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Office of Governmental Accountability Judicial Selection Commission

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Notice of reappointment of Judges of the State of Connecticut will expire during the year 2025.

Chairperson Leander Dolphin

Leander is a partner in the School Law Practice Group at Shipman and Goodwin. She was appointed to the Judicial Selection Commission in August 2022 by Governor Ned Lamont. She was elected as  the Chairperson of  the Judicial Selection Commission in October 2022 by the members of the commission. 

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Lamont makes 20 nominations for judges of the Superior Court

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Gov. Ned Lamont on Wednesday nominated 11 men and nine women as judges of the Superior Court, including three former lawmakers and his commissioner of veterans affairs, Thomas J. Saadi.

The former lawmakers are Daniel J. Fox of Stamford and Paul R. Doyle of Wethersfield, both Democrats, and Jason Welch of Bristol, a Republican who served in the Senate and currently is the Senate GOP’s legal counsel.

The class is Lamont’s third major group of judicial nominees since taking office in 2019. The trial court has 40 vacancies and 185 authorized positions. Lamont did not name a successor to Maria Araujo Kahn, who recently resigned from the state Supreme Court to join the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit.

He also nominated two women Wednesday as family support magistrates.

“Selecting nominees to become judges is one of the most important duties that I have as governor, because these individuals will become responsible for ensuring that justice is administered fairly and without prejudice and that everyone who comes before the court is treated equally and with respect,” Lamont said.

As was the case with previous classes, Lamont nominated nearly an equal number of men and women to the bench.

As of last June, men held 54% of the 155 filled positions on the trial bench; 68% of the trial judges identified as white and 32% as minority or multi-racial.

“Our court system works best when it reflects the diversity, experience and understanding of the people it serves,” Lamont said.

Fox, who was reelected to the House in November, resigned before the 2023 session began in anticipation of an appointment to the bench. Doyle, who served in the House and Senate, did not seek reelection in 2018. Welch did not seek reelection in 2014.

Connecticut governors can only choose nominees from a pool of candidates vetted and approved by the Judicial Selection Commission. Nominees now face a hearing and confirmation votes by the General Assembly.

The new class includes eight lawyers in private practice, one academic and the rest in local, state and federal legal jobs.

The nominees for Superior Court:

• Mark Altermatt, 62, of Bolton. Altermatt graduated from Washington and Lee University and Syracuse University College of Law. He is a partner at David G. Hill and Associates.
• Moira Buckley, 53, of Glastonbury. Buckley graduated from St. Anselm College and Quinnipiac University School of Law. She is an assistant federal defender in the Office of the Federal Defender for the District of Connecticut.
• Patrick Caruso, 55, of Madison. Caruso graduated from the University of Connecticut and Quinnipiac College School of Law. He is an assistant United States attorney.
• Vikki Cooper, 52, of Fairfield. Cooper graduated from John Jay College of Criminal Justice and Quinnipiac University School of Law. She is deputy corporation counsel for the city of Stamford.
• Gregory C. Davis, 60, of Bloomfield. Davis graduated from Tufts University and Georgetown University Law Center. He is a senior counsel at The Travelers Companies and is deputy mayor of Bloomfield.
• Lynn Alvey Dawson, 64, of Cheshire. Dawson graduated from Boston University and Suffolk University School. She is a solo practitioner.
• Karen L. DeMeola, 53, of Tolland. DeMeola graduated from the University of Connecticut and University of Connecticut School of Law. She is the assistant dean for diversity, belonging and community engagement at UConn Law. She is former president of the Connecticut Bar Association.
• Paul R. Doyle, 59, of Wethersfield. Doyle graduated from Colby College and the University of Connecticut School of Law. He is a partner of Kennedy Doyle LLC, a general practice law firm, and formerly served on the Wethersfield Town Council, 12 years as a member of the Connecticut House of Representatives and 12 years as a member of the Connecticut Senate.
• Daniel J. Fox, 46, of Stamford. Fox graduated from Loyola University and New England Law School. He is a partner at Curtis, Brinckerhoff and Barrett, P.C. He served in the House for 12 years.
• Matthew Larock, 47, of Simsbury. Larock graduated from Dickinson College and University of Miami School of Law. He is a chief of the Employment, Labor, and Workers’ Compensation Section of the attorney general’s office.
• Ann F. Lawlor, 55, of North Haven. Lawlor graduated from Providence College and New England Law School. She is a supervisory assistant state’s attorney.
• Walter A. Menjivar, 35, of West Hartford. Menjivar graduated from Vanderbilt University and University of Connecticut School of Law. He is an assistant attorney general and a former associate general counsel in the governor’s office.
• Yamini Menon, 46, of Westport. Menon graduated from Johns Hopkins University and American University Washington College of Law. She is an assistant state’s attorney in the civil litigation bureau in the chief state’s attorney’s office and a former legal aid attorney.
• Thomas J. O’Neill, 57, of Fairfield. O’Neill graduated from Stonehill College and Suffolk University Law School. He is a partner at Day Pitney LLP.
• Richard J. Rubino, 54, of West Hartford. Rubino graduated from Southern Connecticut State University and Ohio Northern University College of Law. He is a supervisory assistant state’s attorney.
• Thomas J. Saadi, 53, of Danbury. Saadi graduated from Western Connecticut State University and Quinnipiac University. He is commissioner of the Connecticut State Department of Veterans Affairs and a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army Reserve.
• Sharon A. Skyers, 54, of New Haven. Skyers graduated from Duke University and North Carolina Central University School of Law. She is a managing partner at Skyers, Skyers and Harrell, LLC, which she co-founded.
• Jennifer J. Tunnard, 57, of Ridgefield. Tunnard graduated from Fordham University and Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center. She is a solo practitioner and a former prosecutor in the Bronx district attorney’s office.
• Emily Wagner, 47, of West Hartford. Wagner graduated from Skidmore College and University of Connecticut School of Law. She is an appeals lawyer at the Connecticut Division of Public Defender Services, where she has spent the past 12 years.
• Jason Welch, 50, of Bristol : Welch graduated from Hamilton College and Quinnipiac University School of Law. He is chief legal counsel to the Senate Republican minority office. He has served in the Connecticut Army National Guard and the Coast Guard Reserves. He served two terms in the state Senate for the 31 st Senatorial District.

The family support magistrate nominees include:

• Jacquelyn B. Kercelius, 35, of Hamden. Kercelius graduated from Fordham College Lincoln Center and Quinnipiac University School of Law. She is an assistant clerk in Family Matters for the Judicial District of New Haven at Meriden.
• Charlene W. Spencer, 58, of Vernon. Spencer graduated from the University of Connecticut and Western New England University School of Law. She is an assistant attorney general.

Mark Pazniokas Capitol Bureau Chief

Mark is the Capitol Bureau Chief and a co-founder of CT Mirror. He is a frequent contributor to WNPR, a former state politics writer for The Hartford Courant and Journal Inquirer, and contributor for The New York Times.

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Legislature Confirms 21 Judges

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The full list of confirmed judges includes: 

• Nicole Anker, 51, of Glastonbury; Anker was confirmed in the Senate by a vote of 32-0. 
• Tamar R. Birckhead, 58, of Hartford;
• Corrine A. Boni-Vendola, 58, of Wallingford; Boni-Vendola 
• Kristin A. Connors, 57, of Newtown;
• Steven R. Dembo, 58, of Bloomfield; Dembo was confirmed in the Senate by a Vote of 32-0
• Cody N. Guarnieri, 37, of South Windsor;
• Christine Jean-Louis, 42, of Wallingford; Jean-Louis was confirmed in the Senate by a vote of 32-0. 
• Cristina M. Lopez, 46, of Wethersfield; Lopez was confirmed in the Senate by a vote of 32-0. 
• Sara Nadim, 40, Unionville; Nadim was confirmed in the Senate by a vote of 32-0. 
• Matthew Necci, 42, Glastonbury; Necci was confirmed in the Senate by a vote of 32-0. 
• Susan E. Nugent, 62, Hamden; Nugent was confirmed in the Senate by a vote of 32-0. 
• John Regan, 62, of Old Greenwich; Regan was confirmed in the Senate by a vote of 32-0. 
• Maria C. Rodriguez, 59, of West Hartford; Rodriguez was confirmed in the Senate by a vote of 32-0. 
• Adam R. Schibley, 38, of Windsor; Schibley was confirmed in the Senate by a vote of 32-0. 
• Pedro E. Segarra, 64, of Hartford;
• Eric P. Smith, 53, of Litchfield; Smith was confirmed in the Senate by a vote of 32-0. 
• Alayna M. Stone, 41, of New Haven; Stone was confirmed by the Senate by a vote of 32-0. 
• Melissa L. Streeto, 51, of Wethersfield; Streeto was confirmed in the Senate by a vote of 32-0. 
• Nicole J. Tung, 54, of Cheshire; Tung was confirmed in the Senate by a vote of 32-0. 
• Matthew T. Wax-Krell, 44, of West Hartford; Krell was confirmed in the Senate by a vote of 32-0. 
• Colleen Zingaro, 57, of Newtown; Zingaro was confirmed in the Senate by a vote of 32-0. 

CHAPTER 882

Superior court, table of contents.

Sec. 51-164s. Superior Court sole trial court. Jurisdiction transferred from Court of Common Pleas and Juvenile Court.

Sec. 51-164t. Composition of Superior Court established by rule.

Sec. 51-164u. Transfer of matters and appeals pending on July 1, 1978.

Sec. 51-164v. (Formerly Sec. 51-141b). Use of Circuit Court and Court of Common Pleas forms in the Superior Court.

Sec. 51-164w. Juvenile Court, Circuit Court and Court of Common Pleas construed to mean Superior Court as of July 1, 1978.

Sec. 51-164x. Review of order prohibiting attendance at court session; review of certain orders sealing or limiting disclosure to court documents, affidavits or files.

Sec. 51-165. Number of judges. Retired judges. Assignment to hear housing matters and juvenile matters.

Sec. 51-166. Annual meeting of judges.

Sec. 51-167. Special meetings of the judges.

Sec. 51-168. Transferred

Secs. 51-169 to 51-171. Salaries of clerks and assistant clerks; traveling expenses; full-time, part-time requirements. Clerks of Superior Court to be county and judicial district clerks; custody of records of former county courts. Certification re authority of notaries public who recorded commissions prior to July 1, 1982. Custody of files and judgments in Stamford.

Sec. 51-171a. Transferred

Secs. 51-172 to 51-174. Records and files at Waterbury. Civil actions on appeals brought in Ansonia filed in Waterbury. Records and seal of court at Winchester.

Sec. 51-175. Transferred

Secs. 51-175a and 51-175b. Transferred

Secs. 51-176 to 51-179. Special state's attorney. Circuit Court prosecutors not to be state's attorneys. Expenses of state's attorneys. Civil term.

Sec. 51-180. Criminal terms and sessions.

Sec. 51-180a. (Formerly Sec. 51-153). Special session when accused confined for want of bail.

Sec. 51-181. Times and places for the sitting of the Superior Court.

Sec. 51-181a. Sessions at Bristol.

Sec. 51-181b. Drug docket and drug courts.

Sec. 51-181c. Community court.

Sec. 51-181d. Truancy docket. Implementation.

Sec. 51-181e. Domestic violence dockets.

Sec. 51-182. Notice of sessions. Special sessions. Short calendar.

Secs. 51-182a and 51-182b. Family relations term. Family relations sessions.

Sec. 51-182c.* Transferred

Sec. 51-182d. Length of family relations sessions; assignment of judges.

Secs. 51-182e and 51-182f.* Transferred

Sec. 51-182g. Transferred

Sec. 51-182h.* Transferred

Secs. 51-182i to 51-182k.* Transferred

Sec. 51-182 l .* Transferred

Sec. 51-182m.* Transferred

Secs. 51-182n and 51-182o. Hearing of appeals from Juvenile Court. Sessions for appeals from Common Pleas Court.

Sec. 51-182p.* Transferred

Sec. 51-183. Substitute judge.

Sec. 51-183a. (Formerly Sec. 51-28). Judge's inability to hold court.

Sec. 51-183b. (Formerly Sec. 51-29). Judgments in civil actions. Time limit.

Sec. 51-183c. (Formerly Sec. 51-41). Same judge not to preside at new trial.

Sec. 51-183d. (Formerly Sec. 51-42). Disqualified judge; proceedings not void.

Sec. 51-183e. (Formerly Sec. 51-43). Presiding judge or arbitrator to have casting vote.

Sec. 51-183f. (Formerly Sec. 51-44). Expiration of term, disability retirement, death or resignation of judge.

Sec. 51-183g. (Formerly Sec. 51-46). Retiring judge; unfinished matters.

Sec. 51-183h. (Formerly Sec. 51-41a). Judge not to hear motion attacking bench warrant which he signed.

Sec. 51-184. Adjournment of court.

Sec. 51-185. Disposition of civil business at criminal sessions.

Sec. 51-186. Hearings at the Connecticut Correctional Institution, Somers.

Sec. 51-187. Court accommodations in Windham County and at Rockville.

Secs. 51-187a and 51-187b. Transferred

Sec. 51-188. Transferred

Sec. 51-189. Transfer of hearings before judges.

Sec. 51-190. Trial before judge; papers filed where.

Sec. 51-190a. (Formerly Sec. 51-161). Filing of papers upon decision.

Secs. 51-191 to 51-193. Cause affecting land; documents lodged in Superior Court. Clerk designated by judge to take papers. Records may be rewritten.

Sec. 51-193a. Transferred

Sec. 51-193b. Payment of fees, costs and fines by credit card.

Sec. 51-193c. Filing of document or data by computer, facsimile transmission or other technology. Use of technology for required payments. Electronic signature and verification. Standards. Rules.

Sec. 51-193d. Moneys found in or on grounds of Superior Court presumed abandoned.

Secs. 51-193e to 51-193k. Reserved

Sec. 51-193 l . Appointment of magistrates. Submission of names of probate judges for approval as magistrates.

Secs. 51-193m to 51-193q. Prosecutions to be submitted to magistrate. Persons alleged to have committed motor vehicle infractions; payment of fine; plea of not guilty. Request for jury trial; hearing in Superior Court. Notification of magistrate by clerk of court; where hearing may be held. Hearing before magistrate; report; final judgment.

Sec. 51-193r. Compensation of magistrates.

Sec. 51-193s. Submission of names of probate judges for approval as magistrates.

Sec. 51-193t. Hearing of small claims matters by magistrate.

Sec. 51-193u. Hearing of violations and infractions by magistrate. Authority of magistrate decision. Demand for trial de novo.

Sec. 51-194. Review division, appointment; meetings; disqualification; secretary.

Sec. 51-195. Application for review of sentence.

Sec. 51-196. Review of sentence or commitment. Decision.

Sec. 51-197. Forms and rules of procedure.

Sec. 51-197a. Appeals to Appellate Court. Writs. Transfer of jurisdiction from appellate session.

Sec. 51-197b. (Formerly Sec. 52-7). Administrative appeals.

Sec. 51-197c. Appellate Court; judges, appointment, terms, Chief Judge.

Sec. 51-197d. Jurisdiction of appellate session.

Sec. 51-197e. Consolidation of appeals.

Sec. 51-197f. Further review by certification only.

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec. 51-164s. Superior Court sole trial court. Jurisdiction transferred from Court of Common Pleas and Juvenile Court. The Superior Court shall be the sole court of original jurisdiction for all causes of action, except such actions over which the courts of probate have original jurisdiction, as provided by statute. All jurisdiction heretofore conferred upon and exercised by the Court of Common Pleas and the Juvenile Court prior to July 1, 1978 shall be transferred to the Superior Court on July 1, 1978.

(P.A. 76-436, S. 1, 681.)

Cited. 179 C. 406; 180 C. 114; 189 C. 29; 192 C. 234; Id., 704; 194 C. 43; 206 C. 323; 209 C. 679; Id., 724; 211 C. 416; 214 C. 256; 222 C. 299; 227 C. 175; 229 C. 691; 237 C. 758.

Cited. 2 CA 308; Id., 355; 3 CA 201; 6 CA 530; 15 CA 185; 24 CA 195; 30 CA 45; 35 CA 769; 45 CA 324. Statute expressly confers to Superior Court all jurisdiction previously held by Juvenile Court. 77 CA 246.

Cited. 39 CS 347.

Sec. 51-164t. Composition of Superior Court established by rule. (a) The Superior Court shall consist of such divisions and parts thereof as shall be provided by the rules of the Superior Court to provide the highest standards of justice and the most efficient operation of the court.

