political equality essay

Search Menu
Browse content in Arts and Humanities
Browse content in Archaeology
Anglo-Saxon and Medieval Archaeology
Archaeological Methodology and Techniques
Archaeology by Region
Archaeology of Religion
Archaeology of Trade and Exchange
Biblical Archaeology
Contemporary and Public Archaeology
Environmental Archaeology
Historical Archaeology
History and Theory of Archaeology
Industrial Archaeology
Landscape Archaeology
Mortuary Archaeology
Prehistoric Archaeology
Underwater Archaeology
Urban Archaeology
Zooarchaeology
Browse content in Architecture
Architectural Structure and Design
History of Architecture
Residential and Domestic Buildings
Theory of Architecture
Browse content in Art
Art Subjects and Themes
History of Art
Industrial and Commercial Art
Theory of Art
Biographical Studies
Byzantine Studies
Browse content in Classical Studies
Classical History
Classical Philosophy
Classical Mythology
Classical Literature
Classical Reception
Classical Art and Architecture
Classical Oratory and Rhetoric
Greek and Roman Epigraphy
Greek and Roman Law
Greek and Roman Papyrology
Greek and Roman Archaeology
Late Antiquity
Religion in the Ancient World
Digital Humanities
Browse content in History
Colonialism and Imperialism
Diplomatic History
Environmental History
Genealogy, Heraldry, Names, and Honours
Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing
Historical Geography
History by Period
History of Emotions
History of Agriculture
History of Education
History of Gender and Sexuality
Industrial History
Intellectual History
International History
Labour History
Legal and Constitutional History
Local and Family History
Maritime History
Military History
National Liberation and Post-Colonialism
Oral History
Political History
Public History
Regional and National History
Revolutions and Rebellions
Slavery and Abolition of Slavery
Social and Cultural History
Theory, Methods, and Historiography
Urban History
World History
Browse content in Language Teaching and Learning
Language Learning (Specific Skills)
Language Teaching Theory and Methods
Browse content in Linguistics
Applied Linguistics
Cognitive Linguistics
Computational Linguistics
Forensic Linguistics
Grammar, Syntax and Morphology
Historical and Diachronic Linguistics
History of English
Language Acquisition
Language Evolution
Language Reference
Language Variation
Language Families
Lexicography
Linguistic Anthropology
Linguistic Theories
Linguistic Typology
Phonetics and Phonology
Psycholinguistics
Sociolinguistics
Translation and Interpretation
Writing Systems
Browse content in Literature
Bibliography
Children's Literature Studies
Literary Studies (Asian)
Literary Studies (European)
Literary Studies (Eco-criticism)
Literary Studies (Romanticism)
Literary Studies (American)
Literary Studies (Modernism)
Literary Studies - World
Literary Studies (1500 to 1800)
Literary Studies (19th Century)
Literary Studies (20th Century onwards)
Literary Studies (African American Literature)
Literary Studies (British and Irish)
Literary Studies (Early and Medieval)
Literary Studies (Fiction, Novelists, and Prose Writers)
Literary Studies (Gender Studies)
Literary Studies (Graphic Novels)
Literary Studies (History of the Book)
Literary Studies (Plays and Playwrights)
Literary Studies (Poetry and Poets)
Literary Studies (Postcolonial Literature)
Literary Studies (Queer Studies)
Literary Studies (Science Fiction)
Literary Studies (Travel Literature)
Literary Studies (War Literature)
Literary Studies (Women's Writing)
Literary Theory and Cultural Studies
Mythology and Folklore
Shakespeare Studies and Criticism
Browse content in Media Studies
Browse content in Music
Applied Music
Dance and Music
Ethics in Music
Ethnomusicology
Gender and Sexuality in Music
Medicine and Music
Music Cultures
Music and Religion
Music and Media
Music and Culture
Music Education and Pedagogy
Music Theory and Analysis
Musical Scores, Lyrics, and Libretti
Musical Structures, Styles, and Techniques
Musicology and Music History
Performance Practice and Studies
Race and Ethnicity in Music
Sound Studies
Browse content in Performing Arts
Browse content in Philosophy
Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art
Epistemology
Feminist Philosophy
History of Western Philosophy
Metaphysics
Moral Philosophy
Non-Western Philosophy
Philosophy of Science
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Perception
Philosophy of Action
Philosophy of Law
Philosophy of Religion
Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic
Practical Ethics
Social and Political Philosophy
Browse content in Religion
Biblical Studies
Christianity
East Asian Religions
History of Religion
Judaism and Jewish Studies
Qumran Studies
Religion and Education
Religion and Health
Religion and Politics
Religion and Science
Religion and Law
Religion and Art, Literature, and Music
Religious Studies
Browse content in Society and Culture
Cookery, Food, and Drink
Cultural Studies
Customs and Traditions
Ethical Issues and Debates
Hobbies, Games, Arts and Crafts
Lifestyle, Home, and Garden
Natural world, Country Life, and Pets
Popular Beliefs and Controversial Knowledge
Sports and Outdoor Recreation
Technology and Society
Travel and Holiday
Visual Culture
Browse content in Law
Arbitration
Browse content in Company and Commercial Law
Commercial Law
Company Law
Browse content in Comparative Law
Systems of Law
Competition Law
Browse content in Constitutional and Administrative Law
Government Powers
Judicial Review
Local Government Law
Military and Defence Law
Parliamentary and Legislative Practice
Construction Law
Contract Law
Browse content in Criminal Law
Criminal Procedure
Criminal Evidence Law
Sentencing and Punishment
Employment and Labour Law
Environment and Energy Law
Browse content in Financial Law
Banking Law
Insolvency Law
History of Law
Human Rights and Immigration
Intellectual Property Law
Browse content in International Law
Private International Law and Conflict of Laws
Public International Law
IT and Communications Law
Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law
Law and Politics
Law and Society
Browse content in Legal System and Practice
Courts and Procedure
Legal Skills and Practice
Primary Sources of Law
Regulation of Legal Profession
Medical and Healthcare Law
Browse content in Policing
Criminal Investigation and Detection
Police and Security Services
Police Procedure and Law
Police Regional Planning
Browse content in Property Law
Personal Property Law
Study and Revision
Terrorism and National Security Law
Browse content in Trusts Law
Wills and Probate or Succession
Browse content in Medicine and Health
Browse content in Allied Health Professions
Arts Therapies
Clinical Science
Dietetics and Nutrition
Occupational Therapy
Operating Department Practice
Physiotherapy
Radiography
Speech and Language Therapy
Browse content in Anaesthetics
General Anaesthesia
Neuroanaesthesia
Browse content in Clinical Medicine
Acute Medicine
Cardiovascular Medicine
Clinical Genetics
Clinical Pharmacology and Therapeutics
Dermatology
Endocrinology and Diabetes
Gastroenterology
Genito-urinary Medicine
Geriatric Medicine
Infectious Diseases
Medical Toxicology
Medical Oncology
Pain Medicine
Palliative Medicine
Rehabilitation Medicine
Respiratory Medicine and Pulmonology
Rheumatology
Sleep Medicine
Sports and Exercise Medicine
Clinical Neuroscience
Community Medical Services
Critical Care
Emergency Medicine
Forensic Medicine
Haematology
History of Medicine
Browse content in Medical Dentistry
Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery
Paediatric Dentistry
Restorative Dentistry and Orthodontics
Surgical Dentistry
Browse content in Medical Skills
Clinical Skills
Communication Skills
Nursing Skills
Surgical Skills
Medical Ethics
Medical Statistics and Methodology
Browse content in Neurology
Clinical Neurophysiology
Neuropathology
Nursing Studies
Browse content in Obstetrics and Gynaecology
Gynaecology
Occupational Medicine
Ophthalmology
Otolaryngology (ENT)
Browse content in Paediatrics
Neonatology
Browse content in Pathology
Chemical Pathology
Clinical Cytogenetics and Molecular Genetics
Histopathology
Medical Microbiology and Virology
Patient Education and Information
Browse content in Pharmacology
Psychopharmacology
Browse content in Popular Health
Caring for Others
Complementary and Alternative Medicine
Self-help and Personal Development
Browse content in Preclinical Medicine
Cell Biology
Molecular Biology and Genetics
Reproduction, Growth and Development
Primary Care
Professional Development in Medicine
Browse content in Psychiatry
Addiction Medicine
Child and Adolescent Psychiatry
Forensic Psychiatry
Learning Disabilities
Old Age Psychiatry
Psychotherapy
Browse content in Public Health and Epidemiology
Epidemiology
Public Health
Browse content in Radiology
Clinical Radiology
Interventional Radiology
Nuclear Medicine
Radiation Oncology
Reproductive Medicine
Browse content in Surgery
Cardiothoracic Surgery
Gastro-intestinal and Colorectal Surgery
General Surgery
Neurosurgery
Paediatric Surgery
Peri-operative Care
Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery
Surgical Oncology
Transplant Surgery
Trauma and Orthopaedic Surgery
Vascular Surgery
Browse content in Science and Mathematics
Browse content in Biological Sciences
Aquatic Biology
Biochemistry
Bioinformatics and Computational Biology
Developmental Biology
Ecology and Conservation
Evolutionary Biology
Genetics and Genomics
Microbiology
Molecular and Cell Biology
Natural History
Plant Sciences and Forestry
Research Methods in Life Sciences
Structural Biology
Systems Biology
Zoology and Animal Sciences
Browse content in Chemistry
Analytical Chemistry
Computational Chemistry
Crystallography
Environmental Chemistry
Industrial Chemistry
Inorganic Chemistry
Materials Chemistry
Medicinal Chemistry
Mineralogy and Gems
Organic Chemistry
Physical Chemistry
Polymer Chemistry
Study and Communication Skills in Chemistry
Theoretical Chemistry
Browse content in Computer Science
Artificial Intelligence
Computer Architecture and Logic Design
Game Studies
Human-Computer Interaction
Mathematical Theory of Computation
Programming Languages
Software Engineering
Systems Analysis and Design
Virtual Reality
Browse content in Computing
Business Applications
Computer Security
Computer Games
Computer Networking and Communications
Digital Lifestyle
Graphical and Digital Media Applications
Operating Systems
Browse content in Earth Sciences and Geography
Atmospheric Sciences
Environmental Geography
Geology and the Lithosphere
Maps and Map-making
Meteorology and Climatology
Oceanography and Hydrology
Palaeontology
Physical Geography and Topography
Regional Geography
Soil Science
Urban Geography
Browse content in Engineering and Technology
Agriculture and Farming
Biological Engineering
Civil Engineering, Surveying, and Building
Electronics and Communications Engineering
Energy Technology
Engineering (General)
Environmental Science, Engineering, and Technology
History of Engineering and Technology
Mechanical Engineering and Materials
Technology of Industrial Chemistry
Transport Technology and Trades
Browse content in Environmental Science
Applied Ecology (Environmental Science)
Conservation of the Environment (Environmental Science)
Environmental Sustainability
Environmentalist Thought and Ideology (Environmental Science)
Management of Land and Natural Resources (Environmental Science)
Natural Disasters (Environmental Science)
Nuclear Issues (Environmental Science)
Pollution and Threats to the Environment (Environmental Science)
Social Impact of Environmental Issues (Environmental Science)
History of Science and Technology
Browse content in Materials Science
Ceramics and Glasses
Composite Materials
Metals, Alloying, and Corrosion
Nanotechnology
Browse content in Mathematics
Applied Mathematics
Biomathematics and Statistics
History of Mathematics
Mathematical Education
Mathematical Finance
Mathematical Analysis
Numerical and Computational Mathematics
Probability and Statistics
Pure Mathematics
Browse content in Neuroscience
Cognition and Behavioural Neuroscience
Development of the Nervous System
Disorders of the Nervous System
History of Neuroscience
Invertebrate Neurobiology
Molecular and Cellular Systems
Neuroendocrinology and Autonomic Nervous System
Neuroscientific Techniques
Sensory and Motor Systems
Browse content in Physics
Astronomy and Astrophysics
Atomic, Molecular, and Optical Physics
Biological and Medical Physics
Classical Mechanics
Computational Physics
Condensed Matter Physics
Electromagnetism, Optics, and Acoustics
History of Physics
Mathematical and Statistical Physics
Measurement Science
Nuclear Physics
Particles and Fields
Plasma Physics
Quantum Physics
Relativity and Gravitation
Semiconductor and Mesoscopic Physics
Browse content in Psychology
Affective Sciences
Clinical Psychology
Cognitive Psychology
Cognitive Neuroscience
Criminal and Forensic Psychology
Developmental Psychology
Educational Psychology
Evolutionary Psychology
Health Psychology
History and Systems in Psychology
Music Psychology
Neuropsychology
Organizational Psychology
Psychological Assessment and Testing
Psychology of Human-Technology Interaction
Psychology Professional Development and Training
Research Methods in Psychology
Social Psychology
Browse content in Social Sciences
Browse content in Anthropology
Anthropology of Religion
Human Evolution
Medical Anthropology
Physical Anthropology
Regional Anthropology
Social and Cultural Anthropology
Theory and Practice of Anthropology
Browse content in Business and Management
Business Strategy
Business Ethics
Business History
Business and Government
Business and Technology
Business and the Environment
Comparative Management
Corporate Governance
Corporate Social Responsibility
Entrepreneurship
Health Management
Human Resource Management
Industrial and Employment Relations
Industry Studies
Information and Communication Technologies
International Business
Knowledge Management
Management and Management Techniques
Operations Management
Organizational Theory and Behaviour
Pensions and Pension Management
Public and Nonprofit Management
Strategic Management
Supply Chain Management
Browse content in Criminology and Criminal Justice
Criminal Justice
Criminology
Forms of Crime
International and Comparative Criminology
Youth Violence and Juvenile Justice
Development Studies
Browse content in Economics
Agricultural, Environmental, and Natural Resource Economics
Asian Economics
Behavioural Finance
Behavioural Economics and Neuroeconomics
Econometrics and Mathematical Economics
Economic Systems
Economic History
Economic Methodology
Economic Development and Growth
Financial Markets
Financial Institutions and Services
General Economics and Teaching
Health, Education, and Welfare
History of Economic Thought
International Economics
Labour and Demographic Economics
Law and Economics
Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics
Microeconomics
Public Economics
Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics
Welfare Economics
Browse content in Education
Adult Education and Continuous Learning
Care and Counselling of Students
Early Childhood and Elementary Education
Educational Equipment and Technology
Educational Strategies and Policy
Higher and Further Education
Organization and Management of Education
Philosophy and Theory of Education
Schools Studies
Secondary Education
Teaching of a Specific Subject
Teaching of Specific Groups and Special Educational Needs
Teaching Skills and Techniques
Browse content in Environment
Applied Ecology (Social Science)
Climate Change
Conservation of the Environment (Social Science)
Environmentalist Thought and Ideology (Social Science)
Natural Disasters (Environment)
Social Impact of Environmental Issues (Social Science)
Browse content in Human Geography
Cultural Geography
Economic Geography
Political Geography
Browse content in Interdisciplinary Studies
Communication Studies
Museums, Libraries, and Information Sciences
Browse content in Politics
African Politics
Asian Politics
Chinese Politics
Comparative Politics
Conflict Politics
Elections and Electoral Studies
Environmental Politics
European Union
Foreign Policy
Gender and Politics
Human Rights and Politics
Indian Politics
International Relations
International Organization (Politics)
International Political Economy
Irish Politics
Latin American Politics
Middle Eastern Politics
Political Methodology
Political Communication
Political Philosophy
Political Sociology
Political Behaviour
Political Economy
Political Institutions
Political Theory
Politics and Law
Public Administration
Public Policy
Quantitative Political Methodology
Regional Political Studies
Russian Politics
Security Studies
State and Local Government
UK Politics
US Politics
Browse content in Regional and Area Studies
African Studies
Asian Studies
East Asian Studies
Japanese Studies
Latin American Studies
Middle Eastern Studies
Native American Studies
Scottish Studies
Browse content in Research and Information
Research Methods
Browse content in Social Work
Addictions and Substance Misuse
Adoption and Fostering
Care of the Elderly
Child and Adolescent Social Work
Couple and Family Social Work
Developmental and Physical Disabilities Social Work
Direct Practice and Clinical Social Work
Emergency Services
Human Behaviour and the Social Environment
International and Global Issues in Social Work
Mental and Behavioural Health
Social Justice and Human Rights
Social Policy and Advocacy
Social Work and Crime and Justice
Social Work Macro Practice
Social Work Practice Settings
Social Work Research and Evidence-based Practice
Welfare and Benefit Systems
Browse content in Sociology
Childhood Studies
Community Development
Comparative and Historical Sociology
Economic Sociology
Gender and Sexuality
Gerontology and Ageing
Health, Illness, and Medicine
Marriage and the Family
Migration Studies
Occupations, Professions, and Work
Organizations
Population and Demography
Race and Ethnicity
Social Theory
Social Movements and Social Change
Social Research and Statistics
Social Stratification, Inequality, and Mobility
Sociology of Religion
Sociology of Education
Sport and Leisure
Urban and Rural Studies
Browse content in Warfare and Defence
Defence Strategy, Planning, and Research
Land Forces and Warfare
Military Administration
Military Life and Institutions
Naval Forces and Warfare
Other Warfare and Defence Issues
Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution
Weapons and Equipment

< Previous chapter
Next chapter >

5 What is Equality? Part 4: Political Equality

Published: February 2003
Cite Icon Cite
Permissions Icon Permissions

In a series of essays, I have been studying the idea of equality beginning in a principle—the abstract egalitarian principle—that states the idea in its most abstract form. This principle stipulates that government must act to make the lives of citizens better, and must act with equal concern for the life of each member. We reach a useful, practical theory about what equality requires by constructing and testing concrete interpretations—conceptions—of that principle, to decide which conception is, all things considered, the best. Of course the abstract egalitarian principle cannot decide all matters: government and politics face a variety of issues, at every level of abstraction and concreteness, that cannot be answered simply by selecting among different interpretations or conceptions of abstract equality. And yet the influence of the egalitarian principle will be pervasive for any society that accepts it. The preferred interpretation of equal concern will affect not only the design of all fundamental institutions of government, but also the particular decisions each of these institutions makes.

Signed in as

Institutional accounts.

