formula ( PR §135, see Hoy 1989, Freyenhagen 2012, Stern 2012). Hegel’s criticisms centre on Kant’s Formula of Universal Law stating we should “act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law” (Kant 1997, 4:421). Undoubtedly, Kant does offer Hegel some ammunition for this criticism. For example, Kant says “All I need for morality is that freedom does not contradict itself and hence can at least be thought; I do not need to have any further insight into it” (Kant 1996, B xxix). At first glance, it might appear Kantian morality is about following a formula and no more.

But, of course, as Kant’s defenders are correct to point out, Hegel’s criticism is unfair and misses its mark (Wood 1989). In fact, Kant purposefully offers multiple versions of his formula to help draw our considerations of morality away from a purely rationalist exercise and bring it “nearer to feeling” (note 15). Our anthropology matters for Kant and he does not see our living ethically as merely living without contradiction.

We should recall that Hegel’s emptiness charge might be made against moral philosophy. This is because Hegel has redefined morality as a purely hypothetical armchair exercise that by itself is “without content” ( PR §135). Of course, this is not how the targets of Hegel’s criticism conceive of morality – and, to some degree, Hegel is using his own redefinition of morality to critique how others understand the same term defined differently.

A more appropriate comparison might be drawn in relating Kant’s principled approach with Hegel’s comments about the relation of religion to the state ( PR §270 Remark). Hegel claims a religious point of view can help furnish individuals with ethical principles and help us lead a more ethical life ( PR §270 Addition). This kind of formulaic thinking in PR to help guide individuals to ethical, law abiding behaviour is perhaps closer to the kind of moral project that Kant was engaged in where there are clearer areas of commonality than in Hegel’s critique in Morality (Brooks 2013).

As should be clear, Morality can only make so much progress in individual abstraction. What is required is a transition bringing together the universality of Abstract Right enveloping us all and providing a foundation in mutual recognition with the particularity of Morality where we both outwardly and inwardly grasp the development of right. This bridge is to the concrete individuality found in comprehending right – not in abstraction – but now in the world and its institutions.

Hegel’s concept of ‘Ethical Life’ [ Sittlichkeit ] plays a pivotal role in his political and legal thought. It is here that Hegel takes other concepts considered earlier found in Abstract Right (such as contract, property and punishment) and Morality to grasp them anew but now in their social – and more “concrete” context. The following discussion retains an abstract character insofar as Hegel discusses institutions that existed at his time – like the family, civil society and the state – but in ways meant to bring out the rational within the actual (and actual within the rational) (see Stern 2006). For example, core ideas about what constitutes a wrong from his discussion of punishment return, but with a deeper and evolved understanding of their place in a social context that brings out a different character and complexity to his views – which is intended to unpack the character and complexity of the inner rationality that Hegel believes we can discern in the world.

Ethical Life is divided into three parts where each builds off of the analysis thus far into the nature of Abstract Right and Morality, but where each part, in turn, develops after the other. This ordering is not chronological, but dialectical. We are not a member of civil society or the state after we join a family, but the concepts of the former are further developments from the latter as the following sections bear out.

Hegel begins his discussion of the first emergence of right embodied in the world through the sphere of Family. As we should expect, Hegel uses common terminology in uncommon ways again.

In Abstract Right, separate abstract individuals connect together through mutual recognition by acknowledging the ownership of property. In Ethical Life, the Family is a sphere where concrete individuals come together bound in a love for each other ( PR §158). This connection is not purely arbitrary, like animals seeking only to satisfy their needs and then seek another. For Hegel, the Family is a connection that, at least in principle, aims at a permanence he calls “marriage” ( PR §161).

These marriages are not defined in contractual terms, but ethical. A contract is an agreement that different parties can enter or exit on mutual consent. Any shared commitment or unity has a temporary character. This is little better than the kind of mutual recognition we saw in Abstract Right.

However, in marriage, a more substantive unity is created that is a permanent bond unlike most contracts. This does not mean that Hegel forbids divorce. The termination of a marriage is seen as an unfortunate possibility born from marriage’s foundation in our feelings, like love, which can be unstable over time ( PR §163 Addition).

While divorce is permitted, arranged marriages are not ( PR §162). This is because marriage is a further development of our freedom – and it requires our being able to choose a life partner. In this way, marriage is an advance of our mutual recognition from a contract where we agree ownership of some thing to where we choose to create a unity with another longer term.

For Hegel, the Family achieves unity through its creation of children ( PR §173 Addition). To this extent, he plainly endorses the traditional family model (see Haldane 2006). However, this is done on very non-traditional grounds. What guides Hegel’s thinking is his logic which brings together opposites in a creative unity producing some new, higher concept ( PR §165). Likewise, Hegel saw men and women as embodying different features with their sexual union able to create children, not unlike the universal and particular giving birth to the concrete individual ( PR §165).

These views have rightly been subjected to widespread criticism by feminists and others (Halper 2001, Knowles 2002, Ravven 1988, Stone 2002). A common argument is that Hegel’s justification of the Family is a poor defence of privileging men over women on the basis of his controversial dialectical method. Only men have the opportunity to engage outside the home in civil society and fully participate in the state. These critics claim that such a privilege should not be reserved for men alone for many, often obvious, reasons. It is also argued that his broad views about the essence of marriage as a permanent bond built on love can be achieved by non-traditional families, too. It is worth pointing out that Hegel’s talk of the Family is of an ideal. Hegel fathered a child outside of wedlock who he supported throughout his life. He sees himself as revealing the full development of right wherever it may take us, and what it requires from us or our institutions may be different from how we find them.

Hegel’s civil society is primarily the place of work, as well as where he situates law and the legal system (see Sect. 5). Whereas the Family is ideally a relation of unity from a natural law for each other, this gives way to the pursuit of the particular individual within the system of needs ( PR §182). The Family is a sphere where it is all for one and one for all. In civil society, the needs of all are met where I make my particular contribution in a pro-market economic vision accepting a natural division of labour ( PR §189, 198).

Hegel sees the world of work as a home away from home, or “second family” ( PR §252). Instead of familial love, there is a kind of brotherly love fostered through an individual’s connection to a corporation, grouped by the kind of trade all are engaged in which educates and supports its member.

Interestingly, Hegel sees market relations in modern society as a foundation for the acquisition by free individuals of social identities including social solidarity. We develop our sense of selves through our economic activities and the myriad of interconnections we forge with others in an extra-familial but non-political way.

A key problem is the problem of poverty. If possession of property is essential for the development of my sense of right and satisfaction of needs, a capitalist economic system which, Hegel accepts, makes poverty for at least some unavoidable raises a serious concern about whether Hegel’s ideal social and political philosophy is ideal for all its citizens.

