research papers on jury trial

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• Psychiatr Psychol Law
• v.25(3); 2018

What Evidence Matters to Jurors? The Prevalence and Importance of Different Homicide Trial Evidence to Mock Jurors

Kimberly schweitzer.

a Department of Criminal Justice University of Wyoming Laramie, WY, United States

Narina Nuñez

b Department of Psychology University of Wyoming Laramie, WY, United States

The present research explores how important different trial evidence is to mock jurors’ decisions. Study 1 surveys legal professionals to determine what evidence is common at homicide trials. Study 2 utilizes the list of evidence generated in Study 1 to ask mock jurors to report how important each piece of evidence would be in deciding their verdicts. The results indicate that DNA is most important to mock jurors, followed by fingerprints, the weapon, video records, crime-scene photos, gunshot residue, bodily secretions, video confession, testimony from a forensic expert, and eyewitness testimony. Study 3 utilizes a different methodology wherein mock jurors were presented with folders labeled with different evidence and asked to choose the piece of evidence they wanted to learn more about first, second, and so on. The results from Study 3 indicate again that DNA evidence is most important to mock jurors, followed by video confession evidence, eyewitness testimony, and fingerprint evidence. Implications are discussed.

Although approximately 90 to 95% of criminal cases end in a plea deal, the remaining 5 to 10% of cases can end up in a jury trial (Devers, 2011 ). These cases tend to concern more serious offenses (e.g., first-degree murder) and often are not ‘slam dunk’ cases for either side. Thus, the criminal justice system relies on jurors to be the fact-finders and determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant through listening to a variety of different types of evidence presented at a trial. A subset of the empirical literature in psychology and law has attempted to determine how important mock jurors perceive the different pieces of trial evidence to be when making their verdict decisions. This research has typically been carried out using a deductive approach informed by theory. Although deductive research is common and often warranted, the present research was conducted to determine if utilizing an inductive approach to researching jurors’ perceptions of the importance of trial evidence would lead to similar results.

Knowing which evidence jurors perceive to be most important has many benefits. First, researchers can focus their efforts on the evidence that is most important to jurors. Specifically, researchers can test and explore how different methods of presentation and different characteristics of that evidence might lead jurors to make different decisions. Thus, the literature would better reflect the needs of those wanting to apply it to the courtroom. Second, legal actors (e.g., attorneys and judges) can make more informed decisions if they know what evidence is important to jurors. For example, prosecutors and defense attorneys would know what evidence is likely to bolster or weaken their case and can adjust their strategies accordingly. Thus, knowing what evidence jurors might value has both empirical and practical applications. To provide guidance for researchers and practitioners, the present research explores how important mock jurors report different pieces of evidence to be, utilizing an inductive approach to research.

Jurors’ Weighting of Evidence

To explore how jurors may weight specific pieces of evidence in their verdict decisions, the existing literature on the impact of three broad types of evidence on jurors’ verdicts is reviewed briefly (i.e., eyewitness testimony, expert testimony, and visual evidence).

Eyewitness Testimony

Research on eyewitness testimony is abundant and has been ongoing for more than 30 years. Although eyewitness testimony is arguably the most convincing evidence presented at trial, it is also one of the most unreliable pieces of evidence (e.g., Loftus & Schneider, 1987 ; Wells & Olson, 2003 ). This is a dangerous combination, illustrated by the fact that jurors believe eyewitness identifications to be more reliable than they actually are (Brigham & Bothwell, 1983 ). The most influential part of eyewitness testimony to jurors is the confidence of the witness (Cutler, Penrod, & Dexter, 1990 ), with increased witness confidence leading to increased perceived credibility of the witness (e.g., Wells & Lindsay, 1983 ; Whitley & Greenberg, 1986 ) and increased likelihood to convict (e.g., Cutler et al., 1990 ; Fox & Walters, 1986 ; Levett, Danielsen, Kovera, & Cutler, 2005 ; Wells, Lindsay, & Ferguson, 1979 ). Unfortunately, statistics on the prevalence of eyewitness testimony are difficult to find; however, one may infer through white papers, Supreme Court rulings, and exonerations based on fallible testimony that eyewitness testimony is common at trial.

Expert Testimony

Like eyewitness testimony, expert testimony has received attention from psycho-legal researchers, with the research regarding the impact yielding mixed findings. The various types of experts used in psycho-legal research may explain why the findings on how much weight jurors give expert testimony are varied. Using Bayes Theorem to determine the appropriate weights, some researchers have found that jurors under-weight scientific expert testimony (Faigman & Baglioni, 1988 ; Kaye & Koehler, 1991 ; Martire, Kemp, Sayle, & Newell, 2014 ; Thompson & Schumann, 1987 ), while others have found that jurors weight the testimony appropriately (Brekke, Enko, Clavet, & Seelau, 1991 ; Nuñez, Gray, & Buck, 2012 ; Saks & Wissler, 1984 ), and other researchers have found in the same study that some jurors under-weight expert testimony and others give expert testimony too much weight (B. C. Smith, Penrod, Otto, & Park, 1996 ). The broad range of the type of expert makes it difficult to draw conclusions on the degree to which jurors weight expert testimony in their final decisions. As Gross ( 1991 ) points out, there are other pieces of evidence that may play a larger role in jurors’ final decisions, such as eyewitness testimony. Presently, the majority of the research regarding the weight that jurors place on expert testimony deals specifically with psychological experts (e.g., Cutler & Kovera, 2011 ).

Research has also explored how common expert testimony is at both criminal and civil trials. The most recent exploration of the prevalence of expert testimony at trial found that in civil cases in 2012 in Polk County, IA, 86% of cases had at least one expert testify (Jurs, 2016 ). The next most recent research found similar numbers: in civil cases randomly selected to be a part of the Arizona Jury Project in 1996/7, 86% contained expert testimony (Diamond, 2007 ). However, the prevalence of expert testimony has been shown to differ based on city. In both civil and criminal cases in 1990 and 1991, experts were present in 92% of cases in Baltimore, MD, 46% of cases in Seattle, WA, and 80% of cases in Tuscon, AZ (Shuman, Whitaker, & Champagne, 1994 ). Two years prior (1988), research indicated that 63% of civil cases in Dallas, TX, contained expert testimony. Thus, it seems that not only has the prevalence of expert testimony increased over time, but also that prevalence varies according to city and state. Unfortunately, much of the existing research does not further break down the prevalence of expert testimony by type of expert, although Diamond ( 2007 ) reports that the experts included physicians, mental health professionals, biomechanical engineers, financial analysts, and academic scientists (frequencies of each are not given).

Visual Evidence

A third type of evidence, visual evidence, has long been used to supplement the testimony of experts and eyewitnesses (Mnookin, 1998 ), and has become increasingly common as technology has advanced (Feigenson & Spiesel, 2009 ). As the prevalence of photographs, videos, and maps has increased, so too has the concern regarding their influence on jurors (Bornstein, Miller, Nemeth, Page, & Musil, 2005 ). Much of the psycho-legal literature has focused on the effect of gruesome crime-scene pictures on jurors’ decisions. For example, Bright and Goodman-Delahunty ( 2006 ) presented participants with gruesome crime-scene pictures, neutral pictures, or no pictures and examined how the pictures affected verdicts. It was found that the mock jurors who were shown pictures, whether gruesome or not, were more likely to find the defendant guilty than those who were not shown any pictures (Bright & Goodman-Delahunty, 2006 ). Finkelstein and Bastounis ( 2010 ) examined the effects of a crime-scene photograph on mock jurors’ sentencing recommendations. The participants read a trial transcript depicting an involuntary homicide and half were shown a photograph of the bloody victim at the crime scene. The participants were then asked to sentence the defendant (who had already been found guilty) to up to 15 years in prison. The participants who were shown the photograph of the crime scene gave significantly longer sentences than those who did not see the photograph (Finkelstein & Bastounis, 2010 ). These findings and others indicate that visual evidence, particularly when it is gruesome, leads to more punitive decisions (e.g., Bright & Goodman-Delahunty, 2006 ; Finkelstein & Bastounis, 2010 ; Oliver & Griffitt, 1976 ; Whalen & Blanchard, 1982 ).

The Present Research

The present research was designed to extend the current literature regarding the prevalence and importance of trial evidence (e.g., eyewitness testimony, expert testimony and visual evidence) by first determining what types of evidence are commonly presented to jurors during trial. As the literature on the prevalence of expert testimony indicates, factors such as the location of the court can impact prevalence statistics. Thus, the present research surveyed legal professionals from various locations in the United States in order to obtain a more diverse perspective. Second, the present research seeks to explore how important mock jurors view the prevalent evidence to be. The evidence presented at any given trial is case-type specific, so a decision was made to examine homicide trials because of the frequency at which homicides occur; homicide was the most severe offense in the 75 largest counties in the United States for 60% of the defendants arrested for more than one felony in 2009, second only to rape (65%; Reaves, 2013 ).

Study 1 was conducted to determine what evidence is commonly presented at homicide trials by surveying a sample of legal professionals (e.g., lawyers and judges). Study 2 and Study 3 were designed to explore how important this evidence is to mock jurors using two different methodologies. Because this research is exploratory and uses an inductive approach, specific hypotheses were not warranted. Overall, the goal was to determine what evidence, when given a list of common homicide trial evidence, mock jurors would find important to the process of reaching a verdict in a homicide trial.