(b) The Chief Court Administrator shall assign to each division or part thereof as many judges as he deems advisable and shall designate the holding of sessions of divisions and parts at such times and localities as he deems to be in the best interest of court business, taking into consideration the convenience of litigants and their counsel, and the efficient use of courthouse personnel and facilities.

(P.A. 76-436, S. 7, 10a, 681; P.A. 82-248, S. 84.)

History: P.A. 82-248 made technical revision, rewording some provisions and dividing section into Subsecs. but made no substantive change.

Cited. 214 C. 256.

Sec. 51-164u. Transfer of matters and appeals pending on July 1, 1978. Section 51-164u is repealed, effective October 1, 2002.

(P.A. 76-436, S. 2, 681; P.A. 77-347, S. 10, 11; S.A. 02-12, S. 1.)

Sec. 51-164v. (Formerly Sec. 51-141b). Use of Circuit Court and Court of Common Pleas forms in the Superior Court. Any form which was valid for use with respect to any court of common pleas proceeding on July 1, 1978, including but not limited to arrest warrant and search warrant forms, shall be valid for use with respect to proceedings in the Superior Court on and after July 1, 1978, and wherever the words “Circuit Court” or “Court of Common Pleas” appear on any such form used on and after July 1, 1978, they shall be construed to mean “Superior Court”.

(P.A. 75-149, S. 1, 2; P.A. 76-436, S. 107, 681.)

History: P.A. 76-436 replaced previous provisions concerning transfer of circuit court functions to court of common pleas with provisions concerning subsequent transfer of court of common pleas functions to superior court, effective July 1, 1978; Sec. 51-141b transferred to Sec. 51-164v in the 1977 Court Reorganization Supplement.

Sec. 51-164w. Juvenile Court, Circuit Court and Court of Common Pleas construed to mean Superior Court as of July 1, 1978. Section 51-164w is repealed, effective October 1, 2002.

(P.A. 76-436, S. 245, 668, 681; S.A. 02-12, S. 1.)

Sec. 51-164x. Review of order prohibiting attendance at court session; review of certain orders sealing or limiting disclosure to court documents, affidavits or files. (a) Any person affected by a court order which prohibits any person from attending any session of court, except any session of court conducted pursuant to section 46b-11 , 46b-49 , 46b-122 or 54-76h or any other provision of the general statutes under which the court is authorized to close proceedings, whether at a pretrial or trial stage, shall have the right to the review of such order by the filing of a petition for review with the Appellate Court within seventy-two hours from the issuance of such court order.

(b) No order subject to review pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall be effective until seventy-two hours after it has been issued, and the timely filing of any petition for review shall stay the order.

(c) Any person affected by a court order that seals or limits the disclosure of any files, affidavits, documents or other material on file with the court or filed in connection with a court proceeding, except (1) any order issued pursuant to section 46b-11 or 54-33c or any other provision of the general statutes under which the court is authorized to seal or limit the disclosure of files, affidavits, documents or materials, whether at a pretrial or trial stage, and (2) any order issued pursuant to a court rule that seals or limits the disclosure of any affidavit in support of an arrest warrant, shall have the right to the review of such order by the filing of a petition for review with the Appellate Court within seventy-two hours from the issuance of such court order.

(d) The Appellate Court shall provide an expedited hearing on such petitions filed pursuant to subsections (a) and (c) of this section in accordance with such rules as the judges of the Appellate Court may adopt, consistent with the rights of the petitioner and the parties to the case.

(P.A. 80-234, S. 1; P.A. 81-89; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 83-29, S. 39, 82; P.A. 97-178, S. 1.)

History: P.A. 81-89 exempted any session of court conducted pursuant to Sec. 46b-11, 46b-49, 46b-122 or 54-76h or any other provision under which court is authorized to close proceedings, and added provision that petition for review shall be filed within 72 hours from issuance of court order and specified that the appellate session of the superior court shall provide hearing in accordance with rules adopted by judges of the superior court; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 83-29 deleted reference to appellate session of the superior court and added reference to appellate court; P.A. 97-178 amended Subsec. (a) by changing right to “appeal” order to right to “the review of” order, amended Subsec. (b) by changing reference to “such order” to “order subject to review pursuant to subsection (a) of this section” and by requiring “timely” filing of petition, and added Subsec. (c) re review of orders sealing or limiting disclosure of files, affidavits, documents or other material on file with the court and exceptions and amended Subsec. (d), formerly Subsec. (c), re expedited hearing on petitions filed pursuant to Subsecs. (a) and (c).

Cited. 208 C. 365; 222 C. 331; 229 C. 178; 230 C. 441; 233 C. 44; 237 C. 339; 240 C. 623.

Cited. 18 CA 273; 23 CA 433; 26 CA 758; 43 CA 851; 45 CA 142. Section does not provide expedited review of protective order issued pursuant to Sec. 13-5 of the Practice Book. 51 CA 287. Confers jurisdiction for court to review order permitting use of pseudonyms regardless of whether the order is separate or connected to an order sealing a file or any portion thereof; Subsec. (c) provides court with jurisdiction to review a court order that limits disclosure of any material on file; defendants' names are “material on file” and omitting those names and permitting them to be replaced with pseudonyms constitutes limiting their disclosure; whole purpose of statute is to afford expedited review of a court order that limits disclosure, and its express provisions do not contain an exception for nondisclosure of the identity of others. 96 CA 399. Documents at issue are judicial documents that are presumed to be open to the public; respondent waived right to have court seal the documents by disclosing them and by not asking for them to be sealed at time of filing, and trial court's subsequent order allowing disclosure to only certain parties was not proper. 120 CA 837. An order that prevents the media or the public from obtaining copies of documentary or photographic trial exhibits, unless otherwise prohibited from disclosure by an existing order or otherwise applicable law, constitutes a limit on disclosure as contemplated by section and the Practice Book; petitioner had a presumptive right not only to inspect all trial exhibits in custody of clerk's office but to obtain copies of those exhibits. 174 CA 298.

Order for closure too broad where included presentation of evidence on newspaper circulation, prior publicity and publishing policies. 37 CS 627. Cited. Id., 705; 38 CS 546.

Sec. 51-165. Number of judges. Retired judges. Assignment to hear housing matters and juvenile matters. (a)(1) On and after July 1, 1998, the Superior Court shall consist of one hundred eighty-one judges, including the judges of the Supreme Court and the Appellate Court, who shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon nomination of the Governor.

(2) On and after October 1, 1998, the Superior Court shall consist of one hundred eighty-three judges, including the judges of the Supreme Court and the Appellate Court, who shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon nomination of the Governor.

(3) On and after January 1, 1999, the Superior Court shall consist of one hundred eighty-six judges, including the judges of the Supreme Court and the Appellate Court, who shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon nomination of the Governor.

(4) On and after October 1, 1999, the Superior Court shall consist of one hundred ninety-one judges, including the judges of the Supreme Court and the Appellate Court, who shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon nomination of the Governor.

(5) On and after October 1, 2000, the Superior Court shall consist of one hundred ninety-six judges, including the judges of the Supreme Court and the Appellate Court, who shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon nomination of the Governor.

(6) On and after April 1, 2009, the Superior Court shall consist of two hundred one judges, including the judges of the Supreme Court and the Appellate Court, who shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon nomination of the Governor.

(b) In addition thereto, each judge of the Supreme Court, Appellate Court, or judge of the Superior Court who elects to retain his office but retire from full-time active service shall continue to be a member of the Superior Court during the remainder of his term of office and during the term of any reappointment under section 51-50i , until he attains the age of seventy years. He shall be entitled to participate in the meetings of the judges of the Superior Court and to vote as a member thereof.

(c) Any judge assigned to hear housing matters should have a commitment to the maintenance of decent, safe and sanitary housing and, if practicable, shall devote full time to housing matters. If practicable, he should be assigned to hear matters for not less than eighteen months. Any judge assigned to housing matters in a judicial district should reside in one of the judicial districts served by the housing session after he is assigned thereto.

(d) Any judge assigned to hear juvenile matters should have a commitment to the prompt resolution of disputes affecting the care and custody of children with full understanding of all factors affecting the best interests of children and, if practicable, shall devote full time to juvenile matters. If practicable, any such judge should be assigned to hear juvenile matters for not less than eighteen months.

(1949 Rev., S. 7621; 1953, S. 3110d; 1957, P.A. 476, S. 1; February, 1965, P.A. 331, S. 16; 1967, P.A. 243, S. 2; P.A. 73-91, S. 1, 2; P.A. 74-183, S. 8, 291; 74-309, S. 11, 17; P.A. 76-436, S. 6, 681; P.A. 78-365, S. 3, 13; P.A. 80-448, S. 5, 8; P.A. 81-312, S. 1, 2; 81-419, S. 7; P.A. 82-248, S. 85; 82-389, S. 1, 3; 82-461, S. 8; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 83-25, S. 4, 9; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 83-29, S. 10, 82; P.A. 85-280; 85-451, S. 1, 4; 85-468, S. 1, 2; P.A. 86-328, S. 1, 3; P.A. 87-508, S. 1, 10; P.A. 89-335, S. 1, 2; 89-390, S. 23, 37; P.A. 93-225, S. 2, 4; May Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-6, S. 12, 28; July 13 Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-1, S. 2, 9; P.A. 97-257, S. 8, 13; P.A. 98-197, S. 1, 8; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 07-4, S. 86.)

History: 1965 act increased number of judges from 27 to 36; 1967 act increased number to 41; P.A. 73-91 increased number of judges to judges to 46, effective April 19, 1973, with terms to commence the first of June, July, August, September and October, 1973 and nominations to be made by governor on or before May 15, 1973; P.A. 74-183 increased number of judges to 51, effective May 24, 1974, for purpose of appointment for terms effective December 31, 1974; P.A. 74-309 added provisions re judges who retain office but retire from full-time active service; P.A. 76-436 increased number of judges to 118, effective July 1, 1978; P.A. 78-365 increased number of judges to 119 and added provisions re judges assigned to hear housing matters; P.A. 80-448 required that judge hearing housing matters should be assigned to do so for not less than 18 months, deleting reference to July 1, 1980, as duration of time during which housing matters assigned to particular judge; P.A. 81-312 increased the number of judges from 119 to 127; P.A. 81-419 deleted a reference to the judge assigned to hear housing matters in the judicial district of Hartford-New Britain and clarified the language concerning residency to make it applicable to any judge hearing housing matters; P.A. 82-248 divided section into Subsecs.; P.A. 82-389 increased number of superior court judges from 127 to 131; P.A. 82-461 provided that a judge assigned to hear housing matters in a judicial district should reside in one of the judicial districts served by the housing session rather than in that judicial district; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 83-25 amended Subsec. (c) by adding “if practicable” to requirement that housing judge should devote full time to housing matters; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 83-29 increased number of superior court judges from 131 to 136 and added references to appellate court; P.A. 85-280 added Subsec. (d) re assignment of judges to hear juvenile matters; P.A. 85-451 increased number of judges to 137; P.A. 85-468 increased number of superior court judges to 143, thereby repealing by implication the increase in P.A. 85-451; P.A. 86-328 increased number of superior court judges to 146; P.A. 87-508 increased number of superior court judges to 155; P.A. 89-335 increased number of superior court judges to 163; P.A. 89-390 increased number of superior court judges from to 166; P.A. 93-225 amended Subsec. (a) by increasing number of superior court judges to 168, effective July 1, 1993; May Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-6 amended Subsec. (a) to increase the number of judges to 172, effective July 1, 1994; July 13 Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-1 amended Subsec. (a) to increase number of superior court judges to 174, effective July 15, 1994; P.A. 97-257 amended Subsec. (a) by increasing number of judges to 177 on and after January 1, 1998, effective July 1, 1997; P.A. 98-197 amended Subsec. (a) by increasing number of judges to 181, on and after July 1, 1998, to 183 on and after October 1, 1998, to 186 on and after January 1, 1999, to 191 on and after October 1, 1999 and to 196 on and after October 1, 2000, effective July 1, 1998; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 07-4 added Subsec. (a)(6) to increase the number of judges on and after April 1, 2009, to 201, effective April 1, 2009.

Is one court throughout state. 76 C. 327; 108 C. 77. Cited. 193 C. 670; 206 C. 323; 217 C. 57.

Cited. 41 CS 1.

Sec. 51-166. Annual meeting of judges. The judges of the Superior Court shall meet annually in June. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall give notice of the date, place and hour of meeting and shall preside at the meeting. A majority of all of the judges of the Superior Court shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business. In the event of the absence or disability of the Chief Justice, the Chief Court Administrator shall act in his place.

(1949 Rev., S. 7653; 1967, P.A. 656, S. 29; P.A. 76-436, S. 10a, 84, 681; P.A. 82-248, S. 86.)

History: 1967 act specified that chief justice is to preside at meeting and that chief court administrator may act in his place and replaced provision whereby judges fixed number which constituted a quorum with provision requiring that majority of entire number of judges be considered as a quorum; P.A. 76-436 allowed meetings to be held at any time during June where previously the first Monday in June was the date, effective July 1, 1978; P.A. 82-248 rephrased section but made no substantive change.

Sec. 51-167. Special meetings of the judges. The Chief Justice or presiding judge of the Supreme Court may call a meeting of the judges of the Superior Court at such time and place as he may designate, and, when convened, they may transact any business that might be done at the annual meeting.

(1949 Rev., S. 7654.)

Sec. 51-168. Transferred to Chapter 873, Sec. 51-51v .

Secs. 51-169 to 51-171. Salaries of clerks and assistant clerks; traveling expenses; full-time, part-time requirements. Clerks of Superior Court to be county and judicial district clerks; custody of records of former county courts. Certification re authority of notaries public who recorded commissions prior to July 1, 1982. Custody of files and judgments in Stamford. Sections 51-169 to 51-171 , inclusive, are repealed.

(1949 Rev., S. 3605, 3608, 7668; 1957, P.A. 445, S. 5, 6; September, 1957, P.A. 11, S. 36; March, 1958, P.A. 27, S. 57; 1972, P.A. 165, S. 4, 24; June, 1972, P.A. 1, S. 20; P.A. 73-635, S. 2; P.A. 81-34, S. 5, 9; P.A. 82-248, S. 163; P.A. 90-154, S. 21.)

Sec. 51-171a. Transferred to Chapter 873, Sec. 51-52b .

Secs. 51-172 to 51-174. Records and files at Waterbury. Civil actions on appeals brought in Ansonia filed in Waterbury. Records and seal of court at Winchester. Sections 51-172 to 51-174 , inclusive, are repealed.

(1949 Rev., S. 7669–7671; 1957, P.A. 603, S. 4; P.A. 76-436, S. 91, 681; P.A. 77-452, S. 44, 72; P.A. 78-280, S. 126, 127; 78-331, S. 54, 58.)

Sec. 51-175. Transferred to Chapter 886, Sec. 51-278 .

Secs. 51-175a and 51-175b. Transferred to Chapter 886, Secs. 51-287 and 51-288 , respectively.

Secs. 51-176 to 51-179. Special state's attorney. Circuit Court prosecutors not to be state's attorneys. Expenses of state's attorneys. Civil term. Sections 51-176 to 51-179 , inclusive, are repealed.

(1949 Rev., S. 3613, 7622, 7665, 7666; 1955, S. 3112d; 1957, P.A. 445, S. 1; 1961, P.A. 517, S. 34; 1963, P.A. 642, S. 51; February, 1965, P.A. 331, S. 20; 1969, P.A. 364, S. 1; 1972, P.A. 165, S. 14; June, 1972, P.A. 1, S. 20; P.A. 73-116, S. 11, 12; 73-122, S. 26, 27; 73-667, S. 1, 2; P.A. 77-576, S. 29, 65; P.A. 78-280, S. 4, 127; P.A. 82-248, S. 163.)

Sec. 51-180. Criminal terms and sessions. (a) There shall be a term of the Superior Court for criminal business on the first Tuesday of each month in each judicial district.

(b) The court shall sit during any term in a judicial district for the trial of any person confined to a community correctional center on the first day of the term for want of bail who applies to the court for such trial.

(1949 Rev., S. 7622; 1951, 1955, S. 3111d; November, 1955, S. N227; 1967, P.A. 656, S. 30; 1969, P.A. 297; 1972, P.A. 165, S. 15; June, 1972, P.A. 1, S. 20; P.A. 78-280, S. 4, 127; P.A. 82-248, S. 87.)

