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• The International Criminal Court and the Darfur Crisis: The Prospects of Prosecuting the Sudanese President / Gariballa A. Mohamed Call Number: Available online Publication Date: 2013 Format: E-thesis
• "When elephants fight, it is the grass that is crushed" A Critical Evaluation of the Treatment of Rape Victim-Witnesses by the International Criminal Court / Kara Morris Call Number: Available online Publication Date: 2013 Format: E-thesis
• The Politics of Torture, Human Rights, and Oversight The Canadian Experience with the UN's Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture (OPCAT) / Erin Holmes Call Number: Available online Publication Date: 2013 Format: E-thesis
• Unaccountable Soldiers Private Military Companies and the Law of Armed Conflict / Peter McRae Call Number: Available online Publication Date: 2012 Format: E-thesis
• Deconstructing Newspaper Representations of the International Criminal Court / Amanda L. Kramer Call Number: Available online Publication Date: 2012 Format: E-thesis
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DISSERTATION THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT IN ENFORCING HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

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ABSTRACT This research work analyzes whether the International Criminal Court (ICC) has lawfully issued and circulated an arrest warrant against the sitting Head of State of Sudan, Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, and whether its request to the States parties to the Rome Statute (particularly Malawi) to arrest and surrender him is in conformity with the provisions of the Statute. In this work, the argument is made that the rules of customary international law on personal immunities of sitting Heads of State do not apply in the case of the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by an international criminal court; therefore they do not bar the exercise of the jurisdiction of the ICC with respect to an incumbent Head of State, even if this individual comes from a state not party to the Rome Statute like Sudan, especially when the case is referred to it by the UN Security Council under chapter VII of the UN Charter. However, one thing is to assert that the ICC can ‘lawfully’ issue and circulate an arrest warrant against individuals entitled to personal immunity before national courts, and quite another to say that States can ‘lawfully’ disregard the personal immunity of these same individuals, and surrender them to the requesting international court. This research work conclude that while the ICC arrest warrant is a lawful coercive act against a sitting Head of State, the ICC request to States parties to surrender President Al Bashir is contrary to Article 98(1) of the Rome Statute. Therefore, States parties are not obliged to comply with this request, as far as the Republic of Sudan will not waive personal immunity entitled to Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir.

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Master of Laws

Llm international criminal law.

A Master of Laws (LLM) in International Criminal Law is a postgraduate degree designed for law and non-law graduates to enhance your academic legal knowledge. This internationally recognised Master’s course will give you the skills to progress within international criminal law and can open up pathways to careers in judicial review, immigration practice, charity or NGO, international organisations, policy work, and more.

Entry requirements

Minimum second-class honours degree

Course requirements ➔

Next start date

September 2024, study online.

If you’re looking for a more flexible approach to your studies, why not consider our online study option?

The law in context

Gain essential in-depth knowledge and insight in your chosen area of law and understand the importance of legal rules as they are applied in the real world.

Our Employment Stats

• 95% of postgraduate students in employment were in highly skilled employment 15 months after graduating (2020/21 Graduate Outcomes data). Contains HESA Data: Copyright Jisc 2022.

Taught by subject experts

Taught by a combination of former and current practitioners, as well as research and teaching academics who are focused on legal practice, not just theory.

Course Details

The LLM International Criminal Law is an innovative, flexible programme that will provide you with an in-depth knowledge of international criminal law in practice. You will explore issues such as crimes against humanity, aggression and grounds for excluding liability, the international criminal court and the relationship between international criminal law and international human rights. As well as looking into specific areas of crime, you will also critically analyse key trials such as the Nuremburg Trials and the impact on the creation of the criminal offences of genocide and war crimes. Alongside this, other key focuses will include the Tribunals in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia and the responsibility to protect and prosecute.

When you study the LLM International Criminal Law with us you will:

• Research and critically evaluate the key theories, concepts and principles of healthcare regulations as applied in the UK.
• Analyse the effectiveness of International criminal institutions in practice and offer suggestions for reform.
• Gain an understanding of how prosecution of international crimes furthers international human rights.
• Be taught by our expert lecturers , including subject matter specialists, former and current practitioners, and research and teaching focused academics. 
• Benefit from strategic partnerships with firms, regulators and accreditation bodies, which inform our programme development.
• Improve your employability by gaining important transferable skills and mapping your career with our careers team.
• Strengthen your network - connect with other students, faculty and industry professionals on an international scale, and seek out opportunities for future placements and job opportunities.
• Increase your earning potential - the 2022 Graduate Labour Market Statistics found that postgraduates on average earn £6,500 more than their graduate counterparts.
• Enjoy flexibility - We understand that everyone’s circumstances are different. That’s why we offer a wide range of study modes (full-time, part-time, on campus, online) across our courses to provide you with the greatest choice and flexibility you need to succeed in your studies. 
• Get ahead of the competition - gain in-depth knowledge of your topic of interest and become a subject expert, which will provide you with a competitive edge in the job market.
• Prepare for the future of Legal Technology – study modules in legal technology and gain insight into this emerging area of law.

Please note that, due to Home Office regulations, students who require a Student Route visa to study with us are not permitted to study online and can only choose face-to-face taught modules.

Course Structure

Terms 1 & 2 (full-time) or 1-4 (part-time).

In addition to a general induction to the programme, there is a two-week induction covering the Key Principles of the English Legal System. This is compulsory for non-law students, but also open to students wanting a refresher in the fundamentals of the law of England and Wales. This would be useful for any student who has taken a considerable break from legal education.

Compulsory modules include:

• International Criminal Law
• Research Methods Training to help you prepare for your dissertation

You may then choose three* from the list of elective modules which includes modules such as:

• Domestic Human Rights and Judicial Review
• Immigrational Law
• International Human Rights
• Public International Law

View the elective module guide

*All elective modules are subject to availability.

Term 3 (full-time) or 5 & 6 (part-time)

Dissertation in International Criminal Law.

Course Start Dates

• Full-time: Birmingham, London Bloomsbury and Manchester
• Part-time: Birmingham, London Bloomsbury and Manchester

February 2025

Study LLM International Criminal Law Online starting September 2024 or February 2025

Make an Enquiry

Course requirements.

The course demands show you the requirements, prior knowledge and commitments our course will involve.

Find out more ➔

Study Online

If you’re looking for the perfect combination of a flexible study programme to fit around your other commitments together with the benefit of our expertise, experience and employability focus, why not consider our online study option?

LLM International Criminal Law Online ➔

open days Upcoming Dates

Course Information

• Course dates

With so many options for studying this course, you can be sure to find a start date and study option to suit your needs.

Modules are assessed by a three hour unseen written examination or 4,500 word coursework assignment.

All assessments are conducted online.

The dissertation module will be assessed by submission of a thesis (15,000 words), and provides an opportunity for sustained, in-depth and intensive investigation into, and reflection upon, a specialist area of International Criminal Law.

The course has an innovatively flexible structure, with specific assessments that are conducive to effective learning.

The approach to learning and teaching on the Master of Laws programmes is predominantly learner-centred. Each taught module is divided into a number of Units which are presented using the Prepare, Engage, Consolidate approach.

Prepare : this represents all the work the student needs to complete before attending the relevant workshop. Traditional lecture content will be presented in short bite-sized segments of approximately 10 minutes to better engage the modern student. Guided independent research and reading will be expected as part of a student’s preparation.

Engage: this represents the interactive element of the Unit. This could be a face to face workshop, a synchronous online workshop or an asynchronous online activity.

Consolidate: this represents the final part of the Unit and can be used by students to check their understanding of the Unit immediately after their Engage activity or as part of their revision for the module or both.

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You can apply for this course directly with the University.

This course cannot be chosen to study alongside our Legal Practice Course (LPC). For more information on the choice of Master's to study alongside our LPC, please visit the LPC page.

Please note: Our Master of Laws (LLM) programmes are not a direct route to qualification as a Barrister or Solicitor in the UK.