The purpose of Study 1 is to determine what evidence legal professionals report as being commonly presented at homicide trials. Presently, there is only one published study that explores what evidence is presented at trial, although it is specific to civil trials and expert testimony, and is based on 30-year-old trial data (Gross, 1991 ). Additionally, there are no field studies to the authors’ knowledge that explore the frequency of a variety of different pieces/types of evidence at criminal homicide trials. As such, Study 1 is necessary in order to obtain some sort of empirically supported list of evidence that is commonly presented at homicide trials to utilize in future studies.

Participants and Design

Attorneys and judges ( n = 136) from six states (CA, CO, IA, MI, TX, and WI) in the United States participated in the current study. The states recruited from were chosen after a search of online legal professional databases was conducted across the country. This search yielded five states (CA, CO, IA, MI, and WI) which had emails for criminal attorneys (both public and private) and judges listed on their respective websites. Contact information for attorneys and judges from the sixth state, TX, was obtained from another research group that had generated an email list for a previous study utilizing legal professionals. These states provide a representative range in the sentencing guidelines for homicide (i.e., first- or second-degree murder) from a minimum of 25 years to a maximum of either life in prison without the possibility of parole or the death penalty. Further, the chosen states also provide a balanced representation of political beliefs, with two states being traditionally liberal (CA and CO), three states being traditionally conservative (TX, WI, and MI), and one state being traditionally split (IA).

Potential participants ( n = 3098) were then contacted via email, briefly told the purpose of the study, and provided with a link to participate. The participants did not receive compensation for their time, but instead were offered to be sent the findings of the study if desired. Approximately 4% ( n = 136) of the legal professionals who were contacted completed the survey. Of those, the majority of participants were male (76%) and had been practicing law for an average of 26 years, with 66% of the sample being criminal defense attorneys.

Materials and Procedure

Interested legal professionals were instructed to click on the study link provided to them at the bottom of the email solicitation they received. They were then taken to the study website and presented with informed consent documentation. Those who did not consent to participate were redirected to a thank you page and were not presented with any study materials. Those who consented to participate then proceeded through the study. Participants were first asked their gender, what type of legal professional they were, how many years they had been practicing, in what state they currently practiced, and if they had ever worked on a homicide case. Participants were then given a list of 66 pieces of evidence generated by a group of psycho-legal researchers and informed by existing literature, and a database of capital murder trial transcripts. From this list, the participants were asked to report whether they thought each piece of evidence was commonly presented at homicide trials, as well as whether or not each piece of evidence was presented at the last homicide trial they were a part of. Participants were asked if the evidence was present at their last trial to ensure they were not suffering from availability or representativeness heuristics. Participants were shown the list of 66 pieces of evidence in four separate groups (i.e., physical/biological, documentary, demonstrative, and testimony).

Lastly, participants were asked if there were any pieces of evidence they thought should have been included as part of the list of evidence presented, to account for the possibility that the list is not exhaustive. Responses to this question varied greatly; thus, no new pieces of evidence were added to the original list.

To determine whether or not availability heuristics were at play, differences between ‘common’ and ‘last’ selections were explored and found to be non-significant. Table 1 lists the 66 pieces of evidence from most common to least common based on the legal professionals’ percentages of endorsement as common. The following 10 pieces of evidence were selected as commonly presented at homicide trials by over 50% of the legal actors surveyed: crime-scene pictures, witness to the crime, diagrams of injuries, police officer expert testimony, forensic expert testimony, weapon, fingerprints, maps, audio confession, and video confession. See Table 1 for the additional evidence and the percent of endorsement associated with each piece of evidence.

Common homicide trial evidence according to attorneys (Study 1), average importance of evidence according to mTurk participants (Study 2), and the difference between the two.

There are some pieces of evidence that legal professionals reported as commonly appearing at criminal homicide trials (e.g., eyewitnesses) which have received research attention from psycho-legal researchers (for a review, see Wells & Olson, 2003 ). However, there are other pieces of evidence that the legal experts listed as commonly appearing at homicide trials which have received little scrutiny (e.g., diagrams of injuries), as well as pieces of evidence which have received substantial attention from researchers (e.g., psychological expert testimony) that the legal professionals said are not commonly presented at homicide trials. Thus, future research may focus on some of the under-studied pieces of evidence to determine if and how they affect jurors’ decisions. The main purpose of Study 1, however, was to generate a list of evidence that legal professionals reported as frequently appearing in homicide trials. This list was then utilized as the basis for Study 2 and Study 3.

The purpose of Study 2 is to determine how important mock jurors think the evidence from Study 1 is in determining their verdicts. As reviewed earlier, the literature suggests that certain types of evidence are more important to mock jurors than others. For example, research has shown that when a witness expresses confidence in his or her identification of the defendant, mock jurors are more likely to find the defendant guilty (e.g., Cutler et al., 1990 ; Levett et al., 2005 ). Furthermore, photographs have also been shown to impact mock jurors’ decisions, suggesting that mock jurors place greater weight on photographic evidence than on verbal evidence (e.g., Bright & Goodman-Delahunty, 2006 ). Expert testimony, however, has not been consistently shown to influence mock jurors’ decisions. Thus, more research is necessary to determine the role of expert testimony at trial. Study 2 is designed to further explore the perceived importance of a large variety of evidence to mock jurors, beyond eyewitness, expert, and visual evidence. A second goal of Study 2 is to narrow down the list of pieces of evidence that at least 20% of the sample said were commonly presented at homicide trials from Study 1 (41 pieces) to 10 pieces of evidence that mock jurors reported as being most important in making verdict decisions.

Participants

The participants ( n = 317) were recruited through Amazon's Mechanical Turk (mTurk) and compensated for their time through mTurk. Participants who were not United States citizens ( n = 8), who did not identify as living in the United States ( n = 5), or who failed an attention check question (i.e., ‘Please select four for this question’, n = 8) were excluded from analyses, leaving data from 296 participants, of which 175 (59.1%) were male and 234 (79.1%) were Caucasian, ranging in age from 18 to 67 years ( M = 34.78).

After consenting to participate, the participants were told to imagine they were serving on a jury whose duty it was to decide whether or not the defendant was guilty of homicide. The participants were instructed that they would be presented with 41 pieces of evidence (derived from Study 1; see Table 1 ) and asked to rate how important each piece would be in reaching a verdict. Each piece of evidence was presented without context. For example, participants were asked to rate how important DNA evidence would be when making a verdict decision and were not told whose DNA it was or where it was found. Participants were told to think about each piece of evidence as though it was the only evidence presented at trial. This was done to attempt to gain ratings of each piece of evidence independent of the other pieces. Participants were then presented with the evidence in a randomized order and asked to rate the level of importance of each using a 10-point Likert scale (where 1 = not at all important to 10 = very important ). When participants finished rating the evidence, they completed a basic demographic questionnaire and received a code to obtain compensation through mTurk.

All 41 pieces of evidence have mean scores at or above the midpoint of the scale (i.e., 5.5), indicating that each piece of evidence was on average perceived as somewhat important by mock jurors in making their verdict decisions (see Table 1 ). Although the mean rating of importance for each piece of evidence is high, there is no indication of ceiling effects; the entire range of the scale was used for all but 8 items. The results indicate that the 10 pieces of evidence mock jurors reported would be most important when deciding a verdict are (in order of importance): (1) DNA, (2) fingerprints, (3) weapon, (4) video records, (5) crime-scene photos, (6) gunshot residue, (7) other bodily secretions, (8) video confession, (9) forensic expert testimony, and (10) eyewitness testimony (see Table 2 for descriptive statistics). A comparison of the findings of Study 1 and Study 2 is presented in Table 1 .

Study 2 descriptive statistics.

The purpose of Study 2 was to obtain ratings of importance of a list of evidence that at least 20% of legal actors said are commonly presented at homicide trials. The results indicate that, on average, the jurors viewed all of the pieces of evidence to be at least somewhat important in order to reach a verdict. However, there are at least 10 pieces of evidence that the jurors rated as highly important, including some types of evidence that psycho-legal researchers have been researching (e.g., expert testimony, eyewitness testimony, and photographic evidence) and others that have received less attention (e.g., video records).

DNA evidence, which mock jurors in this study rated on average as most important when deciding a verdict (and which 49% of legal actors said is common at homicide trial), has more recently received attention from researchers (e.g., L. Smith & Bull, 2014 ; Walsh, Ribaux, Buckleton, Ross, & Roux, 2004 ). Unfortunately, like eyewitness testimony, research has found that jurors have trouble understanding the fallibility of DNA evidence, especially when conveyed in statistical terms (Findlay & Grix, 2003 ; Lieberman, Carrell, Miethe, & Krauss, 2008 ; Villejoubert & Mandel, 2002 ). In fact, Koehler ( 1996 ) found that even when mock jurors were presented with the exact same DNA evidence expressed in different notations (frequency, likelihood ratio, or posterior odds ratio), they weighted the testimony differently in their verdict decisions. Other empirical research has found that compared to Bayes Theorem, jurors over-weight (Koehler, Chia, & Lindsey, 1995 ) and under-weight (Nance & Morris, 2005 ; Schklar & Diamond, 1999 ) DNA evidence. Additionally, Lieberman et al. ( 2008 ) found that DNA evidence is the most persuasive type of evidence in determining the suspect's guilt, and is found to be even more persuasive than eyewitness testimony. This subset of research concerning DNA evidence illustrates the lack of agreement regarding the role DNA plays in jurors’ verdict decisions, further illustrating the need for more research on the topic.