History: 1967 act changed sessions from three to four times each year; 1969 act substituted “community correctional center” for “jail”; 1972 acts added reference to judicial districts and deleted specific reference to sessions in Waterbury in New Haven county, effective September 5, 1972; P.A. 78-280 deleted references to counties; P.A. 82-248 reworded section, divided section into Subsecs. and deleted provision re sitting of court for criminal sessions as fixed by judges.

See Sec. 51-183a re procedure when a judge is unable to hold court.

Sec. 51-180a. (Formerly Sec. 51-153). Special session when accused confined for want of bail. Whenever any person confined to a community correctional center for want of bail applies for trial under the provisions of section 51-180 and the court having jurisdiction of such person is not then sitting for the transaction of criminal business, the Chief Court Administrator shall assign a judge of such court to hold a session of such court for the transaction of criminal business for the purpose of such trial.

(November, 1955, S. N228; 1963, P.A. 642, S. 46; 1967, P.A. 656, S. 31; 1969, P.A. 297; P.A. 76-436, S. 10a, 85, 681.)

History: 1963 act deleted reference to section 51-152 which was repealed; 1967 act substituted chief court administrator for chief justice or associate justice; 1969 act substituted “community correctional center” for “jail”; P.A. 76-436 made no change, Sec. 10a of the act cancelling out amendment called for by Sec. 85. (Revisor's note: Sec. 51-153 transferred to Sec. 51-180a prior to the 1959 revision of the general statutes, revised to 1968.)

Sec. 51-181. Times and places for the sitting of the Superior Court. The Superior Court shall sit continuously throughout the year, at such times and places and for such periods as are set by the Chief Court Administrator or, with the approval of the Chief Court Administrator, his or her designee, in the following cities or towns, except as otherwise provided by law: (1) In the judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, at Ansonia or Derby and at Milford; (2) in the judicial district of Danbury, at Danbury; (3) in the judicial district of Fairfield, at Bridgeport; (4) in the judicial district of Hartford, at Hartford and, whenever suitable accommodations are provided without expense to the state, at Manchester; (5) in the judicial district of Litchfield, at Torrington; (6) in the judicial district of Middlesex, at Middletown; (7) in the judicial district of New Britain, at New Britain; (8) in the judicial district of New Haven, at New Haven and Meriden; (9) in the judicial district of New London, at Norwich and New London; (10) in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, at Stamford; (11) in the judicial district of Tolland, at Rockville; (12) in the judicial district of Waterbury, at Waterbury; and (13) in the judicial district of Windham, at Putnam.

(1949 Rev., S. 7623; 1951, 1953, 1955, S. 3113d; 1957, P.A. 44 5, S. 2; 452, S. 1; 603, S. 1; 1959, P.A. 152, S. 70; 1963, P.A. 465; February, 1965, P.A. 331, S. 21; 1967, P.A. 386, S. 1; 1972, P.A. 165, S. 16; June, 1972, P.A. 1, S. 20; P.A. 73-290; 73-603, S. 4; P.A. 75-530, S. 30, 35; P.A. 76-436, S. 10a, 86, 681; P.A. 77-411, S. 3, 6; 77-576, S. 27, 65; 77-604, S. 59, 84; P.A. 78-280, S. 82, 127; 78-379, S. 6, 27; P.A. 80-201, S. 4, 9; P.A. 82-248, S. 88; P.A. 88-230, S. 6, 12; P.A. 90-98, S. 1, 2; P.A. 93-142, S. 7, 8; P.A. 95-220, S. 4–6; P.A. 98-81, S. 15, 20; P.A. 17-99, S. 7; P.A. 19-64, S. 19.)

History: 1959 act substituted state for county in regard to expenses, county government having been abolished; 1963 act deleted provision session at Meriden be held only when quarters are provided without expense to the state; 1965 act provided the court be continuously in session and substituted the chief court administrator for the chief justice; 1967 act changed dates for sessions from second Tuesday of September, December, March and June; 1972 acts added reference to judicial districts and deleted reference to sessions at Waterbury in New Haven county, effective September 5, 1972; P.A. 73-290 required three sessions in New Britain rather than two; P.A. 73-603 increased number of sessions at Danbury from two to four; P.A. 75-530 deleted requirement for once-a-year naturalization session in New Britain; P.A. 76-436 transferred power to fix times, places and duration of sessions from chief judge of superior court to chief court administrator or his designee, effective July 1, 1978; P.A. 77-411 required four sessions annually at Bristol; P.A. 77-576 amended section to replace counties with specified judicial districts and to replace provision requiring four sessions with provision requiring court to sit continuously, similarly replacing provisions requiring certain localities required to have three or four sessions with provision requiring that court sit at least 40 weeks at Danbury and 30 weeks at Stamford, effective July 1, 1978; P.A. 77-604 made technical grammatical correction; P.A. 78-280 continued substitution of specific judicial districts for counties, required that court sit 40 weeks in Bristol and Stamford, replacing provision requiring that it sit 40 weeks in Danbury and 30 weeks in Stamford and deleted provisions re specific purposes, i.e. civil business and naturalization of aliens, for which court sits; P.A. 78-379 essentially reiterated changes of P.A. 78-280; P.A. 80-201 added judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk; P.A. 82-248 divided section into Subsecs. and placed judicial districts in alphabetical order; P.A. 88-230 added requirement that the court sit in the judicial district of New Britain, at New Britain and Bristol, and changed reference to the judicial district of Hartford-New Britain to the judicial district of Hartford to reflect the division of the judicial district of Hartford-New Britain into two separate judicial districts, effective September 1, 1991; P.A. 90-98 changed the effective date of P.A. 88-230 from September 1, 1991, to September 1, 1993; P.A. 93-142 changed the effective date of P.A. 88-230 from September 1, 1993, to September 1, 1996, effective June 14, 1993; P.A. 95-220 changed the effective date of P.A. 88-230 from September 1, 1996, to September 1, 1998, effective July 1, 1995; P.A. 98-81 deleted phrase “whenever suitable accommodations are provided without expense to the state at” before “Torrington” in Subsec. (a)(5); P.A. 17-99 amended Subsec. (a)(13) by deleting “and Willimantic”, and making a technical change, effective June 30, 2017; P.A. 19-64 deleted Subsec. designator from existing Subsec. (a) and amended same by deleting “Litchfield, New Milford, Winchester and” in Subdiv. (5), deleting “and Bristol” in Subdiv. (7) and making a technical change, and deleted former Subsec. (b) re court sitting not less than 40 weeks in Bristol and Stamford, effective September 1, 2019.

See Sec. 51-180 re criminal terms and sessions.

Cited. 139 C. 260; 143 C. 688; 174 C. 567; 199 C. 417.

Superior Court is continuously in session with four sessions held on first Tuesdays of September, January and April and on first Tuesday following July 4; a session is only part of a “term”. 28 CS 118.

Sec. 51-181a. Sessions at Bristol. Section 51-181a is repealed.

(February, 1965, P.A. 339, S. 1; 1967, P.A. 656, S. 32; P.A. 76-436, S. 88, 681; P.A. 77-411, S. 4, 6; 77-576, S. 29, 65.)

Sec. 51-181b. Drug docket and drug courts. (a) The Chief Court Administrator may establish in any court location or juvenile matters court location a docket separate from other criminal or juvenile matters for the hearing of criminal or juvenile matters in which a defendant is a drug-dependent person, as defined in section 21a-240 . The docket shall be available to offenders who could benefit from placement in a substance abuse treatment program.

(b) The Chief Court Administrator shall establish, within the appropriations designated in public act 03-1 of the June 30 special session* for said purpose, one or more drug courts for the hearing of criminal or juvenile matters in which a defendant is a drug-dependent person, as defined in section 21a-240 , who could benefit from placement in a substance abuse treatment program.

(P.A. 95-131; P.A. 97-248, S. 6, 12; June 30 Sp. Sess. P.A. 03-6, S. 164.)

*Note: Public act 03-1 of the June 30 special session is entitled “An Act Concerning Expenditures and Revenue for the Biennium Ending June 30, 2005”. (See Reference Table captioned “Public Acts of June 30, 2003” in Volume 16 which indicates the appropriations sections in said act.)

History: P.A. 97-248 replaced provision requiring Chief Court Administrator to designate a court location in which a pilot program for a separate drug docket is to be established with provision authorizing said administrator to establish in any geographical area court location or juvenile matters court location such a docket, specified that the docket shall be separate from other juvenile matters, authorized the docket to hear juvenile matters in which a defendant is a drug-dependent person, specified that the availability of the docket to offenders 16 to years of age is only in a geographical area court location and deleted former Subsec. (b) requiring the implementation of the pilot program and a report re its expansion, effective July 1, 1997; June 30 Sp. Sess. P.A. 03-6 designated existing provisions as Subsec. (a) and amended said Subsec. to delete provision that limited the docket to a “geographical area” court location and revise provision re availability of the docket by replacing “shall be available to, but not be limited to, offenders who are sixteen to twenty-one years of age and who could benefit from placement in a substance abuse treatment program” with “shall be available to offenders who could benefit from placement in a substance abuse treatment program” and added new Subsec. (b) re establishment of one or more drug courts, effective August 20, 2003.

Sec. 51-181c. Community court. (a) The Chief Court Administrator shall designate one court location in which a community court is to be established where there shall be a docket separate from other criminal matters for the hearing of (1) criminal matters which are misdemeanor cases, (2) misdemeanor cases transferred by the housing session of the Superior Court, and (3) violations of municipal ordinances referred by municipalities, in accordance with policies and procedures established by the Chief Court Administrator.

(b) The community court may accept transfers and referrals of cases pursuant to subdivisions (1) and (2) of subsection (a) of this section. The community court may order any person to participate in a community service program, (1) if the person has not previously been placed in such program, the court may suspend prosecution and place such person in such program or, upon a plea of guilty without trial, suspend any sentence of imprisonment and make participation in such program a condition of probation or conditional discharge in accordance with section 53a-30 , or (2) if such person has previously been placed in such program, the court may, upon a plea of guilty without trial, suspend any sentence of imprisonment and make participation in such program a condition of probation or conditional discharge in accordance with said section 53a-30 .

(c) Any person for whom prosecution is suspended and who is placed in the community service program pursuant to subdivisions (1) and (2) of subsection (a) of this section shall agree to the tolling of the statute of limitations with respect to such crime and to a waiver of such person's right to a speedy trial. If the program monitor certifies to the court that such person successfully completed the community service program, the court shall make a finding of such satisfactory completion and dismiss the charges. If the program monitor certifies to the court that such person did not successfully complete the community service program to which such person was assigned or is no longer amenable to participating in such program, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty for such person and transfer the case to the regular criminal docket and immediately place the case on the trial list, except that cases accepted from the housing session pursuant to subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of this section shall be returned to the housing session.

(d) The community court may accept transfers and referrals of violations of municipal ordinances under subdivision (3) of subsection (a) of this section whether or not any such person has been found guilty of such violation prior to such referral to community court. The community court may order any such person to participate in a community service program up to a maximum of twenty hours in lieu of, or in addition to, a fine for such violation. If the program monitor certifies to the court that such person successfully completed the community service program, the court shall make a finding of such satisfactory completion and dismiss the charges.

(P.A. 97-199, S. 2; June 18 Sp. Sess. P.A. 97-11, S. 62, 65; P.A. 02-89, S. 81; P.A. 03-19, S. 115; P.A. 12-133, S. 9.)

History: June 18 Sp. Sess. P.A. 97-11 changed effective date of P.A. 97-199 from October 1, 1997, to July 1, 1997, effective July 1, 1997; P.A. 02-89 deleted as obsolete Subsec. (e) requiring Chief Court Administrator to establish policies and procedures to implement pilot program and to report on or before January 1, 1998, recommendations for expansion of program to two additional sites; P.A. 03-19 made technical changes in Subsec. (c), effective May 12, 2003; P.A. 12-133 amended Subsec. (a) by deleting “pilot program”.

Sec. 51-181d. Truancy docket. Implementation. (a) The Chief Court Administrator shall designate a docket separate from the other juvenile matters for the hearing of truancy matters and petitions and motions filed pursuant to section 46b-149 in court locations throughout the state.

(b) The Chief Court Administrator shall establish policies and procedures to implement such truancy docket.

(P.A. 97-253; P.A. 08-86, S. 5.)

History: P.A. 08-86 added reference to motions in Subsec. (a).

Sec. 51-181e. Domestic violence dockets. (a) For the purposes of this section, “domestic violence docket” means a docket in a geographical area separate and apart from other criminal matters for the hearing of family violence matters.

(b) Not later than December 31, 2010, the Chief Court Administrator shall identify geographical areas that do not have a domestic violence docket and designate three geographical areas from among such geographical areas for the establishment of domestic violence dockets. Not later than June 30, 2011, the Chief Court Administrator may establish, within available resources, a domestic violence docket in each geographical area so designated under this subsection. If the Chief Court Administrator establishes such dockets, the Chief Court Administrator shall, prior to establishing such dockets, examine the effectiveness of domestic violence dockets in existence prior to June 7, 2010, and incorporate, within available resources, the operational elements of such dockets that the Chief Court Administrator deems beneficial to victims of family violence. If the Chief Court Administrator does not establish such dockets by June 30, 2011, the Chief Court Administrator shall submit a report, in accordance with section 11-4a , to the joint standing committee of the General Assembly having cognizance of matters relating to the judiciary, stating the reasons why such dockets were not established.

(P.A. 10-144, S. 13.)

History: P.A. 10-144 effective June 7, 2010.

Sec. 51-182. Notice of sessions. Special sessions. Short calendar. (a) The judges of the Superior Court shall provide for the giving of reasonable notice of the times and places when court is to be held.

(b) The Chief Court Administrator or his designee shall assign judges to divisions or parts thereof. The Chief Court Administrator may vary any such assignment.

(c) The Chief Court Administrator or his designee shall provide, so far as it may be practicable, necessary and consistent with the performance by each judge of the usual circuit duty, for the presence of a judge in each judicial district to hold short calendar sessions, small claims sessions, night sessions and other special sessions under such regulations as the Chief Court Administrator may, from time to time, establish.

(d) The regulations established by the Chief Court Administrator shall provide for at least one short calendar session in each judicial district in each month during the year.

(1949 Rev., S. 7624; 1957, P.A. 651, S. 26; February, 1965, P.A. 331, S. 22; P.A. 76-436, S. 10a, 87, 681; P.A. 78-280, S. 83, 127; P.A. 82-248, S. 89.)

History: 1965 act substituted chief court administrator for chief justice and eliminated prohibition against short calendar sessions in July and August; P.A. 76-436 deleted requirement that assignment of judges be made at their annual meeting, added references to districts and geographical areas generally, to the judicial district of Waterbury specifically, to small claims, night and special sessions and replaced chief judge of superior court with chief court administrator or his designee where appearing, effective July 1, 1978; P.A. 78-280 deleted detailed provisions re sessions of courts, reflecting fact that court now sits continuously, and replaced references to counties and to judicial district of Waterbury with general reference to judicial districts; P.A. 82-248 made technical revision, rewording some provisions and dividing section in Subsecs. but made no substantive change.

In absence of required notice or agreement, judgment for substantial damages on default is erroneous. 78 C. 286. Cited. 97 C. 557; 113 C. 382.

Secs. 51-182a and 51-182b. Family relations term. Family relations sessions. Sections 51-182a and 51-182b are repealed.

(1959, P.A. 531, S. 1, 2; February, 1965, P.A. 331, S. 23, 24; 1969, P.A. 365, S. 1, 2; 1972, P.A. 165, S. 17; June, 1972, P.A. 1, S. 20; P.A. 76-436, S. 503, 681; P.A. 77-576, S. 29, 65.)

Sec. 51-182c.* Transferred to Chapter 815, Sec. 46b-1 .

*Note: Originally renumbered as Sec. 51-330 in the 1977 Court Reorganization Supplement.

Sec. 51-182d. Length of family relations sessions; assignment of judges. Section 51-182d is repealed.

(1959, P.A. 531, S. 4; February, 1965, P.A. 331, S. 25; P.A. 76-436, S. 90, 681; P.A. 77-411, S. 5, 6; 77-576, S. 29, 65.)

Secs. 51-182e and 51-182f.* Transferred to Chapter 815, Secs. 46b-3 and 46b-4 , respectively.

*Note: Originally renumbered as Secs. 51-332 and 51-333, respectively, in the 1977 Court Reorganization Supplement.

Sec. 51-182g. Transferred to Chapter 889, Sec. 51-334 .