The problem of poverty is more than a concern about material needs. Hegel describes those in poverty as forming a “rabble” saying “poverty in itself does not reduce people to a rabble; a rabble is created only by the disposition associated with poverty, by inward rebellion against the rich, against society, the government, etc” ( PR §244, Addition). Thus we can understand the rabble as having a conviction about their alienation that may be more likely to find among those who are poorer, but not exclusively them. To be in poverty is to be alienated and see one’s state as a separate, unfriendly other (Brooks 2020). While Hegel was a strong believer that through work we could develop our freedom to become reconciled to our social and political work, he lacks any convincing solution to how the problem of poverty might be overcome short of changing the economic system (Plant 1972).

Part of Hegel’s examination of civil society concerns law and the administration of justice. Hegel’s theory of law has been notoriously difficult to characterize. This is likely, in part, because Hegel uses common terms in an uncommon ways.

Hegel clearly accepts a strong link between morality and law suggesting he endorses some variety of natural law. Like other natural lawyers, Hegel claims “what is law [ Gesetz ] may differ in content from what is right in itself” ( PR §212). Something can be lawful yet unjust – and this having a higher standard of justice by which he can assess posited law is a common feature of natural law jurisprudence.

But what is different is that, traditionally, natural lawyers have developed their understanding of the standard of moral justice to be applied to an assessment of law prior to that assessment. For example, the moral standard would be worked out first and then applied afterwards. This leads some critics of natural law to claim that this approach uses extralegal standards and reasoning to assess law and so really engaging in moral philosophy rather than legal thought.

Hegel’s perspective is unique (Brudner 2017). He accepts the positivist view that our understanding of law must be centred on the law itself rather than extralegal considerations. He says “what is legal [ gesetzmāßig ] is … the source of cognition of what is right [ Recht ], or more precisely, of what is lawful [ Rechtens ]” ( PR §212 Remark). So we start first from a close look at the law before us – whatever it is – and not develop some normative standard separately beforehand. For Hegel, we do not comprehend this standard separately from the law, but immanently within it.

He says: “the scope of the law [ Gesetz ] ought on the one hand to be that of a complete and self-contained whole, but on the other hand, there is a constant need for new legal determinations [ gesetzlicher Bestimmungen ]” ( PR §216). Hegel is claiming the law aspires to be a complete whole and, where we find gaps or inconsistencies, our task is to work out how these can be addressed within the law as a self-contained whole in language echoing Ronald Dworkin’s (1977) use of legal principles a century later. Thus, Hegel looks to the law for the ethical principles that can be used to continually reform our legal system into the complete whole it aspires to be. This “natural law internalism” discerns its principles from within the law rather than from outside it (Brooks 2017b).

The development of law is crucially not a project for professionals alone. Hegel makes a powerful case for the right to trial by jury ( PR §228 Remark). His argument is that without a jury of ordinary citizens there is no guarantee that a citizen would have a reasonable chance of understanding the charges, evidence and outcome, especially if convicted and punished. This is because the law is a technical language which risks becoming the exclusive property of a professional class. The best guarantee of law’s publicity and connection to a public view of right is to ensure a jury is convinced – if they can understand the trial and come to a view, then Hegel finds it reasonable to expect the defendant on trial can, too.

It is here that Hegel revisits the justification of punishment. We now consider crime and punishment not in abstraction, but their concrete reality. Hegel begins by noting that the “outward existence” of a crime and its impact may not change the nature of a crime in its concept, but it does impact how we respond. This suggests that the same kind of crime can be punished more or less severely based, at least in part, on the circumstances. Such a view is starkly at odds with most retributivists where punishment should only be considered in relation to what an offender deserved on account of his moral responsibility for an offence.

Hegel makes clear that a crime’s “danger to civil society is a determination of its magnitude” where circumstances impact in how we determine whether to punish, how much to punish and what form this might take. He notes “a penal code is therefore primarily a product of its time and of the current condition of civil society” ( PR §218 Remark). He adds that “punishments are not unjust in and for themselves, but are proportionate to the conditions of their time” ( PR §218 Addition). So the same crime committed in different circumstances would be punished differently. For example, a crime committed during civil war poses a greater threat to civil society than when at peace – and so the former would see the crimes punished more harshly. There is no difference in the offender or her responsibility. While desert matters, it is not the only factor which does.

These comments make clear a non-retributivist picture. This is consistent with a passage in his Science of Logic ( SL ), the text Hegel claims is presupposed as the foundation for the PR :

Punishment, for example, has various determinations: it is retributive, a deterrent example as well, a threat used by the law as a deterrent, and also it brings the criminal to his senses and reforms him. Each of these different determinations has been considered the ground of punishment , because each is an essential determination, and therefore the others, as distinct from it, are determined as merely contingent relatively to it. But the one which is taken as ground is still not the whole punishment itself ( SL , p. 465)

Hegel’s argument is clearer here. Desert grounds punishment: only the deserving can be liable to be punished. But it does not have a monopoly on the amount or form that punishment can take. This picture is consistent with Hegel’s comments in the PR where the outward existence of punishment may be different depending on circumstances. It should be unsurprising to find that Hegel, who repeatedly defends various groupings of three in his work would seek to combine retribution, deterrence and rehabilitation in a new format – taking common concepts in uncommon ways. This was not lost on his earliest interpreters in the UK, as British Idealists like Green, Bradley and others held similar three-in-one views on punishment and rejected traditional accounts of retributivism (Brooks 2003, 2011). This view has been called the “unified theory of punishment” (Brooks 2017a).

Hegel’s final section of “Ethical Life” is the state. The love for others based on feeling in the family and then on the satisfaction of needs in civil society is transformed to a patriotic love for fellow citizens in support of a shared community, embodied by the modern state (see PR §268). Moreover, the individual pursuit of the satisfaction of needs leads to the development of the state.

For Hegel, it is only in the state that the family develops into civil society and where civil society gains greater “actuality” ( PR §256–57). The state is where our “concrete freedom” is realized as we conceive of ourselves in our full social and political reality ( PR §260). It is only here that the individual is conceived at once as a member of a family, as a part of civil society and as a citizen of a state. While the stage where our freedom is realized most concretely, it is not the case that individual freedom is somehow a problem – our individual freedom has greatest actuality when mutually recognized by others in law. Hegel reflects that “it has often been said that the end of the state is the happiness of its citizens. This is certainly true, for if their welfare is deficient, if their subjective ends are not satisfied, and if they do not find that the state as such is the means to this satisfaction, the state itself stands on an insecure footing” ( PR §265 Addition). Hegel’s state is a community where individuals and their individuality are meant to flourish.

Hegel’s conception of the state’s composition is controversial. He seeks to unify the three traditional models of government – aristocracy, democracy and monarchy – under a new form of representative government with a constitutional monarch (Deranty 2001). Hegel proposes an Estates Assembly with the natural aristocracy of the agrarian class in one chamber and representatives from different trades in another. Hegel believed that representing a locality based on geography was arbitrary and lacking substance. He claimed a stronger ethical relation could be formed through representation of people through their work.