The list of the 10 most important pieces of evidence as rated by the mock jurors that was obtained from Study 2 was utilized for Study 3, which was designed to partially replicate the findings from Study 2 using a different methodology. Specifically, the goal of Study 3 is to determine if having only the 10 most important pieces of evidence from Study 2 to choose from would alter mock jurors’ perceptions of importance, or if the results would remain the same as those of Study 2. However, Study 3 was designed to explore jurors’ perceptions of importance by measuring importance in a different way. The methodology utilized in Study 3 allowed the mock jurors to choose how they wanted to progress through the evidence at trial. It was realized that jurors in actual trials cannot choose what evidence they receive and the order in which they receive it, but this methodology made it possible to see how jurors might prioritize different kinds of evidence in in order to make their decision. This methodology, called a process-tracing method (for a review, see Schulte-Mecklenbeck et al., 2017 ), reveals how people collect information before making a decision, and has been used to study various aspects of decision-making (e.g., political decisions, Redlawsk, 2002 ).

Because mock jurors were allowed to choose the order in which they saw the pieces of evidence and because there were 10 pieces of evidence available, there are over 3 million possible orders. To minimize the number of different orders, a pilot test was completed first with the 10 pieces of evidence from Study 2 to see if a consistent order emerged, with the goal of narrowing the number of items down to 4 or 5.

MTurk participants ( n = 96) were presented with brief juror instructions and asked to choose from 10 folders (DNA, Fingerprints, Weapon Involved in the Crime, Video Records, Photographs of the Crime Scene, Gunshot Residue, Other Bodily Secretions, Video Confessions, Forensic Expert's Testimony, and Witness to the Crime) the evidence that they wanted to learn more about first, second, and so on. After viewing the evidence, participants were asked to decide if the defendant was guilty of homicide.

Exactly 50% of the sample chose to view 5 or more pieces of evidence (of the 10 available), with 14.6% viewing all 10 pieces and 15.6% viewing 9 pieces. An examination of the mean ranking of each piece of evidence yielded 5 pieces that were on average viewed within the first 7 pieces of evidence chosen. The 5 pieces of evidence that are ranked highest, and therefore chosen on average first, are DNA ( M = 6.08, SE = 0.41), eyewitness testimony ( M = 5.09, SE = 0.41), fingerprints ( M = 4.79, SE = 0.41), video confession ( M = 4.44, SE = 0.40), and forensic expert testimony ( M = 4.12, SE = 0.38).

For Study 3 it was necessary to determine whether or not there were reliable differences amongst the top 4 or 5 pieces of evidence; 4 pieces allowed for 24 possible orders, whereas 5 pieces allowed for 120 possible orders. The data indicate that the most important piece of evidence across both Study 2 and the pilot study (DNA) is significantly different to the fifth ranked piece of evidence (forensic expert testimony), t (95) = 4.31, p < .001. For this reason, and the large difference in the number of possible order combinations (96) between using 4 and 5 pieces of evidence, Study 3 was conducted using the top 4 pieces of evidence from the present pilot study.

The participants ( n = 123) were recruited through mTurk and compensated for their time. Participants who were not United States citizens ( n = 2), who did not identify as living in the United States ( n = 4), or who failed an attention check question ( n = 3) were excluded from analyses, leaving data from 114 participants, of which 54 (47.4%) were male and 89 (78.1%) were Caucasian, with an age range of 20 to 77 years ( M = 35.37).

After consenting to participate, the participants were asked to assume the role of mock jurors in a homicide trial in which their job was to decide whether or not the defendant was guilty of homicide. The participants were first presented with brief juror instructions and then directed to another page on which the following instructions appeared:

The defendant in this case is on trial for homicide. The folders below contain information (if available) about the specific piece of evidence typed on each folder. Please select from the folders below which piece of evidence you would like to learn more about in the order of importance. For example, if you think Evidence ‘X’ is most important to making your decision, please select that folder first, and so on, until you have viewed all of the evidence. You may only choose one folder at a time, and you can open the same folder more than once, but you are asked to look at every folder. Your goal is to determine whether or not the defendant is guilty of homicide.

Below these instructions were four folders, and the location and order of each folder on the screen was randomized. Each folder was labeled with a different piece of evidence (DNA, Fingerprints, Video Confessions, and Witness to the Crime). After participants chose which piece they wanted to learn more about first, they were directed to another page in which they were given a brief description of the evidence. For example, if participants selected to learn more about DNA evidence first, they were directed to a page where they were told: ‘The defendant's DNA was a match to the DNA found at the scene of the crime’. Each description of the evidence implied guilt. This was done in order to minimize the complexity of the design and therefore increase power. If the culpability of the evidence had also been varied, there would have been 48 possible different orders.

If participants had not viewed all four pieces of evidence, they were redirected back to the page where the evidence folders were. When all four pieces of evidence had been viewed (or participants opted to give their verdicts), participants were asked to decide whether or not the defendant was guilty of homicide. Because the evidence was all indicative of guilt, it was expected that the majority of participants would find the defendant guilty. The participants then responded to several demographic questions and were compensated for their participation.

To test the order in which participants chose to progress through the evidence, the data were coded to indicate order of progression in line with Peters ( 2013 ). The piece of evidence that mock jurors chose to view first was coded as four, the second piece was coded as three, the third piece as two, and the fourth piece as one. Items that were not chosen to be viewed were coded as zero. An examination of the mean ranking for each piece of evidence indicates that, again, DNA evidence was most likely to be viewed first ( M = 2.95, SE = 0.11), then video confession evidence ( M = 2.46, SE = 0.11), eyewitness evidence ( M = 2.33, SE = 0.10), and fingerprint evidence ( M = 2.18, SE = 0.10). DNA evidence was on average more likely to be chosen first compared to video confession, eyewitness, and fingerprint evidence, with 46.49% of mock jurors viewing DNA evidence first. However, video confession, eyewitness, and fingerprint evidence were not found to be reliably different from each other in terms of rank and order ( p s > .05). Because of this, a different form of analysis was used to further explore the order in which mock jurors progressed through the evidence.

Using the statistical program R, four decision trees were created to examine the relationship between the different types of evidence. Decision trees iteratively split the variables of interest into different groups until a homogenous group is found. The base of the decision tree is referred to as the root and is the variable that best separates the data based on the dependent variable (DV). If the split at the root does not lead to two homogeneous groups, that node is then split again, with each group generated from the split referred to as a leaf. Splitting continues until the leaves furthest from the root are homogenous or the groups are too small. Decision trees allow for paths to be generated to show what happens when variables are split certain ways. Because the goal of a decision tree is to show the path to different categories, it is necessary to define the DV. Although mock jurors were asked to give a verdict, there was little variability in responses as all of the evidence was indicative of guilt; 88.6% of participants said the defendant was guilty. Therefore, instead of using the verdict as the DV, different decision trees were created with each piece of evidence serving as the DV.

Because the mock jurors in this study were significantly more likely to choose DNA evidence first, the decision tree in which the DNA evidence is the root was determined to be the most plausible decision tree ( Figure 1 ). The decision tree that begins with DNA evidence was created when eyewitness evidence was forced to be the DV. As can be seen in Figure 1 , the tree shows that when mock jurors viewed the DNA evidence first, 66% of them then viewed video confession evidence, then fingerprint evidence, and lastly eyewitness evidence. When mock jurors viewed DNA evidence third, fourth, or not at all ( M rank < 2.5), 34% of them viewed the eyewitness evidence next. The tree also shows that there are two paths that lead to eyewitness testimony being chosen approximately third ( M rank = 2.4): through video confession or fingerprint evidence. Because eyewitness evidence was set as the DV, it was forced to be last and therefore could not come before fingerprint evidence (or DNA or video confession evidence). Disregarding the fact that eyewitness testimony was forced to be the DV, the reported decision tree analysis indicates that participants progressed through the evidence in the following order: (1) DNA, (2) video confession, (3) fingerprint, and (4) eyewitness.

Study 3 decision tree analysis with eyewitness evidence as the dependent variable.

Data from Study 3 were analyzed using two different methodologies and found to tell somewhat similar stories. Specifically, both analyses indicate that on average DNA evidence was chosen first by mock jurors and video confession evidence was chosen second. The results are less clear when considering what pieces of evidence were chosen third and fourth. When looking at mean rankings, eyewitness testimony was chosen earlier than fingerprint evidence. However, the decision tree analyses indicate that fingerprint evidence may have been chosen before eyewitness testimony. This finding must be interpreted with caution, however, as eyewitness evidence was forced to be last in order for DNA evidence to be first. These results indicate that DNA evidence is the piece of evidence that mock jurors on average want to learn more about first at a homicide trial. Thus, DNA may be the most important piece of evidence to mock jurors when deciding a verdict, as the majority of the participants in the present study selected to learn more about DNA evidence first. In a similar manner, it may be argued that a video confession is the second most important piece of evidence to mock jurors deciding the fate of a defendant on trial for homicide, as mock jurors on average chose to learn more about video confession evidence second. Likewise, eyewitness and fingerprint evidence appear to be the third and fourth most important pieces of evidence to mock jurors.