2023/24 Course Fee (for courses starting on or after 1 July 2023)

Domestic students London: £12,550 Outside of London: £11,350

Non-domestic students London: £17,500 Outside of London: £15,100

2024/25 Course Fee (for courses starting on or after 1 July 2024)

Domestic students London: £13,450 Outside of London: £11,900

Non-domestic students London: £18,500 Outside of London: £17,000

By studying a Master's degree you could be eligible for a Postgraduate Loan .

We also have a range of scholarships and bursaries available which make studying with us more affordable than ever.

If you’re a ULaw alumnus, you may be eligible to receive our £1000 Academic Master's Alumni Discount .

We have students from over 120 different countries throughout our campuses, with a dedicated team to help international students.

If you are an international student and are coming to the UK to study, then you must apply to the Home Office for a visa. In most cases you will need to obtain a Student Route visa . In order to apply for this visa you must be sponsored by an education provider which is licensed by the UK Home Office.

The Home Office has also introduced a Graduate Work visa which allows Graduates to work flexibly, switch jobs and develop their career in the UK for 2 years post completion of a UK degree. The Graduate route is an unsponsored visa, meaning students will not need a job offer to apply for this visa.

Please note that the University does not currently provide visa sponsorship to students for part-time study. We also cannot sponsor students for online courses due to Home Office regulations.

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International Criminal Law (Advanced LL.M.)

Which organisations have the authority to intervene when violations of human rights occur? Which legal means can be used to combat international terrorism? The Advanced Master's specialization International Criminal Law at Leiden University examines international criminal law and international criminal procedure.

• Public International Law (Advanced LL.M.)

Hitomi Takemura (Japan)

“I am grateful for my time in the Public International Law programme because it served as the foundation that sparked my interest in International Criminal Law. Due to our focus on this unique specialisation, I now know that I hope to pursue International Criminal Law professionally.”

Why did Sabrina choose this Advanced Master's?

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What does this master's programme entail?

In the International Criminal Law specialisation, you will gain foundational knowledge on international criminal law and international criminal procedure. You will study the systemic environment of international criminal law and its link to related fields, such as

• international human rights law
• international humanitarian law and
• general public international law.

Outside of your coursework, additional time will be allotted for you to pursue personal interests within related fields.

Reasons to choose International Criminal Law at Leiden University?

As a student of the Advanced Studies programme in International Criminal Law, you will benefit from:

• Taught partially in The Hague: The Hague is a hub of international legal institutions. That makes it the perfect place for internship and job opportunities with international organisations, international courts and tribunals, defence teams and NGOs, or in academic institutes.
• Multidimensional scope: As the International Criminal Law programme is a specialisation within the larger Public International Law programme, you will obtain the unique perspective of a specialised focus while still gaining a thorough understanding of Public International Law as a whole.
• Expert instructors: You will be taught by practitioners and experts from international judicial institutions as well as distinguished academics from the Leiden Law School.

Find more reasons to study International Criminal Law at Leiden University.

Is International Criminal Law the right programme for you?

The International Criminal Law programme is a good fit for you if you have a sincere interest in the field and:

• you are a qualified lawyer who would like to enhance your career prospects
• you are an excellent student who has completed your legal studies in your home country with sufficient knowledge of Public International Law
• you have professional experience in the field

Read more about the entry requirements for International Criminal Law .

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Theses and Dissertations (Criminal and Procedural Law)

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• Appropriate versus alternative : litigation in the context of dispute resolution methods in Ghana  Kotochie, Clemence ( 2023-07-25 ) The study sought to accomplish three main tasks. These were to clarify ‘appropriate dispute resolution method’, design a mechanism for selecting an appropriate dispute resolution method for use in resolving disputes and ...
• Bail and the presumption of innocence : a comparative legal study  Gissing, A. ( 2022-11-30 ) Every person arrested for allegedly having committed a crime, has a constitutional right to be released on bail if the interests of justice permit and subject to reasonable conditions. Every accused has a constitutional ...
• The role of the presiding officer in South African child justice proceedings : a comparative critique of procedural models  Ndlazi, Muziyabongwa Bongani ( 2023-06-15 ) This research explores the role of the presiding officer in child justice proceedings in South Africa, Germany, and Scotland. The researcher investigates the active participation of the presiding officer as a feature of ...
• A comparative study of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in South Africa, Australia, and the United States of America  Sithole, Sylvester ( 2023-05-11 ) The quest to reduce criminality by effective prosecution has become the paramount role of prosecutors in criminal jurisdictions worldwide. As gatekeepers of the criminal justice system, prosecutors perform different roles ...
• A critical review of the criminalisation of sex work in South Africa : a comparative legal study  Mutiso, Antonio Muinde ( 2022-01-20 ) The objective of this research is to critically examine the causes and consequences of the criminalisation of sex work between consenting adults in South Africa by means of a comparative approach. In order to achieve this ...
• The revisionary jurisdiction of the higher courts of Botswana and England in the review of decisions of private bodies  Maripe, Bugalo ( 2022-02-28 ) Botswana has a peculiar legal system. It is a former British protectorate, yet the British never introduced their own laws into the country. Instead Botswana was made to apply the law of the Colony of the Cape of Good ...
• Alternative dispute resolution for juveniles in crime : a case for Ghana’s legal system  Hassan, Elizabeth Temitope ( 2022-06 ) This research sets out to explore the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Ghana's juvenile justice system, emphasizing traditional customs and practices to solve juvenile delinquency. The mixed-method approach was ...
• An analysis of the sentencing of human trafficking offenders under South African and international law  Ntlatlapa, Itumeleng Lydia ( 2021-11-15 ) There are concerns that the sentencing regime of offenders convicted of human trafficking in South Africa under the Prevention and Combating of Trafficking in Persons Act 77 of 2013 is too harsh and goes beyond the ...
• Use of force by South African security services : a comparative critique  Matubako, Matlhoko Scholtz ( 2022-02 ) One of the most serious challenges facing South Africa currently is the high rate of violent crime as well as violent protests. The police are tasked and empowered by the Constitution as well as statutes to prevent, combat, ...
• The powers of a peace officer to arrest a suspect without a warrant, detain and use force : its constitutionality and consequences on the rights of a suspect  Gopaul, Arusha ( 2022-03 ) Peace officers are empowered to arrest without a warrant, detain and use force on suspects. Suspects are guaranteed protection and promotion of their constitutional rights and any act that violates their constitutional ...
• Offences rising from the right to gather : a legal comparative study  Steyn, Anna Sophia ( 2021-02 ) To gather together is a natural human activity shared by all people. The majority of these activities take place without the involvement of the government, and is of no interest to the law. In South Africa, the right to ...
• The legitimacy of judicial law-making and the application of judicial discretion in South Africa : a legal comparative study  Mhlanga, Pete Vusi ( 2020-02 ) The concept of judicial law-making impacts on the extent, meaning and scope relationship between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. It is an integral function of the courts while its shape, meaning and nature ...
• A historical-legal analysis of search and seizure of electronic records for the prosecution of financial crimes in South Africa  Poyo, Unathi ( 2020-09-01 ) Crime has been around since the beginning of time. In an evolving society, and the methodology of crime also changes. The methodology of combating and preventing crime should aim to match the speed at which crime occurs. ...
• The interpretation and application of dolus eventualis in South African criminal law  Awa, Linus Tambu ( 2019-11 ) An accused cannot be held criminally liable by a court until he is considered to be culpable, a process which entails establishing criminal capacity and intention (dolus) or negligence (culpa). Determining a perpetrator’s ...
• The need for decriminalization of the use of cannabis : a comparative legal study  Singh, Vishik Anil ( 2019-09-04 ) The research determined if constitutional justification existed for the decriminalisation of the use of cannabis for medical and recreational purposes. Various constitutional values were employed when deciding on the ...
• Restorative justice as an alternative sentencing option in South Africa: A different approach to crime  Reliance, Bongani Mokomane ( 2020 ) Concerns with the current criminal justice system in many countries around the world have triggered an interest in alternative methods of dispensing justice. This is because of its failure to effectively reduce crime and ...
• A comparative study of laws governing domestic violence in Ethiopia and India  Raveendran Nair, K. P. ( 2018 ) This study aimed to compare the laws governing domestic violence in Ethiopia and India and to then determine their practical efficacy. Data was collected using in-depth interviews with victims of domestic violence, and an ...
• A restorative approach towards school discipline and behavioural conduct in South African schools: a case study  Buys, Irma ( 2018-09 ) Misconduct, antisocial and offending (criminal) behaviour is becoming a problem in South African schools and maintaining discipline in schools is facing many challenges. Current practices do not solve disciplinary challenges. ...
• A critical appraisal of the legal implications of South Africa’s withdrawal from the ICC in the context of its international and regional human rights obligations  Suckling, Brian Charles ( 2018-04 ) This study involves a critical appraisal of the legal implications of South Africa’s withdrawal from the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the context of its international and regional human rights obligations. The ...
• The impact of e-technology on law of civil procedure in South Africa  Mabeka, Nombulelo Queen ( 2018 ) The law of civil procedure is an important branch of South African law as it resolves individual civil disputes through a regulated judicial system. Mandatory statutes and rules regulate the processes when bringing disputes ...