Hegel’s state is headed by a hereditary monarch (§273 Remark, Brudner 1981, Redding 1994). He claims the state requires someone to provide unity as an individual to the individual state, a someone to declare the state confirms a law as its law or agrees treaties with foreign countries. An elected monarch or president as head of state is objectionable because such a person would represent the interests of supporters. This would create a barrier for the monarch to truly speak with one voice on behalf of the country – and so the monarch should be above such partisanship. A hereditary monarch would provide some basis for there being a head of state that could represent all and provide the unity required.

While virtually no commentator is convinced by Hegel’s justification of constitutional monarch, the orthodox view is that the monarch is a rubber stamp (Yack 1980). Hegel remarks that “in a fully organized state … all that is required in a monarch is someone to say ‘yes’ and to dot the ‘I’; for the supreme office should be such that the particular character of its occupant is of no significance” ( PR §280 Addition). Some have drawn comparisons with the UK’s constitutional monarchy, where laws require the Assent of Her Majesty The Queen but where this is automatically done when requested by Parliament for example (Findlay 1958).

The real power is behind the throne and held by an educated governing cabinet [ Ministerium ], often referred to as the bureaucracy. It is these advisors to the monarch who propose new laws, via the responsible cabinet minister. These ministers, and not the monarch, are answerable to the legislature whose role is to consider proposals and either enact or reject them.

There is reason to doubt this picture (Brooks 2007). The monarch cannot act arbitrarily. In being “bound by the concrete content of the advice he receives,” he must be able to discern this content ( PR §279 Addition). And Hegel is critical of the UK’s constitutional monarchy post-Civil War noting that “since 1692 there has never been a case of the king’s vetoing a parliamentary decree” with the consequence that it “reduces him virtually to a cipher” and he should be more active on state matters – and, presumably, making his own judgements whether to support proposed legislation or not in recommending it for approval to the legislature ( LNR §133 Remark ) . While the ministers advising him should be of rough equality making little difference who is in which role, the monarch has full discretion to hire and fire anyone at will from an eligible pool. Moreover, it is the monarch advised by his relevant minister who agree treaties and decide all matters of war and peace ( PR §329). Given the monarch cannot be removed from office, this gives him considerable powers in foreign affairs raising questions about how relatively powerless, if at all, he really is.

The state has an “immediate actuality” in terms of its internal organization as discussed above, but it further determines itself internationally in relation to other states ( PR §259). This part of the PR is the least worked out and detailed.

Hegel accepts a broadly Westphalian and realist view of international relations whereby the primary actors are states each prioritizing the pursuit of their individual welfare ( PR §336, Smith 1983). States interact with each other like individuals in an anarchic global space. Without any governing global authority, states can come into conflict with each other. He says “wars must be regarded as necessary because independent peoples exist alongside one another” ( LNR §160 Remark). This is not a justification or glorification of war, but a recognition that states are in a state of nature where war is occasionally unavoidable (see LNR §162 Remark). States should aim to enable other states “to live at peace with it” and “war is that of something which ought to come to an end” ( PR §338).

But it is also the case that Hegel saw war as testing the relative health of states where those most rationally organized should triumph over less well ethically structured states. Combined with his rejection of Kant’s proposals for perpetual peace, it has led some to question whether or not war plays a positive, and troubling, role in his philosophy (Avineri 1961, Black 1973, Shelton 2000, Walt 1989). Hegel also comments that “modern wars are accordingly waged in a humane manner, and all persons do not confront each other in hatred” which can give the impression that modern wars are of an improved ethical quality than past wars – when the opposite appears true ( PR §338 Addition).

The only judge of relative rights and wrongs in the international sphere is “world history as the world’s court of judgement” ( PR §340). The PR then transitions to the start of an account of the philosophy of history in the next part of his system, which presupposes all parts preceding it not least the PR itself.