General Discussion

The present research examined first what evidence legal professionals reported to be common evidence at homicide trials, and then how important that evidence is to mock jurors when making verdict decisions. Using an inductive approach in which each study was built using the results of the previous one, the present series of studies is able to explore the importance of different evidence in deciding a verdict using a novel approach in Study 3. After surveying legal professionals and determining which evidence appears at homicide trials in Study 1, the generated list of evidence was used in Study 2. Across three studies (i.e., Study 2, the Study 3 Pilot, and Study 3) and two different methodologies, the results indicate that the mock jurors perceived DNA evidence to be most important piece of evidence when determining a verdict. The order of importance of the other pieces of evidence is, however, not consistent across the studies. Specifically, fingerprint evidence is ranked 2nd of 41 pieces in Study 2, 3rd of 10 pieces in the pilot study, and 3rd/4th of 4 pieces in Study 3; video confession evidence is ranked 8th of 41 pieces in Study 2, 4th of 10 pieces in the pilot study, and 2nd of 4 pieces in Study 3; and eyewitness testimony is ranked 10th of 41 pieces in Study 2, 2nd of 10 pieces in the pilot study, and 3rd/4th of four in Study 3.

Although the differences are not major, the following may explain the discrepancies. First, the differences may be due to the decrease in total evidence in each progressive study. Specifically, Study 2 involved 41 pieces of evidence, the pilot study involved 10 pieces, and Study 3 involved just 4 pieces. Differing numbers of evidence may lead to different types of comparisons, and thus to different importance levels. For example, eyewitness testimony may not have seemed as important when considered with 40 other pieces of evidence, but when in the context of 10 or less pieces of evidence, it may have seemed more important. Further, Study 2 is the only study in which mock jurors were asked to consider each piece of evidence as the only piece of evidence present at trial. In the proceeding studies, mock jurors were aware that there were 4 to 10 pieces of evidence for them to consider, and it is likely that they considered the evidence as a whole, instead of individually. Additionally, Study 2 and Study 3 differ in methodology; instead of asking mock jurors to rate the importance of each piece of evidence, as was done in Study 2, Study 3 asked mocked jurors to choose the evidence they wanted to learn more about first, second, and so on based on how important they perceived each piece of evidence to be. This novel methodology made it possible to obtain a measure of importance without asking mock jurors to quantify how important each piece of evidence was.

Although inconsistent in the exact order, the results do indicate that DNA, fingerprints, eyewitness testimony, and video confession evidence are important to mock jurors. As such, it seems important that future psycho-legal research should explore what it is about these pieces of evidence that causes them to be perceived as important, and if there are any factors that may alter their importance. This research can then better inform policy and legal professionals.

Limitations

The present series of studies is limited by the fact that the scenarios are specific to, and the evidence comes from, a homicide trial. However, this was done purposefully because it cannot be assumed that all types of evidence will be perceived similarly by jurors across case types (e.g., homicide versus drug trafficking). The present research is also in part limited by the small subset of evidence that was used in Study 3. Unfortunately, this was a requirement of the design to be able to obtain the required sample size. As mentioned earlier, the difference in the number of possible orders in Study 3 when going from 5 to 4 pieces of evidence is 96 (120 versus 24). These drastic differences encourage the use of fewer pieces of evidence. Nevertheless, the variation of the 4 pieces of evidence was still more than what is typical in the psycho-legal research. Design restrictions also did not allow the present research to be able to explore the importance of exculpatory evidence. Future research should examine how important mock jurors perceive exonerating evidence, or lack of important evidence, to be in making verdict decisions. It may be the case that DNA evidence is equally important to mock jurors whether or not it is present and damning. In other words, jurors may say a defendant is guilty if the DNA evidence is a match to the defendant, not guilty if the DNA is not a match, and not guilty if there is no DNA evidence. However, future research should test this.

Although the design of the present research utilizes an inductive approach and novel methodology, there may be an alternative explanation for the findings. Study 2 and Study 3 asked participants to indicate the importance of various pieces of evidence. However, the possibility that participants’ prior knowledge of the evidence was influential in their decisions cannot be ruled out. For example, participants may have thought that DNA evidence was important, but they may also have known very little about it and chosen it first because they wanted to learn more about it. Thus, their choice of DNA evidence first may not have indicated that it was more important than video confession evidence. Alternatively, in Study 2, participants may have reported certain types of evidence as less important (e.g., neuroimages) because of their unfamiliarity with the nature of the evidence itself or how it can be utilized in a criminal trial. Thus, their lower rating of importance of a piece of evidence may indicate their lack of knowledge as opposed to unimportance in verdict decisions. Future research should explore the possibility that prior knowledge of evidence may influence interpretations of importance.

Lastly, future research should conduct an analysis of the evidence presented at actual criminal homicide trials. Study 1 was designed to begin to learn about what evidence is common, but unfortunately there is no fieldwork indicating that the present results are indicative of actual trial evidence. Until a comprehensive and representative field study is conducted, the present research is the best proxy for a list of common homicide trial evidence.

Conclusions

The present research establishes the types of evidence that legal professionals indicate are commonly presented at trial, and explores which of these types are considered by mock jurors to be important. The results obtained expand the existing knowledge of how jurors make decisions during trial by starting with evidence that legal professionals report to be commonly presented at trial and using that evidence to determine what types of evidence are important to mock jurors when making verdict decisions. Four pieces of evidence were found to be most important in a homicide trial: DNA, fingerprint, video confession, and eyewitness evidence. Using more elaborate trial materials, researchers should examine how these four pieces (or the lack of these crucial pieces) can affect trial outcomes. More knowledge regarding the ways in which nuances in common trial evidence can affect verdicts can inform courtroom procedures and policy.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

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Mock Juries, Real Trials: How to Solve (some) Problems with Jury Science

2024, Journal of Law and Society

Jury science is fraught with difficulty. Since legal and institutional hurdles render it all but impossible to study live criminal jury deliberation, researchers make use of various indirect methods to evaluate jury performance. But each of these methods are open to methodological criticism and, strikingly, some of the highest-profile jury research programmes in recent years have reached opposing conclusions. Uncertainty about jury performance is an obstacle for legal reform-ongoing debates about the 'justice gap' for complainants of sexual offences has rendered these problems stark. This paper proposes a way to advance the debate.

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The Impact of Jury Race in Criminal Trials

This paper examines the impact of jury racial composition on trial outcomes using a unique data set of felony trials in Florida between 2000 and 2010. We utilize a research design that exploits day-to-day variation in the composition of the jury pool to isolate quasi-random variation in the composition of the seated jury, finding evidence that: (i) juries formed from all-white jury pools convict black defendants significantly (16 percentage points) more often than white defendants and (ii) this gap in conviction rates is entirely eliminated when the jury pool includes at least one black member. The impact of jury race is much greater than what a simple correlation of the race of the seated jury and conviction rates would suggest. These findings imply that the application of justice is highly uneven and raise obvious concerns about the fairness of trials in jurisdictions with a small proportion of blacks in the jury pool.

We thank Peter Arcidiacono, Dan Black, Marcus Casey, Jane Cooley, Kerwin Charles, Jonah Gelbach, Larry Katz, John Kennan, Derek Neal, Jeremy Stein, Chris Taber, Christopher Winship and seminar participants at Carnegie Mellon, Chicago, Columbia, Duke, Rochester, Syracuse, Wisconsin and the NBER Summer Institute and five anonymous referees for many helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

MARC RIS BibTeΧ

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• September 15, 2010
• June 7, 2011

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Criminal Trial Research Paper

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Criminal trials have always held a special fascination for Americans and have furnished the plots for numerous books, plays, films, and television shows. Although civil trials can occasionally be of broad general interest, violations of criminal law frequently arouse strong popular emotions. Not surprisingly, horrific crimes are frequently front-page features in the newspapers. Trials that retell those crimes are often likely to be of interest to the public. To the extent that such trials deal with basic human weaknesses such as greed, anger, or jealousy, they frequently recount a fascinating tale.

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In recent years, through changes in trial rules in some states, the American public has been able to get beyond newspaper coverage of criminal trials and actually watch selected criminal trials on television. Some of these trials have proven very controversial and have sparked considerable interest in our criminal trial system.

Civil Versus Criminal Trial

Criminal trials differ from civil trials in several important respects. For one, criminal trials are always prosecuted on behalf of the state, not on behalf of victims or individual citizens. Thus a prosecutor in deciding whether or not to prosecute a possible crime or whether to offer a defendant a plea bargain has to make decisions in the public interest. For this reason, the head of each prosecuting agency is typically an elected public official who must answer to the voters for the decisions of the office.

Another important difference between criminal cases and civil cases is that criminal cases are regulated by the Constitution to a much greater extent than civil cases. Many provisions of the Bill of Rights, such as the right to indictment by grand jury, the right to counsel, the protection against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to confront witnesses, and the right to a speedy trial are directed only to criminal cases. This concern in the Constitution reflects the fact that, unlike civil cases which are usually concerned with money damages, what hangs in the balance in a criminal case is usually the freedom of the defendant and, sometimes, even the life of the defendant. For this reason, the Constitution provides defendants with guarantees aimed at ensuring that their treatment at the hands of the state is proper and that the trials they receive will be fair.