Google Scholar Indexing
GoogleCrawler [DO NOT DELETE]

Personal account

Sign in with email/username & password
Get email alerts
Save searches
Purchase content
Activate your purchase/trial code

Institutional access

Sign in with a library card Sign in with username/password Recommend to your librarian
Institutional account management
Get help with access

Access to content on Oxford Academic is often provided through institutional subscriptions and purchases. If you are a member of an institution with an active account, you may be able to access content in one of the following ways:

IP based access

Typically, access is provided across an institutional network to a range of IP addresses. This authentication occurs automatically, and it is not possible to sign out of an IP authenticated account.

Sign in through your institution

Choose this option to get remote access when outside your institution. Shibboleth/Open Athens technology is used to provide single sign-on between your institutionâ€™s website and Oxford Academic.

Click Sign in through your institution.
Select your institution from the list provided, which will take you to your institution's website to sign in.
When on the institution site, please use the credentials provided by your institution. Do not use an Oxford Academic personal account.
Following successful sign in, you will be returned to Oxford Academic.

If your institution is not listed or you cannot sign in to your institutionâ€™s website, please contact your librarian or administrator.

Sign in with a library card

Enter your library card number to sign in. If you cannot sign in, please contact your librarian.

Society Members

Society member access to a journal is achieved in one of the following ways:

Sign in through society site

Many societies offer single sign-on between the society website and Oxford Academic. If you see â€˜Sign in through society siteâ€™ in the sign in pane within a journal:

Click Sign in through society site.
When on the society site, please use the credentials provided by that society. Do not use an Oxford Academic personal account.

If you do not have a society account or have forgotten your username or password, please contact your society.

Sign in using a personal account

Some societies use Oxford Academic personal accounts to provide access to their members. See below.

A personal account can be used to get email alerts, save searches, purchase content, and activate subscriptions.

Some societies use Oxford Academic personal accounts to provide access to their members.

Viewing your signed in accounts

Click the account icon in the top right to:

View your signed in personal account and access account management features.
View the institutional accounts that are providing access.

Signed in but can't access content

Oxford Academic is home to a wide variety of products. The institutional subscription may not cover the content that you are trying to access. If you believe you should have access to that content, please contact your librarian.

For librarians and administrators, your personal account also provides access to institutional account management. Here you will find options to view and activate subscriptions, manage institutional settings and access options, access usage statistics, and more.

Our books are available by subscription or purchase to libraries and institutions.

About Oxford Academic
Publish journals with us
University press partners
What we publish
New features
Open access
Rights and permissions
Accessibility
Advertising
Media enquiries
Oxford University Press
Oxford Languages
University of Oxford

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide

Copyright © 2024 Oxford University Press
Cookie settings
Cookie policy
Privacy policy
Legal notice

This Feature Is Available To Subscribers Only

This PDF is available to Subscribers Only

For full access to this pdf, sign in to an existing account, or purchase an annual subscription.

We will keep fighting for all libraries - stand with us!

Internet Archive Audio

This Just In
Grateful Dead
Old Time Radio
78 RPMs and Cylinder Recordings
Audio Books & Poetry
Computers, Technology and Science
Music, Arts & Culture
News & Public Affairs
Spirituality & Religion
Radio News Archive

Flickr Commons
Occupy Wall Street Flickr
NASA Images
Solar System Collection
Ames Research Center

All Software
Old School Emulation
MS-DOS Games
Historical Software
Classic PC Games
Software Library
Kodi Archive and Support File
Vintage Software
CD-ROM Software
CD-ROM Software Library
Software Sites
Tucows Software Library
Shareware CD-ROMs
Software Capsules Compilation
CD-ROM Images
ZX Spectrum
DOOM Level CD

Smithsonian Libraries
FEDLINK (US)
Lincoln Collection
American Libraries
Canadian Libraries
Universal Library
Project Gutenberg
Children's Library
Biodiversity Heritage Library
Books by Language
Additional Collections

Prelinger Archives
Democracy Now!
Occupy Wall Street
TV NSA Clip Library
Animation & Cartoons
Arts & Music
Computers & Technology
Cultural & Academic Films
Ephemeral Films
Sports Videos
Videogame Videos
Youth Media

Search the history of over 866 billion web pages on the Internet.

Mobile Apps

Wayback Machine (iOS)
Wayback Machine (Android)

Browser Extensions

Archive-it subscription.

Explore the Collections
Build Collections

Save Page Now

Capture a web page as it appears now for use as a trusted citation in the future.

Please enter a valid web address

Donate Donate icon An illustration of a heart shape

Political equality : an essay in democratic theory

Bookreader item preview, share or embed this item, flag this item for.

Graphic Violence
Explicit Sexual Content
Hate Speech
Misinformation/Disinformation
Marketing/Phishing/Advertising
Misleading/Inaccurate/Missing Metadata

plus-circle Add Review comment Reviews

Better World Books

DOWNLOAD OPTIONS

No suitable files to display here.

IN COLLECTIONS

Uploaded by station50.cebu on June 29, 2020

Political Equality: An Essay in Democratic Theory

1991, The American Political Science Review

Related Papers

Philosophy & Public Affairs

Daniel Viehoff

This essay seeks to provide a justification for the ‘egalitarian authority claim’, according to which citizens of democratic states have a moral duty to obey (at least some) democratically made laws because they are the outcome of an egalitarian procedure. It begins by considering two prominent arguments that link democratic authority to a concern for equality. Both are ultimately unsuccessful; but their failures are instructive, and help identify the conditions that a plausible defense of the egalitarian authority claim must meet. The first argument (discussed in Section II, after Section I clarifies what authority and democracy are taken to consist in) appeals to the simple idea that fairness disallows granting ourselves special privileges that we deny to others; and it suggests that fairness thus requires obeying democratic decisions rather than acting on our own judgment of the right policy. I show that this argument fails; and its failure indicates that we must invoke a less formal, more substantive understanding of equality to justify democratic authority. The second argument, recently suggested by Thomas Christiano, does just that. Democratic authority is, on this account, not justified by the formal demand for equal treatment but by the distinctive value of showing public equal respect to our fellow citizens. Such public equal respect requires treating as authoritative the democratic decisions in which citizens had an equal say. This argument does not, however, succeed in its goal either. While it plausibly establishes the value of democratic institutions, it does not provide grounds for a duty to obey democratic decisions (Section III). This essay thus develops an alternative argument, according to which egalitarian procedures have authority because, by obeying them, we can avoid acting on certain considerations that must be excluded from our intrinsically valuable egalitarian relationships. The authority of democratic decisions rests on the egalitarian fact that none of us has more of a say than any other, not on the further fact (crucial to the previous argument) that each of us has a positive say (Sections IV and V). The argument in turn helps us understand the limits of democratic authority: it is constrained not only by a demand for equality, and by considerations of justice, but also by a requirement of mutual concern without which our egalitarian relationships lack their distinctive value (Section VI).

Shlomi Segall

Equality is an undisputed political and moral value. But until quite recently, political philosophers have not fully explored its complexity. This article tackles the vast literature on equality and egalitarianism of the past thirty-five years or so, and shows how complex and multi-layered the concept of equality can be. Specifically, it unpacks three major questions we might ask about equality. We first ask what is equality. This question can be unpacked into two sub-questions. Distinguishing first between formal and distributive accounts of equality, we may ask what the currency of egalitarianism can be. The article goes through currencies such as welfare, resources, and capabilities, showing their respective strengths and weaknesses. A second important sub-question here is what is the relevant scope as well as temporal dimensions of equality. Among whom is equality valuable, and in what time-frame, precisely, is it valuable? This hints at our second major question, namely concerning the value of equality. Is equality indeed valuable, or are we confusing it for some other value, be it giving priority to the worse off, or lifting individuals above a certain threshold of deprivation. The article goes through some famous criticisms to equality's purported lack of value (the leveling down objection), explores some potential answers, and then examines the relative strength of equality's two main rivals, namely priority and sufficiency. The third major question we ask concerns what is the proper account of egalitarian justice. In particular, setting aside the question of currency, should our conception of distributive justice be informed by responsibility-sensitive accounts, or rather be focused on a responsibility-insensitive accounts that moreover place an emphasis on equality of relations rather than individuals holdings? We explore this in the two final sections, one devoted to understanding luck egalitarianism, and the other to its rival, relational egalitarianism.

Political Theory

Samuel Bagg

Robert Jubb

This paper investigates how political theorists and philosophers should understand egalitarian political demands in light of the increasingly important realist critique of much of contemporary political theory and philosophy. It suggests, first, that what Martin O'Neill has called non-intrinsic egalitarianism is, in one form at least, a potentially realistic egalitarian political project and second, that realists may be compelled to impose an egalitarian threshold on state claims to legitimacy under certain circumstances. Non-intrinsic egalitarianism can meet realism’s methodological requirements because it does not have to assume an unavailable moral consensus since it can focus on widely acknowledged bads rather than contentious claims about the good. Further, an appropriately formulated non-intrinsic egalitarianism may be a minimum requirement of an appropriately realistic claim by a political order to authoritatively structure some of its members' lives. Without at least a threshold set of egalitarian commitments, a political order seems unable to be transparent to many of its worse off members under a plausible construal of contemporary conditions.

Fabien Tarrit

The paper intends to propose an elaboration of basics for theories on inequalities, on the basis of equality as a central concern. In the first part we discuss the extent to which Rawls’s contribution is a breakthrough in the theories of justice, against utilitarianism. His Theory of Justice raises a number of debates on the nature of equality. In the second part together with a conflict that may appear between equality and basically non egalitarian values we discuss Ronald Dworkin’s and Amartya Sen’s contributions on the issue of what is to be equalized, among various candidates. In the third part, we will discuss G.A. Cohen’s contribution. His internal critique of Rawls’s theory is methodological rather than substantial, and is mainly related to the implementation of equality and to the way equality is to be applied. Mots clés : Equality, welfare, resources, capabilities, basic structure Les working papers d’économie et gestion du laboratoire Regards sont édités après présentation...

Kenneth Baynes

Philosophical Studies

Harry Brighouse

The Future of Democratic Equality, 2009 (Routledge Press), introductory chapter

Joseph Schwartz

Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy

Several democratic theorists have recently sought to vindicate the ideal of equal political power (“political equality”) by tying it to the non-derivative value of egalitarian relationships. This chapter critically discusses such arguments. It clarifies what it takes to vindicate the ideal of political equality, and distinguishes different versions of the relational egalitarian argument for it. Some such arguments appeal to the example of a society without social status inequality (such as caste or class structures); others to personal relationships among equals, like friendship. Each strategy faces problems. After discussing what social status consists in, the chapter argues that social status equality does not require an equal distribution of power, but only that unequal distributions are not justified on grounds incompatible with the citizens’ fundamental equal moral standing. By contrast, personal relationships among equals do require equal power; but establishing that their norms apply to our political community is challenging.

Res publica

Arto Laitinen

RELATED PAPERS

OPM EXPRESS LOGISTIK

Claudio Marouvo

Global Social Sciences Review

Muhammad Shabbir Ali

Dèlia Sacristán

Francis Inegbedion

Olivier Ghekiere

Interacting with Computers

Kess Asikhia

Chemical Research in Toxicology

Milano, La Vita Felice ("Saturnalia", 64). ISBN: 978-88-9346-645-5

Fabio Gasti

The Lancet Planetary Health

James Herrera

Pryazovskyi Economic Herald

Olena Prutska

Cerebral Cortex

Bertrand Thirion

Applied and Environmental Microbiology

BMC Geriatrics

Joanne Dollard

Jurnal Ekonomi Pembangunan

putri halimah

OGIRISI: a New Journal of African Studies

Nelson Udoka Ukwamedua

The Indonesian Journal of Accounting Research

Imam Wahyudi

Pädiatrie und Pädologie

Karl Krajic

British Journal of Educational Studies

Nancy Sherman

Marco Rieckmann

Third International Conference on Theoretical Issues in Machine Translation, Austin

Chrysanne Di Marco

Journal of Neurological Surgery Part A: Central European Neurosurgery

Andreas Hottinger

Surface Science

Juan Cardenas

购买英国Glasgow毕业证成绩单格拉斯哥大学毕业证成绩单

Bibliography

Academic tools.

Friends PDF Preview
Author and Citation Info
Back to Top

This article is concerned with social and political equality. In its prescriptive usage, ‘equality’ is a highly contested concept. Its normally positive connotation gives it a rhetorical power suitable for use in political slogans (Westen 1990). At least since the French Revolution, equality has served as one of the leading ideals of the body politic; in this respect, it is at present probably the most controversial of the great social ideals. There is controversy concerning the precise notion of equality, the relation of justice and equality (the principles of equality), the material requirements and measure of the ideal of equality (equality of what?), the extension of equality (equality among whom?), and its status within a comprehensive (liberal) theory of justice (the value of equality). This article will discuss each of these issues in turn.

1. Defining the Concept

2.1 formal equality, 2.2 proportional equality, 2.3 moral equality, 2.4 presumption of equality, 3.1 simple equality and objections to equality in general, 3.2 libertarianism, 3.3 utilitarianism, 3.4 equality of welfare, 3.5 equality of resources, 3.6 responsibility and luck-egalitarianism, 3.7 equality of opportunity for welfare or advantage, 3.8 capabilities approaches, 4. relational equality, 5. equality among whom, 6.1. kinds of egalitarianism, 6.2 equality vs. priority or sufficiency, other internet resources, related entries.

‘Equality’ is a contested concept: “People who praise it or disparage it disagree about what they are praising or disparaging” (Dworkin 2000, p. 2). Our first task is therefore to provide a clear definition of equality in the face of widespread misconceptions about its meaning as a political idea. The terms ‘equality’ (Greek: isotes ; Latin: aequitas , aequalitas ; French: égalité ; German Gleichheit ), ‘equal’, and ‘equally’ signify a qualitative relationship. ‘Equality’ (or ‘equal’) signifies correspondence between a group of different objects, persons, processes or circumstances that have the same qualities in at least one respect, but not all respects, i.e., regarding one specific feature, with differences in other features. ‘Equality’ must then be distinguished from ‘identity’, which refers to one and the same object corresponding to itself in all its features. For the same reason, it needs to be distinguished from ‘similarity’ – the concept of merely approximate correspondence (Dann 1975, p. 997; Menne 1962, p. 44 ff.; Westen 1990, pp. 39, 120). Thus, to say that men are equal, for example, is not to say that they are identical. Equality implies similarity rather than ‘sameness’.

Judgements of equality presume a difference between the things compared. According to this definition, the notion of ‘complete’ or ‘absolute’ equality may be seen as problematic because it would violate the presumption of a difference. Two non-identical objects are never completely equal; they are different at least in their spatiotemporal location. If things do not differ they should not be called ‘equal’, but rather, more precisely, ‘identical’, such as the morning and the evening star. Here usage might vary. Some authors do consider absolute qualitative equality admissible as a borderline concept (Tugendhat & Wolf 1983, p. 170).

‘Equality’ can be used in the very same sense both to describe and prescribe, as with ‘thin’: “you are thin” and “you are too thin”. The approach taken to defining the standard of comparison for both descriptive and prescriptive assertions of equality is very important (Oppenheim 1970). In the descriptive case, the common standard is itself descriptive, for example when two people are said to have the same weight. In the prescriptive use, the standard prescribes a norm or rule, for example when it is said people ought to be equal before the law. The standards grounding prescriptive assertions of equality contain at least two components. On the one hand, there is a descriptive component, since the assertions need to contain descriptive criteria, in order to identify those people to which the rule or norm applies. The question of this identification – who belongs to which category? – may itself be normative, as when we ask to whom the U.S. laws apply. On the other hand, the comparative standards contain something normative – a moral or legal rule, such as the U.S. laws – specifying how those falling under the norm are to be treated. Such a rule constitutes the prescriptive component (Westen 1990, chap. 3). Sociological and economic analyses of (in-)equality mainly pose the questions of how inequalities can be determined and measured and what their causes and effects are. In contrast, social and political philosophy is in general concerned mainly with the following questions: what kind of equality, if any, should obtain, and with respect to whom and when ? Such is the case in this article as well.

‘Equality’ and ‘equal’ are incomplete predicates that necessarily generate one question: equal in what respect? (Rae 1980,p. 132 f.) Equality essentially consists of a tripartite relation between two (or several) objects or persons and one (or several) qualities. Two objects A and B are equal in a certain respect if, in that respect, they fall under the same general term. ‘Equality’ denotes the relation between the objects compared. Every comparison presumes a tertium comparationis , a concrete attribute defining the respect in which the equality applies – equality thus referring to a common sharing of this comparison-determining attribute. This relevant comparative standard represents a ‘variable’ (or ‘index’) of the concept of equality that needs to be specified in each particular case (Westen 1990, p. 10); differing conceptions of equality here emerge from one or another descriptive or normative moral standard. There is another source of diversity as well: As Temkin (1986, 1993, 2009) argues, various different standards might be used to measure inequality, with the respect in which people are compared remaining constant. The difference between a general concept and different specific conceptions (Rawls 1971, p. 21 f.) of equality may explain why some people claim ‘equality’ has no unified meaning – or is even devoid of meaning. (Rae 1981, p. 127 f., 132 f.)

For this reason, it helps to think of the idea of equality or inequality, in the context of social justice, not as a single principle, but as a complex group of principles forming the basic core of today’s egalitarianism. Different principles yield different answers. Both equality and inequality are complex and multifaceted concepts (Temkin 1993, chap. 2). In any real historical context, it is clear that no single notion of equality can sweep the field (Rae 1981, p. 132). Many egalitarians concede that much of our discussion of the concept is vague, but they believe there is also a common underlying strain of important moral concerns implicit in it (Williams 1973). Above all, it serves to remind us of our common humanity, despite various differences (cf. 2.3. below). In this sense, egalitarianism is often thought of as a single, coherent normative doctrine that embraces a variety of principles. Following the introduction of different principles and theories of equality, the discussion will return in the last section to the question how best to define egalitarianism and its core value.

2. Principles of Equality and Justice

Equality in its prescriptive usage is closely linked to morality and justice, and distributive justice in particular. Since antiquity equality has been considered a constitutive feature of justice. (On the history of the concept, cf. Albernethy 1959, Benn 1967, Brown 1988, Dann 1975, Thomson 1949.) People and movements throughout history have used the language of justice to contest inequalities. But what kind of role does equality play in a theory of justice? Philosophers have sought to clarify this by defending a variety of principles and conceptions of equality. This section introduces four such principles, ranging from the highly general and uncontroversial to the more specific and controversial. The next section reviews various conceptions of the ‘currency’ of equality. Different interpretations of the role of equality in a theory of justice emerge according to which of the four principles and metrics have been adopted. The first three principles of equality hold generally and primarily for all actions upon others and affecting others, and for their resulting circumstances. From the fourth principle onward, i.e., starting with the presumption of equality, the focus will be mainly on distributive justice and the evaluation of distribution.