Sec. 51-182h.* Transferred to Chapter 815, Sec. 46b-11 .

*Note: Originally renumbered as Sec. 51-335 in the 1977 Court Reorganization Supplement.

Secs. 51-182i to 51-182k.* Transferred to Chapter 815, Secs. 46b-5 to 46b-7 , inclusive.

*Note: Originally renumbered as Secs. 51-336 to 51-338, inclusive, in the 1977 Court Reorganization Supplement.

Sec. 51-182 l .* Transferred to Chapter 815, Sec. 46b-10 .

*Note: Originally renumbered as Sec. 51-339 in the 1977 Court Reorganization Supplement.

Sec. 51-182m.* Transferred to Chapter 815, Sec. 46b-9 .

*Note: Originally renumbered as Sec. 51-340 in the 1977 Court Reorganization Supplement.

Secs. 51-182n and 51-182o. Hearing of appeals from Juvenile Court. Sessions for appeals from Common Pleas Court. Sections 51-182n and 51-182o are repealed.

(1959, P.A. 28, S. 31; 531, S. 16–18; 1971, P.A. 870, S. 6, 24; P.A. 73-616, S. 39; P.A. 74-183, S. 47, 291; P.A. 76-435, S. 34, 82; 76-436, S. 117, 657, 681.)

Sec. 51-182p.* Transferred to Chapter 815, Sec. 46b-8 .

*Note: Originally renumbered as Sec. 51-341 in the 1977 Court Reorganization Supplement.

Sec. 51-183. Substitute judge. Any judge of the Superior Court may hold any term or session or part of any term or session of court to which another judge has been assigned, when the latter is unable to hold or complete it; and any judge may try any action when the judge holding court is disqualified or declines to try it.

(1949 Rev., S. 7635; P.A. 82-248, S. 90.)

History: P.A. 82-248 reworded section but made no substantive change.

Cited. 213 C. 686.

Cited. 16 CA 684; 39 CA 635; 44 CA 125.

Sec. 51-183a. (Formerly Sec. 51-28). Judge's inability to hold court. When any judge assigned to hold the Superior Court in any judicial district or geographical area is unable to hold or continue court for such a period as business may require, he shall notify the Chief Court Administrator or his designee of such inability. The Chief Court Administrator or his designee shall immediately assign and direct some other judge or senior judge to hold or continue court. The judge so assigned shall hold or continue court accordingly.

(1949 Rev., S. 7701; 1967, P.A. 656, S. 24; P.A. 74-183, S. 21, 291; P.A. 76-436, S. 10a, 54, 681; P.A. 78-280, S. 84, 127; P.A. 82-248, S. 91.)

History: 1967 act required that judge who is unable to hold or continue court notify chief court administrator rather than chief justice of supreme court; P.A. 74-183 deleted provisions governing procedure for adjournment of court when a judge fails to appear on first day of session and required that judge who is unable to hold or continue court notify chief judge rather than chief court administrator, effective December 31, 1974; P.A. 76-436 added reference to judicial districts, required notification of chief court administrator or his designee rather than chief judge when judge is unable to hold court and allowed assignment of senior judges to hold or continue court, effective July 1, 1978; Sec. 51-28 transferred to Sec. 51-183a in the 1977 Court Reorganization Supplement; P.A. 78-280 deleted provision prohibiting adjournment or discontinuance of term or session of court because judge assigned to preside is absent, reflecting fact that court now sits continuously, deleted reference to counties and added reference to geographical areas; P.A. 82-248 reworded section but made no substantive change.

Annotation to former section 51-28:

Cited. 97 C. 559.

Sec. 51-183b. (Formerly Sec. 51-29). Judgments in civil actions. Time limit. Any judge of the Superior Court and any judge trial referee who has the power to render judgment, who has commenced the trial of any civil cause, shall have power to continue such trial and shall render judgment not later than one hundred and twenty days from the completion date of the trial of such civil cause. The parties may waive the provisions of this section.

(1949 Rev., S. 7706; 1959, P.A. 28, S. 80; 1963, P.A. 209; P.A. 74-183, S. 22, 291; P.A. 76-436, S. 55, 681; P.A. 77-576, S. 26, 65; P.A. 81-52; P.A. 83-295, S. 6; P.A. 96-37, S. 7.)

History: 1959 act applied provisions to judges of newly created circuit court; 1963 act removed circuit court judges from purview of previously existing provisions and added provision specifically applicable to circuit court judges; P.A. 74-183 deleted provision requiring that judgment be rendered within 90 days of the conclusion of a civil trial in the circuit court, reflecting transfer of circuit court functions to court of common pleas, effective December 31, 1974; P.A. 76-436 removed common pleas court judges from purview of section, reflecting transfer of common pleas court functions to superior court, effective July 1, 1978; P.A. 77-576 replaced provision which had allowed continuance of trial and rendering of judgment after expiration of term or session at which trial commenced but required end of trial and judgment before the close of the next term or session with requirement that judgment be rendered not later than 8 months from trial's commencement and added provision allowing parties to waive provisions of section, effective July 1, 1978; Sec. 51-29 transferred to Sec. 51-183b in the 1977 Court Reorganization Supplement; P.A. 81-52 changed the requirement that judgment be rendered not later than 8 months from the commencement of the trial to not later than 120 days from the completion of the trial; P.A. 83-295 applied provisions to any state trial referee who has the power to render judgment; P.A. 96-37 changed “state trial referee” to “judge trial referee”.

Annotations to former section 51-29:

A court has control over its judgments only during the term in which they are rendered. 47 C. 429; 108 C. 282. A judge has power to retain a case for consideration and decision after the close of the term. 47 C. 579. Amending memo of judgment at subsequent term. 74 C. 23. Violation may be waived. 76 C. 305; 86 C. 560. Violation of section makes judgment erroneous, not void. 97 C. 556. Statute expressly authorizes a judge to finish a trial and render judgment therein at any time prior to the close of the next succeeding term or session. 107 C. 383. Judgment must be rendered and trial ended before close of next term or session. 109 C. 54, but see 123 C. 15. In construing statute as to Superior Court, the word “term” is the equivalent of the word “session”. 109 C. 54. If no timely and appropriate advantage of delay is taken, consent of parties will be assumed. 112 C. 154. Cited. 115 C. 623. Judgment erroneous if not rendered during next session after that at which trial commenced, where no act or omission of the parties constitutes consent, waiver or estoppel. 117 C. 639, 645. When too late for court to render judgment, case may be claimed for trial as though no hearing had been held. 118 C. 418. Cited. 123 C. 583. Lack of jurisdiction after time expires does not pertain to subject matter but to the parties; subsequent filing of pleadings and participation in hearings held waiver. 132 C. 438. Cited. 134 C. 183. A judge must decide a case before the end of the session of court next succeeding the session at which it is tried, and a judgment rendered after that time is erroneous. 139 C. 263. On date of rendering, judgment was valid as in compliance with statute in effect while action was pending. 157 C. 434. Cited. Id., 525; 162 C. 534. Not applicable to state trial referees; prior constructions restated; history. 164 C. 360. Statute applies only to cases tried to the court and not to cases tried to a jury. Id., 554. Judge not continuing a trial to its end before close of next session of circuit court, lost jurisdiction; case properly determined by another judge sitting 15 months later. 168 C. 74. Cited. Id., 560.

Cited. 13 CS 121. Section not applicable to proceedings before state trial referee. 33 CS 560.

Order vacating judgment rendered by circuit court 17 months after completion of trial and ordering new trial was interlocutory and not a final judgment from which appeal lies. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 474, 475.

Annotations to present section:

Civil cause should be construed to encompass administrative appeals. 179 C. 415. Cited. 192 C. 484. Determination of “the completion date” discussed; availability of all elements directly or indirectly to be considered in rendering a decision included. Id., 601. Cited. 194 C. 187; 195 C. 174; 208 C. 21; 213 C. 813; 214 C. 801; 215 C. 435. Initial refusal to consent to late judgment rendered judgment void; judgment of Appellate Court in 20 CA 283 reversed. 215 C. 688. Cited. 220 C. 86; 233 C. 153; 234 C. 1; 237 C. 378. As long as order of trial court is issued within 120 days after completion of trial, order constitutes timely judgment within meaning of statute regardless of whether order is accompanied by memorandum of decision explaining legal and factual basis for order. 243 C. 495. Order of trial court constituted a “judgment” within meaning of section where order resolved the dispute and determined appeal in favor of plaintiff. 246 C. 251. 120 day decision period is stopped by a trial court's order requiring supplemental briefing, and such period is restarted after supplemental arguments are heard, despite a party's refusal to consent to the court's requested extension of the decision period. 330 C. 681.

Cited. 2 CA 689; 3 CA 531; 7 CA 136; 12 CA 702; 20 CA 283; judgment reversed; Id., 425; 21 CA 545; 26 CA 426; 28 CA 745. Does not violate separation of powers provision of Art. II of the Connecticut Constitution (now Art. XVIII of the Amendments to the Connecticut Constitution). 29 CA 157. Cited. 30 CA 204. Absent waiver of provisions of statute, a judgment rendered by a court beyond the time period permitted lacks personal jurisdiction over defendants. 39 CA 635. Cited. 40 CA 89; Id., 374; 44 CA 542; 45 CA 626. Court's order that parties submit their positions on release of judgment lien constituted request for briefs which, when filed, began 120-day period. 72 CA 692. Court, by ordering defendant attorney and Statewide Grievance Committee to appear at a subsequent hearing on the issue of sanctions against defendant, implicitly opened the case, which was within its province within the 120 days after trial's completion. 74 CA 464. Statutory time period runs from completion date of trial, not from time of filing of briefs on motion for judgment of dismissal. 82 CA 483. General Assembly did not intend to include within definition of “trial”, for purposes of the 120-day rule, arguments on motions addressed to whether plaintiff is precluded from an evidentiary hearing or trial because of prior trial on the same or similar issues between the same parties. 88 CA 795. Section does not apply to timeliness of judgment rendered following short calendar proceeding. 95 CA 713. Where court sent notice extending commencement of period to issue decision, express consent by parties not required for extension. 99 CA 367. Completion date of trial was date on which court last heard argument on the issues of liability and damages before it rendered judgment on those issues; court complied with section requirements regarding judgment as to liability and damages that was issued within 120 days from completion date of trial, and regarding subsequent judgment awarding punitive damages, attorney's fees and costs more than 120 days after completion date of trial; as long as trial court decides a case on its merits within 120 days, there is no statutory time limit within which it must decide ancillary issues such as punitive damages, attorney's fees and costs; section not intended to guarantee that a losing party will have a final judgment from which to appeal within 120 days of completion of trial. 121 CA 105. Section is not applicable when a matter is referred to and tried before an attorney fact finder. 124 CA 1. Habeas petitioner's silence before tardy judgment was rendered was not a waiver, and motion to set aside judgment, filed 9 days after judgment was rendered beyond the 120-day time limitation, was a seasonable objection. 125 CA 296. Completion date of trial was the date the court last heard argument on the issues of liability and damages, and the court complied with the 120-day time requirement. Id., 399. Where court requested extension of 120-day requirement from only one party, opposing party did not implicitly waive 120-day requirement through silence or inaction, or assume duty to object to or protest the late judgment. 137 CA 142. 120-day period begins to run from date parties file post-trial briefs or other materials the court finds necessary for a well-reasoned decision. 140 CA 697. Trial court's finding that plaintiff had waived the provisions of section by executing multiple agreements extending the period of time for the court to render judgment was clearly erroneous and voidable when the court ultimately rendered judgment after the date stipulated in the parties' second extension. 144 CA 62. When an extension is unaccompanied by any language of limitation or conditions, it necessarily operates as a waiver, and because defendants consented to an extension of the 120-day time period within which the court was required to issue its decision, and did not set forth any conditions or limitations on the agreed upon extension, the court's determination that they waived the 120-day rule was not clearly erroneous. 163 CA 1.

Cited. 44 CS 312.

Sec. 51-183c. (Formerly Sec. 51-41). Same judge not to preside at new trial. No judge of any court who tried a case without a jury in which a new trial is granted, or in which the judgment is reversed by the Supreme Court, may again try the case. No judge of any court who presided over any jury trial, either in a civil or criminal case, in which a new trial is granted, may again preside at the trial of the case.

(1949 Rev., S. 7697; P.A. 74-183, S. 282, 291; P.A. 76-436, S. 60, 681; P.A. 82-248, S. 92.)

History: P.A. 74-183 prohibited judge who tried case in which judgment was reversed in appellate session of superior court from trying case again, effective December 31, 1974; P.A. 76-436 deleted provision added by P.A. 74-183, effective July 1, 1978; Sec. 51-41 transferred to Sec. 51-183c in the 1977 Court Reorganization Supplement; P.A. 82-248 rephrased section but made no substantive change.

Annotations to former section 51-41:

Applies though offenses not in all respects the same. 75 C. 109. Does not create a jurisdictional infirmity which the parties are powerless to remedy by waiver or consent. 147 C. 296. Where judge who tried defendant had been a member of the sentence review division which had heard defendant's application for a review of his sentence on a previous conviction, there was not even a technical infraction of section since the powers of the sentence review division are limited to a review of the sentence imposed and have nothing to do with the ascertainment of guilt or innocence. 152 C. 629.

Section does not prevent original presiding judge from discontinuing case at regular annual call of docket. 3 CS 420.

Cited. 186 C. 426; 188 C. 354; 216 C. 813; 227 C. 784; 242 C. 617. Sentencing hearing does not constitute a trial within meaning of section and defendant's motion that case be assigned to a new judge for resentencing is without merit. 260 C. 93. Section applies when a judgment is reversed in part and fewer than all of the issues in the case must be retried, and includes when a judgment is reversed only as to damages and remanded for a new trial only on the issue of damages. 334 C. 279.

Cited. 10 CA 103. Term “trial” not intended to include pretrial or short calendar proceedings. 27 CA 15. Section does not apply to pretrial or short calendar proceedings, and accordingly, court unwilling to unilaterally extend its legislative policy to arbitration process. 66 CA 202. Section is clear and unambiguous, and explicitly prohibits a judge who tries a case that is thereafter reversed from trying the case on remand, there being no reasonable manner in which the language can be interpreted to yield a different result. 133 CA 431; judgment reversed, see 311 C. 649. Section not restricted to cases in which issues to be considered on remand are identical to those that already had been decided by the trial judge, and it is of no consequence to proper application of section that a remand order require consideration of an issue in the case that the trial judge had yet to resolve on its merits or that the prior judgment had not been reversed with respect to the trial judge's resolution of that unresolved issue of fact. 166 CA 408. Policy underpinning of section does not apply to workers' compensation proceedings. 212 CA 1.

Sec. 51-183d. (Formerly Sec. 51-42). Disqualified judge; proceedings not void. If a judge acts in any legal proceeding in which he is disqualified, the proceeding shall not by reason thereof be void, but such action shall constitute an irregularity of which advantage may be taken by appeal or, where no appeal lies, by proceedings in error.

(1949 Rev., S. 7698; 1959, P.A. 28, S. 85; P.A. 82-248, S. 93.)

History: 1959 act deleted justice of the peace from application of section; Sec. 51-42 transferred to Sec. 51-183d in the 1977 Court Reorganization Supplement; P.A. 82-248 made minor technical changes in language but made no substantive change.

Annotations to former section 51-42:

Cited. 152 C. 630.

Cited. 3 CS 424.

Annotation to present section:

Cited. 27 CA 15.

Sec. 51-183e. (Formerly Sec. 51-43). Presiding judge or arbitrator to have casting vote. Section 51-183e is repealed, effective October 1, 2010.

(1949 Rev., S. 7696; P.A. 82-248, S. 94; P.A. 10-43, S. 43.)

Sec. 51-183f. (Formerly Sec. 51-44). Expiration of term, disability retirement, death or resignation of judge. If the term of office of any judge of the Superior Court expires during the pendency of any proceeding before him, or if any judge of the Superior Court is retired because of a disability, dies or resigns during the pendency of any proceeding before him, any other judge of that court, upon application, shall have power to proceed therewith as if the subject matter had been originally brought before him.

(1949 Rev., S. 7705; 1959, P.A. 28, S. 86; 1967, P.A. 218; P.A. 74-183, S. 26, 291; P.A. 76-436, S. 58, 681.)