Burden of Proof

The most important procedural difference between civil trials and criminal trials is the difference in the burden of proof. In civil trials where, for example, driver Smith claims that driver Jones was at fault in causing an accident and thus was responsible for Smith’s damages, Smith must prove Jones’s negligence by a preponderance of the evidence. This simply means that the jury must find Smith’s evidence on the issue more convincing, even if only slightly so, than any evidence Jones offers. The scale must tip at least a bit in Smith’s favor for Smith to prevail.

In a criminal trial the situation is quite different: the prosecution must prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt . This is obviously a very heavy burden of proof. To explain its meaning a standard jury instruction tells jurors that in order to find the defendant guilty they must be convinced by ‘‘proof of such convincing character that a reasonable person would not hesitate to rely and act upon it in the most important of his or her own affairs’’ (Devitt, Blackmar, and Wolff, p. 354). If, after hearing all the evidence, a jury has a reasonable doubt, then it must return a verdict of not guilty.

The reasonable-doubt standard in criminal cases is constitutionally required, and it has long been viewed as a central safeguard against erroneous conviction and the resulting loss of the wrongly convicted defendant’s liberty and good name. Because a defendant in a criminal trial has at stake interests of immense importance, the U.S. Supreme Court has made it clear that due process demands that the margin of error in criminal cases be reduced in the defendant’s favor by placing on the prosecution the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt ( In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)).

Implications of Proof Beyond A Reasonable Doubt

The most obvious implication of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that criminal cases are almost always close cases. The prosecution may have a strong case against a defendant, and yet, given the heavy burden of proof, it may still not be able to obtain a conviction from a jury. The jury may return a verdict of not guilty, even in a strong case, because the prosecution was not able to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

A second implication of the heavy burden of proof placed on the prosecution by the Anglo-American system of criminal procedure has to do with the meaning of a not guilty verdict. News accounts sometimes report that a jury in a criminal case ‘‘found the defendant innocent,’’ and this seems to imply that the jury was convinced that the defendant was innocent or that it perhaps found the defendant’s evidence more likely to be true than the prosecution’s evidence. But a jury that has been properly instructed on the burden of proof and the meaning of proof beyond a reasonable doubt will often find the prosecution’s evidence to be far stronger than the defendant’s and yet feel compelled to acquit the defendant. Even if the defendant’s explanation is rather implausible, it may leave the jury with a reasonable doubt and thus entitle the defendant to an acquittal. In short, the task of the defense in a criminal trial is not to convince the jury of the defendant’s innocence, but rather to convince the jury that a reasonable doubt remains as to the defendant’s guilt and that the defendant must thus be acquitted.

Adversarial Versus Inquisitorial Criminal Trial Systems

It is often suggested that Western trial systems can be divided neatly into those that are adversarial and those that are inquisitorial . In adversarial systems responsibility for the production of evidence is placed on the opposing attorneys with the judge acting as a neutral referee between the parties. By contrast, in inquisitorial trial systems responsibility for the production of evidence at trial is the job of the trial judge and it is the trial judge who decides which witnesses will be called at trial and who does most of the questioning of witnesses.

According to this claimed division among Western trial systems, the trial systems in the United States and England are considered adversarial in nature while those on the Continent in countries such as France or Germany are supposed to be inquisitorial.

But this distinction is not clear today. One reason for this is that European trial systems have all incorporated some adversarial features into their systems. Thus, for example, lawyers in Europe today have the right to question witnesses and they can also demand that certain witnesses be called to testify. By the same token, in the American criminal trial system trial judges are not always passive. They have the right to ask questions of witnesses and even to call witnesses not called by either party. Particularly, when a jury has been waived by the defendant, trial judges can be quite active in questioning witnesses.

But even if there is no litmus test that sharply distinguishes adversarial trial systems from those that are inquisitorial, it certainly remains accurate that the adversarial elements are much more emphasized in the American trial system. American lawyers have much more responsibility for the production and presentation of evidence than do lawyers in other Western trial systems, and trial judges in the United States tend to be much more passive at trial than judges in other Western trial systems. A trial in the United States is conceptualized as a battle in which the trial judge is a neutral and passive referee between the two combatants with the ultimate decision to be made by a jury.

Discovery in Civil Versus Criminal Cases

Another important difference between civil and criminal cases that affects what takes place in the courtroom is the difference in the amount of discovery that is permitted in preparing for trial. Discovery is the process by which each side preparing for trial learns about the witnesses and other evidence that the other side intends to introduce at trial.

In civil cases there is very broad discovery. For example, in civil cases both parties have the right prior to trial to take depositions of persons with information about the issues at stake in the lawsuit. A deposition provides an opportunity for lawyers on both sides of the case to question a person under oath in the presence of a court reporter who makes a record of what is said. As a result of this face-to-face questioning, the lawyers will not only learn all the information that the person being deposed may later present at trial, but they may also develop a good idea of how the witness will be perceived by a jury and thus will be able to plan for the examination or cross-examination accordingly.

Although there is considerable variation in criminal discovery from one jurisdiction to another, many jurisdictions do not require the prosecution even to disclose the names of the witnesses whom it intends to call at trial, let alone allow the defense to take wide-ranging depositions from them.

In short, in criminal cases the amount of information available to the prosecution and the defense will usually be much less than would be available to opposing sides in a civil lawsuit. As a result of this limited discovery, prosecutors and defense attorneys often question witnesses for the opposing side to whom they have not talked before the trial. Indeed, there may be witnesses of whose existence they were not even aware prior to the trial. This adds an element of uncertainty and surprise that further distinguishes criminal from civil trials.

The Atmosphere Surrounding The Criminal Trial

Due process demands that the trial a defendant receives be a fair one. It is obvious that even if a trial is technically correct in terms of evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, and other rulings during the trial itself, a trial can still be unfair because it takes place in an atmosphere that is prejudicial to the defendant.

In Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966), the Supreme Court reversed a murder conviction because the trial had violated due process in a case that, one hopes, represents a high-water mark in terms of a prejudicial trial atmosphere. In that case the publicity for a local murder trial was pervasive and, more important, it was very prejudicial; numerous editorials insisted on the defendant’s guilt, and even news accounts were sometimes slanted against the defendant. In addition, the newspapers reported sensational rumors or ‘‘evidence’’ that was in fact never disclosed at the trial. Not only were the jurors not protected from this barrage of prejudicial publicity, but reporters themselves were disruptive even during trial proceedings as they moved in and around the courtroom, creating so much noise that it was difficult for witnesses or lawyers to be heard. In the Court’s words, the trial was conducted in a ‘‘carnival atmosphere.’’

Controlling The Courtroom during Criminal Trial

Many occurrences in a courtroom or courthouse can prove distracting to a jury or otherwise threaten a fair trial. Examples include reporters who move around the courtroom and even attempt to handle or photograph exhibits during recesses; spectators who are noisy or who try to intimidate particular witnesses by comments in the courtroom or threatening gestures in the hall outside it, and overcrowding, which interferes with the entry or exit of witnesses and may precipitate disputes between spectators over the right to a seat.

Although there is no one solution to all these problems, a trial judge has the right to control the courtroom and the courthouse premises to help ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial. Given the limited size of most courtrooms, a judge may have to restrict the number of spectators or media representatives who can attend the trial, and may find it necessary in certain highly publicized cases to require the use of a ticket system to prevent corridors from being thronged with would-be spectators. It may also be necessary to bar spectators or media representatives from entering or leaving a crowded courtroom except during recesses.

The Problem of Pretrial Publicity in Criminal Trials

One problem that has gotten worse for trial judges in recent years is the problem of how best to guarantee a defendant a fair trial in a high-publicity case. In such cases there can be pervasive and highly prejudicial publicity about the offense or the suspect in the period leading up to trial and this may continue even during the trial.

At one time, one weapon for countering prejudical pretrial publicity was for the trial judge to order a change of venue so that the trial would take place at a distant location from the county or city in which the crime occurred ( Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. (1963)). But this is far less an effective antidote today. The concentration of new sources, the rise of cable and satellite television systems, and the ability of newspapers to publish immediately on the Internet make it harder to insulate jurors from possibly prejudicial trial publicity.

The Steps in a Criminal Trial

Jury selection.

While technically a trial begins when the jury is sworn in at the end of the jury selection process, jury selection is considered so important by trial lawyers that it is appropriate to consider jury selection as the first step in a criminal trial.

During jury selection either the lawyers or the trial judge will question potential jurors to make sure that they can be fair in deciding the case. As a result of such questioning, if the prosecutor or the defense attorney believes a certain juror cannot be fair and impartial either lawyer can challenge that juror for cause . If the trial judge agrees, the potential juror will be removed from the panel of jurors.

A second way a prosecutor or defense attorney can remove a potential juror is through a peremptory challenge . A peremptory challenge permits a lawyer to remove a possible juror without the necessity of showing a reason. Each jurisdiction allots a certain number of peremptory challenges to each side in a criminal case, and the number usually varies depending on factors such as the size of the jury or the seriousness of the crime. While the number varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, in a routine criminal case, such as a burglary or a theft case, the prosecutor and the defense attorney will often have five or six peremptory challenges at their disposal.

Opening Statements

Because a trial can last days or even weeks, obviously it will be easier for jurors to understand how the bits and pieces of evidence that come to their attention fit together if they can be given an overview of the issues and evidence that will be central to the trial. This overview is provided by the opening statements that are delivered by the lawyers at the start of the trial.