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'War crimes (International law)'

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Consult the top 50 dissertations / theses for your research on the topic 'War crimes (International law).'

Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.

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Sellars, Kirsten. ""Crimes against peace" and international law." Thesis, University of Aberdeen, 2009. http://digitool.abdn.ac.uk:80/webclient/DeliveryManager?pid=133994.

Aksar, Yusuf. "The 'ad hoc' tribunals and international humanitarian law." Thesis, University of Bristol, 2000. http://hdl.handle.net/1983/405a48d5-52b6-4cea-894e-30c7a402faed.

McDonald, A. M. "Rights to legal remedies of victims of serious violations of international humanitarian law." Thesis, Queen's University Belfast, 2003. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.273093.

Nortje, Windell. "The accountability of juveniles for crimes under international law." University of the Western Cape, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/11394/5471.

Candelaria, Jacob. "Europe, the United States, and the international criminal court." Thesis, Monterey, Calif. : Springfield, Va. : Naval Postgraduate School ; Available from National Technical Information Service, 2003. http://library.nps.navy.mil/uhtbin/hyperion-image/03Jun%5FCandelaria.pdf.

Holm, Fanny. "Justice for victims of atrocity crimes : prosecution and reparations under international law." Doctoral thesis, Umeå universitet, Juridiska institutionen, 2017. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-138761.

LaVilla, Oriana H. D. "Reconciliation and The Rule of Law: The Changing Role of International War Crimes Tribunals." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2014. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/scripps_theses/439.

Darge, Tobias. "Kriegsverbrechen im nationalen und internationalen Recht unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Bestimmtheitsgrundsatzes = War crimes in national and international law." [Berlin Heidelberg] Springer, 2008. http://d-nb.info/999263633/04.

Ojo, Victoria Olayide. "The Boko Haram violence from the perspective of International criminal law." Thesis, University of the Western Cape, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/11394/5175.

Hersi, Mohamed Farah. "The possibilites of international prosecution against the former Somali militry regime for human rights abuses in Somaliland from 1981 - 1991: establishing individual criminal and civil responsibility under international law." Diss., University of Pretoria, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/2263/8055.

Torrens, Shannon Maree. "Interrogating International Criminal Law through the Lens of Justice as Process: From Justice Beliefs to Justice Legacies." Thesis, The University of Sydney, 2019. https://hdl.handle.net/2123/21862.

Sonczyk, Barbara. "The anatomy of the war crime of attacking peacekeepers under international humanitarian law and international criminal law." Thesis, University of Westminster, 2014. https://westminsterresearch.westminster.ac.uk/item/964w0/the-anatomy-of-the-war-crimeof-attacking-peacekeepersunder-internationalhumanitarian-law-andinternational-criminal-law.

Romero, Jorge H. "Cyberespionage 2010 : is the current status of espionage under international law applicable in cyberspace? /." (Requires Adobe Acrobat Reader), 2001. http://stinet.dtic.mil/str/tr4%5Ffields.html.

Mugemangango, Paul. "Immunity from prosecution for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes: the case of heads of state." Diss., University of Pretoria, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/2263/1088.

Reyes, Menéndez Valeria. "Children in war: Answers from International Law to the crimes of recruitment of child soldiers and sexual violence." IUS ET VERITAS, 2018. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/123713.

Furphy, Patricia. "Multivariate analysis of war crime behaviour : implications for the International Criminal Court." Thesis, Liverpool John Moores University, 2015. http://researchonline.ljmu.ac.uk/4409/.

Bohle, Eva. "Proving genocidal intent and the policy element :genocide in Darfur?" Thesis, University of the Western Cape, 2009. http://etd.uwc.ac.za/index.php?module=etd&action=viewtitle&id=gen8Srv25Nme4_2738_1297749409.

The International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (Commission) began its work in October 2004 and provided its final report only three months later on 25 January 2005.2 There, it concluded, inter alia, &ldquo that the Government of Sudan has not pursued a policy of genocide&rdquo and that at least the central Government authorities did not act with genocidal intent.3 However, these findings would not exclude the possibility that the atrocities committed by individuals against victims were carried out with the specific intent to destroy and therefore could possibly fulfil all necessary requirements of the crime of genocide.

King, Samantha Jane. "Locating moral responsibility for war crimes : the new justiciability of 'system criminality' and its implications for the development of an international polity." Thesis, University of Plymouth, 2002. http://hdl.handle.net/10026.1/421.

Kuner, Janosch O. A. "The war crimes trial against German Industrialist Friedrich Flick et al - a legal analysis and critical evaluation." Thesis, University of the Western Cape, 2010. http://etd.uwc.ac.za/index.php?module=etd&action=viewtitle&id=gen8Srv25Nme4_1823_1363782732.

This research paper is an analysis of the case United States v Flick et al which took place in 1947 in Nuremberg, Germany. Friedrich Flick, a powerful German industrialist, and several high ranking officials of his firm were tried by a United States military tribunal for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during the Third Reich. The  proceedings and the decision itself are the subject of a critical examination, including an investigation of the factual and legal background. The trial will be regarded in the historical context of prosecutions against German industrialists after World War II. Seen from present-day perspective, the question will be raised whether any conclusions can be drawn from the Flick case in respect of the substance of present-day international criminal law.  

Schuetze, Jennifer Johanna. "To cause or not to cause, that is the question : the prosecutorial standard for incitement at international criminal law." Thesis, McGill University, 2005. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=82670.

Verlage, Christopher. "Responsibility to Protect : ein neuer Ansatz im Völkerrecht zur Verhinderung von Völkermord, Kriegsverbrechen und Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit /." Tübingen : Mohr Siebeck, 2009. http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&doc_number=016710994&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA.

Wright, Crystal Renee Murray. "From the Hague to Nuremberg: International Law and War, 1898-1945." Thesis, North Texas State University, 1987. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc501222/.

Seifert, Katharina Elena. "The scope of war crimes against peace-keeping personnel : Do Articles 8 (2) (b) (iii) and (e) (iiD ICC- Statute and 4 (b) SCSL- Statute fulfil the requirements of the principle of specificify in international law?" Master's thesis, University of Cape Town, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/11427/12610.

Reike, Ruben. "The 'responsibility to prevent' : an international crimes approach to the prevention of mass atrocities." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2014. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:16fdad2d-d295-4904-b730-bc7fe58d96c5.

Mitchell, David Scott. "Voicing the Silent War Crime: Prosecuting Sexual Violence in the Special Court for Sierra Leone." Miami University Honors Theses / OhioLINK, 2006. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=muhonors1146448301.

Bertrand, Virginie. "Crimes de guerre au XXe siècle et juridictions pénales internationales." Thesis, Montpellier 3, 2012. http://www.theses.fr/2012MON30066.

Bardet, Marie. "La notion d'infraction internationale par nature : essai d'une analyse structurelle." Thesis, Bordeaux, 2020. http://www.theses.fr/2020BORD0242.

