thesis and antithesis hegel

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Hegel’s Dialectics

“Dialectics” is a term used to describe a method of philosophical argument that involves some sort of contradictory process between opposing sides. In what is perhaps the most classic version of “dialectics”, the ancient Greek philosopher, Plato (see entry on Plato ), for instance, presented his philosophical argument as a back-and-forth dialogue or debate, generally between the character of Socrates, on one side, and some person or group of people to whom Socrates was talking (his interlocutors), on the other. In the course of the dialogues, Socrates’ interlocutors propose definitions of philosophical concepts or express views that Socrates challenges or opposes. The back-and-forth debate between opposing sides produces a kind of linear progression or evolution in philosophical views or positions: as the dialogues go along, Socrates’ interlocutors change or refine their views in response to Socrates’ challenges and come to adopt more sophisticated views. The back-and-forth dialectic between Socrates and his interlocutors thus becomes Plato’s way of arguing against the earlier, less sophisticated views or positions and for the more sophisticated ones later.

“Hegel’s dialectics” refers to the particular dialectical method of argument employed by the 19th Century German philosopher, G.W.F. Hegel (see entry on Hegel ), which, like other “dialectical” methods, relies on a contradictory process between opposing sides. Whereas Plato’s “opposing sides” were people (Socrates and his interlocutors), however, what the “opposing sides” are in Hegel’s work depends on the subject matter he discusses. In his work on logic, for instance, the “opposing sides” are different definitions of logical concepts that are opposed to one another. In the Phenomenology of Spirit , which presents Hegel’s epistemology or philosophy of knowledge, the “opposing sides” are different definitions of consciousness and of the object that consciousness is aware of or claims to know. As in Plato’s dialogues, a contradictory process between “opposing sides” in Hegel’s dialectics leads to a linear evolution or development from less sophisticated definitions or views to more sophisticated ones later. The dialectical process thus constitutes Hegel’s method for arguing against the earlier, less sophisticated definitions or views and for the more sophisticated ones later. Hegel regarded this dialectical method or “speculative mode of cognition” (PR §10) as the hallmark of his philosophy and used the same method in the Phenomenology of Spirit [PhG], as well as in all of the mature works he published later—the entire Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences (including, as its first part, the “Lesser Logic” or the Encyclopaedia Logic [EL]), the Science of Logic [SL], and the Philosophy of Right [PR].

Note that, although Hegel acknowledged that his dialectical method was part of a philosophical tradition stretching back to Plato, he criticized Plato’s version of dialectics. He argued that Plato’s dialectics deals only with limited philosophical claims and is unable to get beyond skepticism or nothingness (SL-M 55–6; SL-dG 34–5; PR, Remark to §31). According to the logic of a traditional reductio ad absurdum argument, if the premises of an argument lead to a contradiction, we must conclude that the premises are false—which leaves us with no premises or with nothing. We must then wait around for new premises to spring up arbitrarily from somewhere else, and then see whether those new premises put us back into nothingness or emptiness once again, if they, too, lead to a contradiction. Because Hegel believed that reason necessarily generates contradictions, as we will see, he thought new premises will indeed produce further contradictions. As he puts the argument, then,

the scepticism that ends up with the bare abstraction of nothingness or emptiness cannot get any further from there, but must wait to see whether something new comes along and what it is, in order to throw it too into the same empty abyss. (PhG-M §79)

Hegel argues that, because Plato’s dialectics cannot get beyond arbitrariness and skepticism, it generates only approximate truths, and falls short of being a genuine science (SL-M 55–6; SL-dG 34–5; PR, Remark to §31; cf. EL Remark to §81). The following sections examine Hegel’s dialectics as well as these issues in more detail.

1. Hegel’s description of his dialectical method

2. applying hegel’s dialectical method to his arguments, 3. why does hegel use dialectics, 4. is hegel’s dialectical method logical, 5. syntactic patterns and special terminology in hegel’s dialectics, english translations of key texts by hegel, english translations of other primary sources, secondary literature, other internet resources, related entries.

Hegel provides the most extensive, general account of his dialectical method in Part I of his Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences , which is often called the Encyclopaedia Logic [EL]. The form or presentation of logic, he says, has three sides or moments (EL §79). These sides are not parts of logic, but, rather, moments of “every concept”, as well as “of everything true in general” (EL Remark to §79; we will see why Hegel thought dialectics is in everything in section 3 ). The first moment—the moment of the understanding—is the moment of fixity, in which concepts or forms have a seemingly stable definition or determination (EL §80).

The second moment—the “ dialectical ” (EL §§79, 81) or “ negatively rational ” (EL §79) moment—is the moment of instability. In this moment, a one-sidedness or restrictedness (EL Remark to §81) in the determination from the moment of understanding comes to the fore, and the determination that was fixed in the first moment passes into its opposite (EL §81). Hegel describes this process as a process of “self-sublation” (EL §81). The English verb “to sublate” translates Hegel’s technical use of the German verb aufheben , which is a crucial concept in his dialectical method. Hegel says that aufheben has a doubled meaning: it means both to cancel (or negate) and to preserve at the same time (PhG §113; SL-M 107; SL-dG 81–2; cf. EL the Addition to §95). The moment of understanding sublates itself because its own character or nature—its one-sidedness or restrictedness—destabilizes its definition and leads it to pass into its opposite. The dialectical moment thus involves a process of self -sublation, or a process in which the determination from the moment of understanding sublates itself , or both cancels and preserves itself , as it pushes on to or passes into its opposite.

The third moment—the “ speculative ” or “ positively rational ” (EL §§79, 82) moment—grasps the unity of the opposition between the first two determinations, or is the positive result of the dissolution or transition of those determinations (EL §82 and Remark to §82). Here, Hegel rejects the traditional, reductio ad absurdum argument, which says that when the premises of an argument lead to a contradiction, then the premises must be discarded altogether, leaving nothing. As Hegel suggests in the Phenomenology , such an argument

is just the skepticism which only ever sees pure nothingness in its result and abstracts from the fact that this nothingness is specifically the nothingness of that from which it results . (PhG-M §79)

Although the speculative moment negates the contradiction, it is a determinate or defined nothingness because it is the result of a specific process. There is something particular about the determination in the moment of understanding—a specific weakness, or some specific aspect that was ignored in its one-sidedness or restrictedness—that leads it to fall apart in the dialectical moment. The speculative moment has a definition, determination or content because it grows out of and unifies the particular character of those earlier determinations, or is “a unity of distinct determinations ” (EL Remark to §82). The speculative moment is thus “truly not empty, abstract nothing , but the negation of certain determinations ” (EL-GSH §82). When the result “is taken as the result of that from which it emerges”, Hegel says, then it is “in fact, the true result; in that case it is itself a determinate nothingness, one which has a content” (PhG-M §79). As he also puts it, “the result is conceived as it is in truth, namely, as a determinate negation [ bestimmte Negation]; a new form has thereby immediately arisen” (PhG-M §79). Or, as he says, “[b]ecause the result, the negation, is a determinate negation [bestimmte Negation ], it has a content ” (SL-dG 33; cf. SL-M 54). Hegel’s claim in both the Phenomenology and the Science of Logic that his philosophy relies on a process of “ determinate negation [ bestimmte Negation]” has sometimes led scholars to describe his dialectics as a method or doctrine of “determinate negation” (see entry on Hegel, section on Science of Logic ; cf. Rosen 1982: 30; Stewart 1996, 2000: 41–3; Winfield 1990: 56).

There are several features of this account that Hegel thinks raise his dialectical method above the arbitrariness of Plato’s dialectics to the level of a genuine science. First, because the determinations in the moment of understanding sublate themselves , Hegel’s dialectics does not require some new idea to show up arbitrarily. Instead, the movement to new determinations is driven by the nature of the earlier determinations and so “comes about on its own accord” (PhG-P §79). Indeed, for Hegel, the movement is driven by necessity (see, e.g., EL Remarks to §§12, 42, 81, 87, 88; PhG §79). The natures of the determinations themselves drive or force them to pass into their opposites. This sense of necessity —the idea that the method involves being forced from earlier moments to later ones—leads Hegel to regard his dialectics as a kind of logic . As he says in the Phenomenology , the method’s “proper exposition belongs to logic” (PhG-M §48). Necessity—the sense of being driven or forced to conclusions—is the hallmark of “logic” in Western philosophy.

Second, because the form or determination that arises is the result of the self-sublation of the determination from the moment of understanding, there is no need for some new idea to show up from the outside. Instead, the transition to the new determination or form is necessitated by earlier moments and hence grows out of the process itself. Unlike in Plato’s arbitrary dialectics, then—which must wait around until some other idea comes in from the outside—in Hegel’s dialectics “nothing extraneous is introduced”, as he says (SL-M 54; cf. SL-dG 33). His dialectics is driven by the nature, immanence or “inwardness” of its own content (SL-M 54; cf. SL-dG 33; cf. PR §31). As he puts it, dialectics is “the principle through which alone immanent coherence and necessity enter into the content of science” (EL-GSH Remark to §81).

Third, because later determinations “sublate” earlier determinations, the earlier determinations are not completely cancelled or negated. On the contrary, the earlier determinations are preserved in the sense that they remain in effect within the later determinations. When Being-for-itself, for instance, is introduced in the logic as the first concept of ideality or universality and is defined by embracing a set of “something-others”, Being-for-itself replaces the something-others as the new concept, but those something-others remain active within the definition of the concept of Being-for-itself. The something-others must continue to do the work of picking out individual somethings before the concept of Being-for-itself can have its own definition as the concept that gathers them up. Being-for-itself replaces the something-others, but it also preserves them, because its definition still requires them to do their work of picking out individual somethings (EL §§95–6).

The concept of “apple”, for example, as a Being-for-itself, would be defined by gathering up individual “somethings” that are the same as one another (as apples). Each individual apple can be what it is (as an apple) only in relation to an “other” that is the same “something” that it is (i.e., an apple). That is the one-sidedness or restrictedness that leads each “something” to pass into its “other” or opposite. The “somethings” are thus both “something-others”. Moreover, their defining processes lead to an endless process of passing back and forth into one another: one “something” can be what it is (as an apple) only in relation to another “something” that is the same as it is, which, in turn, can be what it is (an apple) only in relation to the other “something” that is the same as it is, and so on, back and forth, endlessly (cf. EL §95). The concept of “apple”, as a Being-for-itself, stops that endless, passing-over process by embracing or including the individual something-others (the apples) in its content. It grasps or captures their character or quality as apples . But the “something-others” must do their work of picking out and separating those individual items (the apples) before the concept of “apple”—as the Being-for-itself—can gather them up for its own definition. We can picture the concept of Being-for-itself like this:

Later concepts thus replace, but also preserve, earlier concepts.

Fourth, later concepts both determine and also surpass the limits or finitude of earlier concepts. Earlier determinations sublate themselves —they pass into their others because of some weakness, one-sidedness or restrictedness in their own definitions. There are thus limitations in each of the determinations that lead them to pass into their opposites. As Hegel says, “that is what everything finite is: its own sublation” (EL-GSH Remark to §81). Later determinations define the finiteness of the earlier determinations. From the point of view of the concept of Being-for-itself, for instance, the concept of a “something-other” is limited or finite: although the something-others are supposed to be the same as one another, the character of their sameness (e.g., as apples) is captured only from above, by the higher-level, more universal concept of Being-for-itself. Being-for-itself reveals the limitations of the concept of a “something-other”. It also rises above those limitations, since it can do something that the concept of a something-other cannot do. Dialectics thus allows us to get beyond the finite to the universal. As Hegel puts it, “all genuine, nonexternal elevation above the finite is to be found in this principle [of dialectics]” (EL-GSH Remark to §81).

Fifth, because the determination in the speculative moment grasps the unity of the first two moments, Hegel’s dialectical method leads to concepts or forms that are increasingly comprehensive and universal. As Hegel puts it, the result of the dialectical process

is a new concept but one higher and richer than the preceding—richer because it negates or opposes the preceding and therefore contains it, and it contains even more than that, for it is the unity of itself and its opposite. (SL-dG 33; cf. SL-M 54)

Like Being-for-itself, later concepts are more universal because they unify or are built out of earlier determinations, and include those earlier determinations as part of their definitions. Indeed, many other concepts or determinations can also be depicted as literally surrounding earlier ones (cf. Maybee 2009: 73, 100, 112, 156, 193, 214, 221, 235, 458).

Finally, because the dialectical process leads to increasing comprehensiveness and universality, it ultimately produces a complete series, or drives “to completion” (SL-dG 33; cf. SL-M 54; PhG §79). Dialectics drives to the “Absolute”, to use Hegel’s term, which is the last, final, and completely all-encompassing or unconditioned concept or form in the relevant subject matter under discussion (logic, phenomenology, ethics/politics and so on). The “Absolute” concept or form is unconditioned because its definition or determination contains all the other concepts or forms that were developed earlier in the dialectical process for that subject matter. Moreover, because the process develops necessarily and comprehensively through each concept, form or determination, there are no determinations that are left out of the process. There are therefore no left-over concepts or forms—concepts or forms outside of the “Absolute”—that might “condition” or define it. The “Absolute” is thus unconditioned because it contains all of the conditions in its content, and is not conditioned by anything else outside of it. This Absolute is the highest concept or form of universality for that subject matter. It is the thought or concept of the whole conceptual system for the relevant subject matter. We can picture the Absolute Idea (EL §236), for instance—which is the “Absolute” for logic—as an oval that is filled up with and surrounds numerous, embedded rings of smaller ovals and circles, which represent all of the earlier and less universal determinations from the logical development (cf. Maybee 2009: 30, 600):

Since the “Absolute” concepts for each subject matter lead into one another, when they are taken together, they constitute Hegel’s entire philosophical system, which, as Hegel says, “presents itself therefore as a circle of circles” (EL-GSH §15). We can picture the entire system like this (cf. Maybee 2009: 29):

Together, Hegel believes, these characteristics make his dialectical method genuinely scientific. As he says, “the dialectical constitutes the moving soul of scientific progression” (EL-GSH Remark to §81). He acknowledges that a description of the method can be more or less complete and detailed, but because the method or progression is driven only by the subject matter itself, this dialectical method is the “only true method” (SL-M 54; SL-dG 33).

So far, we have seen how Hegel describes his dialectical method, but we have yet to see how we might read this method into the arguments he offers in his works. Scholars often use the first three stages of the logic as the “textbook example” (Forster 1993: 133) to illustrate how Hegel’s dialectical method should be applied to his arguments. The logic begins with the simple and immediate concept of pure Being, which is said to illustrate the moment of the understanding. We can think of Being here as a concept of pure presence. It is not mediated by any other concept—or is not defined in relation to any other concept—and so is undetermined or has no further determination (EL §86; SL-M 82; SL-dG 59). It asserts bare presence, but what that presence is like has no further determination. Because the thought of pure Being is undetermined and so is a pure abstraction, however, it is really no different from the assertion of pure negation or the absolutely negative (EL §87). It is therefore equally a Nothing (SL-M 82; SL-dG 59). Being’s lack of determination thus leads it to sublate itself and pass into the concept of Nothing (EL §87; SL-M 82; SL-dG 59), which illustrates the dialectical moment.

But if we focus for a moment on the definitions of Being and Nothing themselves, their definitions have the same content. Indeed, both are undetermined, so they have the same kind of undefined content. The only difference between them is “something merely meant ” (EL-GSH Remark to §87), namely, that Being is an undefined content, taken as or meant to be presence, while Nothing is an undefined content, taken as or meant to be absence. The third concept of the logic—which is used to illustrate the speculative moment—unifies the first two moments by capturing the positive result of—or the conclusion that we can draw from—the opposition between the first two moments. The concept of Becoming is the thought of an undefined content, taken as presence (Being) and then taken as absence (Nothing), or taken as absence (Nothing) and then taken as presence (Being). To Become is to go from Being to Nothing or from Nothing to Being, or is, as Hegel puts it, “the immediate vanishing of the one in the other” (SL-M 83; cf. SL-dG 60). The contradiction between Being and Nothing thus is not a reductio ad absurdum , or does not lead to the rejection of both concepts and hence to nothingness—as Hegel had said Plato’s dialectics does (SL-M 55–6; SL-dG 34–5)—but leads to a positive result, namely, to the introduction of a new concept—the synthesis—which unifies the two, earlier, opposed concepts.

We can also use the textbook Being-Nothing-Becoming example to illustrate Hegel’s concept of aufheben (to sublate), which, as we saw, means to cancel (or negate) and to preserve at the same time. Hegel says that the concept of Becoming sublates the concepts of Being and Nothing (SL-M 105; SL-dG 80). Becoming cancels or negates Being and Nothing because it is a new concept that replaces the earlier concepts; but it also preserves Being and Nothing because it relies on those earlier concepts for its own definition. Indeed, it is the first concrete concept in the logic. Unlike Being and Nothing, which had no definition or determination as concepts themselves and so were merely abstract (SL-M 82–3; SL-dG 59–60; cf. EL Addition to §88), Becoming is a “ determinate unity in which there is both Being and Nothing” (SL-M 105; cf. SL-dG 80). Becoming succeeds in having a definition or determination because it is defined by, or piggy-backs on, the concepts of Being and Nothing.

This “textbook” Being-Nothing-Becoming example is closely connected to the traditional idea that Hegel’s dialectics follows a thesis-antithesis-synthesis pattern, which, when applied to the logic, means that one concept is introduced as a “thesis” or positive concept, which then develops into a second concept that negates or is opposed to the first or is its “antithesis”, which in turn leads to a third concept, the “synthesis”, that unifies the first two (see, e.g., McTaggert 1964 [1910]: 3–4; Mure 1950: 302; Stace, 1955 [1924]: 90–3, 125–6; Kosek 1972: 243; E. Harris 1983: 93–7; Singer 1983: 77–79). Versions of this interpretation of Hegel’s dialectics continue to have currency (e.g., Forster 1993: 131; Stewart 2000: 39, 55; Fritzman 2014: 3–5). On this reading, Being is the positive moment or thesis, Nothing is the negative moment or antithesis, and Becoming is the moment of aufheben or synthesis—the concept that cancels and preserves, or unifies and combines, Being and Nothing.

We must be careful, however, not to apply this textbook example too dogmatically to the rest of Hegel’s logic or to his dialectical method more generally (for a classic criticism of the thesis-antithesis-synthesis reading of Hegel’s dialectics, see Mueller 1958). There are other places where this general pattern might describe some of the transitions from stage to stage, but there are many more places where the development does not seem to fit this pattern very well. One place where the pattern seems to hold, for instance, is where the Measure (EL §107)—as the combination of Quality and Quantity—transitions into the Measureless (EL §107), which is opposed to it, which then in turn transitions into Essence, which is the unity or combination of the two earlier sides (EL §111). This series of transitions could be said to follow the general pattern captured by the “textbook example”: Measure would be the moment of the understanding or thesis, the Measureless would be the dialectical moment or antithesis, and Essence would be the speculative moment or synthesis that unifies the two earlier moments. However, before the transition to Essence takes place, the Measureless itself is redefined as a Measure (EL §109)—undercutting a precise parallel with the textbook Being-Nothing-Becoming example, since the transition from Measure to Essence would not follow a Measure-Measureless-Essence pattern, but rather a Measure-(Measureless?)-Measure-Essence pattern.

Other sections of Hegel’s philosophy do not fit the triadic, textbook example of Being-Nothing-Becoming at all, as even interpreters who have supported the traditional reading of Hegel’s dialectics have noted. After using the Being-Nothing-Becoming example to argue that Hegel’s dialectical method consists of “triads” whose members “are called the thesis, antithesis, synthesis” (Stace 1955 [1924]: 93), W.T. Stace, for instance, goes on to warn us that Hegel does not succeed in applying this pattern throughout the philosophical system. It is hard to see, Stace says, how the middle term of some of Hegel’s triads are the opposites or antitheses of the first term, “and there are even ‘triads’ which contain four terms!” (Stace 1955 [1924]: 97). As a matter of fact, one section of Hegel’s logic—the section on Cognition—violates the thesis-antithesis-synthesis pattern because it has only two sub-divisions, rather than three. “The triad is incomplete”, Stace complains. “There is no third. Hegel here abandons the triadic method. Nor is any explanation of his having done so forthcoming” (Stace 1955 [1924]: 286; cf. McTaggart 1964 [1910]: 292).

Interpreters have offered various solutions to the complaint that Hegel’s dialectics sometimes seems to violate the triadic form. Some scholars apply the triadic form fairly loosely across several stages (e.g. Burbidge 1981: 43–5; Taylor 1975: 229–30). Others have applied Hegel’s triadic method to whole sections of his philosophy, rather than to individual stages. For G.R.G. Mure, for instance, the section on Cognition fits neatly into a triadic, thesis-antithesis-synthesis account of dialectics because the whole section is itself the antithesis of the previous section of Hegel’s logic, the section on Life (Mure 1950: 270). Mure argues that Hegel’s triadic form is easier to discern the more broadly we apply it. “The triadic form appears on many scales”, he says, “and the larger the scale we consider the more obvious it is” (Mure 1950: 302).

Scholars who interpret Hegel’s description of dialectics on a smaller scale—as an account of how to get from stage to stage—have also tried to explain why some sections seem to violate the triadic form. J.N. Findlay, for instance—who, like Stace, associates dialectics “with the triad , or with triplicity ”—argues that stages can fit into that form in “more than one sense” (Findlay 1962: 66). The first sense of triplicity echoes the textbook, Being-Nothing-Becoming example. In a second sense, however, Findlay says, the dialectical moment or “contradictory breakdown” is not itself a separate stage, or “does not count as one of the stages”, but is a transition between opposed, “but complementary”, abstract stages that “are developed more or less concurrently” (Findlay 1962: 66). This second sort of triplicity could involve any number of stages: it “could readily have been expanded into a quadruplicity, a quintuplicity and so forth” (Findlay 1962: 66). Still, like Stace, he goes on to complain that many of the transitions in Hegel’s philosophy do not seem to fit the triadic pattern very well. In some triads, the second term is “the direct and obvious contrary of the first”—as in the case of Being and Nothing. In other cases, however, the opposition is, as Findlay puts it, “of a much less extreme character” (Findlay 1962: 69). In some triads, the third term obviously mediates between the first two terms. In other cases, however, he says, the third term is just one possible mediator or unity among other possible ones; and, in yet other cases, “the reconciling functions of the third member are not at all obvious” (Findlay 1962: 70).

Let us look more closely at one place where the “textbook example” of Being-Nothing-Becoming does not seem to describe the dialectical development of Hegel’s logic very well. In a later stage of the logic, the concept of Purpose goes through several iterations, from Abstract Purpose (EL §204), to Finite or Immediate Purpose (EL §205), and then through several stages of a syllogism (EL §206) to Realized Purpose (EL §210). Abstract Purpose is the thought of any kind of purposiveness, where the purpose has not been further determined or defined. It includes not just the kinds of purposes that occur in consciousness, such as needs or drives, but also the “internal purposiveness” or teleological view proposed by the ancient Greek philosopher, Aristotle (see entry on Aristotle ; EL Remark to §204), according to which things in the world have essences and aim to achieve (or have the purpose of living up to) their essences. Finite Purpose is the moment in which an Abstract Purpose begins to have a determination by fixing on some particular material or content through which it will be realized (EL §205). The Finite Purpose then goes through a process in which it, as the Universality, comes to realize itself as the Purpose over the particular material or content (and hence becomes Realized Purpose) by pushing out into Particularity, then into Singularity (the syllogism U-P-S), and ultimately into ‘out-thereness,’ or into individual objects out there in the world (EL §210; cf. Maybee 2009: 466–493).

Hegel’s description of the development of Purpose does not seem to fit the textbook Being-Nothing-Becoming example or the thesis-antithesis-synthesis model. According to the example and model, Abstract Purpose would be the moment of understanding or thesis, Finite Purpose would be the dialectical moment or antithesis, and Realized Purpose would be the speculative moment or synthesis. Although Finite Purpose has a different determination from Abstract Purpose (it refines the definition of Abstract Purpose), it is hard to see how it would qualify as strictly “opposed” to or as the “antithesis” of Abstract Purpose in the way that Nothing is opposed to or is the antithesis of Being.

There is an answer, however, to the criticism that many of the determinations are not “opposites” in a strict sense. The German term that is translated as “opposite” in Hegel’s description of the moments of dialectics (EL §§81, 82)— entgegensetzen —has three root words: setzen (“to posit or set”), gegen , (“against”), and the prefix ent -, which indicates that something has entered into a new state. The verb entgegensetzen can therefore literally be translated as “to set over against”. The “ engegengesetzte ” into which determinations pass, then, do not need to be the strict “opposites” of the first, but can be determinations that are merely “set against” or are different from the first ones. And the prefix ent -, which suggests that the first determinations are put into a new state, can be explained by Hegel’s claim that the finite determinations from the moment of understanding sublate (cancel but also preserve) themselves (EL §81): later determinations put earlier determinations into a new state by preserving them.

At the same time, there is a technical sense in which a later determination would still be the “opposite” of the earlier determination. Since the second determination is different from the first one, it is the logical negation of the first one, or is not -the-first-determination. If the first determination is “e”, for instance, because the new determination is different from that one, the new one is “not-e” (Kosek 1972: 240). Since Finite Purpose, for instance, has a definition or determination that is different from the definition that Abstract Purpose has, it is not -Abstract-Purpose, or is the negation or opposite of Abstract Purpose in that sense. There is therefore a technical, logical sense in which the second concept or form is the “opposite” or negation of—or is “not”—the first one—though, again, it need not be the “opposite” of the first one in a strict sense.