The prosecution’s opening takes place after the jury has been selected and sworn, but before the first witness has been called to testify. Although the opening does not supply the jury with any evidence (the evidence comes only from the witness stand and whatever exhibits are admitted at trial), nonetheless the prosecution’s opening statement is very important. First, it provides an opportunity to explain the nature of the charge, or charges, for which the defendant is on trial. Some charges are easily understood by a jury, and in such instances it may be sufficient for the prosecutor simply to read the charging document as part of the opening. But other trials involving more complex charges, such as conspiracy or fraud, may require a more careful explanation of the elements involved.

A second function of the prosecutor’s opening is to explain the evidence that will be produced in an attempt to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This preliminary overview of the case is especially important if the trial will be protracted. But even in a trial lasting a relatively short time, an explanation of the prosecution’s case can be important because witnesses may not always be able to testify in the order that a logical presentation of the evidence might suggest. For example, a fingerprint expert may have to testify early in the case, if other obligations make it impossible for the expert to appear later in the trial. But it may only be later in the trial that the gun which the fingerprint expert examined is connected to the defendant. An opening statement can help the jury understand how all the evidence fits together.

An opening statement is also important in a case that is based on a number of pieces of circumstantial evidence. In such a case, there may be no one witness who can tie the whole case together. A jury may grow bored or even frustrated as the prosecutor questions a witness at length about some apparently minor detail whose importance will be apparent only later in the trial. An opening statement helps the jury understand the significance of such pieces of evidence. It is easier for the jury to be patient while the prosecutor elicits testimony about a particular piece of evidence if the jury understands how that evidence fits into the mosaic.

Finally, opening statements are also exercises in persuasion. The opening and closing statements are the only opportunities the lawyers have to speak directly to the jury, and trial lawyers recognize the lasting impression that a clear, forceful, and logical opening statement can make on the jury.

Although the prosecutor always delivers his opening statement at the start of the trial, in many jurisdictions the defense attorney has a choice. The defense can present its opening after that of the prosecutor, or can reserve it until the prosecution has finished presenting its case and the defense is about to begin its own case.

Calling Witnesses

The U.S. system of criminal trials is a part of the Anglo-American adversary system, under which trials are controlled to a large extent by the opposing sides. Each side presents its case and vigorously argues the merits of its evidence while attacking, as energetically as is proper, the evidence supporting the opposing side. The selection and questioning of witnesses is thus primarily the obligation of the opposing lawyers. Although a judge in a criminal case may occasionally call a witness and is permitted to ask questions of witnesses, by tradition the role of the judge is that of a neutral referee between the prosecution and the defense.

Both the prosecutor and the defendant have the power to subpoena witnesses who have relevant testimony to offer at trial. In fact, the Sixth Amendment specifically guarantees that a defendant have ‘‘compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.’’ This subpoena power is necessary because many witnesses would prefer not to testify at trial, especially if there is likely to be a rigorous cross-examination.

Although subpoena power in criminal cases is broad, there are privileges that restrict the ability to call to the stand certain witnesses. For example, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination bars the prosecution from calling the defendant as a witness as part of its case. Some states also have enacted laws providing for a marital privilege, which bars the prosecution from calling as a witness the spouse of the defendant if the defendant objects to having the spouse testify.

Even if there is no bar to calling certain witnesses to the stand, privileges may still protect certain matters from being revealed at trial. Thus, a witness for either the prosecution or the defense may refuse to answer certain questions out of fear that his answers will incriminate him. (Sometimes the prosecution will avoid this problem by granting the witness immunity.) Or a witness may invoke a number of other privileges, for example, the doctor-patient privilege or the priest-penitent privilege. Such privileges are designed to protect confidential communications arising out of these relationships from subsequent disclosure, even at a trial.

Exclusion of Witnesses from The Courtroom

The prosecution has the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and always presents its case first. But before any witnesses are called to the stand, it is frequently moved by either the prosecution or the defense that all witnesses be sequestered. This means that all witnesses who will be called at the trial are ordered to remain outside the courtroom until it is time for a particular witness to take the stand. Thus, a witness who is called late in the trial will not have heard the testimony of earlier witnesses. It is believed that sequestration helps discourage fabrication or collusion and also helps expose any inaccuracies in testimony.

Motions for sequestration of witnesses are usually routinely granted, and in most jurisdictions there is a right to sequestration by either side. There are, however, some exceptions. Usually a person whose presence in the courtroom is essential to the presentation of the case, such as the police officer who investigated the case, will be permitted to remain in the courtroom. The defendant, of course, has a constitutional right to be present and thus must also be permitted to remain in the courtroom even if he or she intends to testify. Finally, some states have exempted crime victims from sequestration rules and permit the victim to remain in the courtroom throughout the trial.

Examination of Witnesses

The general sequence of the witnesses at a trial is as follows. First, the prosecution presents its direct case, aimed at proving that the defendant committed the crime in question. When the prosecution has finished with the presentation of its case against the defendant, the defendant has an opportunity to call witnesses and put on a defense. If the defendant chooses to put on a defense, the prosecution is then permitted to call additional witnesses to rebut the defense witnesses.

For example, the prosecution may present a series of witnesses in an effort to show that the defendant robbed a certain bank on a certain date. The defense may then call witnesses with the aim of establishing that at the time of the robbery the defendant was bowling at a certain bowling alley and thus could not have robbed the bank. Finally, the prosecution may call employees of the bowling alley in question to try to prove that the defendant was not at that bowling alley at the time of the robbery.

Each witness called to testify is questioned first by the side that called the witness. This is known as the direct examination of the witness. When the direct examination is over, the lawyer for the opposing side is permitted to question the witness in what is called cross-examination . After cross-examination is completed, the side that originally called the witness may question him in what is called redirect examination . This is usually limited to explaining or developing matters that were raised during the cross-examination. In some instances, if new matter has come out in redirect examination, a judge has permission to permit recross-examination .

The main difference between direct examination and cross-examination is the manner of questioning. In cross-examination an attorney is permitted to ask leading questions, which suggest the desired answer and usually call for a yes or no response. But in direct examination the questions should not be leading. Thus, in direct examination of a witness to a robbery, it would be improper for the prosecutor to ask a series of questions such as ‘‘And the man you saw robbing the bank was six feet tall, wasn’t he?’’ or ‘‘And he was dressed in jeans and a green sweater, wasn’t he?’’ On the other hand, questions of the same form would be permitted in cross-examination, for example, ‘‘It’s true, isn’t it, that you only saw the robber for fifteen seconds?’’ and ‘‘Isn’t it a fact that you were very frightened at that time?’’

The distinction between the form of questions permitted in direct examination and the form permitted in cross-examination reflects the fact that the witness’s testimony usually is favorable to the side calling the witness, and unfavorable to the other side. In examining a witness called by the other side whose testimony is damaging, leading questions are needed in order to make an effective challenge to the witness’s perception, memory, or credibility.

In addition, since each side usually calls witnesses who are generally cooperative and whose testimony is helpful to it, leading questions are not needed in direct examination. The attorney for that side has generally gone over the questions with the witness outside the courtroom, and sometimes there have been several rehearsals of the trial testimony in the days before trial. Given the reality of extensive witness preparation that takes place prior to important trials, there is less need for leading questions in direct examination and more need for leeway in attacking testimony that is not as spontaneous as it may appear to a jury.

Of course, witnesses do not always cooperate with the side that called them, and the leeway permitted in both the scope of examination and the manner of questioning the witness is always a matter for the discretion of the trial judge.

Admissible Evidence in Criminal Trial

The judge’s screening function.

To understand criminal trials, it is necessary to understand the role of the trial judge in the admission of evidence. In the Anglo-American trial system the judge performs a screening function for the jury, making sure that the evidence brought before it is relevant and that it is not prejudicial to the defendant or to the state. Many items of evidence that are relevant in a broad sense are kept from the jury because the trial judge has decided that the danger of prejudice to the defendant outweighs the probative value of the piece of evidence in showing that the defendant committed the crime in question. Thus in a murder case, evidence offered by the prosecution showing past arrests of the defendant for assault will not be admitted, nor will evidence of the defendant’s reputation as a violent person be admitted as part of the prosecution’s direct case. Even gruesome pictures of the body of a murder victim that show the wounds may not be admitted for the jury’s inspection if a trial judge feels that the pictures may inflame the jury and distract it from its job of carefully evaluating the evidence in the case. Of course, most evidentiary rulings can only be understood in context, taking into account the other evidence in the case and the legal and factual issues being contested. But it should be apparent that many major battles at a trial may take place outside the hearing of the jury because of the judge’s obligation to rule on the admissibility of evidence. Thus one who observes a trial frequently sees the lawyers and the judge conferring at the side of the judge’s bench in whispers discussing the admissibility of a piece of evidence or the propriety of a line of questions. Normally, judges try to resolve these questions quickly so they do not have to remove the jury from the courtroom and the trial can continue without a long interruption. Hence the convenience of arguing some evidentiary issues at the side of the judge’s bench (so-called sidebar conferences ). But sometimes the issue is too complicated or too important to be argued in that abbreviated way and the judge will order the jury to return to the jury assembly room so that a full discussion of the issue can take place in the courtroom. Often a substantial part of a trial is consumed by arguments on evidentiary and other legal issues outside of the hearing of the jury.