Ngameni, Herman Blaise. "La diffusion du droit international pénal dans les ordres juridiques africains." Thesis, Clermont-Ferrand 1, 2014. http://www.theses.fr/2014CLF10457.

Adonis, Bongiwe. "Immunity for serving Heads of State for crimes under International Criminal Law: an analysis of the ICC-indictment against Omar Al Bashir." University of the Western Cape, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/11394/2910.

Cameron, Calla. "Grave Breaches: American Military Intervention in the Late Twentieth- Century and the Consequences for International Law." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2017. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1677.

Diop, Mamadou Falilou. "Essai de construction de poursuites d’auteurs de crimes internationaux à travers les mécanismes nationaux et régionaux." Thesis, Aix-Marseille, 2012. http://www.theses.fr/2012AIXM1066.

Ashfaq, Muhammad. "The crime of aggression : a critical historical inquiry of the just war tradition." Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/13671.

Devouèze, Nelly. "Le droit à l'intégrité physique et mentale dans la jurisprudence internationale pénale." Thesis, Paris 5, 2012. http://www.theses.fr/2012PA05D008.

Peterson, Ines. "Die Strafbarkeit des Einsatzes von biologischen, chemischen und nuklearen Waffen als Kriegsverbrechen nach dem IStGH-Statut /." Berlin : BWV, Berliner Wiss.-Verl, 2009. http://d-nb.info/994112998/04.

Hassan, Kamal. "Le statut des tribunaux ad hoc en droit international pénal." Thesis, Tours, 2015. http://www.theses.fr/2015TOUR1005/document.

Bouvier, Charlotte-Lucie. "La mémoire et le droit des crimes de guerre et des crimes contre l'humanité depuis la seconde guerre mondiale : comparaison Allemagne fédérale / France." Thesis, Poitiers, 2014. http://www.theses.fr/2014POIT3018/document.

Aivo, Gérard. "Le statut de combattant dans les conflits armés non internationaux : etude critique de droit international humanitaire." Thesis, Lyon 3, 2011. http://www.theses.fr/2011LYO30053.

Saldarriaga, Velásquez Giuliana Stephanie. "The legality of the intervention in Mali." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2014. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/116032.

Estupiñan, Silva Rosmerlin. "Los crímenes de guerra en Colombia. Estudio desde el derecho internacional y desde el derecho colombiano." Doctoral thesis, Universitat de València, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/80915.

Dyukova, Yulia. "L’utilisation du droit international humanitaire par les organes chargés de la protection des droits de l'homme." Thesis, Paris 2, 2019. http://www.theses.fr/2019PA020014.

Lira, Cláudio Rogério Sousa. "A resposta ao terrorismo pelo direito: um crime transnacional e de natureza jurídica de tratado." Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos, 2018. http://www.repositorio.jesuita.org.br/handle/UNISINOS/7476.

Bounda, Sosthène. "Le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge en Afrique centrale à la fin du XXe siècle : cas du Cameroun, du Congo Brazzaville, du Congo Kinshasa et du Gabon de 1960 à 1999." Thesis, Bordeaux 3, 2015. http://www.theses.fr/2015BOR30053/document.

Winters, Veronica Jane. "State-Corporate Crime in the Democratic Republic of Congo." Scholar Commons, 2013. http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/4615.

Alendal, Oscar. "Aggressionsbegreppet : En komparativ studie av Förenta nationernas stadgas och Romstadgan för den Internationella brottsmålsdomstolens aggressionsbegrepp." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Juridiska institutionen, 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-342031.

Dubler, Robert Edward. "Crimes against humanity in international law." Thesis, Faculty of Law, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/5306.

Williams, Meagan Meernik James David. "Judicial creativity or justice being served ? a look at the use of joint criminal enterprise in the ICTY prosecution /." [Denton, Tex.] : University of North Texas, 2008. http://digital.library.unt.edu/permalink/meta-dc-9721.

Williams, Meagan. "Judicial Creativity or Justice Being Served? A Look at the Use of Joint Criminal Enterprise in the ICTY Prosecution." Thesis, University of North Texas, 2008. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc9721/.

La, Rosa Aurélie. "Le concept d'enfant soldat et la Cour Pénale Internationale." Thesis, Lille 2, 2013. http://www.theses.fr/2013LIL20006.

Siff, Sarah Brady. "Tough on Dope: Crime and Politics in California's Drug Wars, 1946-1963." The Ohio State University, 2016. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1479203861841892.

Riley, Donald J. "Post-conflict justice : issues and approaches." Thesis, (240 KB), 2003. http://library.nps.navy.mil/uhtbin/hyperion-image/03Jun%5FRiley.pdf.

A Chronicle of Current Events

For human rights & freedom of expression in the ussr, the podrabinek case, dec 1977 to feb 1978 (48.7).

<<No 48 : 14 March 1978>>

On 1 December 1977, the brothers Alexander and Kirill PODRABINEK (CCE 47) and their father Pinkhos Abramovich PODRABINEK were summoned for a chat by Yu.S. Belov, chief of a department at the Moscow City and Regional KGB. Alexander refused to appear.

“On behalf of the Committee for State Security ” (Belov told Kirill and his father Pinkhos Podrabinek)

“I suggest that you and your families leave the Soviet Union and go abroad via Israel within 20 days. There is enough material against you, Kirill Pinkhosovich, to institute criminal proceedings. You, Pinkhos Abramovich, are also known to us for your anti-social activities. An act of humanity is being offered to you both. I advise you to make use of it.”

Alexander (b. 1953) and Kirill Podrabinek (b. 1952)

The same evening Alexander Podrabinek was arrested on the street and taken to the KGB. Belov presented him, too, with an ultimatum: all three must leave the country, otherwise criminal proceedings would be instituted against both brothers.

Belov let it be understood that the absence of an invitation and difficulties with money would not be obstacles. Belov stressed that they could only leave all together.

HOSTAGE-TAKING

Many painful disputes have sprung up around the moral problems arising from KGB’s ultimatums and blackmail. The Chronicle cannot present the arguments but at least it can accurately convey the stance of participants in such events by reproducing all their statements in sufficient detail.

On 6 December 1977, there was a press conference at Andrei Sakharov ’s flat. Pinkhos PODRABINEK read out a “Statement for the Belgrade Conference [note 1] and the Press”:

“A distinctive feature of this case is the KGB’s use of the hostage system. Not one of us can determine his own fate independently, and a decision about the fate of three people has been placed by the KGB on Alexander Podrabinek alone, in whose departure the authorities are most of all interested. “We categorically refuse to accept such conditions and insist on our right to make our choices independently…”

Then Alexander PODRABINEK read out his “Reply” to the KGB’s proposal:

“I would like to draw the attention of the world public to my brother’s painful position and to the dirty tactics of the KGB — tactics of intimidation and terror. The whole world condemns the hijacking of aeroplanes and the taking of passengers as hostages, yet the KGB is using the very same method with regard to my brother, a method commonly used by terrorists. In the situation that has arisen the most painful thing for me is my brother’s fate. “At the KGB they insistently advised me to take advantage of this ‘humane act of the Soviet government’, as they expressed it. I regard this proposal as unconcealed blackmail by the KGB. “They have given me four days to reflect. On 5 December I have to give my reply. A reply that means a great deal to me. “This is my reply.

“I do not wish to go to prison. I value even the semblance of freedom which I possess now. I know that I would be able to live freely in the West and at last receive a real education. I know that there I would not have four agents at my heels, threatening to beat me up or push me under a train.

“Over there, I know, they will not put me in a concentration camp or a psychiatric hospital for attempting to defend people who are denied their rights and oppressed. Over there, I know, one breathes easily. While here one does so with difficulty, and they stop your mouth and stifle you if you speak too loudly. I know that our country is unhappy and doomed to suffering.

“And that is why I am staying.

“I do not want to go to prison, but neither do I fear a camp. I value my own freedom as I value my brother’s, but I am not bargaining for it. I will not give in to any blackmail.