Other problems remain, however. Because the concept of Realized Purpose is defined through a syllogistic process, it is itself the product of several stages of development (at least four, by my count, if Realized Purpose counts as a separate determination), which would seem to violate a triadic model. Moreover, the concept of Realized Purpose does not, strictly speaking, seem to be the unity or combination of Abstract Purpose and Finite Purpose. Realized Purpose is the result of (and so unifies) the syllogistic process of Finite Purpose, through which Finite Purpose focuses on and is realized in a particular material or content. Realized Purpose thus seems to be a development of Finite Purpose, rather than a unity or combination of Abstract Purpose and Finite Purpose, in the way that Becoming can be said to be the unity or combination of Being and Nothing.

These sorts of considerations have led some scholars to interpret Hegel’s dialectics in a way that is implied by a more literal reading of his claim, in the Encyclopaedia Logic , that the three “sides” of the form of logic—namely, the moment of understanding, the dialectical moment, and the speculative moment—“are moments of each [or every; jedes ] logically-real , that is each [or every; jedes ] concept” (EL Remark to §79; this is an alternative translation). The quotation suggests that each concept goes through all three moments of the dialectical process—a suggestion reinforced by Hegel’s claim, in the Phenomenology , that the result of the process of determinate negation is that “a new form has thereby immediately arisen” (PhG-M §79). According to this interpretation, the three “sides” are not three different concepts or forms that are related to one another in a triad—as the textbook Being-Nothing-Becoming example suggests—but rather different momentary sides or “determinations” in the life, so to speak, of each concept or form as it transitions to the next one. The three moments thus involve only two concepts or forms: the one that comes first, and the one that comes next (examples of philosophers who interpret Hegel’s dialectics in this second way include Maybee 2009; Priest 1989: 402; Rosen 2014: 122, 132; and Winfield 1990: 56).

For the concept of Being, for example, its moment of understanding is its moment of stability, in which it is asserted to be pure presence. This determination is one-sided or restricted however, because, as we saw, it ignores another aspect of Being’s definition, namely, that Being has no content or determination, which is how Being is defined in its dialectical moment. Being thus sublates itself because the one-sidedness of its moment of understanding undermines that determination and leads to the definition it has in the dialectical moment. The speculative moment draws out the implications of these moments: it asserts that Being (as pure presence) implies nothing. It is also the “unity of the determinations in their comparison [ Entgegensetzung ]” (EL §82; alternative translation): since it captures a process from one to the other, it includes Being’s moment of understanding (as pure presence) and dialectical moment (as nothing or undetermined), but also compares those two determinations, or sets (- setzen ) them up against (- gegen ) each other. It even puts Being into a new state (as the prefix ent - suggests) because the next concept, Nothing, will sublate (cancel and preserve) Being.

The concept of Nothing also has all three moments. When it is asserted to be the speculative result of the concept of Being, it has its moment of understanding or stability: it is Nothing, defined as pure absence, as the absence of determination. But Nothing’s moment of understanding is also one-sided or restricted: like Being, Nothing is also an undefined content, which is its determination in its dialectical moment. Nothing thus sublates itself : since it is an undefined content , it is not pure absence after all, but has the same presence that Being did. It is present as an undefined content . Nothing thus sublates Being: it replaces (cancels) Being, but also preserves Being insofar as it has the same definition (as an undefined content) and presence that Being had. We can picture Being and Nothing like this (the circles have dashed outlines to indicate that, as concepts, they are each undefined; cf. Maybee 2009: 51):

In its speculative moment, then, Nothing implies presence or Being, which is the “unity of the determinations in their comparison [ Entgegensetzung ]” (EL §82; alternative translation), since it both includes but—as a process from one to the other—also compares the two earlier determinations of Nothing, first, as pure absence and, second, as just as much presence.

The dialectical process is driven to the next concept or form—Becoming—not by a triadic, thesis-antithesis-synthesis pattern, but by the one-sidedness of Nothing—which leads Nothing to sublate itself—and by the implications of the process so far. Since Being and Nothing have each been exhaustively analyzed as separate concepts, and since they are the only concepts in play, there is only one way for the dialectical process to move forward: whatever concept comes next will have to take account of both Being and Nothing at the same time. Moreover, the process revealed that an undefined content taken to be presence (i.e., Being) implies Nothing (or absence), and that an undefined content taken to be absence (i.e., Nothing) implies presence (i.e., Being). The next concept, then, takes Being and Nothing together and draws out those implications—namely, that Being implies Nothing, and that Nothing implies Being. It is therefore Becoming, defined as two separate processes: one in which Being becomes Nothing, and one in which Nothing becomes Being. We can picture Becoming this way (cf. Maybee 2009: 53):

In a similar way, a one-sidedness or restrictedness in the determination of Finite Purpose together with the implications of earlier stages leads to Realized Purpose. In its moment of understanding, Finite Purpose particularizes into (or presents) its content as “ something-presupposed ” or as a pre-given object (EL §205). I go to a restaurant for the purpose of having dinner, for instance, and order a salad. My purpose of having dinner particularizes as a pre-given object—the salad. But this object or particularity—e.g. the salad—is “inwardly reflected” (EL §205): it has its own content—developed in earlier stages—which the definition of Finite Purpose ignores. We can picture Finite Purpose this way:

In the dialectical moment, Finite Purpose is determined by the previously ignored content, or by that other content. The one-sidedness of Finite Purpose requires the dialectical process to continue through a series of syllogisms that determines Finite Purpose in relation to the ignored content. The first syllogism links the Finite Purpose to the first layer of content in the object: the Purpose or universality (e.g., dinner) goes through the particularity (e.g., the salad) to its content, the singularity (e.g., lettuce as a type of thing)—the syllogism U-P-S (EL §206). But the particularity (e.g., the salad) is itself a universality or purpose, “which at the same time is a syllogism within itself [ in sich ]” (EL Remark to §208; alternative translation), in relation to its own content. The salad is a universality/purpose that particularizes as lettuce (as a type of thing) and has its singularity in this lettuce here—a second syllogism, U-P-S. Thus, the first singularity (e.g., “lettuce” as a type of thing)—which, in this second syllogism, is the particularity or P —“ judges ” (EL §207) or asserts that “ U is S ”: it says that “lettuce” as a universality ( U ) or type of thing is a singularity ( S ), or is “this lettuce here”, for instance. This new singularity (e.g. “this lettuce here”) is itself a combination of subjectivity and objectivity (EL §207): it is an Inner or identifying concept (“lettuce”) that is in a mutually-defining relationship (the circular arrow) with an Outer or out-thereness (“this here”) as its content. In the speculative moment, Finite Purpose is determined by the whole process of development from the moment of understanding—when it is defined by particularizing into a pre-given object with a content that it ignores—to its dialectical moment—when it is also defined by the previously ignored content. We can picture the speculative moment of Finite Purpose this way:

Finite Purpose’s speculative moment leads to Realized Purpose. As soon as Finite Purpose presents all the content, there is a return process (a series of return arrows) that establishes each layer and redefines Finite Purpose as Realized Purpose. The presence of “this lettuce here” establishes the actuality of “lettuce” as a type of thing (an Actuality is a concept that captures a mutually-defining relationship between an Inner and an Outer [EL §142]), which establishes the “salad”, which establishes “dinner” as the Realized Purpose over the whole process. We can picture Realized Purpose this way:

If Hegel’s account of dialectics is a general description of the life of each concept or form, then any section can include as many or as few stages as the development requires. Instead of trying to squeeze the stages into a triadic form (cf. Solomon 1983: 22)—a technique Hegel himself rejects (PhG §50; cf. section 3 )—we can see the process as driven by each determination on its own account: what it succeeds in grasping (which allows it to be stable, for a moment of understanding), what it fails to grasp or capture (in its dialectical moment), and how it leads (in its speculative moment) to a new concept or form that tries to correct for the one-sidedness of the moment of understanding. This sort of process might reveal a kind of argument that, as Hegel had promised, might produce a comprehensive and exhaustive exploration of every concept, form or determination in each subject matter, as well as raise dialectics above a haphazard analysis of various philosophical views to the level of a genuine science.

We can begin to see why Hegel was motivated to use a dialectical method by examining the project he set for himself, particularly in relation to the work of David Hume and Immanuel Kant (see entries on Hume and Kant ). Hume had argued against what we can think of as the naïve view of how we come to have scientific knowledge. According to the naïve view, we gain knowledge of the world by using our senses to pull the world into our heads, so to speak. Although we may have to use careful observations and do experiments, our knowledge of the world is basically a mirror or copy of what the world is like. Hume argued, however, that naïve science’s claim that our knowledge corresponds to or copies what the world is like does not work. Take the scientific concept of cause, for instance. According to that concept of cause, to say that one event causes another is to say that there is a necessary connection between the first event (the cause) and the second event (the effect), such that, when the first event happens, the second event must also happen. According to naïve science, when we claim (or know) that some event causes some other event, our claim mirrors or copies what the world is like. It follows that the necessary, causal connection between the two events must itself be out there in the world. However, Hume argued, we never observe any such necessary causal connection in our experience of the world, nor can we infer that one exists based on our reasoning (see Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature , Book I, Part III, Section II; Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding , Section VII, Part I). There is nothing in the world itself that our idea of cause mirrors or copies.

Kant thought Hume’s argument led to an unacceptable, skeptical conclusion, and he rejected Hume’s own solution to the skepticism (see Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason , B5, B19–20). Hume suggested that our idea of causal necessity is grounded merely in custom or habit, since it is generated by our own imaginations after repeated observations of one sort of event following another sort of event (see Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature , Book I, Section VI; Hegel also rejected Hume’s solution, see EL §39). For Kant, science and knowledge should be grounded in reason, and he proposed a solution that aimed to reestablish the connection between reason and knowledge that was broken by Hume’s skeptical argument. Kant’s solution involved proposing a Copernican revolution in philosophy ( Critique of Pure Reason , Bxvi). Nicholas Copernicus was the Polish astronomer who said that the earth revolves around the sun, rather than the other way around. Kant proposed a similar solution to Hume’s skepticism. Naïve science assumes that our knowledge revolves around what the world is like, but, Hume’s criticism argued, this view entails that we cannot then have knowledge of scientific causes through reason. We can reestablish a connection between reason and knowledge, however, Kant suggested, if we say—not that knowledge revolves around what the world is like—but that knowledge revolves around what we are like . For the purposes of our knowledge, Kant said, we do not revolve around the world—the world revolves around us. Because we are rational creatures, we share a cognitive structure with one another that regularizes our experiences of the world. This intersubjectively shared structure of rationality—and not the world itself—grounds our knowledge.

However, Kant’s solution to Hume’s skepticism led to a skeptical conclusion of its own that Hegel rejected. While the intersubjectively shared structure of our reason might allow us to have knowledge of the world from our perspective, so to speak, we cannot get outside of our mental, rational structures to see what the world might be like in itself. As Kant had to admit, according to his theory, there is still a world in itself or “Thing-in-itself” ( Ding an sich ) about which we can know nothing (see, e.g., Critique of Pure Reason , Bxxv–xxvi). Hegel rejected Kant’s skeptical conclusion that we can know nothing about the world- or Thing-in-itself, and he intended his own philosophy to be a response to this view (see, e.g., EL §44 and the Remark to §44).

How did Hegel respond to Kant’s skepticism—especially since Hegel accepted Kant’s Copernican revolution, or Kant’s claim that we have knowledge of the world because of what we are like, because of our reason? How, for Hegel, can we get out of our heads to see the world as it is in itself? Hegel’s answer is very close to the ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle’s response to Plato. Plato argued that we have knowledge of the world only through the Forms. The Forms are perfectly universal, rational concepts or ideas. Because the world is imperfect, however, Plato exiled the Forms to their own realm. Although things in the world get their definitions by participating in the Forms, those things are, at best, imperfect copies of the universal Forms (see, e.g., Parmenides 131–135a). The Forms are therefore not in this world, but in a separate realm of their own. Aristotle argued, however, that the world is knowable not because things in the world are imperfect copies of the Forms, but because the Forms are in things themselves as the defining essences of those things (see, e.g., De Anima [ On the Soul ], Book I, Chapter 1 [403a26–403b18]; Metaphysics , Book VII, Chapter 6 [1031b6–1032a5] and Chapter 8 [1033b20–1034a8]).

In a similar way, Hegel’s answer to Kant is that we can get out of our heads to see what the world is like in itself—and hence can have knowledge of the world in itself—because the very same rationality or reason that is in our heads is in the world itself . As Hegel apparently put it in a lecture, the opposition or antithesis between the subjective and objective disappears by saying, as the Ancients did,

that nous governs the world, or by our own saying that there is reason in the world, by which we mean that reason is the soul of the world, inhabits it, and is immanent in it, as it own, innermost nature, its universal. (EL-GSH Addition 1 to §24)

Hegel used an example familiar from Aristotle’s work to illustrate this view:

“to be an animal”, the kind considered as the universal, pertains to the determinate animal and constitutes its determinate essentiality. If we were to deprive a dog of its animality we could not say what it is. (EL-GSH Addition 1 to §24; cf. SL-dG 16–17, SL-M 36-37)

Kant’s mistake, then, was that he regarded reason or rationality as only in our heads, Hegel suggests (EL §§43–44), rather than in both us and the world itself (see also below in this section and section 4 ). We can use our reason to have knowledge of the world because the very same reason that is in us, is in the world itself as it own defining principle. The rationality or reason in the world makes reality understandable, and that is why we can have knowledge of, or can understand, reality with our rationality. Dialectics—which is Hegel’s account of reason—characterizes not only logic, but also “everything true in general” (EL Remark to §79).

But why does Hegel come to define reason in terms of dialectics, and hence adopt a dialectical method? We can begin to see what drove Hegel to adopt a dialectical method by returning once again to Plato’s philosophy. Plato argued that we can have knowledge of the world only by grasping the Forms, which are perfectly universal, rational concepts or ideas. Because things in the world are so imperfect, however, Plato concluded that the Forms are not in this world, but in a realm of their own. After all, if a human being were perfectly beautiful, for instance, then he or she would never become not-beautiful. But human beings change, get old, and die, and so can be, at best, imperfect copies of the Form of beauty—though they get whatever beauty they have by participating in that Form. Moreover, for Plato, things in the world are such imperfect copies that we cannot gain knowledge of the Forms by studying things in the world, but only through reason, that is, only by using our rationality to access the separate realm of the Forms (as Plato argued in the well-known parable of the cave; Republic , Book 7, 514–516b).

Notice, however, that Plato’s conclusion that the Forms cannot be in this world and so must be exiled to a separate realm rests on two claims. First, it rests on the claim that the world is an imperfect and messy place—a claim that is hard to deny. But it also rests on the assumption that the Forms—the universal, rational concepts or ideas of reason itself—are static and fixed, and so cannot grasp the messiness within the imperfect world. Hegel is able to link reason back to our messy world by changing the definition of reason. Instead of saying that reason consists of static universals, concepts or ideas, Hegel says that the universal concepts or forms are themselves messy . Against Plato, Hegel’s dialectical method allows him to argue that universal concepts can “overgrasp” (from the German verb übergreifen ) the messy, dialectical nature of the world because they, themselves, are dialectical . Moreover, because later concepts build on or sublate (cancel, but also preserve) earlier concepts, the later, more universal concepts grasp the dialectical processes of earlier concepts. As a result, higher-level concepts can grasp not only the dialectical nature of earlier concepts or forms, but also the dialectical processes that make the world itself a messy place. The highest definition of the concept of beauty, for instance, would not take beauty to be fixed and static, but would include within it the dialectical nature or finiteness of beauty, the idea that beauty becomes, on its own account, not-beauty. This dialectical understanding of the concept of beauty can then overgrasp the dialectical and finite nature of beauty in the world, and hence the truth that, in the world, beautiful things themselves become not-beautiful, or might be beautiful in one respect and not another. Similarly, the highest determination of the concept of “tree” will include within its definition the dialectical process of development and change from seed to sapling to tree. As Hegel says, dialectics is “the principle of all natural and spiritual life” (SL-M 56; SL-dG 35), or “the moving soul of scientific progression” (EL §81). Dialectics is what drives the development of both reason as well as of things in the world. A dialectical reason can overgrasp a dialectical world.

Two further journeys into the history of philosophy will help to show why Hegel chose dialectics as his method of argument. As we saw, Hegel argues against Kant’s skepticism by suggesting that reason is not only in our heads, but in the world itself. To show that reason is in the world itself, however, Hegel has to show that reason can be what it is without us human beings to help it. He has to show that reason can develop on its own, and does not need us to do the developing for it (at least for those things in the world that are not human-created). As we saw (cf. section 1 ), central to Hegel’s dialectics is the idea that concepts or forms develop on their own because they “self-sublate”, or sublate (cancel and preserve) themselves , and so pass into subsequent concepts or forms on their own accounts, because of their own, dialectical natures. Thus reason, as it were, drives itself, and hence does not need our heads to develop it. Hegel needs an account of self-driving reason to get beyond Kant’s skepticism.

Ironically, Hegel derives the basic outlines of his account of self-driving reason from Kant. Kant divided human rationality into two faculties: the faculty of the understanding and the faculty of reason. The understanding uses concepts to organize and regularize our experiences of the world. Reason’s job is to coordinate the concepts and categories of the understanding by developing a completely unified, conceptual system, and it does this work, Kant thought, on its own, independently of how those concepts might apply to the world. Reason coordinates the concepts of the understanding by following out necessary chains of syllogisms to produce concepts that achieve higher and higher levels of conceptual unity. Indeed, this process will lead reason to produce its own transcendental ideas, or concepts that go beyond the world of experience. Kant calls this necessary, concept-creating reason “speculative” reason (cf. Critique of Pure Reason , Bxx–xxi, A327/B384). Reason creates its own concepts or ideas—it “speculates”—by generating new and increasingly comprehensive concepts of its own, independently of the understanding. In the end, Kant thought, reason will follow out such chains of syllogisms until it develops completely comprehensive or unconditioned universals—universals that contain all of the conditions or all of the less-comprehensive concepts that help to define them. As we saw (cf. section 1 ), Hegel’s dialectics adopts Kant’s notion of a self-driving and concept-creating “speculative” reason, as well as Kant’s idea that reason aims toward unconditioned universality or absolute concepts.

Ultimately, Kant thought, reasons’ necessary, self-driving activity will lead it to produce contradictions—what he called the “antinomies”, which consist of a thesis and antithesis. Once reason has generated the unconditioned concept of the whole world, for instance, Kant argued, it can look at the world in two, contradictory ways. In the first antinomy, reason can see the world (1) as the whole totality or as the unconditioned, or (2) as the series of syllogisms that led up to that totality. If reason sees the world as the unconditioned or as a complete whole that is not conditioned by anything else, then it will see the world as having a beginning and end in terms of space and time, and so will conclude (the thesis) that the world has a beginning and end or limit. But if reason sees the world as the series, in which each member of the series is conditioned by the previous member, then the world will appear to be without a beginning and infinite, and reason will conclude (the antithesis) that the world does not have a limit in terms of space and time (cf. Critique of Pure Reason , A417–18/B445–6). Reason thus leads to a contradiction: it holds both that the world has a limit and that it does not have a limit at the same time. Because reason’s own process of self-development will lead it to develop contradictions or to be dialectical in this way, Kant thought that reason must be kept in check by the understanding. Any conclusions that reason draws that do not fall within the purview of the understanding cannot be applied to the world of experience, Kant said, and so cannot be considered genuine knowledge ( Critique of Pure Reason , A506/B534).

Hegel adopts Kant’s dialectical conception of reason, but he liberates reason for knowledge from the tyranny of the understanding. Kant was right that reason speculatively generates concepts on its own, and that this speculative process is driven by necessity and leads to concepts of increasing universality or comprehensiveness. Kant was even right to suggest—as he had shown in the discussion of the antinomies—that reason is dialectical, or necessarily produces contradictions on its own. Again, Kant’s mistake was that he fell short of saying that these contradictions are in the world itself. He failed to apply the insights of his discussion of the antinomies to “ things in themselves ” (SL-M 56; SL-dG 35; see also section 4 ). Indeed, Kant’s own argument proves that the dialectical nature of reason can be applied to things themselves. The fact that reason develops those contradictions on its own, without our heads to help it , shows that those contradictions are not just in our heads, but are objective, or in the world itself. Kant, however, failed to draw this conclusion, and continued to regard reason’s conclusions as illusions. Still, Kant’s philosophy vindicated the general idea that the contradictions he took to be illusions are both objective—or out there in the world—and necessary. As Hegel puts it, Kant vindicates the general idea of “the objectivity of the illusion and the necessity of the contradiction which belongs to the nature of thought determinations” (SL-M 56; cf. SL-dG 35), or to the nature of concepts themselves.

The work of Johann Gottlieb Fichte (see entry on Fichte ) showed Hegel how dialectics can get beyond Kant—beyond the contradictions that, as Kant had shown, reason (necessarily) develops on its own, beyond the reductio ad absurdum argument (which, as we saw above, holds that a contradiction leads to nothingness), and beyond Kant’s skepticism, or Kant’s claim that reason’s contradictions must be reined in by the understanding and cannot count as knowledge. Fichte argued that the task of discovering the foundation of all human knowledge leads to a contradiction or opposition between the self and the not-self (it is not important, for our purposes, why Fichte held this view). The kind of reasoning that leads to this contradiction, Fichte said, is the analytical or antithetical method of reasoning, which involves drawing out an opposition between elements (in this case, the self and not-self) that are being compared to, or equated with, one another. While the traditional reductio ad absurdum argument would lead us to reject both sides of the contradiction and start from scratch, Fichte argued that the contradiction or opposition between the self and not-self can be resolved. In particular, the contradiction is resolved by positing a third concept—the concept of divisibility—which unites the two sides ( The Science of Knowledge , I: 110–11; Fichte 1982: 108–110). The concept of divisibility is produced by a synthetic procedure of reasoning, which involves “discovering in opposites the respect in which they are alike ” ( The Science of Knowledge , I: 112–13; Fichte 1982: 111). Indeed, Fichte argued, not only is the move to resolve contradictions with synthetic concepts or judgments possible, it is necessary . As he says of the move from the contradiction between self and not-self to the synthetic concept of divisibility,

there can be no further question as to the possibility of this [synthesis], nor can any ground for it be given; it is absolutely possible, and we are entitled to it without further grounds of any kind. ( The Science of Knowledge , I: 114; Fichte 1982: 112)

Since the analytical method leads to oppositions or contradictions, he argued, if we use only analytic judgments, “we not only do not get very far, as Kant says; we do not get anywhere at all” ( The Science of Knowledge , I: 113; Fichte 1982: 112). Without the synthetic concepts or judgments, we are left, as the classic reductio ad absurdum argument suggests, with nothing at all. The synthetic concepts or judgments are thus necessary to get beyond contradiction without leaving us with nothing.

Fichte’s account of the synthetic method provides Hegel with the key to moving beyond Kant. Fichte suggested that a synthetic concept that unifies the results of a dialectically-generated contradiction does not completely cancel the contradictory sides, but only limits them. As he said, in general, “[t]o limit something is to abolish its reality, not wholly , but in part only” ( The Science of Knowledge , I: 108; Fichte 1982: 108). Instead of concluding, as a reductio ad absurdum requires, that the two sides of a contradiction must be dismissed altogether, the synthetic concept or judgment retroactively justifies the opposing sides by demonstrating their limit, by showing which part of reality they attach to and which they do not ( The Science of Knowledge , I: 108–10; Fichte 1982: 108–9), or by determining in what respect and to what degree they are each true. For Hegel, as we saw (cf. section 1 ), later concepts and forms sublate—both cancel and preserve —earlier concepts and forms in the sense that they include earlier concepts and forms in their own definitions. From the point of view of the later concepts or forms, the earlier ones still have some validity, that is, they have a limited validity or truth defined by the higher-level concept or form.

Dialectically generated contradictions are therefore not a defect to be reigned in by the understanding, as Kant had said, but invitations for reason to “speculate”, that is, for reason to generate precisely the sort of increasingly comprehensive and universal concepts and forms that Kant had said reason aims to develop. Ultimately, Hegel thought, as we saw (cf. section 1 ), the dialectical process leads to a completely unconditioned concept or form for each subject matter—the Absolute Idea (logic), Absolute Spirit (phenomenology), Absolute Idea of right and law ( Philosophy of Right ), and so on—which, taken together, form the “circle of circles” (EL §15) that constitutes the whole philosophical system or “Idea” (EL §15) that both overgrasps the world and makes it understandable (for us).

Note that, while Hegel was clearly influenced by Fichte’s work, he never adopted Fichte’s triadic “thesis—antithesis—synthesis” language in his descriptions of his own philosophy (Mueller 1958: 411–2; Solomon 1983: 23), though he did apparently use it in his lectures to describe Kant’s philosophy (LHP III: 477). Indeed, Hegel criticized formalistic uses of the method of “ triplicity [Triplizität]” (PhG-P §50) inspired by Kant—a criticism that could well have been aimed at Fichte. Hegel argued that Kantian-inspired uses of triadic form had been reduced to “a lifeless schema” and “an actual semblance [ eigentlichen Scheinen ]” (PhG §50; alternative translation) that, like a formula in mathematics, was simply imposed on top of subject matters. Instead, a properly scientific use of Kant’s “triplicity” should flow—as he said his own dialectical method did (see section 1 )—out of “the inner life and self-movement” (PhG §51) of the content.