Hearsay Evidence in Criminal Trial

Besides the general screening function performed by the trial judge in making sure that the probative value of an item of physical evidence or a line of questioning outweighs any prejudice to the defendant, there are many specific rules of evidence designed to enhance the reliability of trial verdicts. One rule that is central to the Anglo-American system of trials—both civil and criminal—is the rule that bars hearsay testimony.

A hearsay statement is defined as an out-ofcourt statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted. This rule is perhaps best understood by considering an example. Imagine a bank robbery trial in a case investigated by Federal Bureau of Investigation agent Mary Smith. At the trial of John Doe, the government calls Smith, who proceeds to tell the whole story of the robbery as she learned it from the witnesses. She explains that a bank teller, Johnson, described the robber and picked out Doe in a lineup; she testifies that a bank customer, King, said that the robber wore a green plaid suit and a red bow tie with white polka dots. Finally, Agent Smith testifies that she interviewed Doe’s ex-girlfriend and that the girlfriend said Doe owned a green plaid suit and a red bow tie with white polka dots.

All of this evidence as testified to by Agent Smith would be hearsay evidence—it is a series of statements that were made out of court to Agent Smith, and they are being offered for their truth. The problem with such hearsay is that the jury hears only Agent Smith, when the crucial witnesses who should be examined in the jury’s presence are the bank teller, the bank customer, and the ex-girlfriend. Because hearsay testimony is inadmissible unless it fits within a recognized exception, the government in this example cannot present its case through secondhand reports of what others said. Instead the prosecution must call the actual witnesses to testify to exactly what they observed and what they each know personally. The jury will then be in a better position to assess the credibility of the witnesses, especially when it is considered that the defense will have an opportunity to cross-examine each of the witnesses and to expose any weaknesses in their testimony.

The ban on the use of hearsay testimony is not absolute. There are many exceptions that would allow it, and, like rules of evidence in general, these exceptions vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. One common exception is the rule that permits the admission of a witness’s prior testimony if he or she is unavailable. Thus, where a witness testified at the first trial of defendant Doe and there was a hung jury necessitating a second trial, the testimony of this witness could be introduced at the second trial under the hearsay exception if the witness had died before the second trial.

The Criminal Trial Ends

Closing arguments.

At the conclusion of the presentation of all the evidence there remain two very important steps: closing arguments and the judge’s instructions to the jury. In a majority of jurisdictions the closing arguments, or summations , precede the judge’s instructions to the jury but in some jurisdictions the judge first instructs the jury and then closing arguments are made.

Closing arguments are vital because a good one can have a strong impact on the jury’s deliberations, which begin shortly after the closings take place. For both prosecutor and defense counsel, the closing argument affords an important chance to review the testimony and exhibits that have been admitted during the trial, as well as to argue for any inferences that they may wish the jury to draw from the evidence. Closing arguments are supposed to be argumentative, and appeals to common sense, attacks on the motives and credibility of unfavorable witnesses, and rather emotional pleas for a certain result are common. Closings also provide the opportunity to remind the jury of how the evidence intertwines with the law, and a good closing argument will weave together favorable evidence and the jury instructions that the lawyer giving the closing believes will support a favorable verdict.

There are some important limitations on the scope of closing arguments. Although a lawyer may argue vigorously for a certain conclusion, it is unethical for a lawyer to assert the lawyer’s personal opinion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused (American Bar Association, p. 325). Thus, a defense lawyer may not state in closing that he or she has a reasonable doubt of the client’s guilt, but an argument that the evidence at trial clearly raises a reasonable doubt would be proper.

Another, perhaps obvious, restriction on final arguments is that the arguments in closing must be tied to the evidence developed at trial. Inferences and conclusions from the evidence at trial can be argued quite freely, but to mention evidence that was never presented (and perhaps even ruled inadmissible by the trial judge) would be improper.

Still another limitation on closings is related to the defendant’s decision whether or not to testify. This decision is often a very important tactical one. For example, if a testifying defendant has been convicted of other serious crimes, the prosecution will often be permitted to attack the defendant’s credibility by asking about these convictions and showing that the defendant has indeed been previously convicted. In such a situation a defendant thus must balance the importance of his or her testimony against the fact that the jury will learn of other convictions if he or she testifies.

If the defendant decides not to testify, a prosecutor may not comment in the closing argument on the fact that the defendant did not choose to testify. In Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), the Supreme Court indicated that comment by the prosecution on the defendant’s failure to testify would violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled selfincrimination. Thus in the closing argument the prosecutor may not argue that an adverse inference should be drawn from the defendant’s silence at the trial. To back up this prohibition, if requested by the defendant, the trial judge will specifically instruct the jury that no adverse inference should be drawn from the defendant’s decision not to testify.

Instructions to The Jury

In speaking of instructions to the jury, it is natural to think first of the instructions at the end of the trial. But although these instructions are of crucial importance, there are often other occasions during the trial when the jury is instructed by the judge. Some judges choose to give a brief instruction on the law controlling the case at the beginning of the trial. Even during the trial, a judge may stop the taking of testimony to instruct the jury about the law surrounding an item of evidence. Thus, to continue the example above, when a defendant is impeached with a prior conviction, a judge should immediately instruct the jury that the conviction can be considered only as it bears on the defendant’s credibility and not as evidence of his guilt.

However, it is at the end of trial that the judge gives the complete body of instructions to the jury. The instructions, of course, go into careful detail on the meaning of each of the elements of the crime, but they also cover many other general matters. A jury is usually instructed on such varied matters as the prosecution’s burden of proof and the presumption of innocence, the meaning of reasonable doubt, the use of circumstantial evidence, the credibility of witnesses, the jury’s role as fact finder, any defenses that have been raised, and the procedures to be followed in the jury room.

Before the judge instructs the jury, the prosecution and the defense will have an opportunity to submit instructions they wish the judge to give the jury. There will also usually be a conference between the judge and the lawyers outside of the hearing of the jury at which the judge hears argument from the lawyers about the instructions to be given.

If, during its deliberations, the jury feels that it needs more guidance, it so informs the judge, and the judge may repeat or further clarify any of the earlier instructions. In addition, if the jury is having difficulty in reaching a verdict, the judge often gives a supplemental instruction asking members of the jury to listen carefully to the arguments of other jurors and encouraging them not to hesitate to reexamine their own views ( Lowenfeld v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 235 (1988)).

The Verdict

In civil trials a jury may be instructed to return either a general verdict (in which the jury simply indicates that it has determined the case for one of the sides) or a special verdict (which can be a rather lengthy list of specific questions on which the jury must reach agreement). As a practical matter in criminal cases, however, juries are always asked to return a general verdict of guilty or not guilty. Indeed, it has even been suggested that a special verdict may be an unconstitutional interference with the right to a jury trial ( United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1969)).

In federal courts and in the courts of most states, the verdict of the jury must be unanimous. This is not a constitutional requirement because the Supreme Court in Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), upheld an Oregon constitutional provision that permitted ten members of a twelve-person jury to render a guilty verdict in a noncapital case. But only Oregon and Louisiana permit nonunanimous jury verdicts in criminal cases.

Of course, not all juries are able to reach a verdict. When a jury indicates that it is deadlocked, the judge usually asks it to continue deliberations until the judge is convinced that further deliberations would be futile. If no verdict can be reached despite continued deliberations, the judge will order the jury discharged. In the event that the first trial ended in a deadlocked (‘‘hung’’) jury, there is no double jeopardy bar to trying the defendant again.

Bibliography:

• American Bar Association, Center for Professional Responsibility. Annotated Model Rules of Professional Responsibility. 3d ed. Chicago: ABA, 1996.
• DEVITT, EDWARD; BLACKMAR, CHARLES B.; and WOLFF, MICHAEL A. Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, vol. 1. 4th ed. St. Paul, Minn.: West, 1987.
• FRANK, JEROME. Courts on Trial: Myth and Reality in American Justice. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1949.
• FRANKEL, MARVIN Partisan Justice. New York: Hill & Wang, 1980.
• MAUET, THOMAS Fundamentals of Trial Techniques. 4th ed. Boston: Little, Brown, 1996.
• PIZZI, WILLIAM Trials without Truth: Why Our Criminal Justice System Has Become an Expensive Failure and What We Need to Do to Rebuild It. New York: NYU Press, 1999.
• STRIER, FRANKLIN. Reconstructing Justice: An Agenda for Trial Reform. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994.
• STRONG, JOHN WILLIAM, ed. McCormick on Evidence. 4th ed. St. Paul, Minn.: West, 1992. With periodic supplements.

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From Donald Trump to Karen Read — how does jury selection proceed in high-profile cases?

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When it comes to trials that have garnered significant public interest, jury selection presents something of a catch-22.

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This week, jury selection began in two high-profile cases: New York’s hush money trial involving former President Donald Trump, and a Massachusetts murder trial involving the girlfriend of a deceased Boston police officer, Karen Read. 

Many Americans know what it’s like to be summoned for jury duty — about 32 million are called to potentially serve every year. Only a fraction, or about 1.5 million , are actually impaneled in state court.

But when it comes to criminal trials that have garnered significant public interest, such as the prosecution of a former president — an unprecedented moment for the nation — jury selection can be a long and tricky process.

For one, both the Trump and Read trials are buzzing with media attention. The peppering of questions intended to root out bias proceeds like it would in any criminal trial. But judges and attorneys are keen to impanel jurors who are capable of avoiding publicity, while setting aside any preconceived notions about the defendants to look at the case as objectively as possible, Northeastern experts say.