“A clear conscience is dearer to me than material well-being. I was born in Russia. This is my country, and I must remain here, however hard it may be and however easy in the West. As far as I am able, I will go on defending those whose rights are being so brazenly trampled on in our country.

“That is my reply. I am staying.”

After this Alexander Podrabinek added that he would agree to leave the country only if Kirill were to ask him to do so.

On 7 December 1977, Kirill PODRABINEK made a statement:

KGB Blackmail

1. The KGB is using the hostage-taking method. They are basically blackmailing my brother Alexander, while I am the hostage. 2. The very formulation of the question: ‘leave or we will put you in prison’, is contrary to the law. If a man has committed a crime he must be prosecuted. However, in this case the KGB does not want to stage a new political trial but prefers to dispatch us abroad. The KGB has employed a well-calculated device — to exploit the insolubility of a situation with a hostage. All this blackmail is patently a consequence of the public stand taken by our family … “If any one of the three of us is arrested and any charge whatsoever brought against him, it can only be viewed as an act of revenge by the KGB and not as a requirement of justice.”

On 12 December 1977, Kirill Podrabinek informed Belov that he had decided to leave. Belov replied that Kirill could hand in his emigration documents, and on the same day Kirill did so. On 14 December Kirill Podrabinek made an addition to his previous statement:

“On 12 December, I telephoned investigator Belov at the KGB. Permission to go abroad has been granted; there was no mention of my only being able to leave only with my brother. Does this mean that the KGB has given up its hostage-taking and will really allow me to leave? In the very near future this will become clear … In view of all the circumstances, and fearing for my life” (see CCE 47) “I have taken the decision to leave.” *

KIRILL PODRABINEK (b. 1952)

On 27 December 1977, the police in Elektrostal (Moscow Region) brought charges against Kirill Podrabinek under Article 215 (RSFSR Criminal Code: “Illegal possession of arms, ammunition” etc). Kirill refused to sign the record of this charge. Investigator Radygin obtained his written undertaking not to leave town but said he would not need Kirill before the middle of January and, if need be, he could go to Moscow.

When Kirill Podrabinek came out of the Elektrostal police station he was met at the door by KGB Investigator Belov, who had arrived from Moscow. The condition of Kirill’s departure remained unchanged, Belov said, and gave him three days in which to persuade his brother to agree to leave.

From that day onwards, KGB employees began trailing Kirill Podrabinek . (His brother Alexander had been under a similar “escort” since 10 October 1977, see below). The same day 22 Muscovites issued a statement:

“Wishing to force Alexander Podrabinek to leave the country, the KGB is openly blackmailing him with his brother’s fate. A method of hostage-taking used thus far only by irresponsible criminal-terrorists is in the present case being adopted as a weapon by the official representatives of a powerful State. This blackmail clearly demonstrates the value of the charges brought against Kirill Podrabinek. “We call upon our fellow countrymen and world public opinion to protest against the use of hostage-taking, unprecedented in the practice of civilized states. We call upon our fellow countrymen and world public opinion to follow attentively the fate of the Podrabinek family.”

On 28 December Kirill Podrabinek made a statement:

State Terrorism

“… The KGB has resorted to hostage-taking. My brother Alexander has made a statement for the press saying that he does not wish to leave, but he will leave if I so demand. “Under no circumstances will I make this demand of Alexander. In the first place, that would mean becoming a blind instrument of blackmail in the hands of the KGB, exploiting a situation created by them for my own sake. In the second place, it is impossible for me to even ask, let alone demand such a thing. “However, I have resolved to pursue my chosen line of action and try to obtain permission to leave.”

On the evening of 29 December 1977, Kirill Podrabinek was arrested.

On the day of his arrest, he declared a hunger strike. After a few days he was transferred from Elektrostal to Moscow, to the MVD’s detention centre on Matrosskaya Tishina Street.

The first response to Kirill’s arrest was “The Christmas ‘Feat’ of the KGB”, a short article by Victor Nekipelov [note 2]:

“… The arrest of Kirill Podrabinek is an act of deliberate, demonstrative revenge. The authorities know full well that they are thereby dealing the severest blow to both Alexander Podrabinek – Take that for not accepting our offer! – and to his father — While you didn’t steer your sons to a compromise!”

On 1 January 1978, Yevgeny Nikolayev (see “In the Psychiatric Hospitals”, CCE 48.12 ) sent a letter to the RSFSR Procurator’s Office, protesting against the arrest of Kirill Podrabinek.

On 4 January 1978, Alexander and Pinkhos Podrabinek asked Belov for a meeting with Kirill.

Belov refused but promised to pass Kirill a note from them, “if there are no objections on the part of the investigator”. In the note Alexander and his father asked Kirill: “Do you agree to leave if there is no need to ask Alexander to do the same?”

On the same day, at 11.30 pm, Belov came to Elektrostal to see Pinkhos Podrabinek . He informed him that the investigator “had not allowed” the note to be passed to Kirill. If Alexander handed in his application to emigrate within three days, however, all three could leave the USSR. Otherwise, Alexander  would also be arrested. Belov suggested that P.A. Podrabinek go at once to Moscow and persuade Alexander to change his mind: he even gave Pinkhos Abramovich a lift back to Moscow in his car.

On 5 January 1978, Alexander Podrabinek appealed in an open letter to Amnesty International, calling on the organisation to speak out in Kirill’s defence.

On 9 January Alexander Podrabinek telephoned Belov at the KGB. When Belov asked if he intended to leave, Alexander replied that he could only decide this matter together with his brother.

On 15 January 1978, the Christian Committee for the Defence of Believers’ Rights in the USSR called upon “world public opinion” to speak out in defence of Kirill Podrabinek and condemn the policy of hostage-taking.

At the beginning of February 1978, the Podrabineks were summoned to Elektrostal for interrogation in connection with Kirill’s case.

Pinkhos Podrabinek replied to questions about Kirill but refused to sign a record of the interrogation. Alexander declined to answer questions, stating that the case was inspired by the KGB and was being conducted with violations of norms laid down in the Code of Criminal Procedure.

ALEXANDER PODRABINEK (b. 1953)

From 10 October 1977, Alexander Podrabinek was under constant KGB surveillance. Round the clock he was pursued by two cars carrying seven or eight employees of the security services.

Whenever he was inside a building the cars stood in front of the doorway. Whenever he walked along the street or travelled in public transport there were always several agents at his side. They threatened Alexander’s acquaintances and took photographs of them. Sometimes they interfered more actively with the life of their charge: on Sunday 18 December the escort prohibited Alexander from going skiing with friends in the Orekhovo-Borisovo district [Moscow Region]. Podrabinek wrote about this incident to [KGB chairman] Andropov:

“… Since 10 October of this year I have been under the continuous and unconcealed observation of our glorious Chekists. Defending the State’s security, I understand, it is essential for the KGB to search my home, call me as a witness in the case of Yury Orlov, suggest that I leave the USSR, blackmail me, make an attempt on my brother’s life, and do much else to ensure that I do not, accidentally, undermine the foundations of the Soviet political and social system. All this I understand. “I am not even particularly annoyed when one of the eight officers who perpetually watch over me swears he will break my legs or push me under a train. I understand the full difficulty of this highly complex, responsible and dangerous work and do not get angry with these heroic young people who, performing their civic duty, freeze on cold December nights outside the entrance to my house or squeeze after me onto a city bus in the rush-hour. I am enraptured by their daring, their persistence and their indifference to the cold … “Citizen Andropov! On behalf of myself and six of my friends I beg you: Provide your employees with skis and toboggans and, please, teach them how to use them, if they do not know. Then I shall be able to enjoy my on Sundays and the KGB will be able to work normally and not violate the Soviet Constitution. This can only enhance the reputation of our valiant organs and promote their physical development.”

From January 1978, the constant “escort” was replaced from time to time by ‘ordinary’ shadowing.