When two persons have equal status in at least one normatively relevant respect, they must be treated equally with regard in this respect. This is the generally accepted formal equality principle that Aristotle articulated in reference to Plato: “treat like cases as like” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics , V.3. 1131a10–b15; Politics , III.9.1280 a8–15, III. 12. 1282b18–23). The crucial question is which respects are normatively relevant and which are not. Some authors see this formal principle of equality as a specific application of a rule of rationality: it is irrational, because inconsistent, to treat equal cases unequally without sufficient reasons (Berlin 1955–56). But others claim that what is at stake here is a moral principle of justice, one reflecting the impartial and universalizable nature of moral judgments. On this view, the postulate of formal equality demands more than consistency with one’s subjective preferences: the equal or unequal treatment in question must be justifiable to the relevantly affected parties, and this on the sole basis of a situation’s objective features.

According to Aristotle, there are two kinds of equality, numerical and proportional (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics , 1130b–1132b; cf. Plato, Laws , VI.757b–c). A way of treating others, or a distribution arising from it, is equal numerically when it treats all persons as indistinguishable, thus treating them identically or granting them the same quantity of a good per capita. That is not always just. In contrast, a way of treating others or a distribution is proportional or relatively equal when it treats all relevant persons in relation to their due. Just numerical equality is a special case of proportional equality. Numerical equality is only just under special circumstances, namely when persons are equal in the relevant respects so that the relevant proportions are equal. Proportional equality further specifies formal equality; it is the more precise and comprehensive formulation of formal equality. It indicates what produces an adequate equality.

Proportional equality in the treatment and distribution of goods to persons involves at least the following concepts or variables: Two or more persons \((P_1, P_2)\) and two or more allocations of goods to persons \((G)\) and \(X\) and \(Y\) as the quantity in which individuals have the relevant normative quality \(E\). This can be represented as an equation with fractions or as a ratio. If \(P1\) has \(E\) in the amount of \(X\) and if \(P_2\) has \(E\) in the amount \(Y\), then \(P_1\) is due \(G\) in the amount of \(X'\) and \(P_2\) is due \(G\) in the amount of \(Y'\), so that the ratio \(X/Y = X'/Y'\) is valid. (For the formula to be usable, the potentially large variety of factors involved have to be both quantifiable in principle and commensurable, i.e., capable of synthesis into an aggregate value.)

When factors speak for unequal treatment or distribution, because the persons are unequal in relevant respects, the treatment or distribution proportional to these factors is just. Unequal claims to treatment or distribution must be considered proportionally: that is the prerequisite for persons being considered equally.

This principle can also be incorporated into hierarchical, inegalitarian theories. It indicates that equal output is demanded with equal input. Aristocrats, perfectionists, and meritocrats all believe that persons should be assessed according to their differing deserts, understood in the broad sense of fulfillment of some relevant criterion. Reward and punishment, benefits and burdens, should be proportional to such deserts. Since this definition leaves open who is due what, there can be great inequality when it comes to presumed fundamental (natural) rights, deserts, and worth -– this is apparent in both Plato and Aristotle.

Aristotle’s idea of justice as proportional equality contains a fundamental insight. The idea offers a framework for a rational argument between egalitarian and non-egalitarian ideas of justice, its focal point being the question of the basis for an adequate equality (Hinsch 2003). Both sides accept justice as proportional equality. Aristotle’s analysis makes clear that the argument involves those features that decide whether two persons are to be considered equal or unequal in a distributive context.

On the formal level of pure conceptual explication, justice and equality are linked through these formal and proportional principles. Justice cannot be explained without these equality principles, which themselves only receive their normative significance in their role as principles of justice.

Formal and proportional equality is simply a conceptual schema. It needs to be made precise – i.e., its open variables need to be filled out. The formal postulate remains empty as long as it is unclear when, or through what features, two or more persons or cases should be considered equal. All debates over the proper conception of justice – over who is due what – can be understood as controversies over the question of which cases are equal and which unequal (Aristotle, Politics , 1282b 22). For this reason, equality theorists are correct in stressing that the claim that persons are owed equality becomes informative only when one is told what kind of equality they are owed (Nagel 1979; Rae 1981; Sen 1992, p. 13). Every normative theory implies a certain notion of equality. In order to outline their position, egalitarians must thus take account of a specific (egalitarian) conception of equality. To do so, they need to identify substantive principles of equality, which are discussed below.

Until the eighteenth century, it was assumed that human beings are unequal by nature. This postulate collapsed with the advent of the idea of natural right, which assumed a natural order in which all human beings were equal. Against Plato and Aristotle, the classical formula for justice according to which an action is just when it offers each individual his or her due took on a substantively egalitarian meaning in the course of time: everyone deserved the same dignity and respect. This is now the widely held conception of substantive, universal, moral equality. It developed among the Stoics, who emphasized the natural equality of all rational beings, and in early New Testament Christianity, which envisioned that all humans were equal before God, although this principle was not always adhered to in the later history of the church. This important idea was also taken up both in the Talmud and in Islam, where it was grounded in both Greek and Hebraic elements. In the modern period, starting in the seventeenth century, the dominant idea was of natural equality in the tradition of natural law and social contract theory. Hobbes (1651) postulated that in their natural condition, individuals possess equal rights, because over time they have the same capacity to do each other harm. Locke (1690) argued that all human beings have the same natural right to both (self-)ownership and freedom. Rousseau (1755) declared social inequality to be the result of a decline from the natural equality that characterized our harmonious state of nature, a decline catalyzed by the human urge for perfection, property and possessions (Dahrendorf 1962). For Rousseau (1755, 1762), the resulting inequality and rule of violence can only be overcome by binding individual subjectivity to a common civil existence and popular sovereignty. In Kant’s moral philosophy (1785), the categorical imperative formulates the equality postulate of universal human worth. His transcendental and philosophical reflections on autonomy and self-legislation lead to a recognition of the same freedom for all rational beings as the sole principle of human rights (Kant 1797, p. 230). Such Enlightenment ideas stimulated the great modern social movements and revolutions, and were taken up in modern constitutions and declarations of human rights. During the French Revolution, equality, along with freedom and fraternity, became a basis of the Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen of 1789.

The principle that holds that human beings, despite their differences, are to be regarded as one another’s equals, is often also called ‘human equality’ or ‘basic equality’ or ‘equal worth’ or ‘human dignity’ (William 1962, Vlastos 1962, Kateb 2014, Waldron 2017, Rosen 2018). Whether these terms are synonyms is a matter of interpretation, but “they cluster together to form a powerful body of principle” (Waldron 2017, p. 3).

This fundamental idea of equal respect for all persons and of the equal worth or equal dignity of all human beings (Vlastos 1962) is widely accepted (Carter 2011, but see also Steinhoff 2015). In a period in which there is not agreement across the members of a complex society to any one metaphysical, religious, or traditional view (Habermas 1983, p. 53, 1992, pp. 39–44), it appears impossible to peacefully reach a general agreement on common political aims without accepting that persons must be treated as equals. As a result, moral equality constitutes the ‘egalitarian plateau’ for all contemporary political theories (Kymlicka 1990, p. 5).

Fundamental equality means that persons are alike in important relevant and specified respects alone, and not that they are all generally the same or can be treated in the same way (Nagel 1991). In a now commonly posed distinction, stemming from Dworkin (1977, p. 227), moral equality can be understood as prescribing treatment of persons as equals, i.e., with equal concern and respect, and not the often implausible principle of providing all persons with equal treatment. Recognizing that human beings are all equally individual does not mean treating them uniformly in any respects other than those in which they clearly have a moral claim to be treated alike.

Disputes arise, of course, concerning what these claims amount to and how they should be resolved. Philosophical debates are concerned with the kind of equal treatment normatively required when we mutually consider ourselves persons with equal dignity. The principle of moral equality is too abstract and needs to be made concrete if we are to arrive at a clear moral standard. Nevertheless, no conception of just equality can be deduced from the notion of moral equality. Rather, we find competing philosophical conceptions of equal treatment serving as interpretations of moral equality. These need to be assessed according to their degree of fidelity to the deeper ideal of moral equality (Kymlicka 1990, p. 44).

Many conceptions of equality operate along procedural lines involving a presumption of equality . More materially concrete, ethical approaches, as described in the next section below, are concerned with distributive criteria – the presumption of equality, in contrast, is a formal, procedural principle of construction located on a higher formal and argumentative level. What is at stake here is the question of the principle with which a material conception of justice should be constructed, particularly once the approaches described above prove inadequate. The presumption of equality is a prima facie principle of equal distribution for all goods politically suited for the process of public distribution. In the domain of political justice, all members of a given community, taken together as a collective body, have to decide centrally on the fair distribution of social goods, as well as on the distribution’s fair realization. Any claim to a particular distribution, including any existing distributive scheme, has to be impartially justified, i.e., no ownership should be recognized without justification. Applied to this political domain, the presumption of equality requires that everyone should get an equal share in the distribution unless certain types of differences are relevant and justify, through universally acceptable reasons, unequal shares. (With different terms and arguments, this principle is conceived as a presumption by Benn & Peters (1959, 111) and by Bedau (1967, 19); as a relevant reasons approach by Williams (1973); as a conception of symmetry by Tugendhat (1993, 374; 1997, chap. 3); as default option by Hinsch (2002, chap. 5); for criticism of the presumption of equality, cf. Westen (1990, chap. 10).) This presumption results in a principle of prima facie equal distribution for all distributable goods. A strict principle of equal distribution is not required, but it is morally necessary to justify impartially any unequal distribution. The burden of proof lies on the side of those who favor any form of unequal distribution. (For a justification of the presumption in favor of equality s. Gosepath 2004, II.8.; Gosepath 2015.)

The presumption of equality provides an elegant procedure for constructing a theory of distributive justice (Gosepath 2004). One has only to analyze what can justify unequal treatment or unequal distribution in different spheres. To put it briefly, the following postulates of equality are at present generally considered morally required.

Strict equality is called for in the legal sphere of civil freedoms, since – putting aside limitation on freedom as punishment – there is no justification for any exceptions. As follows from the principle of formal equality, all citizens must have equal general rights and duties, which are grounded in general laws that apply to all. This is the postulate of legal equality. In addition, the postulate of equal freedom is equally valid: every person should have the same freedom to structure his or her life, and this in the most far-reaching manner possible in a peaceful and appropriate social order.

In the political sphere, the possibilities for political participation should be equally distributed. All citizens have the same claim to participation in forming public opinion, and in the distribution, control, and exercise of political power. This is the postulate – requiring equal opportunity – of equal political power sharing. To ensure equal opportunity, social institutions have to be designed in such a way that persons who are disadvantaged, e.g. have a stutter or a low income, have an equal chance to make their views known and to participate fully in the democratic process.

In the social sphere, equally gifted and motivated citizens must have approximately the same chances to obtain offices and positions, independent of their economic or social class and native endowments. This is the postulate of fair equality of social opportunity. Any unequal outcome must nevertheless result from equality of opportunity, i.e., qualifications alone should be the determining factor, not social background or influences of milieu.

The equality required in the economic sphere is complex, taking account of several positions that – each according to the presumption of equality – justify a turn away from equality. A salient problem here is what constitutes justified exceptions to equal distribution of goods, the main subfield in the debate over adequate conceptions of distributive equality and its currency. The following factors are usually considered eligible for justified unequal treatment: (a) need or differing natural disadvantages (e.g. disabilities); (b) existing rights or claims (e.g. private property); (c) differences in the performance of special services (e.g. desert, efforts, or sacrifices); (d) efficiency; and (e) compensation for direct and indirect or structural discrimination (e.g. affirmative action).

These factors play an essential, albeit varied, role in the following alternative egalitarian theories of distributive justice. These offer different accounts of what should be equalized in the economic sphere. Most can be understood as applications of the presumption of equality (whether they explicitly acknowledge it or not); only a few (like strict equality, libertarianism, and sufficiency) are alternatives to the presumption.

3. Conceptions of Distributive Equality: Equality of What?

Every effort to interpret the concept of equality and to apply the principles of equality mentioned above demands a precise measure of the parameters of equality. We need to know the dimensions within which the striving for equality is morally relevant. What follows is a brief review of the seven most prominent conceptions of distributive equality, each offering a different answer to one question: in the field of distributive justice, what should be equalized, or what should be the parameter or “currency” of equality?

Simple equality, meaning everyone being furnished with the same material level of goods and services, represents a strict position as far as distributive justice is concerned. It is generally rejected as untenable.

Hence, with the possible exception of Babeuf (1796) and Shaw (1928), no prominent author or movement has demanded strict equality. Since egalitarianism has come to be widely associated with the demand for economic equality, and this in turn with communistic or socialistic ideas, it is important to stress that neither communism nor socialism – despite their protest against poverty and exploitation and their demand for social security for all citizens – calls for absolute economic equality. The orthodox Marxist view of economic equality was expounded in the Critique of the Gotha Program (1875). Marx here rejects the idea of legal equality, on three grounds. First, he indicates, equality draws on a limited number of morally relevant perspectives and neglects others, thus having unequal effects. In Marx’s view, the economic structure is the most fundamental basis for the historical development of society, and is thus the point of reference for explaining its features. Second, theories of justice have concentrated excessively on distribution instead of the basic questions of production. Third, a future communist society needs no law and no justice, since social conflicts will have vanished.

As an idea, simple equality fails because of problems that are raised in regards to equality in general. It is useful to review these problems, as they require resolution in any plausible approach to equality.

(i) We need adequate indices for the measurement of the equality of the goods to be distributed. Through what concepts should equality and inequality be understood? It is thus clear that equality of material goods can lead to unequal satisfaction. Money constitutes a typical, though inadequate, index; at the very least, equal opportunity has to be conceived in other terms.

(ii) The time span needs to be indicated for realizing the desired model of equal distribution (McKerlie 1989, Sikora 1989). Should we seek to equalize the goods in question over complete individual lifetimes, or should we seek to ensure that various life segments are as equally provisioned as possible?

(iii) Equality distorts incentives promoting achievement in the economic field, and the administrative costs of redistribution produce wasteful inefficiencies (Okun 1975). Equality and efficiency need to be balanced. Often, Pareto-optimality is demanded in this respect, usually by economists. A social condition is Pareto-optimal or Pareto-efficient when it is not possible to shift to another condition judged better by at least one person and worse by none (Sen 1970, chap. 2, 2*). A widely discussed alternative to the Pareto principle is the Kaldor-Hicks welfare criterion. This stipulates that a rise in social welfare is always present when the benefits accruing through the distribution of value in a society exceed the corresponding costs. A change thus becomes desirable when the winners in such a change could compensate the losers for their losses, and still retain a substantial profit. In contrast to the Pareto-criterion, the Kaldor-Hicks criterion contains a compensation rule (Kaldor 1939). For purposes of economic analysis, such theoretical models of optimal efficiency make a great deal of sense. However, the analysis is always made relative to a starting situation that can itself be unjust and unequal. A society can thus be (close to) Pareto-optimality – i.e., no one can increase his or her material goods or freedoms without diminishing those of someone else – while also displaying enormous inequalities in the distribution of the same goods and freedoms. For this reason, egalitarians claim that it may be necessary to reduce Pareto-optimality for the sake of justice, if there is no more egalitarian distribution that is also Pareto-optimal. In the eyes of their critics, equality of whatever kind should not lead to some people having to make do with less, when this equalizing down does not benefit any of those who are in a worse position.

(iv) Moral objections : A strict and mechanical equal distribution between all individuals does not sufficiently take into account the differences among individuals and their situations. In essence, since individuals desire different things, why should everyone receive the same goods? Intuitively, for example, we can recognize that a sick person has other claims than a healthy person, and furnishing each with the same goods would be mistaken. With simple equality, personal freedoms are unacceptably limited and distinctive individual qualities insufficiently acknowledged; in this way they are in fact unequally regarded. Furthermore, persons not only have a moral right to their own needs being considered, but a right and a duty to take responsibility for their own decisions and the resulting consequences.

Working against the identification of distributive justice with simple equality, a basic postulate of many present-day egalitarians is as follows: human beings are themselves responsible for certain inequalities resulting from their free decisions; aside from minimum aid in emergencies, they deserve no recompense for such inequalities (but cf. relational egalatarians, discussed in Section 4 ). On the other hand, they are due compensation for inequalities that are not the result of self-chosen options. For egalitarians, the world is morally better when equality of life conditions prevail. This is an amorphous ideal demanding further clarification. Why is such equality an ideal, and what precise currency of equality does it involve?

By the same token, most egalitarians do not advocate an equality of outcome, but different kinds of equality of opportunity, due to their emphasis on a pair of morally central points: that individuals are responsible for their decisions, and that the only things to be considered objects of equality are those which serve the real interests of individuals. The opportunities to be equalized between people can be opportunities for well-being (i.e. objective welfare), or for preference satisfaction (i.e., subjective welfare), or for resources. It is not equality of objective or subjective well-being or resources themselves that should be equalized, but an equal opportunity to gain the well-being or resources one aspires to. Such equality depends on their being a realm of options for each individual equal to the options enjoyed by all other persons, in the sense of the same prospects for fulfillment of preferences or the possession of resources. The opportunity must consist of possibilities one can really take advantage of. Equal opportunity prevails when human beings effectively enjoy equal realms of possibility.

(v) Simple equality is very often associated with equality of results (although these are two distinct concepts). However, to strive only for equality of results is problematic. To illustrate the point, let us briefly limit the discussion to a single action and the event or state of affairs resulting from it. Arguably, actions should not be judged solely by the moral quality of their results, as important as this may be. One must also consider the way in which the events or circumstances to be evaluated have come about. Generally speaking, a moral judgement requires not only the assessment of the results of the action in question (the consequentialist aspect) but, first and foremost, the assessment of the intention of the actor (the deontological aspect). The source and its moral quality influence the moral judgement of the results (Pogge 1999, sect. V). For example, if you strike me, your blow will hurt me; the pain I feel may be considered bad in itself, but the moral status of your blow will also depend on whether you were (morally) allowed such a gesture (perhaps through parental status, although that is controversial) or even obliged to execute it (e.g. as a police officer preventing me from doing harm to others), or whether it was in fact prohibited but not prevented. What is true of individual actions (or their omission) has to be true mutatis mutandis of social institutions and circumstances like distributions resulting from collective social actions (or their omission). Social institutions should therefore be assessed not only on the basis of information about how they affect individual quality of life. A society in which people starve on the streets is certainly marked by inequality; nevertheless, its moral quality, i.e., whether the society is just or unjust with regard to this problem, also depends on the suffering’s causes. Does the society allow starvation as an unintended but tolerable side effect of what its members see as a just distributive scheme? Indeed, does it even defend the suffering as a necessary means, as with forms of Social Darwinism? Or has the society taken measures against starvation which have turned out to be insufficient? In the latter case, whether the society has taken such steps for reasons of political morality or efficiency again makes a moral difference. Hence even for egalitarians, equality of results is too narrow and one-sided a focus.