Scholars have often questioned whether Hegel’s dialectical method is logical. Some of their skepticism grows out of the role that contradiction plays in his thought and argument. While many of the oppositions embedded in the dialectical development and the definitions of concepts or forms are not contradictions in the strict sense, as we saw ( section 2 , above), scholars such as Graham Priest have suggested that some of them arguably are (Priest 1989: 391). Hegel even holds, against Kant (cf. section 3 above), that there are contradictions, not only in thought, but also in the world. Motion, for instance, Hegel says, is an “ existent contradiction”. As he describes it:

Something moves, not because now it is here and there at another now, but because in one and the same now it is here and not here, because in this here, it is and is not at the same time. (SL-dG 382; cf. SL-M 440)

Kant’s sorts of antinomies (cf. section 3 above) or contradictions more generally are therefore, as Hegel puts it in one place, “in all objects of all kinds, in all representations, concepts and ideas” (EL-GSH Remark to §48). Hegel thus seems to reject, as he himself explicitly claims (SL-M 439–40; SL-dG 381–82), the law of non-contradiction, which is a fundamental principle of formal logic—the classical, Aristotelian logic (see entries on Aristotle’s Logic and Contradiction ) that dominated during Hegel’s lifetime as well as the dominant systems of symbolic logic today (cf. Priest 1989: 391; Düsing 2010: 97–103). According to the law of non-contradiction, something cannot be both true and false at the same time or, put another way, “x” and “not-x” cannot both be true at the same time.

Hegel’s apparent rejection of the law of non-contradiction has led some interpreters to regard his dialectics as illogical, even “absurd” (Popper 1940: 420; 1962: 330; 2002: 443). Karl R. Popper, for instance, argued that accepting Hegel’s and other dialecticians’ rejection of the law of non-contradiction as part of both a logical theory and a general theory of the world “would mean a complete breakdown of science” (Popper 1940: 408; 1962: 317; 2002: 426). Since, according to today’s systems of symbolic logic, he suggested, the truth of a contradiction leads logically to any claim (any claim can logically be inferred from two contradictory claims), if we allow contradictory claims to be valid or true together, then we would have no reason to rule out any claim whatsoever (Popper 1940: 408–410; 1962: 317–319; 2002: 426–429).

Popper was notoriously hostile toward Hegel’s work (cf. Popper 2013: 242–289; for a scathing criticism of Popper’s analysis see Kaufmann 1976 [1972]), but, as Priest has noted (Priest 1989: 389–91), even some sympathetic interpreters have been inspired by today’s dominant systems of symbolic logic to hold that the kind of contradiction that is embedded in Hegel’s dialectics cannot be genuine contradiction in the strict sense. While Dieter Wandschneider, for instance, grants that his sympathetic theory of dialectic “is not presented as a faithful interpretation of the Hegelian text” (Wandschneider 2010: 32), he uses the same logical argument that Popper offered in defense of the claim that “dialectical contradiction is not a ‘normal’ contradiction, but one that is actually only an apparent contradiction” (Wandschneider 2010: 37). The suggestion (by the traditional, triadic account of Hegel’s dialectics, cf. section 2 , above) that Being and Nothing (or non-being) is a contradiction, for instance, he says, rests on an ambiguity. Being is an undefined content, taken to mean being or presence, while Nothing is an undefined content, taken to mean nothing or absence ( section 2 , above; cf. Wandschneider 2010: 34–35). Being is Nothing (or non-being) with respect to the property they have as concepts, namely, that they both have an undefined content. But Being is not Nothing (or non-being) with respect to their meaning (Wandschneider 2010: 34–38). The supposed contradiction between them, then, Wandschneider suggests, takes place “in different respects ”. It is therefore only an apparent contradiction. “Rightly understood”, he concludes, “there can be no talk of contradiction ” (Wandschneider 2010: 38).

Inoue Kazumi also argues that dialectical contradiction in the Hegelian sense does not violate the law of non-contradiction (Inoue 2014: 121–123), and he rejects Popper’s claim that Hegel’s dialectical method is incompatible with good science. A dialectical contradiction, Inoue says, is a contradiction that arises when the same topic is considered from different vantage points, but each vantage point by itself does not violate the law of non-contradiction (Inoue 2014: 120). The understanding leads to contradictions, as Hegel said (cf. section 3 above), because it examines a topic from a fixed point of view; reason embraces contradictions because it examines a topic from multiple points of view (Inoue 2014: 121). The geocentric theory that the sun revolves around the Earth and the heliocentric theory that the Earth revolves around the sun, for instance, Inoue suggests, are both correct from certain points of view. We live our everyday lives from a vantage point in which the sun makes a periodic rotation around the Earth roughly every 24 hours. Astronomers make their observations from a geocentric point of view and then translate those observations into a heliocentric one. From these points of view, the geocentric account is not incorrect. But physics, particularly in its concepts of mass and force, requires the heliocentric account. For science—which takes all these points of view into consideration—both theories are valid: they are dialectically contradictory, though neither theory, by itself, violates the law of non-contradiction (Inoue 2014: 126–127). To insist that the Earth really revolves around the sun is merely an irrational, reductive prejudice, theoretically and practically (Inoue 2014: 126). Dialectical contradictions, Inoue says, are, as Hegel said, constructive: they lead to concepts or points of view that grasp the world from ever wider and more encompassing perspectives, culminating ultimately in the “Absolute” (Inoue 2014: 121; cf. section 1 , above). Hegel’s claim that motion violates the law of non-contradiction, Inoue suggests, is an expression of the idea that contradictory claims can be true when motion is described from more than one point of view (Inoue 2014: 123). (For a similar reading of Hegel’s conception of dialectical contradiction, which influenced Inoue’s account [Inoue 2014: 121], see Düsing 2010: 102–103.)

Other interpreters, however, have been inspired by Hegel’s dialectics to develop alternative systems of logic that do not subscribe to the law of non-contradiction. Priest, for instance, has defended Hegel’s rejection of the law of non-contradiction (cf. Priest 1989; 1997 [2006: 4]). The acceptance of some contradictions, he has suggested, does not require the acceptance of all contradictions (Priest 1989: 392). Popper’s logical argument is also unconvincing. Contradictions lead logically to any claim whatsoever, as Popper said, only if we presuppose that nothing can be both true and false at the same time (i.e. only if we presuppose that the law of non-contradiction is correct), which is just what Hegel denies. Popper’s logical argument thus assumes what it is supposed to prove or begs the question (Priest 1989: 392; 1997 [2006: 5–6]), and so is not convincing. Moreover, consistency (not allowing contradictions), Priest suggests, is actually “a very weak constraint” (Priest 1997 [2006: 104]) on what counts as a rational inference. Other principles or criteria—such as being strongly disproved (or supported) by the data—are more important for determining whether a claim or inference is rational (Priest 1997 [2006: 105]). And, as Hegel pointed out, Priest says, the data—namely, “the world as it appears ” (as Hegel puts it in EL) or “ordinary experience itself” (as Hegel puts it in SL)—suggest that there are indeed contradictions (EL Remark to §48; SL-dG 382; cf. SL-M 440; Priest 1989: 389, 399–400). Hegel is right, for instance, Priest argues, that change, and motion in particular, are examples of real or existing contradictions (Priest 1985; 1989: 396–97; 1997 [2006: 172–181, 213–15]). What distinguishes motion, as a process, from a situation in which something is simply here at one time and then some other place at some other time is the embodiment of contradiction: that, in a process of motion, there is one (span of) time in which something is both here and not here at the same time (in that span of time) (Priest 1985: 340–341; 1997 [2006: 172–175, 213–214]). A system of logic, Priest suggests, is always just a theory about what good reasoning should be like (Priest 1989: 392). A dialectical logic that admits that there are “dialetheia” or true contradictions (Priest 1989: 388), he says, is a broader theory or version of logic than traditional, formal logics that subscribe to the law of non-contradiction. Those traditional logics apply only to topics or domains that are consistent, primarily domains that are “static and changeless” (Priest 1989: 391; cf. 395); dialectical/dialetheic logic handles consistent domains, but also applies to domains in which there are dialetheia. Thus Priest, extending Hegel’s own concept of aufheben (“to sublate”; cf. section 1 , above), suggests that traditional “formal logic is perfectly valid in its domain, but dialectical (dialetheic) logic is more general” (Priest 1989: 395). (For an earlier example of a logical system that allows contradiction and was inspired in part by Hegel [and Marx], see Jaśkowski 1999: 36 [1969: 143] [cf. Inoue 2014: 128–129]. For more on dialetheic logic generally, see the entry on Dialetheism .)

Worries that Hegel’s arguments fail to fit his account of dialectics (see section 2 , above) have led some interpreters to conclude that his method is arbitrary or that his works have no single dialectical method at all (Findlay 1962: 93; Solomon 1983: 21). These interpreters reject the idea that there is any logical necessity to the moves from stage to stage. “[T]he important point to make here, and again and again”, Robert C. Solomon writes, for instance,

is that the transition from the first form to the second, or the transition from the first form of the Phenomenology all the way to the last, is not in any way a deductive necessity. The connections are anything but entailments, and the Phenomenology could always take another route and other starting points. (Solomon 1983: 230)

In a footnote to this passage, Solomon adds “that a formalization of Hegel’s logic, however ingenious, is impossible” (Solomon 1983: 230).

Some scholars have argued that Hegel’s necessity is not intended to be logical necessity. Walter Kaufmann suggested, for instance, that the necessity at work in Hegel’s dialectic is a kind of organic necessity. The moves in the Phenomenology , he said, follow one another “in the way in which, to use a Hegelian image from the preface, bud, blossom and fruit succeed each other” (Kaufmann 1965: 148; 1966: 132). Findlay argued that later stages provide what he called a “ higher-order comment ” on earlier stages, even if later stages do not follow from earlier ones in a trivial way (Findlay 1966: 367). Solomon suggested that the necessity that Hegel wants is not “‘necessity’ in the modern sense of ‘logical necessity,’” (Solomon 1983: 209), but a kind of progression (Solomon 1983: 207), or a “necessity within a context for some purpose ” (Solomon 1983: 209). John Burbidge defines Hegel’s necessity in terms of three senses of the relationship between actuality and possibility, only the last of which is logical necessity (Burbidge 1981: 195–6).

Other scholars have defined the necessity of Hegel’s dialectics in terms of a transcendental argument. A transcendental argument begins with uncontroversial facts of experience and tries to show that other conditions must be present—or are necessary—for those facts to be possible. Jon Stewart argues, for instance, that “Hegel’s dialectic in the Phenomenology is a transcendental account” in this sense, and thus has the necessity of that form of argument (Stewart 2000: 23; cf. Taylor 1975: 97, 226–7; for a critique of this view, see Pinkard 1988: 7, 15).

Some scholars have avoided these debates by interpreting Hegel’s dialectics in a literary way. In his examination of the epistemological theory of the Phenomenology , for instance, Kenneth R. Westphal offers “a literary model” of Hegel’s dialectics based on the story of Sophocles’ play Antigone (Westphal 2003: 14, 16). Ermanno Bencivenga offers an interpretation that combines a narrative approach with a concept of necessity. For him, the necessity of Hegel’s dialectical logic can be captured by the notion of telling a good story—where “good” implies that the story is both creative and correct at the same time (Bencivenga 2000: 43–65).

Debate over whether Hegel’s dialectical logic is logical may also be fueled in part by discomfort with his particular brand of logic. Unlike today’s symbolic logics, Hegel’s logic is not only syntactic, but also semantic (cf. Berto 2007; Maybee 2009: xx–xxv; Margolis 2010: 193–94). Hegel’s interest in semantics appears, for instance, in the very first stages of his logic, where the difference between Being and Nothing is “something merely meant ” (EL-GSH Remark to §87; cf. section 2 above). While some of the moves from stage to stage are driven by syntactic necessity, other moves are driven by the meanings of the concepts in play. Indeed, Hegel rejected what he regarded as the overly formalistic logics that dominated the field during his day (EL Remark to §162; SL-M 43–44; SL-dG 24). A logic that deals only with the forms of logical arguments and not the meanings of the concepts used in those argument forms will do no better in terms of preserving truth than the old joke about computer programs suggests: garbage in, garbage out. In those logics, if we (using today’s versions of formal, symbolic logic) plug in something for the P or Q (in the proposition “if P then Q ” or “ P → Q ”, for instance) or for the “ F ”, “ G ”, or “ x ” (in the proposition “if F is x , then G is x ” or “ F x → G x ”, for instance) that means something true, then the syntax of formal logics will preserve that truth. But if we plug in something for those terms that is untrue or meaningless (garbage in), then the syntax of formal logic will lead to an untrue or meaningless conclusion (garbage out). Today’s versions of prepositional logic also assume that we know what the meaning of “is” is. Against these sorts of logics, Hegel wanted to develop a logic that not only preserved truth, but also determined how to construct truthful claims in the first place. A logic that defines concepts (semantics) as well as their relationships with one another (syntax) will show, Hegel thought, how concepts can be combined into meaningful forms. Because interpreters are familiar with modern logics focused on syntax, however, they may regard Hegel’s syntactic and semantic logic as not really logical (cf. Maybee 2009: xvii–xxv).

In Hegel’s other works, the moves from stage to stage are often driven, not only by syntax and semantics—that is, by logic (given his account of logic)—but also by considerations that grow out of the relevant subject matter. In the Phenomenology , for instance, the moves are driven by syntax, semantics, and by phenomenological factors. Sometimes a move from one stage to the next is driven by a syntactic need—the need to stop an endless, back-and-forth process, for instance, or to take a new path after all the current options have been exhausted (cf. section 5 ). Sometimes, a move is driven by the meaning of a concept, such as the concept of a “This” or “Thing”. And sometimes a move is driven by a phenomenological need or necessity—by requirements of consciousness , or by the fact that the Phenomenology is about a consciousness that claims to be aware of (or to know) something. The logic of the Phenomenology is thus a phenomeno -logic, or a logic driven by logic—syntax and semantics—and by phenomenological considerations. Still, interpreters such as Quentin Lauer have suggested that, for Hegel,

phenomeno-logy is a logic of appearing, a logic of implication, like any other logic, even though not of the formal entailment with which logicians and mathematicians are familiar. (Lauer 1976: 3)

Lauer warns us against dismissing the idea that there is any implication or necessity in Hegel’s method at all (Lauer 1976: 3). (Other scholars who also believe there is a logical necessity to the dialectics of the Phenomenology include Hyppolite 1974: 78–9 and H.S. Harris 1997: xii.)

We should also be careful not to exaggerate the “necessity” of formal, symbolic logics. Even in these logics, there can often be more than one path from some premises to the same conclusion, logical operators can be dealt with in different orders, and different sets of operations can be used to reach the same conclusions. There is therefore often no strict, necessary “entailment” from one step to the next, even though the conclusion might be entailed by the whole series of steps, taken together. As in today’s logics, then, whether Hegel’s dialectics counts as logical depends on the degree to which he shows that we are forced—necessarily—from earlier stages or series of stages to later stages (see also section 5 ).

Although Hegel’s dialectics is driven by syntax, semantics and considerations specific to the different subject matters ( section 4 above), several important syntactic patterns appear repeatedly throughout his works. In many places, the dialectical process is driven by a syntactic necessity that is really a kind of exhaustion: when the current strategy has been exhausted, the process is forced, necessarily, to employ a new strategy. As we saw ( section 2 ), once the strategy of treating Being and Nothing as separate concepts is exhausted, the dialectical process must, necessarily, adopt a different strategy, namely, one that takes the two concepts together. The concept of Becoming captures the first way in which Being and Nothing are taken together. In the stages of Quantum through Number, the concepts of One and Many take turns defining the whole quantity as well as the quantitative bits inside that make it up: first, the One is the whole, while the Many are the bits; then the whole and the bits are all Ones; then the Many is the whole, while the bits are each a One; and finally the whole and the bits are all a Many. We can picture the development like this (cf. Maybee 2009, xviii–xix):

Since One and Many have been exhausted, the next stage, Ratio, must, necessarily, employ a different strategy to grasp the elements in play. Just as Being-for-itself is a concept of universality for Quality and captures the character of a set of something-others in its content (see section 1 ), so Ratio (the whole rectangle with rounded corners) is a concept of universality for Quantity and captures the character of a set of quantities in its content (EL §105–6; cf. Maybee 2009, xviii–xix, 95–7). In another version of syntactic necessity driven by exhaustion, the dialectical development will take account of every aspect or layer, so to speak, of a concept or form—as we saw in the stages of Purpose outlined above, for instance ( section 2 ). Once all the aspects or layers of a concept or form have been taken account of and so exhausted, the dialectical development must also, necessarily, employ a different strategy in the next stage to grasp the elements in play.

In a second, common syntactic pattern, the dialectical development leads to an endless, back-and-forth process—a “bad” (EL-BD §94) or “spurious” (EL-GSH §94) infinity—between two concepts or forms. Hegel’s dialectics cannot rest with spurious infinities. So long as the dialectical process is passing endlessly back and forth between two elements, it is never finished, and the concept or form in play cannot be determined. Spurious infinities must therefore be resolved or stopped, and they are always resolved by a higher-level, more universal concept. In some cases, a new, higher-level concept is introduced that stops the spurious infinity by grasping the whole, back-and-forth process. Being-for-itself (cf. section 1 ), for instance, is introduced as a new, more universal concept that embraces—and hence stops—the whole, back-and-forth process between “something-others”. However, if the back-and-forth process takes place between a concept and its own content—in which case the concept already embraces the content—then that embracing concept is redefined in a new way that grasps the whole, back-and-forth process. The new definition raises the embracing concept to a higher level of universality—as a totality (an “all”) or as a complete and completed concept. Examples from logic include the redefinition of Appearance as the whole World of Appearance (EL §132; cf. SL-M 505–7, SL-dG 443–4), the move in which the endless, back-and-forth process of Real Possibility redefines the Condition as a totality (EL §147; cf. SL-M 547, SL-dG 483), and the move in which a back-and-forth process created by finite Cognition and finite Willing redefines the Subjective Idea as Absolute Idea (EL §§234–5; cf. SL-M 822–3, SL-dG 733–4).

Some of the most famous terms in Hegel’s works—“in itself [ an sich ]”, “for itself [ für sich ]” and “in and for itself [ an und für sich ]”—capture other, common, syntactic patterns. A concept or form is “in itself” when it has a determination that it gets by being defined against its “other” (cf. Being-in-itself, EL §91). A concept or form is “for itself” when it is defined only in relation to its own content, so that, while it is technically defined in relation to an “other”, the “other” is not really an “other” for it. As a result, it is really defined only in relation to itself. Unlike an “in itself” concept or form, then, a “for itself” concept or form seems to have its definition on its own, or does not need a genuine “other” to be defined (like other concepts or forms, however, “for itself” concepts or forms turn out to be dialectical too, and hence push on to new concepts or forms). In the logic, Being-for-itself (cf. section 1 ), which is defined by embracing the “something others” in its content, is the first, “for itself” concept or form.

A concept or form is “in and for itself” when it is doubly “for itself”, or “for itself” not only in terms of content —insofar as it embraces its content—but also in terms of form or presentation, insofar as it also has the activity of presenting its content. It is “for itself” (embraces its content) for itself (through its own activity), or not only embraces its content (the “for itself” of content) but also presents its content through its own activity (the “for itself” of form). The second “for itself” of form provides the concept with a logical activity (i.e., presenting its content) and hence a definition that goes beyond—and so is separate from—the definition that its content has. Since it has a definition of its own that is separate from the definition of its content, it comes to be defined—in the “in itself” sense— against its content, which has become its “other”. Because this “other” is still its own content, however, the concept or form is both “in itself” but also still “for itself” at the same time, or is “in and for itself” (EL §§148–9; cf. Maybee 2009: 244–6). The “in and for itself” relationship is the hallmark of a genuine Concept (EL §160), and captures the idea that a genuine concept is defined not only from the bottom up by its content, but also from the top down through its own activity of presenting its content. The genuine concept of animal, for instance, is not only defined by embracing its content (namely, all animals) from the bottom up, but also has a definition of its own, separate from that content, that leads it to determine (and so present), from the top down, what counts as an animal.

Other technical, syntactic terms include aufheben (“to sublate”), which we already saw ( section 1 ), and “abstract”. To say that a concept or form is “abstract” is to say that it is only a partial definition. Hegel describes the moment of understanding, for instance, as abstract (EL §§79, 80) because it is a one-sided or restricted definition or determination ( section 1 ). Conversely, a concept or form is “concrete” in the most basic sense when it has a content or definition that it gets from being built out of other concepts or forms. As we saw ( section 2 ), Hegel regarded Becoming as the first concrete concept in the logic.

Although Hegel’s writing and his use of technical terms can make his philosophy notoriously difficult, his work can also be very rewarding. In spite of—or perhaps because of—the difficulty, there are a surprising number of fresh ideas in his work that have not yet been fully explored in philosophy.

• [EL], The Encyclopedia Logic [Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften I] . Because the translations of EL listed below use the same section numbers as well as sub-paragraphs (“Remarks”) and sub-sub-paragraphs (“Additions”), citations simply to “EL” refer to either translation. If the phrasing in English is unique to a specific translation, the translators’ initials are added.
• [EL-BD], Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline Part I: Science of Logic [Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften I] , translated by Klaus Brinkmann and Daniel O. Dahlstrom, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
• [EL-GSH], The Encyclopedia Logic: Part 1 of the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences [Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften I] , translated by T.F. Geraets, W.A. Suchting, and H.S. Harris, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991.
• [LHP], Lectures on the History of Philosophy [Geschichte der Philosophie] , in three volumes, translated by E.S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1974.
• [PhG], Phenomenology of Spirit [Phänomenologie des Geistes] . Because the translations of PhG listed below use the same section numbers, citations simply to “PhG” refer to either translation. If the phrasing in English is unique to a specific translation, the translator’s initial is added.
• [PhG-M], Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit [Phänomenologie des Geistes] , translated by A.V. Miller, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.
• [PhG-P], Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: The Phenomenology of Spirit [Phänomenologie des Geistes] , translated and edited by Terry Pinkard, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018.
• [PR], Elements of the Philosophy of Right [Philosophie des Rechts] , edited by Allen W. Wood and translated by H.B. Nisbet, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
• [SL-dG], Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: The Science of Logic [Wissenschaft der Logik] , translated by George di Giovanni, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
• [SL-M], Hegel’s Science of Logic [Wissenschaft der Logik] , translated by A.V. Miller, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.
• Aristotle, 1954, The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation (in two volumes), edited by Jonathan Barnes. Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Citations to Aristotle’s text use the Bekker numbers, which appear in the margins of many translations of Aristotle’s works.)
• Fichte, J.G., 1982 [1794/95], The Science of Knowledge , translated by Peter Heath and John Lachs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Citations to Fichte’s work include references to the volume and page number in the German edition of Fichte’s collected works edited by I.H Fichte, which are used in the margins of many translations of Fichte’s works.)
• Kant, Immanuel, 1999 [1781], Critique of Pure Reason , translated and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Citations to Kant’s text use the “Ak.” numbers, which appear in the margins of many translations of Kant’s works.)
• Plato, 1961, The Collected Dialogues of Plato: Including the Letters , edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Citations to Plato’s text use the Stephanus numbers, which appear in the margins of many translations of Plato’s works.)
• Bencivenga, Ermanno, 2000, Hegel’s Dialectical Logic , New York: Oxford University Press.
• Berto, Francesco, 2007, “Hegel’s Dialectics as a Semantic Theory: An Analytic Reading”, European Journal of Philosophy , 15(1): 19–39.
• Burbidge, John, 1981, On Hegel’s Logic: Fragments of a Commentary , Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press.
• Düsing, Klaus, 2010, “Ontology and Dialectic in Hegel’s Thought”, translated by Andrés Colapinto, in The Dimensions of Hegel’s Dialectic , Nectarios G. Limmnatis (ed.), London: Continuum, pp. 97–122.
• Findlay, J.N., 1962, Hegel: A Re-Examination , New York: Collier Books.
• –––, 1966, Review of Hegel: Reinterpretation, Texts, and Commentary , by Walter Kaufmann. The Philosophical Quarterly , 16(65): 366–68.
• Forster, Michael, 1993, “Hegel’s Dialectical Method”, in The Cambridge Companion to Hegel , Frederick C. Beiser (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 130–170.
• Fritzman, J.M., 2014, Hegel , Cambridge: Polity Press.
• Harris, Errol E., 1983, An Interpretation of the Logic of Hegel , Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
• Harris, H.S. (Henry Silton), 1997, Hegel’s Ladder (in two volumes: vol. I, The Pilgrimage of Reason , and vol. II, The Odyssey of Spirit ), Indianapolis, IN: Hackett).
• Hyppolite, Jean, 1974, Genesis and Structure of Hegel’s “Phenomenology of Spirit ”, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
• Inoue, Kazumi, 2014, “Dialectical Contradictions and Classical Formal Logic”, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science , 28(2), 113–132.
• Jaśkowski, Stanislaw, 1999 [1969], “A Propositional Calculus for Inconsistent Deductive Systems”, translated by Olgierd Wojtasiewicz and A. Pietruszczak, Logic and Logical Philosophy (7)7: 35–56. (This article is a republication, with some changes, of a 1969 translation by Wojtasiewicz entitled “Propositional Calculus for Contradictory Deductive Systems (Communicated at the Meeting of March 19, 1948)”, published in Studia Logica , 24, 143–160.)
• Kaufmann, Walter Arnold, 1965, Hegel: Reinterpretation, Texts, and Commentary , Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company Inc.
• –––, 1966, A Reinterpretation , Garden City, NY: Anchor Books. (This is a republication of the first part of Hegel: Reinterpretation, Texts, and Commentary .)
• –––, 1976 [1972], “The Hegel Myth and its Method”, in Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays , Alasdair MacIntyre (ed.), Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press: 21–60. (This is a republication of the 1972 Anchor Books/Doubleday edition.)
• Kosok, Michael, 1972, “The Formalization of Hegel’s Dialectical Logic: Its Formal Structure, Logical Interpretation and Intuitive Foundation”, in Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays , Alisdair MacIntyre (ed.), Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press: 237–87.
• Lauer, Quentin, 1976, A Reading of Hegel’s “Phenomenology of Spirit” , New York: Fordham University Press.
• Margolis, Joseph, 2010, “The Greening of Hegel’s Dialectical Logic”, in The Dimensions of Hegel’s Dialectic , Nectarios G. Limmnatis (ed.), London: Continuum, pp. 193–215.
• Maybee, Julie E., 2009, Picturing Hegel: An Illustrated Guide to Hegel’s “Encyclopaedia Logic” , Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
• McTaggart, John McTaggart Ellis, 1964 [1910], A Commentary of Hegel’s Logic , New York: Russell and Russell Inc. (This edition is a reissue of McTaggart’s book, which was first published in 1910.)
• Mueller, Gustav, 1958, “The Hegel Legend of ‘Synthesis-Antithesis-Thesis’”, Journal of the History of Ideas , 19(3): 411–14.
• Mure, G.R.G., 1950, A Study of Hegel’s Logic , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Pinkard, Terry, 1988, Hegel’s Dialectic: The Explanation of a Possibility , Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
• Priest, Graham, 1985, “Inconsistencies in Motion”, American Philosophical Quarterly , 22(4): 339–346.
• –––, 1989, “Dialectic and Dialetheic”, Science and Society , 53(4): 388–415.
• –––, 1997 [2006], In Contradiction: A Study of the Transconsistent , expanded edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press; first edition, Martinus Nijhoff, 1997.
• Popper, Karl R., 1940, “What is Dialectic?”, Mind , 49(196): 403–426. (This article was reprinted, with some changes, in two different editions of Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge , listed below.)
• –––, 1962, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge , New York: Basic Books.
• –––, 2002, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge , second edition, London: Routledge Classics.
• –––, 2013, The Open Society and its Enemies , Princeton: Princeton University Press. (This is a one-volume republication of the original, two-volume edition first published by Princeton University Press in 1945.)
• Rosen, Michael, 1982, Hegel’s Dialectic and its Criticism , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Rosen, Stanley, 2014, The Idea of Hegel’s “Science of Logic” , Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
• Singer, Peter, 1983, Hegel , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Solomon, Robert C., 1983, In the Spirit of Hegel: A Study of G.W.F. Hegel’s “Phenomenology of Spirit” , New York: Oxford University Press.
• Stace, W.T., 1955 [1924], The Philosophy of Hegel: A Systematic Exposition , New York: Dover Publications. (This edition is a reprint of the first edition, published in 1924.)
• Stewart, Jon, 1996, “Hegel’s Doctrine of Determinate Negation: An Example from ‘Sense-certainty’ and ‘Perception’”, Idealistic Studies , 26(1): 57–78.
• –––, 2000, The Unity of Hegel’s “Phenomenology of Spirit”: A Systematic Interpretation , Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
• Taylor, Charles, 1975, Hegel , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Wandschneider, Dieter, 2010, “Dialectic as the ‘Self-Fulfillment’ of Logic”, translated by Anthony Jensen, in The Dimensions of Hegel’s Dialectic , Nectarios G. Limmnatis (ed.), London: Continuum, pp. 31–54.
• Westphal, Kenneth R., 2003, Hegel’s Epistemology: A Philosophical Introduction to the “Phenomenology of Spirit” , Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company.
• Winfield, Richard Dien, 1990, “The Method of Hegel’s Science of Logic ”, in Essays on Hegel’s Logic , George di Giovanni (ed.), Albany, NY: State University of New York, pp. 45–57.