That’s easier said than done, which is why the legal system provides attorneys and judges with several ways to vet members of the public who have been tapped to potentially sit on a jury — including those who might want to game the system, as some may be motivated to do in Trump’s criminal fraud trial.

“We have built into the system that lawyers are entitled to challenge potential jurors in two ways,” says Jeremy R. Paul , professor at the Northeastern University School of Law. “One is based on cause , or when a lawyer hears something in a person’s voir dire that gives them reason to doubt their ability to be impartial.”

“And the other is a peremptory challenge, where you don’t need a reason,” Paul says. “You typically have a certain number of those challenges that you can use.”

Trump’s attorneys and his prosecutors each get to strike up to 10 jurors from the pool of admitted jurors under the peremptory challenge. As of Tuesday , seven of 12 jurors have been picked to decide the case.

But in the Trump trial, legal teams would be concerned less with the fact that prospective jurors might be exposed to media coverage of the case — with a figure like Trump, it’s inevitable — and more with their political leanings and hopes for the 2024 election, Paul says.

“The trial of a former president, who is again running for president, in an election year is unprecedented,” Paul says. 

There is no foolproof method for ensuring juror impartiality — although defense attorneys and prosecutors, working in concert with judges, often devise questionnaires that try to get into the minds of jurors in ways that may seem oblique. 

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“After a certain point, the lawyers and the judge simply have to trust them,” Paul says. 

Still, jury selection involving celebrities can be something of a catch-22. 

“On the one hand, there is a fundamental principle in criminal cases that trials should occur in the county where the incident occurred based on the notion that crimes offend the entire community and regular citizens — the ‘People’ — should have a say in meting out justice,” says Daniel Medwed , Northeastern distinguished professor of law and criminal justice. “Criminal defendants, in turn, have a constitutional right to be tried by a ‘fair and impartial’ jury of their peers.” 

“On the other hand, this poses a problem in high-profile cases where, due to ample pretrial publicity in the affected region, it might be hard to empanel twelve fair and impartial jurors,” Medwed continues. “The challenge, then, is not to find jurors who haven’t heard of the case — who, in Boston, did not know about the Boston Marathon bombing case when it went to trial in 2015? — but rather to find jurors who can put aside what they have heard and any preconceived notions and look at the case with equanimity.”

In recent years, that has often meant that lawyers are also combing through prospective jurors’ social media history. Indeed, jurors have already been dismissed in Manhattan after court officials flagged online posts that point to anti-Trump sentiment. 

For Trump and Read, the process could take some time.  

“I anticipate a long, arduous slog through jury selection this week in Norfolk County with the Karen Read case,” Medwed says. 

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The Evening

Trump’s criminal trial begins with a bumpy jury selection.

Also, Israel weighs retaliation against Iran. Here’s the latest at the end of Monday.

By Matthew Cullen

New York prosecutors joined Donald Trump and his attorneys today in a Manhattan courtroom for the official start of the first criminal trial of an American president . Trump is facing 34 felony counts of falsifying business records to cover up a sex scandal during his 2016 campaign. If convicted, he could face up to four years in prison.

After the judge overseeing the case rejected Trump’s latest effort to oust him, the prosecution and the defense began collaborating on the arduous process of choosing a jury. Immediately, they ran into problems.

More than half of the first pool of 96 prospective jurors was dismissed after they indicated they did not believe they could be impartial, and court adjourned for the day with zero jurors chosen. My colleague Alan Feuer noted that such a high initial failure rate is “surpassingly rare,” underscoring the challenges of seating an impartial jury for a defendant whom much of the country has already made its mind up about. Here’s an explanation of the jurors both sides want.

The trial — perhaps the only one against Trump that will unfold before Election Day — is projected to take about six weeks, the judge told the prospective jurors. But it could stretch out longer if jury selection turns out to be especially time consuming. The process will be crucial for both sides, but could be especially challenging for the defense, who will effectively be searching for red needles in Manhattan’s giant blue haystack.

“The defense will be looking for working class voters, people that work in city jobs, perhaps firefighters, police, sanitation workers,” my colleague Jesse McKinley, who is writing our Trump on Trial newsletter , said.

Israel’s war cabinet met to weigh a response to Iran

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel is facing conflicting pressures as he considers whether and how to retaliate against Iran for its missile and drone attack over the weekend. Some far-right members of his government have called for an immediate military response, while many international leaders, including President Biden, have urged Israel to de-escalate.

Netanyahu’s war cabinet met again today, but so far there has been no response to the attack. And rather than preparing the public for a showdown with its archrival, the government signaled a return to relative normalcy, lifting restrictions on large gatherings and allowing schools to reopen. Here’s the latest .

For more: Our national security correspondent David Sanger explained why it has become more difficult to contain Iran over the last several years .

Scientists warned of the widest-ever threat to coral

Record ocean temperatures have put so much stress on the world’s coral reefs that they are losing their vital algae — a process referred to as bleaching — on an unprecedented scale. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration projected that the current crisis would within weeks become the most extensive bleaching event on record .

A NOAA official said that more than 54 percent of the world’s coral area has experienced bleaching-level heat stress in the past year, and that figure is increasing by about 1 percent per week.

Congress is targeting a Chinese firm that makes key U.S. drugs

WuXi AppTec is among the Chinese drug companies that lawmakers have identified as a potential threat to the security of Americans’ genetic information and U.S. intellectual property. But the company develops and produces crucial therapies for cancer, cystic fibrosis, H.I.V. and other illnesses.

As Congress considers legislation to push U.S. companies away from doing business with firms like WuXi, drug executives have warned that removing the company from the American market could also take some drugs out of the pipeline for years.

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Tesla: Turmoil continued at the electric car company as it announced that it would lay off 10 percent of its work force .

Business: Goldman Sachs earned nearly $4 billion in profit in the first quarter — around $1 billion more than analysts expected .

New York: Lawmakers reached a deal on a framework to address one of the worst housing crises in the nation .

Markets: Shares of Trump Media fell 18 percent today, and are down more than 50 percent since its first days of trading .

Film: The armorer who loaded the gun before a fatal shooting on the “Rust” set was sentenced to 18 months in prison for involuntary manslaughter.

Police: Two officers were killed in a shootout near Syracuse, New York.

Music: Beyoncé’s “Cowboy Carter” is at No. 1 for a second week , a feat the artist last managed 11 years ago.

Nature: Fish off the Florida Keys started swimming upside down, spinning and dying. Scientists are racing to figure out why.

Boston Marathon: Hellen Obiri claimed her second straight women’s title , while Sisay Lemma won the men’s race with the 10th fastest time in the event’s history.

TIME TO UNWIND

A landmark art career outside the establishment.

Faith Ringgold, who died on Saturday at 93 , was most famous for her narrative quilts depicting the joys and rigors of Black lives. But she was an expert at mixing the personal and political across a number of mediums, including sculpture, painting and writing.

But major museums, auction houses and galleries never quite knew what to do with her art, so they mostly ignored it . This was a consequence, she often said, of her race, her sex and her uncompromising focus on art as a vehicle for social justice. It wasn’t until very recently, when Ringgold was approaching 90, that MoMA finally acquired some of her works. The museum paired one alongside a Picasso.

Do clearer images make movies better?

Film restorers are taking advantage of rapidly improving artificial intelligence tools to sharpen decades-old movies. Recently, several of James Cameron’s films, including “True Lies” and “Aliens,” were upgraded with machine-learning technology that makes water appear crystalline and colors look bright and vivid.

Some critics strongly dislike the results . The lack of imperfections delivers an uncanny feeling for some viewers, while others are more broadly skeptical of the suggestion that A.I. could improve on human art.

For more, our tech columnist explained why we struggle to explain how smart A.I. tools are .

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A pricey symbol of love: A dozen red roses may be timeless, but the price isn’t. Here’s why a New York City bouquet now costs $72 .

An ageless sip: There’s a new straw that doesn’t cause facial wrinkles , yet another solution to a problem we didn’t know we had. (And still might not).

A new classic: Gen Z wanted a co-op version of Scrabble, and Mattel obliged. Some fans of the original aren’t happy.

A win in the second half: Dating after 50 can be miserable. But there’s liberation there too, and unexpected pleasure.

WHAT TO DO TONIGHT

Cook: This one-pot pasta dish combines the crisp salt of prosciutto with the bright pop of green peas.

Watch: The W.N.B.A. draft airs tonight on ESPN. Here’s what else is on TV this week .

Dine: Here are the 25 best restaurants in Boston right now.

Clean: Get organized quickly with decluttering sprints lasting 30 minutes or less.

Travel: Planning to bring your pet onto the plane? Here’s how different airlines handle that.

Repel: We’d like to tell you about a secret weapon in the war against ticks.

Compete: Take this week’s Flashback history quiz .

Play: Here are today’s Spelling Bee , Wordle and Mini Crossword . Find all of our games here .

ONE LAST THING

A handmade video game.

For more than a decade, Onat Hekimoglu had wanted to make a video game about a hapless janitor stuck in an undersea city. But he had no digital design experience. So he made Harold Halibut almost entirely by hand .

Nearly everything onscreen was made of physical materials like cardboard and clay, including the characters, with costumes sewn from real textiles, then 3-D scanned so they could be animated digitally.

Have a skillful evening.

Thanks for reading. I’ll be back tomorrow. — Matthew

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