(vi) Finally, there is a danger of (strict) equality leading to uniformity, rather than to a respect for pluralism and democracy (Cohen 1989; Arneson 1993). In the contemporary debate, this complaint has been mainly articulated in feminist and multiculturalist theory. A central tenet of feminist theory is that gender has been and remains a historically variable and internally differentiated relation of domination. The same holds for so-called racial and ethnic differences, which are often still conceived of as marking different values. The different groups involved here rightly object to their discrimination, marginalization, and domination, and an appeal to equality of status thus seems a solution. However, as feminists and multiculturalists have pointed out, equality, as usually understood and practiced, is constituted in part by a denial and ranking of differences; as a result it seems less useful as an antidote to relations of domination. “Equality” can often mean the assimilation to a pre-existing and problematic ‘male’ or ‘white’ or ‘middle class’ norm. In short, domination and a fortiori inequality often arises out of an inability to appreciate and nurture differences, not out of a failure to see everyone as the same. To recognize these differences should however not lead to an essentialism grounded in sexual or cultural characteristics. There is a crucial debate between those who insist that sexual, racial, and ethnic differences should become irrelevant, on the one hand, and those believing that such differences, even though culturally relevant, should not furnish a basis for inequality: that one should rather find mechanisms for securing equality, despite valued differences. Neither of these strategies involves rejecting equality. The dispute is about how equality is to be attained (McKinnon 1989, Taylor 1992).

Proposing a connection between equality and pluralism, Michael Walzer’s theory (1983) aims at what he calls “complex equality”. According to Walzer, relevant reasons can only speak in favor of distributing specific types of goods in specific spheres, not in several or all spheres. Against a theory of simple equality promoting equal distribution of dominant goods, which underestimates the complexity of the criteria at work in each given sphere, the dominance of particular goods needs to be ended. For instance, purchasing power in the political sphere through means derived from the economic sphere (i.e., money) must be prevented. Walzer’s theory of complex equality is not actually aimed at equality per se, but at the separation of spheres of justice; the theory’s designation is misleading. Any theory of equality should, however, as per Walzer, avoid monistic conceptions and recognize instead the complexity of life and the plurality of criteria for justice.

The preceding considerations yield the following desideratum: instead of simple equality, a more complex equality needs to be conceptualized. That concept should resolve the problems discussed above through a distinction of various classes of goods, a separation of spheres, and a differentiation of relevant criteria.

Libertarianism and economic liberalism represent minimalist positions in relation to distributive justice. Citing Locke, they both postulate an original right to freedom and property, thus arguing against redistribution and social rights and for the free market (Nozick 1974; Hayek 1960). They assert an opposition between equality and freedom: the individual (natural) right to freedom can be limited only for the sake of foreign and domestic peace. For this reason, libertarians consider maintaining public order the state’s only legitimate duty. They assert a natural right to self-ownership (the philosophical term for “ownership of oneself” – i.e., one’s will, body, work, etc.) that entitles everybody to hitherto unowned bits of the external world by means of mixing their labor with it. All individuals can thus claim property if “enough and as good” is left over for others (Locke’s proviso). Correspondingly, they defend market freedoms and oppose the use of redistributive taxation schemes for the sake of egalitarian social justice. A principal objection to libertarian theory is that its interpretation of the Lockean proviso – nobody’s situation should be worsened through an initial acquisition of property – leads to an excessively weak requirement and is thus unacceptable (Kymlicka 1990, pp.108–117). However, with a broader and more adequate interpretation of what it means for one a situation to be worse than another, it is much more difficult to justify private appropriation and, a fortiori , all further ownership rights. If the proviso recognizes the full range of interests and alternatives that self-owners have, then it will not generate unrestricted rights over unequal amounts of resources. Another objection is that precisely if one’s own free accomplishment is what is meant to count, as the libertarians argue, success should not depend strictly on luck, extraordinary natural gifts, inherited property, and status. In other words, equal opportunity also needs to at least be present as a counterbalance, ensuring that the fate of human beings is determined by their decisions and not by unavoidable social circumstances. Equal opportunity thus seems to be the frequently vague minimal formula at work in every egalitarian conception of distributive justice. Many egalitarians, however, wish for more – namely, an equality of (at least basic) life conditions .

In any event, with a shift away from a strictly negative idea of freedom, economic liberalism can indeed itself point the way to more social and economic equality. For with such a shift, what is at stake is not only assuring an equal right to self-defense, but also furnishing everyone more or less the same chance to actually make use of the right to freedom (e.g. Van Parijs 1995, Steiner 1994, Otsuka 2005). In other words, certain basic goods need to be furnished to assure the equitable or “fair value of the basic liberties” (Rawls 1993, pp. 356–63).

It is possible to interpret utilitarianism as concretizing moral equality – and this in a way meant to offer the same consideration to the interests of all human beings (Kymlicka 1990, pp. 31f., Hare 1981, p. 26, Sen 1992, pp. 13f.). From the utilitarian perspective, since everyone counts as one and no one as more than one (Bentham), the interests of all should be treated equally without consideration of contents of interest or an individual’s material situation. For utilitarianism, this means that all enlightened personal interests have to be fairly aggregated. The morally proper action is the one that maximizes utility (Hare 1984). This conception of equal treatment has been criticized as inadequate by many opponents of utilitarianism. At least in utilitarianism’s classical form – so the critique reads – the hoped for moral equality is flawed, because all desires are taken up by the utilitarian calculation, including “selfish” and “external” preferences (Dworkin 1977, p. 234) that are meant to all have equal weight, even when they diminish the ‘rights’ and intentions of others. This conflicts with our everyday understanding of equal treatment. What is here at play is an argument involving “offensive” and “expensive” taste: a person cannot expect others to sustain his or her desires at the expense of their own (Kymlicka 1990, p. 40 f.). Rather, according to generally shared conviction, equal treatment consistently requires a basis of equal rights and resources that cannot be taken away from one person, whatever the desire of others. In line with Rawls (1971, pp. 31, 564, cf. 450), many hold that justice entails according no value to interests insofar as they conflict with justice. According to this view, unjustified preferences will not distort the mutual claims people have on each other. Equal treatment has to consist of everyone being able to claim a fair portion, and not in all interests having the same weight in disposal over my portion. Utilitarians cannot admit any restrictions on interests based on morals or justice. As long as utilitarian theory lacks a concept of justice and fair allocation, it must fail in its goal of treating everyone as equals. As Rawls (1971, pp. 27) also famously argues, utilitarianism that involves neglecting the separateness of persons does not contain a proper interpretation of moral equality as equal respect for each individual.

The concept of welfare equality is motivated by an intuition that when it comes to political ethics, what is at stake is individual well-being. The central criterion for justice must consequently be equalizing the level of welfare. But taking welfare as what is to be equalized leads to difficulties resembling those of utilitarianism. If one contentiously identifies subjective welfare with preference satisfaction, it seems implausible to count all individual preferences as equal, some – such as the desire to do others wrong – being inadmissible on grounds of justice (the offensive taste argument). Any welfare-centered concept of equality grants people with refined and expensive taste more resources – something distinctly at odds with our moral intuitions (the expensive taste argument) (Dworkin 1981a). However, satisfaction in the fulfillment of desires cannot serve as a standard, since we wish for more than a simple feeling of happiness. A more viable standard for welfare comparisons would seem to be success in the fulfillment of preferences. A fair evaluation of such success cannot be purely subjective, but requires a standard of what should or could have been achieved. This itself involves an assumption regarding just distribution, so it cannot stand as an independent criterion for justice. Another serious problem with any welfare-centered concept of equality is that it cannot take account of either desert (Feinberg 1970) or personal responsibility for one’s own well-being, to the extent this is possible and reasonable.

Represented above all by both Rawls and Dworkin, resource equality avoids such problems (Rawls 1971; Dworkin 1981b). It holds individuals responsible for their decisions and actions, but not for circumstances beyond their control, such as race, sex, skin-color, intelligence, and social position, thus excluding these as distributive criteria. Equal opportunity is insufficient because it does not compensate for unequal innate gifts. What applies for social circumstances should also apply for such gifts, as both are purely arbitrary from a moral point of view.

According to Rawls, human beings should have the same initial expectations of “basic goods,” i.e., all-purpose goods; this in no way precludes ending up with different quantities of such goods or resources, as a result of personal economic decisions and actions. When prime importance is accorded an assurance of equal basic freedoms and rights, inequalities are just when they fulfill two provisos: on the one hand, they have to be linked to offices and positions open to everyone under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; on the other hand, they have to reflect the famous ‘difference principle’ in offering the greatest possible advantage to the least advantaged members of society (Rawls 1993, p. 5 f.; 1971, § 13). Otherwise, the economic order requires revision. Due to the argument of the moral arbitrariness of talents, the commonly accepted criteria for merit (like productivity, working hours, effort) are clearly relativized. The difference principle only allows the talented to earn more to the extent this raises the lowest incomes. According to Rawls, with regard to the basic structure of society, the difference principle should be opted for under a self-chosen “veil of ignorance” regarding personal and historical circumstances and similar factors: the principle offers a general assurance of not totally succumbing to the hazards of a free market situation; and everyone does better than with inevitably inefficient total equal distribution, whose level of well-being is below that of those worst off under the difference principle.

Since Rawls’ Theory of Justice is the classical focal point of present-day political philosophy, it is worth noting the different ways his theory claims to be egalitarian. First, Rawls upholds a natural basis for equal human worth: a minimal capacity for having a conception of the good and a sense of justice. Second, through the device of the “veil of ignorance,” people are conceived as equals in the “original position.” Third, the idea of sharing this “original position” presupposes the parties having political equality, as equal participants in the process of choosing the principles by which they would be governed. Fourth, Rawls proposes fair equality of opportunity. Fifth, he maintains that all desert must be institutionally defined, depending on the goals of the society. No one deserves his or her talents or circumstances, which are products of the natural lottery. Finally, the difference principle tends toward equalizing holdings. However, it is important to keep in mind, as Scheffler (2003) has pointed out, that the main focus of Rawls’ theory is justice as such; it is only secondarily about an egalitarian conception of justice. In addition, since the primary subject is the basic structure, pure procedural justice has priority over distributive or allocative justice Equality is not the only or single value for Rawls.

Dworkin’s equality of resources (1981b), on the other hand, is concerned with equality as such. His theory stakes a claim to being even more ‘ambition- and endowment-insensitive’ than Rawls’ theory. Unequal distribution of resources is considered fair only when it results from the decisions and intentional actions of those concerned. Dworkin proposes a hypothetical auction in which everyone can accumulate bundles of resources through equal means of payment, so that in the end no one is jealous of another’s bundle (the envy test). The auction-procedure also offers a way to precisely measure equality of resources: the measure of resources devoted to a person’s life is defined by the importance of the resources to others (Dworkin 1981b, p. 290). In the free market, how the distribution then develops depends on an individual’s ambitions. The inequalities that thus emerge are justified, since one has to take responsibility for how one’s choices turn out (i.e., one’s “option luck”) in the realm of personal responsibility. In contrast, unjustified inequalities based on different innate provisions and gifts, as well as on brute luck, should be compensated for through a fictive differentiated insurance system: its premiums are established behind Dworkin’s own “veil of ignorance,” in order to then be distributed in real life to everyone and collected in taxes. For Dworkin, this is the key to the natural lottery being balanced fairly, preventing a “slavery of the talented” through excessive redistribution.

Only some egalitarians hold inequality to be bad per se. Most of today’s egalitarians are pluralistic, recognizing other values besides equality. So called luck-egalitarians regard the moral significance of choice and responsibility as one of the most important values besides equality (for an overview over the debate see Lippert-Rasmussen 2015). They hold that it is bad – unjust or unfair – for some to be worse off than others through no fault or choice of their own (Temkin 1993, 13) and therefore strive to eliminate involuntary disadvantages, for which the sufferer cannot be held responsible (Cohen 1989, 916).

The principle of responsibility provides a central normative vantage point for deciding on which grounds one might justify which inequality. The positive formulation of the responsibility principle requires an assumption of personal responsibility and holds that inequalities which are the result of self-chosen options are just. (See above all Dworkin, 1981b, p. 311; contra: Anderson, 1999.) Unequal portions of social goods are thus fair when they result from the decisions and intentional actions of those concerned. Individuals must accept responsibility for the costs of their decisions. Persons are themselves responsible for certain inequalities that result from their voluntary decisions, and they deserve no compensation for such inequalities, aside from minimal provisions in cases of dire need (see below). In its negative formulation , the responsibility principle holds that inequalities which are not the result of self-chosen options are to be rejected as unjust; persons disadvantaged in this way deserve compensation. That which one can do nothing about, or for which one is not responsible, cannot constitute a relevant criterion. Still, the initial assumption remains an ascription of responsibility, and each individual case requires close scrutiny: one is responsible and accountable unless there is an adequate reason for being considered otherwise (but cf. Stemplowska 2013 for a different interpretation)..

If advantages or disadvantages that are due to arbitrary and unearned differences are unfair, this holds for social circumstances as well as natural endowments. The reasons favoring an exclusion of features like skin-color, size, sex, and place of origin as primarily discriminative apply equally to other natural human qualities, like intelligence, appearance, physical strength, and so forth. The kind and the extent of one’s natural abilities are due to a lottery of nature; considered from a moral standpoint, their distribution is purely arbitrary (Rawls, 1971, § 48). To sum up: natural and social endowment must not count, and personal intentions and voluntary decisions should count. Thus, a given social order is just when it equalizes as much as possible, and in a normatively tenable way, all personal disadvantages for which an individual is not responsible, and accords individuals the capacity to bear the consequences of their decisions and actions, as befits their capacity for autonomy.

Objections to all versions of “brute-luck egalitarianism” come from two sides. Some authors criticize its in their view unjustified or excessively radical rejection of merit: The luck-egalitarian thesis of desert only being justifiably acknowledged if it involves desert “all the way down” (Nozick 1974, p. 225) not only destroys the classical, everyday principle of desert, since everything has a basis that we ourselves have not created. In the eyes of such critics, along with the merit-principle this argument also destroys our personal identity, since we can no longer accredit ourselves with our own capacities and accomplishments. (Cf. the texts in Pojman & McLeod 1998, Olsaretti 2003.) Other authors consider the criterion for responsibility to be too strong, indeed inhuman (or “harsh”) in its consequences, since human beings responsible for their own misery would (supposedly) be left alone with their misery (Anderson 1999, also MacLeod 1998, Scheffler 2003, Wolff 1998, Fleurbaey 1995, Voigt 2007, Eyal 2017, Olsaretti 2009, Stemplowska 2009). However, pluralistic egalitarians should be able to argue that there are special cases, in which people are so badly off that they should be helped, even if they got into the miserable situation through their own fault. But even when people are in terrible situations, which did not arise through their own fault (‘bad brute luck’) – for instance, when they are disabled from birth – and egalitarians therefore have reasons to help them, these reasons are supposedly stigmatizing, since in these cases the principles of distribution would be based on pity. In these cases, political institutions have to take certain decisions – for example, in which category a particular case of distress should be placed – and gather relevant information on their citizens. Against such a procedure, one could object that it subjects the citizens to the tutelage of the state and harms their private sphere (Anderson 1999, also Hayek 1960: 85–102).

Approaches based on equality of opportunity can be read as revisions of both welfarism and resourcism. Ranged against welfarism and designed to avoid its pitfalls, they incorporate the powerful ideas of choice and responsibility into various, improved forms of egalitarianism. Such approaches are meant to equalize outcomes resulting from causes beyond a person’s control (i.e., beyond circumstances or endowment), but to allow differential outcomes that result from autonomous choice or ambition. But the approaches are also aimed at maintaining the insight that individual preferences have to count, as the sole basis for a necessary linkage back to the individual perspective: otherwise, there is an overlooking of the person’s value. In Arneson’s (1989, 1990) concept of equal opportunity for welfare , the preferences determining the measure of individual well-being are meant to be conceived hypothetically – i.e., a person would decide on them after a process of ideal reflection. In order to correspond to the morally central vantage of personal responsibility, what should be equalized are not enlightened preferences themselves, but rather real opportunities to achieve or receive a good, to the extent that it is aspired to. G.A. Cohen’s (1989, p. 916 f.) broader conception of equality of access to advantage attempts to integrate the perspectives of welfare equality and resource equality through the overriding concept of advantage. For Cohen, there are two grounds for egalitarian compensation. Egalitarians will be moved to furnish a paralyzed person with a compensatory wheelchair independently of the person’s welfare level. This egalitarian response to disability overrides equality of (opportunity to) welfare. Egalitarians also favor compensation for phenomena such as pain, independent of any loss of capacity – for instance by paying for expensive medicine. But, Cohen claims, any justification for such compensation has to invoke the idea of equality of opportunity to welfare. He thus views both aspects, resources and welfare, as necessary and irreducible. Much of Roemer’s (1998) more technical argument is devoted to constructing the scale to calibrate the extent to which something is the result of circumstances. An incurred adverse consequence is the result of circumstances, not choice, precisely to the extent that it is a consequence that persons of one or another specific type can be expected to incur.