How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

• Hegel on Dialectic , Philosophy Bites podcast interview with Robert Stern
• Hegel , Philosophy Talks preview video, interview notes and recorded radio interview with Allen Wood, which includes a discussion of Hegel’s dialectics

Aristotle | Aristotle, General Topics: logic | Fichte, Johann Gottlieb | Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich | Hume, David | Kant, Immanuel | Plato

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Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's dialectic is one of the most influential philosophical theories of the modern era. It has been studied and debated for centuries, and its influence can be seen in many aspects of modern thought. Hegel's dialectic has been used to explain a wide range of topics from politics to art, from science to religion. In this comprehensive overview, we will explore the major tenets of Hegel's dialectic and its implications for our understanding of the world. Hegel's dialectic is based on the premise that all things have an inherent contradiction between their opposites.

It follows that any idea or concept can be understood through a synthesis of the two opposing forces. This synthesis creates a new and higher understanding, which then leads to further progress and development. Hegel's dialectic has been used in many different fields, from philosophy to economics, and it provides an important framework for understanding how our world works. In this article, we will explore the historical origins and development of Hegel's dialectic. We will also examine its application in various fields, from politics to art, from science to religion.

Finally, we will consider the implications of Hegel's dialectic for our understanding of the world today. Hegel's dialectic is a philosophical theory developed by German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel in the early 19th century. It is based on the concept of thesis, antithesis and synthesis , which are steps in the process of progress. The thesis is an idea or statement that is the starting point of an argument. The antithesis is a statement that contradicts or negates the thesis.

The synthesis is a combination of the two opposing ideas, which produces a new idea or statement. This process can be repeated multiple times, leading to an evolution of ideas. Hegel's dialectic has been used in many fields, such as politics and economics . It has been used to explain how ideas progress through debate and discussion.

In politics, it has been used to explain how different points of view can lead to compromise or resolution. In economics, it has been used to explain how different economic theories can lead to new solutions and strategies. Hegel's dialectic can also be applied to everyday life. For example, it can be used to resolve conflicts between people or groups.

Thesis, Antithesis and Synthesis

Thesis and antithesis are two conflicting ideas, while synthesis is the result of their interaction. The dialectic process is a way of understanding how the world works, as it helps to explain the constant flux of ideas and events. It also helps to explain how change and progress are possible. Thesis and antithesis can be thought of as two sides of a coin. One side represents an idea or opinion, while the other side represents its opposite.

When the two sides come together, they create a synthesis that incorporates both sides. This synthesis can then be used to create new ideas or opinions. The dialectic process can be applied in various contexts, such as politics and economics. In politics, it can be used to explain how different factions come together to create policies that are beneficial to all parties. In economics, it can be used to explain how supply and demand interact to create a stable market. Hegel's dialectic can also be used in everyday life.

Applications of Hegel's Dialectic

For example, in the political sphere, it can be used to explore how different ideologies can be reconciled or how compromises can be reached. In economics, Hegel's dialectic has been used to explain the process of economic growth and development. It can be seen as a way of understanding how different economic systems interact with each other and how different economic actors are affected by changes in the marketplace. For example, it can help to explain how different economic policies can lead to different outcomes. Hegel's dialectic has also been applied to other social sciences, such as sociology and anthropology. In particular, it has been used to explore how different social systems interact with each other and how different social groups are affected by changes in their environment.

Using Hegel's Dialectic in Everyday Life

This process can be used to explain how various aspects of life, such as career or relationships, evolve over time. Thesis represents an idea or concept, while antithesis represents the opposite of that idea or concept. Synthesis is the resolution between the two opposing forces. This process is repeated until a conclusion is reached.

For example, in a career conflict between two people, one might present an idea while the other presents the opposite idea. Through discussion and negotiation, the two parties can come to a synthesis that meets both their needs. Hegel's dialectic can also be used to resolve conflicts between groups of people. It involves each party presenting their ideas and opinions, then engaging in dialogue to reach a compromise or agreement.

This process can be applied to any area of life, from politics and economics to relationships and personal growth. It helps to create understanding and respect between different perspectives, allowing everyone to come together in a meaningful way. By understanding and applying Hegel's dialectic in everyday life, we can better navigate our relationships and interactions with others. Through dialogue, negotiation, and compromise we can work towards resolutions that benefit all parties involved.

In economics, it has been used to explain how market forces interact with each other and how different economic theories can be used to explain the same phenomenon. The dialectic has also been used in other fields such as philosophy, science, and psychology. In philosophy, it has been used to explain the relationship between theory and practice and how theories evolve over time. In science, it has been used to explain the relationship between empirical evidence and logical reasoning.

This theory can be applied to any area of life, from career to relationships. The core of Hegel's dialectic involves the concept of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, which is a way of understanding how ideas evolve over time. In this way, the dialectic helps to identify contradictions in a situation and find a resolution through synthesis. In terms of its application to everyday life, the dialectic can be used to find common ground between two opposing sides. For example, if two people are in disagreement, the dialectic can help them identify the underlying issues and then work to resolve them.

Additionally, it can help individuals and groups identify areas where they have common interests, which can lead to more productive conversations and outcomes. The dialectic is also useful in understanding how different perspectives can lead to different solutions. By recognizing different points of view, individuals and groups can gain insight into why certain solutions may not work for everyone involved. This can help to create a more productive environment for collaboration. Finally, the dialectic can be used as a tool for self-reflection. By understanding how different ideas evolve over time and how different perspectives interact, individuals can gain insight into their own views and values.

For example, it can be used to explain the development of a new policy proposal or a new form of government. In economics, Hegel's dialectic can be used to explain the dynamics of supply and demand, or the emergence of a new economic system. In addition, Hegel's dialectic has been applied in other areas, such as education and religion. In education, this theory can be used to explain the process of learning and understanding new concepts. In religion, it can be used to explain the evolution of religious beliefs and practices over time.

This is followed by a synthesis of the two, which creates a new, higher form of understanding. This new understanding then forms the basis for further analysis, which can lead to further synthesis and resolution. Hegel's dialectic can be applied to any area of life, such as career or relationships. For example, if two people have different approaches to a problem, they can use the dialectic to work together to find a solution that works for both of them.

This could involve identifying their respective points of view and then looking for common ground where they can agree. As the synthesis forms, it can provide a basis for further discussion, which may eventually lead to a resolution. The same process can be used to resolve conflicts between groups, such as political parties or countries. By recognizing each side's point of view and then looking for common ground, it is possible to find ways to bridge the divide between them.

This can help create an atmosphere of mutual understanding and respect, which can lead to constructive dialogue and positive outcomes. Hegel's dialectic is a valuable tool for helping people and groups come to agreement and harmony despite their differences. By recognizing both sides' points of view and then looking for common ground, it is possible to create a synthesis that can provide a basis for further discussion and resolution. Hegel's dialectic is a powerful philosophical tool that helps to explain how ideas evolve over time. Through the concept of thesis, antithesis and synthesis, it provides a framework for understanding how opposing forces interact and ultimately create new ideas and solutions.

This theory has been applied to many areas, such as politics and economics, and can be used in everyday life. The article has provided a comprehensive overview of Hegel's dialectic and its various applications.

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Hegel-by-HyperText Resources

Excerpt from Hegel for Beginners

Source : Hegel for Beginners , by Llyod Spencer and Andrzej Krauze, Published by Icon Books, 14 of 175 pages reproduced here, minus the abundant illustrations.

"Classical reasoning assumes the principle of logical identity: A = A or A is not non-A".

"But in writing that book I became aware of employing a new and unprecedented way of thinking".

Dialectical Thinking

Aufhebung or sublation, a grammar of thinking.

"I liken my study of logic to the study of grammar. You only really see the rewards when you later come to observe language in use and you grasp what it is that makes the language of poetry so evocative".

Three Kinds of Contradiction

• The three divisions of the Science of Logic involve three different kinds of contradiction. In the first division Being the opposed pair of concepts at first seem flatly opposed, as if they would have nothing at all to do with one another: Being Nothing / Quantity Quality. Only be means of analysis or deduction can they be shown to be intimately interrelated.
• In the second division Essence the opposed pairs immediately imply one another. The Inner and the Outer, for example: to define one is at the same time to define the other.
• In the third division the Concept [ Notion ] we reach an altogether more sophisticated level of contradiction. Here we have concepts such as identity whose component parts, Universality and Particularity, are conceptually interrelated.

Triadic Structure

• The analytic logic of understanding which focuses the data of sense-experience to yield knowledge of the natural phenomenal world.
• The dialectical logic of understanding which operates independently of sense-experience and erroneously professes to give knowledge of the transcendent noumena ("things in themselves" or also the "infinite" or the "whole")
• Analytic understanding is only adequate for natural science and practical everyday life, not for philosophy.
• Dialectic reason s not concerned with Kant's "transcendent", nor with the abstract "mutilated" parts of reality, but with reality as a totality , and therefore gives true knowledge.

Hegel & History

Hegel’s understanding of history, jack fox-williams outlines the basics of how history works for hegel..

One of Hegel’s most interesting but misunderstood areas of enquiry concerns history, particularly his so-called ‘dialectical’ approach to understanding the development of human society. This article aims to provide a brief but useful outline of Hegel’s historical theory, and demonstrate its relevance to the modern age.

Hegel’s Classification of History

In his Introduction to Lectures on the Philosophy of World History (1837), Hegel argues that there are three ways of doing history.

The first of these is original history. Original history refers to first-hand accounts of events, actions and situations, collected or verified by the historian himself. It includes the historian’s own experiences as part of the history he’s recording. Hegel says that the purpose of original history is to create a ‘mental representation’ of phenomena. Contemporary historians aim to record recent and current events with precision and accuracy, explaining and summarising it simply.

However, as Duncan Forbes writes in his introduction to the Introduction , “the first, most primitive (that is logically primitive) kind of history, ‘original’ history, is barely history at all in so far as it represents an immediate unity between the historian’s consciousness; this sort of contemporary history is necessarily limited.” Forbes argues that it is impossible for the original historian to provide much theory on, or even reflect very comprehensively on, events he has only just witnessed. As Hegel notes, original history constitutes a ‘portrait of a time’ rather than an academic analysis of past events. Hegel cites Thucydides and Herodotus as prime examples of original historians, since their accounts constitute a “history whose spirit the historian has shared in.” Consequently, their accounts express “the maxims of their nation and their own personality, their consciousness of their political position and of their moral spiritual nature, and the principles which underlie their designs and conflict.” So by examining this sort of history, we can acquire a greater understanding of a culture’s customs, beliefs, and practices, and so penetrate into the essence of a specific period. Speeches recorded in historical accounts are uniquely valuable in this regard, since they embody a particular time and place; they constitute ‘effective actions in their very essence’, and provide us with a sense of history as it unfolded at the time. They cannot be regarded as disinterested reflections on the historical process, but as ‘integral components of history’ recorded by historians who embody the cultural consciousness of the speaker. As Hegel observes in his Introduction , “speeches are actions among human beings; indeed, they are extremely important momentous actions… Speeches on a national or international plane, issuing from nations themselves or from their sovereigns, are actions and, as such, are an essential object of history (and particularly of earlier history).”

According to Hegel, it is possible to distinguish three stages of original history. In antiquity, it was primarily statesmen (or their scribes) who recorded history. During the Middle Ages, monks assumed the role, since they had the time and education to record the world around them. Hegel observes that in his own time “all this has changed… Our culture immediately converts all events into reports for intellectual representation.”

A second type of history discussed by Hegel is reflective history . Unlike original history, reflective history is not limited to a particular timeframe. It transcends the present culture. It attempts to provide a summary of histories or historical events that have already occurred – in other words, records of a particular culture, country, or period.

Hegel separates reflective history into universal history, pragmatic history, critical history, and specialised history. Universal history aims to provide an entire history of, say, a people, or even of the world. In the case of world histories, significant events must be condensed into brief statements, and the author’s own opinions are integral to the account. Pragmatic history, on the other hand, has a theory or ideology behind it; events are “connected into one pattern in their universal and inner meaning.” The pragmatic account also has more to do with reflections on the historical process, and is not merely about reporting what occurred during a specific period.

Critical reflective history is based on research into the accuracy of historical accounts, and presents alternative explanations and narratives. Hegel is himself critical of this particular type of history, which apparently ‘extorts’ new discourse from existing accounts. He believes that this is a crude and futile way to achieve ‘reality’, that is, understanding, in history, since it replaces facts with subjective impressions and call these impressions reality.

The last type of reflective history that Hegel mentions is ‘specialised history’. Specialised history focuses on a specific historical topic, such as the history of art, law, or religion.

History & Reason

Hegel’s third way of doing history, philosophical history , prioritises thought above event-commentary, synthesising philosophical concepts and ideas with historical information. Hegel himself is doing this kind of activity when he famously argues that the process of human history is a process of self-recognition guided by ‘the principle of reason’.

For Hegel, nature is the embodiment of reason. In the same way that nature strives towards increasing complexity and harmony, so does the world spirit through the historical process. The Presocratic philosopher Anaxagoras (c.500-428 BC) was the first person to argue that nous (meaning reason, or maybe understanding in general) ultimately governs the world – not as an intelligence, but like a fundamental essence of being. Hegel stresses the importance of this distinction, using the solar system as an example. He writes:

“The motion of the solar system proceeds according to immutable laws; these laws are its reason. But neither the sun nor the planets which according to these laws rotate around it, have any consciousness of it. Thus, the thought that there is reason in nature, that nature is ruled by universal, unchangeable laws, does not surprise us; we are used to it and make very little of it…” ( Reason in History ).

Moreover, Hegel argues that evidence of reason is revealed through religious truth, which demonstrates that the world is governed not by chance but by a Providence. During profound moments of spiritual epiphany, we come to the realisation that a divine order presides over the world. Providence is wisdom endowed with an infinite power, which realises its own purpose, that is, the absolute, rational, final purpose of the world; reason is “thought determining itself in absolute freedom.” Hegel suggests that many stages of human history appear irrational and regressive because society is made up of individuals guided by passions, impulses and external forces. However, behind the seeming irregularity of human history lies a divine plan that is hidden from view and yet actualises itself through the historical process. As a result of the many conflicts, revolutions and revolts that society endures, humanity attains a greater glimpse of reason.

Hegel goes even further in the development of his argument and suggests that the realisation of reason in history also serves as a justification for belief in God. He acknowledges that history reveals the cruelty and sadism of human nature, but urges “recognition of the positive elements in which the negative element disappears as something subordinate and vanquished.” Through the consciousness of reason, we recognise that the ultimate purpose of the world is incrementally actualised through those occasional historical events which bring about positive transformation and change. In this sense, Hegel presents a highly progressive view of history, perceiving the development of human society as a dynamic process by which our rational faculties become ever more refined and cultivated. Although, there is evil in the world, reason ultimately triumphs.

History as a Manifestation of Spirit

Hegel’s providence is not the providence of the Judeo-Christian God. Rather, Hegel argues that universal history is itself the divine Spirit or Geist manifesting or working.

Hegel claims that “all will readily assent to the doctrine that Spirit, among other properties, is endowed with Freedom… Freedom is the soul truth of Spirit” ( Introduction ). For Hegel, history unfolds as the self-actualisation of Spirit, eventually resolving itself into the manifestation of true human liberty through the freest form of government. He further argues that self-consciousness is synonymous with the freedom of Spirit – freedom is self-consciousness – since self-consciousness depends on its own being to come into actuality, so must create itself in absolute freedom. And in regards to history, Hegel argues that universal history is the ultimate exhibition of Spirit “in the process of working out the knowledge of that which it is potentially” ( Introduction ). And that which it potentially is, in essence, is freedom. This is why the culmination of the process of history which is the Spirit’s developing knowledge of itself is a knowledge of absolute freedom, through the freest possible political state.

Hegel uses historical examples to demonstrate the process by which the freedom of Spirit becomes actualised through human history. First, he asserts that the origin of the state is not through a ‘social contract’ freely entered into by people, as philosophers such as Hobbes had argued. Rather, to be human means to inhabit a society with other human beings, following basic codes, laws, rules and norms. In other words, it is impossible that humanity existed in a pre-political condition, because politics is a fundamental part of our nature.

According to Hegel’s understanding, politics passes through three stages: from that of the family (or tribe) to civil society, to the state. The state is the ultimate manifestation of Spirit since its development marks an increasing human autonomy. As Hegel writes, “the freedom of nature… is not anything real; for the state is the first realisation of freedom” ( Introduction ). This is due to the fact that members of a state give up their individualism to support the freedom of the community as a whole, and for Hegel, true freedom is communal. We might explain this by saying that without the state, the rights of the individual would become paramount, compromising the greater good of humanity, and so the greater freedom of the Spirit.

Hegel states that original historical cultures, which he calls ‘Oriental’ cultures, including for instance ancient Persia and China, did not attain knowledge of Spirit since they believed that man is not ultimately free. He thought that the Oriental mind-set was instead towards tyranny: to think that people should be governed by a divine ruler or absolute king. This is freedom for only one person: the ruler! The Greeks were aware of freedom, and rejected tyranny for democracy, which is political freedom for the voting set. Their freedom was maintained under conditions of slavery – a fact that made “liberty on the one hand only an accidental, transient and limited growth; on the other hand, it constituted a rigorous thraldom of our common nature of the Human.” So according to Hegel, the German nations, under the influence of Christianity, were the first to come to the realisation that man possesses free will. And even while slavery still occurred under Christianity and subsequent political systems, the notion of individual freedom has become central to states, governments, and constitutions, first in the West, then elsewhere.

Hegel’s Dialectic

For Hegel, historical development proceeds not in a straight line “but in a spiral and leading upwards to growth and progress. This is where action follows reaction; from the opposition of action and reaction a harmony or synthesis results” (‘The Individual, The State and Political Freedom in Hegel’, Uchenna Osigwe, 2014). Whereas many other political thinkers have postulated that political history goes through absolute monarchy to despotism to democracy, Hegel believed that it goes from despotism to democracy, to constitutional monarchy, which combines the features of both despotism and democracy while transcending both. So Hegel uses a ‘dialectical’ approach to examine the course of human history. The dialectic is frequently described in terms of a thesis giving rise to its reaction, an antithesis , which contradicts or negates the thesis; and then the tension between the two is resolved by means of a synthesis of them. Then the synthesis becomes the new thesis… However, Hegel never used this specific terminology (which was originally ascribed to Kant).

The notion that history follows a dialectical pattern can be observed in a more modern context. Communist (socialist) ideologies were a reaction against capitalism, but failed to create sustainable social, political and economic systems, and resulted in the deaths of millions of people around the world. But after the end of the two World Wars, European nations adopted the liberal democratic system – a synthesis of socialism and capitalism. While the state is charged with the responsibility of governing certain aspects of society, such as the law or the military, and other key services, it also promotes business and free-trade. In terms of Hegel’s dialectic, the contradiction of views between socialism and capitalism resulted in a liberal democratic synthesis.

Francis Fukuyama, in his 1992 book The End of History and the Last Man famously argued for the Hegelian concept of the end of History. According to Fukuyama, history has already reached its final stage, in which dialectical ideological conflict is finally eradicated and replaced by a single, universal ideology. Thus, when Communist regimes collapsed across Eastern Europe and those countries looked towards the West, this demonstrated the victory of liberalism.

European countries have not engaged in any major conflict with each other since the Second World War, and Europe has since flourished under the principles of liberal democracy, socially, economically and politically. In this sense, Hegel’s vision of history as a progressive development of political freedom is partially supported by recent historical events.

© Jack Fox-Williams 2020

Jack Fox-Williams graduated from Goldsmiths University with a BA (Hons) in History and History of Ideas, then took a Masters in Law at the Open University. He is currently a doctoral student at the University of Portsmouth and is writing a book on the works of Nietzsche.

Hegel’s Dialectic in a Coffee Cup

Hegel’s theory of dialectics constitutes the last great philosophical system. History is a process that includes everything and everyone, a process in which we all participate. Hegel’s fundamental idea is that history is not a matter of dates and battles and events, but of ‘logic’. It is about how ideas and beliefs interact and develop out of one another, because ideas rule everything else.

Since we are all part of this process, philosophers can think only within the confines of their own historical horizon. This means that philosophy itself is tied to history. To Hegel, philosophy is “its time grasped in thought”. We cannot step outside time, and there is no eternal realm of reason. History and thought emerge together! So, what we try to understand is a complex organic structure, and it is vital to grasp how its parts, which Hegel calls ‘categories’, are connected.

The link between the categories is called the ‘dialectic’. This is an objective order, inherent in the deep structure of things, and characterised by contradiction. Note that therefore to Hegel the dialectic is not simply a method that we apply to understand history. It is the way things actually work in the world. It is not something we make up but something we discover.

Hegel says the dialectic has a three-step structure. Let’s take the example of a historical development involving three categories, from A to B to C. Hegel calls A ‘the immediate’, a self-contained state of affairs. As soon as you spell out A, you must refer to its opposite, B, which is what Hegel calls the ‘first negative’. You realise that A is necessarily connected with its opposite. B is the negation of A, but it is also a modified A: it contains elements of its opposite. But that brings us to a third category, C, which he calls the ‘second negative’. Why? Well, in trying to spell out what B is you realise you must refer back to the previously modified A. C is therefore the negation of B. It constitutes a ‘simple calm unit’: You can imagine this process like dropping a piece of sugar into a glass of water. Once the sugar has dissolved, there is only a homogenous whole. It is inherent in the nature of categories that they contradict each other. Contradiction is characteristic of the nature of reality.

Hegel has a speculative word that describes what happens during a dialectic movement: ‘sublation’. It has three meanings all of which are important to the dialectic:

1. to lift up (every movement, A to B or B to C, means a progression to a higher, more sophisticated level);

2. to preserve (in B something of A is preserved, in C something of A and B is preserved);

3. to negate (B negates A, C negates B).

This sound technical, but Hegel thought sublation to be a normal part of the unfolding of historical events. Indeed, it doesn’t just describe the clashing of ideologies on a grand historical scale, but is a part of everyday human life. Let’s take a look at an example.

The immediate : You wake up and you think that coffee is the best drink in the world and definitely what you want now. Immediately! So you drink four cups with your breakfast.

First negative : Then you feel really sick. Your new position is that you will never drink coffee again.

Second negative : In reaction to the other two categories, a further category develops which preserves something of both of them, but represents a more sophisticated level. You decide that coffee is great in moderation and that you will only ever drink one cup of coffee a day in future.

Anja Steinbauer

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Hegel's Undiscovered Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis Dialectics

What only marx and tillich understood, leonard f. wheat, also available.

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831)

1. background.