History: 1959 act included circuit court judge; 1967 act extended section to include disability retirement, death and resignation; P.A. 74-183 removed judges of circuit court from purview of section, reflecting transfer of circuit court functions to court of common pleas, effective December 31, 1974; P.A. 76-436 removed common pleas court judges from purview of section, reflecting transfer of common pleas court functions to superior court, effective July 1, 1978; Sec. 51-44 transferred to Sec. 51-183f in the 1977 Court Reorganization Supplement.

Annotation to former section 51-44:

Former statute did not apply when judge died during pendency of proceeding. 25 CS 60.

Cited. 22 CA 363. Outlines steps to be taken by successor judge pursuant to section. 29 CA 378. Cited. 34 CA 673; 39 CA 429.

Applies where judge dies after a jury verdict but before case is completed. 46 CS 650.

Sec. 51-183g. (Formerly Sec. 51-46). Retiring judge; unfinished matters. Any judge of the Superior Court may, after ceasing to hold office as such judge, settle and dispose of all matters relating to appeal cases, as well as any other unfinished matters pertaining to causes theretofore tried by him, as if he were still such judge.

(1949 Rev., S. 8010; 1959, P.A. 28, S. 87; P.A. 74-183, S. 27, 291; P.A. 76-436, S. 59, 681.)

History: 1959 act substituted circuit court judge for municipal court judge, latter court having been abolished; P.A. 74-183 removed circuit court judges from purview of section, reflecting transfer of circuit court functions to court of common pleas, effective December 31, 1974; P.A. 76-436 removed common pleas court judges from purview of section, reflecting transfer of common pleas court functions to superior court, effective July 1, 1978; Sec. 51-46 transferred to Sec. 51-183g in the 1977 Court Reorganization Supplement.

Annotations to former section 51-46:

The rule was otherwise before its passage. 41 C. 96. Statute is constitutional. 53 C. 237; 97 C. 565. Making a finding is a ministerial act and may constitutionally be performed by a judge retired because of constitutional limitations as to age. Id. See 105 C. 719. Does not apply to judges of town courts. 130 C. 472. Retired judge has duty to make a finding just as though he were still the judge. 76 C. 388; 143 C. 582.

Judge trial referee may resentence defendant when he had presided over defendant's trial as a Superior Court judge. 274 C. 727.

Sec. 51-183h. (Formerly Sec. 51-41a). Judge not to hear motion attacking bench warrant which he signed. No judge may preside at the hearing of any motion attacking the validity or sufficiency of any bench warrant of arrest which he has signed.

(1967, P.A. 24, S. 1; P.A. 82-248, S. 95.)

History: Sec. 51-41a transferred to Sec. 51-183h in 1979; P.A. 82-248 changed “warrant or arrest warrant” to “warrant of arrest”.

Annotation to former section 51-41a:

Cited. 191 C. 360.

Cited. 227 C. 784.

Cited. 37 CA 672. A hearing in probable cause is not a hearing on a motion attacking the validity or sufficiency of the arrest warrant, and accordingly, does not provide a basis for disqualification under section. 142 CA 530.

Sec. 51-184. Adjournment of court. In any judicial district where the Superior Court may lawfully be held in more than one place, the judge holding court, civil or criminal, may adjourn court to any such lawful place.

(1949 Rev., S. 7636; P.A. 78-280, S. 2, 127; P.A. 82-248, S. 96.)

History: P.A. 78-280 substituted “judicial district” for “county”; P.A. 82-248 rephrased section but made no substantive changes.

Sec. 51-185. Disposition of civil business at criminal sessions. Each criminal session of the Superior Court may hear and determine both criminal and civil actions. At each criminal session, upon the conclusion of the criminal business before the court, or during a recess of the court in the disposition of criminal business, the presiding judge or, in the event of his disability for any cause, any other judge of the Superior Court upon the designation of the Chief Court Administrator or of the judges of the Superior Court may dispose of civil jury business before the same or another jury duly summoned, or, if the jury business is not ready, civil business to the court.

(1949 Rev., S. 7625; 1967, P.A. 656, S. 34; P.A. 76-436, S. 10a, 97, 681; P.A. 82-248, S. 97.)

History: 1967 act substituted chief court administrator for chief justice as authority empowered to designate judge to act for presiding judge; P.A. 76-436 referred to criminal sessions of superior court rather than to sessions of criminal superior court, effective July 1, 1978; P.A. 82-248 reworded section but made no substantive change.

Cited. 113 C. 383.

Sec. 51-186. Hearings at the Connecticut Correctional Institution, Somers. A hearing on any petition for a writ of habeas corpus may be held at the Connecticut Correctional Institution, Somers.

(1949 Rev., S. 7626; 1963, P.A. 28, S. 5; 459, S. 1, 3.)

History: 1963 acts deleted stipulations act applied only to writs brought to superior court for Hartford county and State Prison in town of Wethersfield.

Sec. 51-187. Court accommodations in Windham County and at Rockville. Section 51-187 is repealed.

(1949 Rev., S. 7627; 1959, P.A. 152, S. 71; 1961, P.A. 522; February, 1965, P.A. 516, S. 2.)

Secs. 51-187a and 51-187b. Transferred to Chapter 871, Secs. 51-27c and 51-27d , respectively.

Sec. 51-188. Transferred to Chapter 871, Sec. 51-27f .

Sec. 51-189. Transfer of hearings before judges. When, upon any application, petition or matter presented to any judge of the Superior Court for a hearing by him as a judge, notice to the adverse party of the hearing thereon is required, either by statute or in the discretion of the judge, the judge to whom such application, petition or matter has been presented may, in the order of notice issued by him, designate any other judge of the Superior Court to hear the same, the consent thereto of such other judge having first been obtained, and when any application, petition or matter is pending before any judge of the Superior Court, such application, petition or matter may be by him transferred to any other judge of the Superior Court, upon like consent first obtained, and in either case such other judge shall thereupon proceed with such application, petition or matter with the same authority as though the same had originally been presented to him or had theretofore been pending before him.

(1949 Rev., S. 7650.)

Cited. 186 C. 125.

Sec. 51-190. Trial before judge; papers filed where. Section 51-190 is repealed.

(1949 Rev., S. 7649; P.A. 82-248, S. 163.)

Sec. 51-190a. (Formerly Sec. 51-161). Filing of papers upon decision. (a) In the trial of an action before a judge of the Superior Court that might have been brought to the Superior Court, the judge, when a decision has been reached, shall file the papers in the action and a memorandum of decision with the clerk of the Superior Court who would have been the custodian thereof had the action been tried by the court in the judicial district.

(b) In the trial of an action before a judge of the Superior Court that could not have been brought to the Superior Court, the judge, when a decision has been reached, if the action relates to an interest in land, shall file the papers in the action and a memorandum of decision with the clerk of the superior court in the judicial district in which the land affected is located.

(c) When an action is tried by a judge of the Superior Court other than those mentioned in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, and it is not otherwise provided by law where the papers shall be filed, the judge, when a decision has been reached, shall designate a clerk of the Superior Court with whom the papers shall be filed and shall thereupon file the papers and a memorandum of decision with the clerk.

(d) The clerk of the Superior Court with whom the papers and memorandum of decision are filed pursuant to this section is the lawful custodian thereof.

(1949 Rev., S. 7607; P.A. 76-436, S. 660, 681; P.A. 78-280, S. 1, 127; P.A. 82-248, S. 55; P.A. 05-288, S. 172; P.A. 13-194, S. 8.)

History: P.A. 76-436 replaced court of common pleas with superior court, reflecting transfer of common pleas court functions to superior court, effective July 1, 1978; Sec. 51-161 transferred to Sec. 51-190a in the 1977 Court Reorganization Supplement; P.A. 78-280 deleted reference to counties; P.A. 82-248 rephrased section and changed “cause” to “action”; P.A. 05-288 made a technical change in Subsec. (c), effective July 13, 2005; P.A. 13-194 replaced requirement that file, papers and memorandum of decision be lodged with requirement that papers and memorandum of decision be filed.

Secs. 51-191 to 51-193. Cause affecting land; documents lodged in Superior Court. Clerk designated by judge to take papers. Records may be rewritten. Sections 51-191 to 51-193 , inclusive, are repealed.

(1949 Rev., S. 7651, 7652, 7667; 1972, P.A. 165, S. 19; June, 1972, P.A. 1, S. 20; P.A. 78-280, S. 126, 127; 78-331, S. 54, 58.)

Sec. 51-193a. Transferred to Chapter 877, Sec. 51-95a .

Sec. 51-193b. Payment of fees, costs and fines by credit card. Payment of any fees, costs, fines or other charges to the Judicial Branch may be made by means of a credit card and the payor shall be charged a service fee for any such payment made by means of a credit card. The service fee shall not exceed any charge by the credit card issuer, including any discount rate. Payments by credit card shall be made at such time and under such conditions as the Office of the Chief Court Administrator may prescribe, except that the Chief Court Administrator shall determine the rate or amount of the service fee for any such card in accordance with subsection (c) of section 1-1j .

(P.A. 94-135, S. 4; P.A. 14-207, S. 6; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 21-2, S. 443.)

History: P.A. 14-207 substituted “Judicial Branch” for “Superior Court”; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 21-2 amended section to require charging service fee, add provision re rate or amount of service fee and make technical changes, effective July 1, 2022.

Sec. 51-193c. Filing of document or data by computer, facsimile transmission or other technology. Use of technology for required payments. Electronic signature and verification. Standards. Rules. (a) The Judicial Branch may permit, in any civil, criminal, family, juvenile or other matter, the filing of any document or data that is required by law to be filed with the Superior Court or with a judge or judge trial referee thereof, including, but not limited to, a summons issued pursuant to section 51-164n , a complaint or a summons issued pursuant to section 54-1h , and an information filed pursuant to section 54-46 , by computer or facsimile transmission or by employing other technology.

(b) For the purposes of this section, the judges of the Superior Court may prescribe alternative methods for the signing, subscribing or verifying by a person of any document or data that is required by law to be filed with the Superior Court or with a judge or judge trial referee thereof so that such document or data shall have the same validity and status as a paper document that was signed, subscribed or verified by such person.

(c) Notwithstanding any other provision of the general statutes, the Chief Court Administrator may permit any payment that is required by law to be paid to the clerk of the Superior Court to be made by the use of any technology. The payor may be charged a service fee for any such payment. The service fee shall not exceed any charge by the service provider, including any discount rate.

(d) Any notice, order, judgment, decision, decree, memorandum, ruling, opinion, mittimus or similar document that is issued by the Superior Court or by a judge, judge trial referee or family support magistrate thereof, by a magistrate appointed pursuant to section 51-193 l or by a commissioner of the Superior Court approved by the Chief Court Administrator to hear small claims pursuant to section 52-549d , may be signed or verified by computer or facsimile transmission or by employing other technology in accordance with procedures and technical standards established by the Office of the Chief Court Administrator, and such notice, order, judgment, decision, decree, memorandum, ruling, opinion, mittimus or similar document shall have the same validity and status as a paper document that was signed or verified by the Superior Court or by a judge, judge trial referee or family support magistrate thereof, by a magistrate appointed pursuant to section 51-193 l or by a commissioner of the Superior Court approved by the Chief Court Administrator to hear small claims pursuant to section 52-549d .

(e) The judges of the Superior Court may adopt any rules they deem necessary to implement the provisions of this section and the Office of the Chief Court Administrator shall prescribe any forms required to implement such provisions.

(P.A. 98-13, S. 1; Sept. Sp. Sess. P.A. 09-7, S. 22; P.A. 13-194, S. 9.)

History: Sept. Sp. Sess. P.A. 09-7 added references to “data” and substituted “technology” for “technology as it is developed”, amended Subsec. (a) to reference “any civil, criminal, family, juvenile or other matter”, filing with “a judge or judge trial referee”, and a summons, complaint and information, amended Subsec. (b) to reference any document or data required by law to be filed with the Superior Court or a judge or judge trial referee thereof, amended Subsec. (c) to substitute “permit any payment” for “permit the payment of any fee”, inserted new Subsec. (d) re procedures and standards for signing or verifying by computer or facsimile transmission or other technology, redesignated existing Subsec. (d) as Subsec. (e), and made technical changes, effective October 5, 2009; P.A. 13-194 amended Subsec. (d) to add provisions re commissioner of the Superior Court approved by the Chief Court Administrator to hear small claims.

Sec. 51-193d. Moneys found in or on grounds of Superior Court presumed abandoned. All moneys in an amount of ten dollars or less found by any person in or on the grounds of the Superior Court which is turned over by such person to the clerk of the Superior Court shall be presumed abandoned and deposited into the General Fund by the clerk of the Superior Court.

(P.A. 14-207, S. 4.)

Secs. 51-193e to 51-193k. Reserved for future use.

MAGISTRATES

Sec. 51-193 l . Appointment of magistrates. Submission of names of probate judges for approval as magistrates. The Chief Court Administrator shall make such orders and rules as he deems necessary to provide for the appointment of magistrates to hear and decide cases pursuant to the provisions of sections 51-193t and 51-193u . Any commissioner of the Superior Court, admitted to practice in this state for at least five years, who is able and willing to hear such cases designated in accordance with sections 51-193t and 51-193u may be appointed as a magistrate. Any probate judge who is a commissioner of the Superior Court admitted to practice in this state for at least five years may submit his name to the Probate Court Administrator, who shall submit a list of such names to the Office of the Chief Court Administrator for approval to be placed on a list of available magistrates for one or more judicial districts.

(P.A. 81-462, S. 1, 13; P.A. 82-441, S. 13, 14, 23; P.A. 85-464, S. 1.)

History: P.A. 82-441 changed “may” to “shall”, added exception of motor vehicle violations punishable by sentence of imprisonment and changed practice requirement from three to five years, effective April 1, 1983; P.A. 85-464 provided that chief court administrator rather than judges of supreme and superior courts regulate the appointment of magistrates, authorized magistrates to rule in small claims matters and added provision re appointment of probate judges as magistrates.

Cited. 218 C. 729.

Secs. 51-193m to 51-193q. Prosecutions to be submitted to magistrate. Persons alleged to have committed motor vehicle infractions; payment of fine; plea of not guilty. Request for jury trial; hearing in Superior Court. Notification of magistrate by clerk of court; where hearing may be held. Hearing before magistrate; report; final judgment. Sections 51-193m to 51-193q , inclusive, are repealed.

(P.A. 81-462, S. 2–6, 13; P.A. 82-441, S. 13, 15, 17–19, 23; P.A. 85-464, S. 6.)

Sec. 51-193r. Compensation of magistrates. Each commissioner of the Superior Court shall receive, for acting as a magistrate in accordance with the provisions of sections 51-193t and 51-193u the sum of two hundred dollars for each day he is engaged as a magistrate.

(P.A. 81-462, S. 7, 13; P.A. 82-441, S. 13, 23; P.A. 85-464, S. 2; P.A. 13-247, S. 51.)

History: P.A. 82-441 rewrote effective date section of P.A. 81-462 but changes did not affect this section; P.A. 85-464 substituted reference to Secs. 51-193t and 51-193u for reference to Secs. 51-193l to 51-193q, inclusive, and increased compensation from $100 to $150 per day; P.A. 13-247 increased compensation from $150 to $200 per day, effective July 1, 2013.

Sec. 51-193s. Submission of names of probate judges for approval as magistrates. Section 51-193s is repealed.

(P.A. 82-441, S. 16, 23; P.A. 85-464, S. 6.)

Sec. 51-193t. Hearing of small claims matters by magistrate. (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of chapter 922a, the hearing and determination of small claims matters may be assigned to magistrates. Magistrates may handle all aspects of the small claims session including, but not limited to, the determination of all uncontested and contested matters, motions to open judgment, motions to transfer to the regular civil docket, and any motions concerning any postjudgment remedy resulting from a small claims judgment.

(b) A magistrate appointed to hear a small claims matter shall not be bound by the rules regarding the admissibility of evidence, but all testimony shall be given under oath or affirmation. Either party may be represented by counsel but no record of the proceedings before the magistrate shall be required to be kept.

(P.A. 85-464, S. 3; P.A. 89-93.)

History: P.A. 89-93 amended Subsec. (a) by deleting requirement that motions to transfer to regular civil docket shall be handled by the court and permitting magistrates to handle such motions to transfer.

Sec. 51-193u. Hearing of violations and infractions by magistrate. Authority of magistrate decision. Demand for trial de novo. (a) Cases involving motor vehicle violations, excluding alleged violations of sections 14-215 , 14-222 , 14-222a , 14-224 , 14-227a , 14-227m and 14-227n and any other motor vehicle violation involving a possible term of imprisonment, or any violation, as defined in section 53a-27 , which are scheduled for the entering of a plea may be handled by a magistrate.