Theories that limit themselves to the equal distribution of basic means, in the hope of doing justice to the different goals of all human beings, are often criticized as fetishistic, because they focus on means as opposed to what individuals gain with these means (Sen 1980). The value that goods have for someone depends on objective possibilities, the natural environment, and individual capacities. Hence, in contrast to the resourcist approach, Amartya Sen proposes orientating distribution around “capabilities to achieve functionings,” i.e., the various things that a person manages to do orbe in leading a life (Sen 1992). In other words, evaluating individual well-being has to be tied to a capability for achieving and maintaining various precious conditions and “functionings” constitutive of a person’s being, such as adequate nourishment, good health, the ability to move about freely or to appear in public without shame. The real freedom to acquire well-being is also important here, a freedom represented in the capability to oneself choose forms of achievement and the combination of “functionings.” For Sen, capabilities are thus the measure of an equality of capabilities human beings enjoy to lead their lives. A problem consistently raised with capability approaches is the ability to weigh capabilities in order to arrive at a metric for equality. The problem is intensified by the fact that various moral perspectives are blended in the concept of capability (Cohen 1993, p. 17–26, Williams 1987). Martha Nussbaum (1992, 2000) has linked the capability approach to an Aristotelian, essentialistic, “thick” theory of the good – a theory meant to be, as she puts it, “vague,” incomplete, and open-ended enough to leave place for individual and cultural variation. On the basis of such a “thick” conception of necessary and universal elements of a good life, certain capabilities and functionings can be designated as foundational. In this manner, Nussbaum can endow the capability approach with a precision that furnishes an index of interpersonal comparison, but at the risk of not being neutral enough regarding the plurality of personal conceptions of the good, a neutrality normally required by most liberals (most importantly Rawls 1993; but see Robeyns 2009 for a different take on the comparison with Rawls). For further discussion, see the entry on the capability approach .

Since the late 1990s, social relations egalitarianism has appeared in philosophical discourse as an increasingly important competitor to distribuitivist accounts of justice, especially its luck egalitarian versions (cf. Lippert-Rassmussen 2018). Proponents of social relations egalitarianism include Anderson (1999), Miller (1997), Scanlon (1996, 2018), Scheffler (2003, 2005, 2015), Wolff (1998, 2010) and Young (1990). Negatively, they are united in a rejection of the view that justice is a matter of eliminating differential luck. Positively, they claim that society is just if, and only if, individuals within it relate to one another as equals. Accordingly, the site of justice (i.e. that to which principles of justice apply) is society, not distributions. Relational Egalitarianism has a certain overlap with many theories of recognition and non-domination. Certain status differences are at the core of their objections, like those stigmatizing differences in status, whereby the badly off are caused to experience themselves as inferior, and are treated as inferiors, or when inequalities create objectionable relations of power(Honneth/Fraser 2003) and domination (Pettit 2001).

What does it mean that (and when do) individuals within a society relate to one another as equals? Racial discrimination, for example, is a paradigmatic instance of this condition?s violation. But once we move beyond a handful of such examples things become much less clear.

These claims to social and political equality exclude all unequal, hierarchical forms of social relationships, in which some people dominate, exploit, marginalize, demean, and inflict violence upon others:

As a social ideal, it holds that a human society must be conceived of as a cooperative arrangement among equals, each of whom enjoys the same social standing. As a political ideal, it highlights the claims that citizens are entitled to make on one another by virtue of their status as citizens, without any need for a moralized accounting of the details of their particular circumstances. (Scheffler 2003, p. 22)

However, forms of differentiation that do not violate moral equality (see above) are not per se excluded from social equality, if they are compatible with the recognition of the equal social status of concerned parties, as with differences relating to merit, need, and, if appropriate, race, gender, and social background (as in cases of affirmative action or fair punishment).

Where there is social equality, people feel that each member of the community enjoys an equal standing with all the rest that overrides their unequal ratings along particular dimensions. (Miller, 1997, p. 232)

Thus the question has to be answered whether – and if so, why – other dimensions, such as a person’s natural talents, creativity, intelligence, innovative skills or entrepreneurial ability, can be the basis for legitimate inequalities.

Relational egalitarians need a certain conception of what an equal standing in society amounts to and implies in terms of rights and goods. One way to offer such an account would be to rely (like Anderson 1999) on the capabilities approach (§3.8) and sufficitarianism (§6.2.): In a democratic community that preserves the free and equal status of persons, at least three sets of conditions have to be fulfilled.

First, certain political conditions are necessary to allow citizens to participate as equals in democratic deliberation. These include, among others, the capabilities to vote, hold office, assemble, petition the government, speak freely, and move about freely (Rawls 1999, p.53). The principle of democratic equality (as asked for by Anderson 1999) requires us to eliminate social hierarchies that prevent a democratically organized society, a society in which we cooperate and decide upon state action as equals. Persons morally owe each other the capabilities and conditions to live as equals in a democratic community (Christiano 2008, Kolodny 2014). Democracy can be interpreted as realizing public equality in collective decision-making.

Second, to participate as an equal in civil society, certain civil conditions must obtain. These include the conditions that make it robustly likely that injustices such as marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism (Anderson 1999 with reference to Young 1990), or domination (Pettit 2001) can be to avoided. Third, certain social conditions and personal capabilities have to obtain that enable people to enjoy equal standing in society. Citizens need, in this regard, adequate nutrition, shelter, clothing, education, and medical care. This last point leads into the debate over whether a relational egalitarian conception of social justice yields intrinsic and instrumental reasons of justice to care about distributive inequality in socially produced goods, despite its emphasis on just social relationships and not the distribution of goods per se (Schemmel 2011, Elford 2017).

Justice is primarily related to individual actions. Individual persons are the primary bearers of responsibility (the key principle of ethical individualism). This raises two controversial issues in the contemporary debate.

One could regard the norms of distributive equality as applying to groups rather than individuals. It is often groups that rightfully raise the issue of an inequality between themselves and the rest of society, as with women and racial and ethnic groups. The question arises of whether inequality among such groups should be considered morally objectionable in itself, or whether even in the case of groups, the underlying concern should be how individuals (as members of such groups) fare in comparative terms. If there is a worry about inequalities between groups of individuals, why does this not translate into a worry about inequalities between members of the group?

A further question concerns whether the norms of distributive equality (whatever they are) apply to all individuals, regardless of where (and when) they live. Or rather, do they only hold for members of communities within states and nations? Most theories of equality deal exclusively with distributive equality among people in a single society. There does not, however, seem to be any rationale for that limitation. Can the group of the entitled be restricted prior to the examination of concrete claims? Many theories seem to imply this, especially when they connect distributive justice or the goods to be distributed with social cooperation or production. For those who contribute nothing to cooperation, such as the disabled, children, or future generations, would have to be denied a claim to a fair share. The circle of persons who are to be the recipients of distribution would thus be restricted from the outset. Other theories are less restrictive, insofar as they do not link distribution to actual social collaboration, yet nonetheless do restrict it, insofar as they bind it to the status of citizenship. In this view, distributive justice is limited to the individuals within a society. Those outside the community have no entitlement to social justice. Unequal distribution among states and the social situations of people outside the particular society could not, in this view, be a problem of social distributive justice (Nagel 2005). Yet here too, the universal morality of equal respect and the principle of equal distribution demand that all persons consider one another as prima facie equally entitled to the goods, unless reasons for an unequal distribution can be advanced. It may be that in the process of justification, reasons will emerge for privileging those who were particularly involved in the production of a good, but there is no prima facie reason to exclude from the outset other persons, such as those from other countries, from the process of distribution and justification (Pogge 2002). That may seem most intuitively plausible in the case of natural resources (e.g. oil) that someone discovers by chance on or beneath the surface of his or her property. Why should such resources belong to the person who discovers them, or on whose property they are located? Nevertheless, in the eyes of many if not most people, global justice, i.e., extending egalitarian distributive justice globally, demands too much from individuals and their states (Miller 1998; but cf. Caney 2005). Alternatively, one might argue that there are other ‘special relations’ between members of one society that do not exist between members of different societies. Nationalism is an example for such a (controversial) thesis that may provide a case for a kind of local equality (Miller 1995). For further discussion, see the entry on global justice.

Another issue is the relationship between generations. Does the present generation have an egalitarian obligation towards future generations regarding equal living conditions? One argument in favor of this conclusion might be that people should not end up unequally well off as a result of morally arbitrary factors. However, the issue of justice between generation is notoriously complex (Temkin 1992). For further discussion, see the entry on intergenerational justice .

6. The Value of Equality: Why Equality?

Does equality play a major role in a theory of justice, and if so, what is this role? A conception of justice is egalitarian when it views equality as a fundamental goal of justice. Temkin has put it as follows:

… an egalitarian is any person who attaches some value to equality itself (that is, any person that cares at all about equality, over and above the extent it promotes other ideals). So, equality needn’t be the only value, or even the ideal she values most… . Egalitarians have the deep and (for them) compelling view that it is a bad thing – unjust and unfair – for some to be worse off than others through no fault of their own. (Temkin 1986, p. 100, cf. 1993, p. 7)

In general, the focus of the modern egalitarian effort to realize equality is on the possibility of a good life, i.e., on an equality of life prospects and life circumstances – interpreted in various ways according to various positions in the “equality of what” debate (see above).

It is apparent that there are three sorts of egalitarianism: intrinsic, instrumental and constitutive. (For a twofold distinction cf. Parfit 1997, Temkin 1993, p. 11, McKerlie, 1996, p. 275.)

Intrinsic egalitarians view equality as a good in itself. As pure egalitarians, they are concerned solely with equality, most of them with equality of social circumstances, according to which it is intrinsically bad if some people are worse off than others through no fault of their own. But it is in fact the case that people do not always consider inequality a moral evil. Intrinsic egalitarians regarde quality as desirable even when the equalization would be of no use to any of the affected parties, such as when equality can only be produced through depressing the level of well being of everyone’s life. But something can only have an intrinsic value when it is good for at least one person, when it makes one life better in some way or another.

The following “ leveling-down ” objection indicates that doing away within equality in fact ought to produce better circumstances; it is otherwise unclear why equality should be desired. (For such an objection, cf. Nozick 1974, p. 229, Raz 1986, chap. 9, p. 227, 235, Temkin 1993, pp. 247–8.) Sometimes inequality can only be ended by depriving those who are better off of their resources, rendering them as poorly off as everyone else. (For anyone looking for a drastic literary example, Kurt Vonnegut’s 1950 science-fiction story Harrison Bergeron is recommended.) This would have to be an acceptable approach according to the intrinsic conception. But would it be morally good if, in a group consisting of both blind and sighted persons, those with sight were rendered blind because the blind could not be offered sight? That would be morally perverse. Doing away with inequality by bringing everyone down contains – so the objection goes – nothing good. Such leveling-down objections would of course only be valid if there were indeed no better and equally egalitarian alternatives available, but there are nearly always such alternatives: e.g. those who can see should have to help the blind, financially or otherwise. When there are no alternatives, in order to avoid such objections, intrinsic egalitarianism cannot be strict, but needs to be pluralistic . Then intrinsic egalitarians could say there is something good about the change, namely greater equality, although they would concede that much is bad about it. Pluralistic egalitarians do not have equality as their only goal; they also admit other values and principles, above all the principle of welfare, according to which it is better when people are doing better. In addition, pluralistic egalitarianism should be moderate enough to not always grant equality victory in the case of conflict between equality and welfare. Instead, they must accept reductions in equality for the sake of a higher quality of life for all (as with Rawls’ difference principle).

At present, many egalitarians are ready to concede that equality in the sense of equality of life circumstances has no compelling value in itself, but that, in a framework of liberal concepts of justice, its meaning emerges in pursuit of other ideals, like universal freedom, the full development of human capacities and the human personality, the mitigation of suffering and defeat of domination and stigmatization, the stable coherence of modern and freely constituted societies, and so forth (Scanlon 1996, 2018). For those who are worse off, unequal circumstances often mean considerable (relative) disadvantages and many (absolute) evils; as a rule, these (relative) disadvantages and (absolute) evils are the source of our moral condemnation of unequal circumstances. But this does not mean that inequality as such is an evil. Hence, the argument goes, fundamental moral ideals other than equality stand behind our aspiring for equality. To reject inequality on such grounds is to favor equality either as a byproduct or as a means, and not as a goal or intrinsic value. In its treatment of equality as a derived virtue, the sort of egalitarianism – if the term is actually suitable – here at play is instrumental .

As indicated, there is also a third, more suitable approach to the equality ideal: a constitutive egalitarianism. According to this approach, to the aspiration to equality is rooted in other moral grounds, namely because certain inequalities are unjust. Equality has value, but this is an extrinsic value, since it derives from another, higher moral principle of equal dignity and respect. But it is not instrumental for this reason, i.e., it is not only valued on account of moral equality, but also on its own account. (For the distinction between the origin of a value and the kind of value it is, cf. Korsgaard 1996.) Equality stands in relation to justice as does a part to a whole. The requirement of justification is based on moral equality, and in certain contexts, successful justification leads to the above-named principles of equality, i.e., formal, proportional equality and the presumption of equality. Thus, according to constitutive egalitarianism, these principles and the resulting equality are required by justice, and by the same token constitute social justice.

It is important to further distinguish two levels of egalitarianism and non-egalitarianism, respectively. On a first level, a constitutive egalitarian presumes that every explication of the moral standpoint is incomplete without terms such as ‘equal,’ ‘similarly,’ etc. In contrast, a non-egalitarianism operating on the same level considers such terms misplaced or redundant. On a second level, when it comes to concretizing and specifying conceptions of justice, a constitutive egalitarian gives equality substantive weight. On this level, more and less egalitarian positions can be found, according to the chosen currency of equality (the criteria by which just equality is measured) and according to the reasons for unequal distributions (exemptions of the presumption of equality) that the respective theories regard as well grounded. Egalitarianism on the second level thus relates to the kind, quality and quantity of things to be equalized. Because of such variables, a clear-cut definition of second level egalitarianism cannot be formulated. In contrast, non-egalitarians on this second level advocate a non-relational entitlement theory of justice.

Alongside the often-raised objections against equality mentioned in the section on “simple equality” (3.1. above) there is a different and more fundamental critique formulated by first level non-egalitarians: that equality does not have a foundational role in the grounding of claims to justice. While the older version of a critique of egalitarianism comes mainly from the conservative end of the political spectrum, thus arguing in general against “patterned principles of justice” (Nozick 1974, esp. pp. 156–157), the critique’s newer version also often can be heard in progressive circles (Walzer 1983, Raz 1986, chap. 9, Frankfurt 1987, 1997, Parfit 1997, Anderson 1999). This first-level critique of equality poses the basic question of why justice should in fact be conceived relationally and (what is here the same) comparatively. Referring back to Joel Feinberg’s (1974) distinction between comparative and non-comparative justice, non-egalitarians object to the moral requirement to treat people as equals, and the many demands for justice emerging from it. They argue that neither the postulate nor these demands involve comparative principles, let alone any equality principles. They reproach first-level egalitarians for a confusion between “equality” and “universals.” As the non-egalitarians see things, within many principles of justice – at least the especially important ones – the equality-terminology is redundant. Equality is thus merely a byproduct of the general fulfillment of actually non-comparative standards of justice: something obscured through the unnecessary insertion of an expression of equality (Raz 1986, p. 227f.). At least the central standards of dignified human life are not relational but “absolute.” As Harry Frankfurt puts it: “It is whether people have good lives, and not how their lives compare with the lives of others” (Frankfurt 1997, p. 6). And again: “The fundamental error of egalitarianism lies in supposing that it is morally important whether one person has less than another regardless of how much either of them has” (Frankfurt 1987, p. 34).

From the non-egalitarian perspective, what is really at stake in helping those worse off and improving their lot is humanitarian concern , a desire to alleviate suffering. Such concern is not understood as egalitarian, as it is not focused on the difference between the better off and the worse off as such (whatever the applied standard), but on improving the situation of the latter. Their distress constitutes the actual moral foundation. The wealth of those better off only furnishes a means that has to be transferred for the sake of mitigating the distress, as long as other, morally negative consequences do not emerge in the process. The strength of the impetus for more equality lies in the urgency of the claims of those worse off, not in the extent of the inequality. For this reason, instead of equality the non-egalitarian critics favor one or another entitlement theory of justice , such as Nozick’s (1974) libertarianism (cf. 3.2. above) and Frankfurt’s (1987) doctrine of sufficiency , according to which “What is important from the moral point of view is not that everyone should have the same but that each should have enough. If everyone had enough , it would be of no moral consequence whether some had more than others” (Frankfurt 1987, p. 21).

Parfit’s (1997) priority view accordingly calls for a focus on improving the situation of society’s weaker and poorer members, and indeed all the more urgently the worse off they are, even if they can be less helped than others in the process. Parfit (1995) distinguishes between egalitarianism and prioritarianism. According to prioritarians, benefiting people is more important the worse off those people are. This prioritising will often increase equality, but they are two distinct values, since in an important respect equality is a relational value while priority is not. However, egalitarians and prioritarians share an important feature, in that both hold that the best possible distribution of a fixed sum of goods is an equal one. It is thus a matter of debate whether prioritarianism is a sort of egalitarianism or a (decent) inegalitarianism. In any case, entitlement-based non-egalitarian arguments can practically result in an equality of outcome as far-reaching as egalitarian theories. Hence the fulfillment of an absolute or non-comparative standard for everyone (e.g. to the effect that nobody should starve) frequently results in a certain equality of outcome, where such a standard comprises not only a decent but a good life. Consequently, the debate here centers on the basis – is it equality or something else? – and not so much on the outcome – are persons or groups more or less equal, according to a chosen metric? Possibly, the difference lies even deeper, in their respective conceptions of morality in general.

Egalitarians can respond to the anti-egalitarian critique by conceding that it is the nature of some (however certainly far from all) essential norms of morality and justice to be concerned primarily with the adequate fulfillment of the separate claims of individuals. However, whether a claim can itself be considered suitable can be ascertained only by asking whether it can be agreed on by all those affected in hypothetical conditions of freedom and equality. (See, e.g., Casal 2007 for a deeper discussion and critique of the doctrine of sufficiency.) This justificatory procedure is more necessary if it is less evident that what is at stake is actually suffering, distress, or an objective need. In the view of the constitutive egalitarians, all the judgments of distributive justice should be approached relationally, by asking which distributive scheme all concerned parties can universally and reciprocally agree to. As described at some length in the pertinent section above, many egalitarians argue that a presumption in favor of equality follows from this justification requirement. In the eyes of such egalitarians, this is all one needs for the justification and determination of the constitutive value of equality.