Hegel lived in what is called the Romantic period in European history, his contemporaries included Goethe and Beethoven. In general terms, thinkers in this period preferred the creative, imaginative and intuitive as opposed to the strictly abstract, conventional and intellectual. They tended to look to past ages with nostalgia. Still influential were the Enlightenment ideals of autonomous reason and human freedom and Hegel endorsed them. His receptivity to both Romantic and Enlightenment ideas was a source of tension within his thought. Also, it was a period of revolutions, wars and other political upheavals and these impinged on Hegel’s life. So, considering these various influences, it is not surprising to find within his writings such motifs as a search for a unity which underlies conflict and a confidence in reason.

Hegel was born on August 27, 1770 in Stuttgart. His father was a local revenue officer in the court of the Duchy of Württemberg. Though she died when Hegel was only eleven, his mother had a profound influence on him, teaching him the elements of Latin prior to his enrollment in grammar school. He later wrote, “in the early years it is education by the mother especially which is important, since ethical principles must be implanted in the child in the form of feeling.” (Scharfstein, p. 231) An avid student, he amassed a large personal collection of extracts and annotations on the Classics as well as mathematical and moral treatises. In 1788, Hegel entered the Stift (theological seminary) at the University of Tübingen and studied philosophy and Classics. Upon completion of this curriculum in two years, he pursued a course in theology, although his interest was primarily philosophical. As a student, Hegel did not distinguish himself for his oratory, but "the old man," as he was known to his friends, enjoyed a great deal of success in both his academic endeavors, as well as in his extracurricular activities among the young women of Tübingen. It was during this time that he became friends with Schelling and the Romantic poet Hölderin. The three shared a love of the Classics and interests in the French Revolution, Enlightenment philosophy and German mysticism.

After seminary, Hegel declined to enter ministry, but instead chose to pursue the study of philosophy. To this end, he moved to Bern and became a private tutor. During this time he had opportunity to study history as well as Kant’s writings on religion. After three years in Bern, Hegel became a tutor in Frankfurt int 1796. Three years later, his father died and left him a small inheritance. In 1801, Hegel became a lecturer in Jena where he published his first book, Phenomenology of Mind . Hegel achieved some minor success at Jena, but his career there was cut short by Napoleon who conquered the city in 1806. After this Hegel became a schoolmaster in Nuremberg and in 1811 married Marie von Tucher who was 22 years younger than he. They had two sons together in addition to Hegel’s illegitimate son from a previous relationship. 1812 saw the publishing of the first part of Science of Logic which was completed four years later. This book gave Hegel a philosophical reputation on the strength of which he was offered and accepted a professorship at Heidelberg. In 1817, Hegel published his Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences which were used in his lectures and explicated his entire system. A year later, he became professor of philosophy at Berlin, a chair which he held until his death in 1831. It was here that he became quite successful and influential. He published the Philosophy of Right (1821) and gave lectures on aesthetic, history, and religion which were posthumously published by his editors.

In 1793, Hegel took a position as a private tutor for an aristocratic family in Berne. At this time Hegel first became deeply interested in and influenced by Kant’s philosophical work, particularly the moral philosophy of his Critique of Practical Reason . Such influence and interest are clearly demonstrated in his work of the period ("Das Leben Jesu" ("The Life of Jesus," 1795), and Die Positivität der Christlichen Religion ( The Positivity of the Christian Religion , 1896)) which were posthumously published in 1907 in Hegels theologische Jungendschriften ( Hegel’s Early Theological Writings ). Hölderin secured another tutorship for Hegel in Frankfurt am Main in 1796. His theological work of this period, Der Geist des Christentums und sein Shicksal ( The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate , 1799, first published in ...Jungendschriften , 1907) demonstrates his growing ill-ease with a Kantian vision of religion and morality.

With the death of his father in 1799, Hegel was provided with an inheritance, which made possible his 1801 move to an unpaid position as Privatdozent at Jena. There, he was reunited with Schelling, and the two collaborated in editing the publication Kritisches Journal des Philosophie . That year, Hegel also published his first major essay, Differenz des Fichte’schen und Schelling’schen Systems der Philosophie . Though an uninspiring lecturer, his popularity among students grew, as did respect for his philosophical and scientific endeavors. In 1805 he was appointed "extraordinary professor" at Jena. In 1806, Hegel completed his first major work, Phänomenologie des Geistes ( Phenomenology of Mind/Spirit , published 1807). The uneven nature of the work may be attributed to the historical and personal context of its completion. While in a letter to Schelling, Hegel claimed he finished the Phänomenologie at midnight on the eve of Napoleon’s victory at the Battle of Jena, J. G. Baillie suggests that it was more likely that Hegel felt a great deal of financial pressure from his publisher to complete the manuscript (Hegel 1949, 17-19). The completion of the manuscript was undoubtedly further complicated by the author’s learning that he would soon be the proud father of a child with Christina Burkhard. (As of yet, he had never married.)

In 1807, he took a position as editor of a Bamberg newspaper, and the following year moved to Nürnberg to become rector at a local secondary school. The Nürnberg period proved quite productive for Hegel, both personally and intellectually: in 1811 he married Marie von Tucher, with whom he had two sons, Karl and Immanuel; he also published both parts of his Wissenscaft der Logik ( Science of Logic ), Die objektive Logik (1812-13) and Die subjektive Logik (1816). Hegel returned to higher education in 1816 with a professorship at Heidelberg. In 1817 he published Encyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundisse ( Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline ) as an overview of the system propounded in his lectures. The following year, Hegel assumed the chair of Philosophy at Berlin, previously held by Fichte.

It was at Berlin that Hegel achieved broad popularity and intellectual prominence. His major publications were Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundisse ( Philosophy of Right , 1921; a second edition in 1833, edited by E. Gans, titled Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts ) and a second, enlarged edition of the Encyklopädie in 1927. Yet, somewhat ironically for the poor orator, it was Hegel’s lectures which won him high acclaim in Germany and beyond. Indeed the manuscripts and outlines of and student’s notes upon these lectures would comprise the most influential of Hegel’s works: Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion ( Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion , 1832), Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie ( History of Philosophy, 1833-36), Vorlesungen über die Aesthetik ( Philosophy of Art , 1835-38), and Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte ( Philosophy of History , 1837). The collection and publication of these mature works, which elaborate and expand the philosophical system begun in the Phenomenology , Science of Logic , and Encyclopedia was left to his friends, students and family, for in 1831 Hegel perished amid a cholera epidemic.

Hegel was born on 27 August 1770 in Stuttgart as a son of a Württemberg official. In 1788, he entered the Stift Theological Seminary in nearby Tübingen to prepare for a career as a Protestant clergyman. F.W.J. Schelling (1775-1854) and F. Hölderlin (1770-1843) were his room-mates, and the intellectual exchanges with them influenced Hegel’s thought in many ways. Upon his graduation in 1793, Hegel did not enter ministry but became a private tutor in Berne, Switzerland. He remained there until 1796. Hegel moved to Frankfurt am Main in the following year and worked as a family tutor until the end of 1800. In 1801, Hegel went to the University of Jena, where the “Kantian” philosophy and the early Romantic Movement were flourishing since the 1790s. In Jena, Hegel worked closely with Schelling, who was teaching philosophy as a successor of J.G. Fichte (1762-1814). Together they published Critical Journal of Philosophy, a philosophical periodical, from 1802 until 1803, when Schelling left Jena. The close relationship with Schelling waned as Schelling took personally Hegel’s criticism in the preface of Phenomenology of Spirit (1807).

Later Schelling takes Hegel’s position at the University of Berlin after Hegel’s death. In the autumn of 1806, Hegel had to leave the University of Jena since it closed upon the occupation of Jena by Napoleon’s troops. Hegel faced financial difficulty without a professorship, and he started to work as an editor for a daily newspaper in Bamberg in 1807. To make his financial situation worse, Hegel had an illegitimate son with Christiane Charlotte Burkhardt whom Hegel never married (1807). In the following year (1808), Hegel became a rector and professor at a grammar school in Nuremberg, and served there until 1815. In 1811, Hegel married Maria Helena Susanna von Tucher and they had two sons together. The gentle and affectionate letters to his wife written during his travels testify to their happy marriage. In 1816 Hegel went to University of Heidelberg, and left there to take a chair at the University of Berlin in 1818. The Berlin years marked the height of Hegel’s academic and social life. He finally settled financially and gained fame and followers that he missed at Jena in the shadow of Schelling. The years at Berlin, however, were not without hardship. Hegel’s philosophical and political position was challenged by influential figures within the university such as Schleiermacher and Savingny. The accusations of atheism and pantheism were charges Hegel refuted enthusiastically. Hegel died in his sleep on 14 November 1831 after one day’s illness, possibly due to a Cholera epidemic of the time, or perhaps because of a chronic respiratory ailment. His funeral was that of a person of importance.

Not all of the Hegel’s works were published by Hegel during his life time. Among these posthumous works, Early Theological Writings (published in 1907) is particularly important. Some of the Hegel’s published works were neither written directly nor published by Hegel. They are based on partial manuscript and lecture notes complied by his students. These include Hegel’s influential lectures on philosophy of history, the history of philosophy and the philosophy of religion.

Hegel’s most influential works, written and published by him, include: Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), three volumes of Science of Logic (1812, 1813, and 1816), and Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1817).

2. Works (Selected List)

The spirit of christianity.

With "The Spirit of Christianity" (1905/06?) we see a dramatic transition in Hegel’s thought. He no longer espouses the Kantian moral line. Rather, he sees those who rely on external authority and those, like Kant, who situate moral authority within the individual as cut from the same ecclesiastical cloth, "the difference is not that the former make themselves slaves, while the latter is free, but that the former have their lord outside themselves, while the latter carries his lord within himself, yet at the same time is his own slave" (Hegel 1948, 211). Hegel sees the essential spirit of Christianity as one of love, in which the realms of justice and injustice, the din of competing virtues and absolutes, are transcended in a harmonious unity. "The Spirit of Christianity" marks a significant turning point in Hegel’s thought. First, it demonstrates his growing suspicion of Kant’s morality and metaphysics; secondly, Hegel begins to view the positivity of religion, its historical contingency and determinacy, not as a negative perversion of the truth underlying religious sentiment, but rather as expressive of that truth; and thirdly, Hegel begins to elaborate his processive view of reality and truth, in which seemingly mutually exclusive absolutes are harmonized.

Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion

[Religion] is the loftiest object that can occupy human beings; it is the absolute object. It is the region of eternal truth and eternal virtue, the region where all the riddles of thought, all contradictions, and all the sorrows of the heart should show themselves to be resolved, and the region of the eternal peace through which the human being is truly human. (Hegel, 1827: 75)

Although Hegel is well known as a philosopher rather than a theologian, the lectures on the philosophy of religion clearly show that his philosophy can never be divorced from his theological thought. In fact, for Hegel, the “content” and “object” of philosophy and religion are same: “the eternal truth, God and nothing but God” (78). Criticizing Kantian thought that our cognition cannot grasp God, Hegel says that we can know not only “ that God is” but also “ what God is” (88). In fact, the problems of theology, as Hegel saw them, lay in its inability to yield any cognitive knowledge of God. Theology, in Hegel’s view, should investigate not merely “our relation” to God but God’s nature in God himself (89). But how can God be the object of our cognition? Can we really know God in essence? Yes, Hegel says, precisely because God is “ absolute Spirit ” (118) and spirit is only “ for spirit ” (90).  Put differently, we human beings, who are spirit, cannot but immediately cognize absolute Spirit (God), who presents God-self to our consciousness. In his own words, “God is revealed immediately in the consciousness of human beings” (85).  Thus, this “immediate knowledge” is the first element of the knowledge of God. Here, we are immediately aware of both God and the fact that God exists as an absolute being independent of my consciousness. Hegel calls this immediate certainty of God “faith” (136). But in so far as our certainty of God does not have objective grounds, it is still “subjective” and takes the form of “feeling” (138). Our knowledge has to consider the objective aspect, and the objective side of the feeling is “representation” (144). Representation concerns the “content” of religion, which is God, and it involves two forms: sensible and non-sensible or inner forms. Representation as sensible form presents itself in an empirical and concrete manner, such as “a series of actions and sensible determinations” (148). When religion takes a non-sensible form, it is presented in “its simple mode—an action, activity, or relationship in a simple form” (148). But this non-sensible form is not yet elevated to the level of thought that  conceptualizes the manifold determinations of the representation of God in relationship and universality. It is only in thoughts where the immediacy and the representation of God are universally unified and find their rational expressions, thus establishing the certainty of knowledge of God.

According to Hegel, Religion is “ spirit that realizes itself in consciousness ” (104). This realization is a movement or process in which finite human beings elevate themselves to the infinite and the infinite God comes to the finite human consciousness (104). Since philosophy arrives at certain knowledge through concept, we need to start from the concept of religion. As a concept, religion is universal and general, and it has no determinate character. Without any determination, religion in general enjoys the “ substantial unity ” (104), but at the cost of existence (105). In order for this concept of religion to be real, religion in general must become determinate. In other words, religion should enter existence (108). This activity of “ self-determining ” of religion in concrete time and space is diverse, producing historical and particular religions (109).

Hegel asserts that there are three stages in the determinate religions: Immediate or Nature religion (Religion of magic, Chinese Religion, Buddhism, Hinduism, Persian Religion, Egyptian Religion), Elevation of the Spiritual above the natural (Greek Religion and Jewish religion), and Religion of Expediency (Roman religion, Universal and Purposive, but finite and Unspiritual—the absolute state religion). This categorization is based on the 1827 lectures, and Hegel slightly changes it in 1831. Here, it is notable that Hegel did not enjoy the scholarship of the world religions as we do now. He had limited sources, and seemed to be possibly biased in his understanding. One of the biases, Hodgson points out, is his dependence on “Western ontological categories” (45). What comes next to these three stages of determinate religion is absolute religion or consummate religion, which Hegel identifies with Christian religion. After going through all the necessary finite forms and determinations, spirit negates itself and finally becomes itself in Christian religion. In the stage of determinate religion, spirit went out of itself, putting on a “mode of finitude” (411). In this final stage, spirit finally returns to itself, becoming “infinite form” as an absolute subjectivity (411). For Hegel, the history of religion is the history of spirit’s self realization, “the becoming, the brining forth of spirit by itself” (411).

One of Hegel’s contributions to philosophy is his concept of the dialectic. In Plato’s writings, there are examples of dialogs in which thought moves to a conclusion. This idea is generalized and formalized by Hegel into a theory which permeates his system. The dialectic comes about when two conflicting theses are reflected upon and a unity is discerned which includes both of them, resulting in a synthesis. The term for this uniting is called sublation, or in German, Aufhebung which means a cancellation, preservation, and transcending. (Audi, p. 315) The resulting synthesis then becomes a new thesis (while still retaining vestiges of the previous theses). For Hegel, a thesis incorporates its own antithesis or complement (as in: A is non-A), so the dialectic movement can proceed by sublating the new pair of theses, thereby producing another synthesis, and so on. For an example of dialectic, consider “being” and contrast it with “non-being.” The synthesis that issues from these is “becoming.” However, there are cases in which the two theses are not logical negations of each other. For example, the ancient city-state (characterized by unity) is “negated” by modern individualism (characterized by fragmentation and alienation) and these are sublated by a state which preserves unity while at the same time affording freedom to the individual. (Inwood, p. 613) Hegel thought that all phenomena could be understood as exemplifying the operation of the dialectic and that this process moves toward an absolute. He also considered the historical process of development to be inevitable.

Reconciliation

God is the one who as living spirit distinguishes himself from himself, posits an other and in this other remains identical with himself, has in this other his identity with himself (453).

Humanity is essentially and implicitly in unity with God. But humanity cannot fully realize this unless this unity becomes real and certain in history. The incarnation of God in one single person of Jesus history occurs precisely to give humanity this certainty (455). Incarnation means that infinite God negates his infinitude and universality and puts on finitude and actual existence. In Jesus, the idea of God (the ideal, the subjective) becomes real (the actuality, the objective) and the implicit unity of divine and humanity becomes explicit. This is why Christ is called “God-man”(457).

For Hegel, Christ’s death means that God became utterly other to God, taking upon the ultimate finitude (465). The resurrection of Christ means that God overcame the finitude and put death to the finitude of humanity (466-8). Christ’s death and resurrection attests to God’s infinite love, and restores the unity with God and humanity. We can comprehend the unity with God only spiritually. The church is the community that grasps this unity with the help of the outpouring of Spirit. In that it is Spirit who enables the community, the subject of the community is Spirit itself (469-73), and the members of the community are “the active expression of the Spirit” (475). Since the Spirit already revealed the truth of reconciliation in the community, the church now has task of sharing and teaching this truth. This truth is developed in the form of doctrines within the church, and the church is “essentially a teaching church” (476). Although doctrines have impurities because of they are developed within the human sphere and seem to be external to us, we are urged to “appropriate” the heart of doctrines (the presence of God) and make them genuinely internal to ourselves (481). The truth is at hand through revelation, and one needs to make this truth as “one’s volition, one’s object, one’s spirit” (479). According to Hegel, human beings are “born into the church” and they are “destined to participate in this truth” (477).

Although the Spirit is present in the church, the process of actualization of the sprit has not yet completed. Humanity as a whole has not yet realized their unity with Spirit, and the church has been corrupted (483). Reconciliation must occur on the universal and worldly level. According to Hegel, the reconciliation has three historical moments. The first moment occurs on the worldly level (482). It is the real moment of reconciliation and three stages constitute this. The first stage is the “stage of immediacy [or the heart]” (484) where the individual heart is reconciled with God (481). In the second stage the community of the reconciled heart, which is the church, becomes dominant over the worldly realm (483). In the third stage, the reconciliation occurs in the ethical realm. The freedom and eternal truth are prevalent in the worldly.

The second moment of reconciliation is the ideal moment where the religious consciousness emerges at the level of thinking (484). Enlightenment and pietism constitute this moment.  In the final moment, the unity of ideal and real, and “the reconciliation of God with himself and with nature” occur (489). Thus the subjectivity knows “the content of religion in accord with its necessity and reason” (487).

It is notable here that Hegel’s notion of subjectivity does not refer to an intention of God in classical theism. One can be easily misled by Hegel’s religious language and can think that the subjectivity as shown in God’s going out and returning is something similar to a personal intention of a transcendent being. But subjectivity for Hegel is the activity or creativity immanent in the world historical process (264). One should also not understand Hegel’s notion of God as that of traditional theism. God is not transcendent being apart from the world. Rather, God is dynamic process, and can be actualized only through human history. Thus, the life and the process of God’s unfolding in history is manifest in arts, religion, and philosophy. The human history is the history of human consciousness of God as well as the history of God’s own consciousness. In the domain of religion, one can observe the movement of Spirit through the history of religion. According to Hegel, Spirit, starting as a mere subjective or the universal, goes through the different forms and phases in the particular forms of various religions in history. This history of religion before Christianity is in a sense a preparation for Spirit’s consummation. As I already mentioned, Hegel asserts that Spirit finally achieves its unity of subject and object in Christianity. In Christianity, both the subjectivity and the objectivity of Spirit is negated and Spirit becomes Absolute. This unity of subject and object is well expressed in incarnation. Incarnation means that God negates himself and posits the other, while remaining same in the other (455). Although religion recognizes this truth, it only represents it rather than clearly grasping it. It is philosophy, Hegel’s philosophy to be more accurate, that grasps the movement of God more fully.

According to Hegel, philosophy investigates the life of Absolute Spirit or God as it unfolds throughout the history, and it does so by investigating concept or reason. Criticizing Kant who thought that mere concept without content (intuition) is empty (Calton, 21), Hegel asserts that subjective concepts are not necessarily empty or devoid of being (22). In fact, for Hegel, being is already pertained to concept and the transition from concept to being occurs in the word through action and movement (25). According to him, every concept has contradictions in itself, and this is not failure as Kant saw it in antinomies (55). Rather, we can arrive at a scientific metaphysical knowledge of being as well as concept by observing the contradictions and their necessary inner movement. Hegel argues that logical examination of concept tells us that any concept necessarily contains its opposites within it, and they pass over to the opposites producing the truth of the opposite which is the unity of the two. This is the process of dialectics, and this process of passing over is a dynamic movement.

To explicate this, Hegel investigates the concept ‘being.’  The concept of being is itself not different from nothingness. As a pure abstraction, the concept of being negates being completely, and thus becomes nothingness. The concept of nothing is implicit in the concept of being, and the being negates itself and passes over to nothing, and brings the truth of the becoming, which is the unity of being and nothing. As the two opposites of being and nothing exist in the concept of being, there is a fluctuation on both sides. This fluctuation of the concept is stabilized in determinate beings where the limits are set and the universal amalgam of the two becomes particular and determinate. So the contradiction leads to the movement of one’s negation to the other, and the constant movement of the two occurs until the fluctuation is settled in determinate beings and new concept (52-55). Thus the dialectics entails new concepts, and they are connected by the internal necessity which leads us to the complete scientific system of ideas. (56) Through this process of dialectics and elaboration of concepts, human reason is elevated to the level of God. Indeed, our thinking or Reason sees its own inward movement not only conceptually but also really in the world history. Our Reason penetrates the inner essence of God, and God can be self-conscious or know God’s own self only through finite human mind and history.  In this sense, human Reason is itself the Absolute Spirit or God, and the human history itself is the history of God’s becoming human or human’s becoming God. God is Spirit immanent in the world and comes to self-consciousness in human Reason. Our idea of God reveals the being of God, and in fact Reason itself becomes God. The spiritual consciousness attains the universality in thought and realizes that the worldly is indeed the divine.

Representation, Appearance

In God’s act of primal division God brings the other to exist by positing something independent and other than God: the World. Although the world is not wholly other than God, but intrinsically one with God, humanity elevated itself to the level of God, eating the forbidden fruit. What the story of the Fall means is not that this event actually happened. Rather, it conveys the truth that humanity acquired “cognition.” Cognition, Hegel says, is the source of evil because it enables humanity to judge and divide oneself. Acquiring this cognition, humanity now knows the good and the evil. This awareness of good and evil gives rise to “ongoing anguish” (446), and the sense of “cleavage” to God: “This is the deepest depth. Human beings are inwardly conscious that in their innermost being they are a contradiction, and have therefore an infinite anguish concerning themselves” (447). If anguish arises from the relation to God, but, of course, this needs to be understood in a special way, unhappiness comes from the dissatisfaction with the external world (450). Both anguish and unhappiness call for the need for reconciliation.

The Idea of God In and For itself

Hegel asserts that we cannot speak of God with attributes since those determinate predications often create unsolvable conflicts and contradictions with one another. Thus we need to start from the “idea” of God, which is “itself the resolution of the contradictions posited by it” (420). According to Hegel, God, in his absolute idea, is essentially triune. He states that spirit differentiates itself and begets Son. Yet Son is not utterly other than God, but he is God. Holy Spirit is love, which is the whole activity of this differentiation and reconciliation. Thus God is eternally in and for itself Trinity (426).

The Absolute

Hegel uses the term “Absolute” in a number of ways. In the Phenomenology of Spirit , Hegel traces the historical development of forms of consciousness. The idea behind this work has been compared to Plato’s Allegory of the Cave in which a soul journeys from an initial state in the cave of ignorance, through stages of greater understanding, until it emerges in the sunlight with the ability to contemplate the Forms and The Good. Hegel uses a similar theme, but instead of focusing on an individual, he envisions this process taking place throughout history involving mankind as a whole. The ultimate state that is reached is called Absolute Knowledge. Hegel believed he had acquired this knowledge which enabled him to discern the pattern of the historical development of consciousness. (Patterson)

In his system of logic, the dialectic is seen to generate the categories of experience such as Being, Essence, and Concept. The culmination is the Absolute Knowing which is “the Concept which has itself for object and content and consequently is its own reality.” (Hegel 1986, p. 122) In other words, it overcomes the distinction between subject and object.

Hegel said that religion “consists in the employment or exercise of feeling and thought in forming an idea or representation of the Absolute Being” and that “God is the Absolute Spirit, i.e. he is the pure Being that makes himself his own object and in this contemplates only himself, or who is, in his other-being, absolutely returned into himself and self-identical.” (Hegel 1986, p. 53) An individual, can through the use of his freedom, seek to become absolute for himself and separate himself from God. But Grace informs the individual that his nature is in reality not alien to the divine nature. Once this is grasped, the individual can be reconciled to God. (Hegel 1986, p. 54) Religion’s “main function is to raise the individual to the thought of God, to bring him in to union with God and to assure the individual of that union.” (Hegel 1986, p. 168) This conception of God as Absolute Spirit developed out of Hegel’s philosophical system and so it meets the requirement of rationality and this conception of religion meets the criteria previously mentioned for an adequate religion.

Hegel tries to treat the problem of evil by giving philosophical support to the idea that history is the process of the development of Geist which is moving toward a good result. Thus he attenuates some of God’s attributes, making God less than transcendent, but by doing do so, he makes room for hope.