English Translations of Key Texts

[EL], The Encyclopaedia Logic: Part 1 of the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences with the Zusätze , translated by T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting and H. S. Harris. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991.
[LNR], Lectures on Natural Right and Political Science: The First Philosophy of Right, Heidelberg 1817–1818 with Additions from the Lectures of 1818–1819 , translated by J. Michael Stewart and Peter C. Hodgson. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995.
[PW], Political Writings , edited by Laurence Dickey and H. B. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
[PM], Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind , translated from the 1830 Edition, together with the Zusätze by William Wallace and A.V. Miller, with Revisions and Commentary by M. J Inwood, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007.
[PR], Elements of the Philosophy of Right , edited by Allen W. Wood, translated by H.B. Nisbet, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
[SL], Science of Logic , trans. A. V. Miller. Amherst: Humanity Books, 1969.
Avineri, Shlomo, 1961, “The Problem of War in Hegel’s Thought,” Journal of the History of Ideas , 22: 463–74.
–––, 1972, Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Beiser, Frederick, 2005, Hegel , London: Routledge.
Benhabib, Seyla, 1984, “Obligation, Contract and Exchange: On the Significance of Hegel’s Abstract Right,” in Z. A. Pelczynski (ed.), The State and Civil Society: Studies in Hegel’s Political Philosophy , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 159–77.
Black, Edward, 1973, “Hegel on War,” The Monist , 57: 570–83.
Brooks, Thom, 2003, “T. H. Green’s Theory of Punishment,” History of Political Thought , 24: 685–701.
–––, 2007, “No Rubber Stamp: Hegel’s Constitutional Monarch,” History of Political Thought , 28: 91–119.
–––, 2011, “Is Bradley a Retributivist?” History of Political Thought , 32: 83–95.
–––, 2013, Hegel’s Political Philosophy: A Systematic Reading of the Philosophy of Right , 2nd edition, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
–––, 2017a, “Hegel on Crime and Punishment,” in T. Brooks and S. Stein (eds.) 2017, pp. 202–21.
–––, 2017b, “Hegel’s Philosophy of Law” in Dean Moyar (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Hegel , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 453–74.
–––, 2020, “More than Recognition: Why Stakeholding Matters for Reconciliation in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right,” Owl of Minerva , 51: 59–86.
Brooks, Thom and Sebastian Stein (eds.), 2017, Hegel’s Political Philosophy: On the Normative Significance of Method and System , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Brudner, Alan, 1981, “Constitutional Monarchy as the Divine Regime: Hegel’s Theory of the Just State,” History of Political Thought , 2: 119–40.
–––, 2017, The Owl and the Rooster: Hegel’s Transformative Political Science , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cooper, David E., 1971, “Hegel’s Theory of Punishment,” in Z. Pelczynski (ed.), Hegel’s Political Philosophy: Problems and Prospects , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 151–67.
Deranty, Jean-Philippe, 2001, “Hegel’s Parliamentarianism: A New Perspective on Hegel’s Theory of Political Institutions,” Owl of Minerva , 32: 107–33.
Dworkin, Ronald, 1977, Taking Rights Seriously , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Freyenhagen, Fabian, 2012, “The Empty Formalism Objection Revisited: §135R and Recent Kantian Responses,” in Thom Brooks (ed.), Hegel’s Philosophy of Right , Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 43–72.
Haldane, John, 2006, “Family Matters,” Philosophy , 81: 581–93.
Halper, Edward C., 2001, “Hegel’s Family Values,” Review of Metaphysics , 54: 815–58.
Haym, Rudolf, 1857, Hegel und seine Zeit . Berlin.
Houlgate, Stephen, 2005, The Opening of Hegel’s Logic: From Being to Infinity , West Lafeyette: Purdue University Press.
Hoy, David, 1989, “Hegel’s Critique of Kantian Morality,” History of Philosophy Quarterly , 6: 207–32.
Kant, Immanuel, 1996, Critique of Pure Reason , Werner S. Pluhar (trans.), Indianapolis: Hackett.
–––, 1997, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals , Mary Gregor (trans.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Knowles, Dudley, 2002, Hegel and the Philosophy of Right , London: Routledge.
Knox, T. M., 1970, “Hegel and Prussianism,” in Walter Kaufmann (ed.), Hegel’s Political Philosophy , New York: Atherton Press, pp. 13–29.
Neuhouser, Frederick, 2000, Foundations of Hegel’s Social Theory: Actualizing Freedom , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Nicholson, Peter P., 1982, “Hegel on Crime,” History of Political Thought , 3: 103–21.
Pelczynski, Z. A., 1964, “An Introductory Essay,” in ed., Hegel’s Political Writings , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 5–137.
Pinkard, Terry, 1994, Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pippin, Robert, 2012, Hegel’s Practical Philosophy: Rational Agency as Ethical Life , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Plant, Raymond, 1972, Hegel , London: George Allen & Unwin.
Primoratz, Igor, 1989, Justifying Legal Punishment , Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press.
Popper, Karl, 1966, The Open Society and Its Enemies (Vol. II: The High Tide of Prophecy: Hegel, Marx, and the Aftermath), 5th edition, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Ravven, Heidi, 1988, “Has Hegel Anything to Say to Feminists?” Owl of Minerva , 19: 149–68.
Redding, Paul, 1994, “Philosophical Republicanism and Monarchism – and Republican and Monarchical Philosophy – in Kant and Hegel,” Owl of Minerva , 26: 35–46.
Rosen, Michael, 1984, Hegel’s Dialectic and Its Criticism , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Shelton, Mark, 2000, “The Morality of Peace: Kant and Hegel on the Grounds for Ethical Ideals,” Review of Metaphysics , 54: 379–408.
Smith, Steven, 1983, “Hegel’s Views on War, the State and International Relations,” American Political Science Review , 77: 624–32.
Stone, Alison, 2002, “Feminist Criticism and Reinterpretations of Hegel,” Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain , 45–46: 93–109.
Stern, Robert, 2006, “Hegel’s Doppelsatz : A Neutral Reading,” Journal of the History of Philosophy , 44: 235–66.
–––, 2012, “On Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Ethics: Beyond the Empty Formalism Objection,” in Thom Brooks (ed.), Hegel’s Philosophy of Right , Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 73–99.
Stillman, Peter G., 1976, “Hegel’s Idea of Punishment,” Journal of the History of Philosophy , 14: 169–82.
–––, 1980, “Property, Freedom and Individuality in Hegel’s and Marx’s Political Thought,” in J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman (eds.), Property , New York: New York University Press, pp. 130–67.
Taylor, Charles, 1975, Hegel , Cambridge: Cambridge University Pres.
Walt, Steven, 1989, “Hegel on War: Another Look,” History of Political Thought , 10: 113–24.
Wood, Allen, 1989, “The Emptiness of the Moral Will,” Monist , 72: 454–83.
–––, 1990, Hegel’s Ethical Thought , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
–––, 2017, “Method and System in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right ,” in T. Brooks and S. Stein (eds.) 2017, pp. 82–102.
Yack, Bernard, 1980, “The Rationality of Hegel’s Concept of Monarchy,” American Political Science Review , 74: 709–20.

How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

Hegel Society of America homepage
Hegel Society of Great Britain homepage

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich | Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich: dialectics | Kant, Immanuel

Accessibility

Support SEP

Mirror sites.

View this site from another server:

Info about mirror sites

Library of Congress Catalog Data: ISSN 1095-5054

Consumer Behavior

Dialectics in psychotherapy, an introduction to the meaning and central role of dialectics in therapy..

Posted September 13, 2019 | Reviewed by Abigail Fagan

The word “dialectic” has a long history, from ancient Greek philosophers, through Hegel and Marx, and to the present day. Its meaning has changed over the centuries, and according to different thinkers. In psychotherapy , “dialectic” is almost wholly associated with dialectical behavior therapy (DBT), where the term identifies a particular type of treatment. In reality, dialectics as used in DBT is a feature of all schools of psychotherapy.

Broadly speaking, a dialectic is a tension between two contradictory viewpoints, where a greater truth emerges from their interplay. Socratic dialog, in which philosophers mutually benefit by finding defects in each other’s arguments, is a classic example. In the early 19th century, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel described a universal dialectic, commonly summarized as “thesis, antithesis, synthesis.”

His esoteric philosophy holds that every thesis, or proposition, contains elements of its own negation. Only by considering both the thesis and its contradiction (antithesis) can one synthesize a greater truth. This process never ends, as the new synthesis itself contains antithetical elements. The term veered in meaning with Marx’s dialectical materialism, and in yet other directions with more contemporary writers. But DBT uses the Hegelian sense, and that is our focus here.

Marsha Linehan faced a problem as she developed DBT in the late 1970s. Her behavioral strategies implicitly pathologized those she sought to help. Clients thought: “If I need to change, there must be something wrong with me.” To avoid re-traumatizing them, she turned to Zen Buddhism’s self-acceptance and focused on clients’ strengths. But this, in turn, downplayed their real need to change. Dr. Linehan and her colleagues realized they would have to integrate change (thesis) and acceptance (antithesis) into a larger truth that incorporates both (synthesis).

This is the fundamental dialectic of DBT, although there are others. For example, the therapist is trustworthy and reliable, but also makes mistakes. The client is doing his or her best but wants to do better. Although worded here using “but” for clarity, DBT teaches clients to use “and” instead. (The therapist is reliable and makes mistakes.) In doing so, the therapeutic task is to embrace the truth of both propositions at once, not to choose one over the other.

An uneasy tension between acceptance and the need for change exists in all psychotherapy, not just DBT. Indeed, this tension underlies a question commonly posed to new clients: “What brings you in now?” Therapy begins only when emotional discomfort and the perceived need for change outweigh the inertia (i.e., acceptance), reluctance, and other factors that precluded it before. Then, once in therapy, change versus acceptance is often an explicit struggle. File for divorce or work on one’s marriage ? Learn to be bolder or accept that one is shy by nature? Change physically through exercise or plastic surgery, or become more comfortable with the body one has?