(b) Infractions and violations designated in subsection (a) of this section in which a plea of not guilty has been entered may be heard by a magistrate. Magistrates shall not have the authority to conduct jury trials.

(c) Magistrates shall have the authority to accept pleas of guilty or of not guilty, to accept pleas of nolo contendere and enter findings of guilty thereon, to impose fines, to set bonds, to forfeit bonds, to continue cases to a date certain, to enter nolles brought by the prosecutorial official, to recommend suspension under section 14-111b , 14-140 or 15-154 , to order notices of intention to suspend motor vehicle licenses and registrations, to order issuance of a mittimus if a defendant has been found able to pay and fails to pay, to remit fines, to impose or waive fees and costs, to hear and decide motions, to dismiss cases and to decide cases that are tried before him.

(d) A decision of the magistrate, including any penalty imposed, shall become a judgment of the court if no demand for a trial de novo is filed. Such decision of the magistrate shall become null and void if a timely demand for a trial de novo is filed. A demand for a trial de novo shall be filed with the court clerk within five days of the date the decision was rendered by the magistrate and, if filed by the prosecutorial official, it shall include a certification that a copy thereof has been served on the defendant or his attorney, in accordance with the rules of court. No record of the proceedings shall be required to be kept.

(P.A. 85-464, S. 4; P.A. 86-127, S. 1, 2; P.A. 92-116; P.A. 93-142, S. 2; P.A. 16-126, S. 29.)

History: P.A. 86-127 amended Subsec. (b) to delete provision which authorized magistrates to hear certain cases “unless a claim has been made for a jury trial at which time the case will be entered in the docket as a jury case” and amended Subsec. (c) to authorize magistrates to accept pleas of nolo contendere and enter findings of guilty thereon, to recommend suspension under Sec. 14-111b or 15-154, and to hear and decide motions, deleting former Subsec. (e) which had prohibited magistrates from conducting jury trials and merging former Subsec. (e) into (c); P.A. 92-116 amended Subsec. (c) to permit waiver of fee for motion to reopen judgment and amended Subsec. (d) to provide that no record of the proceedings shall be required to be kept; P.A. 93-142 broadened authority of magistrates to hear cases involving violations as defined in Sec. 53a-27; P.A. 16-126 amended Subsec. (a) by adding references to Secs. 14-227m and 14-227n.

Decision to enter nolle prosequi is a decision of magistrate, not prosecutor, from which demand for trial de novo can be made and over which trial court and appellate court have jurisdiction. 143 CA 194.

Subsec. (d):

Statute violates double jeopardy clause. 41 CS 356.

SENTENCE REVIEW DIVISION

*Constitutionality of Secs. 51-194 to 51-197 discussed and affirmed; state's attorney had standing to challenge constitutionality. 187 C. 109. Cited. 238 C. 389.

Date of crime controls possible punishment for offense; statute as amended applies prospectively only. 3 CA 497. Cited. 41 CA 255.

Cited. 41 CS 229.

Sec. 51-194. Review division, appointment; meetings; disqualification; secretary. The Chief Justice shall appoint three judges of the Superior Court to act as a review division of the court and shall designate one of the judges to act as chairman thereof. The clerk of the Superior Court for the judicial district of Hartford shall record the appointments and shall give notice thereof to the clerk of the court for each other judicial district. Said division shall meet at such times and places as its business requires, as determined by the chairman. The decision of any two of the judges shall be sufficient to determine any matter before the review division. No judge may sit or act on a review of a sentence imposed by him and, in any case in which review of a sentence imposed by any of the judges serving on the review division is to be acted on by the division, the Chief Justice may designate another judge to act in place of the judge. The review division is authorized to appoint a secretary and such clerical help as it deems adequate, whose compensation shall be fixed in accordance with section 51-12 .

(1957, P.A. 436, S. 1; September, 1957, P.A. 14, S. 1, 6; P.A. 78-280, S. 2, 6, 127; P.A. 80-313, S. 50; P.A. 88-230, S. 1, 12; P.A. 90-98, S. 1, 2; P.A. 93-142, S. 4, 7, 8; P.A. 95-220, S. 4–6.)

History: P.A. 78-280 replaced general references to counties with references to judicial districts and replaced “Hartford county” with “judicial district of Hartford-New Britain”; P.A. 80-313 substituted “may” for “shall” and “the” for “such” or “said” where appearing; P.A. 88-230 replaced “judicial district of Hartford-New Britain” with “judicial district of Hartford”, effective September 1, 1991; P.A. 90-98 changed the effective date of P.A. 88-230 from September 1, 1991, to September 1, 1993; P.A. 93-142 changed the effective date of P.A. 88-230 from September 1, 1993, to September 1, 1996, effective June 14, 1993; P.A. 95-220 changed the effective date of P.A. 88-230 from September 1, 1996, to September 1, 1998, effective July 1, 1995.

Cited. 149 C. 694; 168 C. 623. Constitutionality of section discussed and affirmed. 187 C. 109.

Cited. 1 CA 724; 21 CA 557.

Cited. 25 CS 473. Parties may waive their statutory rights to decision by review board of three judges and agree to accept decision by review board of two judges. 27 CS 316. Cited. 42 CS 371.

Cited. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 416.

Sec. 51-195. Application for review of sentence. Any person sentenced on one or more counts of an information to a term of imprisonment for which the total sentence of all such counts amounts to confinement for three years or more, may, within thirty days from the date such sentence was imposed or if the offender received a suspended sentence with a maximum confinement of three years or more, within thirty days of revocation of such suspended sentence, except in any case in which a different sentence could not have been imposed or in any case in which the sentence or commitment imposed resulted from the court's acceptance of a plea agreement or in any case in which the sentence imposed was for a lesser term than was proposed in a plea agreement, file with the clerk of the court for the judicial district in which the judgment was rendered an application for review of the sentence by the review division. Upon imposition of sentence or at the time of revocation of such suspended sentence, the clerk shall give written notice to the person sentenced of his right to make such a request. Such notice shall include a statement that review of the sentence may result in decrease or increase of the term within the limits fixed by law. A form for making such application shall accompany the notice. The clerk shall forthwith transmit such application to the review division and shall notify the judge who imposed the sentence. Such judge may transmit to the review division a statement of his reasons for imposing the sentence, and shall transmit such a statement within seven days if requested to do so by the review division. The filing of an application for review shall not stay the execution of the sentence.

(1957, P.A. 436, S. 2; September, 1957, P.A. 14, S. 2; 1963, P.A. 584, S. 1; P.A. 73-616, S. 44; P.A. 75-567, S. 30, 80; P.A. 77-224; P.A. 78-191; 78-280, S. 2, 127; 78-379, S. 7, 27; P.A. 80-442, S. 8, 28.)

History: 1963 act included commitment to Connecticut Reformatory; P.A. 73-616 replaced State Prison, State Prison for Women and Connecticut Reformatory with Connecticut Correctional Institutions in Somers, Niantic and Cheshire, deleted specific reference to “superior” court in provision re filing of applications for review of sentence and added reference to judicial districts and circuits; P.A. 75-567 deleted reference to circuits, circuit court functions having been transferred to common pleas court by P.A. 74-183; P.A. 77-224 deleted specific reference to Somers and Niantic Correctional Institutions; P.A. 78-191 deleted reference to Cheshire correctional institution and specified that filing for sentence review is not allowed where sentence imposed results from plea agreement or is less than that proposed in such an agreement; P.A. 78-280 deleted reference to counties; P.A. 78-379 deleted specific references to commitments to Correctional Institution at Cheshire, clarified applicability re one-year term of imprisonment to specify one or more counts of an information for which total sentence is one year or more, applied provisions to offenders who received suspended sentence for which maximum confinement was one year or more and deleted requirement that chief justice be notified of clerk's receipt of application for review; P.A. 80-442 applied provisions to cases where total confinement would be three or more years rather than one year or more and specified that sentenced person be informed that sentence review may result in increase or decrease of term within limits of law rather than in increase or decrease of “maximum or minimum” term within limits of law, effective July 1, 1981.

A convicted person is afforded an opportunity for what is, in effect, a limited appeal for a reconsideration of the sentence; the jeopardy, so far as the sentence is concerned, is a single, continuing one, and any change in the sentence results from the sentenced person's own voluntary act; there is no double jeopardy. 149 C. 692. Cited. 152 C. 630. Petitioner has constitutional right to counsel at hearing before sentence review division. 153 C. 673, 677. Prohibition against putting anyone in double jeopardy is a fundamental principle of common law recognized by Connecticut courts although not a state constitutional provision; correction of a mistake by review division is not double jeopardy. 156 C. 598. Plaintiff in petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging unlawful confinement has a right to have his sentence reviewed by the review division of the Superior Court. 168 C. 254. Cited. Id., 623; 187 C. 109; 192 C. 471. “Plea agreement” as used in section means an agreement to a sentence of a specific term of years. 214 C. 195. Cited. Id., 717; 217 C. 810; 220 C. 400; 224 C. 347; 230 C. 183; 243 C. 339. 30-day limit does not act as jurisdictional bar to sentence review division's consideration of an application for sentence review that was delayed by reason of ineffective assistance of counsel. 245 C. 132.

Cited. 1 CA 724; 19 CA 48; Id., 631; 23 CA 201; Id., 564; judgment reversed in part, see 220 C. 400; 27 CA 705; 37 CA 801; 46 CA 486.

Cited. 22 CS 204. In 1960, the court revoked the suspension of a sentence which had been imposed in 1957; as to that sentence, the review division is without power to act, because an application to review it would have to be filed within 30 days after January 1, 1958. Id., 270. Cited. 25 CS 473; 26 CS 186. Where court clerk failed to give defendant notice of his right to file application for review of commitment until after appeal was dismissed, review division entertained application on merits although not filed within 30 days after sentence. 27 CS 78. When defendant filed application for review of his sentence only after his probation was revoked, held review division had no authority to consider it since application was not filed within 30 days of original sentencing date. Id., 108; Id., 128. Cited. Id., 150. Review division is a statutory body and has only such jurisdiction as is conferred on it by statute; hence cannot consider application filed more than 2 years after sentencing. 28 CS 196. Application to sentence review board must be filed within 30 days of imposition of sentence or board has no jurisdiction. 29 CS 133. Persons sentenced under Sec. 19-499 (19a-388) should not have their sentence review period run until court has finished its final review. Id., 137. Sentence review division has no jurisdiction to consider application filed beyond 30-day limit. Id., 203. Review division has no jurisdiction to review an application filed beyond the statutory limit of 30 days. Id., 236. Cited. 42 CS 371.

Sec. 51-196. Review of sentence or commitment. Decision. (a) The review division shall, in each case in which an application for review is filed in accordance with section 51-195 , review the judgment so far as it relates to the sentence or commitment imposed, either increasing or decreasing the penalty, and any other sentence imposed on the person at the same time, and may order such different sentence or sentences to be imposed as could have been imposed at the time of the imposition of the sentence under review, or may decide that the sentence or commitment under review should stand.

(b) In reviewing any judgment, the review division may, for good cause, waive its authority to increase the penalty and may, thereafter, conduct a hearing on such application without the applicant being present. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit an applicant from having counsel present or from appearing pro se at the hearing. In reviewing any judgment, said division may require the production of presentence or precommitment reports and any other records, documents or exhibits connected with such review proceedings.

(c) At a hearing held under this section, the review division shall permit any victim of the crime to appear before the division for the purpose of making a statement for the record concerning whether or not the sentence or commitment of the defendant should be increased or decreased or should stand. In lieu of such appearance, the victim may submit a written statement to the review division and the review division shall make such statement a part of the record at the hearing. For the purposes of this subsection, “victim” means the victim, the legal representative of the victim or a member of the deceased victim's immediate family.

(d) If the review division orders a different sentence or disposition of the case, the Superior Court shall resentence the defendant or make any other disposition of the case ordered by the review division. Time served on the sentence reviewed shall be deemed to have been served on the sentence substituted. The decision of the review division in each case shall be final and the reasons for such decision shall be stated therein.

(e) The secretary of the review division shall act as its clerk or, if there is no such secretary, the clerk of the superior court for the judicial district in which the review division is meeting shall act as the clerk of the division. The acting clerk of the review division shall send the original of each decision to the clerk of the court where the judgment was rendered and a copy thereof to the Chief Justice, the judge who imposed the sentence or commitment reviewed, the person sentenced or committed, the principal officer of the correctional institution in which such person is confined and the Reporter of Judicial Decisions.

(1957, P.A. 436, S. 3; September, 1957, P.A. 14, S. 3; 1959, P.A. 194; 1963, P.A. 584, S. 2; P.A. 75-567, S. 31, 80; P.A. 82-472, S. 136, 183; P.A. 97-37; P.A. 03-129, S. 2; P.A. 17-99, S. 8.)

History: 1959 act added provisions re secretary and acting clerk of review division, deleted provision that all decisions be published in Connecticut Supplement and added provision re selection of decisions and provision re publication in Connecticut Law Journal and Connecticut Supplement; 1963 act included reformatory commitments and added reference to clerk of circuit court; P.A. 75-567 replaced reference to circuits with reference to judicial districts, circuit court functions having been transferred to court of common pleas by P.A. 74-183; P.A. 82-472 substituted a reference to the superior court for the “judicial district” for the superior court for the “county”; P.A. 97-37 added provision authorizing the division to waive its authority to increase the penalty and thereafter conduct a hearing without the applicant being present, added provision re the right of an applicant to have counsel present or to appear pro se, deleted provision re modification of reformatory commitments and deleted obsolete language re court locations; P.A. 03-129 divided existing provisions into Subsecs. (a), (b), (d) and (e), added new Subsec. (c) authorizing a crime victim to appear and make a statement before the division or submit a written statement to the division and defining “victim” and amended Subsec. (e) to make technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality; P.A. 17-99 amended Subsec. (e) by deleting provisions re Reporter of Judicial Decisions to select for publication decisions deemed useful for precedents or serving public interest and publication of decisions in the Connecticut Law Journal, effective June 30, 2017.

A convicted person is afforded an opportunity for what is, in effect, a limited appeal for a reconsideration of the sentence; the jeopardy, so far as the sentence is concerned, is a single continuing one, and any change in the sentence results from the sentenced person's own voluntary act; there is no double jeopardy. 149 C. 692. Denial of due process and defendant placed in double jeopardy when board increased sentence after defendant served the sentence imposed by the trial court. 152 C. 426. Cited. Id., 628, 630. Petitioner has constitutional right to counsel at hearing before sentence review division. 153 C. 673, 677. Resentencing did not involve double jeopardy where review division erroneously increased defendant's sentence when he was not represented before division by counsel. 156 C. 598. Cited. 168 C. 623; 187 C. 109; 192 C. 471; 214 C. 195; 224 C. 347. Determination by review division re its jurisdiction to consider an application for review is a question of law rather than an exercise of discretion and is not otherwise appealable, but may be reviewable under a writ of error; legislature did not intend for review division to conduct proportionality review re similar offenders. 293 C. 489.

Cited. 1 CA 724; 19 CA 48; 46 CA 486. Decision by review division that defendant is not entitled to the review procedure is a non-appealable final judgment, but is reviewable under a writ of error, and a writ of habeas corpus may not be substituted for a writ of error. 57 CA 145.