The security services are trying by any means to prevent Alexander Podrabinek from continuing his activities on the Working Commission (to Investigate the Use of Psychiatry for Political Purposes). In particular, they are hampering him from meeting, in the flats of his Moscow friends, people who have been subjected to “psychiatric persecution” and their relatives. Podrabinek and his friend Dmitry Leontyev , in whose flat he was living, were fined for violating the city residence regulations. Podrabinek was forbidden to continue residing at the flat.

Alexander Podrabinek was warned that he was liable to be charged with “parasitism”. In February 1978, having given his shadow the slip, he managed to get a job as a medical orderly (he is a qualified paramedic).

The pre-trial investigation of Kirill Podrabinek ’s case was completed in February 1978.

=======================

[1] Representatives of all 35 member-States of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) assembed in the Yugoslav capital Belgrade to discuss the implementation of the 1975 Helsinki Accords five years on.

[2] Victor Nekipelov

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March 27, 2024

Russian offensive campaign assessment, march 27, 2024.

March 27, 2024, 5:10pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2:15pm ET on March 27. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 28 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) released its 38th report on the human rights situation in Ukraine on March 26, confirming several of ISW’s longstanding assessments about Russia’s systematic violations of international human rights and humanitarian law in occupied territories and towards Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs). [1] The HRMMU report details activities between December 1, 2023 and February 29 2024, and includes new findings about Russia’s abuse of Ukrainian POWs during this timeframe, based on interviews with 60 recently released male POWs. [2] Nearly all of the POWs that HRMMU interviewed detailed how they were tortured by Russian forces with beatings and electric shocks and threatened with execution, and over half of the interviewees experienced sexual violence. HRMMU also reported that it has evidence of Russian forces executing at least 32 POWs in 12 different incidents during the reporting period and independently verified three of the executions. ISW observed open-source evidence of several POW executions during this reporting period: the execution of three Ukrainian POWs near Robotyne, Zaporizhia Oblast on December 27, 2023; the execution of one Ukrainian POW near Klishchiivka, Donetsk Oblast on February 9, 2024; the executions of three Ukrainian POWs near Robotyne, the execution of six Ukrainian POWs near Avdiivka, Donetsk Oblast, and the executions of two Ukrainian POWs near Vesele, Donetsk Oblast on or around February 18, 2024; and the execution of nine Ukrainian POWs near Ivanivske, Donetsk Oblast, on February 25. [3] The summary execution and mistreatment of POWs is a violation of Article 3 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. [4] The HRMMU report also details the forced Russification of Ukrainian populations in occupied areas, including the imposition of Russian political, legal, and administrative systems onto occupied Ukraine in violation of Russia’s international legal obligations as an occupying power. [5] ISW has reported at length on the specifics of Russia’s illegal occupation of Ukraine, consistent with the findings of the UN HRMMU report. [6]

Russian officials are tying the US and the West to a broader set of “terrorist” attacks against Russia following the Crocus City Hall attack, likely to intensify rhetoric about alleged Western and Ukrainian threats to generate greater domestic support for the war in Ukraine. The Russian Investigative Committee and Prosecutor General’s Office stated on March 27 that they will consider an appeal from the Russian State Duma to investigate American and Western financing and organization of terrorist attacks against Russia. [7] The Russian Investigative Committee, Prosecutor General’s Office, and the Duma Deputies that made the appeal did not explicitly reference the Crocus City Hall attack. [8] Kremlin officials have previously tied Ukraine and the West to the Crocus City Hall attack but have yet to make a formal accusation, and the Kremlin may refrain from issuing an official accusation as all available evidence continues to show that the Islamic State (IS) is very likely responsible for the attack. [9] Russian officials routinely describe Ukrainian military strikes against legitimate military targets in occupied Ukraine and Russia as terrorism and consistently claim that Western actors help organize these strikes. [10] The Kremlin likely aims to seize on wider Russian social fears and anger following the Crocus City Hall attack by portraying Ukraine, the US, and the West as immediate terrorist threats. The Kremlin likely hopes that perceptions of Ukrainian and Western involvement in the Crocus City Hall attack will increase domestic support for the war in Ukraine, and Russian officials will likely invoke a broader view of what they consider terrorism to further cast Ukrainians as terrorists and the West as a sponsor of terrorism. [11] The Kremlin may still formally accuse Ukraine of conducting the Crocus City Hall attack if it believes that these other informational efforts are insufficient to generate the domestic response it likely desires. [12]

Russian authorities are increasing legal pressure against migrants in Russia following recent Russian officials’ proposals for harsher, measures against migrant communities in response to the March 22 Crocus City Hall attack. BBC News Russian Service stated that there has been a significant increase in the number of cases related to violations of the rules of entry for foreign citizens into Russia following the Crocus City Hall attack. [13] BBC News Russian Service reported on March 27 that 784 such cases have been registered since the morning of March 25, as compared with 1,106 during the entire previous week. A Russian lawyer who often works with Tajik citizens reportedly told BBC News Russian Service that over 100 people waited for a Moscow district court to hear their cases on March 25 alone and that Russian authorities are especially targeting migrants from Tajikistan during searches. BBC News Russian Service reported that representatives of the Tajik diaspora in Russia are expecting Russian authorities to conduct a large wave of deportations following the Crocus City Hall attack. A Russian insider source claimed on March 27 that unspecified actors gave the Moscow Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) an “unspoken” order to “not spare” migrants and for MVD employees to use their own judgement in the field. [14] The insider source claimed that a source suggested that Russian authorities are not preparing to conduct raids on migrant communities but will apply the “strictest measures” to migrants in “controversial situations.” Kremlin newswire TASS stated on March 27 that Russian police and Rosgvardia conducted a raid at the Wildberries warehouse in Elektrostal, Moscow Oblast to check the documents of migrant workers, and Russian opposition outlet Baza reported that Russian authorities detained 21 people during the raid. [15] Several Russian ultranationalist milbloggers complained that the way Russian-language schools in Tajikistan are teaching about Russia’s historical imperial occupation of Tajikistan is discouraging Tajik migrants from integrating into Russian society, essentially blaming migrants for the alienation that Russian society subjects them to. [16] Select Russian officials recently called for the introduction of several anti-migrant policies, which Russian authorities are unlikely to enact given Russia’s reliance on migrants for its force generation and labor needs. [17] Russian authorities may continue the practice of raiding migrant workplaces and increase crackdowns at border crossings to temporarily placate emotional cries for retribution following the March 22 attack as the Kremlin continues to develop a cogent and practical response.

Key Takeaways:

• The UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) released its 38th report on the human rights situation in Ukraine on March 26, confirming several of ISW’s longstanding assessments about Russia’s systematic violations of international human rights and humanitarian law in occupied territories and towards Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs).
• Russian officials are tying the US and the West to a broader set of “terrorist” attacks against Russia following the Crocus City Hall attack, likely to intensify rhetoric about alleged Western and Ukrainian threats to generate greater domestic support for the war in Ukraine.
• Russian authorities are increasing legal pressure against migrants in Russia following recent Russian officials’ proposals for harsher, measures against migrant communities in response to the March 22 Crocus City Hall attack.
• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Avdiivka and southwest of Donetsk City on March 27.
• Russian Storm-Z personnel continue to complain about their poor treatment by the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) as the MoD tries to posture efficacy in its force generation and social benefit allocation system.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Positional engagements continued along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on March 27, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional engagements continued northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka and Lake Lyman; southeast of Kupyansk near Ivanivka; west of Kreminna near Terny and Yampolivka; and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka. [18] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Terny, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim. [19] Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov stated that elements of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz “Aida” detachment are operating near Bilohorivka. [20]

Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck Kharkiv City with a D-30 universal joint glide munition (UMPB), a guided glide bomb, on March 27. [21] Ukrainian officials noted that the strike was the first Russian glide bomb strike against Kharkiv City since the beginning of the full-scale invasion in 2022. [22] Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Synehubov stated that the UMPB D-30 has a range of up to 90 kilometers and that Russian forces can launch the bomb from aircraft or ground-based Smerch multiple rocket launch systems (MLRS). [23] Russian forces struck Myrnohrad, Donetsk Oblast with three UMPB D-30SN guided glide bombs on March 10. [24]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces reportedly advanced west of Bakhmut, although there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in the area on March 27. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Bakhmut along a railway line and a section of the O0506 (Khromove-Chasiv Yar) highway by 1.15 kilometers in depth and 1.85 kilometers in width. [25] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are advancing near Ivanivske and are within 500 meters of the city limits of Chasiv Yar (west of Bakhmut). [26] Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu credited elements of the Russian 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) with seizing Ivanivske on March 24, although ISW has yet to observe visual evidence confirming that Russian forces have seized Ivanivske. [27] Positional fighting continued northeast of Bakhmut near Vesele; northwest of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka; west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske; southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka and Andriivka; and south of Bakhmut near Shumy and Pivdenne. [28] A Ukrainian military observer reported that Russian forces have intensified transfers of equipment and personnel along ground lines of communication (GLOCs) through Kadiivka, Pervomaisk, and Popasna (all east of Bakhmut), but did not specify the destination of these transfers. [29] Kadiivka, Pervomaisk, and Popasna all lie along the T0504 Luhansk City-Bakhmut highway that runs directly from the Russian rear in occupied Luhansk Oblast into Bakhmut, however.

Russian forces recently advanced west of Avdiivka amid continued positional fighting in the area on March 27. Geolocated footage published on March 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within Berdychi (northwest of Avdiivka) and in Orlivka (west of Avdiivka). [30] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces entered Semenivka (northwest of Avdiivka) and are attacking Ukrainian positions within the settlement but that Ukrainian forces are actively counterattacking in the area. [31] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced 200 meters west of Orlivka on the western bank of the Durna River, 200 meters west of Tonenke (west of Avdiivka), 200 meters in the direction of Umanske (west of Avdiivka), 300 meters south of Tonenke towards Pervomaiske (southwest of Avdiivka), and 100 meters south of Nevelske (southwest of Avdiivka). [32] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims. Positional fighting continued northwest of Avdiivka near Berdychi and Semenivka; west of Avdiivka near Orlivka, Tonenke, and Umanske; and southwest of Avdiivka near Vodyane, Nevelske, and Pervomaiske. [33]

Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Donetsk City amid continued positional fighting west and southwest of Donetsk City on March 27. Geolocated footage published on March 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within central Novomykhailivka (southwest of Donetsk City). [34] Positional fighting continued west of Donetsk City near Heorhiivka and Krasnohorivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Novomykhailivka and Pobieda. [35] Elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating near Krasnohorivka. [36]

Positional engagements continued south of Velyka Novosilka near Staromayorske and Urozhaine in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on March 27. [37]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional engagements continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 27, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Positional engagements continued near Robotyne, near Mala Tokmachka (northeast of Robotyne), northeast of Novoprokopivka (south of Robotyne), and northwest of Verbove (east of Robotyne). [38] Elements of the Russian 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue operating within Robotyne. [39]

Positional engagements continued in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast, including near Krynky, on March 27. [40]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 26 to 27 and on March 27. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 13 Shahed-136/131 drones from Kursk Oblast and that Ukrainian forces shot down 10 drones over Kharkiv, Sumy, and Kyiv oblasts on the night of March 26 to 27. [41] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck civilian infrastructure in Izyum, Kharkiv Oblast. [42] Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Head Oleh Synehubov stated that a Russian Kh-35U subsonic anti-ship cruise missile struck Kharkiv City on the morning of March 27. [43] Ukraine’s Eastern Air Command reported that Ukrainian forces shot down an unspecified Russian cruise missile over Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on March 27. [44] Ukrainian officials stated that Russian forces struck an industrial enterprise in Mykolaiv City with an Iskander-M ballistic missile on the afternoon of March 27. [45]

Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Colonel Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Russian forces have stored “several dozen” Zircon missiles in military facilities in occupied Crimea. [46] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Major Ilya Yevlash stated that Ukrainian air defense systems, such as Patriot and SAMP/T systems, can intercept Zircon missiles when they slow down to about 3,700 kilometers per hour on approach to a target. [47]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian Storm-Z personnel continue to complain about their poor treatment by the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) as the MoD tries to present the efficacy of its force generation and social benefit allocation system. Russian opposition outlet Mobilization News posted a video appeal from Storm-Z fighters from Kaluga Oblast on March 27 wherein one fighter claimed that after signing contracts with the Russian MoD, Russian command sent a Storm-Z unit of 230 people to the frontline, of whom only 38 survived combat. [48] The Storm-Z fighter complained that he has been unable to receive combat veteran status or promised payments from the Russian authorities for his service. [49] Mobilization News released another video on March 27 wherein relatives of killed and wounded Storm-Z fighters complain to Russian President Vladimir Putin that Russian authorities have not issued the Storm-Z fighters combat status or granted payments in the event of their death or injury in Ukraine. [50] The relatives of the Storm-Z fighters blamed the Russian MoD and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu for the poor treatment and lack of benefits for Storm-Z fighters. The Russian MoD relies heavily on Storm-Z recruits from penal colonies to carry out costly infantry-led frontal assaults against Ukrainian positions and is very unlikely to address complaints concerning their poor treatment. The Russian MoD claimed on March 27 that it is issuing electronic combat veteran certificates and streamlining and digitizing the process for veterans to obtain payments and social benefits — but these privileges evidently do not apply evenly to all personnel who have signed contracts with the Russian MoD. [51]

Russian news outlet Vedemosti reported that US-sanctioned Russian company Baikal Electronics is struggling to domestically package semiconductor chips to produce processors and that over half of its domestically produced processors are defective. [52] Vedemosti reported that Baikal Electronics began to experiment with domestically packaging chips in Russia at the end of 2021 and that outdated equipment and a lack of experienced employees caused the large amount of processor defects.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russian drone developer Albatross LLC told Kremlin newswire TASS that Russian forces used the Albatross M5 long-range reconnaissance drones to guide aviation and artillery strikes while repelling recent pro-Ukrainian Russian raids into Belgorod Oblast. [53] Albatross LLC noted that the modernized Albatross M5 drone has a maximum range of 60-80 kilometers.

Russian state news outlet RIA Novosti reported that Russian T-72B3, T-72B3M, T-80BVM, and T-90M tanks operating in Ukraine use Reflex-M guided weapon systems with the Invar-M/M1 anti-tank guided missiles to strike Ukrainian and Western-made vehicles. [54]

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine today.

Russian officials are weaponizing international responses to the Crocus City Hall attack to accuse the West of espousing Russophobic policies and to baselessly blame Ukraine of involvement in the attack. Russian Ambassador to Austria Dmitry Lyubinsky claimed on March 27 that while the Austrian government reacted to the Crocus City Hall attack, it did not use the words “terrorist attack” or condemn the attack. [55] Lyubinsky accused Austria of having “taken a very special position in its hypocrisy” and a “daze of permissiveness” towards Ukraine and reiterated the Kremlin narrative baselessly connecting Ukraine to the attack. Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova reported that Russia has received 24-hour non-stop words of support from around the globe following the attack, but immediately pivoted to accuse Ukraine of involvement in the attack and blame NATO members of monopolizing the global fight against terror. [56]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://ukraine.un.org/sites/default/files/2024-03/2024-03-26%20OHCHR%2038th%20Periodic%20Report.pdf

[2] https://ukraine.un.org/en/264368-un-says-russia-continues-torture-execute-ukrainian-pows

[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-20-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-10-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-3-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-20-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-27-2023

[4] https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/geneva-convention-relative-treatment-prisoners-war

[5] https://ukraine.un.org/sites/default/files/2024-03/2024-03-26%20OHCHR%2038th%20Periodic%20Report.pdf

[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/24-210-01%20ISW%20Occupation%20playbook.pdf

[7] https://t.me/tass_agency/240300 ; https://t.me/astrapress/52521 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/240322