When clients grapple with such questions, therapists of any school should refrain from choosing sides or giving advice. Except in extreme cases, we simply don’t know which option is best for the individual in our office.

However, it goes further than this. As Hegel wrote, a clash of thesis and antithesis may result in a new third way, a synthesis that incorporates, yet transcends, both sides of the argument. This “union of opposites” was first described by pre-Socratic philosophers (and by Taoists, as in the well-known Yin-Yang symbol of interdependence). The concept was later adopted by alchemists, who observed that compounding two dissimilar chemicals can result in a third unlike either parent (e.g., sodium, a highly reactive metal, plus chlorine, a poisonous gas, produces table salt). Carl Jung, who studied alchemy, weaved the union of opposites into his various psychological writings. It forms the basis of his “transcendent function” that leads to psychological change; an accessible introduction to this concept can be found here .

The shuttling to and fro of arguments and affects represents the transcendent function of opposites. The confrontation of the two positions generates a tension charged with energy and creates a living, third thing … a movement out of the suspension between the opposites, a living birth that leads to a new level of being, a new situation. Collected Works of C. G. Jung, Vol. 8. 2nd ed., Princeton University Press, 1972. p. 67-91 .

One need not be a Jungian to recognize creative, “third-way” processes in therapy. Instead of being caught on the horns of a dilemma, it often helps to take a step back and appreciate the validity of both positions: It is valid to seek autonomy and relatedness. It is valid to be serious and to play. And it is certainly valid to accept oneself while also striving to change. Insight is our term in depth psychotherapy for achieving synthesis: a position that reconciles and transcends thesis and antithesis, makes sense emotionally, and works in one’s life. In this way, dialectical tension generates all creativity and psychological growth.

Steven Reidbord, M.D. , is a psychiatrist and psychiatric educator with a private practice in San Francisco.

Find a Therapist
Find a Treatment Center
Find a Psychiatrist
Find a Support Group
Find Online Therapy
United States
Brooklyn, NY
Chicago, IL
Houston, TX
Los Angeles, CA
New York, NY
Portland, OR
San Diego, CA
San Francisco, CA
Seattle, WA
Washington, DC
Asperger's
Bipolar Disorder
Chronic Pain
Eating Disorders
Passive Aggression
Personality
Goal Setting
Positive Psychology
Stopping Smoking
Low Sexual Desire
Relationships
Child Development
Self Tests NEW
Therapy Center
Diagnosis Dictionary
Types of Therapy

At any moment, someone’s aggravating behavior or our own bad luck can set us off on an emotional spiral that threatens to derail our entire day. Here’s how we can face our triggers with less reactivity so that we can get on with our lives.

Emotional Intelligence
Gaslighting
Affective Forecasting
Neuroscience

Anatomy & Physiology
Astrophysics
Earth Science
Environmental Science
Organic Chemistry
Precalculus
Trigonometry
English Grammar
U.S. History
World History

... and beyond

Socratic Meta
Featured Answers

What is Hegel's concept of thesis, antithesis and synthesis, in simple terms?

Browse by Subjects
New Releases
Coming Soon
Chases's Calendar
Browse by Course
Instructor's Copies
Monographs & Research
Intelligence & Security
Library Services
Business & Leadership
Museum Studies
Pastoral Resources
Psychotherapy

Hegel's Undiscovered Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis Dialectics

What only marx and tillich understood, leonard f. wheat, also available.

Cover image for the book Kant in Context: The Historical Primacy of the Transcendental Dialectic

Persuasive Writing In Three Steps: Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis

April 14, 2021 by Ryan Law in

Great writing persuades. It persuades the reader that your product is right for them, that your process achieves the outcome they desire, that your opinion supersedes all other opinions. But spend an hour clicking around the internet and you’ll quickly realise that most content is passive, presenting facts and ideas without context or structure. The reader must connect the dots and create a convincing argument from the raw material presented to them. They rarely do, and for good reason: It’s hard work. The onus of persuasion falls on the writer, not the reader. Persuasive communication is a timeless challenge with an ancient solution. Zeno of Elea cracked it in the 5th century B.C. Georg Hegel gave it a lick of paint in the 1800s. You can apply it to your writing in three simple steps: thesis, antithesis, synthesis.

Use Dialectic to Find Logical Bedrock

“ Dialectic ” is a complicated-sounding idea with a simple meaning: It’s a structured process for taking two seemingly contradictory viewpoints and, through reasoned discussion, reaching a satisfactory conclusion. Over centuries of use the term has been burdened with the baggage of philosophy and academia. But at its heart, dialectics reflects a process similar to every spirited conversation or debate humans have ever had:

Person A presents an idea: “We should travel to the Eastern waterhole because it’s closest to camp.”
Person B disagrees and shares a counterargument: “I saw wolf prints on the Eastern trail, so we should go to the Western waterhole instead.”
Person A responds to the counterargument , either disproving it or modifying their own stance to accommodate the criticism: “I saw those same wolf prints, but our party is large enough that the wolves won’t risk an attack.”
Person B responds in a similar vein: “Ordinarily that would be true, but half of our party had dysentery last week so we’re not at full strength.”
Person A responds: “They got dysentery from drinking at the Western waterhole.”

This process continues until conversational bedrock is reached: an idea that both parties understand and agree to, helped by the fact they’ve both been a part of the process that shaped it.

Dialectic is intended to help draw closer to the “truth” of an argument, tempering any viewpoint by working through and resolving its flaws. This same process can also be used to persuade.

Create Inevitability with Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis

The philosopher Georg Hegel is most famous for popularizing a type of dialectics that is particularly well-suited to writing: thesis, antithesis, synthesis (also known, unsurprisingly, as Hegelian Dialectic ).

Thesis: Present the status quo, the viewpoint that is currently accepted and widely held.
Antithesis: Articulate the problems with the thesis. (Hegel also called this phase “the negative.”)
Synthesis: Share a new viewpoint (a modified thesis) that resolves the problems.

Hegel’s method focused less on the search for absolute truth and more on replacing old ideas with newer, more sophisticated versions . That, in a nutshell, is the same objective as much of content marketing (and particularly thought leadership content ): We’re persuading the reader that our product, processes, and ideas are better and more useful than the “old” way of doing things. Thesis, antithesis, synthesis (or TAS) is a persuasive writing structure because it:

Reduces complex arguments into a simple three-act structure. Complicated, nuanced arguments are simplified into a clear, concise format that anyone can follow. This simplification reflects well on the author: It takes mastery of a topic to explain it in it the simplest terms.
Presents a balanced argument by “steelmanning” the best objection. Strong, one-sided arguments can trigger reactance in the reader: They don’t want to feel duped. TAS gives voice to their doubts, addressing their best objection and “giv[ing] readers the chance to entertain the other side, making them feel as though they have come to an objective conclusion.”
Creates a sense of inevitability. Like a story building to a satisfying conclusion, articles written with TAS take the reader on a structured, logical journey that culminates in precisely the viewpoint we wish to advocate for. Doubts are voiced, ideas challenged, and the conclusion reached feels more valid and concrete as a result.