Grievance relating to guilt of accused is not within power of division to review. 21 CS 381. In sentencing under uniform state narcotic drug act, court must follow rigorous penalty provisions set forth therein. Id., 388, 392. Proof of variation from sentences given in comparable cases does not necessarily mean that sentence in issue is improper. Id., 388, 434. Enumeration of factors to be considered in setting a sentence. Id., 384, 412. Division cannot evaluate other cases where it is claimed that lesser sentences were imposed unless it has before it the facts of such cases. Id., 415. In determining a proper sentence, trial court owes duty to public as much as it does to accused. Id., 418. Maximum sentences given to defendants who were first offenders under uniform state narcotic drug act reduced from 10 to 7 years as both had used drugs for a short time only and neither sold narcotics. Id., 421. It is function of board of parole, not sentence review division, to determine when a person should be released from prison. Id., 423. Sentence of narcotics offender reduced where background showed prior voluntary submission to arrest in an effort to break narcotic habit. Id., 426. Defendant sentenced to reformatory and then to prison, terms to be served consecutively; prison sentence suspended for presumably he would be reformed while serving reformatory sentence. Id., 431. Relatively more severe sentences may be justified in crimes involving injury or risk of injury to children. Id., 434. Purpose of division is to achieve more rational sentences and greater equality of treatment for offenders; considerations of clemency and postprison reform are matters outside its scope. Id., 448. In sentencing, deterrence of such conduct on the part of others is a desired goal since public has right to be protected against crimes threatening high social and personal injury. Id., 452. Defendant received a higher penalty than his codefendant though tried on a lesser charge, sentence held proper. Id., 455. Defendant charged as second offender; fact that all who might have been presented as second offenders have not been so presented cannot aid defendant. Id., 457. Defendant convicted of manslaughter; in view of circumstances of the killing, defendant's inclination to violence as shown by his criminal record and his knowledge, when he pleaded guilty, of what sentence would be recommended, his sentence held proper. Id., 461. Under uniform state narcotic drug act, conviction of defendant as second offender made compulsory minimum imprisonment term of 10 years, once court deemed confinement was required, and defendant's claim that this amounts to a life sentence because of his age is a request based on considerations of clemency and more properly addressed to the board of pardons. Id., 463. Court's objective to impose a maximum sentence which would ensure that defendant would be under jurisdiction of parole board for the rest of his life could be accomplished with a lesser sentence, so sentence modified accordingly. Id., 468. Mere fact that defendant received a higher sentence than his codefendant affords no sound basis of comparison without the consideration of other pertinent surrounding circumstances. Id., 468, 474. The stress is not alone upon the criminal act but upon make-up of the offender and chances of his reform. Id., 474. Because the trial judge has opportunity to weigh and consider factors personal to defendant in connection with evidence, his opinion as to appropriateness of a sentence deserves great weight. Id., 477. Sentence increased where defendant was second offender and his sentence was less than that given for first offense. Id., 480. Matters which are administrative in nature are not reviewable by review division. 22 CS 208. Trial court's refusal to appoint new counsel in place of public defender was not matter with which review division could concern itself; function limited to harshness of sentence. 25 CS 3. Sentence of 3 to 7 years for blackmail found proper in view of heinous nature of crime and defendant's poor juvenile record. Id., 5. Division not empowered to comply with request of person convicted of violating narcotics act to send him to Kentucky hospital. Id., 7. Defendant's war record, being recited in presentence report, was before court at time of sentencing and cannot now be used to mitigate sentence. Id., 55. All factors must be weighed in reviewing sentences, not just those favorable to defendant. Id., 57. Sentence increased where robberies were vicious and no consideration for victims was shown. Id., 68. Sentence reduction denied where defendant had some knowledge of what is proper in law and order and chose to assume control on his own. Id., 73. Division not empowered to transfer prisoner from jail to a place where he could receive psychiatric help. Id., 145. Cited. Id., 149; Id., 473, 474, 484; 26 CS 176. Where defendant sentenced as second offender asked review division to reduce his maximum term on ground that parole board had denied him parole, held it is not function of division thus to pass on actions of parole board. Id., 196. Where minor defendant was committed to reformatory for indefinite term for crime for which adult could be confined only 30 days, sentence too severe. Id., 506. Where maximum sentence that could have been imposed would be aggregate of 120 days except for reformatory commitment, sentence of not more than 2 years without possibility of parole for 9 months too severe. 27 CS 81. Where, if court had imposed maximum penalty on all charges, result would be substantial fine and sentence in excess of 2 years and in view of defendant's presentence behavior, commitment to reformatory for not more than 2 years with basic minimum of 9 months on good behavior fair and should stand. Id., 89. Where minor defendant committed to reformatory to be detained not more than 2 years was witness for state and helped state obtain a conviction and had been unable to post bond, being jailed over 3 months prior to conviction, sentence too severe. Id., 100. Evidence of reform after conviction outside scope of division's consideration. Id., 221. Unnecessary for division to find facts and interpret statutes to determine its jurisdiction to modify sentence to comply with law limiting commitments to reformatory to males between 16 and 21 when matter not raised before division. Id., 239. Different sentences were ordered where trial court had failed to comply with Sec. 54-121, by fixing minimum and maximum sentences on all counts of a concurrent sentence. Id., 330.

Sec. 51-197. Forms and rules of procedure. The review division shall prescribe forms to be used in accordance with section 51-195 and make rules for procedure under sections 51-195 and 51-196 .

(1957, P.A. 436, S. 4; September, 1957, P.A. 14, S. 4.)

Constitutionality of section discussed and affirmed. 187 C. 109. Cited. 224 C. 347.

Cited. 1 CA 724; 46 CA 486.

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS AND APPELLATE COURT

Sec. 51-197a. Appeals to Appellate Court. Writs. Transfer of jurisdiction from appellate session. (a) Appeals and writs of error from final judgments or actions of the Superior Court shall be taken to the Appellate Court in accordance with section 51-197c , except for small claims, which are not appealable, appeals as provided for in sections 8-8 and 8-9 , and except as otherwise provided by statute.

(b) The Appellate Court may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of its jurisdiction and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.

(c) All matters pending in the appellate session of the Superior Court on July 1, 1983, shall be construed as pending with the same status in the Appellate Court on said date.

(d) Notwithstanding subsection (c) of this section, the appellate session of the Superior Court shall continue to have jurisdiction over appeals which it heard prior to July 1, 1983, pursuant to the provisions which were applicable at such time.

(e) Except as otherwise provided in sections 2-40 , 2-42 , 7-143 , 7-230 , 8-8 , 8-9 , 8-132 , 8-132a , 10-153e , 12-4 , 13a-76 , 31-109 , 31-118 , 31-249b , 31-272 , 31-301b , 31-301c , 31-324 , 31-491 , 31-493 , 38a-470 , 46a-94 , 46a-95 , 46b-142 , 46b-143 , 46b-150c , 51-1a , 51-14 , 51-49 , 51-50j , 51-164x , 51-165 , 51-197a , 51-197b , 51-197c , 51-197e , 51-197f , 51-201 , 51-202 , 51-203 , 51-209 , 51-210 , 51-211 , 51-213 , 51-215a , 51-216a , 52-235 , 52-257 , 52-259 , 52-263 , 52-267 , 52-405 , 52-434 , 52-434a , 52-470 , 52-476 , 52-477 , 52-592 , 54-63g , 54-95 , 54-96 , 54-96a , 54-96b and 54-143 , all jurisdiction conferred upon and exercised by the appellate session prior to July 1, 1983, of the Superior Court shall be transferred to the Appellate Court.

(P.A. 76-436, S. 3, 681; P.A. 77-347, S. 6, 11; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 83-29, S. 3, 82; P.A. 87-338, S. 6, 11; P.A. 88-241, S. 8; P.A. 89-356, S. 6; P.A. 15-127, S. 4; P.A. 19-64, S. 9.)

History: P.A. 77-347 amended exception to include appeals within jurisdiction of appellate session of superior court as provided for within Sec. 51-197d, effective July 1, 1978, and effective through June 30, 1979; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 83-29 included reference to appellate court and added Subsecs. (b) to (e), inclusive, re issuance of writs and transfer of jurisdiction from appellate session to appellate court; P.A. 87-338 amended Subsec. (e) by deleting reference to Sec. 22a-182 for consistency with other statutory changes; P.A. 88-241 made no substantive changes; P.A. 89-356 amended Subsecs. (a) and (e) by deleting references to Secs. 8-28 and 8-30; (Revisor's note: In 1993, a reference to repealed Sec. 22a-182 was removed editorially by the Revisors); P.A. 15-127 deleted reference to Sec. 31-63, effective June 23, 2015; P.A. 19-64 amended Subsec. (a) by adding “and writs of error” and deleting “appeals within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided for in section 51-199,” and amended Subsec. (e) by deleting reference to Sec. 51-199, effective January 1, 2020.

Cited. 186 C. 153. Case does not come within narrow confines of existing exceptions to the finality rule for appeal; exceptions discussed. 189 C. 92. Cited. Id., 92; Id., 101; 191 C. 27; Id., 506; 192 C. 653; 193 C. 612. Does not preclude court from entertaining a writ of error pursuant to Sec. 52-272 from the small claims division. 194 C. 43. Cited. Id., 245; Id., 347; Id., 650; 195 C. 226; Id., 276; Id., 303; 197 C. 82; Id., 87; 202 C. 86; 203 C. 317; 206 C. 542; 209 C. 52; 210 C. 110; 212 C. 741; 220 C. 162; 222 C. 211; 224 C. 749; 225 C. 102; 226 C. 230; 228 C. 106; Id., 630. Appellate Court's order was not a necessary or appropriate exercise of authority under section; judgment of Appellate Court in 31 CA 728 reversed in part. 229 C. 817. Cited. 242 C. 599. Trial court order precluding parties from filing any further motions regarding custody or visitation constitutes an appealable final judgment. 243 C. 380.

Cited. 1 CA 1; Id., 43; Id., 66; Id., 70; Id., 105; Id., 142; Id., 186; Id., 270; Id., 278; Id., 285; Id., 320; Id., 373; Id., 378; Id., 384; Id., 414; Id., 439; Id., 509; Id., 511; Id., 517; Id., 521; Id., 540; Id., 569; Id., 591; 2 CA 1; Id., 7; Id., 11; Id., 14; Id., 109; Id., 164; Id., 196; Id., 204; Id., 219; Id., 255; Id., 321; Id., 384; Id., 595; Id., 628; Id., 689; 3 CA 24; Id., 47; Id., 51; Id., 80; Id., 97; Id., 157; Id., 158; Id., 162; Id., 166; Id., 179; Id., 181; Id., 201; Id., 212; Id., 235; Id., 240; Id., 264; Id., 306; Id., 370; Id., 392; Id., 404; Id., 410; Id., 416; Id., 421; Id., 432; Id., 471; Id., 496; Id., 530; Id., 550; Id., 587; Id., 627; Id., 707; 4 CA 24; Id., 67; Id., 68; Id., 106; Id., 143; Id., 209; Id., 226; 5 CA 170; Id., 244; 9 CA 93; 20 CA 23; Id., 470; 22 CA 73; 25 CA 28; 26 CA 322; 29 CA 716; 33 CA 99; Id., 702; 35 CA 9; 36 CA 49; Id., 138; 37 CA 269; 40 CA 446; Id., 613; 41 CA 1; Id., 747. Court's temporary order to determine joint custody dispute over which school a child would attend was not a final judgment and was therefore not immediately appealable. 75 CA 279. Writ of error is the proper avenue to obtain review of a small claims matter where the trial court awards counterclaim damages above the jurisdictional money limit in Sec. 51-15. 140 CA 514. Imposition of sanctions against non-party attorney for failing to immediately produce phone records of defendant's employer was final action allowing attorney to pursue writ of error before appellate court because sanctions concluded a distinct and separate proceeding and were unrelated to prosecution of underlying personal injury action. 195 CA 131.

Sec. 51-197b. (Formerly Sec. 52-7). Administrative appeals. (a) Except as provided in section 31-301b , all appeals that may be taken from administrative decisions of officers, boards, commissions or agencies of the state or any political subdivision thereof shall be taken to the Superior Court.

(b) Except as provided in section 4-183 , the Superior Court, after a hearing, may reverse or affirm, wholly or partly, or may modify or revise the decision appealed from.

(c) So much of any special act as is inconsistent with this section is repealed.

(d) Except as provided in sections 8-8 , 8-9 and 22a-43 , there shall be a right to further review to the Appellate Court under such rules as the judges of the Appellate Court shall adopt.

(e) The procedure on such appeal to the Appellate Court shall be in accordance with the procedure provided by rule or law for the appeal of judgments rendered by the Superior Court unless modified by rule of the judges of the Appellate Court. There shall be no right to further review except to the Supreme Court pursuant to the provisions of section 51-197f .

(1949 Rev., S. 7742; P.A. 76-436, S. 4, 681; P.A. 77-347, S. 7, 11; 77-604, S. 60, 84; P.A. 80-352, S. 1, 2; 80-422, S. 48; P.A. 81-416, S. 3, 5; P.A. 82-248, S. 98; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 83-29, S. 4, 82; P.A. 88-317, S. 27, 107; P.A. 89-356, S. 7; P.A. 95-151, S. 3.)

History: P.A. 76-436 transferred court of common pleas' jurisdiction of appeals under section provisions to superior court and added provisions re appeal to supreme court, effective July 1, 1978; P.A. 77-347 added exception re provisions of Sec. 53-36(b) and provision re appeals from judgment of common pleas court entered prior to July 1, 1978, effective July 1, 1978, and effective through June 30, 1979; P.A. 77-604 substituted “section 53-36b” for reference to Sec. 53-36(b), effective July 1, 1978; Sec. 52-7 transferred to Sec. 51-197b in the 1977 Court Reorganization Supplement; P.A. 80-352 added exception re appeals concerning administrative decisions of revenue services commissioner; P.A. 80-422 substituted reference to Sec. 53-36d for reference to Sec. 53-36b; P.A. 81-416 replaced provisions barring further review of superior court decisions of administrative appeals except by certification for review by the supreme court with provisions allowing review by the appellate session but no further review except by the supreme court pursuant to Sec. 51-197f; P.A. 82-248 reworded section, divided section into Subsecs. and deleted provision re appeals from judgments entered by court of common pleas prior to July 1, 1978; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 83-29 made changes necessitated by establishment of the appellate court; P.A. 88-317 divided Subsec. (a) into three subsections, inserted “Except as provided in section 4-183,” in Subsec. (b) and relettered former Subsec. (b) as Subsec. (d) and former Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (e), effective July 1, 1989, and applicable to all agency proceedings commencing on or after that date; P.A. 89-356 amended Subsec. (d) by deleting reference to Secs. 8-28 and 8-30; P.A. 95-151 amended Subsec. (d) to include an exception for appeals taken from judicial decisions re inland wetlands matters.

See Sec. 4-183 re appeals to Superior Court from administrative proceedings.

See Sec. 52-233 re requirements upon statutory appeal from administrative action taken to a judge.

Annotations to former section 52-7:

Cited. 130 C. 126; 133 C. 718; 134 C. 151. When provisions of general statute cover same field as those of special law, the former prevail; Superior Court did not have jurisdiction. 135 C. 303. Cited. 138 C. 501. Board of police commissioners is a municipal board and appeals must go to court of common pleas. 145 C. 1. Cited. 150 C. 431. Where no provision for appeal in disability retirement act for municipal employees, court had no jurisdiction. 151 C. 703. Title to public office is a legal rather than an equitable question; equity does not act to restrain or relieve against proceedings for the removal of public officers. 154 C. 228. Section supersedes provisions of the Bridgeport charter which authorized appeal to Superior Court. Id., 416. Cited. 156 C. 605; 171 C. 553.

Effect of appeal from municipal board inadvertently taken to Superior Court. 13 CS 70. Power of common pleas to issue mandamus in matters concerning liquor control. Id., 446. Cited. 14 CS 450. Suspended police officer may appeal. 20 CS 148. Towns cannot adopt rules of legal procedure contrary to the provisions of general statutes. 25 CS 116. Right of appeal not created, only establishes jurisdiction of court of common pleas. 30 CS 290. Cited. 31 CS 125; 32 CS 82.

Cited. 180 C. 692; 181 C. 1. Proceeding brought under Sec. 4-195 is not an administrative appeal subject to appellate restrictions under this section. 186 C. 153. Cited. 187 C. 262; 192 C. 183; 196 C. 283; 202 C. 28; 225 C. 13.

Cited. 1 CA 285; 2 CA 384; 3 CA 496; 5 CA 520; 13 CA 1; 34 CA 567.

Subsec. (a):

There is no right of appeal to Superior Court from the dismissal of a complaint by the State-Wide Grievance Committee. 110 CA 641.

Failure of legislature to include reference to Sec. 8-30g did not thereby manifest an intention to permit direct appeal to Appellate Court of affordable housing land use appeals. 245 C. 257.

Sec. 51-197c. Appellate Court; judges, appointment, terms, Chief Judge. (a) The Appellate Court shall consist of nine judges, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, who shall also be judges of the Superior Court, and who shall be appointed by the General Assembly, upon nomination of the Governor for a term of eight years. The judges shall sit in panels of three, or en banc, pursuant to rules adopted by the Appellate Court. The Chief Justice shall designate one of these judges as Chief Judge of the Appellate Court.

(b) If a judge of the Appellate Court (1) is appointed the Chief Court Administrator, or (2) on July 1, 2001, is serving as the Chief Court Administrator, the Appellate Court shall consist of ten judges for the remainder of said judge's current term on the Appellate Court, or until his or her retirement from full-time active service, whichever occurs first. The tenth judge shall also be a judge of the Superior Court and shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon nomination of the Governor for a term of eight years.