Secondly, even if – for the sake of argument – the question is left open as to whether demands for distribution according to objective needs (e.g. alleviating hunger) involve non-comparative entitlement-claims, it is nonetheless always necessary to resolve the question of what needy individuals are owed. And this is tied in a basic way to the question of what persons owe one another in comparable or worse situations, and how scarce resources (money, goods, time, energy) must be invested in light of the sum total of our obligations. While the claim on our aid may well appear non-relational, determining the kind and extent of the aid must always be relational, at least in circumstances of scarcity (and resources are always scarce). Claims are either “satiable” (Raz 1986, p. 235) – i.e., an upper limit or sufficiency level can be indicated, after which each person’s claim to X has been fulfilled – or they are not. For insatiable claims, to stipulate any level at which one is or ought to be sufficiently satisfied is arbitrary. If the standards of sufficiency are defined as a bare minimum, why should persons be content with that minimum? Why should the manner in which welfare and resources are distributed above the poverty level not also be a question of justice? If, by contrast, we are concerned solely with claims that are in principle “satiable,” such claims having a reasonable definition of sufficiency, then these standards of sufficiency will most likely be very high. In Frankfurt’s definition, for example, sufficiency is reached only when persons are satisfied and no longer actively strive for more. Since people find themselves ourselves operating, in practice, in circumstances far beneath such a high sufficiency level, they (of course) live under conditions of (moderate) scarcity. Then the above mentioned argument holds as well – namely, that in order to determine to what extent it is to be fulfilled, each claim has to be judged in relation to the claims of all others and all available resources. In addition, the moral urgency of lifting people above dire poverty cannot be invoked to demonstrate the moral urgency of everyone having enough. In both forms of scarcity – i.e., with satiable and insatiable claims – the social right or claim to goods cannot be conceived as something absolute or non-comparative. Egalitarians may thus conclude that distributive justice is always comparative. This would suggest that distributive equality, especially equality of life-conditions, should play a fundamental role in any adequate theory of justice in particular, and of morality in general.

Albernethy, Georg L. (ed.), 1959, The Idea of Equality , Richmond: John Knox.
Anderson, Elizabeth, 1999, “What Is the Point of Equality?,” Ethics , 109: 287–337.
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics , in J. Barnes (ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle , Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Aristotle, Politics , in J. Barnes (ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle , Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Arneson, Richard, 1989, “Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare,” Philosophical Studies , 56: 77–93; reprinted in L. Pojman & R. Westmoreland (eds.), 1997, Equality. Selected Readings , Oxford:Oxford University Press, pp. 229–241.
–––, 1990, “Liberalism, Distributive Subjectivism, and Equal Opportunity for Welfare,” Philosophy and Public Affairs , 19: 158–194.
–––, 1993, “Equality,” in R. Goodin & P. Pettit (eds.), A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy , Oxford:Blackwell, pp. 489–507.
Babeuf, Gracchus, 1796, “Manifeste des Égaux,” in Histoire de G. Babeuf et du Babouvisme , Paris 1884, Engl. trans. in L. Pojman & R. Westmoreland (eds.), 1997, Equality. Selected Readings , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 49–52.
Baker, John, Kathleen Lynch, Sara Cantillon, Judy Walsh, 2004, Equality. From Theory to Action , Houndsmill/New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Bedau, Hugo Adam, 1967, “Egalitarianism and the Idea of Equality,” in J. R. Pennock, J. Chapman (eds.), Equality , New York: Atherton, pp. 3–27.
Benn, Stanley, 1967, “Equality, Moral and Social,” in P. Edwards(ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy , Vol 3, New York: Macmillan, pp. 38–42.
Benn, Stanley I. and Richard S. Peters, 1959, Social Principles and the Democratic State , London: Allen & Unwin.
Berlin, Isaiah, 1955–56, “Equality,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society LVI , pp. 301–326.
Brown, Henry Phelps, 1988, Egalitarianism and the Generation of Inequality , Oxford: Clarendon.
Callinicos, Alex, 2000, Equality , Cambridge: Polity Press.
Caney, Simon, 2005, Justice Beyond Borders , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Carter, Ian, 2011, “Respect and the Basis of Equality”, Ethics , 121(3): 538–571.
Casal, Paula, 2007, “Why Sufficiency Is Not Enough”, Ethics , 117(2): 296–326.
Cavanagh, Matt, 2002, Against Equality of Opportunity , Oxford: Clarendon.
Christiano, Thomas, 2008, The constitution of equality: democratic authority and its limits , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cohen, Gerald A., 1989, “On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice,” Ethics , 99: 906–944.
–––, 1993, “Equality of What? On Welfare, Goods, and Capabilities,” in M. Nussbaum & A. Sen (eds.), The Quality of Life , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 9–29.
–––, 2000, If You’re an Egalitarian, How Come You’re so Rich? , Harvard: Harvard University Press.
–––, 2007, Rescuing Justice and Equality , manuscript.
Dahrendorf, Ralf, 1962, “On the Origin of Social Inequality,” in P. Laslett & W. G. Runciman (eds.), Philosophy, Politics, and Society , 2nd Series, Oxford: Blackwell.
Daniels, Norman, 2003, “Democratic equality: Rawls’s complex egalitarianism,” in S. Freeman (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Rawls , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 241–276.
Dann, Otto, 1975, “Gleichheit,” in V. O. Brunner, W. Conze, R. Koselleck (eds.), Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe , pp. 995–1046.
Dworkin, Ronald, 1977, Taking Rights Seriously , Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
–––, 1981a, “What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare”, Philosophy and Public Affairs , 10: 185–246; reprinted in R. Dworkin, 2000, Sovereign Virtue. The Theory and Practice of Equality , Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp.11–64.
–––, 1981b, “What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources,” Philosophy and Public Affairs , 10: 283–345; reprinted in R. Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue. The Theory and Practice of Equality , Cambridge: Harvard University Press 2000, pp. 65–119.
–––, 2000, Sovereign Virtue. The Theory and Practice of Equality , Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Elford, Gideon, 2017, “Relational Equality and Distribution,” Journal of Political Philosophy , 25: 80–99.
Eyal, Nir, 2017, “Luck Egalitarianism, Harshness, and the Rule of Rescue”, in S.M. Liao and C. O’Neil (eds.), Current Controversies in Bioethics , pp. 160–176, New York: Routledge.
Feinberg, Joel, 1970, “Justice and Personal Desert,” in J. Feinberg, Doing and Deserving , Princeton; reprinted in L. P. Pojman & O. McLeod (eds.), 1998, What Do We Deserve? A Reader on Justice and Desert , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 70–83.
–––, 1974, “Non-Comparative Justice,” Philosophical Review , 83: 297–358.
Fleurbaey, Marc, 2008, Fairness, Responsibility, and Welfare , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Frankfurt, Harry, 1987, “Equality as a Moral Ideal,” Ethics , 98: 21–42; reprinted in H. Frankfurt, 1988, The Importance of What We Care About , Cambridge University Press, pp. 134–168; reprinted in L. Pojman & R. Westmoreland (eds.), 1997, Equality. Selected Readings , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 261–273.
–––, 1997, “Equality and Respect,” Social Research , 64: 3–15.
Gosepath, Stefan, 2004, Gleiche Gerechtigkeit. Grundlagen eines liberalen Egalitarismus , Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
–––, 2015, “The Principles and the Presumption of Equality,” in C. Fourie, F. Schuppert, I. Wallimann-Helmer (eds.), Social equality: on what it means to be equals , Oxford University Press, pp. 167–185.
Habermas, Jürgen, 1983, “Diskursethik – Notizen zu einem Begründungsprogramm,” in J. Habermas, Moralbewußtsein und kommunikatives Handeln , Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, pp. 53–126; English translation, “Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical Justification,” in J. Habermas, 1990, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action , tr. C. Lenhardt and S. Weber Nicholsen, Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 43–115.
–––, 1992, Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats , Frankfurt: Suhrkamp; Engl. Trans.: Habermas, Jürgen, 1996, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy , tr. W. Rehg, Cambridge: MIT Press.
Hajdin, Mane (ed.), 2000, The Notion of Equality , Aldershot: Ashgate.
Hare, Richard M., 1981, Moral Thinking. Its Levels, Method and Point , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
–––, 1984, “Rights, Utility and Universalization: Reply to J. L. Mackie,” in R. G. Frey (ed.), Utilities and Rights, Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press; reprinted Oxford: Blackwell 1985.
Hayek, Friedrich A., 1960, The Constitution of Liberty , London: Routledge.
Hinsch, Wilfried, 2002, Gerechtfertigte Ungleichheiten , Berlin/New York: de Gruyter.
–––, 2003, “Angemessene Gleichheit,” in R. Geiger, J. C. Merle, N. Scarano (eds.), Modelle politischer Philosophie , Paderborn: Mentis, pp. 260–271.
Hobbes, Thomas, 1651, in E. Curley (ed.), 1994, Leviathan: With Selected Variants from the Latin Edition of 1668 , Indianapolis: Hackett.
Holtug, Nils and Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (eds.), 2006, Egalitarianism. New Essays on the Nature and Value of Equality , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Honneth, Axel and Nancy Fraser, 2003, Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange , New York: Verso.
Kaldor, Nicholas, 1939, “Welfare Propositions of Economics and Inter-Personal Comparison of Utility,” The Economic Journal , 49: 549–552.
Kant, Imanuel, 1785, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten , in Kants Gesammelte Schriften , ed. by Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin 1902ff., vol. IV.
–––, 1797, Metaphysik der Sitten , in Kants Gesammelte Schriften , ed. by Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin 1902ff., vol. VI.
Kateb, George, 2014, Human Dignity , Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
Kersting, Wolfgang, 2002, Kritik der Gleichheit. Über die Grenzen der Gerechtigkeit und der Moral , Weilerswist: Velbrück.
Kolodny, Nico, 2014, “Rule Over None II: Social Equality and the Justification of Democracy,” Philosophy & Public Affairs , 42 (4):287–336.
Korsgaard, Christine, 1996, “Two Distinctions in Goodness,” in C. Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 249–253.
Kymlicka, Will, 1990, Contemporary Political Philosophy , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Lakoff, Sandford A., 1964, Equality in Political Philosophy , Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Lippert-Rasmussen, Kasper, 2015, Luck Egalitarianism , London: Bloomsbury Academic.
–––, 2018, Relational Egalitarianism: Living as Equals , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Locke, John, 1690, in C. B. MacPerson (ed.), 1980, The Second Treatise of Government , Indianapolis: Hackett.
MacKinnon, Catherine, 1989, Towards a Feminist Theory of the State , Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
MacLeod, Colin M., 1998, Liberalism, Justice, and Markets , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Marshall, Thomas Humphrey, 1950, “Citizenship and Social Class,” in T. Marshall, 1950, Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–75; reprinted London: Pluto 1981, 1992.
Marx, Karl, 1875, Critique of the Gotha Program ; reprinted in Marx-Engels-Werke (MEW) vol. 19, Berlin 1978; and in Marx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe (MEGA-B), Berlin 1975 ff., vol. I 25.
McKerlie, Dennis, 1989, “Equality and Time,” Ethics , 99: 274–296; reprinted in L. Pojman & R. Westmoreland (eds.), 1997, Equality. Selected Readings , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 65–75.
–––, 1996, “Equality,” Ethics , 106: 274–296.
Menke, Christoph, 2000, Spiegelungen der Gleichheit , Berlin: Akademie 2000; reprinted Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 2004.
Menne, Alfred, 1962, “Identität, Gleichheit, Ähnlichkeit,” Ratio , 4: 44ff.
Miller, David, 1995, On Nationality , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
–––, 1997, “Equality and Justice,” Ratio , 10: 222–237.
–––, 1998, “The Limits of Cosmopolitan Justice,” in D. R. Mapel & T. Nardin (eds.), International Society. Diverse Ethical Perspectives , Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp.164–181.
Murphy, Liam and Thomas Nagel, 2002, The Myth of Ownership. Taxes and Justice , Oxford University Press.
Nagel, Thomas, 1979, “Equality,” in T. Nagel, Mortal Questions , Cambridge University Press, pp. 106–127.
–––, 1991, Equality and Partiality , Oxford University Press.
–––, 2005, “The Problem of Global Justice,” Philosophy and Public Affairs , 33 (2): 113–147.
Nozick, Robert, 1974, Anarchy, State, and Utopia , New York: Basic Books.
Nussbaum, Martha, 1992, “Human Functioning and Social Justice. In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism,” Political Theory , 20: 202–246.
–––, 2000, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Okun, Arthur M., 1975, Equality and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff , Washington: The Brookings Institution.
Olsaretti, Serena (ed.), 2003, Desert and Justice , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
–––, 2009, “Responsibility and the Consequences of Choice,”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society , CIX(2): 165–188.
Oppenheim, Felix, 1970, “Egalitarianism as a Descriptive Concept,” American Philosophical Quarterly , 7: 143–152; reprinted in L. Pojman & R. Westmoreland (eds.), 1997, Equality. Selected Readings , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 55–65.
Otsuka, Michael, 2005, Libertarianism without Inequality , NewYork: Oxford University Press.
Parfit, Derek, 1995, Equality or Priority? , The Lindley Lectures, Lawrence, KA: The University of Kansas.
–––, 1997, “Equality and Priority,” Ratio , 10: 202–221.
Plato, Republic , in J. M. Cooper & D.S. Hutchinson (eds.), 1997, Plato: Complete Works , Indianapolis: Hackett, pp. 971–1223.
Plato, Laws , in J. M. Cooper & D.S. Hutchinson (eds.), 1997, Plato: Complete Works , Indianapolis: Hackett, pp. 1318–1616.
Pettit, Philip, 2001, A Theory of Freedom , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pogge, Thomas W., 1999, “Human Flourishing and Universal Justice,” Social Philosophy and Policy , 16 (1): 333–361, and in E. Frankel Paulet al. (eds.), 1999, Human Flourishing, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 333–361.
–––, 2002, World Poverty and Human Rights. Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms , Cambridge: Polity Press.
Pojman, Louis P. and Owen McLeod (eds.), 1998, What Do We Deserve? A Reader on Justice and Desert , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pojman, Louis P. and Robert Westmoreland (eds.), 1996, Equality. Selected Readings , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rae, Douglas et al. (eds.), 1981, Equalities , Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Rawls, John, 1971, A Theory of Justice , Cambridge: Harvard University Press, rev. ed. 1999.
–––, 1993, Political Liberalism , New York: Columbia University Press.
Raz, Joseph, 1986, The Morality of Freedom , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Robeyns, Ingrid, 2009, “Justice as fairness and the capability approach”, in: Kaushik Basu and Ravi Kanbur (eds.), Arguments for a Better World. Essays for Amartya Sen’s 75 th Birthday , Oxford University Press, pp. 397–413.
–––, 2017, Wellbeing, Freedom and Social Justice: The Capability Approach Re-Examined , Cambridge: Open Book Publishers.
Roemer, John E., 1998, Equality of Opportunity , Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Rosen, Gideon, 2018, Dignity: Its History and Meaning , Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 1755, in M. Cranston (ed.), 1984, A Discourse on Inequality , London: Penguin; partly reprinted in L. Pojman & R. Westmoreland (eds.), 1997, Equality. Selected Readings , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 36–45.
–––, 1762, in M. Cranston (ed.), 1987, The Social Contract , Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Scanlon, Thomas, 1996, The Diversity of Objections to Inequality , The Lindley Lectures, Lawrence, KA: University of Kansas; reprinted in T. Scanlon, 2003, The Difficulty of Tolerance: Essays in Political Philosophy , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 202–218.
–––, 2018, Why Does Inequality Matter? , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Scheffler, Samuel, 2003, “What is Egalitarianism?,” Philosophy and Public Affairs , 31: 5–39; reprinted in Equality and Tradition , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 175–207.
–––, 2005, “Choice, Circumstances and the value of Equality,” Politics, Philosophy & Economics , 4: 5–28.
–––, 2015, “The Practice of Equality,” in C. Fourie, F. Schuppert, and I. Wallimann-Helmer (eds.), Social Equality: Essays on What it Means to be Equals , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 21–44.
Schemmel, Christian, 2011, “Why Relational Egalitarians Should Care About Distibutions,” Social Theory and Practice , 37: 365–390.
Sen, Amartya, 1970, Collective Choice and Social Welfare , San Fransisco: Holden-Day; reprinted Amsterdam 1979.
–––, 1980, “Equality of What?,” in S. M. McMurrin (ed.), The Tanner Lectures on Human Values , I, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 197–220; reprinted in A. Sen, 1982, Choice, Welfare and Measurement , Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 353–372, Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1997; also in S. Darwall (ed.), 1995, Equal Freedom , Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
–––, 1992, Inequality Reexamined , Oxford: Clarendon Press, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Shaw, George Bernard, 1928, The Intelligent Woman’s Guide to Socialism and Capitalism , New York: Brentano’s Publishers.
Sikora, R.I., 1989, “Six Viewpoints for Assessing Egalitarian Distribution Schemes,” Ethics , 99: 492–502.
Steinhoff, Uwe (ed.), 2015, Do All Persons Have Equal Moral Worth? For and Against “Basic Equality” and the Principle of Equal Respect and Concern , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Steiner, Hillel, 1994, An Essay on Rights , Oxford: Blackwell.
Stemplowska, Zofia, 2009, “Making Justice Sensitive to Responsibility,” Political Studies , 57: 237–259.
–––, 2013, “Rescuing Luck Egalitarianism,”, Journal of Social Philosophy , 44(4): 402–419.
Sypnowich, Christine (ed.), 2006, The Egalitarian Conscience. Essays in Honour of G. A. Cohen , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tawney, R. H., 1931, Equality , London: Allen & Unwin.
Taylor, Charles, 1992, Multiculturalism and “The Politics of Recognition” , Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Temkin, Larry, 1986, “Inequality,” Philosophy and Public Affairs , 15: 99–121; reprinted in L. Pojman & R. Westmoreland (eds.), 1997, Equality. Selected Readings , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 75–88.
–––, 1992, “Intergenerational Inequality,” in Laslett, P. & J.S. Fishkin (eds.), Justice Between Age Groups and Generations , New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 169–205.
–––, 1993, Inequality , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
–––, 2009, “Illuminating Egalitarianism,” in T. Christiano & J. Christman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Political Philosophy , Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, pp. 155–178.
Thomson, David, 1949, Equality , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tugendhat, Ernst and Ursula Wolf, 1983, Logisch-Semantische Propädeutik , Stuttgart: Reclam.
Tugendhat, Ernst, 1993, Vorlesungen über Ethik , Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp.
–––, 1997, Dialog in Letitia , Frankfurt a.M: Suhrkamp.
Van Parijs, Philippe, 1995, Real Freedom For All. What (If Anything) Can Justify Capitalism? Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Vlastos, Gregory, 1962, “Justice and Equality,” in R. Brandt (ed.), Social Justice , Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall; reprinted in J. Waldron (ed.), 1984, Theories of Rights , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 41–76; reprinted in L. Pojman & R. Westmoreland (eds.), 1997, Equality. Selected Readings , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 120–133.
Voigt, Kristin, 2007, “Brute Luck, Option Luck, and Equality of Initial Opportunities,” Ethics , 112(3): 529–57.
Vonnegut, Kurt, 1950, “Harrison Bergeron,” in K. Vonnegut, 1950, Welcome to the Monkey House , New York: Delacorte Press, pp. 7–13; reprinted in L. Pojman & R. Westmoreland (eds.), 1997, Equality. Selected Readings , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 315–311.
Waldron, Jeremy, 2017, One another’s equals: the basis of human equality , Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Walzer, Michael, 1983, Spheres of Justice. A Defence of Pluralism and Equality , New York/London: Basic Books.
Westen, Peter, 1990, Speaking Equality , Princeton: Princeton University Press.
White, Stuart, 2006, Equality , Oxford: Blackwell.
Williams, Bernard, 1973, “The Idea of Equality”, in B. Williams, Problems of the Self , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 230–249, reprinted in: L. Pojman & R. Westmoreland (eds.), 1997, Equality. Selected Readings , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 91–102.
–––, 1987, “The Standard of Living: Interests and Capabilities,” in A. Sen, The Standard of Living , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 94–102.
Wolff, Jonathan, 1998, “Fairness, Respect, and the Egalitarian Ethos,” Philosophy & Public Affairs , 27: 97–122.
–––, 2010, “Fairness, respect and the egalitarian ethos revisited,” Journal of Ethics , 14 (3–4): 335–350.
Young, Iris Marion, 1990, Justice and the Politics of Difference , Princeton: Princeton University Press.