There are two main ways to apply TAS to your writing: Use it beef up your introductions, or apply it to your article’s entire structure.

Writing Article Introductions with TAS

Take a moment to scroll back to the top of this article. If I’ve done my job correctly, you’ll notice a now familiar formula staring back at you: The first three paragraphs are built around Hegel’s thesis, antithesis, synthesis structure. Here’s what the introduction looked like during the outlining process . The first paragraph shares the thesis, the accepted idea that great writing should be persuasive:

Next up, the antithesis introduces a complicating idea, explaining why most content marketing isn’t all that persuasive:

Finally, the synthesis shares a new idea that serves to reconcile the two previous paragraphs: Content can be made persuasive by using the thesis, antithesis, synthesis framework. The meat of the article is then focused on the nitty-gritty of the synthesis.

Introductions are hard, but thesis, antithesis, synthesis offers a simple way to write consistently persuasive opening copy. In the space of three short paragraphs, the article’s key ideas are shared , the entire argument is summarised, and—hopefully—the reader is hooked.

Best of all, most articles—whether how-to’s, thought leadership content, or even list content—can benefit from Hegelian Dialectic , for the simple reason that every article introduction should be persuasive enough to encourage the reader to stick around.

Structuring Entire Articles with TAS

Harder, but most persuasive, is to use thesis, antithesis, synthesis to structure your entire article. This works best for thought leadership content. Here, your primary objective is to advocate for a new idea and disprove the old, tired way of thinking—exactly the use case Hegel intended for his dialectic. It’s less useful for content that explores and illustrates a process, because the primary objective is to show the reader how to do something (like this article—otherwise, I would have written the whole darn thing using the framework). Arjun Sethi’s article The Hive is the New Network is a great example.

The article’s primary purpose is to explain why the “old” model of social networks is outmoded and offer a newer, better framework. (It would be equally valid—but less punchy—to publish this with the title “ Why the Hive is the New Network.”) The thesis, antithesis, synthesis structure shapes the entire article:

Thesis: Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram grew by creating networks “that brought existing real-world relationships online.”
Antithesis: As these networks grow, the less useful they become, skewing towards bots, “celebrity, meme and business accounts.”
Synthesis: To survive continued growth, these networks need to embrace a new structure and become hives.

With the argument established, the vast majority of the article is focused on synthesis. After all, it requires little elaboration to share the status quo in a particular situation, and it’s relatively easy to point out the problems with a given idea. The synthesis—the solution that needs to reconcile both thesis and antithesis—is the hardest part to tackle and requires the greatest word count. Throughout the article, Arjun is systematically addressing the “best objections” to his theory and demonstrating why the “Hive” is the best solution:

Antithesis: Why now? Why didn’t Hives emerge in the first place?
Thesis: We were limited by technology, but today, we have the necessary infrastructure: “We’re no longer limited to a broadcast radio model, where one signal is received by many nodes. ...We sync with each other instantaneously, and all the time.”
Antithesis: If the Hive is so smart, why aren’t our brightest and best companies already embracing it?
Thesis: They are, and autonomous cars are a perfect example: “Why are all these vastly different companies converging on the autonomous car? That’s because for these companies, it’s about platform and hive, not just about roads without drivers.”

It takes bravery to tackle objections head-on and an innate understanding of the subject matter to even identify objections in the first place, but the effort is worthwhile. The end result is a structured journey through the arguments for and against the “Hive,” with the reader eventually reaching the same conclusion as the author: that “Hives” are superior to traditional networks.

Destination: Persuasion

Persuasion isn’t about cajoling or coercing the reader. Statistics and anecdotes alone aren’t all that persuasive. Simply sharing a new idea and hoping that it will trigger an about-turn in the reader’s beliefs is wishful thinking. Instead, you should take the reader on a journey—the same journey you travelled to arrive at your newfound beliefs, whether it’s about the superiority of your product or the zeitgeist-changing trend that’s about to break. Hegelian Dialectic—thesis, antithesis, synthesis— is a structured process for doing precisely that. It contextualises your ideas and explains why they matter. It challenges the idea and strengthens it in the process. Using centuries-old processes, it nudges the 21st-century reader onto a well-worn path that takes them exactly where they need to go.

Ryan is the Content Director at Ahrefs and former CMO of Animalz.

Why ‘Vertical Volatility’ Is the Missing Link in Your Keyword Strategy

Get insight and analysis on the world's top SaaS brands, each and every Monday morning.

Success! Now check your email to confirm your subscription.

There was an error submitting your subscription. Please try again.

Scholarly Community Encyclopedia
Log in/Sign up

Video Upload Options

MDPI and ACS Style
Chicago Style

In philosophy, the triad of thesis, antithesis, synthesis (German: These, Antithese, Synthese; originally: Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis) is a progression of three ideas or propositions. The first idea, the thesis, is a formal statement illustrating a point; it is followed by the second idea, the antithesis, that contradicts or negates the first; and lastly, the third idea, the synthesis, resolves the conflict between the thesis and antithesis. It is often used to explain the dialectical method of German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, but Hegel never used the terms himself; instead his triad was concrete, abstract, absolute. The thesis, antithesis, synthesis triad actually originated with Johann Fichte.

1. History of the Idea

Thomas McFarland (2002), in his Prolegomena to Coleridge's Opus Maximum , [ 1 ] identifies Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (1781) as the genesis of the thesis/antithesis dyad. Kant concretises his ideas into:

Thesis: "The world has a beginning in time, and is limited with regard to space."
Antithesis: "The world has no beginning and no limits in space, but is infinite, in respect to both time and space."

Inasmuch as conjectures like these can be said to be resolvable, Fichte's Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre ( Foundations of the Science of Knowledge , 1794) resolved Kant's dyad by synthesis, posing the question thus: [ 1 ]

No synthesis is possible without a preceding antithesis. As little as antithesis without synthesis, or synthesis without antithesis, is possible; just as little possible are both without thesis.

Fichte employed the triadic idea "thesis–antithesis–synthesis" as a formula for the explanation of change. [ 2 ] Fichte was the first to use the trilogy of words together, [ 3 ] in his Grundriss des Eigentümlichen der Wissenschaftslehre, in Rücksicht auf das theoretische Vermögen (1795, Outline of the Distinctive Character of the Wissenschaftslehre with respect to the Theoretical Faculty ): "Die jetzt aufgezeigte Handlung ist thetisch, antithetisch und synthetisch zugleich." ["The action here described is simultaneously thetic, antithetic, and synthetic." [ 4 ] ]

Still according to McFarland, Schelling then, in his Vom Ich als Prinzip der Philosophie (1795), arranged the terms schematically in pyramidal form.