(c) With the approval of the Chief Justice, the Chief Judge shall (1) schedule such sessions as may be necessary, at such locations as the facilitation of court business requires, (2) designate as many panels as may be necessary, each consisting of three judges assigned by the Chief Judge, and (3) designate a presiding judge for each panel on which the Chief Judge does not sit.

(d) Every judge of the Superior Court shall, by virtue of appointment to the Superior Court, be qualified to serve as a judge on the Appellate Court.

(e) Each of the parties in any case shall have a right to be heard by a full panel. The Chief Judge, with the approval of the Chief Justice, may summon one or more of the judges of the Superior Court to constitute a full panel.

(f) The judges of the Appellate Court shall be released from sitting on the Superior Court, except that the Chief Justice may assign any such judge to sit on the Superior Court whenever in the Chief Justice's judgment the public business may require it.

(g) If the Chief Court Administrator is a judge of the Appellate Court, said Chief Court Administrator shall be released from sitting on the Appellate Court, except that the Chief Justice may assign the Chief Court Administrator to sit on the Appellate Court whenever, in the Chief Justice's judgment, the public business may require it.

(h) Each Chief Judge or judge of the Appellate Court who elects to retain such judge's office but to retire from full-time active service shall continue to be a member of the Appellate Court during the remainder of such judge's term of office and during the term of any reappointment under section 51-50i , until such judge attains the age of seventy years. Such judge shall be entitled to participate in the meetings of the judges of the Appellate Court and to vote as a member thereof.

(i) In each appeal to the Appellate Court, the party appealing shall pay a record fee as prescribed in section 52-259 , at such time as is fixed by rule of court, which amount shall be taxed in favor of the appellant if judgment is finally rendered in such appellant's favor.

(P.A. 77-347, S. 1, 2, 11; P.A. 79-195, S. 1, 2; P.A. 81-416, S. 1, 5; P.A. 82-248, S. 99; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 83-29, S. 5, 82; P.A. 85-451, S. 2, 4; P.A. 87-198, S. 4, 6; 87-508, S. 2, 10; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-9, S. 64, 131.)

History: P.A. 77-347 effective July 1, 1978, through June 30, 1979; P.A. 79-195 extended closing date for appellate sessions of superior court from June 30, 1979, to June 30, 1981; P.A. 81-416 amended Subsec. (a) by extending the expiration date of the appellate sessions from June 30, 1981, to June 30, 1983; P.A. 82-248 made technical revision, rewording some provisions and dividing section into Subsecs. but made no substantive change; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 83-29 deleted provisions re appellate session and substituted provisions re appellate court; P.A. 85-451 increased number of appellate court judges from five to six; P.A. 87-198 substituted “chief judge” for “chief presiding judge” and added Subsec. permitting chief judge of appellate court who elects to retire from full-time active service to continue to be member of court during remainder of term or any term of reappointment until age of 70 and is entitled to participate in meetings and vote as a member thereof; P.A. 87-508 increased number of appellate court judges from six to nine; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-9 amended Subsec. (a) to add exception re number of judges, added new Subsec. (b) re appointment of a tenth judge when one of the judges is the Chief Court Administrator, redesignated former Subsecs. (b), (c), (d) and (e) as Subsecs. (c), (d), (e) and (f), added new Subsec. (g) re the sitting on the Appellate Court by a judge who is the Chief Court Administrator, redesignated former Subsecs. (f) and (g) as Subsecs. (h) and (i), and made technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality in redesignated Subsecs. (c), (d), (f), (h) and (i), effective July 1, 2001.

Sec. 51-197d. Jurisdiction of appellate session. Section 51-197d is repealed.

(P.A. 77-347, S. 3, 11; P.A. 78-280, S. 85, 127; P.A. 79-376; 79-540, S. 9; P.A. 80-234, S. 2; P.A. 81-416, S. 2, 5; P.A. 82-248, S. 100; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 83-29, S. 80, 82.)

Sec. 51-197e. Consolidation of appeals. When any appeal pending before the Appellate Court involves the same cause of action, transaction or occurrence as an appeal pending before the Supreme Court, the appeals may be consolidated in the Supreme Court.

(P.A. 77-347, S. 4, 11; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 83-29, S. 6, 82.)

History: P.A. 77-347 effective July 1, 1978, through June 30, 1979; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 83-29 deleted reference to appellate session and deleted provision re establishment of rules governing consolidation by superior court judges.

Sec. 51-197f. Further review by certification only. Upon final determination of any appeal by the Appellate Court, there shall be no right to further review except the Supreme Court shall have the power to certify cases for its review upon petition by an aggrieved party or by the appellate panel which heard the matter. A vote of three judges of the Supreme Court shall be required to certify a case for review by the Supreme Court, except that if fewer than six judges of said court are available to consider a petition, a vote of two judges of said court shall be required to certify a case, under such other rules as the justices of said court shall establish. The procedure on appeal from the Appellate Court to the Supreme Court shall, except as otherwise provided, be in accordance with the procedure provided by rule or law for the appeal of judgments rendered by the Superior Court, unless modified by rule of the justices of the Supreme Court.

(P.A. 77-347, S. 5, 11; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 83-29, S. 7, 82; P.A. 96-179, S. 8; P.A. 12-133, S. 11.)

History: P.A. 77-347 effective July 1, 1978, through June 30, 1979; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 83-29 deleted provisions re appellate session and substituted provisions re appellate court; P.A. 96-179 changed the vote required for certification from two to three justices of the Supreme Court; P.A. 12-133 added provision specifying that if fewer than 6 judges of Supreme Court are available to consider a petition, a vote of 2 judges shall be required to certify a case, and made a technical change, effective July 1, 2012.

Cited. 186 C. 153. Decision of Appellate Court denying petition for certification was not a “final” determination of an appeal by Appellate Court within meaning of statute. 194 C. 277. Cited. 196 C. 676; 220 C. 922; 221 C. 84; 222 C. 331; 224 C. 711; 226 C. 230; 229 C. 178; 230 C. 427; 236 C. 266; Id., 388; 241 C. 282. Meaning of “party” distinguished from meaning in Sec. 52-263. 250 C. 147. A final determination exists for purposes of Supreme Court jurisdiction under section once Appellate Court conclusively resolves the issue or issues before it and disposes of the cause such that no further action is necessary by Appellate Court. 293 C. 247. A writ of error is tantamount to an appeal for purposes of this section and Supreme Court has jurisdiction to grant certification to appeal Appellate Court's judgment on transferred writ of error. 331 C. 711.

Cited. 4 CA 1. Supreme Court's review is discretionary; certification process does not create a right to counsel. 54 CA 400.

Cited. 38 CS 356.

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Conference Acts to Promote Random Case Assignment

Published on March 12, 2024

The Judicial Conference of the United States has strengthened the policy governing random case assignment, limiting the ability of litigants to effectively choose judges in certain cases by where they file a lawsuit.

The policy addresses all civil actions that seek to bar or mandate state or federal actions, “whether by declaratory judgment and/or any form of injunctive relief.” In such cases, judges would be assigned through a district-wide random selection process.

“Since 1995, the Judicial Conference has strongly supported the random assignment of cases and the notion that all district judges remain generalists,” said Judge Robert J. Conrad, Jr., secretary of the Conference. “The random case-assignment policy deters judge-shopping and the assignment of cases based on the perceived merits or abilities of a particular judge. It promotes the impartiality of proceedings and bolsters public confidence in the federal Judiciary.”

In most of the nation’s 94 federal district courts, local case assignment plans facilitate the random selection of judges. Some plans assign cases to a judge in the division of the court where the case is filed. In divisions where only a single judge sits, these rules have made it possible for a litigant to pre-select that judge by filing in that division. 

In a November 2021 letter, Senator Thom Tillis (R-N.C.), and Patrick Leahy, a Vermont senator who since has retired, raised concerns about a concentration of patent cases filed in single-judge divisions. 

Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., referenced this letter in his 2021 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary , calling for a study of judicial assignment practices in patent cases.

“Senators from both sides of the aisle have expressed concern that case assignment procedures … might, in effect, enable the plaintiff to select a particular judge to hear a case,” Roberts said. During the patent-case study, the Court Administration and Case Management Committee (CACM) determined that similar issues might occur in bankruptcy and other types of civil litigation. Public debate grew when several highly controversial lawsuits, seeking nationwide injunctions against federal government policies, were filed in single-judge court divisions.

In submitting the proposed policy to the Judicial Conference, the CACM Committee said that some local case assignment plans risked creating an appearance of “judge shopping.” The committee also noted that the value of trying a civil case in the nearest court division becomes less important when the impact of a ruling might be felt statewide or even nationally.

The amended policy applies to cases involving state or federal laws, rules, regulations, policies, or executive branch orders. District courts may continue to assign cases to a single-judge division when they do not seek to bar or mandate state or federal actions, whether by declaratory judgment and/or any form of injunctive relief.

In addition to the Judiciary policy, the CACM committee will disseminate guidance to all district courts regarding civil case assignment.

The  26-member Judicial Conference  is the policy-making body for the federal court system. By statute, the Chief Justice of the United States serves as its presiding officer and its members are the chief judges of the 13 courts of appeals, a district judge from each of the 12 geographic circuits, and the chief judge of the Court of International Trade.

The Conference convenes twice a year to consider administrative and policy issues affecting the court system.

Related Topics:  Judicial Conference of the United States

Texas federal court will not adopt policy against 'judge shopping'

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Reporting by Nate Raymond in Boston; Editing by Bill Berkrot

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Nate Raymond reports on the federal judiciary and litigation. He can be reached at [email protected].

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Texas Bankruptcy Court Sticks to Judge Practice Others Banished

By Evan Ochsner

One of the most popular bankruptcy courts in the US still employs a case assignment system that others have cut off, despite growing complaints the method provides unfair advantages to bankrupt companies.

The US Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas assigns large, complex Chapter 11 cases to one of two judges. The practice, which gives top bankruptcy law firms predictability about who will be handling a case, has led to accusations the court encourages, and rewards, venue shopping—accusations only growing louder after one of the two judges on the panel was forced to resign under an ethics scandal.

“Judge shopping has already damaged public confidence in the fairness of the judicial system, particularly given the ethics scandal unfolding in the Southern District of Texas, and it is time for that to be restored,” professors and other bankruptcy experts wrote to the federal judiciary.

The issue has been in the spotlight after the government last month alleged California-based drug developer Sorrento Therapeutics blatantly manufactured a connection to Houston so it could file its bankruptcy in the Texas court.

But changing the system is complicated. Under bankruptcy law, the judge assigned to the case is the one who decides whether the company’s venue choice is appropriate.

For judges, handling the biggest cases can bring prestige, influence, and more business for the local bar that the judge likely came up through. Turning cases away over venue concerns could threaten their popularity.

In the case of Sorrento, the judge overseeing the bankruptcy rejected the government’s complaints Monday. His decision narrowly focused on the timeliness of the complaint, offering no clear resolution to the broader dispute over venue shopping at Houston’s two-judge bankruptcy panel.

“His decision only serves to foster further distrust of the federal judiciary’s willingness to impartially and fairly dispense justice to all,” said Bruce Markell, a Northwestern University professor and former bankruptcy judge.

Now, advocates have called on the Southern District of Texas to follow the lead of the Eastern District of Virginia and Southern District of New York, which have started randomly assigning cases to a large panel of judges, even as the change dented the courts’ popularity among law firms deciding where to file their clients’ cases.

“The rules in Houston with the complex panel are the exception, not the norm,” Arnold & Porter restructuring partner Tyler Nurnberg said.

District Court Death Knell

Some debate whether venue-shopping is even a problem, with debtors’ attorneys often arguing the best judges should be tapped to handle the hardest cases. Proponents of venue flexibility say it lets companies file in courts that allow them to maximize the value they can distribute to creditors.

But critics of the two-judge bankruptcy court panel in Texas say it encourages egregious venue-shopping through predictable judge assignments, allowing companies and their lawyers to pick judges that will give them the most favorable outcomes and skewing cases against creditors.

The question is how to change it. Outside of bankruptcy courts, the Judicial Conference of the US, which oversees federal courts, on Tuesday changed its policies to limit “the ability of litigants to effectively choose judges” when filing a lawsuit in order to secure more favorable rulings.

Random case assignment “promotes the impartiality of proceedings and bolsters public confidence in the federal Judiciary,” Judge Robert J. Conrad, Jr., secretary of the conference, said in a release.

In the Eastern District of Virginia, it was the local district court that decided to intervene to curb a two-judge panel in Richmond. The bankruptcy court there was becoming more popular, with Toys “R” Us and J. Crew filing there between 2017 and 2020.

But Judge David J. Novak of the US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia excoriated the panel in a 2022 opinion for too eagerly handing out litigation releases to non-bankrupt people and entities, drawing more debtors to Richmond.

“The practice of regularly approving third-party releases and the related concerns about forum shopping call into question public confidence in the manner that these cases are being handled by the bankruptcy court in the Richmond division,” Novak wrote.

Novak went further, making the court less attractive to out-of-town business by tying fees in one case to market rates in Richmond, rather than the higher rates charged by attorneys coming in from larger markets. His order was quickly followed by a bankruptcy court rule change to randomly assign large cases , and resulted in a steep decline in major Chapter 11 cases in the district.

“There was a lot of pressure from that on the Eastern District of Virginia, and honestly that has probably been a cautionary tale for Texas” about not curbing new filings, said Robert Miller, a bankruptcy professor at the University of South Dakota.

Purdue Prompts Changes

Outside pressure also helped change the situation in the Southern District of New York. When Purdue Pharma filed Chapter 11 in 2019 in White Plains, New York, it ensured its case would be assigned to Judge Robert Drain, the only judge in that courthouse who heard corporate bankruptcies.

The move drew scrutiny from Congress, and a public outcry that Purdue hand-picked its judge. The Southern District of New York bankruptcy court, which also has locations in Manhattan and Poughkeepsie, in 2021 began randomly assigning large bankruptcies to judges, regardless of which courthouse the case was filed in.

At the time, Chief Judge Cecelia G. Morris said the change was related to nationwide trends. But others see it as a direct response to the criticism the court received.

“That’s a natural reaction by a court, which is very concerned about ethics and any appearance of impropriety,” said Rachel Ehrlich Albanese, co-chair of DLA Piper’s restructuring practice.

‘Perception’ of Fairness

The same outside pressure hasn’t prompted changes in Texas.

Judge Marvin Isgur, one of the founding members of the Southern District of Texas’ two-judge panel, has worried about judge-shopping in the past. Debtors at one time engaged in “divisional forum-shopping,” filing at specific courthouses within the district to steer themselves to a particular judge, Isgur said.

“We wanted this to be a situation where people came in, they took a draw, it’s a two-judge draw, but it’s still two,” Isgur said on an American Bankruptcy Institute podcast in 2022. “And so we changed it to where it doesn’t matter what division you pick. You can’t hand-pick your judge under our rules. And it’s important. I want the perception, not just the reality of fairness.”

Isgur’s chambers declined an interview request for this story. His podcast comments appear to be related to a 2018 rule that said any complex Chapter 11 case “will be assigned on a consolidated docket across all divisions within the Southern District of Texas,” and randomly assigned to one of the two complex case judges.

But that change still isn’t as broad as the random assignments adopted by other courts. And the situation didn’t change after David R. Jones, one of the two judges on the complex case panel, resigned after revelations his live-in girlfriend worked for a bankruptcy firm with business before his court.

“The SDTX bankruptcy court is ‘selling’ its venue, and part of its unique selling proposition is a guaranty of case assignment to one of two judges who want to attract mega cases and understand the need to ‘sell’ the venue to debtors,” Georgetown bankruptcy professor Adam Levitin has written . Levitin pointed to comments Jones made saying he was concerned about developing the next generation of bankruptcy lawyers in Texas.

The exact motivations for the formation of Texas’s panel remain an open question. But they might not be that relevant, said Boston College professor Edith Hotchkiss.

“Did they set out to increase their own business? I don’t know,” Hotchkiss said. “Did they increase their business? Absolutely.”

“The end result is what you have to, I think, be concerned about,” she added.

James Nani in New York also contributed to this story.

To contact the reporter on this story: Evan Ochsner in Washington at [email protected]

To contact the editors responsible for this story: Maria Chutchian at [email protected] ; Anna Yukhananov at [email protected]

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