Hegel’s Logic

In his discussion of logic, both in the Science of Logic and in the Encyclopedia , Hegel offers his greatest rejection of Kantian thought. He firmly rejects the supposition that concepts and categories are static, and that knowledge is constructed by their interrelation and application. To view the categories and individual concepts as static entities is to deny the very nature of thought itself. Thought is dynamic. At every point, thought overturns the bases from which it proceeds, for each basis is itself conflictual and incomplete (Hegel 1975, xiii). For example, one may posit A . In the very positing of A , there emerges the thought of that which is not-A . That is, A, as a concept or category, contains in itself the very concept of its negation, an element of conflict. Logically, therefore, one proceeds from A to not-A . Thus thought, specifically, dialectical thought, contains in it the element of negation. To the Understanding, which seeks to categorize and separate, dialectic appears as solely negative and destructive (Hegel 1975, xvi). Yet it also contains the element of inclusion, for in A , and not-A , there exists implicitly its opposite. Logical thought, therefore, is not merely the negation of static categories, of immediate things, but a making explicit what is implicit in each of its elements. Thus, not-A , by its very difference, aids the expression of A . The purpose of dialectic, of the transition from immediacy (the given category or concept) to a mediate stage (wherein the immediate is negated in the assertion of its opposite), is a full, harmonious, concrete and synthetic expression of that which was contained abstractly in immediacy. This third stage is the stage of Reason, wherein the Notion - the truth present in thesis and antithesis, though only particularly and imperfectly - is most fully articulated. This Notion is present, though only implicitly in the first stage, the thesis. Through negation and differentiation, an antithesis is posited. In Reason, thesis and antithesis are harmonized in a synthesis which is a fuller expression of the Notion. Thus the thought process has a directionality: it aims toward the increasingly refined articulation of the Notion. Through the narrowing of the variations and their negation, there arises precision in definition. Furthermore, the Notion is concrete, as it is ever that which drives forward the logical process and which is also its concrete result.

Each Notion in itself, however, is not an isolated and static thing. Rather, every notion is necessarily related to all other Notions. Thought seeks to articulate this fundamental connection, and in so doing, arrives at the Idea. As each notion is itself the synthesis of competing and apparently contradictory instances of its expression, so the Idea is the ultimate synthesis of the "competing absolutes" which are the Notions themselves.

Thus, for Hegel, logic is necessarily a dynamic. To affirm static categories and ideas is artificially cut short the inherent process, and thereby sever the means by which one arrives at truth , or, more appropriately, the means by which truth finds its fullest expression and apprehension. Each finite and static expression of the truth is, of itself, necessarily true. But, as static, it falls short of final expression. It holds within itself its negation, its relative falsehood. The goal of logic, therefore, is not the construction of truths from static Notions, but rather the explicit expression of the truth implicit in them, and the synthesis of these notions into the Idea. Flux and dynamism are therefore not only attributes of the world of appearances, but the nature of that which orders those appearances (Hegel 1975, xvi).

Critique of Religion

From his classical studies, Hegel had developed a deep appreciation for ancient Greek culture. (After Hegel, scholarly interest in ancient history burgeoned in Germany.) He saw within it an integrated, harmonious society whose citizens enjoyed self-determination. This sharply contrasted with his own culture which was marked by individual alienation and political discord. To differentiate between these two types of culture, Hegel used the terms understanding ( Verstand ) and reason ( Vernunft ). As Hegel saw it, his contemporary culture sought understanding which is theoretical and lifeless, an external authority, while the Greeks used reason to gain knowledge which enabled individuals to direct their own lives.

At seminary, Hegel was exposed to rational theology against which he reacted in his posthumously published, Early Theological Writings . For Hegel, religion has a crucial influence on the character of a culture. When he examined the Christian church of his time, he found it to have a negative effect. Christianity seemed to be little more than a collection of creeds, rituals and dogmas. This religion, which was imposed upon individuals, did not arise from the people’s experience and was therefore alien and irrelevant. Using his terms, it was a religion of understanding, not reason. As Hegel reflected on the Greeks, he conceived of an ideal religion which taught that the good life could be achieved through wisdom and virtue, a religion that could be embraced from the heart. Such a religion touches the spirit of people and Hegel believed that culture could be improved if it had a new understanding of religion along such lines. (Williamson, pp. 13, 14)

At this point in the development of his thought, Hegel had come to consider religion to be essentially and primarily internal, a matter of the heart. In addition, religion must not only accommodate the needs of the individual, but also those of the entire population. Thus Hegel identifies community as an important dimension of religion. These considerations gave rise to requirements that any adequate religion must satisfy. Hegel recommended that the doctrines of religion be grounded on universal reason, not just authority; that they be understandable by the general public; and that they not contain moral demands which are beyond their reach . In other words, religion should not be a repressive burden. (Williamson, pp. 16,17)

4. Outline of Major Works

Critique of kant.

Kant’s philosophical thought was prominent during Hegel’s career. Hegel considered Kant to be his principle disputant and he diverged from Kant in a number of ways. For example, Kant held that the categories of thought that structure our experience are static, but Hegel considered them to be dynamic, to have developed over history according to the dialectic process.

In his Critique , Kant concluded that knowledge of the thing-in-itself was impossible since the objects of experience are modified by our cognition of them. Hegel considered this to be an undesirable type of scepticism and wanted to overcome it. Kant had modeled cognition as an instrument for mediating knowledge and Hegel believed that this assumption inevitably leads to the noumenal/phenomenal gap. But Hegel reasoned that if we have no conception of the thing-in-itself, then it lacks content and can have no meaning. Hence, the putative thing-in-itself is not, in principle, something about which we can have knowledge. Hegel can still accept a theory of truth in which thought corresponds to the object, but the object corresponded to is not the thing-in-itself, but rather the thing that is thought. So knowledge for Hegel is modeled as a kind of reflective self-consciousness, a thinking about thought. (Berthold-Bond, pp. 42-46)

Two of Hegel’s critiques of Kant can be summarized as follows.

1) For Kant, the noumenal is needed to account for the phenomenal, but Hegel disputes this, claiming the noumenal is an unnecessary postulate. Since we have no knowledge of the noumenal realm, we don’t know that such can be the cause of thought. Hegel moves to a pure idealism: phenomena result strictly from the mind.

2) Kant’s attempt to critique reason is self-defeating. In order to detect the limits of reason, you must be on higher ground, but where is such a ground? There can be no transcendent vantage point from which can we judge human reason because reason itself is our only means of judgment. But in reply, Kant could say that some limits, such as a horizon, can be detected from an immanent vantage point, so the possibility of determining limits depends on the type of limit in question.

Phenomenology of Spirit

On the title page of the first edition of the Phenomenology , Hegel introduces the volume as "Science of the Experience of Consciousness" and later terms it his "voyage of discovery." It is, indeed both, for in it, Hegel’s attempts to examine the varieties of experience of consciousness, while at the same time to uncover that which underlies and unifies all experience. The Phenomenology , wherein Hegel articulates the "science of philosophy," was to be the first part of a system which would be completed in the Encyclopedia , wherein the philosophical sciences as a whole - those of nature, logic and mind - are examined. Nevertheless, Hegel writes with some notion of the full system in mind. His argument is often circular, and one has to have to have some conception of the scope and end of the project in order to understand its course. Further, it is necessary to have a sense of the intellectual context of the work. Hegel seeks to overcome the limits of reason set by Kant, and to arrive at Absolute Truth. His system is a concerted effort to "intellectualize Romanticism," affirming the ultimate unity of the world, and respecting its fundamental vitality and beauty, and to "spiritualize the Enlightenment," affirming the primacy of reason while restoring its dynamic element (cf. Hegel 1948, 20-21). (With regards to religion, Hegel was also responding to the popularity of Schleiermacher, whose notion of dependency as the foundation for religion he rebuked with the comment that if a sense of absolute dependency were indeed the font of religion, then the dog would be the most religious of creatures.) With Schelling, Hegel affirmed that above the diversity of experience and the competing antinomies of reason, there was a higher unity. However, he rejected Schelling’s leap to poetry and intuition to arrive at this unity, and, moreover, he disdained Schelling’s vision of a unity in which all difference was simply void (i.e., "the night in which all cows are black")(Hegel 1948, 21-22).

In seeking to find a basis for a more synthetic unity of the variety of experience, Hegel focuses upon human consciousness. The human mind is confronted with a variety of experiences, which it manages to analyze and classify. It dissects experience. Yet the human mind is also capable of synthesizing such variety into a persisting unity, the unity of its consciousness. By examination of the human consciousness, one can arrive at a vision of an ultimate unity of experience which is fundamentally rational, as it is necessarily based in the human thought process. He outlines the "historical" development of human consciousness, arising from a primordial insensibility, to a recognition of self as subject amidst a world of alien objects. The human mind seeks to take in this world of variety, to categorize and codify. In so doing, it transforms the world mentally. The mind also effects physical transformation of the world, through the development of culture and civilization. From this stage of differentiation, it moves into a stage of increasing recognition of an identity of the subject with the object. This can clearly be seen in the work of the Enlightenment, and in Kant in particular, for in the latter’s writings,we see the contemplation of the human mind as itself an object, yet an object which is wholly identified with the contemplating subject.

It should here be noted that in his discussion, Hegel treats not only the individual mind, but the human mind as manifest on a societal level. Consciousness, in its collective form, also passes through such a recognition. Indeed, each individual may come to a realization that the society, or people ( Volk ) into which he or she is born, is not an alien and external force, but rather the manifestation of human mind and spirit of which the individual is a particular manifestation. The historical and societal context and the individual influence one another, and share a common spirit. There is, as ever, and underlying unity.

Through examination of the human mind/spirit, Hegel arrives not at empirical psychology or sociology alone. The workings of the human spirit are not isolated operations, but rather the finite manifestations of a universal process. The differentiation and integration which take place in human reason bespeaks a broader force at work in and through the world. By examination of human consciousness and human reason, one gains access to that force. This force, as understood by Hegel, is Geist , Spirit. (While there is much debate over the appropriate translation of this multifaceted German term, for the purposes of this paper I have elected to use the term Spirit as opposed to mind, for while Geist is eminently rational, it contains within itself, as a process, that which transcends reason.) Spirit is at work in the world, in natural history and in the history of social groups, as a process of emerging determinate self-consciousness and integration. It proceeds from an ideal, totally abstract state, a state of immediacy without self-consciousness, through a realization of difference, to a self-conscious unity, wherein difference is not obliterated, but harmonized in a greater rationality.

Thus, the world’s history is not a random association of discordant events and competing philosophies, but the often painful though ultimately glorious self-realization and self-integration of the Absolute. "The life of God and the divine intelligence, then, can, if we like, be spoken of as love disporting with itself; but this idea falls into edification, and even sinks into insipidity, if it lacks the seriousness, the suffering, the patience, and the labour of the negative" (Hegel 1948, 81). The dark elements of history and the pain of existence are not excluded in this view; indeed, conflict is necessary, and never overlooked by Hegel’s keen historical eye. Such conflict, however, is subsumed into the abiding unity of the divine life.

The Philosophy of Religion

In understanding the positivity of religion there are two things to take into consideration, first how one can verify the spiritual, and second, how external features display religion. According to Hegel verifying the spiritual cannot be done externally, but occurs when spirit bears witness to spirit, "The spiritual as such cannot be directly verified by the unspiritual, the sensible" (Hegel 1827, 396). For example, in the case of miracles, there is no need to investigate their truth because it cannot be obtained in the finite sphere in which miracles occur. The spiritual for Hegel can only be witnessed through itself. Since miracles occur externally there is no criteria in them for truth. Hegel asserts that there is no need to either verify or attack miracles because they are not the way to know truth. The spirit is what bears witness to the truth ( Hegel 1827, 397).

Absolute religion is described as "manifesting of itself according to its concept, taking its former, initial manifestation back into itself, sublimating it, coming to its own self, becoming and being explicitly the way it is implicitly" (Hegel 1827, 103) Christianity fits this definition, by Christ’s incarnation consciousness occurs, and his death and resurrection are the returning to self. God made himself known in consciousness, and through this reconciliation can then occur, "God made himself known not in just an external history, but in concsiousness" (Hegel 1827, 392).

Even thought there is one universal spirit there are two aspects to it, the human spirit and the universal spirit. The two spirits cannot be separated from each other because the universal spirit works in the human spirit, "however, the latter is not an autonomous singular activity but the inner working of the holy and universal spirit" (Hegel 1827, 397). Our spirit responds to the universal spirit/ God’s spirit, "In history, all that is noble, lofty , and divine speaks to us internally" (Hegel 1827, 397). Everything stems from the spirit, the spirit is the foundation, and it is through this foundation then that reasoning and understanding can occur. According to Hegel philosophy embodies spirit because it has insights into its own truths. Truth is innate in an individuals spirit, and so the universal spirit awakens that spirit in an individual. Hegel points out that truth is not only revealed through philosophy, but also in a second handed nature through "authority and testimonies" (Hegel 1827, 60).

Universality, particularity, and singularity, make up Hegel’s system of the consumate religion. God is the universal idea and the foundation for all thought. God creates a finite world which he separates himself from, and at the same time plans to be reconciled with, which is the particularity. The process of reconciliation occurs in such a way that the spirit returns to itself which is singularity (Hegel 1827, 62). God makes himself present in nature, therefore the eternal spirit recognizes God in this finite existence. There must be both a finite spirit and an infinite spirit so that reconciliation can take place: "The concrete spirit, the finite spirit defined as finite, is therefore in contradiction to its object or content, and this gives rise above all to the need to sublate this contradiction and separation that appear in finite spirit as such - in other words, the need for reconciliation" (Hegel 1827, 414).

God comes in the form of finite so that the finite spirit can know the infinite. Spirit is both finite and infinite, and that this distinction must be made between the infinite spirit and the spirit of essence:

Consciousness is precisely the mode of finitude of spirit: distinction is present here. One thing is on one side, another on the other side; something has its limit or end in something else, and this way they are limited. Finite is this distinguishing which in spirit takes the form of consciousness (Hegel 1827, 405) The finite and the infinite have to come work together for truth to be revealed.

The process by which the concept of religion becomes absolute spirit occurs in different moments of the concept. Religion begins as a concept, and then moves to determinateness, and from there to absolute religion,

the moments of pure conceptuality (universality), self determination (differentiation, particularity), and self determination (differentiation, particularity), and self - reunification (reestablishment, consummation, subjectivity), which serve as the logical, rational basis for the actual appearance of religions and the division of the subject into three parts (Hegel 1827, 100). The universal is the seed of all truth. Self-determination is the finite state. If reconciliation is to occur the finite has to acknowledge this separation, and then it is possible for it to return.

According to Hegel one can never know God, but only know our relation to Him. And it is through consciousness that this knowledge of God occurs at all. This knowledge is at the same time God’s self-knowledge. Hegel says that our spirit bears witness only by its connection to the universal spirit. Absolute spirit is found in consciousness, "our conviction about it rests on the assent of our own spirit, on our consciousness, that spirit finds this content within itself" (Hegel 1827, 88). In consciousness we find knowledge which is God, therefore consciousness and spirit cannot be separated.

In Hegel’s model of the universal it seems that consciousness is philosophy. For Hegel philosophy makes religion the object of its conversation. The impetus for knowledge can be external, but the way one knows is only by the spirit which is manifested in consciousness. Spirit manifests what is already present in both philosophy and religion. This same spirit of consciousness that holds together philosophy is in Religion:

"According to the philosophical concept God is spirit, concrete; and if we inquire more precisely what spirit is, it turns out that the basic concept of spirit is the one whose development constitutes the entire doctrine of religion" (Hegel 1827, 90). Philosophy actually occurs in religion, and in this sense is said to be above religion.

Hegel’s model of universality, consciousness and reconciliation are exemplified in the Christian religion. In Christianity God is revealed to the world through history - so we have come to the level of consciousness. Through the Christian religion Hegel expressed his theology by suggesting that what has been revealed in History (Jesus) now needs to be conceived in thought (Livingston, 150). This is the system being displayed in Christianity. The incarnation and death represents for Hegel the finitude and the resurrection of Christ represents the return of spirit to itself. In Hegel’s model estrangement and then reconciliation must occur therefore, Jesus crucifixion and death fulfill this. Christ’s death and resurrection represent the finitude and reconciliation Hegel describes, "But what God’s death on the cross symbolizes is that God’s finitude is only a transitional moment in the emergence of Absolute spirit" (Livingston 153-154) After the death and resurrection of Christ is the emergence of a spiritual community - the Holy Spirit or Universal Spirit (Livingston 154).

In Hegel’s earlier writings he said that Christianity was lacking and did not reflect the intelligence of people (Livingston, 149) Hegel’s later view of Christianity was one that suggested, "Historical Christianity had grasped the truth in representational form, but philosophy grasps this same truth in its rational necessity" (Livingston 1971, 150). Therefore, Christianity becomes the manifestation of the spirit in history.

In his closing lines to the 1827 Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion (From this point on Lectures ), Georg W. F. Hegel described his approach to religion as “the philosophical cognition of religion” (Hegel, [1827]1988). This statement brings forth the fundamental relationship that Hegel posited between philosophy and religion. For Hegel philosophy elucidates religion. That is philosophy penetrates religious representations in order to bring forth their true content. However, before going into a detailed discussion of Hegel’s   Lectures a few words about their context and their formation are in order.

According to Peter C. Hodgson, Hegel lectured on the topic of philosophy of religion in the years 1821, 1824, 1827, and 1831 at Berlin (Hodgson, ed., [1827]1988). Hegel made modifications to the Lectures as he saw the need to respond to the philosophical and theological climate of his day. Hodgson points out that Hegel’s   Lectures were initially conceived in anticipation of the intended union of the Lutheran and Reform Churches of Prussia. Merklinger, on the other hand, argues that Hegel’s understanding of the interplay between philosophy and religion was shaped by his conflict, initially, with F.D. Schleiermacher, and later, with Pietism (Merklinger 1993). It is also worth noting that although Hegel assumed Kant’s “transcendental turn”, he reacted against the limits placed upon religious knowledge by Kant’s critique. Yet, Hegel’s reaction did not amount to, in the words of Robert R. Williams, a return to “precritical modes of thought” (McGrath, ed., 1993). Instead, Williams argues, Hegel sought to bridge the post-Enlightenment gap between philosophy and theology by transforming religious representations ( Vorstellungen ) into philosophical concepts ( Begriffe ). Indeed, Hegel introduced his Lectures by arguing that his contemporary intellectual climate was propitious for a “linkage” between philosophy and theology (Hegel, p. 81).

For Hegel religion describes a dynamic thought process, which embraces the absolute idea and humanity. According to Hegel religion is the “relation of human consciousness to God” (Hegel, p. 76). This relation has two poles, namely God as absolute idea, and humanity. This relationship is progressive and can be accounted for from each of its poles (Hegel, p. 90, 203).

For Hegel the progressive unfolding of the absolute idea has three moments. First the absolute idea is wholly enclosed within itself (Hegel, p. 117). The absolute idea has no internal differentiation. In the second moment, as Hegel articulates it in his idealist reformulation of the doctrine of God, the absolute idea or God is “conscious of its own self” (Hegel, p. 104, 118). God’s consciousness of its own self means that God has introduced a “judgment”, a “division”, a “distinction” within its own self, for consciousness always entails such distinction (Hegel, p. 443). Finally, God is reconciled to God’s own self. God is reconciled when the initial distinction brought about by consciousness is overcome. This happens when God as subject has God’s own self as object (Hegel, p. 103). Furthermore, although the internal life of God as absolute idea can be organized for analytical purposes into these three moments, Hegel sustains that the absolute idea is this dynamic process for eternity (Hegel, p. 102-103).

On the other side of the equation, on the side of humanity, religion reflects a historic progression through three stages. The first one is the moment of religion in general. Here human consciousness is related to God as absolute idea. The concept of religion contains all its possible determinations. However, the content of the concept is not yet developed. The nature of religion is in the concept as potentiality but has not yet come out into existence (Hegel, p. 101).

The second moment is the moment of determinate religion. Here human consciousness is related to God in its self-consciousness. God as absolute idea enters the historic realm, the realm of existence and is confronted with the finite, with its negation. Determinate forms of religion are already part of the content of the general concept of religion. However, determinate religion does not yet embody the realization of the concept of religion. Determinate religion is religion “implicitly” but not “explicitly” (Hegel, p. 107-109).

Finally, the last stage of the progression is consummate religion. Hegel identifies Christianity as the consummate or absolute religion. Here humanity is related to the absolute idea in its own reconciliation. According to Hegel, humanity suffers the anguish caused by the cleavage of self-consciousness. Humanity experiences this cleavage as “evil” or the “antithesis vis-à-vis God” and as “misery” or the “antithesis vis-à-vis nature” (Hegel, p. 447). Hence, humanity is in dire need of reconciliation.

God’s reconciliation or the absolute idea’s overcoming of the cleavage brought about by consciousness occurs when it can have its own self as object. Likewise, humanity can only be reconciled when it knows itself in its realization. Because humanity does not know how it ought to be it exists in a state of untruth (Hegel, p. 437). It is in freedom that humanity is able to pursue the contradiction of self-consciousness to its limit, at the point where it learns itself in need of reconciliation (Hegel, p. 216-217). Humanity’s freedom is the movement towards the cognitive realization of what humanity ought to be. The fundamental act of freedom is thought (Hegel, p. 446). Precisely because of its inner cleavage from God, from itself, and from nature, humanity is driven by freedom to know the truth (Hegel, p. 458). Thus, reconciliation is finally achieved when God, absolute reason, becomes flesh. At that point humanity, by an act of sensible cognition overcomes its contradiction. The consummate religion or the absolute religion is hence the revealed religion where spirit is self-manifesting.

An essential category within Hegel’s idealist approach is that of religious representations. According to Hegel, religious representations are images that give expression to an inner meaning (Hegel, p. 144-151). Religious representations may give expression to religious feelings and they may as well evoke such feelings. Hegel stresses the point that religion is grounded in thought, that religious knowledge is above feeling. Yet, he is also arguing that religious knowledge finds expression in representations that ought to be interpreted in light of the concept of God as absolute idea. In a way Hegel is positing the speculative concept of God as a hermeneutical principle able to crack open religious representations found in the form of texts, dogma, and even in history (Hegel, p. 146-147). All religious representations, in particular those of the absolute religion give expression to the dynamic thought process of spirit by means of which it moves from its self-enclosedness through its self-limiting and up to its self-reconciliation. This is no other than the trajectory of human consciousness towards its absolute realization.

By means of this method, Hegel is able to establish the linkage between philosophy and religion, or theology. Hegel approaches different points of Christian dogma and renders them into new forms, in agreement with his speculative concept of God as absolute idea. Hegel sees no obstacle in thus proceeding since, he argues, Christian dogma is only the representation of the absolute concept of God. To the contrary, Hegel feels that he is only bringing forth the true content of dogma (Hegel, p. 144-151).

The doctrine of the Trinity and the doctrine of the Church, represent two clear instances where Hegel applied his, if I may, “hermeneutics of the spirit.” As I have already observed, the central idea in Hegel’s rendering of the doctrine of God is that of God’s self-consciousness. This idea posits a cleavage within God that needs to be overcome and is indeed overcome. Hegel states that “God is love”, where love is that ability to be “outside myself and in the other” (Hegel, p. 418). Hence, the Son is other to the Father, but not absolutely other. Because God is “love”, the Father is in the Son and the Son is in the Father. However, Hegel’s rendering of the Trinity seems to be deficient as it fails to clearly articulate the place of the Holy Spirit in the Trinity. One could infer that Hegel’s notion of “love” could stand for the Holy Spirit. Yet, this is not clear.

Nevertheless, Hegel does not entirely neglect the Holy Spirit. Hegel’s rendering of the doctrine of the Church presents it as the community of the Spirit (Hegel, p. 470-489). According to Hegel the outpouring of the Holy Spirit as depicted in Acts 2, starts the community of the Spirit. Moreover, for Hegel the community is the “existing Spirit” (Hegel, p. 473). This community subsists as the Church by means of authority, doctrine, repentance, and penitence. The spirituality of the community is realized when its members embrace their vocation for freedom. The Spirit of reconciliation moves the community to bring forth the true knowledge of what humanity ought to be (Hegel, p. 482). Hence, the community of the Spirit is the final realization of the concept of religion, where human consciousness of God and God’s self-consciousness are identical.

Perhaps, one of the most problematic aspects of Hegel’s philosophy of religion was his attempt to classify world religions along a progression. His classification and categorization of determinate religions was one of the most unstable aspects of his lectures. For instance, what he termed the “Greek religion” was in his original manuscript classified as the “religion of necessity”. Yet, in 1824 the “Greek religion” was classified as the “religion of beauty”. No doubt that Hegel’s was an effort to incorporate the, in his time, growing amount of information on world religions to a comprehensive comparative framework.

Another area that may be subject to criticism was the prominent place that Hegel gave to Christianity as the absolute religion. No doubt that Hegel was consequent with his system in arriving at his conclusion. However, in light of our contemporary knowledge of world religions it is very unlikely that were we to proceed as Hegel did, we would arrive at the same conclusion.

5. Relation to Other Thinkers

Early theological writings.

Hegel’s early theological writings reflect his fascination with Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason . His "Life of Jesus" and "Positivity of the Christian Religion" show his early endorsement of the Kantian supposition of the autonomy of the individual and the primacy of the categorical imperative. In these works, Jesus is recast as a fully human proto-Kantian moralist, struggling against the external, ecclesiastical and repressive authority of the Judaism of the Pharisees. He "was the teacher of a purely moral religion, not a positive one" (Hegel 1948, 71). Moreover, Jesus, according to Hegel, was given to say such things as, "Act on the maxim which you can at the same time will to be a universal law among men. This is the fundamental law of morality - the content of all legislation and of the sacred books of all nations" (Hegel 1948, 6). The ecclesiastical aspect of Christianity was never part of Jesus’ mission, but rather arose out of the religious and political context in which the faith grew.

Philosophy and Religion

In Hegel’s study of philosophy and religion his aim was to come to terms with the relation between knowledge and experience. Religion is the way by which truth is revealed experientially, and philosophy is the way by which truth is revealed in thought. Hegel describes truth as an eternal spirit which manifests itself in religion externally and in philosophy internally in thought. In the History of Philosophy Hegel describes this spirit as the universal spirit of the times that is present in all things and knows itself by its own consciousness. For Hegel philosophy stands above religion in the sense that philosophy has direct access to the spirit which is knowledge. This same spirit is described in the History of Religion, except the spirit is manifest first in matter, and then in spirit. In this process the finite has to be reconciled with the infinite, and this happens in such a way that spirit returns to itself. Christianity is called the absolute religion because God reveals himself through history - in Christianity the incarnation of Christ is the external manifestation of God, where the finite becomes spirit through Christ’s death and resurrection.