According to Walter Kaufmann (1966), although the triad is often thought to form part of an analysis of historical and philosophical progress called the Hegelian dialectic, the assumption is erroneous: [ 5 ]

Whoever looks for the stereotype of the allegedly Hegelian dialectic in Hegel's Phenomenology will not find it. What one does find on looking at the table of contents is a very decided preference for triadic arrangements. ... But these many triads are not presented or deduced by Hegel as so many theses, antitheses, and syntheses. It is not by means of any dialectic of that sort that his thought moves up the ladder to absolute knowledge.

Gustav E. Mueller (1958) concurs that Hegel was not a proponent of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, and clarifies what the concept of dialectic might have meant in Hegel's thought. [ 6 ]

"Dialectic" does not for Hegel mean "thesis, antithesis, and synthesis." Dialectic means that any "ism" – which has a polar opposite, or is a special viewpoint leaving "the rest" to itself – must be criticized by the logic of philosophical thought, whose problem is reality as such, the "World-itself".

According to Mueller, the attribution of this tripartite dialectic to Hegel is the result of "inept reading" and simplistic translations which do not take into account the genesis of Hegel's terms:

Hegel's greatness is as indisputable as his obscurity. The matter is due to his peculiar terminology and style; they are undoubtedly involved and complicated, and seem excessively abstract. These linguistic troubles, in turn, have given rise to legends which are like perverse and magic spectacles – once you wear them, the text simply vanishes. Theodor Haering's monumental and standard work has for the first time cleared up the linguistic problem. By carefully analyzing every sentence from his early writings, which were published only in this century, he has shown how Hegel's terminology evolved – though it was complete when he began to publish. Hegel's contemporaries were immediately baffled, because what was clear to him was not clear to his readers, who were not initiated into the genesis of his terms. An example of how a legend can grow on inept reading is this: Translate "Begriff" by "concept," "Vernunft" by "reason" and "Wissenschaft" by "science" – and they are all good dictionary translations – and you have transformed the great critic of rationalism and irrationalism into a ridiculous champion of an absurd pan-logistic rationalism and scientism. The most vexing and devastating Hegel legend is that everything is thought in "thesis, antithesis, and synthesis." [ 7 ]

Karl Marx (1818–1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820–1895) adopted and extended the triad, especially in Marx's The Poverty of Philosophy (1847). Here, in Chapter 2, Marx is obsessed by the word "thesis"; [ 8 ] it forms an important part of the basis for the Marxist theory of history. [ 9 ]

2. Writing Pedagogy

In modern times, the dialectic of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis has been implemented across the world as a strategy for organizing expositional writing. For example, this technique is taught as a basic organizing principle in French schools: [ 10 ]

The French learn to value and practice eloquence from a young age. Almost from day one, students are taught to produce plans for their compositions, and are graded on them. The structures change with fashions. Youngsters were once taught to express a progression of ideas. Now they follow a dialectic model of thesis-antithesis-synthesis. If you listen carefully to the French arguing about any topic they all follow this model closely: they present an idea, explain possible objections to it, and then sum up their conclusions. ... This analytical mode of reasoning is integrated into the entire school corpus.

Thesis, Antithesis, and Synthesis has also been used as a basic scheme to organize writing in the English language. For example, the website WikiPreMed.com advocates the use of this scheme in writing timed essays for the MCAT standardized test: [ 11 ]

For the purposes of writing MCAT essays, the dialectic describes the progression of ideas in a critical thought process that is the force driving your argument. A good dialectical progression propels your arguments in a way that is satisfying to the reader. The thesis is an intellectual proposition. The antithesis is a critical perspective on the thesis. The synthesis solves the conflict between the thesis and antithesis by reconciling their common truths, and forming a new proposition.

Samuel Taylor Coleridge: Opus Maximum. Princeton University Press, 2002, p. 89.
Harry Ritter, Dictionary of Concepts in History. Greenwood Publishing Group (1986), p.114
Williams, Robert R. (1992). Recognition: Fichte and Hegel on the Other. SUNY Press. p. 46, note 37.
Fichte, Johann Gottlieb; Breazeale, Daniel (1993). Fichte: Early Philosophical Writings. Cornell University Press. p. 249.
Walter Kaufmann (1966). "§ 37". Hegel: A Reinterpretation. Anchor Books. ISBN 978-0-268-01068-3. OCLC 3168016. https://archive.org/details/hegelreinterpret00kauf.
Mueller, Gustav (1958). "The Hegel Legend of "Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis"". Journal of the History of Ideas 19 (4): 411–414. doi:10.2307/2708045. https://dx.doi.org/10.2307%2F2708045
Mueller 1958, p. 411.
marxists.org: Chapter 2 of "The Poverty of Philosophy", by Karl Marx https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1847/poverty-philosophy/ch02.htm
Shrimp, Kaleb (2009). "The Validity of Karl Marx's Theory of Historical Materialism". Major Themes in Economics 11 (1): 35–56. https://scholarworks.uni.edu/mtie/vol11/iss1/5/. Retrieved 13 September 2018.
Nadeau, Jean-Benoit; Barlow, Julie (2003). Sixty Million Frenchmen Can't Be Wrong: Why We Love France But Not The French. Sourcebooks, Inc.. p. 62. https://archive.org/details/sixtymillionfren00nade_041.
"The MCAT writing assignment.". Wisebridge Learning Systems, LLC. http://www.wikipremed.com/mcat_essay.php. Retrieved 1 November 2015.

Terms and Conditions
Privacy Policy
Advisory Board

IMAGES

Hegel's Triad of Thesis, Antithesis and Synthesis.
Thesis, antithesis, synthesis
What Is Antithesis, and How Do You Use It in Writing?
hegel sintesis tesis antitesis
Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel Quote: “Truth is found neither in the

VIDEO

Hegel
Dialectic and Praxis 12 of 18
Thesis, Anti-thesis & Synthesis
Thesis, antithesis, synthesis
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's Philosophy (Tagalog-English)
Hegel's Philosophy and the Master-Slave Dialectic (Alienation 1)