How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

[Please contact the author with suggestions.]

The Equality Studies Centre , University College/Dublin.

Accessibility

Political Equality

Charles R. Beitz

Before you purchase audiobooks and ebooks

Please note that audiobooks and ebooks purchased from this site must be accessed on the Princeton University Press app. After you make your purchase, you will receive an email with instructions on how to download the app. Learn more about audio and ebooks .

Support your local independent bookstore.

United States
United Kingdom

Political Equality: An Essay in Democratic Theory

Download Cover

The description for this book, Political Equality: An Essay in Democratic Theory, will be forthcoming.

" . . . Beitz believes it is possible to explain political equality in terms of a deeper moral perspective. He not only provides democrats with a line of argument against those who think egalitarian commitments are arbitrary; he also develops a sensible account of what democratic equality requires in the way of specific institutions. This is a real advance in the philosophy of democracy."—William Smith, University of Houston

Stay connected for new books and special offers. Subscribe to receive a welcome discount for your next order.

ebook & Audiobook Cart

Advertisers
Agents and Vendors
Book Authors and Editors
Booksellers / Media / Review Copies
Librarians and Consortia
Journal Authors and Editors
Licensing and Subsidiary Rights
Mathematics Authors and Editors
Prospective Journals
Scholarly Publishing Collective
Explore Subjects
Authors and Editors
Society Members and Officers
Prospective Societies

Open Access

Job Opportunities
Conferences

Equaliberty

Political essays.

a John Hope Franklin Center Book

More about this series

Author: Étienne Balibar

Translator: James Ingram

Subjects Sociology > Social Theory , Theory and Philosophy , Politics > Political Theory

". . . this is a timely publication. It identifies and expands upon a crucial tension within liberal citizenship that runs through the course of history, but which seems particularly prescient today, especially within Europe. . . . Rare for a book with such a philosophical argument, the connection to these issues is clear and prescient. Indeed, this continual problematization of the conditions for citizenship might be considered to be an exemplary manifestation of what it means to be a critical citizen." — Jonathan Joseph, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

“This is a wonderful speculative text in the best tradition of French political philosophy. But it is not only this: Balibar is also in dialogue with problems of leftist American social and political philosophy and especially its focus on the violences of neoliberalism. Finally, in a style that, by design, knows no country, Balibar’s Equaliberty works to update the enduring insights of Marx and Marxism in a deep reflection for our times." — Amy E. Wendling, Marx & Philosophy Review of Books

“Balibar may accept the frameworks and language of really existing capitalism, but he does so in order to pull at their threads and to refocus critique upon tired concepts. But a revolutionary fervour (although this too does not escape theorizing) runs throughout these essays. . . . It is Balibar’s persuasive analysis of who counts as a citizen and who does not, and who is granted rights and who must take them another way, that makes these essays.” — Nina Power, Radical Philosophy

“A well-written, if still extremely dense, collection of theoretical investigations that lead towards more than just mere armchair philosophising; rather, to a motivated call for sophisticated and impassioned activism through normative research agendas for graduate students and academic professionals, specifically focusing on the future of cosmopolitics and trans-/de-nationalised notions of citizenship.” — Bryant William Sculos, Political Studies Review

"This outstanding book is Étienne Balibar at his most powerfully synthetic and politically incisive. In Equaliberty , Balibar works his way through the house of left-wing political thought, performing a sort of philosophical spring cleaning. He disarticulates complex concepts only to reassemble them in better, more usable combinations. It is a call to action." — Bruce Robbins, author of Perpetual War: Cosmopolitanism from the Viewpoint of Violence

"Today many of the key concepts of our political vocabulary—including equality, freedom, democracy, and emancipation—seem so corrupted and vacuous that they are almost unusable. Étienne Balibar makes an important contribution by engaging critically and restoring these and other crucial political concepts. Equaliberty is a major book that displays Balibar's exemplary combination of erudition and clear, accessible argument." — Michael Hardt, coauthor of the books Declaration, Commonwealth, Multitude, and Empire

Buy the e-book: Apple iBooks Barnes & Noble nook Google Play Kobo
Author/Editor Bios
Table of Contents
Additional Information

Étienne Balibar was a student of Louis Althusser, with whom he cowrote Reading Capital . The author of many books on moral and political philosophy, he is Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the Université de Paris–X Nanterrre and Anniversary Chair in the Humanities at Kingston University in London. He has served as Distinguished Professor of Humanities at the University of California, Irvine, and, more recently, as Visiting Professor at Columbia University.

If you are requesting permission to photocopy material for classroom use, please contact the Copyright Clearance Center at copyright.com;

If the Copyright Clearance Center cannot grant permission, you may request permission from our Copyrights & Permissions Manager (use Contact Information listed below).

If you are requesting permission to reprint DUP material (journal or book selection) in another book or in any other format, contact our Copyrights & Permissions Manager (use Contact Information listed below).

Many images/art used in material copyrighted by Duke University Press are controlled, not by the Press, but by the owner of the image. Please check the credit line adjacent to the illustration, as well as the front and back matter of the book for a list of credits. You must obtain permission directly from the owner of the image. Occasionally, Duke University Press controls the rights to maps or other drawings. Please direct permission requests for these images to [email protected] . For book covers to accompany reviews, please contact the publicity department .

If you're interested in a Duke University Press book for subsidiary rights/translations, please contact [email protected] . Include the book title/author, rights sought, and estimated print run.

Instructions for requesting an electronic text on behalf of a student with disabilities are available here .

Email: [email protected] Email contact for coursepacks: [email protected] Fax: 919-688-4574 Mail: Duke University Press Rights and Permissions 905 W. Main Street Suite 18B Durham, NC 27701

1. Author's name. If book has an editor that is different from the article author, include editor's name also. 2. Title of the journal article or book chapter and title of journal or title of book 3. Page numbers (if excerpting, provide specifics) For coursepacks, please also note: The number of copies requested, the school and professor requesting For reprints and subsidiary rights, please also note: Your volume title, publication date, publisher, print run, page count, rights sought

This book is subject to the standard Duke University Press rights and permissions.

Bk Cover Image Full
Also Viewed
Also Purchased

Cruel Optimism

In the Wake

Marx for Cats

The Right to Maim

Vibrant Matter

Meeting the Universe Halfway

Necropolitics

Designs for the Pluriverse

Queer Phenomenology

Animals and Women

A World of Many Worlds

Desire Work

Mohawk Interruptus

Kindle Store
Kindle eBooks
Politics & Social Sciences

Promotions apply when you purchase

These promotions will be applied to this item:

Some promotions may be combined; others are not eligible to be combined with other offers. For details, please see the Terms & Conditions associated with these promotions.

Highlight, take notes, and search in the book

Buy for others

Buying and sending ebooks to others.

Select quantity
Buy and send eBooks
Recipients can read on any device

These ebooks can only be redeemed by recipients in the US. Redemption links and eBooks cannot be resold.

Download the free Kindle app and start reading Kindle books instantly on your smartphone, tablet, or computer - no Kindle device required .

Read instantly on your browser with Kindle for Web.

Using your mobile phone camera - scan the code below and download the Kindle app.

Image Unavailable

Political Equality: An Essay in Democratic Theory

To view this video download Flash Player

Follow the author

Political Equality: An Essay in Democratic Theory Kindle Edition

The description for this book, Political Equality: An Essay in Democratic Theory, will be forthcoming.

ISBN-13 978-0691022710
Sticky notes On Kindle Scribe
Publisher Princeton University Press
Publication date November 10, 2020
Language English
File size 815 KB
See all details
Kindle (5th Generation)
Kindle Keyboard
Kindle (2nd Generation)
Kindle (1st Generation)
Kindle Paperwhite
Kindle Paperwhite (5th Generation)
Kindle Touch
Kindle Voyage
Kindle Oasis
Kindle Scribe (1st Generation)
Kindle Fire HDX 8.9''
Kindle Fire HDX
Kindle Fire HD (3rd Generation)
Fire HDX 8.9 Tablet
Fire HD 7 Tablet
Fire HD 6 Tablet
Kindle Fire HD 8.9"
Kindle Fire HD(1st Generation)
Kindle Fire(2nd Generation)
Kindle Fire(1st Generation)
Kindle for Windows 8
Kindle for Windows Phone
Kindle for BlackBerry
Kindle for Android Phones
Kindle for Android Tablets
Kindle for iPhone
Kindle for iPod Touch
Kindle for iPad
Kindle for Mac
Kindle for PC
Kindle Cloud Reader

Editorial Reviews

From the back cover.

Product details

ASIN ‏ : ‎ B08K3QJVY9
Publisher ‏ : ‎ Princeton University Press (November 10, 2020)
Publication date ‏ : ‎ November 10, 2020
Language ‏ : ‎ English
File size ‏ : ‎ 815 KB
Text-to-Speech ‏ : ‎ Enabled
Screen Reader ‏ : ‎ Supported
Enhanced typesetting ‏ : ‎ Enabled
X-Ray ‏ : ‎ Not Enabled
Word Wise ‏ : ‎ Enabled
Sticky notes ‏ : ‎ On Kindle Scribe
Print length ‏ : ‎ 271 pages

About the author

Charles r. beitz.

Discover more of the author’s books, see similar authors, read author blogs and more

Customer reviews

Customer Reviews, including Product Star Ratings help customers to learn more about the product and decide whether it is the right product for them.

To calculate the overall star rating and percentage breakdown by star, we don’t use a simple average. Instead, our system considers things like how recent a review is and if the reviewer bought the item on Amazon. It also analyzed reviews to verify trustworthiness.

No customer reviews

Amazon Newsletter
About Amazon
Accessibility
Sustainability
Press Center
Investor Relations
Amazon Devices
Amazon Science
Start Selling with Amazon
Sell apps on Amazon
Supply to Amazon
Protect & Build Your Brand
Become an Affiliate
Become a Delivery Driver
Start a Package Delivery Business
Advertise Your Products
Self-Publish with Us
Host an Amazon Hub
› See More Ways to Make Money
Amazon Visa
Amazon Store Card
Amazon Secured Card
Amazon Business Card
Shop with Points
Credit Card Marketplace
Reload Your Balance
Amazon Currency Converter
Your Account
Your Orders
Shipping Rates & Policies
Amazon Prime
Returns & Replacements
Manage Your Content and Devices
Recalls and Product Safety Alerts
Conditions of Use
Privacy Notice
Consumer Health Data Privacy Disclosure
Your Ads Privacy Choices

Content Guidelines
Privacy Policy

Essay on Equality: Meaning and Kinds of Equality

ADVERTISEMENTS:

By equality, we generally mean that all men are equal and all should be entitled to identity of treatment and income. “Men are born, and always continue, free and equal in respect of their rights”. We hold these truths to be self-evident that all men are created equal”. But in practical life this is not true. No two men are similar in physical constitution, capacity and temperament.

Professor Laski has very aptly remarked in this connection:

“Equality does not mean the identity of treatment or the sameness of reward. If a bricklayer gets the same reward as a mathematician or a scientist, the purpose of society will be defeated. Equality, therefore, means, first of all the absence of social privilege. In the second place it means that adequate opportunities are laid open to all”.

Equality is a leveling process:

“The ideal of equality has insisted that men are politically equal, that all citizens are equally entitled to take part in political life, to exercise the franchise, to run for and hold office. It has insisted that individuals should be equal before the law, that when the general law confers rights or imposes duties, the rights and duties shall extend to all; or conversely that they shall not confer special privileges on particular individuals or groups”.

Undoubtedly, it implies fundamentally a leveling process”, says Professor Laski, “It means that no man shall be placed in society that he can overreach his neighbour to the extent which constitutes a denial of the latter’s citizenship”.

Equality, after all, is a derivative value”, explains Braker. “It is derived from the supreme value of the development of personality-in each like and equally, but each along its own different line and of its own separate motion”.

He further says, “We are thus arranged as it were, in a level time at the starting point of the race that lies ahead; and we start from that level line, so far as the state is concerned, with equal conditions guaranteed to each for making the best of himself-however much we may eventually differ in what we actually make of ourselves”.

Kinds of Equality :

There are following kinds of equality:

(1) Social Equality.

(2) Civil Equality.

(3) Political Equality.

(4) Economic Equality.

(5) Equality of Opportunity and Education.

(1) Social Equality :

Social equality means that all the citizens are entitled to enjoy equal status in society and no one is entitled to special privileges. There should not be any distinction of caste and creed, colour and race, groups and classes, clans and tribes All should have an equal opportunity to develop his personality.

All citizens In India enjoy social equality. Untouchability has been abolished and its practice has been forbidden. Previously, the policy of racial discrimination was adopted in the United States of America but Johnson I, Ex-President of U.S.A., established social equality by getting the Bill passed by the Congress.

The policy of racial discrimination is still followed by South Africa. Social inequality still prevails over there. On 10th December, 1948, the U.N.O. declared the charter of human rights which laid stress on social equality. But these rights have been violated by a number of countries in the past according to the report of Amnesty International.

(2) Civil Equality :

Secondly, we have the concept of Civil Liberty. Civil liberty consists in the enjoyment of similar civil liberties and civil rights by all the citizens. Civil laws should treat all the individuals equally.

There should not be any discrimination of superior and inferior, the rich and the poor, caste and creed, colour and race, clam and tribes, groups and classes. Rule of law is in force in England and in the eyes of the rule of law all are equal. Equal treatment is given to all by the rule of law. Similar is the case with India.

(3) Political Equality :

By Political Equality we mean equal access of everyone to the avenues of political authority. All citizens must possess similar political rights, they should have similar voice in the working of the government and they should have equal opportunities to actively participate in the political life and affairs of the country.

Political equality guarantees the enjoyment of similar political rights to all citizens. Universal adult franchise is a means to this end. Universal adult suffrage has been introduced in India. The same provision has been made in England, U.S.S.R., U.S.A., France and many other countries.

Previously, Switzerland had not conferred on women the right to vote but in February 1971 conferred the right of vote to women. In Asia and Africa there are many countries where Political Equality has not been established.

(4) Economic Equality :

Economic Equality is closely related to political equality. Professor Laski underlies the great significance of economic equality. “Political equality is therefore, never real unless it is accompanied with virtual economic liberty; political power otherwise is bound to be the hand-maid of economic power”.

According Lord Bryce, Economic Equality “is the attempt to expunge all differences in wealth’ allotting to every man and woman an equal share in worldly goods”. But this concept of ideal economic equality can never be materialised in practical politics.

By economic equality we mean the provision of equal opportunities to all so they may be able to make their economic progress. This can be done only in Socialism and not in Capitalism. Hence, Capitalism should be replaced by Socialism.

(5) Equality of Opportunity and Education :

By equality of opportunity and education we mean that all the citizens should be given equal and similar opportunities by the state. All the individuals should have similar chances to receive education. They should have similar opportunities to develop their personality. Racial or any type of discrimination should not be observed. There should not be any distinction of caste and creed, colour and race, rich and poor. In India, all are provided with equal opportunities and all have equal rights to education.

Top Six Kinds on Liberty – Explained!
Equality: Meaning, Aspects and Theories
Essay on Democracy: Kinds, Basic Principles and Future of Democracy
Relationship between Liberty and Equality

Upload and Share Your Article:

Description *
Your Name *
Your Email ID *
Upload Your File Drop files here or Select files Max. file size: 3 MB, Max. files: 5.

Upload Your Knowledge on Political science:

Privacy overview.

NPR Editor's Critical Op-Ed Ignites Debate Over Political Bias in Journalism: 'This Essay Has It Backwards'

A scathing op-ed from NPR veteran and current senior business editor Uri Berliner published in The Free Press on Tuesday has intensified debates over whether the publicly funded news organization has adopted a partisan lean in recent years.

In the piece , Berliner details a culture shift at the organization, in which "An open-minded spirit no longer exists within NPR, and now, predictably, we don't have an audience that reflects America."

Berliner argued that NPR is plagued with an "absence of viewpoint diversity," which he considers to be a result of leadership's emphasis on promoting diversity and inclusion on the basis of race and sexual orientation. He also claims that he found "87 registered Democrats working in editorial positions and zero Republicans."

NPR editor-in-chief Edith Chapin defended the organization in response to the piece, saying she the leadership team "strongly disagree with Uri's assessment of the quality of our journalism."

While Chapin backed the "exceptional work that our desks and shows do to cover a wide range of challenging stories," she added that "None of our work is above scrutiny or critique. We must have vigorous discussions in the newsroom about how we serve the public as a whole."

According to NPR media reporter David Folkenflik , several journalists inside the organization question how they can proceed with Berliner as a colleague, with concerns about whether he can be a trusted member of NPR in the aftermath of the op-ed. Additionally, Berliner did not seek NPR's approval to publish the piece, nor did he seek comment from the organization ahead of time; though he does say in his piece that he sought to raise his concerns with leadership on several occasions.