[8] https://ria dot ru/20240327/rassledovanie-1936142056.html ; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/03/27/deputaty-gosdumy-potrebovali-ot-sk-rassledovat-akty-terrorizma-kotorye-ssha-sovmestno-so-stranami-nato-i-spetssluzhbami-ukrainy-osuschestvlyayut-v-rossii

[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032324 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032424 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032624

[10] https://t.me/tass_agency/239253%C2%A0;%C2%A0https://isw.pub/UkrWar020624%C2%A0;%C2%A0https://isw.pub/UkrWar031824%C2%A0 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-calls-ukrainian-attack-belgorod-terrorism-promises-more-strikes-2024-01-01/ ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23-2024 ; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignOct10

[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032324

[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032324

[13] https://t.me/bbcrussian/62850

[14] https://t.me/vchkogpu/47045

[15] https://t.me/bazabazon/26432 ; https://t.me/bazabazon/26440 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/03/27/politsiya-i-rosgvardiya-priehali-s-reydom-na-sklad-wildberries-v-podmoskovnoy-elektrostali-u-rabotnikov-proveryayut-dokumenty-nekotoryh-uvozyat-v-voenkomat ; https://t.me/tass_agency/240303 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/240290

[16] https://t.me/rybar/58588 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/16295 ; https://t.me/historiographe/12011 ; https://t.me/voenacher/63252

[17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-26-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-24-2024

[18] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rxTJAPqhSGh5mqY7C4XDTQiRjiVX25K4Tmx6tT6GCypPhjw8tmKBZAmRa5jaETbGl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ReTBwNLG8czu42xB89ixKbv1WzZE2LqsgMcXwngSeHHpRjAXoaR3esPk1eCxZiZ8l ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37036 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19025 ; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/17835 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19025

[19] https://t.me/dva_majors/38313 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8702

[20] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/4620

[21] https://suspilne dot media/714544-zelenskij-zminiv-sekretara-rnbo-zvit-oon-sodo-stracenih-ukrainskih-polonenih-763-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1711553688&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/03/27/boyeprypas-yakym-rosiyany-vdaryly-po-harkovu-mozhe-letity-na-vidstan-do-90-km-oleg-synyegubov/

[22] https://suspilne dot media/714544-zelenskij-zminiv-sekretara-rnbo-zvit-oon-sodo-stracenih-ukrainskih-polonenih-763-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1711553688&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/03/27/boyeprypas-yakym-rosiyany-vdaryly-po-harkovu-mozhe-letity-na-vidstan-do-90-km-oleg-synyegubov/

[23] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/03/27/boyeprypas-yakym-rosiyany-vdaryly-po-harkovu-mozhe-letity-na-vidstan-do-90-km-oleg-synyegubov/

[24] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031024

[25] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/64758; https://t.me/basurin_e/10068 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/13845

[26] https://t.me/rusich_army/13845

[27] https://t.me/mod_russia/37029 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23-2024

[28] https://t.me/mod_russia/37044 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37051 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Lh7wn9dDbMDZcCSUP4kHDoHuABYPPUB5vnfakuyQw21x2MKXQ1fcsLqAgYeuSQVWl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rxTJAPqhSGh5mqY7C4XDTQiRjiVX25K4Tmx6tT6GCypPhjw8tmKBZAmRa5jaETbGl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ReTBwNLG8czu42xB89ixKbv1WzZE2LqsgMcXwngSeHHpRjAXoaR3esPk1eCxZiZ8l ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8702 ; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/16170 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19025 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/13845 ;

[29] https://t.me/samotniyskhid/4868

[30] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/4888; https://t.me/kultshturmovika_ukraine/1773 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/4889; https://t.me/c/1595839251/3625; https://x.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1772981767139430744?s=20

[31] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8702 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/38373 ; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/16183 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8724 ; https://t.me/rybar/58575

[32] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8720

[33] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rxTJAPqhSGh5mqY7C4XDTQiRjiVX25K4Tmx6tT6GCypPhjw8tmKBZAmRa5jaETbGl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ReTBwNLG8czu42xB89ixKbv1WzZE2LqsgMcXwngSeHHpRjAXoaR3esPk1eCxZiZ8l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Lh7wn9dDbMDZcCSUP4kHDoHuABYPPUB5vnfakuyQw21x2MKXQ1fcsLqAgYeuSQVWl ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37044 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37051 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/38313 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8720 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8702 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19025 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/55225

[34] https://t.me/tivaz_artillery/3650; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/4893

[35] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Lh7wn9dDbMDZcCSUP4kHDoHuABYPPUB5vnfakuyQw21x2MKXQ1fcsLqAgYeuSQVWl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rxTJAPqhSGh5mqY7C4XDTQiRjiVX25K4Tmx6tT6GCypPhjw8tmKBZAmRa5jaETbGl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ReTBwNLG8czu42xB89ixKbv1WzZE2LqsgMcXwngSeHHpRjAXoaR3esPk1eCxZiZ8l ; https://t.me/dva_majors/38313 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19025 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/118101 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/55225

[36] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/118105

[37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rxTJAPqhSGh5mqY7C4XDTQiRjiVX25K4Tmx6tT6GCypPhjw8tmKBZAmRa5jaETbGl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ReTBwNLG8czu42xB89ixKbv1WzZE2LqsgMcXwngSeHHpRjAXoaR3esPk1eCxZiZ8l ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37044 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37052 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Lh7wn9dDbMDZcCSUP4kHDoHuABYPPUB5vnfakuyQw21x2MKXQ1fcsLqAgYeuSQVWl

[38] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Lh7wn9dDbMDZcCSUP4kHDoHuABYPPUB5vnfakuyQw21x2MKXQ1fcsLqAgYeuSQVWl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rxTJAPqhSGh5mqY7C4XDTQiRjiVX25K4Tmx6tT6GCypPhjw8tmKBZAmRa5jaETbGl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ReTBwNLG8czu42xB89ixKbv1WzZE2LqsgMcXwngSeHHpRjAXoaR3esPk1eCxZiZ8l ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/7591 ; https://t.me/rybar/58575 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/38313 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8715 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8692 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19025

[39] https://t.me/batalyon15/4045

[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rxTJAPqhSGh5mqY7C4XDTQiRjiVX25K4Tmx6tT6GCypPhjw8tmKBZAmRa5jaETbGl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ReTBwNLG8czu42xB89ixKbv1WzZE2LqsgMcXwngSeHHpRjAXoaR3esPk1eCxZiZ8l ; https://t.me/dva_majors/38313

[41] https://t.me/kpszsu/12330

[42] https://t.me/pgo_gov_ua/22717 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/03/27/vijska-rf-atakuvaly-izyum-shahedamy-poshkodzheno-gimnaziyu-poraneno-ohoronczya/ ; https://t.me/synegubov/8827?single

[43] https://t.me/synegubov/8827

[44] https://www.facebook.com/pvkshid/posts/pfbid0LGmUtBDdzmxud8zZ23FDoN8eKarYJkLS6YrsSUzB62HVo7uSrXWhxPxnnzAhuSUyl

[45] https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/8840 ; https://t.me/dsns_mykolaiv/4948 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/7600

[46] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/03/27/u-sylah-oborony-povidomyly-pro-kilkist-rosijskyh-czyrkoniv-u-krymu/

[47] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/03/27/u-povitryanyh-sylah-povidomyly-pro-sposoby-zbyttya-rosijskyh-czyrkoniv/

[48] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/18111

[49] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/18111

[50] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/18114

[51] https://t.me/mod_russia/37031

[52] https://www.severreal.org/a/bolshe-poloviny-rossiyskih-protsessorov-baykal-okazalis-brakovannymi/32879476.html ; https://www.vedomosti dot ru/technology/articles/2024/03/26/1027924-razrabotchik-protsessorov-baikal-lokalizuet-odin-iz-etapov-proizvodstva

[53] https://t.me/tass_agency/240240 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/240241 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/240268

[54] https://ria dot ru/20240327/rakety-1936068479.html

[55] https://t.me/RusBotWien_RU/4869

[56] https://t.me/MID_Russia/38112

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