The History of Philosophy

"Philosophy first commences when...a gulf has arisen between inward strivings and external reality" (Hegel 1840, 52). According to Hegel there is an eternal Spirit that all things come from, which is the spirit of time. The function of philosophy in this is, "It is one determinate existence, one determinate character which permeates all sides and manifests itself in politics and in all else as in different elements" (Hegel 1840, 54). The spirit of the time is a direct result of the history preceding it. Knowledge is the finite spirit Hegel refers to in the History of Religion. It is that consciousness which makes reconciliation possible. Philosophy is where all knowledge comes from. It is part of the process that makes religion absolute. Hegel describes philosophy as a move away from external reality toward true reality, such as thought, mind and knowledge, "Philosophy is the reconciliation following upon the destruction of that real world which thought has begun" (Hegel 1840, 52). Religion is limited because it does not encompass knowledge in the same way philosophy does. In religion the universal works through the external before the truth is revealed. In philosophy truth is revealed directly through knowledge (Hegel 1840, 77)

Hegel suggests that in religion truth is discovered from outside of it, meaning that it is understood through ritual (Hegel 1840, 71). In the definition of positive religion the source of truth is unknown. The messenger is not what is important for Hegel, but it is the truth revealed that he is concerned with, "through whatever individual the truth may have been given, the external matter is historical, and this is indifferent to the absolute content and to itself, since the person is not the import of the doctrine" (Hegel 1840, 71). For Hegel what matters is that Christ was someone in history.

Whatever is revealed in historical form must become spirit for it is the connection between the human spirit and the universal spirit where truth is found, "We must know God in spirit and in truth’ "(Hegel 1840, 72). The spirit in each human reacts to the universal spirit, "the spirit alone comprehends Spirit, the miracle is only a presentment of the Spirit; and if the miracle be the suspension of natural laws, spirit itself is the miracle in the operations of nature" (Hegel 1840, 72). It is not so much the event which occurs that needs to be investigated, but how it is received by the spirit. The importance lies in how the human spirit comprehends the universal spirit. There is one spirit with two aspects to it. It is actually a spirit which becomes spirit to itself, "Spirit in itself is merely this comprehension of itself"(Hegel 1840, 72). Spirit manifests itself differently in religion than in philosophy. In philosophy spirit is knowledge, it is this consciousness that becomes spirit for spirit. "A division is formed in the understanding of itself, and the Spirit is the unity of what is understood and the understanding person" (Hegel 1840, 72).

This universal spirit is enmeshed in everything. It is universal in that it encompasses everything, and it is particular in that it is its own. That is why knowledge occurs through a consciousness of self, because spirit in itself completes itself (Hegel 1840, 72)

For Hegel Philosophy develops away from all that is external and by separating itself from the external is able to reconcile itself and discover truth, "Then it is the Mind takes refuge in the clear space of thought to create for itself a kingdom of thought in opposition to the world or actuality, and philosophy is the reconciliation following upon the destruction of that real world which thought has begun" (Hegel 1840, 52) For Hegel truth is not present in the material world, but is only manifest in spirit. In the one universal spirit there is a subjective spirit and an objective spirit. The subjective spirit, by comprehending the objective or divine spirit returns to itself (Hegel 1840, 73). In coming to this understanding of spirit faith occurs (Hegel 1840, 73). Hegel points out that the Christ’s presence in history is this consciousness.

The Effect of Philosophy on Religion

Spirit must reach a radical’ self-estrangement before reconciliation can occur. Christ’s crucifixion and death reveal God’s love. Through this estrangement love occurs, and this estrangement must take place for reconciliation to occur, "it is shown how this terrible abnegation by God is in fact the ultimate measure of the divine love,...it is in fact love itself become absolute" (Crites, 257). Death and resurrection reveal the finitude and the eternal universality of God. Christ’s resurrection becomes the concrete universality’ estrangement is overcome (Crites, 257). Philosophy and religion both contain absolute truth as their "common content" (Crites, 260). Since philosophy is the knowledge which religion only has access to in the finite, according to Hegel, it stands above religion because it embraces everything, "but while Religion grasps this truth in representational form, philosophy grasps it in its own absolutely adequate form, of thought" (Crites, 260). Religion is lacking in the knowledge which philosophy already grasps.

Estrangement has to occur in this model in order for knowledge to be grasped. As is demonstrated in Christ’s death, there is a moment of complete separation, "The death of Christ symbolizes the destruction of finitude, so that in the crucifixion we see in sensible form the yielding up of , all that is peculiar to the individual’" (Livingston, 153) Hegel suggests that the trinity in the Christian faith is representative of the dialectical process of spirit (Livingston 153). The result of this estrangement is a reconciliation which takes place when the absolute spirit realizes itself and then a spirit of community results (Livingston 153). In order for Christianity to match Hegel’s system entirely it would need to give up its theistic view, because as is noted once consciousness, and reconciliation occur there is nothing that divides God from man( Livingston, 153). However, Christianity still holds that there is a separation between God and Man and Christ is the mediation. According to Hegel’s model the incarnation was the complete bridging of that gap.

6. Bibliography and Works Cited

Primary sources.

Hegel, Georg Wihelm Friedrich. 1948. Early Theological Writings . Translated by T. M. Knox. With introduction and fragments translated by Richard Kroner. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Hegel, Georg W. F. [1827]. Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion . One volume edition. Edited by Peter C. Hodgson. Translated by R. F. Brown, P. C. Hodgson, and J.M. Stewart. Berkley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 1988.

_______. 1949 [1807] The Phenomenology of Mind . Translated and with introduction and notes by J. B. Baillie. Revised second ed. New York: The Macmillan Co.

_______. 1954. The Philosophy of Hegel. Edited by Carl J. Friedrich. New York: The Modern Library.

_______. 1975 [1830]. Hegel’s Logic: Being Part One of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830). Translated by William Wallace. Foreword by J. N. Findlay. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

_______. 1997. G. W. F. Hegel: Theologian of the Spirit . Edited by Peter C. Hodgson. In the series The Making of Modern Theology . John W. de Gruch gen ed. Minneapolis: Fortress Press.

_______. 1995 [1840]. Lectures on the History of Philosophy . Trans. E.S. Haldane. Lincoln and London. University of Nebraska Press.

Works Cited—Secondary Sources

Crites, Stephen D. 1966. "The Gospel According to Hegel." Journal of Religion 46: 246-63.

Dudeck, C. V. 1981. Hegel’s Phenomenology of Mind: Analysis and Commentary . Washington, D.C.: University Press of America.

Fackenheim, Emil L. 1967. The Religious dimension in Hegel’s Thought. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Kojève, Alexandre. 1969. Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit . Assembled by Raymond Queneau. Edited by Allan Bloom. Translation by James H.

Livingston, James. 1971. Modern Christian Thought . New York: The Macmillan Company. Nichols, Jr. New York: Basic Books.

Secondary Sources

Audi, Robert, ed. 1995. The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy , Cambridge University Press.

Berthold-Bond, Daniel. 1989. Hegel’s Grand Synthesis , Albany: State University of New York.

Calton, Patricia Marie Hegel’s Metaphysics of God Aldershot, Burlington USA, Singapore, Sydney: Ashgate, 2001

Crities, Stephen, "The Gospel According to Hegel," in Journal of Religion 46/2 (April, 1966): 246-63.

Inwood, Michael. 1996. The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy . Oxford: Blackwell.

Merklinger, Philip M. Philosophy, Theology, and Hegel’s Berlin Philosophy of Religion: 1821-1827 . Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1993.

Patterson, William. 1998. http://www.wpunj.edu/cohss/philosophy/courses/hegel/HEGEL1.HTM.

Rockmore, Tom. 1993. Before and After Hegel . University of California Press.

Scharfstein, Ben-ami. 1980. The Philosophers - Their Lives and the Nature of their Thought . Oxford University Press.

Smith, John. “Hegel’s Reinterpretation of the Doctrine of the Spirit and the Religious Community”. In Darrel E. Christensen, ed. Hegel and the Philosophy of Religion: The Wofford Symposium . The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff (1970), 157-177.

Welch, Claude. 1972. Protestant Thought in the Nineteenth Century . New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Werkmeister, W.H. “Hegel’s Phenomenology of Mind as a Development of Kant’s Basic Ontology”. In Darrel E. Christensen, ed. Hegel and the Philosophy of Religion:   The Wofford Symposium . The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff (1970), 93-110.

Williams, Robert R. “Hegelianism.” In Alister E. McGrath, ed. The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Modern Chistian Thought. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. (1993), 250-259.

Williamson, Raymond Keith. 1984. introduction to Hegel’s Philosophy of Religion . State University of New York Press.

Published Books

Phenomenology of Spirit (1807)

The Science of Logic (1812, second volume 1816)

Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1817, revised 1827, 1830)

Philosophy of Right (1821)

Published Lectures

Philosophy of History

History of Philosophy

Philosophy of Religion

Other Publications

Hegel, G. W. F. [1840]. The Philosophical Propaedeutic . A. V. Miller, trans. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1986.

Early Theological Writings (1907)

7. Internet Resources

[Forthcoming]

8. Related Topics

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Hegel's Undiscovered Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis Dialectics: What Only Marx and Tillich Understood Hardcover – December 18, 2012

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G.W.F. Hegel: Life, Philosophy and Legacy

Biography | Influences | Core Philosophy | Essential Works | Reception | Criticisms | Legacy

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, commonly known as G.W.F. Hegel, stands as one of the most influential philosophers in the history of Western thought, renowned for his work in the realm of metaphysics, epistemology and social theory.

Hegel’s most famous notion, and the one that often overshadows the broader scope of his philosophy, is the concept of dialectical idealism. This innovative idea was expounded in his major work, The Phenomenology of Spirit and further developed in his magnum opus, Science of Logic . Dialectical idealism posits that history and human development are driven by a process of continuous contradiction, conflict and resolution of opposing ideas and forces. This concept laid the foundation for his comprehensive philosophical system, later known as Hegelianism.

The transformative nature of Hegel’s dialectical idealism lies in its ability to provide a dynamic framework for understanding change and progress in various spheres of life, including society, politics, ethics and even nature itself.

Table of Contents

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel was born on August 1770 in Germany. He hailed from a middle-class family, his father working as a civil servant. During his formative years, the exposure to literature, art and religion at home instilled in him a deep sense of cultural appreciation.

Hegel attended the Protestant Stiftskirche grammar school, where he developed a passion for the classics, literature and philosophy, displaying remarkable academic prowess and a keen interest in the humanities. In 1788, he enrolled at the Tübinger Stift seminary, a prestigious institution known for producing prominent theologians and philosophers. During the time at Tübingen, he forged enduring friendships with fellow students, including Friedrich Hölderlin and Friedrich Schelling, who would later become influential figures in the German philosophical landscape.

After completing his studies at Tübingen, he embarked on a career in education. He initially worked as a private tutor, an experience that allowed him to delve deeper into his philosophical interests while honing his teaching skills. However, he found the tutoring job unfulfilling and sought to secure a position in academia.

In 1801, Hegel obtained a position as a lecturer at the University of Jena. During this time, he developed close connections with other leading philosophers, including Johann Gottlieb Fichte. Over the next years, he held prestigious professorships in various universities, such as Heidelberg and Berlin. It was in Berlin that he would deliver his most influential lectures and develop his renowned works.

Throughout his career, his ideas evolved significantly, shaped by the historical and intellectual context of his time. His encounters with the French Revolution, the Napoleonic era, and the aftermath of Enlightenment ideas played crucial roles in molding his philosophical outlook.

As Hegel’s career progressed, his philosophical ideas gained recognition, eventually earning him a reputation as one of the leading thinkers of his era. His profound contributions to metaphysics, epistemology, political philosophy and aesthetics established him as a pivotal figure in the development of modern philosophy.

Intellectual Influences

The Enlightenment era, spanning the 17 th and 18 th centuries, was a period of intellectual and cultural transformation in Europe, characterized by a profound emphasis on reason, science and skepticism towards traditional authority. Enlightenment thinkers sought to challenge religious dogma and superstition, advocating for individual rights, liberty and the pursuit of knowledge through reason and empirical evidence.

During this era, philosophers such as René Descartes , John Locke and Immanuel Kant ushered in a new age of philosophical inquiry, grounding knowledge in rationality and empirical observation. The Enlightenment’s emphasis on human reason and the power of the individual mind set the stage for the development of modern philosophy and influenced a wide range of disciplines, including politics, economics and science.

At the same time, German Idealism emerged as a prominent philosophical movement. This movement sought to reconcile the tensions between subjectivity and objectivity, mind and nature, and freedom and necessity. German Idealists, including Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Friedrich Schelling , proposed that reality was fundamentally shaped by the human mind, or “Geist” – they posited that the ultimate reality lay in the realm of ideas and that human consciousness played a pivotal role in shaping the world.

Hegel’s philosophical journey was deeply influenced by the works of his predecessors, especially Immanuel Kant and Johann Gottlieb Fichte. Kant’s critical philosophy, with its distinction between noumena (things as they are in themselves) and phenomena (things as they appear to us), laid the groundwork for his own exploration of the nature of knowledge and reality.

Additionally, Hegel’s intellectual development was significantly shaped by his interactions with Johann Gottlieb Fichte, one of the key figures of German Idealism. Fichte’s notion of the self as both the subject and creator of reality – that is, self-consciousness as a foundational aspect of reality – provided a framework for Hegel’s own exploration of consciousness and its role in the unfolding of history.

Core Philosophical Framework

Dialectical method.

The dialectical method is a mode of philosophical reasoning that seeks to understand the development of ideas and the resolution of contradictions through a dynamic process of interaction.

Hegel’s dialectic follows a triadic structure, comprising three stages: thesis, antithesis and synthesis. The process begins with a thesis, representing a particular idea or concept, which gives rise to its opposite, the antithesis, creating a conflict or contradiction between the two. The tension between thesis and antithesis leads to a higher-level synthesis, which reconciles and transcends the opposing elements, forming a more comprehensive understanding.

Absolute Idealism

Hegel’s concept of Absolute Idealism forms the cornerstone of his philosophical system.

Absolute Idealism posits that the ultimate reality, or Absolute, is grounded in the realm of mind (or ideas) rather than material substance. The Absolute is not an abstract concept, but a dynamic and evolving process of self-awareness and self-realization.

Central to Absolute Idealism is the notion of Geist, often translated as “Spirit”, which represents the collective mind or consciousness that permeates all of reality, including both the natural world and human history. The development of Geist unfolds dialectically, constantly seeking self-completion and self-awareness.

Hegel viewed history as the progressive manifestation of Geist’s self-realization, where societies and individuals experience a continuous process of development, conflicts and resolutions. This historical progression, driven by the dialectical interplay of ideas and social forces, leads towards greater freedom, rationality and self-consciousness.

The Absolute, therefore, is a dynamic and evolving force that drives the continuous transformation of reality.

G.W.F. Hegel’s Essential Works

By exploring these essential works, beginners can grasp the foundational elements of Hegel’s philosophical system: from the development of self-consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit to the intricacies of logical reasoning in the Science of Logic , and the relation between individual freedom and the state in the Elements of the Philosophy of Right , these works illuminate the core tenets of Hegelian thought and provide a solid grounding for further exploration of his profound philosophical ideas.

Phenomenology of Spirit

Phenomenology of Spirit , Hegel’s most famous work, is an essential entry point to his philosophical system, for it offers a comprehensive exploration of the development of self-consciousness and the unfolding of truth.

In this work, the author employs the dialectical method to examine the evolution of human consciousness through various stages of experience and knowledge. He takes the reader on a journey from the most immediate forms of consciousness, like sense perception, to more complex and self-aware states of mind. Through this progression, he lays the foundation for understanding how knowledge and truth emerge from the dialectical interplay between subject and object, knower and known .

Science of Logic

Hegel’s Science of Logic is crucial for comprehending Hegel’s method of philosophical reasoning and the structure of his overall paradigm, as it delves into the realm of logic and metaphysics.

In the Science of Logic , Hegel explores the fundamental categories and concepts that underlie all thought and reality. He presents a rigorous investigation into the nature of being, essence and becoming, revealing the logical foundations of existence .

Through the dialectical paradigm, he demonstrates how contradictions and oppositions within concepts ultimately lead to their higher synthesis, unveiling the dynamic nature of reality.

Elements of the Philosophy of Right

Hegel’s Elements of the Philosophy of Right provides key insights into his political philosophy and the concept of the state. Published in 1821, this work offers a comprehensive examination of the relationship between individual freedom and the ethical community.

In this treatise, the author elucidates the idea of the state as an organic entity that embodies the collective will of its citizens . He emphasizes the role of the state in upholding and promoting individual freedom within the context of a cohesive social order.

Hegel’s political philosophy centers on the notion that true freedom can be achieved only within a well-structured society governed by rational laws and ethical principles.

Influence on Philosophy

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, known for his complex and comprehensive philosophical system, has had an inspiring influence on various schools of thought and numerous renowned philosophers.

Hegelianism, a movement characterized by the direct continuation and development of Hegel’s ideas, witnessed prominent thinkers such as Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Karl Rosenkranz interpreting and promoting his comprehensive philosophical system. During the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries, Neo-Hegelians, including Benedetto Croce, Giovanni Gentile and Josiah Royce, engaged in a profound reevaluation of the former’s concepts, skillfully adapting them to their respective cultural contexts, leading to a notable resurgence of interest in Hegelian philosophy across Europe and America.

Existentialism, a philosophical movement emphasizing individual existence and freedom, also drew inspiration from Hegel’s philosophy. However, existentialists like Søren Kierkegaard and Jean-Paul Sartre offered strong criticisms of the focus on the absolute and collective, advocating instead for a more personal and subjective understanding of existence and choice.

Hegel’s influence also extended to phenomenology, significantly impacting its founder, Edmund Husserl . Although Husserl eventually distanced himself from the former’s absolute idealism, the initial influence of Hegelian dialectic and historical development is evident in his early works.

But perhaps the most significant and enduring impacts of Hegel’s philosophy was on Karl Marx . Marx developed his own distinct philosophy of historical materialism and dialectical materialism, skillfully adapting Hegel’s dialectical method into a materialist framework that focuses on the role of economic factors and class struggle in shaping history and society. On the same note, thinkers of the Frankfurt School, such as Theodor Adorno and Herbert Marcuse, skillfully utilized Hegelian dialectics to analyze and critique modern society and culture, particularly within the context of contemporary capitalism and its effects on human freedom and society.

From Hegelianism’s direct continuation and reinterpretation of his philosophical system to existentialism’s nuanced critique, and even the influential works of Karl Marx, Hegel’s inspiring influence permeates through history, influencing debates on history, society, freedom and the human experience.

During his time, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s philosophy received mixed responses, with both positive acclaim and critical opposition.

Hegel garnered a dedicated circle of followers and admirers who found his philosophical system compelling. Many of his students, including influential philosophers such as Ludwig Feuerbach and Friedrich Engels , embraced and propagated his ideas, as they considered Absolute Idealism and the dialectical method to be profound contributions to the understanding of history, consciousness and social development. His insights into the nature of truth and knowledge also attracted those who appreciated the systematic and comprehensive nature of his thought.

Nonetheless, some philosophers, particularly proponents of German Romanticism, found fault with Hegel’s focus on reason and his perceived neglect of individual emotion and intuition, and accused the perspective of reducing human existence to an abstract and rigid system, overlooking the complexities of human experience.

Hegel’s works generated intense debates and controversies both during his time and in the years that followed. Some of the key areas of contention include the interpretation of his dialectical method, the nature of his concept of the Absolute and the role of religion in his philosophy.

Moreover, Hegel’s intricate prose and complex philosophical language contributed to both admiration for his intellectual prowess and frustration for those who struggled to understand his works fully. Interpreting Hegel’s dialectic and his concept of the Absolute proved challenging for many scholars, fueling debates over the true meaning and implications of Hegelian thought.

The reception of Hegel’s work, both positive and negative, has contributed significantly to the ongoing development of Western philosophical thought, as his philosophy continue to be studied, debated and reinterpreted by scholars and philosophers around the world.

Hegel’s philosophy has been the subject of intense critique and debate throughout the years regarding the complexity of his prose, the ambitious pursuit of a totalizing philosophical system and the abstract notion of Absolute Idealism.

The first criticisms aimed at Hegel’s works is the sheer complexity of the language and abstractness of the concepts he proposed, rendering his prose dense and intricate, making his works challenging for many readers to comprehend and thus inaccessible to a broader audience, potentially resulting in multiple interpretations of his perspective. More importantly, critics raised concerns about any totalizing philosophical system, as one that seeks to encompass all aspects of reality, in the view that such an ambitious undertaking leads to oversimplification, potentially overlooking the nuances of individual experiences and phenomena.

In response to these criticisms of Hegel’s complex language and totalizing systematization, among others, the 20 th century witnessed the emergence of analytic philosophy . Analytic philosophers focus on logical analysis, seek to clarify language and address specific problems, rather than constructing comprehensive philosophical systems.

The belief in historical progress as the unfolding of Geist has been seen as teleological, for it suggests a predetermined and linear development of consciousness which overlooks the unpredictable nature of human agency and historical events.

Arthur Schopenhauer and Karl Popper offered scathing criticisms of Hegelian though, challenging the coherence and validity of Hegelian metaphysics and the viability of his historical perspective. Schopenhauer, a philosopher known for his pessimistic worldview, accused Hegel of constructing an overly complex and convoluted system that lacked empirical grounding and instead promoted abstract idealism, strongly objecting to the former’s the belief in a rational, harmonious reality. Karl Popper, a key figure in the philosophy of science, criticized Hegel’s ideas as lacking falsifiability, a crucial criterion for scientific theories, as the historical dialectic and notion of Geist unfolding throughout history are unfalsifiable claims, making them more akin to metaphysical speculation than empirical science.

Existentialist philosophers, including Søren Kierkegaard and Jean-Paul Sartre , also engaged with certain aspects of Hegel’s philosophy, particularly his ideas of self-consciousness and dialectics, while diverging significantly in their conclusions. Existentialism, as a distinct movement, questions the idea of constructing an all-encompassing philosophical system that captures the entirety of reality, focusing instead individual freedom, responsibility and the subjective experience of existence.

Kierkegaard, often regarded as the father of existentialism, considered Hegel’s systematic approach to be an abstract intellectual exercise that fails to address the concrete and individual existence of human beings, in light of the significance of personal choice and the subjective experience of faith. Similarly, Sartre, a prominent existentialist philosopher, rejecting the notion of an all-encompassing reality, criticized Hegel’s system as denying human freedom and reducing individuals to mere products of historical forces, advocating instead for the absolute importance of human agency and responsibility.

In contrast to Hegel’s objective and systematic approach, existentialism offers an alternative perspective that celebrates individual autonomy and subjective experience.

G.W.F. Hegel, known for his influential ideas on dialectical reasoning, historical development and the concept of absolute spirit, left a profound legacy in the history of philosophy.

Hegel’s significance lies in his transformative perspective, wherein he developed the dialectical method to understand the evolution of history as a process of continual change and development, culminating in the realization of Absolute Spirit, or absolute knowledge.

His ideology inspired subsequent thinkers, including existentialists like Søren Kierkegaard and even Karl Marx, who further expanded upon the former’s framework. Additionally, his theories have had a lasting impact on various fields, including politics, social theory, aesthetics and theology, making him a key figure in modern academia. The emphasis on the role of the individual, within the context of society and history, continues to inspire thought.

Furthermore, Hegel’s works have been subject to diverse interpretations and debates within the academic community, leading to the development of different philosophical schools, such as “left” and “right” Hegelianism. His philosophy’s complex and abstract nature has also given rise to criticism and challenges, with some accusing him of advocating for an overly systematic and idealistic worldview.

Nevertheless, his ideas continue to be studied, dissected and debated, with scholars and philosophers delving into his works to explore their relevance and applicability in contemporary contexts.

Hegel’s significant contributions to the understanding of history, human consciousness and the interconnectedness of ideas have left an enduring mark on intellectual history, ensuring that his legacy remains a crucial point of reference for future generations of thinkers and scholars alike.

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Dialectics in psychotherapy, an introduction to the meaning and central role of dialectics in therapy..

Posted September 13, 2019 | Reviewed by Abigail Fagan

The word “dialectic” has a long history, from ancient Greek philosophers, through Hegel and Marx, and to the present day. Its meaning has changed over the centuries, and according to different thinkers. In psychotherapy , “dialectic” is almost wholly associated with dialectical behavior therapy (DBT), where the term identifies a particular type of treatment. In reality, dialectics as used in DBT is a feature of all schools of psychotherapy.

Broadly speaking, a dialectic is a tension between two contradictory viewpoints, where a greater truth emerges from their interplay. Socratic dialog, in which philosophers mutually benefit by finding defects in each other’s arguments, is a classic example. In the early 19th century, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel described a universal dialectic, commonly summarized as “thesis, antithesis, synthesis.”

His esoteric philosophy holds that every thesis, or proposition, contains elements of its own negation. Only by considering both the thesis and its contradiction (antithesis) can one synthesize a greater truth. This process never ends, as the new synthesis itself contains antithetical elements. The term veered in meaning with Marx’s dialectical materialism, and in yet other directions with more contemporary writers. But DBT uses the Hegelian sense, and that is our focus here.

Marsha Linehan faced a problem as she developed DBT in the late 1970s. Her behavioral strategies implicitly pathologized those she sought to help. Clients thought: “If I need to change, there must be something wrong with me.” To avoid re-traumatizing them, she turned to Zen Buddhism’s self-acceptance and focused on clients’ strengths. But this, in turn, downplayed their real need to change. Dr. Linehan and her colleagues realized they would have to integrate change (thesis) and acceptance (antithesis) into a larger truth that incorporates both (synthesis).