Meanwhile, outside of the organization, debates regarding the content of Berliner's piece have sprouted up across social media, with many coming to the defense of the storied NPR institution.

Some argued that the shift that occurred in political coverage across the media industry was forced on institutions due to the changing nature of the Republican Party since the election of Donald Trump in 2016.

Some came to Berliner's defense, including former NPR vice president for news Jeffrey Dvorkin who vouched for the changes to the organization.

The post NPR Editor's Critical Op-Ed Ignites Debate Over Political Bias in Journalism: 'This Essay Has It Backwards' appeared first on TheWrap .

Share full article

Supported by

Guest Essay

Why Is Biden Struggling? Because America Is Broken.

By Damon Linker

Mr. Linker, a former columnist at The Week, writes the newsletter Notes From the Middleground.

Seven months away from a rematch election pitting President Biden against former President Donald Trump, the incumbent is struggling. Mr. Biden suffers from persistently low approval ratings, he barely manages to tie Mr. Trump in national head-to-head polls and he lags behind the former president in most of the swing states where the election will be decided (despite some recent modestly encouraging movement in his direction).

The question is why.

When Mr. Biden’s defenders seek to answer the question, most of them tick off declining rates of inflation, historically low unemployment, strong economic growth, a list of legislative accomplishments and other evidence of a successful presidency. This suggests the problem is primarily a failure of communication — the thing flailing administrations always blame first, since it implies the path to improvement requires little more than doing a better job of “getting the message out” about how great the president is doing.

It’s usually wiser to listen to what voters are saying — beyond the obvious concerns about the president’s age.

Recently, Gallup released the latest edition of its longstanding survey measuring “satisfaction with the way things are going in the U.S.” Three out of four Americans (75 percent) claimed to be dissatisfied. The long-term trend tells a clear story: From the mid-1990s to late 2004, the level of satisfaction bounced around between 39 percent and 71 percent. But in the aftermath of the George W. Bush administration’s failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and during a yearslong violent insurgency challenging American military occupation of the country, numbers began to slide. They would reach a low of 9 percent satisfaction in October 2008, in the midst of the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression.

What followed was a very slow 12-year recovery of satisfaction across almost the entirety of the Obama and Trump administrations, with a post-2004 high of 45 percent reached in February 2020, on the eve of the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic. By January 2021, the level of satisfaction was back down to 11 percent, just two points off its historical low. Under Joe Biden, Americans briefly became somewhat more upbeat — but figures have sunk again from the mid-30s to the high teens and low 20s in recent months.

These findings mirror what other pollsters have found when they asked respondents about whether they think the country is on the right or wrong track, and about their trust in government and confidence in American institutions . The latter number has been slowly falling since the 1960s, but it, too, really began to collapse in 2004, eventually reaching the low 30s by 2007. In 2023, just 26 percent of Americans expressed confidence in our institutions.

In January 2021, Alana Newhouse published an essay in Tablet, “Everything Is Broken,” that gave voice to this incredibly widespread (but underreported) sentiment. Why did so many people in the United States believe that, as Ms. Newhouse put it in a follow-up essay , “whole parts of American society were breaking down before our eyes”?

The examples are almost too numerous to list: a disastrous war in Iraq; a ruinous financial crisis followed by a decade of anemic growth when most of the new wealth went to those who were already well off; a shambolic response to the deadliest pandemic in a century; a humiliating withdrawal from Afghanistan; rising prices and interest rates; skyrocketing levels of public and private debt; surging rates of homelessness and the spread of tent encampments in American cities; undocumented migrants streaming over the southern border; spiking rates of gun violence, mental illness, depression, addiction, suicide, chronic illness and obesity, coupled with a decline in life expectancy.

That’s an awful lot of failure over the past 20-odd years. Yet for the most part, the people who run our institutions have done very little to acknowledge or take responsibility for any of it, let alone undertake reforms that aim to fix what’s broken. That’s no doubt why angry anti-establishment populism has become so prominent in our politics over the past decade — with Mr. Trump, a political outsider, taking over the Republican Party in 2016 by running against the elites of both parties, and Senator Bernie Sanders giving the establishment favorite Hillary Clinton a run for her money that same year by taking on the banking and finance sectors of the economy, along with their Democratic and Republican enablers.

Mr. Biden has never been that kind of politician. Most of the time he speaks and acts as if he thinks American institutions are doing perfectly fine — at least so long as Mr. Trump doesn’t get his hands on them. Part of that is undoubtedly because Mr. Biden is an incumbent, and incumbents always find themselves having to defend what they’ve done in office, which isn’t compatible with acting like an insurgent going to war against the system.

Then there’s the fact that Mr. Biden has worked within our elected institutions since the Nixon administration, making him deeply invested in them (and implicated in their failures). Finally, as a Democrat who came of age during the heyday of mid-20th-century liberalism, Mr. Biden is wedded to the idea of using a functional, competent and capable federal government to improve people’s lives — whether or not more recent history validates that faith.

This places him badly out of step with the national mood, speaking a language very far removed from the talk of a broken country that suffuses Mr. Trump’s meandering and often unhinged remarks on the subject. The more earnest statements of the third-party candidates Robert F. Kennedy Jr. , Cornel West and Jill Stein also speak to aspects of our brokenness, taking ample and often nostalgic note of what’s gone wrong and promising bold, if vague, action to begin an effort of repair.

That leaves Mr. Biden as the lone institutionalist defender of the status quo surrounded by a small army of brokenists looking for support from an electorate primed to respond to their more downcast message.

There may be limits to what Mr. Biden can do to respond. For one thing, his 81-year-old frailty can’t help appearing to mirror the fragile state of our public institutions. For another, in an era of political bad feeling, when presidential approval ratings sink quickly and never recover, incumbents from both parties may no longer enjoy the kind of advantage in seeking re-election that they once did, at least at the national level.

Still, there are things the Biden campaign could do to help the president better connect with voters.

First, he should stop being so upbeat — about the economy in particular — and making the election entirely about the singular awfulness of his opponent. While the latter sounds evasive, the former makes the president seem hopelessly out of touch and risks antagonizing people who aren’t in the mood for a chipper message.

Mr. Biden should instead try to meet Americans where they are. He should admit Washington has gotten a lot of things wrong over the past two decades and sound unhappy about and humbled by it. He could make the argument that all governments make mistakes because they are run by fallible human beings — but also point out that elected representatives in a democracy should be upfront about error and resolve to learn from mistakes so that they avoid them in the future. Just acknowledging how much in America is broken could generate a lot of good will from otherwise skeptical and dismissive voters.

Even better would be an effort to develop a reform agenda: Mr. Biden could declare it’s long past time for America to put its house in order, to begin cleaning up the messes of the past two decades, to face our problems and return to our own best national self. He might even think of adapting and repurposing for the center-left a few lines from Ronald Reagan’s first Inaugural Address : “It’s not my intention to do away with government. It is rather to make it work — work with us, not over us; to stand by our side, not ride on our back. Government can and must provide opportunity, not smother it; foster productivity, not stifle it.”

In concrete terms, this means pledging to reform existing institutions and programs, not promising to build new ones on top of the ambitious legislation and substantial spending Congress passed during Mr. Biden’s first two years in office. It means, instead, a commitment to pause and begin assessing what government has been doing at all levels, under both Republican and Democratic leadership, over the past two decades.

It means, more specifically, a resolution to continue and expand existing reviews into what worked and what didn’t during the pandemic — in red states and blue states, in cities, suburbs and small towns — in order to prepare for a better response the next time we confront a public-health emergency. It means talking honestly about the surging and unsustainable national debt and what it will take to begin reining it in. It means trying to help government function better, including a concerted effort to increase state capacity , eliminate regulations that constrain the nation’s housing supply and build on the administration’s attempts at permitting reform to streamline or remove regulations that slow down and increase the cost of private as well as public development.

These projects will far outlast a second Biden term. But the president can promise to get them started, with the remaining work to be completed by presidents and generations to come.

Taking this approach may help to neutralize the populist advantages Mr. Trump enjoys (at least when he isn’t running as an incumbent). However much voters appreciate his denunciations of a corrupt and rigged system, as well as his management of the economy over the first three years of his presidency, they have no love for the G.O.P.’s obsession with pairing cuts to entitlement programs and upper-income tax rates with draconian restrictions on abortion — not to mention Mr. Trump’s focus on personal grievances and legal recklessness. That leaves plenty of room for Mr. Biden to make a case for himself as the guy who can enact the sweeping reforms American needs, and without all the unnecessary and dangerous drama a second Trump administration would surely bring.

Everything is broken — or so it feels to many of our fellow citizens. Denying this reality only empowers populist candidates whose message acquires its potency by pointing to an entrenched political establishment unwilling or unable to learn from (or even admit) its myriad mistakes. That shirking needs to stop. And it should do so with Joe Biden.

Damon Linker, who writes the newsletter “ Notes From the Middleground ,” is a senior lecturer in the department of political science at the University of Pennsylvania and a senior fellow at the Open Society Project at the Niskanen Center.

The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips . And here’s our email: [email protected] .

Follow the New York Times Opinion section on Facebook , Instagram , TikTok , WhatsApp , X and Threads .

Reflective Essay

Leonjre Awani

Media & Politics Minor Capstone

Reflective essay

February 25, 2024

I believe that this course has taught me how the intersection of media and politics serves as a platform where various spheres of society converge, creating narratives that shape perceptions and influence public discourse. This is the phenomenon that is commonly referred to as the “politicization of media”, and that theme manifests across many realms, including: sports, feminism and racial discourse.

The intertwining of media and politics has transformed outlets into conduits for political ideologies and narratives within these realms. Sports athletes become social activists when the politicization of media is exemplified by athletes who leverage their platforms for social and political activism. The intersection of sports and politics has been a perennial feature, but in recent years, athletes have become more vocal on issues ranging from racial injustice to gender equality.

Notable instances include Colin Kaepernick’s decision to kneel during the national anthem, sparking a nationwide dialogue on racial inequality and police brutality and Caster Semenya’s tribulations regarding her sexual identity. Media coverage played a pivotal role in amplifying these athletes and their messages, with outlets either championing their activism or criticizing it as disruptive to the status quo. The politicization of sports media is evident not only in the coverage of athlete activism but also in the framing of sports narratives through distinct political lenses.

Media outlets contribute to the politicization of sports by framing narratives in ways that align with prevailing political ideologies. Coverage can vary widely, with outlets choosing to emphasize either the athlete’s activism or their perceived disruption of the status quo. The choice of language, framing, and the inclusion or exclusion of certain perspectives all contribute to the political nature of sports media and the tendency of an outlet to lean towards political right or left.

In recent times, the media has turned into a battlefield for gender equality. A new wave of feminism has begun dominating opinions on social media which facilitate the shaping of narratives around gender equality. The politicization of media within feminist discourse revolves around the portrayal of women in various media forms, challenging traditional gender norms and advocating for broader social change. Media has historically perpetuated gender stereotypes, contributing to societal expectations and reinforcing unequal power dynamics. However, contemporary feminist movements have harnessed media platforms to challenge these norms. The #MeToo movement, for instance, gained momentum through social media and traditional news outlets, illustrating how media serves as both a reflection of and a catalyst for feminist political discourse. This was a pertinent topic of discussion in my first GuQ class, wherein we all studied the women of the Gulf region.

Media outlets contribute to the politicization of feminism by framing issues such as reproductive rights, workplace discrimination, and gender-based violence within distinct political lenses. Depending on where you are, this rhetoric is cited to disparage feminism and dub it a cancer to society. The choice of language, framing, and emphasis can either reinforce or challenge existing power structures. The representation of feminist activists and the framing of feminist movements in media coverage play a crucial role in shaping public perceptions of gender-related issues.

Racial discourse is probably the media’s most profitable form of news. Delegitimizing stereotypes and advocating for social justice is ostensibly the purpose of racial discourse. However, with interference of social media the amplification of unrest and birth of social justice movements from racial discourse have become much more ubiquitous. Media has historically played a role in reinforcing racial hierarchies, perpetuating harmful stereotypes, and shaping public perceptions. In recent times this is done in a covert manner. Which is why, though it also serves as a tool for marginalized communities to challenge these narratives and advocate for racial justice, it is seen as a double edged sword.

The Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement provides a contemporary example of the politicization of media in racial discourse. Social media and news outlets have worked hand in hand in bringing attention to systemic racism and police violence in the United States (predominantly). Media coverage contributed to the politicization of racial discourse by framing narratives in ways that either challenge or reinforce prevailing power structures. The choice of images, headlines, and the framing of protests can influence public opinion and contribute to broader discussions on racial equity. Nevertheless, I would argue that racial discourse is politicized in a very flawed manner and this is due to the media. Theoretical philosophies and methodologies that were taught by renowned scholars and known by contemporary ones are rarely mentioned in movements like BLM. While social media has politicized a movement like this I think it has simultaneously invalidated its importance with triviality and wantonness.

In all these aspects the politicization of the media reflects societal dynamics and how they can send populations on social declines. The media operates as a mirror, reflecting existing power structures, ideologies, and inequalities. Simultaneously, it serves as a mold that influences public perceptions, amplifying certain voices, and constructing narratives that align with or the status quo and ostracize the other.

Since October 7, 2023, my social media feed has become a daily testament to the ongoing Palestinian plight, and this experience has only reinforced the pervasive theme of media being politicized. The stories, images, and narratives flooding my timelines depict the struggles faced by the Palestinian people, and how politics has deeply affected them as a whole. The politicization of media is evident as different sources frame the narrative in ways that align with their political perspectives. Israeli portrayal of events, emphasize terror attacks over the literal genocide which is still ongoing. Whether through news articles, firsthand accounts, or images shared by activists, the media becomes a battleground for competing narratives, reflecting the broader geopolitical landscape surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

In an attempt to move beyond the digital realm and engage with the Palestinian narrative more directly, I participated in an extracurricular activity that involved interacting with Palestinian refugees, primarily children, in Qatar. This experience allowed me to connect with individuals who are often reduced to statistics or political talking points in media coverage. It shed light on the human stories behind the headlines. These were not just faces of a distant conflict but individuals with hopes and aspirations and who’ve experienced far too much loss. The children, in particular, left a lasting impression. Their resilience in the face of adversity was a quite literally what I was used to witnessing on social media. Despite the bleak circumstances, the sense of determination and unyielding resistance among the Palestinian refugees was palpable. Engaging with them provided a counterbalance to the media’s polarized narratives. It reinforced the notion that the politicization of media can sometimes overshadow the human stories that lie at the heart of conflicts. In this juxtaposition of social media narratives and personal interactions, the theme of media being politicized became even more pronounced.

Initially, my perception of media and politics was simplistic, I saw media as a passive conveyor of information rather than an active participant in shaping narratives. However, the courses within the minor, along with real world experiences and some extracurriculars, contributed to reshaping my perspective. The examination of the politicization of media within the contexts of sports, feminism, and racial discourse exposed the power dynamics that lie in information dissemination. I learned how sports media tend to either amplify or challenge political statements, emphasizing that the construction of narratives influence public discourse. Through Caster Semenya I saw how it was tied to the feminist movements and racial discourse. They underscored the role of media in perpetuating or challenging societal gender norms and ethnic biases, showcasing its potential as a tool for social and political change.

International relations within the minor deepened my understanding of how media shapes global narratives and influences public perceptions through the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, witnessed on social media and through direct interactions with Palestinian refugees in Qatar. I had known before that geopolitical interests were an inciting factor of war but engaging with the Palestinian refugees added a layer of realism to my learning. It allowed me to see it as a less abstract concept and look past the digital narratives to resonate with the individual stories that often go forgotten by history. This experience was a catalyst to prompting a critical reflection on the limitations and biases inherent in media coverage.

The trajectory of my learning during the Media and Politics minor has been marked by a continuous evolution of awareness and critical thinking. The acknowledgment of the media’s active role in constructing our very thoughts makes me now realize and contemplate the importance of media literacy and actively seeking diverse perspectives and critically evaluating what is fed to us. Moving forward, I plan to apply my understanding by engaging in more informed and critical discussions (where before I would avoid them), and communicating with those marginalized by the media. All in all, the Media and Politics minor has been a transformative and intellectual journey that reshaped my understanding of the intricate relationship between the media and global politics. This newfound awareness has influenced my approach to information consumption, emphasizing the need for critical engagement and media literacy.

political equality essay

IMAGES

VIDEO

COMMENTS

5 What is Equality? Part 4: Political Equality

Signed in as

Personal account

Institutional access

IP based access

Sign in through your institution

Sign in with a library card

Society Members

Sign in through society site

Sign in using a personal account

Viewing your signed in accounts

Signed in but can't access content

This Feature Is Available To Subscribers Only

Internet Archive Audio

Mobile Apps

Browser Extensions

Save Page Now

Political equality : an essay in democratic theory

plus-circle Add Review comment Reviews

DOWNLOAD OPTIONS

IN COLLECTIONS

SIMILAR ITEMS (based on metadata)

Political Equality: An Essay in Democratic Theory

Related Papers

RELATED PAPERS

RELATED TOPICS

Bibliography

1. Defining the Concept

2. Principles of Equality and Justice

3. Conceptions of Distributive Equality: Equality of What?

6. The Value of Equality: Why Equality?

Political Equality

Before you purchase audiobooks and ebooks

Support your local independent bookstore.

Political Equality: An Essay in Democratic Theory

Open Access

Equaliberty

a John Hope Franklin Center Book

Cruel Optimism

In the Wake

Marx for Cats

The Right to Maim

Vibrant Matter

Meeting the Universe Halfway

Necropolitics

Designs for the Pluriverse

Queer Phenomenology

Animals and Women

A World of Many Worlds

Desire Work

Mohawk Interruptus

Buy for others

Image Unavailable

Follow the author

Political Equality: An Essay in Democratic Theory Kindle Edition

Editorial Reviews

Product details

About the author

Customer reviews

No customer reviews

Essay on Equality: Meaning and Kinds of Equality

Kinds of Equality :

(1) Social Equality :

(2) Civil Equality :

(3) Political Equality :

(4) Economic Equality :

(5) Equality of Opportunity and Education :

Related Articles:

Upload and Share Your Article:

Upload Your Knowledge on Political science:

NPR Editor's Critical Op-Ed Ignites Debate Over Political Bias in Journalism: 'This Essay Has It Backwards'

Why Is Biden Struggling? Because America Is Broken.

Reflective Essay

Leave a Reply Cancel reply

IMAGES

VIDEO

COMMENTS