COMMENTS

Hegel's Dialectics
After using the Being-Nothing-Becoming example to argue that Hegel's dialectical method consists of "triads" whose members "are called the thesis, antithesis, synthesis" (Stace 1955 [1924]: 93), W.T. Stace, for instance, goes on to warn us that Hegel does not succeed in applying this pattern throughout the philosophical system.
Dialectic
Hegel was influenced by Johann Gottlieb Fichte's conception of synthesis, although Hegel didn't adopt Fichte's "thesis-antithesis-synthesis" language except to describe Kant's philosophy: rather, Hegel argued that such language was "a lifeless schema" imposed on various contents, whereas he saw his own dialectic as flowing out of "the inner ...
Hegel's Dialectic: A Comprehensive Overview
Hegel's dialectic is a philosophical theory developed by German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel in the early 19th century. It is based on the concept of thesis, antithesis and synthesis, which are steps in the process of progress. The thesis is an idea or statement that is the starting point of an argument.
What Is Hegel's Dialectic Method?
The first thesis, being, has turned into its antithesis, nothing. Being and nothing are opposite and the same - their truth, therefore, is that movement into and apart from each other. In other words, it is becoming. So, the dialectic leads on and on (Peter Singer, Hegel: A Very Short Introduction, 103).
Hegel For Beginners
It has "overcome and preserved" (or sublated) the stages of the thesis and antithesis to emerge as a higher rational unity. Note: This formulation of Hegel's triadic logic is convenient, but it must be emphasised that he never used the terms thesis, antithesis and synthesis. Hegel's dialectic triad also serves another logical purpose.
Hegel's Understanding of History
So Hegel uses a 'dialectical' approach to examine the course of human history. The dialectic is frequently described in terms of a thesis giving rise to its reaction, an antithesis, which contradicts or negates the thesis; and then the tension between the two is resolved by means of a synthesis of them. Then the synthesis becomes the new ...
PDF The Hegel Legend of 'Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis'
Brutalsimplifications are Marxisticspecialties. " Thesis, antithesis, ynthesis " is said to be an " absolutemethod " ofHegel's alleged " rationalism."Marx says: " Thereis in Hegel no longera historyin the order of time,but onlya sequenceof ideas in reason." Hegel,on the con- trary, says: " The time-order of historyis distinguished from the ...
Hegel's Undiscovered Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis Dialectics
For over fifty years, Hegel interpreters have rejected the former belief that Hegel used thesis-antithesis-synthesis dialectics. In this incisive analysis of Hegel's philosophy, Leonard F. Wheat shows that the modern interpretation is false. Wheat rigorously demonstrates that there are in fact thirty-eight well-concealed dialectics in Hegel's two most important works--twenty-eight in ...
Hegelian Dialectics as a Source of Inspiration for the ...
community in Hegel's original intent was to devise a method to resolve disagreements and control outcomes. The Hegelian formula is typically expressed as follows: Thesis represents an idea or opinion; antithesis represents the counter-opinion or opposite idea; synthesis represents the domain where thesis and antithesis intersect and overlap. In
Hegel's Eurocentric Triads of Dialectics and Its Transformation to
of thesis and antithesis to form a new thesis, starting the process again) [31]. Note that the antithesis is the direct opposite, the annihilation/negation, or at least the sublation, of the thesis in (1); and the synthesis in (3) is the updated thesis of (1) in a higher, richer, and fuller form to return to itself after the antithesis in (2).
Hegel's Social and Political Philosophy
First published Thu Jun 3, 2021. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) developed a philosophy based on freedom within a wider philosophical system offering novel views on topics ranging from property and punishment to morality and the state. Hegel's main work was the Elements of the Philosophy of Right (" PR ") first published in 1821.
Hegel's Undiscovered Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis Dialectics. What Only
Hegel's Undiscovered Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis Dialectics. What Only Marx and Tillich UnderstoodLEONARD F. WHEAT Amherst: Prometheus Books, 2012; 400 pp. $32.00 (hardback) - Volume 52 Issue 4
Can you provide examples of Hegelian thesis, antithesis, and synthesis
For Marx, historical dialectics that Hegel articulated are rooted in materialism. Throughout history, the thesis of wealth accumulation has collided with the antithesis that lacks wealth accumulation.
Dialectics in Psychotherapy
As Hegel wrote, a clash of thesis and antithesis may result in a new third way, a synthesis that incorporates, yet transcends, both sides of the argument. This "union of opposites" was first ...
PDF HEGEL AND STIRNER: THESIS AND ANTITHESIS
HEGEL AND STIRNER: THESIS AND ANTITHESIS LAWRENCE S. STEPELEVICH The recent profusion of studies directed to uncovering the "Young. Marx" has also provoked so me renewed interest in his contemporary, Johann Caspar Schmidt (1806-1856), better known as Max Stirner. With a few exceptions, the most important being William Brazill's
Time and Dialectic in Hegel and Heidegger
Let us first take Hegel on the relation of time and dialectic. History is the history of the self-manifestation of Absolute Spirit, and this Spirit reveals itself in a dialectical fashion. Dialectic in German Idealism has the structure of in itself, for itself, and in and for itself (Hegel) or in Fichte's terminology of thesis, antithesis, and ...
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (born August 27, 1770, Stuttgart, Württemberg [Germany]—died November 14, 1831, Berlin) was a German philosopher who developed a dialectical scheme that emphasized the progress of history and of ideas from thesis to antithesis and thence to a synthesis. Hegel was the last of the great philosophical system ...
A Study of Hegelian Dialectical Embodiment in "Nostromo" written by
Keywords: Hegel, Dialectic, Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis, Relation, Negation, Sublation, Understanding and Reason Introduction Joseph Conrad is a well-know English novelist depicting trials of the human spirit by the demands of duty and honor in his stories and novels. Conrad was a master prose stylist who brought
Hegel's Undiscovered Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis Dialectics: What Only
For over fifty years, Hegel interpreters have rejected the former belief that Hegel used thesis-antithesis-synthesis dialectics. In this incisive analysis of Hegel's philosophy, Leonard F. Wheat shows that the modern interpretation is false. Wheat rigorously demonstrates that there are in fact thirty-eight well-concealed dialectics in Hegel's ...
What is Hegel's concept of thesis, antithesis and synthesis ...
Antithesis refers to the refutation of the idea. Synthesis is the moulding of the idea and its refutations into a new idea. For instance, I can crudely write an example like this: Thesis - There is a God. Antithesis - There is a lot of bad in the world. Synthesis - There is a God but His ways are mysterious. See below: A couple of things to ...
Hegel's Undiscovered Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis Dialectics
For over fifty years, Hegel interpreters have rejected the former belief that Hegel used thesis-antithesis-synthesis dialectics. In this incisive analysis of Hegel's philosophy, Leonard F. Wheat shows that the modern interpretation is false. Wheat rigorously demonstrates that there are in fact thirty-eight well-concealed dialectics in Hegel's ...
Persuasive Writing In Three Steps: Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis
Thesis: Present the status quo, the viewpoint that is currently accepted and widely held. Antithesis: Articulate the problems with the thesis. (Hegel also called this phase "the negative.") Synthesis: Share a new viewpoint (a modified thesis) that resolves the problems. Hegel's method focused less on the search for absolute truth and more ...
Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis
In philosophy, the triad of thesis, antithesis, synthesis (German: These, Antithese, Synthese; originally: Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis) is a progression of three ideas or propositions. The first idea, the thesis, is a formal statement illustrating a point; it is followed by the second idea, the antithesis, that contradicts or negates the first; and lastly, the third idea, the synthesis ...