This is the fundamental dialectic of DBT, although there are others. For example, the therapist is trustworthy and reliable, but also makes mistakes. The client is doing his or her best but wants to do better. Although worded here using “but” for clarity, DBT teaches clients to use “and” instead. (The therapist is reliable and makes mistakes.) In doing so, the therapeutic task is to embrace the truth of both propositions at once, not to choose one over the other.

An uneasy tension between acceptance and the need for change exists in all psychotherapy, not just DBT. Indeed, this tension underlies a question commonly posed to new clients: “What brings you in now?” Therapy begins only when emotional discomfort and the perceived need for change outweigh the inertia (i.e., acceptance), reluctance, and other factors that precluded it before. Then, once in therapy, change versus acceptance is often an explicit struggle. File for divorce or work on one’s marriage ? Learn to be bolder or accept that one is shy by nature? Change physically through exercise or plastic surgery, or become more comfortable with the body one has?

When clients grapple with such questions, therapists of any school should refrain from choosing sides or giving advice. Except in extreme cases, we simply don’t know which option is best for the individual in our office.

However, it goes further than this. As Hegel wrote, a clash of thesis and antithesis may result in a new third way, a synthesis that incorporates, yet transcends, both sides of the argument. This “union of opposites” was first described by pre-Socratic philosophers (and by Taoists, as in the well-known Yin-Yang symbol of interdependence). The concept was later adopted by alchemists, who observed that compounding two dissimilar chemicals can result in a third unlike either parent (e.g., sodium, a highly reactive metal, plus chlorine, a poisonous gas, produces table salt). Carl Jung, who studied alchemy, weaved the union of opposites into his various psychological writings. It forms the basis of his “transcendent function” that leads to psychological change; an accessible introduction to this concept can be found here .

The shuttling to and fro of arguments and affects represents the transcendent function of opposites. The confrontation of the two positions generates a tension charged with energy and creates a living, third thing … a movement out of the suspension between the opposites, a living birth that leads to a new level of being, a new situation. Collected Works of C. G. Jung, Vol. 8. 2nd ed., Princeton University Press, 1972. p. 67-91 .

One need not be a Jungian to recognize creative, “third-way” processes in therapy. Instead of being caught on the horns of a dilemma, it often helps to take a step back and appreciate the validity of both positions: It is valid to seek autonomy and relatedness. It is valid to be serious and to play. And it is certainly valid to accept oneself while also striving to change. Insight is our term in depth psychotherapy for achieving synthesis: a position that reconciles and transcends thesis and antithesis, makes sense emotionally, and works in one’s life. In this way, dialectical tension generates all creativity and psychological growth.

©2019 Steven Reidbord MD . All rights reserved.

Steven Reidbord, M.D. , is a psychiatrist and psychiatric educator with a private practice in San Francisco.

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In philosophy, the triad of thesis, antithesis, synthesis (German: These, Antithese, Synthese; originally: Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis) is a progression of three ideas or propositions. The first idea, the thesis, is a formal statement illustrating a point; it is followed by the second idea, the antithesis, that contradicts or negates the first; and lastly, the third idea, the synthesis, resolves the conflict between the thesis and antithesis. It is often used to explain the dialectical method of German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, but Hegel never used the terms himself; instead his triad was concrete, abstract, absolute. The thesis, antithesis, synthesis triad actually originated with Johann Fichte.

1. History of the Idea

Thomas McFarland (2002), in his Prolegomena to Coleridge's Opus Maximum , [ 1 ] identifies Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (1781) as the genesis of the thesis/antithesis dyad. Kant concretises his ideas into:

• Thesis: "The world has a beginning in time, and is limited with regard to space."
• Antithesis: "The world has no beginning and no limits in space, but is infinite, in respect to both time and space."

Inasmuch as conjectures like these can be said to be resolvable, Fichte's Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre ( Foundations of the Science of Knowledge , 1794) resolved Kant's dyad by synthesis, posing the question thus: [ 1 ]

• No synthesis is possible without a preceding antithesis. As little as antithesis without synthesis, or synthesis without antithesis, is possible; just as little possible are both without thesis.

Fichte employed the triadic idea "thesis–antithesis–synthesis" as a formula for the explanation of change. [ 2 ] Fichte was the first to use the trilogy of words together, [ 3 ] in his Grundriss des Eigentümlichen der Wissenschaftslehre, in Rücksicht auf das theoretische Vermögen (1795, Outline of the Distinctive Character of the Wissenschaftslehre with respect to the Theoretical Faculty ): "Die jetzt aufgezeigte Handlung ist thetisch, antithetisch und synthetisch zugleich." ["The action here described is simultaneously thetic, antithetic, and synthetic." [ 4 ] ]

Still according to McFarland, Schelling then, in his Vom Ich als Prinzip der Philosophie (1795), arranged the terms schematically in pyramidal form.

According to Walter Kaufmann (1966), although the triad is often thought to form part of an analysis of historical and philosophical progress called the Hegelian dialectic, the assumption is erroneous: [ 5 ]

Whoever looks for the stereotype of the allegedly Hegelian dialectic in Hegel's Phenomenology will not find it. What one does find on looking at the table of contents is a very decided preference for triadic arrangements. ... But these many triads are not presented or deduced by Hegel as so many theses, antitheses, and syntheses. It is not by means of any dialectic of that sort that his thought moves up the ladder to absolute knowledge.

Gustav E. Mueller (1958) concurs that Hegel was not a proponent of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, and clarifies what the concept of dialectic might have meant in Hegel's thought. [ 6 ]

"Dialectic" does not for Hegel mean "thesis, antithesis, and synthesis." Dialectic means that any "ism" – which has a polar opposite, or is a special viewpoint leaving "the rest" to itself – must be criticized by the logic of philosophical thought, whose problem is reality as such, the "World-itself".

According to Mueller, the attribution of this tripartite dialectic to Hegel is the result of "inept reading" and simplistic translations which do not take into account the genesis of Hegel's terms:

Hegel's greatness is as indisputable as his obscurity. The matter is due to his peculiar terminology and style; they are undoubtedly involved and complicated, and seem excessively abstract. These linguistic troubles, in turn, have given rise to legends which are like perverse and magic spectacles – once you wear them, the text simply vanishes. Theodor Haering's monumental and standard work has for the first time cleared up the linguistic problem. By carefully analyzing every sentence from his early writings, which were published only in this century, he has shown how Hegel's terminology evolved – though it was complete when he began to publish. Hegel's contemporaries were immediately baffled, because what was clear to him was not clear to his readers, who were not initiated into the genesis of his terms. An example of how a legend can grow on inept reading is this: Translate "Begriff" by "concept," "Vernunft" by "reason" and "Wissenschaft" by "science" – and they are all good dictionary translations – and you have transformed the great critic of rationalism and irrationalism into a ridiculous champion of an absurd pan-logistic rationalism and scientism. The most vexing and devastating Hegel legend is that everything is thought in "thesis, antithesis, and synthesis." [ 7 ]

Karl Marx (1818–1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820–1895) adopted and extended the triad, especially in Marx's The Poverty of Philosophy (1847). Here, in Chapter 2, Marx is obsessed by the word "thesis"; [ 8 ] it forms an important part of the basis for the Marxist theory of history. [ 9 ]

2. Writing Pedagogy

In modern times, the dialectic of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis has been implemented across the world as a strategy for organizing expositional writing. For example, this technique is taught as a basic organizing principle in French schools: [ 10 ]

The French learn to value and practice eloquence from a young age. Almost from day one, students are taught to produce plans for their compositions, and are graded on them. The structures change with fashions. Youngsters were once taught to express a progression of ideas. Now they follow a dialectic model of thesis-antithesis-synthesis. If you listen carefully to the French arguing about any topic they all follow this model closely: they present an idea, explain possible objections to it, and then sum up their conclusions. ... This analytical mode of reasoning is integrated into the entire school corpus.

Thesis, Antithesis, and Synthesis has also been used as a basic scheme to organize writing in the English language. For example, the website WikiPreMed.com advocates the use of this scheme in writing timed essays for the MCAT standardized test: [ 11 ]

For the purposes of writing MCAT essays, the dialectic describes the progression of ideas in a critical thought process that is the force driving your argument. A good dialectical progression propels your arguments in a way that is satisfying to the reader. The thesis is an intellectual proposition. The antithesis is a critical perspective on the thesis. The synthesis solves the conflict between the thesis and antithesis by reconciling their common truths, and forming a new proposition.

• Samuel Taylor Coleridge: Opus Maximum. Princeton University Press, 2002, p. 89.
• Harry Ritter, Dictionary of Concepts in History. Greenwood Publishing Group (1986), p.114
• Williams, Robert R. (1992). Recognition: Fichte and Hegel on the Other. SUNY Press. p. 46, note 37. 
• Fichte, Johann Gottlieb; Breazeale, Daniel (1993). Fichte: Early Philosophical Writings. Cornell University Press. p. 249. 
• Walter Kaufmann (1966). "§ 37". Hegel: A Reinterpretation. Anchor Books. ISBN 978-0-268-01068-3. OCLC 3168016. https://archive.org/details/hegelreinterpret00kauf. 
• Mueller, Gustav (1958). "The Hegel Legend of "Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis"". Journal of the History of Ideas 19 (4): 411–414. doi:10.2307/2708045.  https://dx.doi.org/10.2307%2F2708045
• Mueller 1958, p. 411.
• marxists.org: Chapter 2 of "The Poverty of Philosophy", by Karl Marx https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1847/poverty-philosophy/ch02.htm
• Shrimp, Kaleb (2009). "The Validity of Karl Marx's Theory of Historical Materialism". Major Themes in Economics 11 (1): 35–56. https://scholarworks.uni.edu/mtie/vol11/iss1/5/. Retrieved 13 September 2018. 
• Nadeau, Jean-Benoit; Barlow, Julie (2003). Sixty Million Frenchmen Can't Be Wrong: Why We Love France But Not The French. Sourcebooks, Inc.. p. 62. https://archive.org/details/sixtymillionfren00nade_041. 
• "The MCAT writing assignment.". Wisebridge Learning Systems, LLC. http://www.wikipremed.com/mcat_essay.php. Retrieved 1 November 2015. 

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Writing Tip: Three-Act Structure as Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis

Scott Myers

Go Into The Story

How we can apply this theory of dialectics to the story-crafting process.

I saw a tweet recently where someone mentioned that Hegel’s use of dialectics could be applied to story. Here is a definition I found online:

An interpretive method, originally used to relate specific entities or events to the absolute idea, in which some assertible proposition (thesis) is necessarily opposed by an equally assertible and apparently contradictory proposition (antithesis), the mutual contradiction being reconciled on a higher level of truth by a third proposition (synthesis).

One problem: Apparently, Hegel never used these terms — Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis. He did use these: Abstract — Negative — Concrete.

As for me, I never let pesky details such as facts get in the way of a possible teaching moment. And here we are!

Thesis — Antithesis — Synthesis as Three-Act Structure

Thesis (Act One): Where the writer establishes the Protagonist in the context of their Ordinary Life. They have cobbled together beliefs and behaviors, coping skills and defense mechanisms into a life which Joseph Campbell describes as “just making do.” Psychologically speaking, we may refer to this as an Inauthentic Existence. This is not the life the Protagonist is supposed to be living. The thesis is this: This character is capable of making this life a meaningful one … as it is.

And then … a “plop point” . Some refer to it as an Inciting Incident. Others the Call to Adventure. I call it The Hook. Whatever its name, it is the Story Universe acting as Fate creating an event which disrupts the Protagonist’s Ordinary Life. The Protagonist may respond affirmatively to the Call or refuse it, but eventually off they go on their Journey.

Antithesis (Act Two): In effect, the Story Universe is saying: You can no longer live this life. You have to change. This is the opposite of the Thesis state. Act Two is a battle between the pull for the Protagonist to go back to their Old Ways of Being and the push toward New Ways of Being. The events in the Plotline not only challenge the Protagonist, they break down the Thesis elements which opens them up to latent dynamics inside their Self which are the substance of their Authentic Nature.

After a journey in which each trial and tribulation knocks down the Old Ways and compels the Protagonist to embrace the New Ways, they eventually have some sort of Final Struggle. If they have fully embraced their True Nature, they experience …

Synthesis (Act Three): Carl Jung uses this exact language. “The goal of the individuation process is the synthesis of the self.” Individuation is the psychological process each of us is called to undertake. The path toward wholeness is engage and understand all aspects of the Self: memories, associations, instincts, habits, taboos, even the Shadow, our darkest impulses and urges. For it is only by processing all of who we are that we can hope to synthesize them into a whole.

Ultimately, the Outer Journey of the Plotline is about the Inner Journey of the Protagonist into their Self.

That works for me. This also does.

Abstract — Negative — Concrete: Three-Act Structure

Abstract (Act One): If the Outer Journey really is about the Inner Journey into the Protagonist’s inner nature, then it stands to reason that what they discover is already there at the beginning of the story. As screenwriters, we often begin character development by asking, “ What is this character’s Need?” I believe that question is best served as a kind of diamond-tipped drill we use to burrow down … down … down into the deepest part of the Protagonist’s psyche. There are layers of needs, but at the core of their being lies a seed. As Ovid wrote, “The seeds of change lie within.”

That seed is why the story exists. It’s why the Protagonist goes on their journey. Because that need is their Unconscious Goal.

In Act One, the Protagonist is unaware of all this. Therefore, their Unconscious Goal is nothing more than Abstract. It’s real in that it exists within, but it’s unreal in the conscious life of the Protagonist because for whatever reason, they are ignoring it … unaware of it … repressing it. In fact, subconsciously they may even fear facing it. Which leads to …

Negative (Act Two): What better way to explore the psychological connection between the Protagonist’s conscious and subconscious self than by having a Nemesis who is the physicalization of the Protagonist’s fear. That Negative energy can create great drama. It also contributes to the Deconstruction of the Protagonist’s Old Ways of Being which allows for that seed … the seed is the Need … to emerge into the light of the Protagonist’s consciousness which inspires the Reconstruction of their New Ways of Being. And as the Protagonist embraces their Authentic Nature …

Concrete (Act Three): What was once illusory and ephemera, an Abstract becomes Concrete. The Protagonist feels it … senses it … knows it to their core. It empowers their choices and actions.

It leads them to a positive resolution of the Final Struggle and a move toward Unity.

Either language system works for me as they both speak to the inner journey. After all, Joseph Campbell said the whole point of the Hero’s Journey is transformation . Or in the words of Carl Jung, “The privilege of a lifetime is to become who you are.”

If you like what you read here, check out my book: The Protagonist’s Journey: An Introduction to Character-Driven Screenwriting and Storytelling is an Amazon #1 Best Seller in Film and Television. Endorsed by over thirty professional screenwriters, novelists, and academics , you may purchase it here . If you want an autographed copy, go here .

Written by Scott Myers

More from scott myers and go into the story.

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Persuasive Writing In Three Steps: Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis

April 14, 2021 by Ryan Law in

Great writing persuades. It persuades the reader that your product is right for them, that your process achieves the outcome they desire, that your opinion supersedes all other opinions. But spend an hour clicking around the internet and you’ll quickly realise that most content is passive, presenting facts and ideas without context or structure. The reader must connect the dots and create a convincing argument from the raw material presented to them. They rarely do, and for good reason: It’s hard work. The onus of persuasion falls on the writer, not the reader. Persuasive communication is a timeless challenge with an ancient solution. Zeno of Elea cracked it in the 5th century B.C. Georg Hegel gave it a lick of paint in the 1800s. You can apply it to your writing in three simple steps: thesis, antithesis, synthesis.

Use Dialectic to Find Logical Bedrock

“ Dialectic ” is a complicated-sounding idea with a simple meaning: It’s a structured process for taking two seemingly contradictory viewpoints and, through reasoned discussion, reaching a satisfactory conclusion. Over centuries of use the term has been burdened with the baggage of philosophy and academia. But at its heart, dialectics reflects a process similar to every spirited conversation or debate humans have ever had:

• Person A presents an idea: “We should travel to the Eastern waterhole because it’s closest to camp.”
• Person B disagrees and shares a counterargument: “I saw wolf prints on the Eastern trail, so we should go to the Western waterhole instead.”
• Person A responds to the counterargument , either disproving it or modifying their own stance to accommodate the criticism: “I saw those same wolf prints, but our party is large enough that the wolves won’t risk an attack.”
• Person B responds in a similar vein: “Ordinarily that would be true, but half of our party had dysentery last week so we’re not at full strength.”
• Person A responds: “They got dysentery from drinking at the Western waterhole.”

This process continues until conversational bedrock is reached: an idea that both parties understand and agree to, helped by the fact they’ve both been a part of the process that shaped it.

Dialectic is intended to help draw closer to the “truth” of an argument, tempering any viewpoint by working through and resolving its flaws. This same process can also be used to persuade.

Create Inevitability with Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis

The philosopher Georg Hegel is most famous for popularizing a type of dialectics that is particularly well-suited to writing: thesis, antithesis, synthesis (also known, unsurprisingly, as Hegelian Dialectic ).

• Thesis: Present the status quo, the viewpoint that is currently accepted and widely held.
• Antithesis: Articulate the problems with the thesis. (Hegel also called this phase “the negative.”)
• Synthesis: Share a new viewpoint (a modified thesis) that resolves the problems.

Hegel’s method focused less on the search for absolute truth and more on replacing old ideas with newer, more sophisticated versions . That, in a nutshell, is the same objective as much of content marketing (and particularly thought leadership content ): We’re persuading the reader that our product, processes, and ideas are better and more useful than the “old” way of doing things. Thesis, antithesis, synthesis (or TAS) is a persuasive writing structure because it:

• Reduces complex arguments into a simple three-act structure. Complicated, nuanced arguments are simplified into a clear, concise format that anyone can follow. This simplification reflects well on the author: It takes mastery of a topic to explain it in it the simplest terms.
• Presents a balanced argument by “steelmanning” the best objection. Strong, one-sided arguments can trigger reactance in the reader: They don’t want to feel duped. TAS gives voice to their doubts, addressing their best objection and “giv[ing] readers the chance to entertain the other side, making them feel as though they have come to an objective conclusion.”
• Creates a sense of inevitability. Like a story building to a satisfying conclusion, articles written with TAS take the reader on a structured, logical journey that culminates in precisely the viewpoint we wish to advocate for. Doubts are voiced, ideas challenged, and the conclusion reached feels more valid and concrete as a result.

There are two main ways to apply TAS to your writing: Use it beef up your introductions, or apply it to your article’s entire structure.

Writing Article Introductions with TAS

Take a moment to scroll back to the top of this article. If I’ve done my job correctly, you’ll notice a now familiar formula staring back at you: The first three paragraphs are built around Hegel’s thesis, antithesis, synthesis structure. Here’s what the introduction looked like during the outlining process . The first paragraph shares the thesis, the accepted idea that great writing should be persuasive:

Next up, the antithesis introduces a complicating idea, explaining why most content marketing isn’t all that persuasive:

Finally, the synthesis shares a new idea that serves to reconcile the two previous paragraphs: Content can be made persuasive by using the thesis, antithesis, synthesis framework. The meat of the article is then focused on the nitty-gritty of the synthesis.

Introductions are hard, but thesis, antithesis, synthesis offers a simple way to write consistently persuasive opening copy. In the space of three short paragraphs, the article’s key ideas are shared , the entire argument is summarised, and—hopefully—the reader is hooked.

Best of all, most articles—whether how-to’s, thought leadership content, or even list content—can benefit from Hegelian Dialectic , for the simple reason that every article introduction should be persuasive enough to encourage the reader to stick around.

Structuring Entire Articles with TAS

Harder, but most persuasive, is to use thesis, antithesis, synthesis to structure your entire article. This works best for thought leadership content. Here, your primary objective is to advocate for a new idea and disprove the old, tired way of thinking—exactly the use case Hegel intended for his dialectic. It’s less useful for content that explores and illustrates a process, because the primary objective is to show the reader how to do something (like this article—otherwise, I would have written the whole darn thing using the framework). Arjun Sethi’s article The Hive is the New Network is a great example.

The article’s primary purpose is to explain why the “old” model of social networks is outmoded and offer a newer, better framework. (It would be equally valid—but less punchy—to publish this with the title “ Why the Hive is the New Network.”) The thesis, antithesis, synthesis structure shapes the entire article:

• Thesis: Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram grew by creating networks “that brought existing real-world relationships online.”
• Antithesis: As these networks grow, the less useful they become, skewing towards bots, “celebrity, meme and business accounts.”
• Synthesis: To survive continued growth, these networks need to embrace a new structure and become hives.

With the argument established, the vast majority of the article is focused on synthesis. After all, it requires little elaboration to share the status quo in a particular situation, and it’s relatively easy to point out the problems with a given idea. The synthesis—the solution that needs to reconcile both thesis and antithesis—is the hardest part to tackle and requires the greatest word count. Throughout the article, Arjun is systematically addressing the “best objections” to his theory and demonstrating why the “Hive” is the best solution:

• Antithesis: Why now? Why didn’t Hives emerge in the first place?
• Thesis: We were limited by technology, but today, we have the necessary infrastructure: “We’re no longer limited to a broadcast radio model, where one signal is received by many nodes. ...We sync with each other instantaneously, and all the time.”
• Antithesis: If the Hive is so smart, why aren’t our brightest and best companies already embracing it?
• Thesis: They are, and autonomous cars are a perfect example: “Why are all these vastly different companies converging on the autonomous car? That’s because for these companies, it’s about platform and hive, not just about roads without drivers.”

It takes bravery to tackle objections head-on and an innate understanding of the subject matter to even identify objections in the first place, but the effort is worthwhile. The end result is a structured journey through the arguments for and against the “Hive,” with the reader eventually reaching the same conclusion as the author: that “Hives” are superior to traditional networks.

Destination: Persuasion

Persuasion isn’t about cajoling or coercing the reader. Statistics and anecdotes alone aren’t all that persuasive. Simply sharing a new idea and hoping that it will trigger an about-turn in the reader’s beliefs is wishful thinking. Instead, you should take the reader on a journey—the same journey you travelled to arrive at your newfound beliefs, whether it’s about the superiority of your product or the zeitgeist-changing trend that’s about to break. Hegelian Dialectic—thesis, antithesis, synthesis— is a structured process for doing precisely that. It contextualises your ideas and explains why they matter. It challenges the idea and strengthens it in the process. Using centuries-old processes, it nudges the 21st-century reader onto a well-worn path that takes them exactly where they need to go.

Ryan is the Content Director at Ahrefs and former CMO of Animalz.

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Encyclopedia of Sciences and Religions

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The first to involve all academic disciplines

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The first to treat important thinkers and concepts in direct relation to their significance for religions and academic disciplines

The first to include the views of religious and academic authorities, as well as outsider perspectives

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Table of contents (1682 entries)

Front matter, a priori arguments, a priori/a posteriori.

• Neil Spurway

Abhidhamma Piṭaka

Abhidhamma, southern.

• Ven. Agganyani

Abhidharma, Northern

• Kuala Lumpur Dhammajoti

Aboriginal Studies

Academic theology, action control.

• Giacomo Rizzolatti, Maria Alessandra Umiltà

Adaptation, Behavioral

Adaptationism, adaptiveness, aesthetics (philosophy).

• Charles Taliaferro

Affective Attitudes

• Disciplinarity
• Disciplinary Identity
• Inter-disciplinarity
• Philosophy of Religion
• Philosophy of Science

"To all who love the God with a 1000 names and respect science”

In the last quarter century, the academic field of Science and Theology (Religion) has attracted scholars from a wide variety of disciplines. The question is, which disciplines are attracted and what do these disciplines have to contribute to the debate? In order to answer this question, the encyclopedia maps the (self)-identified disciplines and religious traditions that participate or might come to participate in the Science and Religion debate. This is done by letting each representative of a discipline and tradition answer specific chosen questions. They also need to identify the discipline in relation to the Science and Religion debate. Understandably representatives of several disciplines and traditions answered in the negative to this question. Nevertheless, they can still be important for the debate; indeed, scholars and scientists who work in the field of Science and Theology (Religion) may need knowledge beyond their own specific discipline. Therefore the encyclopedia also includes what are called general entries. Such entries may explain specific theories, methods, and topics. The general aim is to provide a starting point for new lines of inquiry. It is an invitation for fresh perspectives on the possibilities for engagement between and across sciences (again which includes the social and human sciences) and religions and theology. This encyclopedia is a comprehensive reference work for scholars interested in the topic of ‘Science and Religion.’ It covers the widest spectrum possible of academic disciplines and religious traditions worldwide, with the intent of laying bare similarities and differences that naturally emerge within and across disciplines and religions today. The A–Z format throughout affords easy and user-friendly access to relevant information. Additionally, a systematic question-answer format across all Sciences and Religions entries affords efficient identification of specific points of agreement, conflict, and disinterest across and between sciences and religions. The extensive cross-referencing between key words, phrases, and technical language used in the entries facilitates easy searches. We trust that all of the entries have something of value for any interested reader.

Anne L.C. Runehov and Lluis Oviedo

Anne L. C. Runehov

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Book Title : Encyclopedia of Sciences and Religions

Editors : Anne L. C. Runehov, Lluis Oviedo

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-8265-8

Publisher : Springer Dordrecht

eBook Packages : Humanities, Social Sciences and Law

Copyright Information : Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Hardcover ISBN : 978-1-4020-8264-1 Published: 18 May 2013

eBook ISBN : 978-1-4020-8265-8 Published: 19 June 2013

Edition Number : 1

Number of Pages : LVIII, 2372

Number of Illustrations : 31 b/w illustrations, 50 illustrations in colour

Topics : Religious Studies, general , Science, Humanities and Social Sciences, multidisciplinary , Philosophy of Religion , Philosophy of Science , Regional and Cultural Studies

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